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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Alemanha. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Alemanha. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 4 de fevereiro de 2024

Polônia e Alemanha: acordo de resolução pacífica de controvérsias de 1934: cinco anos depois Alemanha invadia a Polônia

Meu amigo José Antonio de Macedo Soares mantém, desde alguns anos, uma "Folhinha do Futuro", na qual ele nos informa sobre fatos do passado. O futuro se deve apenas que ele antecipa em um mês, as datas comemorativas que ocorrerão no mês seguinte. Em 26 de janeiro deste ano, segundo a Folhinha recebida no final de dezembro de 2023, se deveria "comemorar"os 90 anos desse acordo "memorável", pelo qual Alemanha e Polônia renunciavam à guerra e prometiam regular e pautar suas relações por métodos pacíficos, de acordo ao Pacto Briand-Kellog de 1928.

Ele alimentou minha curiosidade sobre a data enviando o teor do acordo bilateral, cuja implementação seria o eixo central "de uma paz geral na Europa". Cinco anos depois, a Alemanha nazista invadia brutalmente a Polônia, trazendo uma guerra geral na Europa. Não só na Europa, pois desde 1937 já havia guerra na Ásia e o conflito se estendeu ao mundo todo, até 1945.

A Rússia pós-soviética assinou, nos anos 1990, pactos desse tipo com seus vizinhos, enfim libertos da opressão da URSS, o que não impediu Putin de invadir a Ucrânia em 2014 e 2022. Putin é o novo Hitler; ainda não sabemos se isso será o início de uma guerra geral na Europa.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


TEXT OF GERMAN-POLISH AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 26, 1934

(From: Yale University documentary records)

The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State. They have, therefore, decided to lay down the principles for the future development of these relations in the present declaration.

The two Governments base their action on the fact that the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between their countries is an essential pre-condition for the general peace of Europe.

They have therefore decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of the 17th August, 1928, and propose to define more exactly the application of these principles in so far as the relations between Germany and Poland are concerned.

Each of the two Governments, therefore, lays it down that the international obligations undertaken by it towards a third party do not hinder the peaceful development of their mutual relations, do not conflict with the present declaration, and are not affected by this declaration. They establish, moreover, that this declaration does not extend to those questions which under international law are to be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of one of the two States.

Both Governments announce their intention to settle directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their mutual relations.

Should any disputes arise between them and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying, if necessary, those methods of procedure in which provision is made for such cases in other agreements in force between them. In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.

The guarantee of peace created by these principles will facilitate the great task of both Governments of finding a solution for problems of political, economic and social kinds, based on a just and fair adjustment of the interests of both parties.

Both Governments are convinced that the relations between their countries will in this manner develop fruitfully, and will lead to the establishment of a neighbourly relationship which will contribute to the well-being not only of both their countries, but of the other peoples of Europe as well.

The present declaration shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Warsaw as soon as possible.

The declaration is valid for a period of ten years, reckoned from the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

If the declaration is not denounced by one of the two Governments six months before the expiration of this period, it will continue in force, but can then be denounced by either Government at any time on notice of six months being given. Made in duplicate in the German and Polish languages.

Berlin, January 26, 1934.
For the German Government:
FREIHERR VON NEURATH.
For the Polish Government
JOSEF LIPSKI.

quarta-feira, 30 de agosto de 2023

O tamanho da crise econômica da China - Paul Krugman (NYT, OESP)

O Brasil seria mais impactado por uma crise chinesa do que os EUA (pouco) ou o Japão e a Alemanha, que vendem muito para a China. Ou seja, o Brasil é um perdedor se a China entrar em recessão. 

O tamanho da crise econômica da China
Paul Krugman

O Estado de S. Paulo | Internacional
30 de agosto de 2023
Paul Krugman 
É colunista e ganhador do prêmio Nobel de Economia de 2008
The New York Times

Graças à baixa exposição da economia dos EUA, é difícil que problemas chineses se tornem globais

O efeito da crise seria maior em países que vendem mais para a China, como Alemanha e Japão

A s agruras econômicas dos anos pós-pandêmicos têm ocasionado intensos debates intelectuais e sobre políticas. Algo com que quase todos concordam, porém, é que a crise póscovid se assemelha pouco à crise financeira de 2008. Mas a China – segunda maior economia do planeta – parece balançar à beira de uma crise muito parecida.

Eu não confio no meu próprio entendimento sobre a China para julgar se o país vive seu momento Minsky, o ponto em que todos de repente se dão conta de que uma dívida insustentável é, de fato, insustentável. E, de fato, duvido que alguém ? incluindo as autoridades chinesas ? saiba responder a essa questão.

Mas acho que somos capazes de responder a uma pergunta mais condicional: se a China realmente passa por uma crise em estilo 2008, ela transbordará para o restante do mundo? E a resposta é clara: não. Por maior que seja a economia chinesa, os EUA estão pouco expostos aos problemas chineses. Antes de chegar aí, contudo, falemos sobre por que a China de 2023 se assemelha às economias americana e europeia de 2008.

BOLHA. A crise de 2008 foi ocasionada pelo estouro de uma bolha imobiliária transatlântica. Os efeitos foram amplificados por perturbações financeiras, especialmente o colapso dos ditos "shadow banks" – instituições que agiam clandestinamente como bancos, criando riscos de uma corrida bancária, mas prescindindo de regulamentações e de redes de segurança.

E agora chega a China, com um setor imobiliário ainda mais inchado que o dos países ocidentais em 2008. A China também tem um atribulado setor de "shadow banking", além de problemas peculiares, como dívidas enormes de governos locais.

A boa notícia é que a China não é a Argentina ou a Grécia, que deviam quantias imensas a credores estrangeiros. A dívida em questão aqui é de dinheiro que a China deve para si mesma. E deveria ser possível, em princípio, para o governo nacional resolver a crise por meio de alguma combinação entre resgates de devedores e abatimentos para credores.

