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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Niall Ferguson. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Niall Ferguson. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 4 de setembro de 2016

A biografia de Kissinger por Niall Ferguson - critica por Todd Gitlin

The Servile Fanatic: Niall Ferguson’s Grotesque but Telling New Biography of Henry Kissinger
Jackson, Polk, and—Kissinger?
By Todd Gitlin|
Tablet Magazine, October 28, 2015 12:00 AM

1.
American history does not lack for superintendents of devastation whom the taxidermy of whitewashed history puts on display as illustrious persons for the admiration of schoolchildren. While ghosts prowl the outskirts of national mythology, herds of admirers graze agreeably, ever cowed.
Consider Thomas Jefferson, who in 1803 wrote confidentially  to the governor of the Indiana Territory that if natives east of the Mississippi persisted in refusing to give up their hunting ways and take up sedentary agriculture instead, they should be rounded up and sent West. Consider his protégé Andrew Jackson , whose Indian Removal Act, the legal justification for grabbing Cherokee land in the southeast and force-marching the “savage hunters” westward, was, he said, a policy “not only liberal, but generous” and “a happy consummation” that might “perhaps cause” the natives “to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community.” Or consider Jackson’s protégé James K. Polk, who then-Congressman Abraham Lincoln  showed had provoked war with Mexico in 1848. Thirteen thousand Americans died  in the ensuing Mexican War, but the story told to American schoolchildren is that the memorable local event was the martyrdom of the Anglo victims of the earlier battle of the Alamo. None of this is even to speak of the several presidents and other high officials of the United States who owned slaves—which entailed holding onto them by force and violence, which may not technically qualify as war criminality but may surely be understood as the continuation of war (on Africans) by other means. At his death in 1845, Jackson owned about 150 slaves , his protégé James Polk  more than 50. (Writes one historian: “More than half of the children among Polk’s slaves died before reaching age 15”—a mortality rate  more than 50 percent higher than that for all blacks in America.) But that’s by the by. The official website about Jackson baronial home “The Hermitage,” the same that tells us about the slaves, calls him “The People’s President,” and his face still adorns the $20 bill.

2.
Or consider Henry Kissinger, who finds America self-evidently glorious and the expansion of American power an unquestionable virtue. In a 1956 article that his often reverent biographer Niall Ferguson characterizes mildly as “self-confident,” Kissinger deplored Americans’ penchant for blind optimism. Americans, he wrote, lack the ability to “grasp … the nuances of possibilities,” as (surprise!) none other than Henry Kissinger was adept at doing. Eighteen years after arriving in the United States as a refugee from Nazi Germany, Kissinger had stars in his eyes. Poor enfeebled Americans: They suffered from a “lack of tragic experience.” They needed close encounters with the abyss. They need a gravel-voiced, heavily accented refugee from the old country—Henry Kissinger.
How the historian Niall Ferguson (late of Harvard, now heading to Stanford’s Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace) will assess Kissinger’s years in Richard Nixon’s White House we shall see when he brings out his second volume, which will take up the saga in 1969, when Kissinger assumes the office of national security adviser and more than 21,000 Americans and between 800,000  and 1.5 million Vietnamese who would die before Nixon left the White House in disgrace are still breathing.
But it is not a happy forecast of what is to follow that Ferguson sees Kissinger’s critics as grudge-bearing self-seekers. The flavor of Ferguson’s approach emerges as early as page 16 in Vol. I, subtitled “1923-1968: The Idealist.” Ferguson tells the tale of 13 former Harvard colleagues descending upon Washington to meet with Kissinger in May 1970. “We’re a group of people,” the game-theory pioneer Thomas Schelling, no radical and a later Nobel Prize-winner in economics, told Kissinger, “who have completely lost confidence in the ability of the White House to conduct our foreign policy, and we have come to tell you so. We are no longer at your disposal as personal advisers.”
Ferguson goes on that the Schelling “group’s stated reason for breaking with Kissinger was the invasion of Cambodia. (As their spokesman Schelling put it, ‘There are two possibilities. Either, one, the President didn’t understand … that he was invading another country; or, two, he did understand. We just don’t know which one is scarier.’)” Ferguson goes on to acknowledge that “[n]o doubt Schelling and his colleagues had cogent reasons to criticize Nixon’s decision.” But he does not tarry to present any of those “cogent reasons.” Instead, Ferguson’s next sentence reads: “Still, there was something suspiciously staged about their showdown with Kissinger. Each one [of the 13] … had experience in government, and at high levels. … For these men, publicly breaking with Kissinger … was a form of self-exculpation.”
In this view from Ferguson’s planet Kissinger’s Harvard critics were not only pinkly fatuous moralists but dishonest, carping, bitter men trying to whitewash their own dirty records. Some of them were, in fact, eminently conventional Cold Warriors themselves who had come to see that the wheels were coming off the express. But to mention their conventionality would deprive Ferguson of his main line of argument: namely, that Kissinger was the reasonable statesman-hero in action. It’s of interest, then, to compare the historian Greg Grandin’s longer version of the Schelling story in his own useful survey, Kissinger’s Shadow, published concurrently, as if to haunt Ferguson’s dithyrambic tome. Grandin, unlike Ferguson, includes Schelling’s comment about the invasion of Cambodia:  “Sickening.” And Schelling spoke this most un-Schelling-like word at a time when neither he nor his colleagues knew yet about the secret, pulverizing B-52 bombing of Cambodia that Kissinger had been personally directing for a year.

