O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Brazilian Foreign Policy. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Brazilian Foreign Policy. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 9 de novembro de 2016

Brazil in the World: um livro de Sean Burges: apresentacao no Itamaraty em 14/11, as 16hs


Sean Burges, professor titular de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Nacional da Austrália e Vice-coordenador do  Centro Nacional australiano para Estudos Latino-americanos encontra-se no Brasil, para participar de um encontro sobre cooperação ao desenvolvimento, envolvendo a Funag e Wilton Park.
Ele é autor de um livro precedente sobre o Brasil após a Guerra Fria: “Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War” (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009) e acaba de publicar  Brazil in the World: The International Relations of a South American Giant (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), sobre a política externa brasileira nas últimas décadas, tanto no plano multilateral quanto bilateral (China, EUA, América do Sul, Sul-Global). 


Para falar um pouco de seu último livro e de suas pesquisas sobre a diplomacia brasileira, o presidente da Funag, embaixador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, e eu, em minha qualidade de Diretor do IPRI, tomamos a iniciativa de organizar uma apresentação-debate na próxima segunda-feira, 14 de novembro, a ser feita na sala D do Itamaraty, às 16:00hs.
Creio que será uma excelente oportunidade para abordar com Sean Burges as grandes linhas da diplomacia e da política externa do Brasil nas últimas décadas.

 Sumário do livro:

1 Thinking about Brazil in the world 1
2 The domestic foreign policy context 25
3 O jeito brasileiro … the Brazilian way 48
4 Brazil’s multilateralist impulse 64
5 Trade policy 86
6 Brazil Inc. 110
7 Security policy 134
8 Brazil and Latin America 153
9 Brazil and the Global South 174
10 Brazil and the United States 197
11 Brazil and China 222
12 Conclusions and future possibilities 241

Description:


Drawing on over seventy interviews, fieldwork in five countries, and a comprehensive survey of government documents, media reports and scholarly literature, Burges examines a series of issue areas - multilateralism, trade, and security - as well as the pattern of bilateral relations in South America, the Global South and with China and the USA to trace how Brazil formulates its transformative foreign policy agenda and works to implement it regionally and globally.


                Specific focus is given to tracing how and why Brazil has moved onto the global stage, leveraging its regional predominance in South America into a global leadership role and bridge between the North and South in international affairs. The analysis highlights the extent to which foreign policy making in Brazil is changing as a field of public policy and the degree to which sustained political attention is necessary for a dynamic and innovative international engagement approach. Of interest to students, scholars and policy makers, this book casts light not only how an emerging power rises in the international system, but also isolates the blind spots that existing analytical approaches have when it comes to thinking about what power means for the increasingly vocal rising states of the global South.



                About the Author

                Sean W. Burges is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Deputy Director of the Australian National Centre for Latin American Studies at the Australian National University and a Senior Research Fellow with the Washington, DC-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

sexta-feira, 6 de fevereiro de 2015

Brazil's Global Ambitions - Harold Trinkunas (Brookings)


Brazil's Global Ambitions
Harold Trinkunas
Brookings, 6 Feb 2015

Harold Trinkunas is the Charles W. Robinson Chair and senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program. His research focuses on Latin American politics, particularly on issues related to democratization and security. He has also written on terrorism financing, borders and ungoverned spaces.

The world's seventh-largest economy needs a foreign policy that matches rhetoric with capabilities.