Mas o governo da China tem competência para gerir o tipo de reestruturação financeira? As autoridades chinesas têm determinação ou clareza intelectual para fazer o que é necessário? Eu me preocupo especialmente com a segunda questão.

A China precisa substituir o investimento imobiliário insustentável por maior demanda de consumo. Mas alguns relatos sugerem que autoridades chinesas mais graduadas continuam suspeitas em relação a gastos de consumo "supérfluos" e resistem à ideia de "dar poder para os indivíduos tomarem mais decisões a respeito de como gastar seu dinheiro".

E não é nada tranquilizador o fato de as autoridades chinesas estarem respondendo à possível crise pressionando os bancos para emprestar mais, basicamente continuando a política que levou a China à situação em que ela se encontra.

EXPOSIÇÃO. Portanto, a China poderá entrar em crise. Se entrar, como isso afetará os EUA? A resposta, até onde eu consigo perceber, é que a exposição dos americanos a uma possível crise chinesa é surpreendentemente pequena.

Quanto os EUA têm investido na China? O investimento direto é de US$ 215 bilhões. Investimentos em carteira – ações e obrigações –, pouco mais de US$ 300 bilhões. Então, estamos falando de um total de US$ 515 bilhões.

Este número pode parecer grande, mas, para uma economia enorme, não é. Considerem uma comparação. Neste momento, há muitas preocupações a respeito do setor imobiliário comercial dos EUA, especialmente em relação aos prédios de escritórios ? que provavelmente encaram uma redução permanente na demanda em virtude do aumento do trabalho remoto. Os prédios de escritórios dos EUA valem hoje US$ 2,6 trilhões, aproximadamente cinco vezes mais que o nosso investimento total na China.

Por que uma economia tão grande atraiu tão pouco investimento dos EUA? Basicamente, porque, dadas as arbitrariedades das políticas chinesas, muitos possíveis investidores temem a possibilidade de a China se tornar uma armadilha: você consegue entrar, mas não consegue sair.

Mas o que dizer da China enquanto mercado? A China é uma importante jogadora no comércio mundial, mas não compra muito dos EUA – apenas US$ 150 bilhões, em 2022, menos de 1% do nosso PIB. Portanto, uma crise não surtiria muito efeito direto na demanda por produtos americanos.

O efeito seria maior em países que vendem mais para a China, como Alemanha e Japão, e algo poderia ricochetear nos EUA por meio das vendas a esses países. Mas o efeito geral ainda seria pequeno.

DIFERENÇAS
Uma crise poderia até surtir um pequeno efeito positivo nos EUA, porque reduziria a demanda por matérias-primas, especialmente petróleo, o que reduziria a inflação. Nada disso significa que devamos aplaudir a possibilidade de uma recessão chinesa ou tripudiar sobre os problemas de outro país.

Mesmo que por razões puramente egoístas, devemos nos preocupar com o que o regime chinês poderá fazer para distrair a atenção de seus cidadãos dos problemas domésticos. Mas, em termos econômicos, parece que estamos diante de uma possível crise interna na China, não de um evento global em estilo 2008. 

TRADUÇÃO DE GUILHERME RUSS


segunda-feira, 5 de junho de 2023

Alemanha (chanceler e ministro do trabalho) vem ao Brasil com menos entusiasmo do que da 1a vez: querem enfermeiras brasileiras - David Sadler (Globe Echo)

Os alemães estão um pouco decepcionados com o Brasil, pelo fato de Lula não ter querido aderir ao "Clube do Clima", proposto por Scholz, e pelo fato de Scholz não gostar do "Clube da Paz" de Lula, e também porque Lula tem insistindo no apoio ao Putin. (PRA)

Baerbock And Heil In South America: Double Charm Offensive

 

Https://Globeecho.com/News/Europe/Germany/Baerbock-And-Heil-In-South-America-Double-Charm-Offensive/

Foreign Minister Baerbock and Labor Minister Heil travel to Brazil and Colombia. In addition to dealing with China and Russia, it will also be about skilled workers. But the visit is not only met with approval.

At the beginning there was still a lot of optimism: Brazil is back on the world political stage, the Chancellor rejoiced at the beginning of the year. “You were missing,” said Scholz most recently during his visit to Brazil. With the victory of Lula da Silva in the presidential election against the right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro, Germany thought it had an important partner at its side again. Especially within the SPD, the 77-year-old Lula was seen as a “brother in spirit”.

But when Scholz met Lula, this “brother” gave him the cold shoulder. In the Ukraine conflict, Lula disagreed with the chancellor, who blames Russia for the war. The Brazilian President made it clear that Ukraine was also to blame for the war. Brazil does not want any involvement in the war – not even indirectly. Lula does not want to join the Chancellor’s heart project, the climate club, and he also rejected the German supply chain law. According to this, products from Brazil may only be imported into Germany if it can be proven that no rainforest was cut down for their production.

Chancellor Scholz and Brazil’s President Lula have promised faster progress on the Mercosur free trade agreement.

Brazil is not an easy partner

Under these omens, Foreign Minister Baerbock and Labor Minister Heil are now traveling to the region and know very well how difficult some talks can be. It is the Foreign Minister’s first trip to Latin America and there will be a number of topics that will require a great deal of sensitivity in the talks. The Foreign Minister will be particularly concerned with dealing with China and Russia. Compared to Chancellor Scholz, she is tougher on China – knowing that China is also an important trading partner.

Brazil, on the other hand, is getting closer and closer to China. Lula recently traveled to Beijing with a large business delegation and claims to have concluded 15 agreements in the areas of trade, finance, science and space travel. The Brazilian President also sees China as an important partner in mediating in the Ukraine war. Both countries have each presented their own initiatives to end the violence. Brazil is striving to form a group of states that will mediate in the conflict.

Both countries concluded a series of agreements. Lula stressed the “special importance” of relationships.

