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Mostrando postagens com marcador Frank D. McCann. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Frank D. McCann. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 1 de julho de 2021

Uma visita do além-túmulo: Frank D. McCann visita minha página em Academia.edu depois de falecido? Mistério...

 Uma surpresa: verificando a lista dos que acessaram meus trabalhos no período recente, encontro estes registros: 

Recent Activity
Read 11/10/20

Ou seja, a leitura mais recente desse "visitante" foi em 30 de junho de 2021
E quem foi o visitante?
Este aqui: 

map

University of New Hampshire
History
Emeritus
Dover, United States
Natural Resources Management + 4
585 total views
40 followers

Ora, o meu grande amigo Frank D. McCann faleceu algum tempo ANTES de 30 de junho: 

Frank McCann

Origem: Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre.
Frank McCann
NascimentoFrancis Daniel McCann
15 de dezembro de 1938
Morte2 de abril de 2021 (82 anos)
CidadaniaEstados Unidos
Ocupaçãohistoriador, professor universitário

Francis Daniel McCann, mais conhecido como Frank McCann (15 de dezembro de 1938 — 2 de abril de 2021) foi um historiador dos Estados Unidos, especialista na atuação do Brasil durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial.[1] Foi professor da Universidade de Nova Hampshire.

Professor emérito de Relações Internacionais na UFF, foi chamado de "um grande americano e um grande amigo do Brasil".

Brasilianista militar

Generalleutnant Otto Fretter-Pico (à esquerda) rendendo-se ao General Olímpio Falconière da Cunha (ao centro) da 1ª Divisão de Infantaria Expedicionária.

Brasilianista famoso, escreveu o livro Soldados da Pátria,[7] sobre a mentalidade e políticas internas do Exército Brasileiro durante o período formativo após a Guerra do Paraguai e a proclamação da ditadura do Estado Novo de Getúlio Vargas em 1937. Frank também escreveu outra grande obra, o livro Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos 1937-1945,[8] estudando as relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos;[1] publicado pela primeira vez em 1974, concorreu com menção honrosa ao Prêmio Bolton e vencedor do Prêmio Bernath de 1975.[9] Ele foi editado no Brasil pela Biblioteca do Exército (Bibliex).[8] Um dos comentários feito por McCann foi o convite ao Brasil para participar da administração da Áustria ocupada ao fim da Segunda Guerra.[10][11][12][13]

Além de bibliografia de referência, Frank McCann também publicou diversos periódicos e foi convidado a escrever capítulos em livros, geralmente voltados para a Força Expedicionária Brasileira. Dentre essas várias contribuições, está o último capítulo na 3ª edição (revisada e aumentada) do livro A Luta dos Pracinhas: A FEB 50 anos depois - uma visão crítica, de Joel Silveira e Tassilo Mitke. Em seu periódico Brazil and World War II: The Forgotten Ally. What did you do in the war, Zé Carioca?,[3] McCann traz uma visão global sobre a participação do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial, analisando o pensamento estratégico das lideranças brasileiras, como Góes Monteiro e Getúlio Vargas, atuação no Atlântico Sul e na Itália. O texto analisa brevemente a aviação brasileira, mas o seu foco principal é no elemento terrestre. Sobre a divisão expedicionária, McCann concluiu:

A FEB cumpriu todas as missões que lhe foram confiadas e comparou-se favoravelmente com as divisões americanas do Quarto Corpo (en). Infelizmente, o forte simbolismo de Monte Castello obscureceu a vitória da FEB em Montese em 16 de abril, na qual tomou a cidade após uma batalha exaustiva de quatro dias, sofrendo 426 baixas. Nos dias seguintes, lutou contra a 148ª Divisão alemã e as divisões italiana fascistas Monte RosaSan Marco e Italia, que se renderam ao General Mascarenhas em 29-30 de abril. Em questão de dias, os brasileiros prenderam e receberam a rendição de 2 generais, 800 oficiais e 14.700 soldados. A 148ª foi a única divisão alemã intacta a se render nessa frente. Embora tivessem pouca preparação e servissem sob comando estrangeiro, contra um inimigo experiente em combate, os "Smoking Cobras" (Cobras Fumantes), como era apelidada a FEB, haviam mostrado, como dizia uma de suas canções, a "fibra do exército brasileiro" e a "grandeza de nossa gente". (McCann, 1995, pg.15)[13]

A canção mencionada por McCann é a Fibra de Herói.[14][15] Outros livros menos conhecidos incluem Modern Brazil: Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective (Brasil Moderno: elites e massas em perspectiva histórica, ainda sem tradução para o português), em coautoria com Michael L. Conniff, e A Nação Armada: Ensaios sobre a História do Exército Brasileiro.[4] Seu último livro foi Brazil and the United States During World War II and Its Aftermath: Negotiating Alliance and Balancing Giants, publicado em 6 de outubro de 2018 pela editora Palgrave MacMillan.[4]

O governo brasileiro reconheceu seu compromisso com o estudo do país, conferindo-lhe o título de Comendador da Ordem do Rio Branco (1987) e a Medalha do Pacificador (1995).[4] O professor Frank McCann era fluente em português.[16]