When President Dilma Rousseff first took office in 2010, Brazil’s future looked exceptionally bright. For nearly a decade, the country had benefited from Asia’s enormous appetite for its commodities. This allowed Brazil to reduce poverty and expand the middle class while at the same time sustaining a remarkable growth rate, becoming the seventh largest economy in the world in 2014.
But by the time Rousseff was sworn in for a second term on January 1, 2015, she faced serious decisions about Brazil’s future. Brazil’s development model based on domestic consumption and commodity exports has reached its limits and the real is significantly overvalued, thus undercutting the competitiveness of its non-commodity-based export sectors. Moreover, the Southern Common Market, Mercosur, which had once showcased Brazil’s leadership in regional integration, now ties Brazil’s flagging economy to two of the most troubled economies in South America—Argentina and Venezuela. At the same time, the two most significant global trade negotiations in a decade, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, are nearing completion without Brazil.
Brazil has sought to play the role of a major power on the global stage since the beginning of the twentieth century, but it will not earn this status just by virtue of its size, burgeoning population and impressive economic achievements. Historically, rising powers acquired dreadnoughts or sizeable armies to achieve influence. Today, they also seek to become a permanent member on the United Nations Security Council or lead the World Trade Organization.[1] Brazil under Dilma stands at a crossroads: it can try to parlay its rising economic might and soft power into global influence, or it can remain a regional power, albeit a significant one, with limited influence on the course of world events.  To turn its aspirations into reality, Brazil will have to deploy its national capabilities more effectively to shape the rules governing the international order.

Hard and Soft Powers
Unlike other global powers, which employ economic and military hard power to play a role in shaping the international order, Brazil has primarily relied on its soft power and exhibited a notable reluctance to compel other states to follow its lead. Brazil’s largely peaceful history and secure geostrategic position meant that it never felt the need to project power abroad through military strength.
Unlike other rising powers, such as India and China, Brazil’s regional security environment is enviably peaceful, at least at the interstate level. This has not only allowed Brazil to escape the costs of creating a formidable military machine, but encouraged Brasília’s policymakers to believe that shrewd diplomacy was sufficient to propel them onto the world stage. In 2012, Brazil was 68th in the world in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and 11th in the world in terms of total amount spent.[2] Although Brazil has steadily increased defense spending over the past two decades—and although its defense budget accounts for over half of Latin America’s total defense expenditures—this has not yet translated into concrete capabilities that would enable its armed forces to conduct significant combat operations beyond its borders.[3]
At the same time, Brazil has been reluctant to leverage its hard economic power, either in the form of rewards or sanctions, to make other countries follow its lead. Brazil has made large strides in reducing poverty and growing its middle class.[4] Its national development bank, BNDES, is a significant player in both internal and regional development, with a total lending volume three times that of the World Bank in 2011.[5] However, Brazil has shied away from committing economic resources beyond South America. And its official international development assistance remains quite modest.[6]
In contrast to these historical and self-imposed limits on the use of its hard power, Brazil wields significant soft power relative to many states. It ranks 17th in the world, according to the Monocle/Institute for Government’s 2012 ranking of soft power, ahead of developing countries and many of the rising powers.[7] The emphasis of its foreign policy on equity, inclusion and universal institutions appeals to many states, especially small and middle powers. Brazilian diplomats are widely respected for their professionalism and effectiveness, and Brazilians consider themselves to be particularly adroit at bringing together parties with opposing points of view.[8] Domestically, Brazil provides an attractive narrative of economic growth with a strong state and a growing degree of social inclusion. As Brazil has substantially consolidated its democracy over the past three decades, its political success story contributes to its prestige in international and regional forums.[9]