Looking for skilled workers for Germany

All the more Baerbock will have to manage the balancing act – between diplomacy and clear positions. Above all, she wants to achieve this with positive stories, such as the federal government’s skilled labor strategy and how the region can benefit from it. “Brazilian nurses and Colombian electricians are already finding open arms in Germany,” said Baerbock before departure. “We want to expand this partnership.”

The federal government believes that the labor force potential in Brazil is great, but so are the hurdles. In her role as Foreign Minister, Baerbock will explain how these skilled workers can more easily come to Germany with visas and how many need to take away the fear of German bureaucracy. “As the federal government, we have decided to turn immigration policy upside down because our economy urgently needs more skilled workers,” she said.

Minister of Labor Heil will promote why it is worth coming to Germany – far away from language barriers and from home. “Here we can create a classic win-win situation in which everyone benefits,” said the SPD politician in the run-up to the trip tagesschau.de. “Germany gets qualified specialists, also in sectors that are particularly affected by the shortage of skilled workers, such as nursing. Brazil benefits, for example because we are involved in local training, and the people who come to us can practice their learned profession.”

But locally, in Brazil, there are definitely reservations. Many trade unions complain that they are not involved in such negotiations. Many questions are open. The fear of a brain drain, i.e. the emigration of qualified workers, cannot be downplayed.

In view of the shortage of skilled workers in nursing, the federal government is relying on young people from abroad.

Visit to the rainforest

The Foreign Minister wants to send another signal with a visit to Bélem, on the edge of the Amazon. A visit to the rainforest could show once again how much the federal government supports Brazil’s climate protection plans to prevent further deforestation of the rainforest. Most recently, Development Aid Minister Svenja Schulze promised 200 million euros in emergency aid for the rainforest in the first 100 days of the Lula government. But how realistic is the Brazilian government’s promised “zero deforestation strategy” by 2030? How does it look in reality? Questions that Foreign Minister Baerbock will ask on site.

“Without Latin America, we will not contain the climate crisis,” she said before departure, at the same time making it clear: “In the Amazon rainforest, an area the size of three soccer fields goes up in smoke or falls victim to chainsaws every minute. That has consequences for all of us .” That’s why the federal government shares “the ambitions of the Brazilian government to offer those living near the forest economic prospects – not against the forest, but with it.”

From Brazil, Baerbock will travel on to Colombia and Panama, then without Labor Minister Heil. Baerbock wants to intensify relations with both countries – especially with a view to further trade relations with the region.

domingo, 12 de março de 2023

O que o Brasil deixou de aprender com a Alemanha? (artigos na revista Crusoé) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 O que o Brasil deixou de aprender com a Alemanha?

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Colaboração com a revista Crusoé, a propósito da visita ao Brasil do chanceler Olaf Scholz, enfatizando educação de qualidade na Alemanha e trajetórias diferentes do SPD e do PT. Publicado em 3/02/2023 (link: https://oantagonista.uol.com.br/brasil/crusoe-o-que-o-brasil-deixou-de-aprender-com-a-alemanha/).

 

 

Na origem de tudo: o marxismo juvenil e o capitalismo tardio

Quando o jovem Marx e colegas da esquerda hegeliana se cansaram da censura prussiana e decidiram partir para o exílio, na França, na Bélgica, no Reino Unido, eles não estavam tão oprimidos pela repressão da polícia dos Hohenzollern quanto obcecados pela visão de uma Alemanha dividida e muito atrás, economicamente falando, da pujante Grã-Bretanha, na sua marcha triunfal do primeiro capitalismo (manchesteriano). De fato, a Alemanha da primeira metade do século XIX era o próprio símbolo daquilo que os ideólogos da UniCamp chamariam, no seguimento de Trotsky e outros epígonos, de capitalismo tardio, uma “maldição” que também atingia, ao que parece, o Brasil da primeira metade do século XX. Pouco depois, graças a List e outros “desenvolvimentistas” prussianos, entre os quais o próprio Bismarck, a Alemanha unificada deslanchou sua “revolução pelo alto”, o que a fez ultrapassar a Grã-Bretanha ainda antes do final do século XIX. 

O Brasil não conseguiu igualar tal feito, e só enveredou pela segunda revolução industrial quando o capitalismo avançado já estava na quarta, mesmo tendo tido vários generais e intelectuais bismarckianos na condução de seu “desenvolvimentismo” tardio. Mas o que a Alemanha conheceu de original, no plano dos movimentos de massa, foi ter criado um modelo de partido socialista, tendo na sua base o marxismo sindical, que conseguiu sobreviver à crise da República de Weimar, à tirania hitlerista, para construir, no pós-guerra, junto com o ordo-liberalismo da democracia cristã, um modelo de capitalismo liberal e de democracia de mercado, que assegurou à nova Alemanha, novamente reunificada, o galardão de economia mais produtiva do mundo e a de maior sucesso nas exportações de ponta.

Como isso foi possível? Parte do sucesso é histórico, partindo da educação de massa ainda sob o absolutismo prussiano, passando pela educação humboldtiana da nação liberta da dominação napoleônica, tanto na sua vertente popular, das escolas técnicas superiores para a formação da mão-de-obra trabalhadora, quanto na formação graduada, deixando de lado o modelo escolástico dos países pioneiros para enveredar por universidades vinculadas à indústria, até chegar à inovação tecnológica contínua, com pesquisa científica associada. A outra parte é propriamente social, ou política, e está vinculada às vidas paralelas dos partidos conservadores (majoritariamente cristãos) e do grande partido socialista, o mais antigo em funcionamento no mundo, o SPD, fundado quando Marx ainda era vivo. Na terceira década do século XX, impulsionadas pelo fervor bolchevique da Revolução russa, frações radicais do socialismo marxista formam o Partido Comunista, que será selvagemente reprimido quando Hitler chega ao poder, em 1933, como de resto o SPD e todos os demais partidos. 

