O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador ensaio. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador ensaio. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 22 de dezembro de 2021

Livro de Bruno Sampaio da Costa: Processo Civilizador nas Exposições de Motivos dos Códigos de Processo Civil: um ensaio - meu orientando

Uma das últimas publicações identificadas deste ano de 2021 (outras podem estar correndo por aí):

1431. “Uma leitura original das Exposições de Motivos aos Códigos de Processo Civil”, Orelhas ao livro de Bruno Sampaio da Costa, Processo Civilizador nas Exposições de Motivos dos CPCs: um ensaio (São Paulo: Editora Dialética, 2021, 152 p.; ISBN: 978-6525209920). Relação de Originais n. 3955.


O livro está disponível na Amazon, neste link.



Transcrevo abaixo o texto da orelha: 

Uma leitura original das Exposições de Motivos aos Códigos de Processo Civil 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(www.pralmeida.orghttp://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

[Objetivocontracapa ao livro de Bruno Sampaio da CostafinalidadeProcesso Civilizador nas Exposições de Motivos dos CPCs: um ensaio]

 

 

Constituições, códigos e outros instrumentos relativos à organização legal de um determinado país costumam refletir o espírito da época, o chamado Zeitgeist. Oliveira Viana, um dos primeiros sociólogos do Brasil dizia, num de seus trabalhos dos anos 1920, que havia uma incompatibilidade entre o Brasil real e o Brasil legal, e que o fato de no país se valorizar mais a Autoridade do que a Liberdade era devido a que o povo não demonstrava sentimentos de solidariedade social como talvez se encontrassem nos povos europeus, em especial no povo anglo-saxão, daí a ausência de liberalismo no Brasil. Ele se colocou, em consequência, a serviço dos interesses corporativos das elites, em especial do autoritarismo do Estado Novo.

Pois foi no Estado Novo que Francisco Campos, outro arauto do autoritarismo tupiniquim, elaborou a Exposição de Motivos ao Código de Processo Civil de 1939; foi também sob uma outra ditadura, o regime militar que perdurou de 1964 a 1985, que outro defensor do autoritarismo, Alfredo Buzaid, elaborou sua Exposição de Motivos ao Código de 1973. Mas, já foi no contexto de abertura que se seguiu à democratização retomada em 1985 que uma Comissão de Juristas elaborou a Exposição de Motivos ao CPC de 2015. 

Bruno Sampaio da Costa mobilizou a metodologia elaborada pelo sociólogo Norbert Elias a respeito do “processo civilizador”, para examinar detidamente as três exposições de motivos aos Códigos respectivos de 1939, 1973 e 2015, evidenciando justamente a dinâmica social, ideológica, em uma palavra, civilizatória, que marcaram as introduções a essas três peças de três momentos diferentes da evolução política do Brasil.  Seu livro, Processo Civilizador nas Exposições de Motivos dos CPCs, constitui justamente uma leitura original, inédita para os padrões deste tipo de análise, sobre nosso próprio processo civilizador numa área das mais relevantes para os atuais sentimentos de solidariedade na sociedade brasileira.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor.

 

[Brasília, 3955, 2 de agosto de 2021]

 

domingo, 28 de novembro de 2021

A diplomacia brasileira da independência: heranças e permanências (ensaio e apresentação) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Abaixo, início de meu ensaio sobre o tema-título, remetendo ao arquivo disponibilizado em Academia.edu, seguido da referência à apresentação preparada para a aula magna: 

4018. “A diplomacia brasileira da independência: heranças e permanências”, Brasília, 15 novembro 2021, 26 p. Ensaio preparado especialmente para Aula Magna na Universidade Federal Fluminense (dia 29/11, de 9 a 11h), a convite do Prof. Danilo Sorato. Preparada apresentação em Power Point, em 24/11/2021, sob n. 4023. Disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/62641768/4018_A_diplomacia_brasileira_da_independencia_heranças_e_permanencias_2021_).

