Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mais recente artigo publicado:

1181. “Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region”, revista Paiaguás: revista de estudos sobre a Amazônia e Pacífico (UFMS; vol. I, n. 1, 2015; link para a revista: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas; link para o artigo: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997; em pdf: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997/606). Relação de Originais n. 2830.

v. 1, n. 1 (2015) > Almeida

Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Resumo

Analytical essay dealing with Latin American integration process, its peculiarities and  the recent development trends in the region. Instead of deepening its integration process, Latin America is experiencing a clear fragmentation path, with many divergences among leading countries in the domains of economic policies and the integration processes, notwithstanding the fact that new instances were created for that objective (Unasur, Celac). The essay also examines Brazil’s economic and political role in the region, and concludes by an assessment of current trends (comparing the region with Asia Pacific) and advance prospects for divergent trends in Latin America.

Texto completo em pdf: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997/606

Foreign Policy resume o acordo sobre o programa nuclear iraniano: vai funcionar?

Esta é a pergunta que vale milhões, ou uma nova corrida nuclear na região.
Se os demais países acreditarem nesse acordo -- que ainda precisa passar pela aprovação, ou rejeição, do Congresso americano -- pode ser que se evite nova onda de proliferação.
Do contrário, as perspectivas são relativamente obscuras quanto às suas consequências...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Deal is Done
By Paul McLeary and Adam Rawnsley
Foreign Policy Daily Report, July 14, 2015

It starts here. An agreement has been reached. After an intense 18 days of negotiation, six world powers and Iran finally managed to strike a historic deal Tuesday to curb Iran's nuclear program in exchange for billions of dollars in relief from international sanctions. The agreement will prevent Iran from producing enough material for a nuclear weapon for at least a decade while giving the international community access to Iranian facilities, including military sites, to ensure compliance.

For Iran, the deal will give the country access to more than $100 billion in assets frozen overseas -- money that critics fear will be used to step up Tehran's support for its armed proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere.

A key provision calls for the U.N. arms embargo on the country to stay in place for at least five more years, though it could end earlier if the International Atomic Energy Agency can certify that Iran has stopped all work on nuclear weapons. A U.N. restriction on the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Tehran is set to stay in place for up to eight more years.

FP’s Colum Lynch and Dan De Luce tackle the highly contentious arms embargo issue, writing that U.S. negotiators believe the embargo -- which prevents Iran from importing a range of military hardware, including warplanes and battle tanks -- “has done little to impede Iran’s ability to arm and equip its proxies throughout the region, including in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.”

On the other hand, the agreement mostly leaves in place the infrastructure that Tehran has built up at its main nuclear sites, though much of it will be taken apart and placed in storage. Iran will also be allowed to continue enriching smaller amounts of lower-grade uranium and plutonium.

Fallout. The administration will now start trying to sell the deal to skeptics on Capitol Hill and throughout the Middle East, where both Israel and Gulf powers like Saudi Arabia believe the agreement will eventually allow for Iran to attain a bomb.

The deal will likely set off a new round of weapons buys by Gulf countries who have eyed the Iran talks warily. FP recently reported on the potential Gulfie wish list: more expensive missile defense systems, more long-range radar units, and better command and control equipment to stitch the region’s various missile defense batteries into a networked whole.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- one of the biggest critics of the talks on the world stage -- said on Tuesday in Jerusalem that the deal was "a historic mistake for the world,” since “in every area where it was supposed to prevent Iran attaining nuclear arms capability, there were huge compromises.”

Netanyahu gave a high-profile speech on Capitol Hill lobbying against a potential deal earlier this year; now that one has been reached he and Israel's top diplomats are sure to do what they can to derail the deal or tighten its terms.

Speaking early Tuesday morning at the White House, President Barack Obama said that the deal “is not built on trust, it is built on verification,” while insisting that the U.S. would reinstate sanctions -- and potentially use force -- if Iran cheated and continued work towards a nuclear weapon. Obama also said he would veto any attempt by the Republican-controlled Congress to scuttle the agreement.

Reflexoes de um diplomata americano, depois de 33 anos de servico (Foreign Policy)

Creio que pouco, ou muito pouco, se aplica ao caso brasileiro, mas as "lições" de procedimento, mais do que substância, são sempre interessantes. O trabalho de todos os diplomatas é aborrecidamente igual em todas as partes, mas como diria Orwell no Animal Farm, alguns diplomatas são mais iguais do que outros.
Os imperiais, por exemplo, são mais requisitados, mas também correm mais riscos, não apenas de vida, com tantos terroristas voluntários andando à solta por aí, mas sobretudo o risco de ficar sem interlocutores, depois do Wikileaks: quem vai querer falar com um diplomata americano sabendo que a sua confidência pode ser revelada em pouco tempo?
Ossos do ofício. E quase já não tem mais caviar...
Essas coisas chiques são as primeiras que acabam, na era da diplomacia de massa e popularesca..
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

10 Parting Thoughts for America's Diplomats

As one of America's foremost diplomats hangs up his spurs, lessons from 33 years at the State Department.

• BY William J. Burns
• Foreign Policy, OCTOBER 23, 2014

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• U.S. Foreign Policy
• North America

Diplomacy is not quite the world's oldest profession, but it remains one of the most misunderstood. It's a predictable and recurring habit to question its relevance and dismiss its practitioners, especially at moments like this, when international affairs are rocked by powerful and tumultuous transitions.
It is true that the world today is far different from the one that I encountered as a new foreign service officer in 1982. Today's international landscape is far more crowded. New global powers are rising, hundreds of millions of people around the world are climbing into the middle class, hyper-empowered individuals with the capacity to do great good and huge harm are multiplying, and more information is flowing more rapidly than ever before.
These realities pose some real challenges and difficult questions for professional diplomats. How can we add value in a world of instant and nearly universal access to information? How important are foreign ministries in an age of citizen awakenings? And who needs foreign assistance from governments when they can get it from private foundations and mega-philanthropists?
These are fair questions, but none of them foretells the imminent demise of our profession. The ability of American diplomats to help interpret and navigate a bewildering world still matters. After more than a decade dominated by two costly conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the worst financial crisis of our lifetime, the United States needs a core of professional diplomats with the skills and experience to pursue American interests abroad -- by measures short of war.

The real question is not whether the State Department is still relevant but how we can sustain, strengthen, and adapt the tradecraft for a new century unfolding before us.