No pós-guerra, o SPD permanece geralmente na oposição, pois a CDU, de base cristã-democrata, obtém o controle quase constante do Bundestag, o parlamento alemão. O “milagre alemão” dos anos 1950-60 será presidido sobretudo pelo seu líder, Konrad Adenauer, mas os socialistas chegam ao poder em 1969, com Willy Brandt. Tal evolução deve-se especialmente à reviravolta política ocorrida no SPD, a partir de seu congresso de Bad Godesberg, em 1959, que abandona o velho programa marxista de construção do socialismo em favor da adoção de um programa reformista dentro do capitalismo liberal e da democracia de mercado. Tal visão não estava distante daquilo que pretendia o socialista Friedrich Ebert, o primeiro dirigente da República de Weimar, em 1919, em linha com o reformismo moderado adotado por vários partidos socialistas que, desde o final do século XIX, tinham decidido abandonar o projeto revolucionário para reformar o capitalismo a partir do seu interior. 

Data dessa época, a fundação da Segunda Internacional, organização política de caráter nitidamente socialdemocrata, em contraposição à primeira Internacional, dos tempos de Marx, onde se digladiavam marxistas e anarquistas. A Segunda Internacional permanece até hoje, tendo deixado para trás a Terceira, fundada pelo próprio Lênin, e a anêmica Quarta Internacional, criada por Trotsky para se contrapor ao stalinismo da Terceira (que acabou sendo extinta em plena Segunda Guerra Mundial, quando a União Soviética precisava da ajuda das potências capitalistas para vencer a superioridade bélica do Exército nazista). Nessa época, a Alemanha foi seduzida e destruída pelo psicopata perverso que só perdeu para Mao Tse-tung no número de vítimas de seu horrível regime totalitário. A derrota e a ocupação militar estrangeira durante a Guerra Fria parecem tê-la curado de ideologias extremas. Com a auto implosão da União Soviética, o que sobrou de “comunismo” no mundo acabou escanteado nas antípodas (em Cuba e na Coreia do Norte), sobrevivendo pateticamente em alguns poucos partidos leninistas espalhados sobretudo na América Latina.

 

Mas o que o Brasil e o PT deixaram de aprender com a Alemanha? 

Alemanha e Brasil são ambos exemplos de capitalismo tardio, como proclamam acadêmicos da UniCamp, o que, aliás, é válido para qualquer outro país que não a Inglaterra da primeira revolução industrial. O Brasil também seguiu o modelo da modernização pelo alto de estilo bismarckiano, chegando até a praticar certa modalidade de “stalinismo industrial” durante o auge da “marcha forçada para a frente” do período militar. Nos anos 1930, o Brasil varguista e a Alemanha nazista eram os países que mais defendiam seus mercados com tarifas elevadíssimas, e até fizeram acordo bilateral para comerciar sem divisas, o que, aliás, alguns alucinados argentinos e brasileiros querem adotar atualmente para supostamente “estimular o comércio recíproco”, o que significaria um retrocesso de mais de 80 anos na modalidade multilateral de pagamentos estabelecida em Bretton Woods (1944).

O que o Brasil não fez foi a grande revolução educacional, que tinha começado na Prússia numa primeira derrota para os suecos, ainda no regime absolutista, que foi a escolarização compulsória para alfabetização das crianças, seguida, depois da derrota para Napoleão em Iena (1806), da grande transformação do ensino médio para capacitar sua mão-de-obra industrial, a Technische Hoschschule, e, sobretudo, pela novidade da universidade humboldtiana, mais vinculada à indústria do que à escolástica medieval das primeiras universidades europeias, criadas ainda na Idade Média. Comparado aos países pioneiros na alfabetização universal – os Estados Unidos e a própria Alemanha do início do século XIX –, o Brasil só conseguiu atingir esse objetivo – puramente quantitativo, vale recordar – no final do século XX, quando dos esforços do governo FHC em apoio ao ciclo primário local. 

O segundo não aprendizado tem mais a ver com traços da vida política e social vinculados à ideologia progressista que tanto o SPD alemão quanto o PT dizem defender, o primeiro de maneira mais pragmática, o segundo de forma bizarramente canhestra. Depois do grande desafio do renascimento alemão do pós-Segunda Guerra, marcado pela liderança moderada e democrática de Adenauer, e do “ordo-liberalismo” da política econômica que permitiu o “milagre alemão” dos anos 1950 e 60, o SPD resolveu finalmente se modernizar, abandonando a ideologia marxista das décadas precedentes para adotar o reformismo dentro do capitalismo e da democracia, o que foi feito no famoso Congresso de Bad Godesberg, em 1959, revolução partidária que o New Labour de Tony Blair só fez nos anos 1990, depois do furacão neoliberal de Margaret Thatcher. Ora, o PT jamais fez o seu “Bad Godesberg”, pois que continua a exibir as mesmas más ideias do “desenvolvimentismo” inflacionário iniciado nos anos 1950, continuado pelo extremo intervencionismo estatal da ditadura militar. 

Ainda agora, depois da Grande Destruição Econômica da era Dilma, a maior recessão de toda a história do Brasil (superior à crise dos anos 1930-31), lideranças do PT continuam a exibir a mesma incompreensão sobre os mecanismos de uma moderna economia integrada aos mercados mundiais quanto a que caracterizou o partido e seus conselheiros econômicos na maior parte de sua história. No plano da geopolítica mundial, o contraste não poderia ser mais eloquente entre o SPD e o PT: em face do desafio representado pelo comunismo soviético – que, por sinal, inundou as duas Alemanhas de espiões e funcionários subornados pela sua “atração fatal” –, os socialistas alemães adotaram resolutamente a defesa dos valores das liberdades, da democracia e dos direitos humanos, os valores centrais desse “Ocidente” tão desprezado pelos aliados do “socialismo sem exploração do homem pelo homem”. O PT, formado por sindicalistas anticapitalistas e ex-guerrilheiros reciclados – complementados pela massa eleitoral da “teologia da libertação” –, jamais proclamou abertamente sua opção pelo reformismo capitalista, que eles praticaram contra a vontade, canhestramente, durante os mandatos confusos dos anos 2003-16. Pior ainda, prisioneiros do apoio castrista e chavista nos primeiros anos, o PT e seus líderes nunca se distanciaram dos seus “amigos” ditatoriais pretensamente de esquerda (quando são apenas brutais ditadores muito similares ao fascismo de estilo mussoliniano). 