Constraints in Cooperation
Brazil’s renewed attempts to rise to major power status benefit from two unique opportunities. The first is Brazil’s ascendancy in South America. For most of the twentieth century, Argentina was a regional rival to Brazil in economic and military terms. The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry is now history, marked not only by diminished military competition, but also a mutual agreement on nuclear non-proliferation that consolidated Latin America’s status as a nuclear-free zone. The likelihood of interstate war in South America involving Brazil has become very low, further reducing Brazil’s need for military capabilities.
During the past decade, Brazil has also worked steadily to constrain challengers within South America, principally through regional integration and multilateral diplomacy.[10] The reduction in security tensions was complemented by the negotiation of Mercosur, a new common market arrangement initially formed with Argentina in 1988 and ratified by Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991. This set of negotiations and agreements transformed Brazil’s main rival in South America into a partner.[11] Brazil also laid the groundwork for securing its regional ascendancy through new multilateral institutions that excluded the United States. These institutions evolved under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to become the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. UNASUR excludes not only the U.S., but also Canada, Mexico and Central America, which are considered too politically and economically tied to Washington.[12] Most recently, Brazil has worked to create the Comunidad de Estados de Latinoamérica y el Caribe (CELAC), which includes South, Central American and Caribbean states—but pointedly, neither the U.S. nor Canada.
The second new opportunity arises from the fading of post-Cold War U.S. hegemony and the subsequent rise of global multipolarity. This geopolitical opening offers rising powers the opportunity to influence the international order more actively as their own capabilities improve relative to those of established powers. Moreover, the increasing number of powers critical in varying degrees of the existing liberal international order—Brazil is joined in this respect by Russia, China, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran—offers Brazilian policymakers a range of potential collaborators with common interests in revising the international system. Brazil hopes that the sum of the rising powers will have a greater impact than each acting alone.[13]
Since Brazil is not a regional rival to any of these nations, it can help facilitate multilateral networks among the rising powers. The BRICS summits, bringing together the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, formally launched in 2009, are one example of new initiatives that exclude the traditional major powers and provide opportunities to craft alternative global governance institutions. In August 2014, for instance, the BRICS nations announced they were forming an international development bank with over $50 billion in starting capital. Brazil shares with its new international partners an interest in defending their sovereignty and autonomy of action, as well as in opening room for their participation in global “rule shaping.”
Brazil also claims to represent the concerns of a growing number of small and middle powers in the international system about global inequality.[14] Why would smaller nations accept Brazil’s leadership? Brazil’s attraction for smaller states has an economic and cultural dimension, but it is based, more importantly, on its promised commitment to more democratic, equitable and universal international institutions once it becomes a major power.
Brazil has not been able to fully exploit these opportunities. It has had limited success in persuading other states in South America to adhere to the new order it purports to have created or to support it in global forums. For example, Brazil’s leadership was challenged by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who used oil diplomacy and relations with leftist and progressive movements around the globe in a bid for global influence. Brazil defused Venezuela’s aspirations for regional leadership, but only by incorporating some of Chávez’s ideological proposals into UNASUR and CELAC.[15]
While Venezuela’s regional challenge has faded, other sub-regional institutions have emerged as would-be alternatives to UNASUR and Mercosur, particularly the Pacific Alliance between Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Mexico. The free-market foundation of these new groupings undermines the more political logic for integration that Brazil has promoted within UNASUR. In addition, Mexico’s re-engagement with South America has undermined Brazil’s claim to uncontested regional leadership. Mexico and Argentina have also quietly networked neighboring states to undermine Brazil’s campaign to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).[16]
Perhaps most tellingly, Brazil’s historical reluctance to place limits on its sovereignty through adherence to rules-based international regimes has diminished the utility of Mercosur, UNASUR and CELAC as platforms for its leadership. These institutions all have limited budgets, small cadres of personnel and inconsistent leadership. In the absence of capacity and commitment, these new multilateral institutions have essentially devolved into opportunities for presidential summitry in the region rather than institutions that can govern interstate relations or bind the actions of member states. Their weakness highlights a central problem in Brazil’s multilateralism: a willingness to evade the rules of the institutions it creates. For example, Venezuela’s domestic legislation did not meet many regulatory requirements for admission to Mercosur, nor did it fully adhere to the institution’s democracy standard. Nevertheless, with consistent backing from Brazil, Venezuela was admitted over the objection of other Mercosur member states, such as Paraguay.
Brazil has also been unable to attract support for its aspirations from the U.S. and other established powers, a major problem when Brazil’s strategy relies on soft power. Its frequent criticism of the present international order limits the chances that such powers will support Brazil’s efforts to play the role in world affairs that it believes it deserves. Consider Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, spearheaded by former President Lula da Silva. The lack of U.S. support for its campaign has been a particular source of tension between Brasília and Washington, even though Brazilian diplomats recognize that Russia and China also oppose Brazilian permanent membership. Here, the contrast with Washington’s support for India’s bid for a permanent seat has been particularly galling for Brazilians.