Bibliografia

  • Soldados da Pátria: História do Exército brasileiro de 1889 a 1937, Companhia das Letras, 2004 e 2009.[7]
  • Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos 1937-1945, Biblioteca do Exército (Bibliex), 1995.[3][8]
  • A Nação Armada: Ensaios sobre a História do Exército Brasileira, Editora Guararapes, 1982.[4]
  • Modern Brazil: Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective, University of Nebraska Press, 1989.[4][5]
  • Brazil and the United States During World War II and Its Aftermath: Negotiating Alliance and Balancing Giants, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018.[4]

Periódicos

  • Brazil and World War II: The Forgotten Ally. What did you do in the war, Zé Carioca?, University of New Hampshire, 1995.[3]
  • Airlines and Bases: Aviation Diplomacy; The United States and Brazil, 1939-1941, Inter-American Economic Affairs, 1968.[3]
  • The Rise and Fall of the Brazilian-American Military Alliance, 1942-1977, University of New Hampshire, 2015.[17]


Um mistério a resolver: quem acessou minha página a partir da identidade de Frank McCann?



domingo, 4 de abril de 2021

Uma homenagem a Frank D. McCann - Martha K. Huggins

 Recebido hoje, 4/04/2021: 

 

From: mhuggins12305@yahoo.com

 

Dear friends of Frank McCann,


Forgive me for using one of Frank's email's to you but I want this to be published in a number of places in his honor. Here are my memories of Frank in the attachment below.

Martha K. Huggins

 

 

Memories of Frank McCann, my mentor, by Martha K. Huggins:

 

This is a very difficult memory to write without crying. I learned that Frank had died on Good Friday late the next evening through a letter from UC Berkeley historian Linda Lewin. I slept fitfully having lost an academic and intellectual mentor and friend of 47 years. 

My first contact with Frank was in a c.1973 in a University of New Hampshire graduate seminar that he taught on “Comparative Slave Systems.” Frank opened my eyes to Brazil and deepened my understanding of histories that I had never before been taught. Frank’s course and his careful analysis of slaves’ lives, their enforced labor, their inequitably managed religious participation and their many forms of resistance to the brutal management of their lives in the structured slave systems of Brazil, Haiti, and the U.S. South. What Frank had taught me academically and through his teaching and mentoring shaped my future teaching, mentoring, and research. Frank’s UNH seminar on slavery guided my later doctoral dissertation research (1975-1977) on slavery in Pernambuco. But I am getting ahead of myself.

Frank McCann was first and foremost my intellectual mentor. As a professor of history Frank carried his love of Brazil, accompanied by his wife Diane McCann, into their home: After teaching a seminar on Brazil students would be invited to the McCann home to meet the newest Brazilian or Brazilianist in town. We would talk while eating Brazilian food and enjoying Brazilian music. There was a Brazilian rede for relaxing in Frank and Diane’s living room; I once shared it collegially with another recently deceased, brilliant, and much loved ‘Branilianist,’ 

Frank firmly believed that researching in Brazil was impossible without knowing Brazil’s food and other essential aspects of Brazilian culture. When I missed a lecture or other ‘Brazil event’ hosted by Frank at UNH the next day as Frank passed me in the hall that linked the Sociology Department (my major) to the History Department, Frank would kindly admonish me: “Dee Dee, Dee Dee!, you missed seeing ‘Fulano de Tal’s’ lecture on Colonial Brazil but he’s coming to dinner at our house tonight, can you attend?” A soft nudge backed by a dinner invitation was an important component of Frank’s mentoring.

In 1974 I applied for a Latin American Teaching Fellowship (LATF) funded by Tuft’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the Ford Foundation. I did not know at the time that several Brazil-related scholars had been asked by the Ford Foundation if they knew me and my work; each had said that they had no knowledge of me or my work (Information obtained by a graduate student in a research seminar directed by Historian Elizabeth Cancelli (University of São Paulo (USP), Department of History)Fortuitously, Frank McCann ran into the recruiter for the LATF fellowship lunching at a table on the sidewalk near the Copacabana Palace. Frank sat down with the recruiter and talked with him about my application. Frank’s apparently solid recommendation launched my career as a “Brazilianist.” Mentoring counts and so do chance encounters!

In Recife, between 1975 and 1977—teaching at the University Federal de Pernambuco and researching for my dissertation—published in 1985 as, From Slavery to Vagrancy in Brazil: Social Control and Crime in the Third World(Rutgers University, 1984) -- I often wrote Frank with questions and thoughts as my research broadened to include historical papers and the prison logs of the Casa de Detenção do Recife—then housed at the Ilha de Itamaracá. When my book was published in 1984 Frank expressed great pride about my publication and said that it was an ‘important’ contribution to scholarship on slavery. I especially appreciated Frank’s opinion because Frank and I had very different theoretical and disciplinary foci and training. In contrast, a well-known historian of slavery wrote briefly in his review of From Slavery to Vagrancy: “Do not read this book.” That was literally all the reviewers said. Mentoring requires patience and an acceptance of differences: Frank McCann practiced both. 

I credit Frank McCann with any success that I have had in my 42-years as a Brazilianist. As a sociologist who takes a critical criminology approach to social control by government agents, I feared that Frank would have serious reservations about the “academic quality” of From Slavery to Vagrancy in Brazil. But as always Frank McCann was supportive and encouraging.

I have carried with me throughout my career a respect for Frank McCann’s carefully researched and well-written books, his intellectual teaching, and his intense attention to student research and writing. I think of Frank McCann every time I work with students, conduct my own research, and write about what I have learned from research—to be honest, thorough, and inside the lives of those I study. 