The real question is not whether the State Department is still relevant but how we can sustain, strengthen, and adapt the tradecraft for a new century unfolding before us. As I look back across nearly 33 years as a career diplomat -- and ahead to the demands on American leadership -- I offer 10 modest observations for my colleagues, and for all those who share a stake in effective American diplomacy. 1. Know where you come from.
When I was a junior diplomat, a story circulated that then Secretary of State George Shultz used to invite new ambassadors for a farewell chat. He would walk over to a large globe near his desk and ask the ambassador to point to "your country." Invariably, the ambassador would put a finger on the country of his or her assignment. Shultz would then gently move their finger across the globe to the United States, making the not-so-subtle point that diplomats should always remember whom they represent and where they come from.
We cannot afford to forget where we come from, whom we serve, and whom we represent. While we still have a long way to go, the foreign service today is far more representative of the richness and diversity of American society than when I entered. The white, male, East Coast, elitist caricature has faded. Today's officers come from across the country and from every social background. The percentage of women and minorities has doubled. New officers bring proficiency in difficult languages and a range of work experience that I would have envied 30 years ago. This diversity is a huge asset overseas, where the power of our example often matters more than the power of our preaching -- especially when we ask others to respect pluralism, tolerance, and universal human rights.
2. It's not always about us.
Americans are often tempted to believe the world revolves around us, our problems, and our analysis. The recent revolutions that swept the Middle East remind us that this is not always the case. These revolutions were, at their core, about dignity and the profound humiliation of people denied economic opportunity, a political voice, and solutions to the problems that mattered most to them. Yet these revolutions still matter a great deal to the United States, and we have a central role to play in helping shape their trajectory.
The fact remains that other governments and people look to the United States to help make sense of a chaotic world and to build coalitions to deal with it. That is true in the fight against the Islamic State, just as it is true in the effort to stem the spread of Ebola. Other people and societies have their own realities, not always hospitable to ours. That does not mean that we need to accept those perspectives, or indulge them, but understanding them is the key to sensible diplomacy.
3. Master the fundamentals.
One perverse side effect of WikiLeaks' release of State Department cables was to show that American diplomats are pretty good at honest analysis of foreign realities and how to navigate them in America's best interest. This kind of effectiveness requires a nuanced grasp of history and culture, mastery of foreign languages, facility in negotiations, and the ability to translate American interests in ways that other governments can see as consistent with their own -- or at least in ways that drive home the costs of alternative courses. If we let these basic diplomatic skills atrophy, our relevance will inevitably decline.
In today's world of digital and virtual relationships, there is still no alternative to old-fashioned human interactions -- not in business, romance, or diplomacy. More than a half-century ago, Edward R. Murrow, the CBS News great who joined the State Department, gave advice to incoming diplomats that still resonates: "The really critical link in the international communications chain is the last three feet, which is best bridged by personal contact -- one person talking to another." Diplomats provide that critical link, whether in managing relationships with foreign leaders, ensuring the safety and well-being of Americans abroad, or promoting commercial, cultural, and educational exchanges.
4. Stay ahead of the curve.
While the fundamentals are essential, they are not enough. American diplomats have to stay ahead of the curve -- ready to adapt to new challenges and innovations and ready to lead in emerging arenas of competition and cooperation. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized the need to deepen the partnership between diplomacy and development to address the underlying drivers of instability around the world. The historic President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched during George W. Bush's administration, is an exceptional example of American leadership in global health. The Obama administration's food and water security programs have been just as transformational.

Energy, climate, gender issues, and cyberspace are all growing priorities for American diplomats, and each requires us to develop new expertise and master new tools and technologies.

Energy, climate, gender issues, and cyberspace are all growing priorities for American diplomats, and each requires us to develop new expertise and master new tools and technologies. My generation of diplomats spent a good portion of their careers learning about nuclear proliferation and global oil politics. This generation will have to learn about the shale gas revolution and its impact on global energy markets, about cyber-norms and their impact on our security and our privacy, and about the Arctic, which may become as vital a maritime passageway in the coming years as the Suez and Panama canals. 5. Promote economic renewal.
Nothing demonstrates diplomacy's relevance more than its ability to contribute to America's economic renewal. And nothing will support strong American diplomacy abroad better than a strong and vibrant American economy. Since 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside the United States, Americans have a big stake in the role diplomats play in opening markets abroad, strengthening the economic rules of the road, ensuring a level playing field for U.S. companies, attracting foreign investment, and advocating on behalf of U.S. businesses. Renewed focus on economic statecraft in recent years helped generate $150 billion in trade supporting more than 11 million U.S. jobs.
There is no better diplomatic investment in the years ahead than the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreements, which would bring higher standards of free market rules to two-thirds of the global economy and strengthen American prosperity for decades to come. Secretary of State John Kerry continually reminds our diplomats that "foreign policy is economic policy." I could not agree more.
6. Connect leverage to strategy.
Successful diplomacy has to begin with strategic vision, a concept for shaping international order in the service of American interests. Effective strategy requires leverage, connecting concepts and goals to available instruments of national power, including military power. The "rebalance" of U.S. priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region is one clear example, integrating efforts to manage China's rise and build healthy relations with Beijing while strengthening ties to key allies, expanding links to ASEAN, and investing in the strategic partnership with India. Economic and political leverage, along with a genuine offer of engagement, opened the door to back-channel talks with Iran that ended more than 35 years without sustained diplomatic contact and helped produce a first nuclear agreement. Progress toward a comprehensive accord remains difficult and uncertain, but carefully testing the possibilities of diplomacy is very much in our interest.
7. Don't just admire the problem -- offer a solution.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson once complained that senior diplomats tended to be "cautious rather than imaginative." Most of his successors have harbored similar concerns, some more openly than others. It is true that career officers sometimes seem to take particular relish in telling a new administration why its big new idea is not so new or why it won't work. It is also true that the revolution in communications technology and the increasing role of both the National Security Council staff and other agencies over successive administrations have tended to bring out the more passive (or sometimes passive-aggressive) side of the State Department.
Most ambassadors, however, realize that they have an enormous opportunity to make a difference in policymaking and get things done on the ground. They don't just report about the challenges they face -- they try to shape the policy response. Tom Pickering, one of the best career diplomats I have ever known, never wanted to get an instruction from Washington that he had not shaped himself. He understood that he was the president's representative, which carried a responsibility to offer his best judgment on how to fix a problem -- not just serve as a postman for Washington decisions.
8. Speak truth to power.
I have great admiration for colleagues who in recent decades decided that they could no longer serve policies in which they did not believe. More than a dozen foreign service colleagues resigned over the United States' nonintervention in the Balkans in the early 1990s, and several others left over the Iraq War a decade ago. Short of resignation, however, officers are obliged to exercise discipline and avoid public dissent. But they also have a parallel obligation to express their concerns internally and offer their best policy advice, even if the truths they perceive are inconvenient. In the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003, several of my colleagues and I wrote a lengthy memo at Secretary of State Colin Powell's request on what we thought could go wrong. We titled it: "The Perfect Storm." In hindsight, we got some things right and missed others, but it was the sort of effort to offer an honest professional judgment that should be encouraged.
9. Accept risk.
We live and work in a dangerous world. Demanding zero security risk means achieving zero diplomatic results. We take every prudent precaution, and we learn and apply the painful lessons of terrible tragedies like the loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other colleagues in Benghazi, Libya, two years ago. But we cannot hole up behind embassy walls. Every American diplomat was filled with pride when we watched Ryan Crocker excel in a succession of dangerous and important posts from Beirut to Kabul -- and when Robert Ford, as ambassador to Syria, visited areas where peaceful protesters had just been attacked by the regime. In less dramatic moments, diplomats serving in hard jobs in hard places take calculated risks every day. I wish that we could ensure zero risk, but we cannot.
10. Remain optimistic.
Teddy Roosevelt said life's greatest good fortune is to work hard at work worth doing. By that standard, American diplomats have reason to feel fortunate. Yes, the world is getting more complicated and the political paralysis and partisanship in Washington don't make it any easier. It is hard to convince people overseas that we can build coalitions when they prove so elusive at home, when the most popular thing any congressman can do is cut our budget, and when members of U.S. military bands outnumber members of the foreign service. But there are many reasons to be optimistic.
We have a remarkable military and an economy still bigger, more innovative, and more resilient than anyone else's. Our system of government and values remains -- warts and all -- a magnet for people around the world. We possess a transformational energy potential and a diverse and mobile population that is the envy of our competitors. And we have a diplomatic service that still attracts the best young people from across our society to a career of significance.
As I prepare to retire, I have never been more proud of America's diplomats and I have never been more confident in their ability to help renew American leadership in the world. It is hard work, but it has never been more important or more worthwhile.