4023. A diplomacia brasileira da independência: Apresentação”, Brasília, 24 novembro 2021, 30 slides. Apresentação em formato de PowerPoint, seguindo de forma flexível o trabalho n. 4018, preparada para Aula Magna na Universidade Federal Fluminense (dia 29/11, de 9 a 11h), a convite do Prof. Danilo Sorato. Divulgada na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/62644789/4023_A_diplomacia_brasileira_da_independencia_Apresentacao_2021_).


 A diplomacia brasileira da independência: heranças e permanências

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

  

Sumário:

1. Introdução: a diplomacia e a política externa na independência do Brasil

2. O primeiro registro oficial da autonomia: o Arquivo Diplomático da Independência

3. Uma outra independência: uma história alternativa da construção do Estado

4. A Bacia do Prata e a Cisplatina: a primeira guerra do Brasil (herdada de Portugal)

5. A lamentável diplomacia do tráfico escravo: defendendo o indefensável

6. Conclusão: a diplomacia brasileira na construção do Estado

 

 

1. Introdução: a diplomacia e a política externa na independência do Brasil

Este ensaio, de caráter histórico e analítico, trata das questões internacionais afetando o Brasil desde quando suas relações exteriores estavam inseridas no contexto da diplomacia portuguesa do final do século XVIII e início do XIX, período caracterizado pelas guerras napoleônicas e suas consequências para os dois reinos ibéricos e suas colônias americanas. Ele se ocupa apenas dos temas mais importantes, como as relações regionais e o problema do tráfico e da escravidão, à exclusão, no entanto, das questões estritamente comerciais, bastante conhecidas e trabalhadas pela historiografia do período, com ampla bibliografia sobre a questão – desde Hipólito da Costa, passando por Oliveira Lima e chegando a Roberto Simonsen e Celso Furtado –, a partir dos tratados entre Portugal e Grã-Bretanha de 1810, cujos dispositivos foram prolongados na Independência até o início do Segundo Reinado. Essa primeira fase, está marcada pela abertura dos portos em 1808 e pelo tratado de comércio de 1810, que dá 15% de tarifas para Grã-Bretanha, alíquota inferior à do próprio Portugal. Os grandes temas da diplomacia econômica do Brasil no século XIX foram amplamente tratados pelo autor na obra Formação da Diplomacia Econômica no Brasil (2017).

A questão da historiografia brasileira sobre a independência sofre, desde muito tempo, praticamente desde o início do regime republicano, de alguns dos mesmos vieses interpretativos que Bolívar Lamounier acusou, recentemente, na segunda edição de seu livro sobre dois séculos de política brasileira, a propósito da historiografia política, no sentido de preservar certo “economicismo dogmático” que a tinha caracterizado desde os anos 1950:

A partir da Segunda Guerra Mundial, numerosos autores e praticamente todo o meio universitário puseram em relevo os efeitos da colonização portuguesa e nossas relações de dependência econômica em relação à Inglaterra e aos Estados Unidos, mas poucos deram a devida atenção à construção institucional da democracia representativa, cujo início remonta à Independência e à Constituição de 1824. (Lamounier, 2021, p. 12)

 

No caso da historiografia da independência – abstraindo-se a visão gloriosa do reino dos Braganças, criada pelo pai da historiografia brasileira, Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, de certa forma continuada por alguns dos seus seguidores, entre eles Hélio Vianna –, a interpretação que começa com Manoel Bonfim e que se prolonga em Caio Prado Jr., José Honório Rodrigues e em números outros pesquisadores universitários, tende justamente a enfatizar o peso da herança colonial portuguesa e da estrutura escravocrata-latifundiária e oligárquica que continuou impérvia na nação independente como uma espécie de “pé-de-chumbo” a moldar nossas instituições políticas e estruturas sociais, como se fossem algo equivalente a um “pecado original” do qual o Estado nascente não pudesse se libertar. É verdade que tanto os “efeitos da colonização portuguesa”, quanto “nossas relações de dependência econômica em relação à Inglaterra e aos Estados Unidos”, marcaram determinadas políticas ao longo do século XIX e do seguinte, mas é também verdade que as elites brasileiras, quaisquer que fossem, sempre detiveram ampla latitude de manobra para moldar o Estado e as instituições, desde o início, e nos ajustes constitucionais, golpes militares e outras crises políticas subsequentes. 