Changing the Rules or Just Criticizing Them?
Brazil’s ability to act as a major power will depend on its contributions to shaping and enforcing the rules that govern the international order. Two recent episodes highlight the dilemmas Brazil faces: the global financial crisis and international responses to imminent threats to human security. Brazil has consistently privileged the use of diplomacy over all other state capabilities, but its reluctance to assume economic and military costs to contribute to global order prevents it from participating effectively. Moreover, its desire to minimize the role of military power in settling major conflicts, such as those in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, sometimes leads it to propose solutions that are discarded as unrealistic by the established powers.
Brazil had an unprecedented opportunity to insert itself into the heart of international economic and financial governance during the 2008 global financial crisis. The rising powers, which by and large were much less affected by the crisis, garnered even more importance once reform and recapitalization of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became necessary. The incumbent major powers turned to Brazil, India and China for support after experiencing great economic turmoil, and Brazil was able to negotiate a redistribution of IMF voting weights to better reflect the actual economic power of the member states. Brazil’s role as a key member in the G-20, the small group of states that coordinate international economic policy, indicates that it has joined an exclusive group of major powers at least in the financial domain. This is quite a contrast to Brazil’s stance during the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, when it went along—often grudgingly—with IMF-recommended austerity packages.[17] Brazil’s challenge will be to translate its new institutional weight in the IMF—which has been delayed because of U.S. congressional inaction on altering member country voting rights—into meaningful, positive changes in how the IMF views the developing world and conducts its business.
Since its reluctance to use hard power diminishes its influence over policy outcomes, Brazil has been less successful as a global actor in responding to international security crises. Brazil is frequently critical of the selectivity with which international law is applied by the major powers, especially in cases where the international community intervenes in the internal affairs of states. Brazil’s stance runs counter to the prevailing liberal international order, which is premised on the belief that violations of popular sovereignty and humanitarian crises can at times trump national sovereignty and permit the use of force to pursue humanitarian goals or contain rogue states—and was codified in the concept of Responsibility to Protect.
Brazil’s participation on the Security Council during the 2011–2012 term brought it into direct conflict with this prevailing order.[18] First, Brazil’s decision to caucus with BRICS in the UNSC was not viewed positively by the three other permanent members of the Council. The matter came to a head during the UN response to the conflict in Libya in 2011. Brazil opposed the UN’s authorization of the use of force by NATO to justify an expanded campaign against a broad range of government targets in Libya, leading to the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The expansion of the intervening powers’ objectives in Libya provoked criticism from the BRICS and developing countries that Responsibility to Protect was being used as a cover for regime change.
Brazil, instead, proposed the concept of Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), advocating that before states deploy military force to protect civilians in humanitarian and human rights crises, they carefully consider collateral damage. The U.S. and many European states rejected RWP as unrealistic, thus highlighting the ongoing disagreement between Brazil and the West over norms governing the use of force in response to humanitarian crises.[19] In the end, the initiative, while a major Brazilian diplomatic effort, received scant support among the UNSC powers, demonstrating Brazil’s inability to influence the core security debates among the major powers and shape the rules governing the use of force in the international system.