3.
Not only was Kissinger possessed of “tremendous drive and discipline,” Ferguson writes, he was “brillian[t] as a prose stylist.” Another way to introduce Kissinger would be to note that until 1968, the only remarkable aspect of his career as an pedestrian Cold Warrior was his skill at acquiring bedazzled patrons. His thinking was the standard stuff of the defense intellectuals whom C. Wright Mills reasonably dubbed “crackpot realists.” It is true that Kissinger’s wartime and immediate postwar reports from embattled and then occupied Germany were sparkling—these, quoted at length, are the Ferguson book’s chief revelations, signs of the intelligence that Kissinger had to keep contained, if not drowned, in order to make his illustrious career in social climbing. It is to Ferguson’s credit that he and his research assistants have dredged through so many cubic feet of Kissinger diaries, correspondence, and drafts that they have unearthed more than enough material to demonstrate that Kissinger was not only an accomplished stylist but an intellectual hack when he was not a raving hysteric.
Much of what Ferguson credits as “brilliance” reads as the sheerest banality, yet it leaves the biographer breathless. For example, Kissinger’s dissertation on Metternich and post-Napoleonic Europe, published in 1957 as A World Restored, contains, Ferguson tells us, “striking formulations” such as these:
• “To plan policy on the assumption of the equal possibility of all contingencies is to confuse statesmanship with mathematics.”
• “[C]alculations of absolute power lead to a paralysis of action … strength depends on the relative [Kissinger’s italics] position of states.”
1 + 1 = 2, writes the great man. But there is worse. Ferguson is also “struck” by this Kissingerian aperçu:
[T]o divine the direction on a calm sea may prove more difficult than to chart a course through tempestuous waters, where the violence of the elements imparts inspiration through the need for survival.
Which is to say that only the inspired, the action freaks, are entitled to rule. The agonist is the divine.
Indeed, as early as his Harvard undergraduate thesis, written in 1950 at age 27, Kissinger insisted that “inaction has to be avoided” to overcome the bureaucracy’s “incentive for inaction.” The state has its reasons about which citizens need not inquire, and the belligerence that Kennedy would later call “vigor” is always imperative. Because the state is august, its struggles are near-holy. One theme that runs throughout Kissinger’s writing of the fifties and sixties is his dismay over the inefficiency that arises from diffusion of power.
The struggle to overcome the self-canceling inefficiencies and indecisions of bureaucrats would become Kissinger’s lifelong cause, probably the single conviction that recommended him most to Richard M. Nixon, who had his own reasons to conquer his own underlings. Grandin, by the way, makes too much of Kissinger’s undergraduate work, a mishmash of Spengler and, weirdly, Kant (thus Ferguson’s subtitle, “The Idealist”), but he is right to note that Kissinger’s saw grandeur in his ideal of the self-justifying nation-state that is morally (though incoherently) bound to bring forth its own purpose like a rabbit out of a hat.

4.
In A World Restored, Kissinger wrote of the otherwise admirable Austrian Prince Metternich that he lacked
the attribute which has enabled the spirit to transcend an impasse at so many crises of history: the ability to contemplate an abyss, not with the detachment of a scientist, but as a challenge to overcome—or to perish in the process.
Kissinger could stare at the abyss with aplomb. As he applied his heroics to the problem of making the world safe for “limited nuclear war,” Kissinger had what he construed to be the courage to accept that millions, tens or hundreds of millions of human beings might actually perish along with Kissinger’s ideal hero-statesman. Kissinger would neglect Nietzsche’s warning that “if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.” No matter. Kissinger seemed to revel in bringing abyss news from abysmal Europe to impress naïve Americans. His complaint about Metternich served, among other things, as Kissinger’s memo to himself to stay tougher than suckers, the self-description of a man of limitless ambition and no small gift for self-promotion learned early to put his European aura to huge use making connected friends and influencing impressionable people.
So, seemingly discontented with the haughty provincialism that grows on trees in Harvard Yard, Kissinger went about working his way up the greasy influence pole. As rubber-jointed sage he could go ponderous or he could go witty. He cultivated, among many others who might be of use, Harvard’s McGeorge Bundy, dean of the faculty and later national security adviser and leading war hawk under both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Bundy got Kissinger a job at the Council for Foreign Relations, which led, in turn, to years of service at the side of—or elsewhere near the anatomy of—New York Gov. and putative Republican front-runner Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger proved a virtuoso of sycophancy. And one good feat of sycophancy deserved others: Not surprisingly, “Dr. Kissinger” was lionized for years by Nightline’s Ted Koppel and still is so, by Koppel’s current epigones.
How, apart from his gravitas-bearing accent, did Kissinger pull off this feat? Part of the explanation was that Kissinger was not original; he was, for the most part, conventional. Virtually everything he wrote during his surprising climb to fame in the 1950s was either a) the taken-for-granted wisdom of his time (the Russians, a revolutionary power, were always coming), or b) nonsense (a passage from his diary: “Spiritual force, multiplied by economic force, multiplied by military force, is roughly equal to security”); or—and here is where some originality crept in—c) wild-eyed hysteria in the face of the USSR’s conventional military might and its accumulating nuclear bombs.
The hysterical mode gave rise to sentences like this (from 1955): “If we refused to fight in Indo-China [on the French side] when the Soviet nuclear capability was relatively small because of the danger that a limited war might become general, we shall hardly be readier to risk nuclear bombing for the sake of Burma or [the Shah’s] Iran or even Jugoslavia.” Such unmanly unreadiness to risk nuclear bombing was, in Kissinger’s world, a very bad thing. But he breathed easier at more pleasant prospects in Southeast Asia: “In Indo-China, an all-out American effort may still save at least Laos and Cambodia.” Kissinger worried about “substantial Soviet gains among the uncommitted peoples of the world” but did not begin to grasp that they were not only uncommitted peoples but poor and ex-colonial peoples who were ready to follow compelling nationalists like Ho Chi Minh.
The wild-eyed part was Kissinger’s panic about Soviet nuclear weapons. He criticized President Eisenhower let-’er-rip strategy to blast away all the Soviet Union’s cities if the Red Army went on the move. “There had to be some alternative to massive retaliation,” as Ferguson puts it. Kissinger came up with that alternative: Prepare for limited nuclear war. In his overblown, lavishly reviewed and 1957 “magnum opus” (as Ferguson calls it), Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger built up the fantasy of a nuclear war that could be kept “limited.” Richard Nixon admired this book, Ferguson tells us. Ferguson calls the book “coherent” and lauds its “appealing toughness”—although Kissinger delicately called for “pauses for calculation between bouts of fighting and negotiation between two sides even as the [limited nuclear] war was going on. Ferguson does note: “Conspicuous by its absence … was any serious discussion of what a limited nuclear war might actually be like.” But any flaws in the book, he insists, were not Kissinger’s but “reflect the reality that … the book remained, at root, the work of a committee.”
Weirdly, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy became a best-seller. The Sputnik scare helped by pumping up American panic. It was as if a casting call went out for a gravel-voiced, heavily accented German-Jewish sage, heavy with tragic aura, to intone that the world was complicated and therefore it was necessary to prepare to fight a limited nuclear war in Central Europe. Mind you, such a war, Kissinger proposed, should obey rules. One was this: each “battlefield nuclear weapon” should observe “a 500-kiloton maximum”—that is, the equivalent of 25 Hiroshimas. After Central Europe was to be rendered a smoking radioactive ruin, the United States would pause to chat with the Kremlin about what would happen next.
Kissinger had long patented, as if original, the boilerplate notion that “it was an inherently moral act to make a choice between lesser and greater evils.” He brandished such self-justifications so often, it was as if he thought he was making a grand contribution to moral philosophy. In truth, the limited nuclear war fantasy was sheer lunacy. Indeed, three years later, Ferguson tells us, Kissinger had “repudiated” the thesis that had established him as the nation’s Big-Thinker-in-Chief, noting that “[s]ince no country has had any experience with the tactical use of nuclear weapons, the possibility of miscalculation is considerable.” Oh.