Photo by BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP/Getty Images

Uma outra Escocia e' possivel! Sim! Mais pobre, e mais confusa... - Mark Blyth

Populistas, oportunistas, ou seja, políticos, estão sempre querendo conquistar o seu reino, ou seu principado. Depois dão com os burros n'água, ou seja, trocam os pés pelas mãos, e acabam deixando o povo pior do que estava: com menos serviços sociais, e mais dívidas.
Os escoceses vivem hoje de mensalão britânico, isto é, recebem mais do Reino Unido do que contribuem. Também pudera: não elegem respresentantes conservadores para o parlamento da Grã-Bretanha, só trabalhistas, que são distribucionistas por excelência (com o dinheiro dos outros, claro).
Em síntese, o Reino Unido vai deixar de ser o Reino Unido, e vai virar uma potência de terceira classe, quase na companhia da Etiópia (estou exagerando, claro...). Enfim, vão voltar a ser o que eram até o século XV, ou seja, dois séculos antes da absorção da Escócia por aqueles ingleses arrogantes.
Os escoceses vão estar melhor?
Duvido. Mas vão ficar orgulhosos de seu cantinho, vendendo uisque e salmão para todo o mundo. O difícil vai ser dividir o petróleo do mar do Norte, pois nessas horas todos os políticos são rentistas.
Quem sabe uma nova guerra resolve os problemas?
O que diria Adam Smith disso tudo?, ele que não ligava para as fronteiras e apenas queria comércio livre e sobretudo nenhuma colônia para sustentar...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

It's Not About the Money

Why Scotland Might Just Say Yes to Independence

By Mark Blyth

Foreign Policy, September 9, 2014

Manpreet Sing Makkar -- active in the Yes campaign -- poses for a photograph in Edinburgh, July 16, 2014. (Paul Hackett / Courtesy Reuters)

Debates over national independence are seldom rational. Since they deal with what may happen in the future, each side must convince voters that it is the better soothsayer. In the political battle over Scottish independence, which will come to a popular vote on September 18, two competing visions are clashing hard.

The “No” camp, which goes by the slogan “Better Together,” has run a campaign that focuses primarily on the costs of separation, which are hard to price but estimable. The “Yes” campaign’s response has been to dismiss such concerns as “fear-mongering,” highlighting instead how much better Scotland would fare after independence. In so doing, the Yes camp has rested its case on a counterfactual that can never be proven, seemingly a weaker hand to play.

Yet the key nationalist claims are not without merit. First, since the 1980s, Scotland has overwhelmingly voted for the Labour and the Scottish National Parties, whereas the United Kingdom has voted Conservative. As a result, most Scots feel that they often end up with a government they didn’t vote for. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 went some way toward addressing the democratic deficit. But since the body has limited fiscal powers -- and no independent monetary powers -- it has provided only a partial fix. Second, Scottish voters, the Yes campaign argues, favor a generous welfare state backed by a government that defends public institutions from austerity. And third, most Scots, so says the Yes camp, want to be part of the European Union at a time when the British government is thinking about parting ways with Brussels, so independence would safeguard ties to Europe.

As a wish list, such priorities may seem admirable, especially if one’s politics stand center-left. But to what extent are they achievable? That question has formed the crux of the No campaign, which has shied away from extolling the benefits of the union and stressed instead the economic risks that would come with independence. The core dispute in the independence debate has been over what currency an independent Scotland would use; after all, if you are not in charge of your own money, one has to question the extent to which, like a teenager who never leaves home, you are truly independent and can set your own goals.

Three hundred years is a decent run for any political project.

As the polls narrow and the referendum nears, the money question has become all the more pressing. According to the latest poll, the Yes camp is trailing by only six points, with eight percent of voters still undecided. The result, in other words, remains very much up in the air. Markets are starting to get nervous, suddenly waking up to the fact that if Scotland goes, neither the British pound nor sterling securities will be what they once were. If sterling’s backers, the British taxpayers, are suddenly reduced by ten percent, should UK bonds reflect that risk?

The Yes campaign wants a currency union with the rest of the United Kingdom that retains the pound. (Although London has ruled that out, how Westminster could prevent such a union without removing the coins and notes already in circulation remains an open question.) Yet a currency union would not do an independent Scotland any favors. The United Kingdom’s electoral politics would ultimately determine monetary policy, and Scotland could find itself facing an even tougher macroeconomic and monetary environment than it already does. If the Labour Party was deprived of its Scottish seats, it would struggle to form a majority in the House of Commons, strengthening Conservative control. And with Scotland gone, London’s finance-centric economy would have greater influence still. 

London could turn the screws on Edinburgh further, and not without reason. An independent Scotland would have a massively oversize banking system, with assets possibly exceeding 1,000 percent of GDP. This would represent an Icelandic-sized risk to British taxpayers, who would have to stand behind the liabilities of the Scottish banks if they ran into trouble. As the Financial Times put it in a recent editorial, no British government would back those banks “unless Scotland were to accept very heavy constraints over its public finances.” In short, budgetary austerity and conservative policies would remain the only game in town, even after independence. 

To get out of this bind, an independent Scotland would need its own currency, an option the Yes campaign has only recently acknowledged as a possible “plan B.” Without monetary sovereignty, a country can neither print nor devalue its way out of trouble. And if it doesn’t want to default, austerity is the only way forward.

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Yet to establish an independent currency, Scotland would need three things: a central bank, a bond shop, and independent tax institutions. For now, Edinburgh has none of these. And it would take five to ten years to build them. In the meantime, the country Scotland just broke up with would be raising the taxes, paying the bond investors, and running the currency -- and charging a pretty penny to do so. Joining the euro, the only other alternative, would simply mean austerity would come from another direction, from Berlin rather than London.

Given all this, if Scotland votes in favor of independence, the United Kingdom’s reaction would not likely be the velvet divorce the Yes campaigners envision. Nationalism, like most forms of identity politics, thrives only in the face of a foreign other. Far from safeguarding Scotland’s position in Europe, the United Kingdom’s already resurgent nationalism will likely grow fiercer. Edinburgh’s exit would probably make London’s withdrawal from the EU more likely, complicating the Yes campaign’s desire to protect European interdependence.

Yet perhaps the oddest thing about the Scottish debate has been its lack of concern for issues of language, culture, or past sins -- all central features of Basque, Catalan, and other independence movements. On the surface, it’s been all about the money, which makes the recent turn at the polls all the more telling. Although the No camp has largely won the economic arguments, the Yes campaign has gained the upper hand. The question is why?

The journalist Paul Mason noted recently in The Guardian newspaper that age is becoming a key factor in determining how Scots vote, with older people being more likely to vote no. This sits well with the famous observation (falsely attributed to Winston Churchill) about being a liberal at 25 and a conservative at 35. Those with assets in the current system don’t want the system to change. Those with no or few assets are willing to see it transformed. Generational, rather than monetary, politics may well be the determinant of the final result.

Raised in a country where the policy choice of the past 30 years has been neoliberalism with airbags (New Labour under Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown) or neoliberalism on steroids (under the Tories), and faced with falling real wages and diminished opportunity, young people in Scotland want another choice. This is perhaps why nationalism retains the capacity to surprise. It’s not about costs, risks, or uncertainties; it’s about the idea that a different future is possible. 

As Mason noted, “Once established, political psychologies like this do not go away. History shows they intensify until something gives, and at some point it is usually the borders of a nation state.” Three hundred years is a decent run for any political project. If the United Kingdom’s borders give way in a few days’ time, nobody should be surprised that those who said Yes ignored the warnings about what their vote would cost them. For Scotland’s young, those who yearn for a different future, it was never really about the money.

Venezuela: los enchufados! Nao sabe quem sao? Descubra... - Foreign Policy

O retrato de uma economia esquizofrenica, e de um governo totalmente corrupto:

Why Venezuela's 'Plugged-In' Elites Hold the Keys to Its Future
http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/05/23/why_venezuelas_plugged_in_elites_hold_the_keys_to_its_future
---- 
Vale a pena ler por completo.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

As relacoes paranoicas entre os EUA e o Brasil - David Rothkopf (Foreign Policy)

Elas já eram paranoicas. Com os companheiros deram um passo à frente... na paranoia...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasil e EUA vivem hoje uma relação de paranoia mútua

Folha de S.Paulo, 2/06/2014

Brasil e EUA precisam resolver suas "paranoias" recíprocas se quiserem ter uma parceria mais produtiva. "Hoje, quando os dois presidentes se encontram, só falam de ninharias", diz o publisher da revista "Foreign Policy", influente publicação americana sobre assuntos internacionais, David Rothkopf, 58.