Essa distância se torna ainda mais dramática quando o chanceler Olaf Scholz, o primeiro alto dirigente estrangeiro em visita ao Brasil de Lula 3, vem pleitear do Brasil, não a defesa desse “Ocidente” identificado com a Otan, mas a simples adesão aos princípios mais elementares do Direito Internacional enfeixados na Carta da ONU e integrados à Constituição de 1988. Ao proclamar uma falsa “neutralidade” na guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, com o cometimento de crimes de guerra, contra a humanidade e o supremo crime contra a paz – os mesmos que levaram dirigentes civis e militares nazistas ao Tribunal de Nuremberg em 1946 –, a nova-velha diplomacia lulopetista mostra a pior face de um alheamento completo às realidades da nova “guerra fria” entre o Ocidente e as autocracias remanescentes do século XX. Pior ainda, o grande erro estratégico cometido pela mesma diplomacia obtusa, na criação dessa entidade bizarra chamada Brics – derivada, em 2011, do Bric original de 2006-2009 –, faz com que o Brasil lulista se torne caudatário, hoje, dos interesses nacionais de duas grandes autocracias.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4314: 31 janeiro 2023, 4 p.

 

quarta-feira, 8 de março de 2023

Uma política externa feminista? A Alemanha demonstra que é possível - GZero Media,

 


   

Alles liebe zum Frauentag! To mark International Women's Day we delve into feminist foreign policy. Which countries have adopted the gender-focused framework that shapes how they interact with other states, and how does the policy play out in practice? 

Germany made headlines this week when Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock unveiled a new feminist foreign policy framework, outlining Berlin's efforts to boost female participation in international affairs. It directs an additional 12 billion euros in development funds to further global gender equality and says that Berlin will work to ensure that European foreign policy focuses more on the needs of women worldwide.

But what is a feminist foreign policy, and what do proponents and critics of the framework have to say about it?

First, some background. In 1995, then-first lady Hillary Clinton declared in Beijing that “women’s rights are human rights,” publicly advocating that gender equality be a core principle in international politics.

Since then, a growing number of political influencers have pushed for a radical overhaul of how states interact with each other, arguing that the pursuit of gender equality should be at the heart of all international politics.

While there is no uniform approach to its implementation – countries have interpreted the framework differently – there are areas of overlap, including the idea that increasing the number of women working in foreign policy reduces conflict and enhances peaceful outcomes. A look at the impact of having women negotiators, mediators, and witnesses involved in 182 peace agreements from 1989-2011, for example, shows that those deals involving females were 35% more likely to survive at least 15 years, according to a report by the International Peace Institute.

There’s broad agreement that gender equality at home, including increased female participation in the workforce, at the negotiating table, and in policy-making, boosts security at home andabroad. As a result, there's been an uptick in female participation in legislatures in many countries, while some institutions have introducedgender quotas in politics. The European Union, for instance, started calling for a minimum of 50% women in all its decision-making positions back in 2020 – and a whopping 85% of women in decisions about development aid.

But how do these policies play out in practice? Read more here and tell us what you think.

https://gzeromedia.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=7404e6dcdc8018f49c82e941d&id=9ca98d9ba0&e=96ffb72608 

quinta-feira, 15 de setembro de 2022

Alemanha caminha para a recessão: começou pela siderurgia (ArcelorMittal), vai se propagar a outros setores

 Alemanha

O caos econômico, provocado pela alta exorbitante da Energia elétrica e do gás, chegou na maior siderúrgica na Europa, que avisou que vai fechar as portas. 

Em comunicado aos investidores a ArcelorMittal, disse que está fechando uma siderúrgica na Espanha e paralisando outras duas empresas na Alemanha, nas cidades Bremen e outra em Hamburgo. A medida vai colapsar o preço do aço na Alemanha e causar uma destruição da cadeia produtiva. Em nota a empresa disse que o alto preço do gás e da energia elétrica foi o motivo, pois o "aumento exorbitante dos preços da energia", que está afetando devastadoramente a "competitividade da produção de aço". A empresa deve começar as demissões no final de setembro. 

Abaixo o comunicado da empresa:

https://germany.arcelormittal.com/icc/arcelor/broker.jsp?uMen=7a770135-5051-5e71-9945-be470aa06ac3&uCon=b611ba70-782e-2810-a61e-481f0ad3a7b3&uTem=aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-000000000042

Estamos prestes a enfrentar uma situação preocupante no fornecimento do aço mundial. A Europa está hoje sofrendo enormes problemas  devido a decisões estratégicas tomadas em sua matriz energética. Isto está tendo um impacto severo no custo da energia, que em alguns lugares já subiu mais que 1300%.

A consequência para o mercado do aço é o fechamento e desligamento de usinas e fábricas como jamais visto antes .

São no total 14 desligamentos e fechamentos de usinas por toda a Europa, incluindo 7 da ArcelorMittal.

O resultado lógico será um sobrecarregamento dos demais produtores e um potencial aumento nos preços do aço.

Nossa avaliação é que não se trata de uma situação de fácil solução para o curto e médio prazo, afinal é um problema de direcionamento de matriz energética na Europa.

Recomendamos aos amigos que façam uma análise profunda e considerem todos os fatores macro, para as decisões nos meses que virão. E desejamos à todos que tomem decisões sábias e acertivas para os seus negócios para enfrentar os próximos meses.


How Bad Will the German Recession Be? - Der Spiegel

A Alemanha, a maior economia da Europa, pode entrar em recessão, em função da guerra na Ucrânia e seu impacto nos preços e no fornecimento de insumos para sua indústria.

