O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador USA. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador USA. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 10 de julho de 2018

Trade Policy in the USA: tariffs - Mises org

Woodrow Wilson and the Tariff: Lessons for Today

Theodore Roosevelt (president 1901–09) and Woodrow Wilson (president 1913–21) are the two celebrated progressive presidents. Many of today’s observers, not familiar with the detailed history of that era, fail to appreciate the fundamental importance of the tariff issue to debates of that time.

A search for “tariff” in Scott Berg’s biography, Wilson, turns up 66 hits. Then, 250 hits in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s, The Bully PulpitTheodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and the Golden Age of Journalism. Wilson’s 1913 book, The New Freedom A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People, was an edited selection of his campaign speeches. Sixty-three hits on this book.

What were the issues? The tariff was a breeding ground for corruption and unfair to those forced to pay elevated prices. The tariff reinforced the position of firms with market power — the “trusts” in the language of that time.
Wilson was thoroughly familiar with how the tariff actually worked, as he explained clearly in The New Freedom. “We have come to recognize in the tariff as it is now constructed, not a system of protection, but a system of favoritism, of privilege, too often granted secretly and by subterfuge, instead of openly and frankly and legitimately, and we have determined to put an end to the whole bad business … .”
Goodwin discusses the difficulties reformers had in making any progress in Congress. “Aware that [Senator Nelson] Aldrich had abundant experience in devising obscure classifications for each of the 4,000 duties in the tariff schedule, …” How familiar does this passage sound?
As is true of pro-tariff arguments today, obfuscation of the issues was a key mechanism of the forces supporting trade restriction during the Progressive Era. Goodwin recounts the campaign against the tariff waged by journalist Ida Tarbell. “Fifty years ago, [Tarbell wrote in 1909] wool was disposed of in perhaps fifty words, which anybody could understand; to-day it takes some three thousand, and as for intelligibility, nobody but an expert versed in the different grades of wools, of yarns, and of woolen articles could tell what the duty really is.” These tariffs pumped up the profits of American firms manufacturing woolen clothing. Tariffs raised the cost of machinery used in cotton production and reduced competition from machinery producers abroad.
Then, as now, log-rolling coalitions made reform difficult. Goodwin writes: “To Taft’s disappointment, the controversial wool schedule was not changed. The combination of ‘the Western wool growers and the Eastern wool manufacturers,’ he lamented, rendered it ‘impossible’ to get lower duties ‘through either the Committee or the House.’ ”
Wilson was a Southerner, born in Virginia and raised in Georgia and South Carolina. He understood the costs high tariffs imposed on the South. The beneficiaries were Eastern manufacturing interests. Farmers were especially disadvantaged as they paid excessive prices for farm equipment in an era of rapid mechanization of agriculture.
A key campaign promise of Wilson’s was reduction of the tariff. This he did after assuming office with the Revenue Act of 1913. Tariff reduction was good for the South and the rest of the country as well. Unfortunately, Wilson failed to institutionalize a lower tariff and did not “put an end to the whole bad business.” In 1922, Congress raised tariffs once again with the Fordney–McCumber Tariff. As I recounted recently in my Tariff of Abominations II, President Trump is taking the United States back to an unhealthy era of tariff controversy, special-interest pleading and retaliation by other countries.
Worse, President Trump has upset a painful and slow institutional process begun after World War II in moving the world toward freer trade. No country will be a winner. Wilson’s experience as president after the election of 1912 should serve as a warning. Winning a battle is not enough to win a war.
Perhaps it is time to start thinking about the tariff in an entirely different way. Starting with the Tariff Act of 1789, the US tariff has been the playground of special interests, and used as a means of rewarding political friends, and harming political enemies. If we must have a tariff, all tariffs ought to be levied at the same rate. This approach would turn the tariff principle from that of “bad business” favoritism to pure revenue.