Crítico duro do governo Barack Obama, apesar de ser democrata, Rothkopf acha que Brasil e EUA têm visões "caricaturais" um do outro e que a memória da Guerra Fria tem peso excessivo.

"Se a China desacelerar, se houver uma seca de capitais rumo aos emergentes, o que [a presidente Dilma Rousseff] vai fazer?", pergunta.

Seu próximo livro, a ser lançado em outubro, será sobre a política externa de Bush e Obama "na era do medo".

Ele recebeu a Folha em seu escritório em Washington.

David Rothkopf, especialista em relações internacionais, ressalta relação difícil entre Brasil e EUA

*

Folha - O Brasil pode ficar isolado se os dois blocos comerciais estimulados pelos EUA, com a Europa e com os países do Pacífico, saírem do papel?

David Rothkopf - Não parece que ninguém do governo brasileiro esteja preocupado com isso, senão fariam algo.

Dilma vai enfrentar muitos problemas domésticos em relação à economia. Se a China desacelerar, se os estímulos à economia americana forem reduzidos, se houver seca de capitais rumo aos emergentes, o que ela vai fazer?

Ela não mostrou apetite pela arena global. O Brasil tem seguido a política de fazer seus próprios negócios, desde que não sejam negócios com os Estados Unidos.

Por quê?

Todo país é colorido por sua história e tem suas paranoias. O Brasil é paranoico em ser dominado pelos EUA. Tem uma reação negativa anormal a qualquer projeto de cooperação com os EUA.

Como meu irmão é casado com brasileira, minha mulher já trabalhou lá e tenho muitos amigos brasileiros, acho que posso ser franco. Já os EUA são paranoicos com a ascensão brasileira e regularmente suas políticas na região querem deixar o Brasil de fora.

Depois da crise causada pela espionagem da NSA (Agência de Segurança Nacional dos EUA), o sr. vê a possibilidade de reconstruir a confiança?

Se hoje os dois líderes se encontram, vão falar sobre o quê? Só de ninharia. Não conseguimos falar nem de liberar os vistos reciprocamente, nem de facilitar alfândega.

O melhor momento recente foi a relação entre [George W.] Bush e Lula. Veja só. Lula fez algo admirável, construindo em cima das fundações deixadas por Fernando Henrique Cardoso, que estabilizou a economia. Transformou o Brasil em um ator global.

Se eu fosse os EUA, cansado de guerras e querendo ter novos aliados no mundo, priorizaria essa gigante democracia no nosso hemisfério, com quem compartilhamos a diversidade cultural. Mas Dilma não é Lula.

É comum detectar antiamericanismo de um lado e um antiesquerdismo do outro. Vai demorar essa aproximação?

A memória da Guerra Fria tem um papel grande demais nos dois lados. Temos um problema aqui nos EUA: muitos dos nossos latino-americanistas foram educados na Guerra Fria e têm uma atitude automática contra a esquerda. Tratam igual, seja Cristina [Kirchner], [Evo] Morales, [Rafael] Correa, seja quem estiver à frente da Venezuela.

Onde estão hoje os líderes inovadores da América Latina? Na esquerda. Lula foi talvez o mais importante lider latino-americano dos últimos cem anos, e a reação inicial a ele foi negativa. Hoje, há um líder mais inovador do que [José] Mujica?

Do lado americano, é comum a reclamação de que o Brasil não se comporta como aliado, abstendo-se na crise da Ucrânia ou da Síria. O acordo com o Irã é lembrado até hoje.

O Irã foi "nonsense" (absurdo), mas Brasil e Turquia estavam por trás do acordo, e fizemos as pazes com a Turquia rapidinho por termos interesse. E olha que [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan não era tão legal quanto pensávamos.

Mas, se Dilma for reeleita, ela tem de pensar em como será a relação com Hillary Clinton ou com Jeb Bush, os favoritos para a sucessão de Obama. Há oportunidades para cooperação em ciência, energia, mudança climática.

Mas não parece que a América Latina esteja entre as prioridades do governo Obama.

Há 20 crises simultâneas, então só o que é problema vira prioridade. É a política velha, por inércia.

O mundo parece dar um suspiro de alívio quando um presidente americano, como Obama, diz preferir a diplomacia ao uso da força. Por que o sr. acha que não devemos comemorar?

Podemos celebrar o fim do uso exagerado da força dos anos Bush, mas Obama faz um governo minimalista. A menor ação possível, criando a ilusão de fazer muita coisa. Precisamos de uma combinação de diplomacia, pressão política e econômica, cooperação militar, ação legal, ação multilateral.

Obama não está de mãos atadas por uma opinião pública que não quer saber de guerra nem de intervenções no exterior e por um Congresso onde ele não tem maioria?

Não precisava ser binário –ou usamos força ou não fazemos nada. O povo americano não quer mais guerra, mas quer que o país lidere, que o mundo não se torne mais perigoso, que não sejamos cúmplices por inação pelo massacre na Síria. Ou pelo crescimento do terrorismo, ou por encorajar [Vladimir] Putin, ou por a China invadir vizinhos ou ilhas.

Falta liderança, energizar a opinião pública, identificar objetivos, convencer aliados. Obama é cauteloso demais e sem experiência de política externa. Sua equipe se tornou ainda mais fraca, com menos poder, no segundo mandato que no primeiro. Centraliza tudo na Casa Branca.

Quando os EUA falam em contenção de China ou Rússia, não acaba provocando reação de ambos, por se sentirem "cercados" pelos EUA?

A "contenção" é maior que os EUA admitem, mas menor do que os chineses reclamam. Os vizinhos da China não têm uma relação tão boa e não a querem como chefe por lá. É uma questão de avançar nossos interesses, de proteger nossos aliados. A China tem uma estratégia, dá a volta ao mundo com o talão de cheques na mão, cria interdependência. Nós não temos estratégia.

Os EUA perderam a moral para denunciar a pirataria cibernética chinesa?

Ambos espionam e admitem. Os EUA dizem "vocês roubam segredos industriais para dar às suas empresas, nós cuidamos da segurança nacional", mas a China retruca que os EUA querem benefícios comerciais e que espionaram a [empresa] Huawei.

Na Guerra Fria, o preço do conflito ficou tão alto com a possibilidade de guerra nuclear que não lutamos porque seria a destruição. Já os ataques cibernéticos, assim como os drones, sem humanos, são baratos demais. O perigo é não pararem nunca. Em que ponto veremos que fomos longe demais?

A crise da NSA também demonstrou como os governos ainda conhecem pouco a segurança digital?

Não há tanta gente no governo, especialmente em altos cargos, que entenda o mundo cyber. Sete bilhões de pessoas terão celular, e o fluxo de dados já é mais importante que o de capital. Privacidade é uma nova prioridade, e não temos uma doutrina cibernética, nem debate, nem normas globais.

O fim do acordo Sykes-Picot na Siria, e no Oriente Medio em geral - Gregory Gause (Foreign Policy)

Is this the end of Sykes-Picot?

• BY F. GREGORY GAUSE III

• May 20 at 4:18 pm

The Gulf/2000 Project and United Nations ReliefWeb

The intensity of the civil war in Syria, combined with the continued upheavals in Iraq and the endemic instability of Lebanese politics, has naturally led to speculation that the famously “artificial” borders in the eastern Arab world, drawn by Britain and France in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, are on their last legs. Are the state entities created by European colonialism in the 1920s about to collapse? Are we about to see a grand redrawing of the borders in the Middle East? The short answer to this question is no. While none of these three states will be able to claim effective governance within their borders anytime soon, the borders themselves are not going to change. They are devolving into what the political scientist Robert Jackson perceptively referred to as “quasi-states,” internationally recognized de jureas sovereign even though they cannot implement de facto the functional requisites that sovereignty assumes – control of territory and borders. Real governance in the eastern Arab world is certainly up for grabs, but the borders themselves will be the last things to change, because almost none of the actors, either regionally or internationally, really want them to change.