Dear, Dear Frank, I shall miss you. Abraços de Dee Dee (Easter Sunday, April 4, 2021 

 


quinta-feira, 3 de abril de 2014

O regime militar e o Brasil: resposta a Frank D. McCann - Jorge Alberto Forrer Garcia

No dia 1 de Abril, transcrevi neste blog a entrevista concedida pelo historiador Frank D. McCann, especialista na história militar e nas Forças Armadas (mais Exército) do Brasil, ao jornal O Estado de S.Paulo, como abaixo.

'Vivi com o golpe toda a minha carreira'
Em entrevista ao Estado, historiador americano explica em que 1964 foi diferente das outras tentativas de golpe
Entrevista: Frank D. McCann
Wilson Tosta
O Estado de S. Paulo28 de março de 2014
- See more at: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2014/04/frank-d-mccann-tentando-entender-os.html#sthash.y4M3JZ19.dpuf

Recebo agora do historiador militar Jorge Alberto Forrer Garcia os comentários abaixo que se referem a trechos, afirmações, argumentos, do dito historiador, especialmente na parte final de sua entrevista.
Quem desejar ler primeiro a entrevista, siga este link:
http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2014/04/frank-d-mccann-tentando-entender-os.html
Mas, recomendo a leitura atenta, e a reflexão sobre as palavras que vão abaixo transcritas.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
==========

Sr. Diplomata Dr.  Paulo Roberto de Almeida.
Sou oficial do Exército, do posto de Coronel Reformado, residente em Curitiba/PR. Acompanho seu "blog" por indicação de amigos.
Dessa forma, fiquei um tanto revoltado com as palavras finais da entrevista concedida pelo "scholar" Frack D. McCann em entrevista ao jornal O Estado de São Paulo e reproduzida no "blog" de V. Sa. Acompanho há anos a obra de McCann como historiador do Exército Brasileiro e estudei 3 (três) de suas obras. Isto posto, Venho solicitar de V. Sa. que se digne publicar o texto que consta abaixo.
Certo de sua compreensão, desde já agradeço. Tentei postá-lo diretamente,mas a operação não se completou.
Jorge Alberto Forrer Garcia

Cel Ref

Tomado apenas o trecho final da entrevista que o Sr. Prof. Franck D. McCann deu ao jornal O Estado de São Paulo em 31 de março de 2014.