William Poole is Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the University of Delaware. He was a member of President’s Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers 1982-85. He retired as President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in March 2008.

segunda-feira, 16 de abril de 2018

The Globalist: China among the greatest, by volume, but also by quality

O mais recente boletim de Globalist, traz algumas matérias que confrontam resultados chineses – indicadores econômicos e sociais – com os de países atualmente na vanguarda do desenvolvimento mundial. A China já é a maior economia mundial, a despeito do fato que, em termos per capita, ela ainda vai levar décadas para se equiparar aos países mais avançados.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida



China Vs. the US: Just the Facts

China Vs. the US: The GDP Race

Who leads depends on how it’s measured. | By The Globalist

China Vs. the US: Lifespan Gains

A child born in China today can expect to live decades longer than someone born in China in 1950. | By The Globalist

China Vs. Europe: Living Standards and Costs

While much of China remains poor, some cities are now on par with EU levels. | By The Globalist

China Vs. the US: Who Has More Land?

The two countries have very similar land areas for now, but China has extensive additional claims. | By The Globalist



China Vs. The US: The GDP Race

Who leads depends on how it’s measured.
9

Takeaways


  • At market prices, China’s GDP is still only about 61.7% the size of the US economy.
  • China’s economy is also more than three times greater than that of Germany, and four and a half times larger than the economies of France or the United Kingdom.
1. At market prices, China’s GDP (the size of its economy) is still only about 61.7% the size of the U.S. economy, according to International Monetary Fund estimates in 2017.
2. China is the second-largest economy in the world in nominal terms (i.e., without adjustment for local purchasing power). 
3. China’s GDP is nearly two-and-a-half times larger than that of third-ranked Japan.
4. China’s economy is also more than three times greater than that of Germany, and four and a half times larger than the economies of France or the United Kingdom.
5. Only by measuring China’s GDP in international dollars that adjust for local purchasing power does it surpass the United States’ economic size.
6. By this indicator, the U.S. economy is 84% the size of China’s. 
7. China certainly seems destined for economic pre-eminence, if current trends continue. 
8. This would be a return to China’s previous path and position in the global economy. 
9. Back in 1820, two centuries ago, the largest productive economies in the world were China and India. 
10. Together they accounted for half of the aggregate value of the global economy at the time.
Sources: IMF, Maddison Project Historical Statistics, The Globalist Research Center

terça-feira, 16 de janeiro de 2018

Aluisio Lima-Campos, Juan Antonio Gaviria: Trade Policy: lancamento (em Washington)

Eu recomendo mesmo sem ter recebido o livro e sem ver o seu conteúdo.
Mas é que conheço o autor, da embaixada do Brasil em Washington, e sei de sua expertise nos temas de políticas comerciais, na teoria, na prática, casos concretos de contenciosos envolvendo o Brasil, os EUA e outros países.
Basta ver, aliás, os nomes que comentarão o livro quando do lançamento, todos experts reconhecidos nessa mesma área.

quinta-feira, 21 de dezembro de 2017

Doutrina de seguranca dos EUA: um jogo de soma zero? - Susan Rice (NYT)