Reconciling the Rise with Ambition
President Rousseff has some difficult decisions ahead of her in 2015. Brazil needs to implement an economic adjustment plan to address its overvalued currency, persistent inflation, high levels of consumer debt, and slowing economic growth. Brazil’s prospects in the energy sector, particularly the offshore oil field known as the pré-sal, are not as bright as they once seemed. Finally, Rouseff’s thin margin of victory in the 2014 presidential elections indicates that she will preside over a divided country in which the Brazilian middle class will continue to demand improved government effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.
None of these issues present an insurmountable obstacle to Brazil’s rise. Nor do they represent a long-term threat to its success. Brazil has an unprecedented set of opportunities: a large economy, considerable soft power, a lack of regional rivals, and a network of partners among other rising powers and the developing world. But Brazil needs to do a better job of using the hard power it does have—military or economic—while still maintaining its commitment to the norms that have historically guided its foreign policy.
Given that Brazil’s regional security environment is likely to remain peaceful, its shortage of military hard power is likely to endure, and the government is right not to emphasize this dimension. Rather, Brazil should seek another avenue to shape the international order by extending the scope and size of its contributions to international peacekeeping, focusing in particular on developing the types of capabilities that are in short supply among peacekeeping-contributing nations: intelligence, logistics, aviation, communications, command, and control. By developing these capabilities, Brazil would acquire greater influence on the terms under which its peacekeepers deploy and the UN mandates under which they operate.
Brazil can also achieve greater influence by extending the global reach of its humanitarian and development assistance. Brazil currently ranks 23rd among international donors.20 Although Brazil’s overseas development assistance has risen in the past decade, as the seventh largest economy in the world, Brazil should be able to increase its humanitarian aid contributions above the 0.2 percent of gross national income it donated in 2011.[20] Brazil has extensive domestic experience in developing social programs to reduce poverty and foster social inclusion. Through its Agência Brasileira de Cooperaçaõ, it is already using this knowledge in its international assistance programs in the Americas and parts of Africa. It could also expand the reach of its national development bank, BNDES, to fund a broader range of projects overseas and work with the new BRICS bank to ensure that its lending portfolio benefits from Brazil’s domestic experience.

quinta-feira, 3 de abril de 2014

Brazil and the World: Strategy and Foreign Policy - City College of New York (April 25, 2014, 4PM )

To be held:


Panel Discussion
Brazil and the World: Strategy and Foreign Policy

Professor Luiz Pedone
Brazilian Institute of Strategic Studies
Universidade Federal Fluminense

Discussants:
Kenneth Erickson
The Graduate Center and Hunter College

Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner
The Graduate Center and City College of New York

Friday, April 25, 2014, 4PM
The Graduate Center, Room C201

About the speakers:

Luiz Pedone obtained his Ph.D at the University of Massachusetts. He taught at the University of Brasilia from 1976 to 2003 and is currently a senior researcher at the Institute of Strategic Studies at UFF. His current research focuses on energy as a key factor in defense and security stategy. He also earned degrees in public administration at University of Brasilia and studied industrial engineering.

Kenneth Erickson is a professor of Political Science at Hunter College. His areas of specialization include comparative politics, Latin American politics, democratization, drugs and public policy, and environmental and energy policy.

Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner is a specialist in foreign policy, diplomacy and development, particularly with respect to small states (and specifically Caribbean states) as well as the nations of the global south in general. Prof. Braveboy-Wagner was the first Caribbean female president of the Caribbean Studies Association (1992-3). For many years, she has also served as the United Nations-NGO representative of the International Studies Association.

sexta-feira, 21 de março de 2014

Brazil: a diplomacy that failed - The Economist

Bello
The bets that failed
The Economist, March 22nd 2014 | From the print edition