5.
To judge from Ferguson’s biography, when it suited Kissinger to take credit for noting the uncertainties of the world, because they made the world safe for vigorous statesmanship, he did so. At other times, it suited him to argue, as in 1957, after the Soviets’ panic-inducing satellite launch:
We’re really in trouble now. We’ve been pushed back gradually, position by position. … The basic trend is against us. [The Soviets] had “superior organization and superior doctrine. … If things continue as they are, our expulsion from Eurasia is a mathematical certainty.”
A mathematical certainty. This was sheer hysteria speaking. As it continued to speak in 1958: “We’re losing the Cold War.” “We simply lost our nerve.” In 1959, Kissinger was so distraught at hearing that his patron Rockefeller was withdrawing from a run as presidential nominee, he described a “feeling almost of despair. … We are heading, I am convinced, for dark, perhaps desperate times.” By which he did not mean that nuclear war was a clear and present danger—it came within a hair’s breadth of breaking out on Oct. 27, 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis. Kissinger meant that Western collapse was nigh and the Western alliance was crumbling because Washington was guilty of an “abdication of doctrine.” That is, Washington lacked himself.
Picking up part-time work running errands for the Kennedy White House, Kissinger brandished his résumé as a hack militarist plumping for precisely that “credibility” fetish that delivered the United States into the grotesque and, in the strategic terms beloved of Kissinger, utterly pointless, war in Southeast Asia. It wasn’t just that he participated in what Ferguson delicately calls “the missile gap era” (as if everyone believed in such nonsense at a time when the gap was vastly in America’s favor). “By June 1960,” Ferguson tells us, “Kissinger was no longer debating that ‘the “missile gap” will materialize in the period 1960-64”; the only question was whether it would lead to “a Soviet surprise attack or merely to ‘the piecemeal erosion of the free world.’ ”
For such sagacity, Kissinger was courted not only by Rockefeller (who put up a grateful Kissinger in his Caribbean “palace”) but by John F. Kennedy. Desperate to get to the right hand of power, Kissinger courted the two at the same time. Ferguson exempts him from the charge of obsequiousness on the ground that Kissinger must have understood that his patron Nelson Rockefeller would never be president. But his time with Rockefeller was time well spent legitimizing Kissinger as a Great Mind. By 1961, in the midst of Kennedy’s Berlin crisis, he was grumpy about being treated as a mere “idea man.” For Kissinger craved the thick of the diplomatic action.
To speak of his power lust is a decided understatement. When it came to power, Kissinger had an urgent zipper problem. When the time came for the Richard Nixon he “loathed” to come calling, Kissinger could adapt. He was ever-ready. His wartime mentor Fritz Kraemer warned him that “the trap is in your own character.”
When Kissinger said, in 1962, that the United States must make “the internal commitment to ourselves to see that a sufficient military effort is made to end the guerrilla attacks” in Vietnam, Ferguson speaks of “the conditional nature of Kissinger’s position.” He claims that in August 1965 Kissinger “already knew” that “this was a war that could not be won by military means.” For this claim, for all the thousands of pages he had access to, Ferguson offers no serious evidence. While Kissinger recognized that the military briefers in Vietnam were obfuscating, he still welcomed “an outcome in which we achieve a major pacification.” A couple of months later, after briefly forfeiting his standing as an insider by giving a press briefing, Kissinger whined to Bundy about the injustice of it all when he, Henry Kissinger, had “consistently supported Administration policy in Vietnam.” The nerve of Johnson’s ungrateful underlings! It was this Kissinger who, Ferguson writes, was not the sort of gullible fool whom Graham Greene brilliantly described in The Quiet American. For one thing, Ferguson says, Kissinger lacked the “insufferable self-assurance” of  Greene’s character. Right.