“The end of Sykes-Picot” is the tagline used by those who argue that the borders themselves are on the verge of substantial change. This is something of a misnomer. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 made a preliminary division of the Arab (and some Turkish and Kurdish) territories of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France, but the final borders were determined by the two powers at the San Remo conference in 1920. Sykes-Picot, for example, gave what is now northern Iraq to France and foresaw an international regime for the Holy Land. San Remo gave League of Nations approval to the borders that France and Britain subsequently worked out – Lebanon carved from the French mandate of Syria, Transjordan separated from the British mandate of Palestine, and the British mandate of Iraq created from the three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. It would be more accurate historically to refer to the prospective collapse of the regional order in the Fertile Crescent as “the end of San Remo,” but that is not a semantic fight worth fighting.

Google returns 14,700 results when queried on “the end of Sykes-Picot.” Formerdiplomats, respected journalists and academics have all recently used the phrase to express their doubts that the territorial state status quo can be sustained. But we should be leery about jumping to the conclusion that the geopolitical dispensation created by France and Britain nearly a hundred years ago is not much longer for this world. These “artificial” entities have had remarkable staying power. Their borders are basically unchanged from their post-World War I creation. Transjordan is now Jordan, and the old mandate of Palestine is now completely under Israeli control (with Gaza a partial exception and the West Bank in an uncertain limbo regarding sovereignty). Iraq, Lebanon and Syria (with the exception of the cession of Alexandretta/Hatay by France to Turkey in 1939) remain as they were created.

The prospects that the map will continue to look as it does now remain strong. First, no one questions the longevity of either Israel or Jordan. Palestinian statehood, which would have been a major shift in the map, looked closer to realization in 1999 than it does now. If anything, the British-drawn border between “Palestine” and “Transjordan” seems more stable now than it has been for years. Second, the deconstruction of the Iraqi state began not recently, but back in 1991 with the establishment of the Western-protected (under a United Nations Security Council resolution) Kurdish region in the north and northeast of the country. That soft partition of Iraq became a constitutional element of the post-Saddam Iraqi state, with the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government. The KRG has had most of the attributes of statehood – effective control of territory, its own military and an ability to conduct foreign relations – for more than 20 years, yet the map of the Iraqi state remains unchanged.

The anomalous status of the KRG, effectively sovereign but lacking international recognition, leads to the third and most serious weakness of the “end of Sykes-Picot” argument. The international powers constructed the post-Ottoman eastern Arab world. They created territorial shells in which colonial authorities, local elites in league with the colonialists and then independent state rulers, tried, with varying degrees of success, to build real states. But the success or failure of those efforts has not determined whether outsiders grant diplomatic recognition to those entities or not. The Lebanese government has not been able to claim effective control over all its territory since the civil war began in 1975. Yet not a single state granted diplomatic recognition to any sub-state Lebanese entity during the civil war, nor did a single state withdraw diplomatic recognition from Lebanon as a state. The KRG effectively governs a good chunk of Iraq, but no foreign government has recognized it as a state or limited its recognition of the Iraqi state to the territory that Baghdad effectively controls. Knowing that it is unlikely to receive international recognition, the KRG will very likely continue to maintain the fiction that it is a part of Iraq, despite the fact that most Kurds would rather have an independent state. Syria might end up, like Lebanon in its civil war, in a state of de facto partition, but it does not look like any foreign power would be willing to recognize the independence of any of those Syrian statelets. Nor is it clear that the Syrian leaders of such statelets would claim formal independence.

This is the ultimate analytical flaw of the “end of Sykes-Picot” argument. Outsiders drew those borders. No outsiders seem to have any interest in redrawing them, or recognizing the redrawing of them, at this time. The United States certainly does not. It has patronized the KRG for nearly 25 years while never encouraging the Kurds to declare independence. No Russian, Chinese or European leader has suggested an international conference to remake the Middle Eastern map. The states themselves might fragment internally. De facto governing authorities might emerge. But the international borders themselves do not look like they are going to change. All the action in the Middle East is bottom-up, as various domestic and regional groups fight for control of these states and regional powers aid their allies in these fights. But these fights look to remain, at least formally and in terms of international law, within the borders that the French and the British drew nearly a hundred years ago. “Sykes-Picot” lives, as fragile as governance within those borders is.

F. Gregory Gause III is a professor of political science at the University of Vermont and non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. He is the author of “The International Relations of the Persian Gulf.”

Egito e Siria: um pouco da miseria do mundo - Foreign Policy

Inacreditável... É tudo o que eu consigo dizer... Paulo Roberto de Almeida  Defense Lawyers Quit Egypt’s Trial of Al Jazeera Journalists

The lawyers for two of three Al Jazeera journalists being tried in Egypt on charges of fomenting violence have quit accusing the Qatar-based news agency of a "vendetta." The lead defense lawyer, Farag Fathy said "Al Jazeera is using my clients" and that the network was "fabricating quotes" attributed to him. Additionally, the court has demanded defense lawyers pay $170,000 to view footage prosecutors say shows the journalists fabricated news reports to incite unrest. The trial has been adjourned until May 22, and the journalists have again been denied bail. Meanwhile, Al Jazeera Arabic correspondent Abdullah Elshamy, who has been held without charges since August 2013, has been transferred to solitary confinement after smuggling a video out of Tora prison highlighting his deteriorating health. Elshamy has been on hunger strike for 107 days protesting his detention. Syria A car bombing killed at least 43 people in the Syrian province of Aleppo near the Bab al-Salam border crossing into Turkey. The area is the main route used by Syrians refugee fleeing into Turkey. The region has been controlled by the Islamic Front's Tawhid Brigade, which has been engaged in fierce fighting with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since January. Iran has reportedly been recruiting thousands of Afghan refugees to fight alongside President Bashar al-Assad's forces in Syria. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been offering $500 a month as well as Iranian residency and has been training Afghan fighters. Meanwhile, growing frustrated with the inability of the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid to Syrians, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States is exploring other options for providing aid, including circumventing the Syrian government. Additionally, Kerry stated he has seen evidence suggesting that Assad's forces have used chlorine gas in attacks on rebel fighters and civilians in recent months, which would be against the weapons convention signed by the Syrian government.

A happy new year? Ten pretty beautiful wars, by Louise Arbour (Foreign Policy)

Next Year’s Wars

From Sochi to Sudan, 10 conflicts that will threaten global stability in 2014.