SINCE it is the only big power in South America, Brazil inevitably catches the eye of outsiders looking for a country to take the lead in resolving the region’s conflicts—such as the one raging in the streets of Venezuela. Yet leader is not a role that Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s president, is keen to play. She has reasons for her reluctance—and they explain why Brazilian foreign policy has run into trouble.
Ms Rousseff has behaved as a loyal ally to the elected, but autocratic, government of Nicolás Maduro, which faces opposition protests almost daily. Brazil worked hard to thwart any role in Venezuela for the Organisation of American States, which includes the United States. Instead, the foreign ministers of the South American Union (UNASUR) have agreed to promote talks in Venezuela. It is an initiative without teeth: the ministers expressed their solidarity with Mr Maduro, disqualifying themselves as honest brokers in the opposition’s eyes.
Brazil’s wrong-headed calculation is that the protests will fizzle out. Mr Maduro took a UNASUR statement on March 12th as a green light to launch another crackdown. Faced with a deteriorating economy and mounting unpopularity, Mr Maduro’s rule is likely to remain repressive. Given that Brazil’s ruling Workers’ Party (PT) claims to stand for democracy and human rights, he is a strange ally.
One explanation is that Venezuela has become an issue in Brazil’s presidential election in October, in which Ms Rousseff will seek a second term. Venezuela’s left-right divide is echoed, albeit more faintly, in Brazil. Whatever the PT’s differences with Mr Maduro’s authoritarian populism, they are trumped by left-wing solidarity. Having done lucrative business in Venezuela, Brazilian companies want to repatriate their profits and worry that Brazil may fall out of favour in Caracas. In addition, Brazil’s long tradition of multilateralism and non-intervention means its default position is to talk, not act.
But not always. When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Ms Rousseff’s predecessor and political mentor, took office in 2003 he declared that Brazil would pursue a more ambitious foreign policy and seek a leading role in South America. Brazil duly forged closer ties with other rising powers of the global “south” and allied with them in the Doha round of world-trade talks. It sought a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. In South America a “pink tide” of electoral victories by the left allowed Lula’s Brazil to recast Mercosur, the flawed customs union it leads, as an instrument of political co-operation, shared protectionism and social justice—an alternative to the “Washington consensus”. When the 2008 financial crisis crippled the United States and Europe, Lula’s bet on the south seemed to have paid off.
But five years later, the world is a much harsher place for Brazil, as Matias Spektor, an international-affairs specialist at Kings College London, points out. Brazil’s new friends in the south helped to torpedo any meaningful Doha deal. The relationship with China has disappointed. China failed to back its security-council bid; it is happy to buy Brazilian soyabeans, but not its manufactures. Most wounding of all, the countries of Latin America’s western seaboard—Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico—have forged their own Pacific Alliance, built on free trade and free markets, in a tacit rebuke to Mercosur.
Brazil still has international strengths. It has acquired influence in Africa, and has plenty of soft power (which will be enhanced if this year’s football World Cup goes well). But in the region, its main allies now are ultra-protectionist Argentina and Venezuela, a basket case and political embarrassment.
Brazil’s underlying problem in South America is its ambivalence about exercising real leadership. That would involve opening its economy to its neighbours, and seeking integration based on mutual national interest and binding rules, rather than fleeting ideological solidarity.
Brazil’s foreign ministry recently launched a policy review (though, on South America, it is Ms Rousseff and her advisers who call the shots). So here is Bello’s contribution: in Mercosur external trade negotiations are conducted by the bloc and hobbled by Argentina. Brazil should set out to turn it into a free-trade area instead. Brazil could then do trade deals with the Pacific Alliance, the EU and others. And it should recognise that the democracy clauses in regional agreements do not merely require condemnation of coups but also oblige elected presidents, like Mr Maduro, to adhere to minimum standards of democratic governance and human rights. Unfortunately, such changes are likely only if the opposition wins in October.

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segunda-feira, 19 de dezembro de 2011

Brazilian Foreign Policy by an expert - Joseph Marques

Transcrevo, por enquanto sem comentários, um artigo impecável.
Blog International Relations (link)