6.
It’s to Ferguson’s credit that he lays before careful readers ample—bulging—material for such severe judgment. Look no further than his own numerous quotations for heaps of testimony to Kissinger’s banality. Ferguson also, to my eyes, makes mincemeat of the charge that Kissinger, by relaying inside information about the 1968 Paris negotiations that Lyndon Johnson was sponsoring, helped sabotage those talks and therefore to elect Richard Nixon. (Even Grandin, who concludes that Kissinger was “implicated in Nixon’s preelection machinations” to get the Saigon government to scuttle the talks so that Johnson could not announce a deal that might put his acolyte Hubert Humphrey over the top, thinks Kissinger has been over-blamed for sabotage on that occasion.) And even as he is swallowing Kissinger’s conventionality as insight, Ferguson is not without criticisms of his own. When Kissinger went on about America’s “margin of survival” having “narrowed dangerously” to the point that “national disaster” loomed and the United States was “in ‘mortal danger’ of a Soviet surprise attack,” Ferguson allows that his uproar “seems overdone.” But don’t count on Ferguson to point to the sheer craziness of so much that Kissinger maintained.
Kissinger was surely one of the most gifted exponents of an intellectual disaster that led to moral disaster. But such exponents were legion. Mario Del Pero , a professor of international history at Sciences Po in Paris and author of The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, has it right:
Kissinger has been a quintessential 1950s U.S. Cold War intellectual. He was not particularly original or bold, once we scratch away from his writings the deliberately opaque and convoluted prose he often used, possibly to try to render more original thoughts and reflections that were in reality fairly conventional…. What the archival record has so far revealed is that Kissinger was often simplistic, binary and even uninformed….His often broadcasted realism notwithstanding, he tended to adhere to a dogmatic, zero-sum-game of the international game. In short, he wasn’t a war criminal, he wasn’t a very deep or sophisticated thinker, he rarely challenged the intellectual vogues of the time (even because it would have meant to challenge those in power, something he always was—and still is—reluctant to do), and once in government he displayed a certain intellectual laziness vis-à-vis the intricacies and complexities of a world that he still tended to see in black-and-white.
Ferguson’s readers need reminding what kind of thought was conventional during the years of Kissinger’s ascent and his White House reign as (to borrow the brilliant title of Russell Lees’s 1974 play) Nixon’s Nixon. Kissinger’s heedlessness was thought with a bludgeon. As for his time in the White House, no better introduction to Kissinger’s wartime achievement there can be found than that contributed by his onetime Harvard colleague (they taught classes together), the most hard-headed realist Stanley Hoffmann. Hoffmann, whose inspiration was the underrated French liberal Gaullist political writer Raymond Aron, early in his Harvard career was raking peaceniks like this writer, then his admiring though skeptical student, over the coals. By the late Sixties, Hoffmann had fervently turned against Kissinger and the war. When a British journalist named William Shawcross published his devastating 1979 bookSideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, Hoffmann began his review with this quote from the work: “Cambodia was not a mistake; it was a crime.” Hoffmann continued:
This is what William Shawcross demonstrates in his careful, detailed, and incisive book. Sideshow is both masterly and horrifying. It lays bare the fallacies and the shame of the Vietnam war with so much evidence and force that recent attempts at rewriting this tragic story in order to vindicate American policy appear as ludicrous as the policy itself….[It] presents hard and irrefutable documentary evidence showing that the monsters who decimated the Cambodian people [the Khmer Rouge, who slaughtered at least 1.7 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979 until they were brought down by the Vietnamese invasion, as case of “liberal Intervention” if there ever was one] were brought to power by Washington’s policies…. the ordeal inflicted on the Cambodian people by its rulers since April 1975 was not merely preceded but prepared by America’s own atrocious policy
Hoffmann came round to describing Kissinger’s view of the world as an “Olympian but distorted view,” which “was accompanied by another form of hubris: a self-intoxicating confidence in our capacity to manipulate other societies.”
But such hubris could not be purchased without a massive capacity for dissembling. In 25 small-print pages in a 1987 Appendix to Sideshow, Shawcross amply demonstrated that Kissinger was a serial liar. He lied in 1970 about the Cambodia bombing. When, in 1979, the interviewer David Frost, working for NBC, and Kissinger, looking angry, admitted to making a public statement then that was “not correct,” Kissinger moved “heaven and earth” to convince NBC executives to eliminate this exchange from the broadcast. He called them “dozens of times,” Shawcross wrote. He lied, and covered up, and lied about lying and about covering up. Examples are legion; see, for example, accounts by Nick Thimmesch , Bob Woodward ,Walter Isaacson , Seymour Hersh , Rep. Joshua Eilberg , and the late Christopher Hitchens , among others . This is a man who does not stint at self-taxidermy or taking evasive action. An authorized rebuttal published under the name of Kissinger’s amanuensis, Peter Rodman, smeared Shawcross for “political apologetics” and called it “obscene.” Pot, meet kettle.
Shawcross noted that the final 894 pages of Kissinger’s first memoir, White House Years, included no mention at all of the horrors that the American bombing and the consequent Khmer Rouge takeover (itself inconceivable without the American bombing) brought to Cambodia. “Indeed,” as Shawcross wrote, “White House Years demonstrates more forcefully and more conclusively than any of his critics could do that for Kissinger Cambodia was a sideshow, its people expendable in the great game of large nations.” It will be interesting to see how Ferguson deals with the horrors of Cambodia, and Kissinger’s dissembling about how they came to pass, in his second volume.
One also looks forward to seeing how Ferguson will deal, for example, with a 2001 book by Kissinger called Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (Spoiler alert: Yes, it does; and guess who can supply it.) There, Kissinger wrote that America’s allies held themselves “aloof” from the Vietnam war—Aloof! In truth, France’s Charles de Gaulle and Great Britain’s Harold Wilson both tried mightily to dissuade the Americans from their nightmare course. Before, during, and after Kissinger served Nixon, it never dawned on him that what actually threatened the Western alliance was the American insistence on defying sound advice against the nation’s deep dive into the wicked and doomed Vietnam war.
We shall see if the Ferguson of Vol. II agrees with Kissinger’s congratulating Nixon for what he called “negotiated extrication from Vietnam.” With extrication like that, who needed war? It will be interesting, too, to see how Ferguson deals with such items as Kissinger’s memorandum  of his 1976 conversation with Chile’s dictator Agosto Pinochet, in which, by his own account, Kissinger told the murderous Pinochet: “My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist.”
Where Henry Kissinger is concerned, so many smoking guns are still smoking, it will take superhuman strength for the biographer to hold his nose as the stench reaches high heaven.
***