Opinion | Op-Ed Contributor

Susan Rice: When America No Longer Is a Global Force for Good

Susan Rice

The New York Times, December 21, 2017

President Trump’s National Security Strategy marks a dramatic departure from the plans of his Republican and Democratic predecessors, painting a dark, almost dystopian portrait of an “extraordinarily dangerous” world characterized by hostile states and lurking threats. There is scant mention of America’s unrivaled political, military, technological and economic strength, or the opportunities to expand prosperity, freedom and security through principled leadership — the foundation of American foreign policy since World War II.
In Mr. Trump’s estimation, we live in a world where America wins only at others’ expense. There is no common good, no international community, no universal values, only American values. America is no longer “a global force for good,” as in President Obama’s last strategy, or a “shining city on a hill,” as in President Reagan’s vision. The new strategy enshrines a zero-sum mentality: “Protecting American interests requires that we compete continuously within and across these contests, which are being played out in regions around the world.” This is the hallmark of Mr. Trump’s nationalistic, black-and-white “America First” strategy.
But the world is actually gray, and Mr. Trump’s strategy struggles to draw nuanced distinctions. Throughout, China and Russia are conflated and equated as parallel adversaries. In fact, China is a competitor, not an avowed opponent, and has not illegally occupied its neighbors. Russia, as the strategy allows, aggressively opposes NATO, the European Union, Western values and American global leadership. It brazenly seized Georgian and Ukrainian territory and killed thousands of innocents to save a dictator in Syria. Russia is our adversary, yet Mr. Trump’s strategy stubbornly refuses to acknowledge its most hostile act: directly interfering in the 2016 presidential election to advantage Mr. Trump himself.
On China and Russia, I suspect the White House realists, to escape the embarrassment of a strategy that ignored Russia’s hostile behavior, agreed to lump China with Russia and almost always mention China first, to placate their nationalist colleagues who hate China but admire Russia. The result is a flawed analysis that may actually drive Russia and China closer together.

In several respects, including nuclear weapons and arms control, weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, intelligence, cyberthreats, space policy, unfair trade practices and theft of intellectual property, the strategy falls within the bipartisan mainstream of United States national security policy, differing little from that of a more traditional Republican president. In other areas, it helpfully corrects this administration’s wavering course, as in its unequivocal embrace of United States allies and partners and reaffirmation of our Article V commitment to defend NATO. The strategy recognizes the threat from pandemics and biohazards and the importance of strengthening global health security. And it maintains at least a nominal commitment to women’s empowerment and providing generous humanitarian assistance.
But the nationalists around him succeeded in enshrining Mr. Trump’s harsh anti-immigration policies, from the border wall to ending family preferences and limiting refugee admissions. They reprised their paean to bilateral over multi-nation trade agreements and trumpeted the abrogation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would help check China’s economic and strategic expansionism in Asia. The result is an insular, ideological treatment of our complex world, substantially unimpaired by facts and dismissive of United States interests.
The plan also glaringly omits many traditional American priorities. It fails to mention the words “human rights” or “extreme poverty”; there is no talk of higher education, combating H.I.V.-AIDS or seeking a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Absent, too, is any discussion of people under 30 (who make up over 50 percent of the world’s population), of civil society or of the value of promoting democracy and universal rights. Gone is “climate change” and its threat to American national security. Neither is there any expression of concern for the rights of the oppressed, especially L.G.B.T. people. These omissions undercut global perceptions of American leadership; worse, they hinder our ability to rally the world to our cause when we blithely dismiss the aspirations of others.
The plan also contains some true howlers. It heralds diplomacy, yet Mr. Trump and his secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, have starved the State Department of resources, talent and relevance. The strategy lauds the “free press,” yet Mr. Trump routinely trashes our most respected news outlets as “fake news,” threatening their personnel and operations. And it claims the United States “rejects bigotry and oppression and seeks a future built on our values as one American people”; yet the president has denigrated women, used race-baiting language and been hesitant to criticize anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi extremists. One wonders how seriously to take a document that so starkly diverges from the president’s own words and deeds.
These contradictions matter, as does the administration’s enthusiastic embrace of a self-serving, confrontational vision of the world. National security strategies do not always leave an enduring legacy, but they are important articulations of an administration’s priorities — signposts to a world that cares deeply about America’s ambitions and interests.
The United States’s strength has long rested not only on our unmatched military and economy, but also on the power of our ideals. Relinquishing the nation’s moral authority in these difficult times will only embolden rivals and weaken ourselves. It will make a mockery of the very idea of America first.