Prezado amigo, cordiais saudações.
É triste ver um estudioso como esse, de quem li os três livros sobre os militares do Brasil...(lágrimas)
Comecei a preparar essa resposta e fui tomado pela raiva. Ira, na verdade. Sei que são sentimentos menores, burrice mesmo, mas, preciso de várias reencarnações para chegar a um estado de evolução que me permita não mais sentir as coisas dessa forma.
Esse estudioso, que, até ler no jornal sua entrevista, eu tinha como um conhecedor dos militares do Brasil atreve-se a, hoje, tratar-nos dessa forma. Justamente ele que teve o mais amplo acesso que o Exército lhe poderia dar para a execução de suas pesquisas.
Eu mesmo, como tenente, participei de uma demonstração de ataque de carros de combate especialmente realizada para ele no 4° RCC, em Rosário do Sul. Até no tiro de M41 ele participou como atirador do Carro. (“A Nação Armada”, Franck D. McCann, 1982, Editora Guararapes, Recife/PE) Tenho fotos. Entrevistou-se com vários oficiais. Ele fora até lá como convidado do Estado-Maior do Exército e amigo do Comandante. Hoje, sou obrigado a ler tais palavras e pensar que ele, que tanto se serviu do Exército, foi levado na "onda" do "politicamente correto" e, agora, expressa-se dessa maneira. Para ficar só nas questões finais de sua entrevista ao Estado de São Paulo, tento argumentar como se segue.
Como evitar que tudo aconteça de novo? Basta que os Poderes da República e as instituições nacionais tomem vergonha na cara e cumpram com seus deveres...Retomem seus compromissos com a Nação e o Povo brasileiros. Quando me refiro a vergonha na cara quero dizer que voltem a se fazer respeitadas pelo cumprimento de suas missões constituicionais, e não mais se sirvam do Brasil e voltem à servi-lo.
É bom que a Presidente Dilma tenha proibido os militares de comemorar 1964 e o regime posterior...Que parte de seus estudos Sr. Frack lhe deu autoridade para tratar de assuntos internos do Brasil assim com essa desfaçatez? Seria a amizade que o Sr. sempre cultivou nos altos círculos do Exército e que foram fontes para seus estudos? Militares morreram em consequencia desse evento. Por que não podemos cultuá-los dentro dos quartéis? Eles estavam fardados, enquadrados e com, missões definidas. Não eram um “bando armado”. Tinham comandantes, famílias...Por que não se poder homenageá-los?
As escolas militares deveriam estar ensinando sobre tudo isso como um exemplo do que os militares brasileiros não devem fazer...Pôxa! Sr. McCann. Pelo fato de o Sr. nos ter estudado tanto isso lhe dá a suprema sabedoria para nos dizer como conduzir o ensino nas nossas escolas militares? Logo o Sr.! Que deve conhecer mais escolas militares brasileiras do que eu mesmo. Gostamos de cultuar aquele ditado militar que diz que numa Força Armada são preferíveis os leões aos cordeiros. Então posso concluir que o Sr. preferiria que nossas escolas estivessem formando cordeiros?
A melhor proteção para as Forças Armadas é ver o golpe como um erro grave...Sr. Franck! Tenha a santa paciência. Proteção contra quem e/ou contra o quê? E o que lhe dá o direito de vir apontar erros das Forças Armadas de um país que – até onde eu sei – é soberano? O Sr. é um historiador, logo, não serei eu a lhe dizer o que é conjuntura de uma época. O Sr. percebe que vivíamos uma conjuntura específica ou, com tanto estudo, o Sr não percebe? Se o “golpe”, como por V. Sa. tratado, não tivesse acontecido não há dúvida de que hoje seríamos um país comunista ou posso concluir que o Sr. preferiria que o país que tão bem o acolheu – e lhe permitiu sucesso por isso – fosse uma imensa Cuba?
Não foi uma vitória sobre o comunismo...Em seu livro “Soldados da Pátria – História do Exército Brasileiro 1889-1937” (Frack D. McCann, 2007, Editora Companhia das Letras, São Paulo/SP) V. Sa. gasta um bom números de páginas discorrendo sobre os acontecimentos de 1935. Então posso entender que também lá quando o Exército respondeu com armas à tentativa de tomada do poder pelos comunistas, a Instituição não os derrotou? Claro, o Sr, pode vir com aquele ponto de vista de que as ideias não se podem derrotar. Mas, acho que não vem ao caso. Não vamos agora discutir se trocamos uma ditadura por outra, pois isso também não vem ao caso. Se 1964 - num contexto de Guerra Fria - não foi uma vitória sobre o comunismo o que foi então? Talvez, se nos tivéssemos tornado aquela "Grande Cuba" o Sr. não tivesse tido a oportunidade de ter realizado tantas pesquisas com os militares brasileiros. Mas a História não aceita "talvez" e o Sr. bem sabe do perigo que o Brasil corria em 1964. Em 1965 o Sr. era professor na Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC) do Rio de Janeiro. Como historiador e pesquisador o Sr. não auscultava o que a população dizia daqueles anos? E depois, entre 1976 e 1977, quando o Sr. lecionou da Universidade de Brasília (UnB) não percebeu a ação deletéria das esquerdas sobre a vida acadêrmica brasileira? Afinal, que historiador o Sr. me saiu?
Mas um ataque à democracia e ao Brasil como um país livre...Para qual democracia o País estava indo? É como dizem: "O Brasil não é para principiantes!", ou o Sr. - que tanto nos estudou e, por isso, nem principiante pode ser considerado - não sabe da infiltração comunista no governo João Goulart? Das Ligas Camponesas? Da atuação de Prestes? Do apoio financeiro de Cuba? Isso tudo o Sr. não sabia?
Devo lembrar que as Forças Armadas de hoje não são as mesmas que as de 1964...Novamente nos jogam essa cunha ideológica para, noutra tentativa divisionista, tentar dissolver o amálgama que une as gerações de militares brasileiros. Como podem as Forças Armadas serem instituições permanentes e a cada momento serem tratadas como as de "ontem" e as de "hoje". Esta é uma das variadas formas de romper o compromisso da juventude militar das tradições históricas de cada uma das Forças Armadas. Verdadeira quimera buscada incessantemente pelas esquerdas.
As instituições militares de hoje no Brasil são politicamente neutras e totalmente engajadas na sua missão de defesa nacional...e de garantia da Lei e da Ordem! O Sr. esqueceu dessa parte da missão? Cabe às Forças Armadas defender o Brasil dos próprios brasileiros. Como não? Veja o que o que diz a missão de países tidos como muito desenvolvidos: defender a nação contra todos os tipos de inimigos, mesmo os domésticos. Ou o Sr. considera que estes não existem? Forças Armadas totalmente engajadas na defesa nacional? E as Forças Armadas de outros tempos não o foram igualmente? O Sr. que tanto nos estudou poderia citar uma oportunidade em que as Forças Armadas furtaram-se à defesa do Brasil por serem menos profissionais? Quanto a elas serem politicamente neutras aí eu concordo com o Sr. pois, toda a vez em que os militares brasileiros meteram-se com políticos deram-se mal. Não se trata de um juízo de valor É uma constatação histórica. Bem fazia Caxias. Quando o Império lhe dava poder militar sobre uma região ele logo pedia também o poder político local, pois bem sabia o que podia acontecer se assim não fosse.
Portanto Sr. Franck D. McCann, desça do pedestal a que o Sr. foi levado por essas mesmas Forças Armadas às quais ousa agora dar lições de moral e use o amplo conhecimento que tem de nós não para nos ser gratos, mas para ser honesto em seus propósitos de acadêmico e historiador..

Jorge Alberto Forrer Garcia
Coronel Reformado

Curitiba/PR

sexta-feira, 19 de julho de 2013

Frank D. McCann: Soldados da Patria: o papel politico do Exercito na historia do Brasil

Uma resenha antiga de um livro já traduzido e publicado no Brasil sobre a construção institucional do moderno Estado brasileiro pela única força organizada do país durante décadas a fio, até a reconstrução do Estado burocrático que eles mesmos conduziram depois de 1964: os soldados da pátria sempre foram nacionalistas e tecnocráticos, e Frank McCann conhece bem a sua história.