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Todd Gitlin, professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University, is the author of The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage; Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street; and, with Liel Leibovitz, The Chosen Peoples: America, Israel, and the Ordeals of Divine Election.
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segunda-feira, 8 de agosto de 2016

Applied History Project - Graham Allison, Niall Ferguson (Harvard Univesity)

Presidentes precisam, realmente, do conselho de historiadores? Precisam de um Conselho Assessor de Historiadores, como hoje possuem um para assuntos econômicos?
Duvidoso que assim seja, ou melhor: seria desejável que assim fosse, mas eles provavelmente não têm tempo, nem paciência, para ficarem se encantando com histórias passadas para iluminar o presente e ficar planejando o futuro.
Não tenho certeza de que os dois historiadores que assinam esta opinião pretendam criar um Historian of the Presidency Office, ou estejam buscando um emprego no próximo governo, mas parece bem assim: conselheiros do príncipe desejando evitar, por exemplo, uma nova confrontação estilo Guerra Fria, desta vez envolvendo a vigorosa China, ou mesma a decadente Rússia.
Vamos ler, em todo caso...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Why the President Needs a Council of Historians

The Atlantic, September 2016 Issue

 

It isn’t enough for a commander in chief to invite friendly academics to dinner. The U.S. could avoid future disaster if policy makers started looking more to the past.
 
It is sometimes said that most Americans live in “the United States of Amnesia.” Less widely recognized is how many American policy makers live there too.
Speaking about his book Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship From Truman to Obama, the American diplomat Dennis Ross recently noted that “almost no administration’s leading figures know the history of what we have done in the Middle East.” Neither do they know the history of the region itself. In 2003, to take one example, when President George W. Bush chose to topple Saddam Hussein, he did not appear to fully appreciate either the difference between Sunni and Shiite Muslims or the significance of the fact that Saddam’s regime was led by a Sunni minority that had suppressed the Shiite majority. He failed to heed warnings that the predictable consequence of his actions would be a Shiite-dominated Baghdad beholden to the Shiite champion in the Middle EastIran.
The problem is by no means limited to the Middle East or to Bush. President Obama’s inattention to the deep historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine led him to underestimate the risks of closer ties between Ukraine and Europe. “I don’t really even need George Kennan right now,” President Obama told The New Yorker for a January 2014 article, referring to the great Cold War–era diplomat and historian. By March, Russia had annexed Crimea.
To address this deficit, it is not enough for a president to invite friendly historians to dinner, as Obama has been known to do. Nor is it enough to appoint a court historian, as John F. Kennedy did with Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. We urge the next president to establish a White House Council of Historical Advisers. Historians made similar recommendations to Presidents Carter and Reagan during their administrations, but nothing ever came of these proposals. Operationally, the Council of Historical Advisers would mirror the Council of Economic Advisers, established after World War II. A chair and two additional members would be appointed by the president to full-time positions, and respond to assignments from him or her. They would be supported by a small professional staff and would be part of the Executive Office of the President.
For too long, history has been disparaged as a “soft” subject by social scientists offering spurious certainty. We believe it is time for a new and rigorous “applied history”—an attempt to illuminate current challenges and choices by analyzing precedents and historical analogues. We not only want to see applied history incorporated into the Executive Office of the President, alongside economic expertise; we also want to see it developed as a discipline in its own right at American universities, beginning at our own. When people refer to “applied history” today, they are typically referring to training for archivists, museum curators, and the like. We have in mind a different sort of applied history, one that follows in the tradition of the modern historian Ernest May and the political scientist Richard Neustadt. Their 1986 book, Thinking in Time, provides the foundation on which we intend to build.
Mainstream historians take an event, phenomenon, or era and attempt to explain what happened. They sometimes say that they study the past “for its own sake.” Applied historians would take a current predicament and try to identify analogues in the past. Their ultimate goal would be to find clues about what is likely to happen, then suggest possible policy interventions and assess probable consequences. You might say that applied history is to mainstream history as medical practice is to biochemistry, or engineering is to physics. But those analogies are not quite right. In the realm of science, there is mutual respect between practitioners and theorists. In the realm of policy, by contrast, there is far too often mutual contempt between practitioners and academic historians. Applied history can try to remedy that.
Imagine that President obama had a Council of Historical Advisers today. What assignments could he give it?
Start with the issue that the president and his national-security team have been struggling with most: isis. Recent statements indicate that the administration tends to see isis as essentially a new version of al-Qaeda, and that a top goal of U.S. national-security policy is to decapitate it as al-Qaeda was decapitated with Osama bin Laden’s assassination. But history suggests that isis is quite different in structure from al-Qaeda and may even be a classic acephalous network. When we searched for historical analogues to isis, we came up with some 50 groups that were similarly brutal, fanatical, and purpose-driven, including the Bolsheviks of the Russian Revolution. By considering which characteristics of isis are most salient, a Council of Historical Advisers might narrow this list to the most relevant analogues. Study of these cases might dissuade the president from equating isis with its recent forerunner.
The U.S. government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis illustrates the value of this approach. That September saw the biggest shock to the world economy since the Great Depression. In a stroke of luck, the chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, Ben Bernanke, was a student of earlier financial crises, particularly the Depression. As he wrote in his 2015 memoir, “The context of history proved invaluable.” Bernanke’s Fed acted decisively, using unprecedented tools that stretched—if not exceeded—the Fed’s legal powers, such as buying up mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in what was called quantitative easing. Bernanke’s knowledge of the Depression also informed the Fed’s efforts to backstop other central banks.
To be sure, historical analogies are easy to get wrong. “History is not, of course, a cookbook offering pretested recipes,” observed Henry Kissinger, the most influential modern practitioner of applied history. “It can illuminate the consequences of actions in comparable situations, yet each generation must discover for itself what situations are in fact comparable.” Amateur analogies were commonplace in the wake of September 11, ranging from President Bush’s invocation in his diary of Pearl Harbor to the parallels drawn by his administration between Saddam and the Axis leaders in World War II. To guard against such faulty parallels, May advised students and policy makers to follow a simple procedure: Put the comparison you are considering—for example, isis and the Bolsheviks—on a sheet of paper, draw a line down the page, and label one column “similar and the other “different.” If you are unable to list three points of similarity and three of difference, you should consult a historian.
Were a Council of Historical Advisers in place today, it could consider precedents for numerous strategic problems. For example: As tensions increase between the U.S. and China in the South and East China Seas, are U.S. commitments to Japan, the Philippines, and other countries as dangerous to peace as the 1839 treaty governing Belgian neutrality, which became the casus belli between Britain and Germany in 1914?
The council might study whether a former president’s handling of another crisis could be applied to a current challenge (what would X have done?). Consider Obama’s decision to strike an imperfect deal to halt or at least delay Iran’s nuclear program, rather than bombing its uranium-enrichment plants, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hoped he might. Obama’s deliberations have significant parallels with Kennedy’s decision during the Cuban missile crisis to strike a deal with Nikita Khrushchev, rather than invading Cuba or learning to live with Soviet missiles off Florida’s coast.
A president might also ask the council “what if?” questions. What if some action had not been taken, or a different action had been taken? (These questions are too seldom asked after a policy failure.) In this spirit, the next president could ask the council to replay 2013. What if Obama had enforced his “red line” against the Assad regime, rather than working with Russia to remove Syrian chemical weapons? Was this decision, as critics maintain, the biggest error of his presidency? Or was it, as he insists, one of his best calls?
Finally, the council might consider grand strategic questions, including perhaps the biggest one of all: Is the U.S. in decline? Can it surmount the challenges facing it, or will American power steadily erode in the decades ahead?
Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump offer answers to these questions. Indeed, Trump proposes to “make America great again,” implying that decline has already occurred, and to put “America first,” reviving a slogan with, to put it mildly, a problematic history. The presidential campaign thus far gives us little confidence that America’s history deficit is about to be closed.
We suggest that the charter for the future Council of Historical Advisers begin with Thucydides’s observation that “the events of future history … will be of the same nature—or nearly so—as the history of the past, so long as men are men.” Although applied historians will never be clairvoyants with unclouded crystal balls, we agree with Winston Churchill: “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.”