O Brasil monárquico do século XIX, assim como o republicano do século XX é o resultado de arranjos no seio das elites e não um simples derivativo de séculos de estatuto colonial ou qualquer tipo de dominação estrangeira no período subsequente. O que se pretende neste ensaio é reler a historiografia da independência com vistas a colocar o foco nos problemas iniciais com que se defrontou nossa primeira diplomacia, a de uma nação que emergia, ainda na fase regencial do príncipe D. Pedro e, logo em seguida, no primeiro gabinete do Estado independente, nos dois casos dominada pela figura de José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, o virtual “primeiro-ministro” por breve tempo. No que se refere à construção da instituição diplomática, ao longo de quase dois séculos de funcionamento efetivo, cabe remeter, para a devida remissão às fontes oficiais, à pesquisa documental de Flávio Mendes de Oliveira Castro sobre a organização do Itamaraty (2009).

(...) 

Ler a íntegra do ensaio na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/62641768/4018_A_diplomacia_brasileira_da_independencia_heranças_e_permanencias_2021_).


Apresentação em Power Point, focando na bibliografia do período, neste link: 

https://www.academia.edu/62644789/4023_A_diplomacia_brasileira_da_independencia_Apresentacao_2021_


sexta-feira, 4 de junho de 2021

Planejamento Econômico no Brasil: uma visão de longo prazo, 1934-2006 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Planejamento Econômico no Brasil: 

uma visão de longo prazo, 1934-2006

 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 “Planejamento Econômico no Brasil: uma visão de longo prazo, 1934-2006”. In: João Paulo Peixoto (org.): Governando o Governo: modernização da administração pública no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 2008, 139 p.; ISBN: 978-85-224-5105-0; p. 71-106). Relação de Trabalhos n. 1637. Publicados n. 844.

 

 

Sumário:

 

1. Introdução: a experiência brasileira de planejamento econômico

2. O nascimento do Estado intervencionista: do Império à República

3. Construindo o Estado desenvolvimentista (1934-1945)

4. Primeiras experiências de planejamento governamental no Brasil (1946-1955)

5. O Plano de Metas de JK: a mística do desenvolvimentismo (1956-1960)

6. O Plano Trienal: a economia vitimada pela política (1961-1963)

7. O Paeg do governo militar: o Estado interventor (1964-1967)

8. O planejamento se consolida: o Plano Decenal e o PED (1968-1970)

9. O planejamento na era militar: o I e o II PND (1970-1985)

10. Instabilidade macroeconômica e planos tentativos de estabilização (1986-1994)

11. A experiência do “Brasil 2020”, da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (1998)

12. O Projeto Brasil 3 Tempos, do Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos (2004-2006)

13. O planejamento do desenvolvimento na experiência brasileira

 

Resumo: Ensaio de caráter histórico sobre os diferentes planos de desenvolvimento e de estabilização econômica conduzidos no Brasil desde o início da era republicana até os dias atuais, com ênfase nas suas modalidades, metodologias e resultados efetivos.

 

Palavras-chave: Brasil; planejamento econômico; intervenção do Estado na economia.

 

 Ler a íntegra deste trabalho nos seguintes links: 

1637) Planejamento Economico no Brasil: uma visao de longo prazo (Book 2006)

https://www.academia.edu/49126593/1637_Planejamento_Economico_no_Brasil_uma_visao_de_longo_prazo_Book_2006_


terça-feira, 23 de março de 2021

O neoliberalismo e os seus descontentes - Christian Edward Cyril Lynch (FSP)

 Ainda vou retrucar este ensaio: mas como já são 3h45 da madrugada, e acabo de tomar uma supercaipirinha de Pisco, vou deixar para depois...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


LIBERAIS, NEOLIBERAIS, POLÍTICA E MERCADO!

(Christian Edward Cyril Lynch, autor de ‘Da Monarquia à Oligarquia: História Institucional e Pensamento Político Brasileiro - Ilustríssima - Folha de S.Paulo, 21) O tema do neoliberalismo está em voga desde a década de 1980, quando a crise da social-democracia europeia trouxe a crítica do planejamento econômico pelo Estado e a defesa do liberalismo econômico como fórmula capaz de superar a estagnação.