Susan E. Rice (@AmbassadorRice), the national security adviser from 2013 to 2017 and a former United States ambassador to the United Nations, is a contributing opinion writer.
A version of this op-ed appears in print on December 21, 2017, on Page A31 of the New York edition

 

 

segunda-feira, 18 de dezembro de 2017

National Security Strategy: a nova doutrina de defesa dos EUA sob Trump - Foreign Policy

A nova Estratégia Nacional de Segurança do governo Trump parece ser tão confusa quanto o próprio, pois diz coisas que contradizem o que o presidente diz, afirma, proclama, em seus discursos e postagens de Tweet.
Abaixo um resumo por dois autores da Foreign Policy.

Situation Report
By Paul McLeary with Adam Rawnsley
National Security Daily Brief,  
Foreign Policy, December 18, 2017  

New strategy. The new National Security Strategy document set to be unveiled by President Donald Trump at 2:00 p.m. on Monday describes a world locked in unceasing economic competition, in which Washington has little time for things like promoting democracy abroad, and instead will focus on great power competition, economic rivalry, and homeland security.

Outlining the document for reporters on Sunday, several administration officials called the document a dose of  “principled realism” in an “ever-competitive world.”

Cold war is back. The document calls Russia and China “revisionist powers” seeking to change the global status quo, and paints a stark picture of the world, rejecting cooperation in favor of competition. 

The United States has to “rethink the policies of the past two decades — policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners,” the document says, according to the New York Times. “For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.” 

Preemptive war? Asked directly how the document treats the concept of preemptive war in places like North Korea and Iran, the officials were vague. One officials said, “we don’t use the term preemption, but we will defense our national interests and values when threatened.”

Democracy promotion out. The strategy also jettisons the idea of democracy promotion, traditionally a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. One official said Sunday that economic relationships will guide the administration, while “ultimately it’s their choice” in how states govern at home.

“America’s economic security is national security,” the official said. “We will demand fair and reciprocal economic relationships around the world. The economic piece gets much more attention.”

Climate change out. The document is also at odds with the long-time Pentagon recognition that climate change is a problem. “Climate change is not identified as a national security threat,” one official said, noting the new strategy was “inspired by the president’s speech” in June that pulled the United States out of the Paris Climate Accord.

But just last week however, president Trump signed off on the 2018 defense spending bill that states, “climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States,” and calls for the Pentagon to submit a report to Congress within a year listing the ten most vulnerable military installations, and what steps have to be taken to ensure they remain operational.

Earlier this year, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told Congress that “climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are operating today,” and military commanders need to “incorporate drivers of instability that impact the security environment in their areas into their planning.”

terça-feira, 31 de janeiro de 2017

This Day in History: Emancipation Act, January 31, 1865 - 113 yeas, 58 nays (NYT)

On Jan. 31, 1865, the House of Representatives passed a constitutional amendment to abolish slavery.

From Washington
Abolition Of Slavery


Passage of the Constitutional Amendment
ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEEN YEAS AGAINST FIFTY-SIX NAYS
Exciting Scene in the House
Enthusiasm Over the Result
THE PEACE MISSION IN THE SENATE
A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR INFORMATION
Passage of Retaliation Resolutions in the Senate
Special Dispatches to the New York Times
OTHER HEADLINESThe Peace Question:Its Latest Aspect: Three Commissioners Coming from Richmond: They Apply for Admission to General Grant's Lines: A Flag of Truce and a Parley: General Grant In Communication With The Government: Respected Arrival of the Commissioners at Annapolis
Washington, Tuesday, Jan. 31.
THE PASSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The great feature of the existing rebellion was the passage to-day by the House of Representatives of the resolutions submitting to the Legislatures of the several States an amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery. It was an epoch in the history of the country, and will be remembered by the members of the House and spectators present as an event in their lives. At 3 o'clock, by general consent, all discussion having ceased, the preliminary votes to reconsider and second the demand for the previous question were agreed to by a vote of 113 yeas, to 58 nays; and amid profound silence the Speaker announced that the yeas and nays would be taken directly upon the pending proposition. During the call, when prominent Democrats voted aye, there was suppressed evidence of applause and gratification exhibited in the galleries, but it was evident that the great interest centered entirely upon the final result, and when the presiding officer announced that the resolution was agreed to by yeas 119, nays 56, the enthusiasm of all present, save a few disappointed politicians, knew no bounds, and for several moments the scene was grand and impressive beyond description. No attempt was made to suppress the applause which came from all sides, every one feeling that the occasion justified the fullest expression of approbation and joy.