About the Authors

·                Graham Allison is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a co-director of the Center's Applied History Project.
·                Niall Ferguson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a co-director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Applied History Project. He is the author of Kissinger, 1923–1968: The Idealist.

Historia Aplicada: conselheiros do principe querem uma "assessoria historica" para o presidente (Harvard)

Acabo de ler, e achei interessante. Depois vou comentar...
Graham Allison é co-autor, com Philip Zelikow, do famoso The Essence of Decision, sobre a crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba. Niall Ferguson não precisa de apresentação, não é mesmo?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard University
 
Colleagues & Friends,

It is sometimes said that most Americans live in “the United States of Amnesia.” Less widely recognized is how many American policymakers live there, too. To address this deficit, Niall Ferguson and I have written an Applied History Manifesto, which appears in the September print issue of The Atlantic magazine. In it, we urge the candidates running for president to announce now that, if elected, they will establish a White House Council of Historical Advisers, analogous to the Council of Economic Advisers.

In an effort to revitalize Applied History both in universities and in policymaking, I am happy to announce that the Belfer Center is launching an Applied History Project. Niall Ferguson and I will serve as Co-Directors.

What is Applied History? In one line, it is the explicit attempt to illuminate current challenges and choices by analyzing historical precedents and analogues. We believe it is time to institutionalize historical analysis in the tradition of two great Harvard Kennedy School professors, Ernest May and Richard Neustadt – indeed, to create in universities beginning with Harvard a new and rigorous sub-discipline of Applied History.

The charter of the future Council of Historical Advisers should begin with Thucydides’s observation that “events of future history will be of the same nature – or nearly so – as the history of the past, so long as men are men.” Applied History does not offer a crystal ball – but which discipline does? We subscribe to Winston Churchill’s dictum, “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.”

Imagine that President Obama had a Council of Historical Advisers today. What assignments could he give it? How might the Council respond? He could, for example, ask about ISIS: Have we ever seen anything like this before? If so, what did who do, and how did that work out? For this question and a number of others, see the Project’s new website.

Applied historians take current predicaments and identify precedents and analogues that offer clues about what is likely to happen, suggest possible policy interventions, and assess probable consequences. In the “Applied History Manifesto,” we provide a number of examples. The Project website also features a curated selection of exemplary instances of applied history, a basic bibliography, and a catalog of quotations and insights on the topic by scholars and statesmen.

If you have thoughts, please let me know.