Der Spiegel, Hamburgo – 14.9.2022

How Bad Will the German Recession Be?

The first German companies have begun throwing in the towel and consumption is collapsing in response to the fallout from exploding energy prices. The economy is sliding almost uncontrolled into a crisis that could permanently weaken the country.

Michael Brächer, Matthias Kaufmann, Florian Diekmann, Simon Hage, Martin Hesse, Isabell Hülsen, Henning Jauernig, Kristina Gnirke, Simon Book, Gerald Traufetter and Cornelia Schmergal

 

To get a better idea of what lies ahead for the German economy, you can go out and talk to executives in the automotive industry and scholars of the economy; you can study inflation data and share prices. But it's probably also enough just to take a look at an indispensable, everyday product: toilet paper.

In the early days of the coronavirus pandemic, the product served as a gauge of the level of Germans' anxiety. The steeper the rate of infection, the emptier the shelves. Manufacturers of the hygiene product were even among the beneficiaries of the pandemic. Now, worries are once again growing across the country about potential shortages of toilet paper, only this time for completely different reasons. Hakle, a household brand name in Germany founded almost 100 years ago, last week filed for bankruptcy in self-administration.

The medium-sized paper manufacturer is one of the first victims of the crisis that is eating through the entire country. You need energy to turn wood into toilet paper – quite a lot of it. Hakle uses 60,000 megawatt hours of natural gas and 40,000 megawatt hours of electricity annually at its Düsseldorf plant alone. And the company can no longer afford it. Skyrocketing energy and raw material prices combined to push Hakle over the edge.

And they're not alone. Bad news from companies all over the country is piling up.

Company CEOs and union leaders are now speaking openly about their fears. "The worst is yet to come," says CEO Klaus-Dieter Maubach of the German natural gas import giant Uniper, referring to energy prices. And Yasmin Fahimi, head of the powerful DGB union, warned in an interview with DER SPIEGEL that if the government doesn't take swift countermeasures, there is a risk of domino effect that could lead to the de-industrialization of Germany. "That would be a disaster."

The question is no longer whether the crisis will come. The question is how bad it will be and how long it will last.

This tragedy has five acts, and it begins with the energy price shock. Its first victims have been manufacturers that are highly dependent on electricity and gas: paper manufacturers, fertilizer producers, steelmakers. They pass on the price increases – the second act – to other sectors, from industrial companies to small and medium-sized enterprises. For many companies, it is now a matter of sheer survival: More than 90 percent of companies see the increased prices for energy and raw materials as a strong or even existential challenge, according to a recent survey conducted by the Federation of German Industries (BDI).

Companies usually have no choice but to pass on the price increases to consumers, who are already having to save money to cover their skyrocketing electricity and gas bills. And that raises the curtain on the third act, the one with the makings of an economic disaster: Consumer sentiment is worse than it has ever been in postwar German history.

Vacation? A dinner out? New furniture? "These are purchases that millions of people in Germany will now postpone," warns economic researcher Sebastian Dullien, director of the trade union-affiliated Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK). Skyrocketing energy prices, he says, are a "gigantic macroeconomic shock." Some households don't know how they are going to pay the next heating bill, the economist warns. If the heater even works at all – a certainty is beginning to waiver in the face of looming shortages .

Consumption goes down, the first companies throw in the towel and, at some point, unemployment rises. Welcome to acts four and five of the economic drama. There is a word for this horror scenario that awakens age-old fears: recession. And it looks like the country will soon be right in the middle of one.

In the second quarter of 2022, the German economy grew by a paltry 0.1 percent. Economic researchers and policymakers alike are convinced that the next quarterly numbers will be negative. The question is whether politicians will manage to mitigate the consequences – or if there is a threat of an economic crisis that may last for several years with "losses of prosperity on a previously unimaginable scale," as Peter Adrian, the president of the Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) put it. In other words, a crisis that could eat away at the country's substance, undermining social security funds and the state's ability to act. It could also lead to the permanent disappearance of many companies. A crisis that would make Germans poorer.

These days, it's difficult to tell where to draw the line between pessimism and justified panic. What is certain is that Putin's economic war is hitting Germany where it hurts most: a gas price that has already more than quadrupled is crushing competitiveness, across pretty much all industries.

The current gas crisis has all the "ingredients for this to be the energy industry's Lehman Brothers," Finnish Economic Affairs Minister Mike Lintilä said recently. Back in 2008, investment banks triggered a global financial and economic crisis by selling toxic home mortgages tied up in wild securities constructs. This time, it is high gas and electricity prices that could trigger a systemic collapse.

 

Act One: Freezing Production

 

Alexander Becker is desperate. "We really don't know what to do anymore," says the CEO of the Georgsmarienhütte Group (GMH). "We're in a state of shock."

The company is one of Germany's larger steel producers. With 21 facilities, 6,000 employees, its own foundries and forgers – and a power requirement of 1 terawatt hour of electricity a year. That's more than the electricity consumption of 300,000 single-family homes.

Last year, the company paid 120 million euros for electricity and gas. If prices remain at current levels, costs will rocket to 1.2 billion euros next year. At worst, a loss of 1 billion euros would be incurred in the coming year. "We would be bankrupt immediately," Becker says.

To avoid that, GMH would have to raise its steel prices by 50 percent. "Customers won't go along with that," Becker says. Even the 20 percent boost in prices that have already been applied can't be implemented at two locations because customers have long since started buying their steel from China and India, where energy costs have so far risen only moderately, if at all. Becker has even instructed his own forges, which normally process domestic steel, to buy cheaper in Asia, a move that is particularly painful for him. "If policymakers don't take action quickly, Germany's energy-intensive industrial companies won't survive," Becker warns.