Brazil: Growing Pains of an Emerging Power

Written by  on December 16, 2011 – 01:46

   
Much has been written about Brazil’s successful trajectory from emerging economy to emerging giant. Much less attention, however, has been given to the remaining challenges which need to be addressed before fully taking on additional global responsibilities. The country’s recent transition from emerging economy to major economic power is both the result of deliberate policies on the part of the Lula administration (2002 – 2010) to “re-insert” the country into the most important decision-making institutions as well as an ambitious drive on the part of several powerful private sector economic actors with global reach and growing involvement in Brazilian foreign relations. Multilateral reinsertion has been facilitated by the emergence of Brazilian multinational companies (BMNCs) and the leadership of a growing core of sophisticated global corporate managers.
The foreign policy implications of Brazil’s continued integration with the world economy include:
1) a reduction of the overall monopoly of Brazil’s Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) over foreign policy information and influence in favor of other ministries and several major private sector actors;
2) Brazilian multinationals have become both “clients” of Itamaraty and  “ alternative sources” of information and competency in international issues;
3) Brazil’s foreign policy agenda and diplomatic network continue to expand in line with the demands of many of the new economic actors who increasingly interact and challenge Itamaraty;
4) domestic policies (i.e. industrial policy, innovation policy, etc.) have growing international repercussions and will require greater cohesiveness in order to maximize their effectiveness.
Brazil seeks to increase multi-polarity in the major global institutions by carefully building coalitions with other partners of the global South and through the active participation in the international agenda-setting process as a leading member of the international community (i.e. World  Trade Organization Doha Round of negotiations, the India, Brazil, South Africa bloc – IBSA, the group of emerging economies – BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), UNASUL (Union of South American Nations), the G20 (the leading economies of the world),etc. The country’s increased visibility in the international community has also been enhanced by the dramatic increase in the number of new diplomatic missions around the world.
Re-insertion in the international trade regime benefits from the emergence of large locally based international firms, privatization of state owned companies and increased global merger and acquisition activity. The internationalization of Brazilian firms is also greatly supported by the increase in value of the local currency (BRL – Brazilian Real) and the critical role of the national development bank (BNDES) in underwriting the initial operations of many of Brazil’s national champions (aircraft manufacturer Embraer, mining conglomerate VALE, animal protein producer JBS, etc.) mainly in South America).
There is a growing list of cases involving Brazilian multinationals in international disputes or possible disagreements between Brazil and several of its economic partners. With increased internationalization, the country’s internal dynamics increase the probability that large economic actors will ultimately affect the country’s external policies.  Over time, the growing number of BMNCs will increase the probability that they will likely be involved in foreign policy issues and challenge traditional preconceptions of Itamaraty. These big Brazilian firms possess the technology, capital, access and contacts with major markets which allow them to counterbalance Itamaraty’s traditional monopoly over all decisions involving foreign policy.
Brazil’s discourse and practice has always been emerging country friendly – though frequently contested by its neighbors. Though the Brazilian government has financed over 40 infrastructure projects in neighboring countries over the last few years, several BMNCs have recently encountered difficulties with some economic partners:
Bolivia nationalized several foreign companies, including the local subsidiary of Petrobras. Construction company Queiroz Galvão also suffered pressure from the Bolivian government regarding terms of an earlier contract. Recently there have been additional protests against several Brazilian companies (OAS, Furnas, Odebrecht, Eletrobras, Camargo Correa, etc.) involved in the construction of a major road through the Tipnis national park in Bolivia and the construction of the Inambari hydro-electric plant in Peru.
Ecuador expelled construction company Odebrecht following a dispute involving the company’s role in the construction of a large hydroelectric project. It also delayed payments on a loan in the amount of $280 million from BNDES.
Iran: Several Brazilian firms are actively seeking contracts to supply Iran with food (beef, poultry, sugar and soybeans) and ethanol. This may conflict with existing and pending international sanctions against Iran on the part of the international community. Any infringement poses the additional risk of the U.S. applying pressure on Brazilian companies with a major presence in the U.S. and lead to a dispute between Brazil and the U.S.). Over 400 Brazilian companies had exports worth approximately $2 billion to Iran in 2009, despite relatively high tariffs and the lack of bank guarantees which suggests companies run substantial risks which may end up as legal disputes between the two countries.
Iraq: Brazilian companies are very interested in participating in contracts for large infra-structure projects in Iraq. Accordingly, they have tried to forge parallel contacts with the Iraqi and U.S. authorities often independently from the Brazilian government and, at times, in spite of the government’s objection to the American role in the region.
SudanBrazilian companies announced up to $500 million of deals mainly in sugar (Dedini) and infrastructure last year.