Nos últimos dez anos, seu prestígio cresceu e seus partidários aderiram à chamada "nova direita", parte da qual viria a apoiar o governo Bolsonaro. O debate público sobre o conceito de liberalismo é intenso. Hoje, o tema guarda grande atualidade, tendo em vista o referido endosso de Paulo Guedes e de maioria dos neoliberais brasileiros às tendências conservadoras e autoritárias de Jair Bolsonaro.

Entre os pretendentes dessa ideologia política, a querela gira em torno de um liberalismo democrático inimigo do autoritarismo político (a vertente liberal democrata), que mantém relações pragmáticas com a economia, e um outro, para quem a liberdade política depende essencialmente da econômica, ponto de vista segundo o qual o verdadeiro autoritarismo seria a intervenção do Estado na economia (a vertente neoliberal).

Os neoliberais se apresentam como “liberais”, ou como sendo os “autênticos liberais”, alinhando-se, todavia, a pautas reconhecidamente conservadoras em sua dimensão política. Tentam, assim, conciliar em abstrato a distinção histórica entre conservadorismo e liberalismo, sem deixar de aderir a uma coalizão de vocação autoritária, que conta com conservadores reacionários (olavistas) e estatistas (militares).

Eles enfrentam sempre a oposição de outros “liberais”, que se pretendem progressistas e negam a compatibilidade entre liberalismo e conservadorismo ou autoritarismo político.

Vários estudiosos conferiram grande importância à questão das chamadas famílias, tradições ou linhagens do pensamento político brasileiro. Esse tipo de classificação tem entre suas vantagens a capacidade de servir de anteparo ao presentismo: a tentação de ver os problemas do momento atual como puramente inéditos. Assim, podemos revisitar a tradição do liberalismo brasileiro, buscando suas regularidades no tempo.

Desde o começo do século 19, os liberais associaram o suposto atraso brasileiro a um problema de origem. A baixa capacidade de os portugueses estabelecerem as bases de uma civilização moderna nos trópicos, a influência da Igreja Católica, a concentração da grande propriedade agrária e a escravidão teriam produzido uma sociedade civicamente egoísta, indiferente à ciência, dependente de um Estado autoritário e patrimonial, avessa ao indivíduo autônomo e incapaz de cooperação —como descrito, por exemplo, por Raymundo Faoro em “Os Donos do Poder” (1958).

Para além do transplante de instituições anglo-saxãs, o programa liberal inspirado por Stuart Mill tem se pautado por políticas públicas voltadas para a abertura comercial e cultural, para a descentralização político-administrativa, desregulação econômica e redução da burocracia.

Do ponto de vista político, o liberalismo brasileiro de tendência democrática manifesta um certo centrismo. O mais destacado intelectual liberal brasileiro do período pós-independência, Evaristo da Veiga, já celebrava a moderação como a virtude política por excelência. Essa postura confere aos liberais um dinamismo de se deslocar para a direita ou para a esquerda, conforme percebam a ameaça autoritária vindo de um dos lados opostos, socialista ou conservador.

No governo, o liberalismo democrático brasileiro tende a ser mais cauteloso, hesitando a respeito da conveniência e do ritmo da expansão dos direitos sociais e políticos. Acreditando que a colonização teria conformado uma sociedade inclinada a soluções políticas messiânicas, populistas e estatistas, os liberais acabam por não confiar no “bom senso” das massas. Daí a tendência a um excesso de moderação que conduz ao elitismo, ou seja, a circunscrever o centro decisório a uma minoria homogênea de cidadãos em termos de renda e cultura.

Desde que a democratização começou a surgir no horizonte, a partir da Campanha Abolicionista com Joaquim Nabuco e, depois, com a Campanha Civilista de Rui Barbosa, a classe média entrou no radar dos liberais. Como segmento social, exprimiria as qualidades da sociedade civil, por sua sensibilidade a temas como participação política, liberdade, mérito e moralidade.