Soldiers of the Patria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937 (review)
From: The Journal of Military History
Volume 69, Number 1, January 2005
pp. 257-258 | 10.1353/jmh.2005.0016
In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
The Journal of Military History 69.1 (2005) 257-258
Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937. By Frank D. McCann. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-8047-3222-1. Maps. Tables. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. xxvi, 593. $75.00.

Veteran Brazilianist Frank McCann seeks to present a solid historical foundation for understanding the military's role in Brazil's national development by explaining how it defended its institutional identity between 1889 and 1937. During this period, Brazil experimented with a decentralized republic after having deposed the monarchy and then imposed, in 1937, a short-lived civilian-led dictatorship. The military, and especially the Army, played a crucial role in these and most other critical political events throughout the period. McCann's extensive archival research and review of the growing volume of secondary literature leads him to conclude that the military's defense of national unity—the concept of "Pátria" or "motherland"—earns it the distinction of being the only truly national institution during this period.
McCann supports this argument by recounting in detail how the Army matured institutionally while honoring its commitment to Brazilian unity. It dutifully responded to a series of armed challenges to the agrarian-oriented regional elites whose effectiveness in governing decreased progressively in the face of growing urbanism and industrialism. With officers largely from the urban middle or lower middle classes, and soldiers and sailors often impressed off the street, the military struggled to assert the central government's authority in Brazil's vast hinterland. Although eventually victorious, its disastrous battlefield experiences—the product of poor leadership, inadequate planning, and, especially, logistical deficiencies—and then contact with German and French military experts engendered a spirit of reform. This generated core institutional values and a desire for national industrial self-sufficiency. By 1937, the Army's institutional strength made it the nation's foremost national political broker, supporting the onset of Getúlio Vargas's dictatorship in exchange for his commitments to the military's short-term rearmament and the nation's long-term industrialization.
Along the way, McCann's account also serves as a traditional institutional history imbued with personal histories of prominent officers and of institutional tensions produced by pressures for reform from both within and outside of Brazil. He delivers detailed accounts of the critical battles of Canudos, the War of the Contestado, and the 1922 uprising at Copacabana, as well as of minor uprisings that attested to the proclivity of troops at all levels to engage in political activism. He shows how the military struggled to improve its education, training, and armament even while hamstrung by a tradition of lax discipline and an unworkable conscription system.
This work deserves serious consideration by military historians and scholars of Brazil and civil-military relations in Latin America. McCann contributes to the debate on the Brazilian state's development by arguing that only in the 1930s did the military's institutional development endow it with the capabilities to perform a "moderating role" in society, and not earlier. McCann also disputes the argument that only after the 1964 coup did the military shift its focus from external threats to internal development. The post-1964 military professionally defended its institutional interests just as it had done during the period of McCann's study. Finally, he implies that the burdens of military government and then the adoption of the Constitution of 1988 have forced the military to redefine its role—finally relegating to society as a whole its role of defending the Pátria.

Richard Downes

Downes Technology Consulting
Miami, Florida

sexta-feira, 4 de março de 2011

Brasil-Estados Unidos: visita de Obama - entrevista Frank D. McCann

Minhas fontes secretas me passaram, antecipadamente, a entrevista que o historiador e brasilianista Frank D. McCann, especialista em Forças Armadas brasileiras -- autor de Soldiers of the Fatherland, já traduzido e publicado como Soldados da Pátria -- deu ao Estadão sobre a visita do Obama ao Brasil, que deve, em princípio, ser publicado no Estadão do domingo (ainda devem estar traduzindo).
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Nota em 5/03/2011:
Um leitor deste post chama a atenção para a seguinte frase de McCann (destacada no seu comentário):
"For the first time in all the years I have studied Brazil, I thought that Brazilian government spokesmen seemed arrogant."
Bem, ela se refere especificamente à política externa de Lula, caracterizada por um anti-americanismo infantil e um desejo meio estúpido de confrontar os EUA, apenas pelo gosto de se mostrar independente ou anti-hegemônico. Coisas do petismo rudimentar...

Entrevista com Frank D. McCann, historiador brasilianista
O Estado de S. Paulo

O Estado de S. Paulo
1) Qual é a expectativa do senhor, um acadêmico americano que há tanto tempo estuda a história brasileira, tem da visita do presidente Obama ao Brasil?
Well, Wilson, I always hope for the best. A state visit by an American president is important and can have long lasting results. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s visit in 1936 cemented his friendship with Getulio Vargas which contributed to Brazil joining the Allied side in World War II and opened a period of intense relations that led to Brazil’s industrialization. Today Brazil is much more important than it was then, and I hope that Obama acts accordingly.