Foreign Policy

• BY LOUISE ARBOUR
• DECEMBER 30, 2013
•   

Before we dive into next year's list of conflicts to watch, some thoughts on the year we are about to conclude are in order. In short, 2013 was not a good year for our collective ability to prevent or end conflict. For sure, there were bright moments. Colombia appears closer than ever to ending a civil war which next year will mark its 60th birthday. Myanmar, too, could bring down the curtain on its decades-long internal ethnic conflicts, though many hurdles remain. The deal struck over Iran's nuclear program was a welcome fillip for diplomacy, even dynamism. The U.N. Security Council finally broke its deadlock over Syria, at least with regards to the regime's chemical weapons, and committed to more robust interventions in Eastern Congo and the Central African Republic. Turkey's talks with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continue in fits and starts, but the ceasefire looks reasonably durable. Pakistan enjoyed its first-ever democratic handover of power. 
As important as these achievements are, still more important is to keep them in perspective. Colombia's peace process remains vulnerable to messy domestic politics in the election year ahead. Myanmar's positive trajectory could derail if the bigotry unleashed on Muslim communities continues unchecked. Moving towards a final settlement with Iran amidst a sea of red lines and potential spoilers -- in Washington, Tehran, and the region -- is undoubtedly a more perilous challenge than reaching the interim deal in Geneva, welcome step though it was. And that Turkey and Pakistan, both entries on last year's "top 10" list, don't make it onto this year's list is hardly a clean bill of health, given the spillover of Syria's conflict into Turkey, and the ongoing dangers of extremism and urban violence in Pakistan.
But it is Syria and the recent muscular interventions in Central Africa that best illustrate alarming deficiencies in our collective ability to manage conflict.   
In Syria, the speed and decisiveness with which the international community acted to eliminate Bashar al-Assad's chemical weapons can't help but underscore its failure to act with equal determination to end the fighting; even concerted humanitarian action remains elusive. As the conflict in Syria enters its third winter, there is little indication it will stop any time soon, whatever hopes are centered around the Geneva talks scheduled for January. If the Security Council's role is to maintain international peace and security, then as Syria's conflict claims ever more lives and threatens to suck in Lebanon and Iraq, how else can one judge its impact than as an abject failure?
In the Central African Republic, meanwhile, the international community was apparently taken by surprise by the collapse into violence. There is no excuse for this: Decades of misrule, under-development, and economic mismanagement had left behind a phantom state long before this year's coup unleashed turmoil and now escalating confessional violence. France's robust support for the African Union (AU) in a full-fledged humanitarian intervention was commendable. But without concerted, sustained commitment to rebuilding the Central African Republic (CAR), it is unlikely to make much difference in the long run.
So how does this list compared with that of last year? Five entries are new: Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Honduras, Libya, and North Caucasus. Five remain: Central Asia, Iraq, the Sahel, Sudan, and Syria/Lebanon. Of course, by their nature, lists beget lists. It would not have been too difficult to draw up a completely different one. In addition to Pakistan and Turkey, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been omitted, though all could have easily merited a place. Nor did South Sudan, apparently on the cusp of civil war, make it onto this year's list.
In Afghanistan, next year's elections, coupled with the Taliban's continued insurgency in the face of unsettled international support for a still nascent national army, make 2014 a crucial year for the country -- and a potentially ominous one for Afghan women. In Somalia, despite some gains by an AU mission and a new "provisional" government, al-Shabab militants have shown their continued ability to strike -- both at home and abroad -- and many of Somalia's clans remain in conflict with each other. Finally, the sheer absence of the state and the rule of law in the DRC could have justified an entry on this year's list, despite the recent welcome defeat of the M23 rebel movement and signs that, finally, the international community can no longer ignore the conflict's regional dimensions.
But ultimately, this list seeks to focus not just on crises in the international spotlight -- CAR, Syria, the Sahel, and Sudan -- but also on some that are less visible or slower-burning. Thus Honduras -- estimated to be the world's most violent country outside those facing conventional conflict -- is included, as is Central Asia, which totters ever closer to a political and security implosion.  
The list illustrates the remarkable range of factors that can cause instability: organized crime in Central America; the stresses of the political competition around elections, as in Bangladesh; the threat of insurgency -- in the North Caucasus, for example -- or the dangers of regional spillover, as in Lebanon or the Sahel. Then there are the perils of authoritarian rule and an overly securitized response to opposition: in Syria, of course, but also in Iraq and Russia's North Caucasus. An alarming rise in communal or identity-based violence is likewise contributing to instability in Iraq, Syria, and CAR (and Myanmar and Sri Lanka, for that matter). Finally, center/periphery tensions cut across a range of countries on the list. Mali, Libya, Sudan, and Iraq -- plus Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and others -- all wrestle with notions of strong, centralized governance that appear unworkable, yet struggle to find alternatives that don't atomize the state or feed secessionism.
Above all, however, the list highlights that deadly conflict rarely springs up out of nowhere or is entirely unanticipated. It usually has long roots: in underdevelopment; states' inability to provide all their citizens with basic public goods; inequality; and divisive or predatory rule. It shows, too, that reducing the fragility of the most vulnerable countries -- arguably among the greatest moral and political challenge of our era -- takes time, commitment, and resources. Three things that, sadly, too often are lacking.  

Syria and Lebanon
The diplomatic breakthrough in September on Syria's chemical weapons -- and subsequent progress in dismantling them -- has had little noticeable impact on the battlefield. Violence continues, with ever-worsening humanitarian consequences. Having avoided a U.S. military intervention, the Bashar al-Assad regime has displayed increasing confidence, re-escalating its campaign to drive rebels from strongholds around the capital, Aleppo, and the Lebanese border. The regime, with some success, has also sought to market itself to Western governments as a counterterrorism partner -- ironically so, given that its brutal tactics and reliance on sectarian militias helped fuel the rise of its extremist adversaries in the first place.

In part, the regime's momentum -- however limited -- can be attributed to disarray among rebel forces. The opposition's primary political umbrella, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, has no real control of military operations on the ground. The opposition's regional backers -- principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar -- support competing blocs within the coalition, as well as separate armed groups outside it, contributing to rifts that jihadi groups have exploited. The al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is now the strongest rebel faction in much of the north, but its aggressive tactics have alienated fellow militants and the opposition's base. In response, other leading rebel groups formed the "Islamic Front," potentially the largest and most coherent opposition alliance to date. Its Islamist platform, however, has raised concerns among some of the opposition's external backers, and coordination issues remain a persistent problem.

Meanwhile, Syria is slowly but surely dragging Lebanon down with it. Lebanon's population has swelled by at least 25 percent as a result of Syrian spillover. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's growing involvement on the regime's behalf, allegedly in a "pre-emptive war" to keep its jihadist enemies at bay, is in fact luring them to take the fight to the Shiite militant group at home. Other attacks have targeted Sunni mosques in Tripoli, where sectarian strife has pushed the army to take control.

International attention is currently focused on the renewed push to hold talks between the regime and opposition, scheduled for Jan. 22 in Geneva. But both sides see it as little more than a venue for the other to formalize its capitulation. The opposition coalition accepts the premise of the talks -- the June 2012 Geneva communiqué calling for establishment of a mutually agreed transitional body with full executive authority -- but has struggled to make a final decision about whether to participate under current conditions. The regime, by contrast, has readily agreed to join talks, but rejects the ostensible goal of the process: the formation of a transitional government. The positions of each side's external backers will be critical in bringing the parties toward agreement in any political process, but here, too, signs of willingness to compromise are few, if any.

Iraq
Since April 2013, when Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-led government intensified its violent crackdown on a peaceful Sunni protest movement, the tide of attacks, arrests, and executions has gradually swelled. Sunni distrust of the central government is greater than ever, providing an opening for al Qaeda in Iraq after years of decline. Over 7,000 civilians have fallen victim to this destructive cycle already this year, but still the government has shown no appetite for compromise. Iraq's Sunnis, therefore, have turned to Syria, hoping a victory by the opposition there will enable a political comeback at home.

The coming year is likely to see further intertwining of the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts. As the Iraqi state weakens, its frontier with Syria erodes. Baghdad, more overtly than ever, is aiding Damascus in order to stave off the Sunni wave it fears at home -- though its support for the Syrian regime is encouraging precisely that, as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda offshoot, has become the biggest player in northern Syria. To halt the violence, the Iraqi government should change its approach radically: It must win Iraqi Sunnis back to its side, re-engage them in the political process and in the fight against al Qaeda, and use its improved domestic support base to secure its own borders. Only an inclusive state can save Iraq from fragmenting.

The coming year's parliamentary elections are unlikely to produce solutions. On the contrary, they risk exacerbating violence and attracting foreign interference. Maliki's ambition to run for a third term pits his coalition against other Shiite groups, encouraging Iran to weigh in. At the same time, the political scene is fragmenting into a variety of political entities, the culmination of eight years of Maliki's divide-and-rule strategy. The prime minister's base has dwindled as well, so absent an unexpectedly dominant candidate or coalition, one can expect the elections to yield an excruciating period of bargaining and political paralysis.