VISIT APPLIED HISTORY WEBSITE
Graham Allison
Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Subscribe to the Belfer Center

segunda-feira, 16 de novembro de 2015

Niall Ferguson e a queda de Roma na Europa atual (The Sunday Times)

Analogias históricas são sempre enganosas, mas não deixam de ser saborosas...
Grato ao meu colega Renato Marques que me enviou este artigo, e autor dos comentários iniciais.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
========
Para aqueles que (não) leram meu livro, capítulo Tempus Fugit, recordo que nele abordo o impacto da invasão desses "novos bárbaros" (na composição étnica, na identidade cultural e no quadro de valores das sociedades hospedeiras) e a estratégia ambígua e ineficaz até agora adotada pela Europa (ajuda financeira e/ou intervenção militar). Os EUA tampouco estão imunes a essa problemática, mesmo que à margem das grandes correntes migratórias (dado o antagonismo entre a agenda assistencialista favorecida por seus núcleos hispânicos e afroamericanos, cuja taxa de natalidade faz antever sua maioria em 2043). No Brasil, a proliferação na base da pirâmide torna o ambiente político refém de noções que vão na contra mão do desenvolvimento e da competitividade. Por distintas razões, os três estariam assim condenados a um futuro medíocre (Europa e EUA - de onde vêm os Nobel de ciências e medicina - teriam sua trajetória de grandeza interrompida; o Brasil sequer a realizaria).   
Mas o objetivo era enviar o excelente artigo de Niall Ferguson (caso você tenha chegado até aqui). Eu acrescentaria apenas um elemento novo dentre as causas do declínio do Império Romano, algo que o bom mocismo e o politicamente correto tem deixado de mencionar: a crescente introdução e propagação de valores cristãos, de solidariedade (somos todos irmãos), de rejeição à acumulação capitalista de riquezas (é mais fácil um camelo passar pelo buraco de uma agulha do que um rico entrar no reino dos Céus) e de apego ao trabalho (visto como uma punição pelo Pecado Capital). 
Dito isso, recomendo sobretudo a leitura do 13° parágrafo do artigo do Ferguson, por sua atualidade.
Renato L R Marques



Like the Roman empire, Europe has let its defences crumble 

Niall Ferguson
The Sunday Times, 15 November 2015

I am not going to repeat what you have already read or heard. I am not going to say that what happened in Paris on Friday night was unprecedented horror, for it was not. I am not going to say that the world stands with France, for it is a hollow phrase. Nor am I going to applaud François Hollande’s pledge of “pitiless” vengeance, for I do not believe it. I am, instead, going to tell you that this is exactly how civilisations fall. 
Here is how Edward Gibbon described the Goths’ sack of Rome in August 410AD: “. . . In the hour of savage licence, when every passion was inflamed, and every restraint was removed . . . a cruel slaughter was made of the Romans; and . . . the streets of the city were filled with dead bodies . . . Whenever the Barbarians were provoked by opposition, they extended the promiscuous massacre to the feeble, the innocent, and the helpless. . .”
Now, does that not describe the scenes we witnessed in Paris on Friday night? True, Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, published in six volumes between 1776 and 1788, represented Rome’s demise as a slow burn. Gibbon covered more than 1,400 years of history. The causes he identified ranged from the personality disorders of individual emperors to the power of the Praetorian Guard and the rise of Sassanid Persia. Decline shaded into fall, with monotheism acting as a kind of imperial dry rot.
For many years, more modern historians of “late antiquity” tended to agree with Gibbon about the gradual nature of the process. Indeed, some went further, arguing that “decline” was an anachronistic term, like the word “barbarian”. Far from declining and falling, they insisted, the Roman empire had imperceptibly merged with the Germanic tribes, producing a multicultural post-imperial idyll that deserved a more flattering label than “Dark Ages”. Recently, however, a new generation of historians has raised the possibility that the process of Roman decline was in fact sudden — and bloody — rather than smooth. 
For Bryan Ward-Perkins, what happened was “violent seizure . . . by barbarian invaders”. The end of the Roman west, he writes in The Fall of Rome (2005), “witnessed horrors and dislocation of a kind I sincerely hope never to have to live through; and it destroyed a complex civilisation, throwing the inhabitants of the West back to a standard of living typical of prehistoric times”. 
In five decades the population of Rome itself fell by three-quarters. Archaeological evidence from the late fifth century — inferior housing, more primitive pottery, fewer coins, smaller cattle — shows that the benign influence of Rome diminished rapidly in the rest of western Europe. “The end of civilisation”, in Ward-Perkins’s phrase, came within a single generation.
Peter Heather’s Fall of the Roman Empire emphasises the disastrous effects not just of mass migration but of organised violence: first the westward shift of the Huns of Central Asia and then the Germanic irruption into Roman territory. In his reading, the Visigoths who settled in Aquitaine and the Vandals who conquered Carthage were attracted to the Roman empire by its wealth, but were enabled to seize that wealth by the arms they acquired and the skills they learnt from the Romans themselves.
“For the adventurous,” writes Heather, “the Roman empire, while being a threat to their existence, also presented an unprecedented opportunity to prosper . . . Once the Huns had pushed large numbers of [alien groups] across the frontier, the Roman state became its own worst enemy. Its military power and financial sophistication both hastened the process whereby streams of incomers became coherent forces capable of carving out kingdoms from its own body politic.” 
Uncannily similar processes are destroying the European Union today, though few of us want to recognise them for what they are. Like the Roman Empire in the early fifth century, Europe has allowed its defences to crumble. As its wealth has grown, so its military prowess has shrunk, along with its self-belief. It has grown decadent in its shopping malls and sports stadiums. At the same time it has opened its gates to outsiders who have coveted its wealth without renouncing their ancestral faith. 
The distant shock to this weakened edifice has been the Syrian civil war, though it has been a catalyst as much as a direct cause for the great Völkerwanderung of 2015. As before, they have come from all over the imperial periphery — from North Africa, from the Levant, from south Asia — but this time they have come in their millions, not in mere tens of thousands. 
To be sure, most have come hoping only for a better life. Things in their own countries have become just good enough economically for them to afford to leave and just bad enough politically for them to risk leaving. But they cannot stream northwards and westwards without some of that political malaise coming with them. As Gibbon saw, convinced monotheists pose a grave threat to a secular empire.
It is doubtless true to say that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Europe are not violent. But it is also true that the majority hold views not easily reconciled with the principles of our liberal democracies, including our novel notions about sexual equality and tolerance not merely of religious diversity but of nearly all sexual proclivities. And it is thus remarkably easy for a violent minority to acquire their weapons and prepare their assaults on civilisation within these avowedly peace-loving communities.
I do not know enough about the fifth century to be able to quote Romans who described each new act of barbarism as unprecedented, even when it had happened multiple times before; or who issued pious calls for solidarity after the fall of Rome, even when standing together meant falling together; or who issued empty threats of pitiless revenge, even when all they intended to do was to strike a melodramatic posture.
I do know that 21st-century Europe has itself to blame for the mess it is now in. Surely nowhere in the world has devoted more resources to the study of history than modern Europe did. When I went up to Oxford more than 30 years ago, it was taken for granted that in the first term I would study Gibbon. It did no good. We learnt a lot of nonsense to the effect that nationalism was a bad thing, nation states worse and empires the worst things of all.
“Romans before the fall”, wrote Ward-Perkins, “were as certain as we are today that their world would continue for ever substantially unchanged. They were wrong. We would be wise not to repeat their complacency.” 
Poor, poor Paris. Killed by complacency.
Niall Ferguson is Laurence A Tisch professor of history at Harvard, a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, and the author of Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist (Penguin)