2) Qual é o balanço que o senhor faria da história das relações entre Brasil e EUA?
The history of relations between the two countries is dense and deep, reaching back to the late 1700s. Their relations have been marked by continuous trade, American suspicion of monarchial government and Brazilian worries about republican subversion, Brazilian fear of American interest in Amazonia, Brazilian dependence on the American coffee market, American worries over British influence, then German influence, and finally communist subversion. The United States has been a continuous presence in the Brazilian mind, while Brazil has been a rather vague one in the American mind. Underlying placid, generally friendly relations there has been tension that never rose to violence, but never completely disappeared. This tension was especially curious because so much of it seems to have been generated on the American side. Moreover, it existed regardless of the type of government ruling Brazil. Monarchial, republican, nationalist, developmentalist, left-leaning, right-wing military, and civilian-centrist governments have all had their share of problems with the United States. In recent decades as the United States pressured Brazil to end its atomic program, and more recently questioned why Brazil wanted to have atomic submarines, it never seems to have entered the minds of American leaders that Brazilians do not trust the United States to remain forever friendly. Washington failed to understand that when it ordered the invasion of Panama, the attack on Grenada, and the two wars against Iraq such actions made Brazilians nervous and somewhat suspicious.
The resurrection of the US Fourth Fleet was a perfect example of Washington’s tone deafness when it comes to understanding how its actions are viewed by others. That fleet number had been first used in World War II to designate the American naval forces based at Recife. That experience was generally positive for the Brazilian navy. The fleet was deactivated after the war, so its reactivation and its mission in regard to the Caribbean and the South Atlantic required careful explanation. But the official explanation was vague at best.
It turned out that the Fourth Fleet has no ships of its own, that it is merely a headquarters that has to request the loan of ships in case of some operation. It is not the powerful instrument of American power that many commentators in Brazil feared. Unnecessarily its “reactivation” raised the level of tension in Latin America and certainly in Brazil
One of the problems is that Washington thinks of Brazil as part of Latin America, when it should be thinking of it on its own terms first, and only secondarily as it relates to the countries around it. The reality is that Obama is making a Latin American tour, Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador, he is not just coming to see Brazil and its leaders. It is obvious that there is no commonality among the three countries that he will visit, they are just a grouping that satisfies some odd ideas that the State Department developed for this trip. Brazilians can consider their country truly important when foreign leaders go there and not make a grand tour.

3) É possível comparar a vinda de Obama com outras visitas de presidentes americanos ao Brasil?
Yes, the history of such visits is quite interesting. But,first, I should say that no American president has matched the standard set by Emperor Pedro II’s 1876 tour of the United States. The Emperor traversed the United States from New York to San Francisco, Chicago to New Orleans, Niagara Falls to Boston, and opened the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia. It was a truly extraordinary event. He was the only reigning monarch to visit the US in the 19th century.
Theodore Roosevelt was the first president to ever leave the country when he visited the Panama Canal construction in 1906. After leaving the White House he, of course, made his famous journey with Colonel Rondon through Mato Grosso and Amazonia. Herbert Hoover, between his election and inauguration, made an extensive tour of Latin America that included a stop in Rio de Janeiro in 1928.
The first sitting president to visit Brazil was Franklin D. Roosevelt in November 1936. In a way that visit was a model for later ones, because he was en route by ship to Buenos Aires for an inter-American conference. During his stop in Rio de Janeiro he dined with President Vargas and addressed the congress. He emphasized the history of friendly peaceful relations between the two countries, characterizing them as being a “brotherhood.” He declared that “The fine record of our relations is the best answer to those pessimists who scoff at the idea of true friendship between Nations.” Although FDR was a political realist I think he did believe, or at least hoped, in true friendship between our governments and peoples. Unhappily, his idealism did not survive his presidency. He visited again in January 1943, at Belém and Natal en route and returning from the Casablanca conference. His meeting with Vargas in Natal was a key event in wartime relations. But note in both cases he was here because of a journey to somewhere else. He did not come solely because of Brazil’s importance. This kind of stop over became part of the model for American presidents traveling abroad.
Harry S Truman flew to Rio de Janeiro for the September 1947 Rio Conference (Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security); he spoke at the conference in Petrópolis, addressed the congress and attended the Sete de Setembro military parade. President Truman hosted festivities on the battleship USS Missouri, which had arrived to take him back home. He visited Brazil but only saw the capital and the road to Petrópolis. His primary purpose was to attend the conference.
His successor, Dwight Eisenhower came for three days in February 1960, stopping in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, as part of a tour that landed in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. The visit was made sadly memorable by the disaster of the plane that carried the US Navy band crashing into Pão de Açucar while trying to land at Santos Dumont.
It took until March 1978 for the next president to travel to Brazil in the person of Jimmy Carter. He came not as part of a Latin American tour but as part of a South Atlantic tour. After Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro he flew to Lagos Nigeria. Ronald Reagan returned to the Latin American tour model by visiting Brasília and São Paulo on November 30 through December 3, 1982, then flying off to Colombia, Costa Rica, and Honduras. His visit is best remembered by his awkward toast in Brasília, “to the people of Bolivia”! George H.W. Bush spent a day in Brasilia, in December 1990, before hurrying off to Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Caracas. In June 1992 he returned to Rio de Janeiro for the Earth Summit. He only visited the Cidade Marvelhosa, and at least did not then go to another country. Bill Clinton maintained the tour model in October 1997 stopping in Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina. In Brazil he did the triangle of Brasilia, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro in two days. George W. Bush, returned President Lula’s visit to Washington by spending a day at the Granja do Torto in November 2005 then flying off to Panama for a day. He returned in March 2007 for a day in São Paulo, thence to Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico for a day each.
Wilson, please excuse this tedious listing but it shows clearly that Obama is following the Latin American tour model. Clearly such visits have little to do with real diplomacy and much to do with projecting an image.