Libya
Beset with myriad security concerns and mired in political deadlock, Libya's post-Qaddafi transition is threatening to go off the rails. The General National Congress' mandate is set to expire on Feb. 7,  2014, and the formation of a constitution-writing body is already over a year late. Ali Zeidan, the current prime minister, has been the target of several attacks -- and a brief kidnapping -- and calls for his dismissal are rising. Meanwhile, public confidence in state institutions is fast waning, and with it confidence in a transition process that was supposed to create the framework for a new democracy.

Like other Arab countries in transition, Libya has become increasingly divided along several different axes -- Islamist vs. liberal, conservative vs. revolutionary, and center vs. periphery -- all of which are contributing to instability on the ground. Following the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, militias largely took over from the official military and police force, and the country is awash in weapons. The coalition that brought Qaddafi's former allies together with liberal exiles and long-imprisoned Islamists has collapsed, leaving in its wake a fragmented polity. In Libya's east, almost daily targeted assassinations of security officials -- for which residents blame radical Islamists -- is fuelling belligerent anti-Islamist attitudes.
Overwhelmed, the government has been obliged, paradoxically, to bribe and cajole militias in an attempt to rebuild the state's monopoly on force. So far, it has had little success: Armed groups have blocked gas pipelines and besieged crude oil facilities, reducing exports to around 20 percent of the pre-uprising level. The loss of revenues is crippling the national budget.

There are no easy answers to these problems. At a minimum, local militias and the proliferation of small arms will plague Libya (and its neighbors) for years to come, frustrating the government's efforts to rebuild the country's security forces and secure its borders. But it remains an open question whether Libya's leaders can build sufficient consensus to keep the process moving in the right direction.

Honduras
Honduras is the world's murder capital, with more than 80 homicides reported for every 100,000 citizens in 2013. A weak, often compromised justice and law enforcement system means that most serious crimes are never prosecuted. One of the two poorest countries in the region -- half the population lives in extreme poverty -- Honduras is also among the 10 most unequal countries in the world. Much of the country is plagued by criminal violence, and most Hondurans cannot access state services or enjoy the protection of law enforcement. Democracy and rule of law -- never strong -- were further undermined by a coup in 2009.
The United Nations and human rights groups have reported that members of the Honduran National Police have engaged in criminal activity, including murder. Weak, corrupt security forces have turned Honduras into an ideal way-station for drugs heading from the Andes to U.S. markets. An estimated 87 percent of all airborne cocaine headed north stops first in Honduras.
Organized criminal activity ranges from drug and human trafficking to kidnapping and extortion. Criminal groups have become strong enough that the state has effectively lost control over parts of the country. Compounding these security threats are street gangs, led by the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (M18), which together boast an estimated 12,000 members. For the most part, these gangs terrorize the poor, urban neighborhoods in the capital city, Tegucigalpa, and the port of San Pedro Sula.
Violence in Honduras spiked upward in 2009, when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup. The International Criminal Court is currently investigating crimes committed in the aftermath of that coup, while an official truth commission revealed that the military killed at least 20 people. Since 2009, 10 human rights activists, 29 journalists, 63 lawyers, and some 20 political candidates have been killed. In almost all of these instances, no one has been held accountable.
Newly elected President Juan Orlando Hernandez campaigned on an "iron fist" response to crime, proposing to create a militarized police force. Given ongoing complaints of human rights abuses by security forces -- including allegations of involvement in disappearances and kidnappings for ransom -- it is little surprise that his proposal has been met with vocal opposition by civil society organizations and the diplomatic community. Such an overly securitized response, built on corrupt or predatory institutions, is unlikely to resolve the problem. Absent concerted efforts to strengthen the rule of law, Honduras' plight looks set to continue -- even intensify -- in the coming year.

Central African Republic
Months of deadly clashes in the Central African Republic (CAR) have brought an already perilously weak state to the brink of collapse, with 400,000 people displaced and untold thousands terrorized into hiding. Nearly half of the population is in need of some form of assistance, and state services, including the police and the army, no longer exist.

It was just a year ago that a transition of power from then-President François Bozizé appeared to be in on track. But that agreement fell apart and in March, Seleka rebels -- a loose alliance of Muslim fighters from the CAR, Chad, and Sudan -- staged a coup to oust Bozizé and replace him with their leader, Michel Djotodia. In September, Djotodia disbanded Seleka, triggering a wave of widespread violence with no effective national army in place to stop it.

The United Nations and Western powers were slow to respond, in part because they thought Djotodia could control Seleka fighters and that the African Union-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) could secure the capital, Bangui. They were wrong on both counts. The transitional government and the regional security force have failed to prevent a free fall into chaos. The "wait and see" approach of the United Nations and Western powers now has them breathlessly trying to catch up.

The Seleka have since splintered into leaderless factions that clash regularly with armed groups made up of villagers and national security services alike. Eyewitnesses report daily attacks on civilians and massacres carried out with machetes and semi-automatic weapons. More worryingly still, the conflict has taken on a religious undercurrent, with the Seleka pitted against newly formed Christian self-defense groups. The process of radicalization is well underway. If the violence continues and religious tensions escalate, large-scale confessionally-driven violence is frighteningly possible.

The conflict could also easily spread to other neighboring countries -- insecurity is already rife on the border with Cameroon -- although help appears to be belatedly at hand. Following French warnings of potential regional destabilization, the United Nations authorized France to send 1,600 troops to bolster MISCA's operations and restore law and order. For now, the future of the CAR is in their hands. Challenges ahead include disarming militiamen in Bangui and preventing fighting between Christian and Muslim communities. Only then can the process of state-building begin.


Sudan
A hotbed of instability and violence for years, conditions remain dire across much of Sudan. Political restlessness in Khartoum, economic fragility, and multiple center-periphery tensions all pose major conflict risks for 2014.

In November, Sudan's defense minister announced a new offensive against Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels in South Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, aimed at "ending the rebellion." The rebel alliance, which is fighting for a more representative government, responded in kind, leveling attacks against strategic roads and army facilities in North and South Kordofan. Khartoum has since backpedaled, downplaying the significance of the campaign and saying the government is ready to resume talks. But African Union mediators still need Khartoum's consent to start a comprehensive, national dialogue that includes the SRF.

In Darfur, the violence that began a decade ago has now mostly given way to fighting between Arab tribes, once the government's main proxies against non-Arab rebels and communities. Since the beginning of 2013, inter-tribal violence has displaced an additional 450,000 people. One of the most violent conflicts in the region -- involving the Salamat, Missiriya, and Ta'aisha tribes at the Sudan-Chad-CAR tri-border -- has forced 50,000 more refugees into Chad. In the east of Sudan, lack of implementation of a 2006 peace deal backed by Eritrea is also threatening to reignite conflict.
Poor governance is also inching the country closer to disaster. Nationwide protests in late September against ending fuel subsidies sparked much deeper levels of discontent among urban populations, once reliable government supporters. The growth of militant Islamist groups -- independent of the governing National Congress Party or the Islamist Movement -- also points to a government losing control on all fronts.

The solution to all of these challenges remains the same as ever: The relationship between Khartoum and the rest of the country must be fundamentally redefined. Otherwise, regional grievances will continue to fester, Khartoum will continue to be consumed with crisis management, and the international community will continue to spend billions each year to manage the consequences.

One of several obstacles that could stand in the way of reforming Sudan's centre-periphery troubles is President Omar al-Bashir's indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Without some incentive, Bashir could well block all but cosmetic change for fear of losing power and ending up at the court. But if the international community confirms that credible reform is underway -- and that the only thing standing in the way of further, comprehensive progress is the indictment -- the Security Council could request that the ICC defer prosecution of Bashir for a year with no obligation to extend.  

