O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador dominação capitalista. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador dominação capitalista. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 21 de julho de 2013

Alemanha: um "imperio acidental" - Ulrich Beck (Social Europe Journal)

Germany Has Created An Accidental Empire

ulrich beck 124x166 Germany Has Created An Accidental EmpireAre we now living in a German Europe? In an interview with EUROPP editors Stuart A Brown and Chris Gilson, Ulrich Beck discusses German dominance of the European Union, the divisive effects of austerity policies, and the relevance of his concept of the ‘risk society’ to the current problems being experienced in the Eurozone.
How has Germany come to dominate the European Union?
Well it happened somehow by accident. Germany has actually created an ‘accidental empire’. There is no master plan; no intention to occupy Europe. It doesn’t have a military basis, so all the talk about a ‘Fourth Reich’ is misplaced. Rather it has an economic basis – it’s about economic power – and it’s interesting to see how in the anticipation of a European catastrophe, with fears that the Eurozone and maybe even the European Union might break down, the landscape of power in Europe has changed fundamentally.
First of all there’s a split between the Eurozone countries and the non-Eurozone countries. Suddenly for example the UK, which is only a member of the EU and not a member of the Eurozone, is losing its veto power. It’s a tragic comedy how the British Prime Minister is trying to tell us that he is still the one who is in charge of changing the European situation. The second split is that among the Eurozone countries there is an important division of power between the lender countries and the debtor countries. As a result Germany, the strongest economic country, has become the most powerful EU state.
Are austerity policies dividing Europe?
Indeed they are, in many ways. First of all we have a new line of division between northern European and southern European countries. Of course this is very evident, but the background from a sociological point of view is that we are experiencing the redistribution of risk from the banks, through the states, to the poor, the unemployed and the elderly. This is an amazing new inequality, but we are still thinking in national terms and trying to locate this redistribution of risk in terms of national categories.
At the same time there are two leading ideologies in relation to austerity policies. The first is pretty much based on what I call the ‘Merkiavelli’ model – by this I mean a combination of Niccolò Machiavelli and Angela Merkel. On a personal level, Merkel takes a long time to make decisions: she’s always waiting until some kind of consensus appears. But this kind of waiting makes the countries depending on Germany’s decision realise that actually Germany holds the power. This deliberate hesitation is quite an interesting strategy in terms of the way that Germany has taken over economically.
The second element is that Germany’s austerity policies are not based simply on pragmatism, but also underlying values. The German objection to countries spending more money than they have is a moral issue which, from a sociological point of view, ties in with the ‘Protestant Ethic’. It’s a perspective which has Martin Luther and Max Weber in the background. But this is not seen as a moral issue in Germany, instead it’s viewed as economic rationality. They don’t see it as a German way of resolving the crisis; they see it as if they are the teachers instructing southern European countries on how to manage their economies.
This creates another ideological split because the strategy doesn’t seem to be working so far and we see many forms of protest, of which Cyprus is the latest example. But on the other hand there is still a very important and powerful neo-liberal faction in Europe which continues to believe that austerity policies are the answer to the crisis.
Is the Eurozone crisis proof that we live in a risk society?
Yes, this is the way I see it. My idea of the risk society could easily be misunderstood because the term ‘risk’ actually signifies that we are in a situation to cope with uncertainty, but to me the risk society is a situation in which we are not able to cope with the uncertainty and consequences that we produce in society.
I make a distinction between ‘first modernity’ and our current situation. First modernity, which lasted from around the 18th century until perhaps the 1960s or 1970s, was a period where there was a great deal of space for experimentation and we had a lot of answers for the uncertainties that we produced: probability models, insurance mechanisms, and so on. But then because of the success of modernity we are now producing consequences for which we don’t have any answers, such as climate change and the financial crisis. The financial crisis is an example of the victory of a specific interpretation of modernity: neo-liberal modernity after the breakdown of the Communist system, which dictates that the market is the solution and that the more we increase the role of the market, the better. But now we see that this model is failing and we don’t have any answers.