4) O que significa o fato de Obama ter dito que o presidente Lula era “o cara”, mas não ter vindo ao Brasil durante o governo Lula, e agora fazer uma visita de Estado com Dilma Rousseff há menos de três meses na Presidência?
You would have to ask President Obama what he meant by “o cara”. I don’t know what word he used in English. Perhaps he meant that Lula was “the guy”, the man, which in street talk would have been positive. Why he did not make a visit during Lula’s government is a bit strange, but he had a lot to do to correct some of the mess the Bush people left behind. In fact why he would leave the United States now, while it is in the midst of such a terrible economic and political crisis is a question that should be asked.
Frankly speaking, the Lula government projected a tone that felt mildly hostile to the United States. I said tone because there were no acts of hostility but an oddly antagonistic feeling. For the first time in all the years I have studied Brazil, I thought that Brazilian government spokesmen seemed arrogant. Certainly Brazilians were right to be upset with the failure of Washington to prevent the financial disaster. As the elections in November showed the American people are angry about it too.
It is a bit trivial but it is possible that Chicago’s loss of the Olympics to Rio de Janeiro may have affected Obama’s attitude a bit. After all he did campaign personally for his city and he is not a man who enjoys losing.
Lula’s embrace of Chavez makes sense from the perspective of Brasilia, but his enthusiasm looks odd to Washington. The same is true of his relations with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, as did the quixotic attempt with Turkey to negotiate an end to the danger of Iran developing an atomic bomb. The Obama administration was put off, not because Brazil did not have the right to use its diplomatic influence, but by the way it was done. The tone was off key.

5) Podemos dizer que Brasil e EUA vivem o seu período de maior afastamento ou houve outros períodos piores?
I do not think “afastamento” is the right word. During the last years trade has been very active, the Brazilian migrant or immigrant population is huge, Brazilians are investing heavily in the United States. And, of course, tourism continues strong and investment in Brazil is at all time high levels. The tension that I mentioned earlier has been higher than usual these past few years. But we have successfully weathered worse periods. The trade competition with Nazi Germany in the late 1930s was potentially much worse, but had a happy outcome.

6 ) O que contribuiu para o atual afastamento?
I think both sides failed to understand how the other perceived their words and actions. There is an impatience among some in the Brazilian government to see Brazil accepted as a world power. They are impatient for Brazil to have its rightful place in the world. I imagine that most educated Brazilians are tired of the idea of the country of the future. They want the future now. Brazil is not a country most Americans immediately think of as a world power. In fact Brazil is not a country that most Americans think of at all. The vast majority of Americans know very little, if anything, about Brazil, partly because it is rarely taught about in schools and universities. Portuguese is rarely taught in the universities. There is little financial support nationally for Brazilian studies except in a handful of institutions. The Brazilian government has arranged support for programs in a few prestige universities, but this has had little impact nationally. So it is not surprising that leaders in the two countries do not easily understand each other’s point of view.
If you read the speeches that American presidents from FDR to George W. Bush have delivered in Brazil you will see a lot of similarity. They all speak of friendship, of alliances, of potential, of great natural resources, of a dynamic people, and of economic growth. They call Brazil a regional leader, as Nixon said, “so goes Brazil, so goes South America.” But they do not think of it as an equal. They have difficulty seeing the world from the perspective of Brasília. For Obama to talk of forging “new alliances” is to serve old wine in a new bottle. I can’t imagine that such phrases excite anyone in the Itamaraty and worse I doubt that there is any reality behind them.

7) De que forma a política americana em relação ao Brasil também influiu para que os dois países se afastassem?
Again it is a matter of perspective. Washington does not see Brazil as itself, American leaders see it as part of Latin America, as the pattern of the presidential tours shows. Obviously, Brazil is today much more connected to its neighbors than it was fifty years ago, but it still does not see itself first and foremost as Latin American. It is Brazil, first and foremost, Brazil above all.
Unfortunately this difference in perspective is deep seated in the United States. Even in the universities, if Portuguese is taught at all, it is taught in Departments of Spanish. It would be interesting to know how many of the people in Obama’s entourage speak Portuguese fluently.

8) O que causou mais estragos à relação Brasil-EUA: a iniciativa brasileira (e turca) junto ao Irã, na questão nuclear, ou a posição do Brasil em relação à crise de Honduras?
The Obama administration reacted coldly to Brazil’s initiatives regarding Iran and Honduras. In neither case was the State Department expecting Brazilian involvement. It might have been American haughtiness, but certainly Washington was insensitive to Brazil’s interests in both cases. I wonder what kind of communications had gone on between the Itamaraty and the State Department? Mrs. Clinton seemed surprised and a bit annoyed in her comments about both cases. The two governments can’t develop supportive positions unless they are talking regularly and deeply. Of the two cases I found the Honduras one the most disturbing. Washington, in effect, was supporting or at least accepting a coup d’etat, while Brasilia was saying that it was not acceptable. Considering that Brasilia has had much more direct experience with coups than Washington has had, you would think the Americans would pay more attention.