The Sahel and Northern Nigeria
The Sahel region and Northern Nigeria have emerged as major sources of instability for parts of West and Central Africa, as last year's watchlist foretold. In 2014, expect separatist movements, Islamist terrorism, and north-south tensions to continue to spark violence, which the region's weak or stressed governments are ill-equipped to address.

In Mali, a French military intervention in early 2013 successfully wrested control of northern cities from a coalition of Islamist militant groups. Subsequently, presidential and parliamentary elections were held without major incident. Still, the country is far from stable today. Terror attacks, inter-communal clashes and bouts of fighting between armed Tuareg groups and the Malian army have continued, while representatives of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the primary Tuareg separatist group, have repeatedly threatened to withdraw from peace talks. A U.N. mission has deployed to the country, but still lacks adequate resources and personnel.

To escape further conflict, Mali must look beyond immediate security concerns and provide its diverse population with essential services, impartial justice, and inclusive politics. The government in Bamako cannot be seen as imposing its own vision for stability on the north -- or the roots of the conflict will remain untouched.

Next door, Niger may seem comparatively tranquil, but it is subject to many of the same pressures that tipped Mali into chaos. President Mahamadou Issoufou has pursued a security agenda focused on external threats, while his government is failing to deliver long promised and vital social goods at home. Tensions surrounding a government shuffle last summer revealed how fragile Niger's democracy remains. Add to the equation suspected criminal infiltration of the state and security services, the acute misery of most of the population, and you have a decidedly combustible mix.

Finally, Nigeria's Boko Haram continues to wage a bloody insurgency in the north of Africa's most populous country. Despite a year-long and often harsh government campaign, the group still mounts regular attacks on military and police installations, and civilians -- often from safe havens in the mountains, as well as from neighboring Niger and Cameroon. Fighting will claim further thousands of lives in 2014 unless the government adopts significant reforms, including addressing impunity, tackling systemic corruption, and promoting development. This will be made even more difficult as the country prepares for what could be fiercely contested general elections in 2015.

Bangladesh
Bangladesh enters 2014 amid escalating political violence. Scores of people died and hundreds were injured in clashes between the opposition and security forces ahead of general elections scheduled for January, the former embracing a growing campaign of violent nationwide shutdowns, or hartals. The opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) has said it will boycott the elections, accusing the ruling Awami League (AL) of authoritarian rule and plans to rig the polls.
A boycott would deepen the crisis and lead to more deadly violence. Merely postponing polls  -- as some have suggested -- without a roadmap for how to hold credible elections in the future is also not the solution. There is deep animosity between the heads of the AL and BNP, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, who have been swapping power since 1991. A phone call between them in October 2013 -- reportedly their first conversation in over a decade -- quickly deteriorated into barbs about each other's mental health.

The roots of Bangladeshi political polarization run deep. Over the past two years, a government-appointed tribunal has carried out profoundly flawed trials for war crimes committed during the country's 1971 war of liberation from Pakistan. To date, everyone on trial is a Bangladeshi citizen. No one from the Pakistani military, the main force resisting the liberation of what was then East Pakistan, has been indicted. Making matters worse, the sentencing to death of six members of the BNP and Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami parties -- for allegedly trying to sabotage the country's formation -- has inflated religious-versus-secular social divisions and spawned the radicalization of newer groups like Hefajat-e-Islam.

The only way out is via credible elections and a stable, responsive government. For that, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia must overcome their mutual loathing and negotiate an inclusive roadmap. The risks are manifold. Since 1971, the military has attempted some 30 coups, about a fifth of them successful. In two, prime ministers were assassinated, including Sheikh Hasina's father, Mujibur Rahman. Today, the military remains a risk. Finally, the potential radicalization of Rohingya refugees, human rights concerns, and Bangladesh's complicated economic trajectory all make for an explosive mix.

Central Asia
The 2014 Afghanistan drawdown is not the only thing to worry about in Central Asia. Most countries in this region are governed by aging leaders and have no succession mechanisms -- in itself potentially a recipe for chaos. All have young, alienated populations and decaying infrastructure. 
Uzbekistan, a perpetually difficult neighbor, squabbles with Kyrgyzstan over borders and with Tajikistan over water. Moscow is warning of a buildup of Central Asian guerrillas on the Afghan side of the border, and is ramping up military assistance. Tajikistan, the main frontline state, is also deeply vulnerable -- with low governance capacity, high corruption, barely functional security forces, and limited control over some strategically sensitive regions. It is also a key transit route for opiates destined for Russia and beyond.
In Kyrgyzstan, extreme nationalist politics threaten not just the country's social fabric, but its economy too, as some politicians seek political and possibly financial gain by hounding foreign investors in the crucial mining sector. Crime and corruption are endemic. The harshly authoritarian state of Uzbekistan is Moscow's biggest irritant and the United States' closest ally in the region. And yet its president, Islam Karimov, may have lost control over his own family: His eldest daughter, Gulnara, is suspected of having her own presidential ambitions and has lashed out against her mother as well as Uzbekistan's security chief, probably the country's second most powerful figure. Neighbors fear post-Karimov instability could trigger waves of refugees, a further pressure on their poorly defined borders.

Resource-rich Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has ambitions of regional leadership, but it could just as easily be undone by a host of internal problems. Investors like China worry that the Kazakhs have made heavy weather of handling even very modest insurgency problems. The country also suffers from a serious lack of transparency for foreign investment, enormous income disparities, a poor human rights record, and increasing pressure from Moscow. It also needs to design a smooth transition mechanism for its long-time leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Finally, Turkmenistan, generously endowed with hydrocarbons but weak in governance, hopes to withstand any post Afghanistan spillover by doing a deal with its new leaders. This has worked in the past, but there is no guarantee it will in the future.
While Afghanistan will undoubtedly be the focus of the international community again in 2014, Central Asia's states will continue to grapple with their own individual and unique circumstances in a corner of the world too long cast as a pawn in someone else's game.

North Caucasus (Sochi)
This February, Russia will host the Winter Olympics -- at $47 billion, the most expensive ever -- in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. But security is even more of a problem than cost: Europe's most active ongoing conflict is taking place nearby in the North Caucasus. If the Olympics motto is "faster, higher, stronger," Putin's motto in approaching the North Caucasus insurgency appears to be "meaner, tougher, stronger."

The leader of the North Caucasus Islamist insurgency, Doku Umarov, has threatened to disrupt the Olympics and urged militants to use all available means to commit terrorist attacks across Russia. His efforts appear to have paid off: In 2013, there were at least 30 terrorist attacks in southern Russia, according to independent media sources. Twin bombings on Monday, Dec. 30, that killed dozens in Volgograd -- responsibility for which is as yet unclaimed -- speak to the nature of the terrorist threat. In response, the Russian government has rolled out unprecedented security measures in Sochi, and strengthened border controls to prevent infiltration of fighters from abroad and minimize the risk emanating from the North Caucasus, especially its most restive republic, Dagestan.

Unfortunately, some of these measures could worsen the situation. In Jan. 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Dagestan's president and overhauled the republic's nuanced security strategy, which had been showing signs of success. Along with vigorous anti-corruption measures, the new president, Ramazan Abdulatipov, backed a wave of repression against the Dagestan's vibrant Salafi community. Security forces conducted mop-up operations in villages, arrested large groups of believers from cafes, madrassas, and homes, and intimidated moderate Salafi leaders, civic organizations, and businesses. Modest initiatives at inter-sectarian dialogue have ceased. Abdulatipov also closed the commission for rehabilitation of fighters and encouraged the creation of people's militias, supposedly to combat extremism. These, however, have already been involved in intra-confessional violence.

Equally troubling was the announcement in September by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, president of another North Caucasus republic, Ingushetia, that the homes of insurgents' families will be demolished and their land seized. In nearby Kabardino-Balkariya, the civilian president, Arsen Kanokov, was replaced by the former chief of the Interior Ministry's Department for Combating Extremism -- not exactly known for its subtle approach to security.