 

Para acessar a íntegra:

https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/energy-crisis-fallout-how-bad-will-the-german-recession-be-a-9e1f479e-5fef-4e62-b5ca-2f9e87b9bbca

quarta-feira, 4 de maio de 2022

Documentos da RFA sobre a imediata queda do muro e a implosão da União Soviética, 1991: contra a expansão da OTAN - Der Spiegel

 Der Spiegel, Hamburgo – 3.5.2022

Bonn-Moscow Ties

Newly Released Documents Shed Fresh Light on NATO's Eastward Expansion

In 1991, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wanted to prevent the eastward expansion of NATO and Ukrainian independence, according to newly released files from the archive of the German Foreign Ministry. Was he trying to assuage Moscow?

Klaus Wiegrefe

 

Usually, only experts take much note when another volume of "Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany" is released by the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History. They tend to be thick tomes full of documents from the Foreign Ministry – and it is rare that they promise much in the way of reading pleasure.

This time around, though, interest promises to be significant. The new volume with papers from 1991 includes memos, minutes and letters containing previously unknown details about NATO’s eastward expansion, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine. And already, it seems that the documents may fuel the ongoing debate surrounding Germany’s policies toward the Soviet Union and Russia over the years and up to the present day.

In 1991, the Soviet Union was still in existence, though many of the nationalities that formed the union had begun standing up to Moscow. Kohl, though, felt that a dissolution of the Soviet Union would be a "catastrophe" and anyone pushing for such a result was an "ass." In consequence, he repeatedly sought to drum up momentum in the West against independence for Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been annexed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in 1940, with West Germany later never recognizing the annexation. But now that Kohl found himself faced with the three Baltic republics pushing for independence and seeking to leave the Soviet Union, Kohl felt they were on the "wrong path," as he told French President François Mitterrand during a meeting in Paris in early 1991. Kohl, of course, had rapidly moved ahead with Germany’s reunification. But he felt that Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania should be more patient about their freedom – and should wait around another 10 years, the chancellor seemed to think at the time. And even then, Kohl felt the three countries should be neutral ("Finnish status"), and not become members of NATO or the European Community (EC).

He felt Ukraine should also remain in the Soviet Union, at least initially, so as not endanger its continued existenceOnce it became clear that the Soviet Union was facing dissolution, the Germans were in favor of Kyiv joining a confederation with Russia and other former Soviet republics. In November 1991, Kohl offered Russian President Boris Yeltsin to "exert influence on the Ukrainian leadership" to join such a union, according to a memo from a discussion held between Kohl and Yeltsin during a trip by the Russian president to the German capital of Bonn. German diplomats felt that Kyiv was demonstrating a "tendency toward authoritarian-nationalist excesses."

When over 90 percent of Ukrainian voters cast their ballots in favor of independence in a referendum held two weeks later, though, both Kohl and Genscher changed course. Germany was the first EC member state to recognized Ukraine’s independence.

Nevertheless, the passages could still cause some present-day eyebrow raising in Kyiv, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian invasion.

Germany’s policies toward Eastern and Central Europe also raise questions. The Warsaw Pact collapsed during the course of 1991, and Genscher sought to employ a number of tricks to prevent countries like Poland, Hungary and Romania from becoming members of NATO – out of consideration for the concerns of the Soviet Union.

The momentum of Eastern and Central European countries toward joining the NATO alliance was creating a volatile mixture in Moscow of "perceptions of being under threat, fear of isolation and frustration over the ingratitude of former fraternal countries," reported the German ambassador as early as February 1991.

Genscher was concerned about fueling this situation further. NATO membership for Eastern-Central Europeans is "not in our interest," he declared. The countries, he noted, certainly have the right to join the Western alliance, but the focus should be on ensuring "that they don’t exercise this right."

Was his position born merely of prudence and a desire to ensure peace for the good of Europe? Or was it a precursor to the accommodation with Moscow "at the expense of other countries in Eastern Europe" that Social Democratic (SPD) parliamentarian Michael Roth recently spoke of? The chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German parliament, Roth is in favor of establishing a committee of inquiry to examine failures in Germany and within his own party when it comes to Ostpolitik. He believes that Germany "de facto denied the sovereignty" of its neighboring countries.

Roth is referring specifically to Berlin’s policies in recent years. But should the analysis perhaps take a look further into history? All the way back to the era of Kohl and Genscher?

“Initially, the former Warsaw Pact countries pursued the intention of becoming NATO members. They have been discouraged from doing so in confidential discussions.”

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 1991

Curiously, Germany’s Ostpolitik – both in the period leading up to German reunification and since then – has today become the focus of criticism from all sides. Russia, too, is among the critics, accusing the West of having broken its word with the eastward expansion of NATO.

Some of the documents that have now been declassified may even be reframed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his acolytes as weapons in the ongoing propaganda war. Because in several instances, Genscher and his top diplomats refer to a pledge made during negotiations over German reunification – the Two Plus Four negotiations – that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe.

Russian politicians have been claiming the existence of such a pledge for decades. Autocrat Putin has sought to use the argument to justify his invasion of Ukraine. Yet Moscow approved the eastern expansion of NATO in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, if only grumblingly.

 

Many of the documents that have now been made public seem to support the Russian standpoint:

* On March 1, 1999, Genscher told the U.S. that he was opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO with the justification that "during the Two Plus Four negotiations the Soviets were told that there was no intention of expanding NATO to the east."

* Six days later, the policy director of the German Foreign Ministry, Jürgen Chrobog referred in a meeting with diplomats from Britain, France and the U.S. to "the understanding expressed in the Two Plus Four process that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the West cannot be used for our own advantage."

* On April 18, Genscher told his Greek counterpart that he had told the Soviets: "Germany wants to remain a member of NATO even after reunification. In exchange, it won’t be expanded to the east ..."

* On October 11, Genscher met with his counterparts from France and Spain, Roland Dumas and Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, respectively. Minutes from that meeting recorded Genscher’s statements regarding the future of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as follows:

"We cannot accept NATO membership for CEEC states (referral to Soviet reaction and pledge in 2 + 4 negotiations that NATO territory is not to be expanded eastward). Every step that contributes to stabilizing situation in CEEC and SU is important." SU is a reference to the Soviet Union.