A "nova" anti-politica comercial de Trump e as oportunidades para a China - Alasdair Macleod

What Trump Means for Brexit, China, and the EU
by Alasdair Macleod
Mises Daily, January 31, 2017

The easy pattern of prolonged trade negotiations has been rudely interrupted by President Trump. Even before he had become president, his anticipated presence in the White House changed global attitudes and expectations. In Europe, EU officials are wrong-footed, while British trade officials cannot believe their luck.

EU officials were prepared to punish the UK knowing they could prevaricate for ever, because the EU should never, in its view, be challenged by a member state. The UK has been a disruptive member, and other members must be discouraged from following Britain’s exit at a time when there are increasing signs of rebellion by Europe’s "deplorables." Britain, having shocked its own establishment by voting for Brexit, faced the prospect of protracted negotiations with the EU that could, in the words of one British official who has since resigned, take a decade or more.

President Trump has dramatically changed the balance of power in Britain’s trade negotiations with the EU. It is probably no accident that the British approach was finally declared after Trump won the presidential election, and his attitude to trade with Britain was more friendly than Obama’s. The British negotiating strategy is remarkably sensible from a government that hasn’t until now believed in free markets, at least to the extent that it is prepared to back genuine free trade as a policy. Effectively, the EU has been told by Prime Minister Theresa May that Britain will propose, and they can take it or leave it, because Britain’s focus is now to trade relatively freely with the rest of the world. And if they don’t agree, Britain will cut corporation taxes to compensate British-based businesses from EU intransigence.

The threats from members of the European political establishment sound increasingly desperate, signaling they are waking up to the weakness of their position. They claim Britain will be cut out from the EU’s existing trade agreements. But when you look at them, you see there are only two of them with other G20 members — South Korea and Mexico. The rest are with small states, damning evidence of the failure of the EU to interact with the rest of the world. Big businesses in Europe are now switching sides, having unsuccessfully argued against a hard Brexit. They are now lobbying European governments instead for tariff-free trade with the UK.

Trump and Trade

Donald Trump apparently sees himself as bringing business priorities to government. He intends to run America in the manner of a nineteenth century mercantilist, where the priority is that America Inc. must become great again, with every able-bodied person regarded as potential contributors to the national enterprise. With respect to trade agreements, he will tear up the rules agreed between long-winded diplomats in favor of more effective business-driven resolutions, favoring America. Business negotiating strategies will be implemented, as we can see with the early signs of public negotiations between mercantilist Trump and China’s mercantilist Xi.

Britain’s free traders are likely to be at odds with Trump. He is signaling he is not interested in free trade. His attitude to the EU also marks a major change in American geopolitical thinking. Europe is now regarded as a leach, sucking America’s blood, not paying its way in NATO. Its socialism is alien to Trump. That’s the new world, as proposed by Trump, but the reality can be expected to turn out somewhat differently.

Trade Fallacies

All this would be fine, if President Trump based his understanding on the economics of trade imbalances. Like most people, he appears to think a trade deficit is the result of unfair foreign competition. It is not. It is the result of monetary expansion. In a sound money environment, everything is paid for out of real money. If I buy a foreign good, it must be matched by a fellow citizen’s export. If people change their preferences for real money, there will be a temporary surplus or deficit, but prices will rapidly adjust to find a new balance, the flows stop, and trade balances again.

In a sound-money environment, permanent or semi-permanent trade surpluses and deficits cannot exist. With unsound money, in other words if extra money is conjured up out of thin air and spent into the economy, excess demand is created, which either drives up prices domestically, or it is spent on imported goods. And given a country’s total production usually matches its total consumption, that extra money is certain to lead to an increase in imports.