terça-feira, 29 de setembro de 2015

Niall Ferguson me escreve para recomendar seu novo livro: Kissinger, The Idealist

Na verdade, não foi bem Niall Ferguson, mas o Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, da Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, para anunciar a publicação do seu novo livro, o primeiro volume de uma obra de dois volumes, dedicada ao Mazarino das relações internacionais contemporâneas. Bem, nesse volume ele ainda não era o Mazarino que veio a ser depois...
Bem, agradeço a recomendação, mas vou esperar o livro ficar disponível a 3 dólares na Abebooks padra comprar. Acho que Kissinger merece mais do que isso, mas não estou disposto a pagar um livro que vou ler nas livrarias nas próximas semanas, e depois esperar que caia sobre a minha mesa...
Esse primeiro volume do livro do conhecido historiador britânico, aliás escocês, do meu ponto de vista, deve até ser mais interessante por quem se dedica à história das ideias, terreno no qual Kissinger foi quase um filósofo da diplomacia contemporânea, bem mais, em todo caso, do que o susequente, segundo volume, quando ele já era um velhaco administrador da potência americana em suas projeções imperiais. Tem quem goste: eu prefiro ficar com a história das ideias.
Para isso recomendo também o livro de um filósofo da CIA, Peter Dickson: Kissinger and the Meaning of History.
Kissinger não tinha princípios? Claro que tinha, mas o seu jeito de Mazarino, justamente, não combina com minhas inclinações kantianas...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Dear Friends:

Kissinger: Volume 1: The Idealist, 1923-1968

Few figures provoke as much passionate disagreement as Henry Kissinger. Equally revered and reviled, his work as an academic, national security adviser, diplomat, and strategic thinker indelibly shaped America's role in the 20th century. Kissinger's counsel knew few boundaries: His advice was sought by every president from Kennedy to Obama. Yet the man and his ideas remain the object of profound misunderstanding.


Drawing on 50 archives around the world, including Kissinger's private papers, my new book, "Kissinger: Volume 1: The Idealist, 1923-1968," argues that America's most controversial statesman, and the cold war history he witnessed and shaped, must be seen in a new light. In this first of a two-volume history, you'll learn that:

Kissinger was far from a Machiavellian realist. At least in the first half of his career, he was an idealist, opposed to philosophies that see human actions and events as determined by factors beyond our control, such as laws of history or economic development. Kissinger rejected the idea that such "necessity" was the crucial element in human affairs. He exalted the role of human freedom, choice, and agency in shaping the world.
Kissinger worried that the United States was forfeiting its moral leverage by accepting a Soviet-framed contest over economic productivity. In a remarkable interview with ABC's Mike Wallace in July 1958, he made the startling argument that the U.S. was being insufficiently idealistic in its Cold War strategy. "I think we should go on the spiritual offensive in the world," he said. "We should identify ourselves with the revolution." The aim was not to win a contest between rival models of economic development but above all to "fill…a spiritual void," for "even Communism has made many more converts through the theological quality of Marxism than through the materialistic aspect on which it prides itself."
Kissinger believed deeply in the importance of applied history to good statecraft: "When I entered office, I brought with me a philosophy formed by two decades of the study of history," he wrote in "White House Years." "History is not, of course, a cookbook offering pretested recipes. It teaches by analogy, not by maxims. It can illuminate the consequences of actions in comparable situations, yet each generation much discover for itself what situations are in fact comparable."
A proper understanding of American history – indeed, of America's ebbing and flowing faith in itself – requires a proper understanding of Kissinger. As I note in Volume One, "In researching the life and times of Henry Kissinger, I have come to realize that … I had missed the crucial importance in American foreign policy of the history deficit: the fact that key decision-makers know almost nothing not just of other countries' pasts, but also of their own. Worse, they often do not see what is wrong with their ignorance…. What is most needed, for students of economics and international relations alike, is a stiff dose of applied history."

I am pleased to be partnering with Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs to help build a project that does just that.

I invite you to read "Kissinger: Volume One," and welcome your thoughts.

Learn More

Sincerely,
Niall Ferguson
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History, Harvard University
Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs