O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

Mostrando postagens com marcador IMF. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador IMF. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 14 de junho de 2016

Efeitos dos acordos de livre comercio: Swarnali Ahmed Hannan (FMI)

The Impact of Trade Agreements : New Approach, New Insights

Swarnali Ahmed Hannan

Publication Date: June 10, 2016
Electronic Access: Free Full text (PDF file size is 849KB).

Summary: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has reinvigorated research on the ex-ante impact of trade agreements. The results from these ex-ante models are subject to considerable uncertainties, and needs to be complimented by ex-post studies. The paper fills this gap in recent literature by employing synthetic control methods (SCM) – currently extremely popular in micro and macro studies – to understand the impact of trade agreements in the period 1983–1995 for 104 country pairs. The key advantage of using SCM to address selection bias – one of the persisting issues in trade literature – is that it allows the effect of unobserved confounder to vary with time, as opposed to traditional econometric methods that can deal with time-invariant unobserved country characteristics. Using SCM approach, the paper finds that trade agreements can generate substantial gains, on average an increase of exports by 80 percentage points over ten years. The export gains are higher when emerging markets have trade agreements with advanced markets. The paper shows that all the countries in NAFTA have substantially gained due to NAFTA. Finally, there is some evidence that trade agreements can potentially lead to slight import diversion, but not export diversion.

Text: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16117.pdf

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate 

sábado, 5 de abril de 2014

Por que a Asia resistiu melhor 'as crises do que a America Latina? - paper do FMI

A Ásia resistiu melhor às crises porque não perpetrou as mesmas bobagens que a América Latina nas décadas anteriores e no período recente. Senão vejamos:
1) crescimento moderado do crédito não é o que tivemos no Brasil no passado recente, ao contrário: ele dobrou nos últimos oito anos;
2) crédito baseado na poupança interna? Nem pensar...;
3) Financiamento externo reduzido? Ninguém consegue...
4) Transações correntes sólidas? Mas elas estão se degradando rapidamente...
Pois é, tudo o que temos de bom, que é um sistema bancário sólido (et encore) foi feito pelo governo anterior; a flutuação cambial também, que nos ajuda a aliviar os desequilíbrios externos e que os companheiros tanto criticaram quando foi feito.
Os companheiros, na verdade, são responsáveis por tudo o que está acontecendo de ruim na economia brasileira, e já nem falo da destruição da Petrobras e da Eletrobras, das patifarias em todas as áreas e da incompetência generalizada. Eles estão simplesmente afundando o Brasil.
Podiam pelo menos aprender como fazer as coisas direito.
Este paper do FMI sobre a Ásia ensina como...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Why Was Asia Resilient? Lessons from the Past and for the Future
Prepared by Phakawa Jeasakul, Cheng Hoon Lim, Erik Lundback
February, 2014
IMF Working Paper, WP/14/38
Monetary and Capital Markets Department 

Asia proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of the global financial crisis, but why was its output performance stronger than that of other regions? The paper shows that better initial conditions—in the form of lower external and financial vulnerabilities—contributed  significantly to Asia’s resilience. Key pre-crisis factors included moderate credit expansion, reliance on deposit funding, enhanced bank asset quality, reduced external financing, and improved current accounts. These improvements reflected the lessons from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, which helped reshape both public policies and private sector behavior. For example, several countries stepped up their use of macroprudential policies, well before they were recognized as an essential component of the financial stability toolkit.
They also overhauled financial regulations and strengthened oversight of financial institutions, which helped reduce risk-taking by households and firms before the global financial crisis. Looking ahead, Asia is in the process of adjusting to more volatile external conditions and higher risk premiums. By drawing the right lessons from its pre-crisis experiences, Asia’s economies will be better equipped to address new risks associated with increased cross-border capital flows and greater integration with the rest of the world.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.

sábado, 3 de agosto de 2013

O Brasil parece querer chatear o mundo - Samantha Pearson (Financial Times)

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A brief history of Brazilian bolshiness

Brazil has been putting its weight about again, this time throwing a spanner into the IMF’s efforts to secure an €11bn bailout for Greece from the eurozone countries. Even if Brazil’s economic weight is not what it used to be, it seems it can still rile the old world when it feels like it.
So for the benefit of beyondbrics readers, here is a timeline of Brazilian bolshiness:
  • October 2009 – Brazil becomes a net creditor of the IMF for the first time after providing $10bn of financing to help developed nations hit by the financial crisis. In a gleeful press conference, finance minister Guido Mantega, says the “radical change” is proof that Brazil is faring much better in the crisis than other countries.
  • May 2010 – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president at the time, takes it upon himself to help Turkey broker a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. His cosy relationship with Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, including lots of public hugging and hand-holding, is seen as an attack on US foreign policy.
  • September 2010 – On a roll now, Brazil’s Mantega declares the world is engaged in a global “currency war”, criticising US monetary stimulus and the subsequent weak dollar for ruining the competitiveness of other countries’ exports. “Everybody wants the US economy to recover, but it does no good at all to just throw dollars from a helicopter,” he declares.
  • April 2012 – Mantega takes the face-off between the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing’ world to a new level. He says the Brics countries are working together to elect a candidate from the developing world as president of the World Bank. However, the Russian government soon declares its support for Jim Yong Kim, the US candidate.
  • March 2013 – Undeterred, Brazil goes one step further announcing that it and the other Brics countries have agreed to create their own development bank to rival the World Bank and the IMF. However, the countries struggle to agree on the bank’s funding or its location.
  • July 2013 – Brazil asks the IMF to change its methodology for calculating nations’ gross debt, complaining it inflates Brazil’s own liabilities. Under the IMF’s methodology, Brazil’s gross debt at the end of last year accounted for 68 per cent of GDP, while the country’s central bank puts the number at 59 per cent.
  • July 2013 – Paulo Nogueira Batista, Brazil’s executive director at the IMF, abstains from approving the fund’s new €1.8bn contribution to Greece’s bailout, in a sign of growing frustration over the bailout of debt-ridden Europeans. Nogueira, who also represents 10 nations from Central and South America and the Caribbean, said he was dissatisfied with almost all areas of Greece’s reform programme.