We have to make a distinction between a risk society and a catastrophe society. A catastrophe society would be one in which the motto is ‘too late’: where we give in to the panic of desperation. A risk society in contrast is about the anticipation of future catastrophes in order to prevent them from happening. But because these potential catastrophes are not supposed to happen – the financial system could collapse, or nuclear technology could be a threat to the whole world – we don’t have the basis for experimentation. The rationality of calculating risk doesn’t work anymore. We are trying to anticipate something that is not supposed to happen, which is an entirely new situation.
Take Germany as an example. If we look at Angela Merkel, a few years ago she didn’t believe that Greece posed a major problem, or that she needed to engage with it as an issue. Yet now we are in a completely different situation because she has learned that if you look into the eyes of a potential catastrophe, suddenly new things become possible. Suddenly you think about new institutions, or about the fiscal compact, or about a banking union, because you anticipate a catastrophe which is not supposed to happen. This is a huge mobilising force, but it’s highly ambivalent because it can be used in different ways. It could be used to develop a new vision for Europe, or it could be used to justify leaving the European Union.
How should Europe solve its problems?
I would say that the first thing we have to think about is what the purpose of the European Union actually is. Is there any purpose? Why Europe and not the whole world? Why not do it alone in Germany, or the UK, or France?
I think there are four answers in this respect. First, the European Union is about enemies becoming neighbours. In the context of European history this actually constitutes something of a miracle. The second purpose of the European Union is that it can prevent countries from being lost in world politics. A post-European Britain, or a post-European Germany, is a lost Britain, and a lost Germany. Europe is part of what makes these countries important from a global perspective.
The third point is that we should not only think about a new Europe, we also have to think about how the European nations have to change. They are part of the process and I would say that Europe is about redefining the national interest in a European way. Europe is not an obstacle to national sovereignty; it is the necessary means to improve national sovereignty. Nationalism is now the enemy of the nation because only through the European Union can these countries have genuine sovereignty.
The fourth point is that European modernity, which has been distributed all over the world, is a suicidal project. It’s producing all kinds of basic problems, such as climate change and the financial crisis. It’s a bit like if a car company created a car without any brakes and it started to cause accidents: the company would take these cars back to redesign them and that’s exactly what Europe should do with modernity. Reinventing modernity could be a specific purpose for Europe.
Taken together these four points form what you could say is a grand narrative of Europe, but one basic issue is missing in the whole design. So far we’ve thought about things like institutions, law, and economics, but we haven’t asked what the European Union means for individuals. What do individuals gain from the European project? First of all I would say that, particularly in terms of the younger generation, more Europe is producing more freedom. It’s not only about the free movement of people across Europe; it’s also about opening up your own perspective and living in a space which is essentially grounded on law.
Second, European workers, but also students as well, are now confronted with the kind of existential uncertainty which needs an answer. Half of the best educated generation in Spanish and Greek history lack any future prospects. So what we need is a vision for a social Europe in the sense that the individual can see that there is not necessarily social security, but that there is less uncertainty. Finally we need to redefine democracy from the bottom up. We need to ask how an individual can become engaged with the European project. In that respect I have made a manifesto, along with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, called “We Are Europe”, arguing that we need a free year for everyone to do a project in another country with other Europeans in order to start a European civil society.
A more detailed discussion of the topics covered in this article is available in Ulrich Beck’s latest book, German Europe (Polity 2013). This interview was first published on EUROPP@LSE