Entretanto, por vezes, os liberais democráticos se perceberam em um clima de polarização entre a esquerda e a direita radicais que reduzia o seu espaço de atuação em defesa das liberdades públicas e inclinava o país para o autoritarismo. A sociedade brasileira parecia não se adequar à pedagogia dos valores cosmopolitas liberais.

Inoculada nas massas, a hostilidade a esses valores inclinaram-nas à tutela de um líder carismático; daí a fortuna de um conceito controverso como o de “populismo” tanto entre liberais quanto entre socialistas cosmopolitas. Tal diagnóstico leva muitos liberais democráticos a periodicamente advogarem mecanismos institucionais como o parlamentarismo e o judiciarismo.

Este último é uma velha aspiração que data da queda da Monarquia e encontrou seus grandes defensores em Rui Barbosa e Pedro Lessa, para quem a República transferira para o Supremo Tribunal a função arbitral exercida antes pelo Poder Moderador.

Somente na Nova República, todavia, com a retirada de cena do Exército, o judiciarismo se tornou hegemônico, auxiliado pelo desenho institucional da Constituição de 1988. No começo do século 21, voltou a ser apresentado como um remédio para as tendências corruptoras e oligárquicas da representação política.

Em épocas de polarização e crise aguda do Estado de Direito, quando as instituições constitucionais parecem indiferentes ou hostis à cultura do liberalismo, nasceu frequentemente entre os liberais democratas brasileiros a tentação do golpismo.

Desde 1889, o liberalismo nacional tendeu a encarar esse recurso como legítimo em momentos críticos para salvar a liberdade contra seus inimigos percebidos como autoritários. Quem melhor representou essa ambiguidade foi o próprio Rui Barbosa. O temor de um eventual reinado reacionário da princesa Isabel o fez embarcar no golpe militar e a se tornar ministro da ditadura republicana, interpretada por ele como um autoritarismo transitório que preparava um Estado de Direito mais sólido, conforme o figurino estadunidense.

Depois de combater o militarismo dos presidentes Floriano Peixoto e Hermes da Fonseca, Rui voltou a cogitar a intervenção do Exército no começo dos anos 1920, quando lhe pareceu que a República marchava de novo para o autoritarismo.

O golpe de 1964 também foi apoiado por liberais democratas, a exemplo de Afonso Arinos e Carlos Lacerda, como um breve período de exceção destinado a afastar o risco de ameaça comunista. Na prática, em todas essas ocasiões, os liberais brasileiros só participaram de uma “jornada de otários”, que precipitou o advento de um autoritarismo de direita que terminou por voltar-se contra eles e persegui-los como subversivos.

Embora se imagine sempre uma correlação automática entre liberalismo econômico e político, essa relação, ao longo dos últimos três séculos, é mais complexa e nem sempre de fácil distinção. Se a liberdade de mercado é parte das liberdades modernas, o foco sobre a liberdade política, aquela plasmada na forma dos direitos e das garantias constitucionais, distingue o liberalismo democrático daquele que via no livre mercado o objetivo principal de uma ordem liberal.

A esta última vertente poderíamos chamar de libertarianismo econômico, ou neoliberalismo. Surgido pelas mãos de Herbert Spencer por volta de 1880 como reação ao processo de democratização política, impulsionado pelo socialismo e pelo alargamento do sufrágio, o neoliberalismo consiste em um híbrido de liberalismo e conservadorismo: ao mesmo tempo em que apresenta características liberais, como o individualismo, eleva o mercado à condição de gerador e ordenador da vida social, intangível porque produto de forças extra-humanas —uma suposta “ordem espontânea” do universo social fruto da interação não planificada entre os indivíduos.

Os neoliberais apresentam seus argumentos em uma roupagem supostamente “técnica” ou “científica”, defendendo suas posições como as únicas “realistas”, não capturadas pela tentação idealista e normativa da mentalidade planificadora e maximizadora do Estado que teria marcado as ideologias democráticas desde o século 18, como se notaria tanto nos liberais quanto nos socialistas.