9) A postura do Brasil no caso iraniano inviabilizou qualquer esperança brasileira de ir permanentemente para o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas ou há outros motivos para a resistência americana à pretensão brasileira nesse sentido?
This is one of the most difficult questions in Brazilian-American diplomatic history. Brazil is one of the founders of the United Nations. Even in the dark days of World War II the State Department carefully consulted then foreign minister, Oswaldo Aranha, about his ideas for the new organization. Brazilian diplomats were active in the negotiations at the formative conferences at Chapultepec and San Francisco. Aranha was, of course, the first president of the General Assembly. I think that if FDR had lived he would have insisted that Brazil have a seat on the Security Council. Looking back it is very odd that two failed, even conquered, countries, France and China were given seats and veto power. We know that the British and the Russians opposed a Brazil’s membership, thinking that it would be an echo of the United States.
For Washington to now support India, over Brazil, is to violate the history since World War II. India was a mere colony when the UN came into existence. That does not mean it should be ignored, just that Brazil has a more senior claim that should be respected.

10) Qual é a visão que o governo Obama tem do Brasil, hoje?
I doubt that Obama has thought seriously about Brazil or its role in the world. If he had, or if his closest advisers have, he would not be doing another tour of Latin America but would be doing one solely of Brazil. To talk of trade with Chile or El Salvador, countries with populations of 15.2 million and 6.9 million is strange, when there could be much more trade with just the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, with their populations of 41 million and nearly 20 million respectively. Size matters, but seems to get diminished in the State Department. He will likely speak the same old platitudes and avoid strong backing of Brazil in the United Nations. It is odd in the extreme that the United States has negotiated trade agreements with small countries and has not done so with Brazil. Obama’s advisors should be constantly telling him that 200 million Brazilians and their seventh-ranked economy are important to the United States, or should be important.

11) Quais serão os temas críticos da visita?
Necessarily President Obama wants to strengthen the relationship. Trade dynamics will probably be discussed. The American subsidies of agriculture, particularly cotton, must be on the table. Likely there will be discussion of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and what can be done about them. Nice things will be said about Egypt and worries will be expressed about Libya, unless that crisis has been resolved by the time of the visit.
Hopefully there will be talk of importing Brazilian ethanol fuel into the United States. Domestic politics has delayed and side-tracked free entry and has raised pointless barriers, even while Washington has preached free trade to the world.
Apparently the Americans will be offering assistance with civil security for the coming 2014 World Cup and the Summer Olympics in 2016. I hope they recall that Washington has a checkered history with such assistance in Brazil. How much assistance the Americans can offer in controlling the narcotics problem in Brazil seems problematical. They have been singularly unsuccessful in controlling the narcotics trade in their own country or stopping the stream of drugs from Mexico.
It will be interesting to see what Obama has to offer regarding the FX2 jet fighter. France won out some years ago selling helicopters to Brazil by bribing decision-markers in Brasília. French law allows that sort of thing but American law forbids it. A multi-billion dollar contract would go a long way toward bringing the two militaries closer and would stimulate collateral trade deals.
And, of course, looming over these conversations is the Chinese giant. For the first time since the 1930s the United States is no longer Brazil’s major trading partner. The Chinese purchases of iron ore, other minerals, and soy beans have overwhelmed the American position. They have overwhelmed the Brazilians as well. The scale of the Brazil-China trade has no equal in Brazilian history. Both the Brazilians and the Americans are worried and uncertain what to do, so they both have reasons to find ways to manage the Chinese giant.
Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota will make the Americans feel comfortable. He speaks English with a near American accent and that will have a soothing effect. Unhappily the American side does not speak Portuguese in equally comforting tones.

12) Comenta-se no Brasil que o presidente Obama poderia intervir na licitação para compra de caças por parte da Força Aérea Brasileira, para ajudar a Boeing na disputa contra a Rafale (França) e Saab (Suécia). O que poderia acontecer? Uma oferta mais ampla, envolvendo garantias de transferência de tecnologia?
Washington has been signaling that it is willing to share the technology which could be a huge boost to Brazil’s aviation industry.

13) Brasil e EUA também têm conflitos na área comercial, com sobretaxas americanas sobre produtos brasileiros comprados pelos americanos, como etanol, suco de laranja etc. Há alguma possibilidade de Obama oferecer alguma boa mudança para o Brasil nessa área?
Wilson, you’ll have to ask the White House and State Department on this one. If Obama is smart that is exactly what he will do. Unfortunately, the contrary political pressures in the United States are very strong and very short-sighted about such things.

14) Apesar das divergências com os EUA, o Brasil pode argumentar que fez o seu “dever de casa” (home work). É um país formalmente democrático, que respeita os foros internacionais, aberto ao capital estrangeiro, signatário do Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares, participa de operações de paz das Nações Unidas, assinou o Regime de Limitação de Tecnologia de Mísseis. Nada disso é suficiente para que o Brasil tenha sua cadeira permanente no Conselho de Segurança?
I think it is more than sufficient. Brazil should have had the seat decades ago. Unfortunately the United States does not have complete power to make such a decision. The British, Russians, French, and Chinese have a say. Brazil should pressure the Chinese to speak in its favor. President Obama should loudly and energetically support Brazil’s membership, but I do not know if he will.

15) O que deverá ficar de saldo dessa visita?
Honestly, I hope it deepens relations, but I doubt that it will. The history of such trips does not encourage me. The tour model of such trips necessarily weakens the possible impacts and confuses the thinking of the travelers. It is a shame that President Obama is not taking this opportunity to go to Salvador da Bahia, likely the most African city in the Americas. It would make have a huge influence on African Americans to see their first brother in the White House swaying to the rhythms of Olodum in the Pelourinho. And who knows what else he might have learned and might have stimulated.

Frank D. McCann
Professor of History Emeritus
University of New Hampshire
5 March 2011