terça-feira, 25 de outubro de 2011

Teorias conspiratorias: a confirmacao que faltava...

Você ainda estava em dúvida sobre se as multinacionais -- especialmente as do setor financeiro, o mais cruel de todos -- realmente dominam o mundo, determinam a sua vida (e até dão uma espiada em seus segredos sem o seu consentimento) e conspiram para que você sempre fique prisioneiro de seus tentáculos malévolos e pague sempre para maior lucro e glória delas mesmas?
Não tenha mais dúvidas, aqui está a comprovação: a rede capitalista que a tudo açambarca, a tudo abraça, tudo embarca nos seus porões secretos, e nos emborca no abismo infinito das perdições consumistas, devidamente comprovada por pesquisadores sérios, cientistas do mais alto gabarito, que confirmam, enfim, as piores suspeitas dos paranoicos de sempre.
Fique tranquilo, o mundo não vai acabar: outras multinacionais surgirão...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Matemáticos revelam rede capitalista que domina o mundo
Da New Scientist - 22/10/2011
Visão crítica: Revelada a rede capitalista que domina o mundo
Este gráfico mostra as interconexões entre o grupo de 1.318 empresas transnacionais que formam o núcleo da economia mundial. O tamanho de cada ponto representa o tamanho da receita de cada uma.[Imagem: Vitali et al.]
Além das ideologias
Conforme os protestos contra o capitalismo se espalham pelo mundo, os manifestantes vão ganhando novos argumentos.
Uma análise das relações entre 43.000 empresas transnacionais concluiu que um pequeno número delas - sobretudo bancos - tem um poder desproporcionalmente elevado sobre a economia global.
A conclusão é de três pesquisadores da área de sistemas complexos do Instituto Federal de Tecnologia de Lausanne, na Suíça.
Este é o primeiro estudo que vai além das ideologias e identifica empiricamente essa rede de poder global.
"A realidade é complexa demais, nós temos que ir além dos dogmas, sejam eles das teorias da conspiração ou do livre mercado," afirmou James Glattfelder, um dos autores do trabalho. "Nossa análise é baseada na realidade."
Rede de controle econômico mundial
A análise usa a mesma matemática empregada há décadas para criar modelos dos sistemas naturais e para a construção de simuladores dos mais diversos tipos. Agora ela foi usada para estudar dados corporativos disponíveis mundialmente.
O resultado é um mapa que traça a rede de controle entre as grandes empresas transnacionais em nível global.
Estudos anteriores já haviam identificado que algumas poucas empresas controlam grandes porções da economia, mas esses estudos incluíam um número limitado de empresas e não levavam em conta os controles indiretos de propriedade, não podendo, portanto, ser usados para dizer como a rede de controle econômico poderia afetar a economia mundial - tornando-a mais ou menos instável, por exemplo.
O novo estudo pode falar sobre isso com a autoridade de quem analisou uma base de dados com 37 milhões de empresas e investidores.
A análise identificou 43.060 grandes empresas transnacionais e traçou as conexões de controle acionário entre elas, construindo um modelo de poder econômico em escala mundial.
Poder econômico mundial
Refinando ainda mais os dados, o modelo final revelou um núcleo central de 1.318 grandes empresas com laços com duas ou mais outras empresas - na média, cada uma delas tem 20 conexões com outras empresas.
Mais do que isso, embora este núcleo central de poder econômico concentre apenas 20% das receitas globais de venda, as 1.318 empresas em conjunto detêm a maioria das ações das principais empresas do mundo - as chamadas blue chipsnos mercados de ações.
Em outras palavras, elas detêm um controle sobre a economia real que atinge 60% de todas as vendas realizadas no mundo todo.
E isso não é tudo.
Super-entidade econômica
Quando os cientistas desfizeram o emaranhado dessa rede de propriedades cruzadas, eles identificaram uma "super-entidade" de 147 empresas intimamente inter-relacionadas que controla 40% da riqueza total daquele primeiro núcleo central de 1.318 empresas.
"Na verdade, menos de 1% das companhias controla 40% da rede inteira," diz Glattfelder.
E a maioria delas são bancos.
Os pesquisadores afirmam em seu estudo que a concentração de poder em si não é boa e nem ruim, mas essa interconexão pode ser.
Como o mundo viu durante a crise de 2008, essas redes são muito instáveis: basta que um dos nós tenha um problema sério para que o problema se propague automaticamente por toda a rede, levando consigo a economia mundial como um todo.
Eles ponderam, contudo, que essa super-entidade pode não ser o resultado de uma conspiração - 147 empresas seria um número grande demais para sustentar um conluio qualquer.
A questão real, colocam eles, é saber se esse núcleo global de poder econômico pode exercer um poder político centralizado intencionalmente.
Eles suspeitam que as empresas podem até competir entre si no mercado, mas agem em conjunto no interesse comum - e um dos maiores interesses seria resistir a mudanças na própria rede.
As 50 primeiras das 147 empresas transnacionais super conectadas
  1. Barclays plc
  2. Capital Group Companies Inc
  3. FMR Corporation
  4. AXA
  5. State Street Corporation
  6. JP Morgan Chase & Co
  7. Legal & General Group plc
  8. Vanguard Group Inc
  9. UBS AG
  10. Merrill Lynch & Co Inc
  11. Wellington Management Co LLP
  12. Deutsche Bank AG
  13. Franklin Resources Inc
  14. Credit Suisse Group
  15. Walton Enterprises LLC
  16. Bank of New York Mellon Corp
  17. Natixis
  18. Goldman Sachs Group Inc
  19. T Rowe Price Group Inc
  20. Legg Mason Inc
  21. Morgan Stanley
  22. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc
  23. Northern Trust Corporation
  24. Société Générale
  25. Bank of America Corporation
  26. Lloyds TSB Group plc
  27. Invesco plc
  28. Allianz SE 29. TIAA
  29. Old Mutual Public Limited Company
  30. Aviva plc
  31. Schroders plc
  32. Dodge & Cox
  33. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc*
  34. Sun Life Financial Inc
  35. Standard Life plc
  36. CNCE
  37. Nomura Holdings Inc
  38. The Depository Trust Company
  39. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
  40. ING Groep NV
  41. Brandes Investment Partners LP
  42. Unicredito Italiano SPA
  43. Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan
  44. Vereniging Aegon
  45. BNP Paribas
  46. Affiliated Managers Group Inc
  47. Resona Holdings Inc
  48. Capital Group International Inc
  49. China Petrochemical Group Company