Pakistan: A Brazilian manufacturer of defense and aerospace products is currently discussing a joint venture to build the MAR-1 missile with Pakistan.
Additional examples of where priorities or interests between the government and private firms may diverge include Libya, Venezuela, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
With a wider global corporate footprint the commercial interests of private firms may clash with sensitive geo-strategic priorities. On the other hand, greater interaction between private managers and government policy managers may lead BMNCs to serve as occasional instruments or agents of Brazilian foreign policy.  In the absence of a significant role on the part of the business community in the foreign policy-making process, private companies will continue to seek opportunities abroad and follow their commercial logic rather than forging a political convergence with the diplomatic aims of the government. Foreign policy practitioners and corporate managers need to make a serious effort to bridge the gap in their separate worldviews and strive towards greater cooperation and national policy cohesion.
Going forward, Itamaraty must adapt to the new international economic reality and harness its resources to better manage several emerging priorities: 1) Brazil’s economic success, the speed of globalization and the ever changing international political agenda are constantly adding new issues to the country’s foreign policy agenda. Itamaraty will have the opportunity to treat corporate actors as an important new constituency. Greater demand for ‘international public service’ on the part of corporate citizens will allow Itamaraty to embark on needed reforms to justify its strategic role as the principal gatekeeper regarding foreign affairs; 2) Brazil’s drive towards greater visibility and clout in the international arena will require a significant change to the policy planning function (coordination of overall interagency strategic and global policy framework). Itamaraty must strengthen policy planning capacity in order to better develop long range policies and to act more as a policy think tank and strategic rapid response team rather than focus on its traditional role in preserving institutional memory and speechwriting.
The steady pace of internationalization will undoubtedly create additional foreign policy priorities linked to the growing exposure of Brazilian companies and investors in the global markets. As these companies expand their activity internationally, Brazil will need to negotiate additional bilateral tax and bilateral investment treaties to avoid Brazilian companies from being penalized for their growing international activities.
Credit lending by the national development bank will continue to have a significant role throughout South America and further. Brazilian banks have been laggards in the internationalization process but they are now becoming more active laying the groundwork to form an international network to support Brazilian multinationals.
Credit and technical cooperation will drive greater use of government agencies as instruments of regional integration and foreign policy (i.e. BNDES, the recently created sovereign wealth fund, EximBank Brasil (the newly created export-import bank), and the governmental agricultural research corporation Embrapa, etc.).
Brazil’s growing international presence will likely produce a new generation of the Brazilian diaspora including many more white collar managers who will join the growing number of Brazilian nationals living and working around the world. This white collar population will join the ranks of an already sizeable number of Brazilians living abroad requiring greater consular services and administrative assistance on the part of Brazil’s diplomatic network putting additional pressure on and force changes to the way Brazil has traditionally dealt with its citizens abroad.
Additional areas for improvement include public diplomacy, trade negotiations, trade promotion, scientific and technological exchange, security and health arrangements, regulation, antitrust, intellectual property, human rights, and the environment.
The public sector retains an important responsibility regarding the long-term competitive advantage of its firms. To become more competitive the country must align its domestic industrial policies with its ambitious foreign policy. While the emergence of Brazilian multinationals is an established fact, Brazil’s quest for a greater role in international affairs and greater visibility will undoubtedly require greater involvement of its citizenry in redefining the diplomatic-industrial relationship. Given the fact that Brazilian corporate footprint is outgrowing its diplomatic presence there is the need for a “corporate diplomacy” culture on the part of the business sector in order to better promote and defend Brazilian corporate priorities and play a more strategic role regarding the definition of  the country’s “national interests” Corporate managers must become more active in promoting a better understanding on the part of the population of the role of major domestic firms and their contribution to society. The country’s leading companies can promote the discussion of foreign policy issues and request greater interagency coordination regarding international issues.
Significant change has begun to occur within the government’s bureaucratic structure dealing with international issues. Driving these changes is globalization, regionalization and the emergence of large private sector economic groups with increasingly wider international interests. These new economic actors demand transparency and greater inclusion in the foreign policy-making process.  Responsibility for the conduct of diplomacy will certainly spread among a wider group of political actors. The effective management of this business-diplomatic interaction will be the next real challenge to Brazil’s claim to a seat at the international high table.
Dr Joseph Marques is currently Visiting Researcher at the Brazil Institute at Kings College, London. He received his Ph.D at the Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies, Geneva.