It’s the cheat factor of fiat currency that’s responsible for trade imbalances, not unfair competition from foreigners. And because all countries cheat with their own fiat currencies, untangling the trade surpluses and deficits becomes a fruitless task.

We can conclude that however Trump’s trade policies turn out, America’s trade deficits will not go away. He will need to take a firm grasp of the budget deficit, and the Fed must take tighter control over the expansion of bank credit and money, both of which are unlikely.

Unintended Consequences

The Trump administration appears to be set to discourage imports by the introduction of a border tax, or discriminatory corporate income taxes. We know this will not achieve its objective, unless bank credit fails to grow. And if bank credit fails to grow despite the Fed’s desire for it to do so, a reduction in the trade deficit would be part and parcel of a contracting economy. America would then risk triggering a rerun of the depression of the 1930s, which was given an extra spin from the Smoot-Hawley tariff signed into law by President Hoover. In those days, both the dollar and sterling, as the two leading currencies, started the decade on the gold standard, which continued for the dollar after sterling abandoned it in 1931. This meant that commodity prices priced in both gold and dollars collapsed, impoverishing miners and agricultural producers worldwide. If the same thing happened today, the dollar would go down with commodity prices, because we know the Fed would expand money supply to avoid a slump. But measured in gold, commodity prices would still fall.

For now, this outcome is regarded by markets as a low risk, but given Trump’s contradictory statements on trade, it would be wrong to dismiss a Smoot-Hawley rerun. Trump’s rhetoric is indeed frighteningly similar.

China would be justified in taking the view that Trump’s intentions are protectionist, and therefore represent an escalation of the financial war between the two countries. That will depend on the outcome of negotiations between Presidents Trump and Xi. China could equally console herself with the knowledge that the dollar will become less important if gross American trade (as opposed to the net balance) diminishes because of protectionist measures. For the moment, the dollar is riding high, partly due to the declining use of the euro. But a higher dollar could be regarded as an opportunity for China to sell more Treasuries to invest in commodity stockpiles, before the dollar declines. And when the dollar declines, the yuan is likely to stabilize and become more attractive as a global trade settlement currency.

If, and it is an if, the Chinese take this view, they will not worry too much about Trump and his aggressive stance. He might be surprised that the Chinese give in on very little in the trade negotiations due to take place later this year. Their view could be that Trump is fighting yesterday’s trade war. Instead, China will be content with free trade agreements between the Pacific nations cut out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. South-East Asia will manufacture the cheap goods China used to make, because China is already upscaling her economy into services and technology, redeploying capital from the manufacture of cheap goods.

Where are Europe and Britain likely to end up in all this? The will for a rapid resolution of an Anglo-American trade agreement is there at both the White House and Downing Street. However, under the terms of Brexit, a deal cannot be signed before March 2019, which is a long time in politics. The threat of a US/UK agreement is more important as a lever to pull the EU into line, than its eventual reality. Additionally, Britain can easily sign agreements with Commonwealth members, comprised of 52 countries and a third of the world’s population. Importantly, these are the growing economies of the future. South Korea, Mexico, and the minor nations that have existing agreements with the EU should also be ready signatories, assuming the EU does not successfully pressure them not to enter agreements with the UK. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and China total another two billion, again growing more rapidly than the advanced nations, taking the potential total to well over half the world’s population.

The opportunity for Britain presented by Brexit, and facilitated by Trump’s election, is truly extraordinary, but that’s not reckoning with the politics. Politicians do not define free trade in the way that free trade should be. To politicians, free trade is a complex agreement, regulating every provision of goods and services. Free trade without politicians is simple: we can all get on with buying and selling with each other what we truly desire.

The greatest threat to world trade comes not from the break-up of the EU, nor from China. It appears to be Trump’s lack of understanding of why trade imbalances exist, and his wrongheaded policy of American protectionism.

Alasdair Macleod is the head of research at GoldMoney.