As such, Genscher wanted to "redirect" the desires of CEEC to join NATO and was on the lookout for alternatives that would be "acceptable" to the Soviet Union. The result was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a body within which all former Warsaw Pact countries would have a say.

"Initially, the former Warsaw Pact countries pursued the intention of becoming NATO members," said Genscher. "They have been discouraged from doing so in confidential discussions."

For a time, the Germans were even in favor of NATO issuing an official declaration that it would not expand eastward. Only after the German foreign minister visited Washington in May 1991 and was told that an expansion "cannot be excluded in the future" did he quickly back off and say that he was not in favor of a "definitive declaration." De facto, however, it appears that he wanted to avoid expanding NATO to the east.

In Bonn, the initial capital of newly reunified Germany, the mood was one of self-confident optimism. The Cold War was over, Germany had been unified and Kohl and Genscher were pushing forward the consolidation of the EC into the European Union.

The chancellor also saw an historic opportunity when it came to relations with the Soviet Union. "Perhaps we will now be able to make right some of what went wrong this century," he said. After World War II with its millions of deaths and the partitioning of Germany that resulted, Kohl was hoping to open a new chapter in relations with Moscow.

The Soviet Union at the time was under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, an idealistic, pro-reform communist who the Germans loved since he had acquiesced to the end of East Germany. "If the Germans are prepared to help the Soviet Union, it is primarily out of gratitude for the role played by Gorbachev in Germany’s reunification," was Kohl’s description of the situation. The fact that Gorbachev was vehemently opposed to expanding NATO into Central and Eastern Europe was of no consequence when it came to the esteem in which he was held in Germany.

Later, the chancellor would say in public that he had been Gorbachev’s "best advocate." The two leaders used the informal term of address, passed along greetings to their wives and gossiped over the phone.

Kohl sought to drum up support around the world for "Misha" and his policies. He helped secure an invitation for the Kremlin leader to attend the G-7 summit and under Kohl’s leadership, Germany sent by far the most foreign aid to Moscow.

Kohl was deeply concerned that Gorbachev detractors in the Soviet military, secret services or state apparatus could seek to overthrow him. And an attempted putsch only just barely failed in August 1991. A group surrounding Vice President Gennady Yanayev detained Gorbachev, but mass demonstrations, the widespread refusal to obey orders in the military and resistance from Boris Yeltsin, who was president of the republic of Russia at the time, doomed the attempted overthrow to failure. Gorbachev remained in office.

It is hard to imagine what might have happened if the Soviet military had ended up under the command of a revanchist dictator at the time. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were still stationed in what had been East Germany and additional units were still waiting to be pulled out of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German Foreign Ministry files make it clear that the withdrawal of the troops was a "central priority" of German policy.

And then there were the roughly 30,000 Soviet nuclear warheads, which represented a significant danger. The "nuclear security on the territory of Soviet Union has absolute priority for the rest of the world," the Foreign Ministry in Bonn stated.

From this perspective, any weakening of Gorbachev was out of the question, and the same held true for the Soviet Union as a whole, which Gorbachev was trying to hold together against all resistance.

Kohl and Genscher believed in a kind of domino theory, which held that if the Baltic states left the Soviet Union, Ukraine would then follow, after which the entire Soviet Union would collapse, and Gorbachev would fall as well. And that is roughly what happened throughout the year of 1991. Kohl, though, had his doubts as to whether such a dissolution would be peaceful. He felt that a kind of "civil war" was possible, of the kind that was soon to break out in Yugoslavia.

Gorbachav’s longtime foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, even warned the Germans. During a Genscher visit to Moscow in October 1991, Shevardnadze, who was no longer in office by that time, prophesied that if the Soviet Union were to fall apart, a "fascist leader" could one day rise to power in Russia who may demand the return of the Crimea.

Putin annexed the Crimea a little over two decades later.

In 1991, Kohl even felt it was possible that the poisonous form of nationalism that appeared in Eastern Europe following World War I could make a reappearance. He believed that if the Baltic countries were to become independent, "the clash with Poland will start (anew)." Poland and Lithuania fought against each other in 1920.

The conclusion drawn by the German chancellor was that "the dissolution of the Soviet Union cannot be in our interest ..."

Ultimately, the Baltic countries and Ukraine went on to gain independence. And it likely won’t ever be possible to determine conclusively if Kohl’s analysis of the situation was erroneous or whether the Latvians and Lithuanians were simply lucky that their path to independence was more or less peaceful.

Many Western allies, in any case, tended to side with the Germans in their analysis of the situation. French President Mitterrand, for his part, complained about the Baltics, saying "you can’t risk everything you have gained (with Moscow – eds.) just to help countries that haven’t existed on their own in 400 years." Even U.S. President George H. W. Bush, a cold realist, complained about the forcefulness of the Baltic politicians as they pushed for independence.

Germany’s friendship with the Kremlin even led Chancellor Kohl to overlook a criminal offense on one occasion. On Jan. 13, 1991, Soviet special forces in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius were unleashed on the national independence movement there, storming the city’s television tower and other buildings. Fourteen unarmed people were killed and hundreds more injured.

The protests from Bonn were tepid at best.

Just a few days after the violence, Kohl and Gorbachev spoke on the phone. The diplomat listening in on the call noted that the two exchanged "hearty greetings." Gorbachev complained that it was impossible to move forward "without certain severe measures," which sounded as though he was referring to Vilnius. Kohl’s response: "In politics, everyone must also be open to detours. The important thing is that you don’t lose sight of the goal." Gorbachev concluded by saying that he "very much valued" the chancellor’s position. The word Lithuania wasn’t uttered even a single time, according to the minutes.

Gorbachev’s role in the violent assault remains unclarified to the present day.