Na ideologia neoliberal, a função do Estado é essencialmente a preservação das condições de competição dos indivíduos no mercado. A justiça social é produto das leis do mercado, cujo livre funcionamento por parte de empresários “empreendedores” e criativos, em um contexto de população tecnicamente educada, geraria de forma mais ou menos automática riqueza pública e emprego, através de sucessivos ganhos de produtividade.

Para os neoliberais, o Brasil estaria sempre patinando entre a barbárie e a estupidez, carecendo constantemente de abertura comercial e financeira para o mercado exterior. Aqui, empreender teria muito mais obstáculos a enfrentar devido à ausência de uma cultura moderna, ou seja, capitalista. Em contraste, os países do Atlântico Norte costumam ser referenciados como modelares.

O cosmopolitismo neoliberal demonstra, coerentemente, grande apreço a organismos internacionais —mas não os de caráter político, como a Liga das Nações ou a ONU, enaltecidas pelos liberais democratas, e sim os financeiros, como o FMI, bancos e empresas multinacionais.

E se é verdade que ambas as tradições liberais podem ter uma aproximação instrumental com o autoritarismo, no caso dos neoliberais essa dimensão é muito mais acentuada. De todo esse diagnóstico negativo dos libertários econômicos sobre a situação do Brasil resultava um descompromisso ainda maior com a democracia.

A necessidade de um choque civilizador de capitalismo vindo de fora justificava métodos autoritários. A marca acentuadamente demofóbica já estava presente nos fundadores libertários da República, como os irmãos Alberto e Campos Sales, que ajudaram a urdir o golpe de 1889 contra os liberais e defendiam a toda força o presidencialismo, na crença de que só um governo forte e enérgico poderia enfrentar o “socialismo”.

No século 20, Eugênio Gudin e Roberto Campos demonstraram idêntico descaso com o regime democrático. Diziam que as constituições de 1946 e 1988, por não corresponderem às suas doutrinas, eram produtos da ignorância e da utopia. Como nenhuma delas resolvia os problemas do país, duravam pouco e mereciam, por isso, o desprezo geral.

Muitas tensões marcaram a convivência dos dois liberalismos, o democrático e o neoliberal, em nosso país. Para Rui Barbosa, o presidente Campos Sales era o grande artífice do conservadorismo da Primeira República. Ele acusava Sales de autoritário, oligarca e corruptor, assim como via na política neoliberal de seu ministro da Fazenda, Joaquim Murtinho, uma cortina de fumaça doutrinária destinada a favorecer os interesses internacionais. Já Sales e Murtinho chamavam Rui de subversivo e tendente ao socialismo, criticando sua política econômica.

Quando o regime militar impôs a Constituição de 1967, o liberal democrata Afonso Arinos também se queixou de que a nova Carta continha “excessivo liberalismo econômico em contraste com o autoritarismo político”. Em defesa dela, os neoliberais Gudin e Roberto Campos justificaram o fortalecimento do Executivo pela necessidade de passar as reformas modernizadoras de corte libertário.

Roberto Campos também se estranhou publicamente com Carlos Lacerda, quando este atacou sua política neoliberal como própria de tecnocratas e defendeu uma abordagem pragmática da economia. No livro “Brasil entre a Verdade e a Mentira” (1965), Lacerda invocou em seu apoio a autoridade de Rui Barbosa, cuja obra defendeu contra Murtinho e Campos.

Apoiador de primeira hora do golpe militar, Lacerda acabou preso após o AI-5 e teve seus direitos políticos cassados. Também para ele, a adesão ao golpismo resultou numa “jornada de otários”. A história se repetiu recentemente, com a adesão dos liberais democratas ao lavajatismo como método de deposição da esquerda. Ao invés de chegarem ao reino da liberdade republicana, esquentaram a cama para Jair Bolsonaro se deitar.

Depois de 1990, os liberais democratas recuperariam o discurso do liberalismo econômico, voltando a apresentar um ponto de contato com os neoliberais. Nem por isso se tornariam a mesma coisa. Em suas memórias, “A Lanterna na Popa” (1994), Roberto Campos lamentou as brigas com Arinos e Lacerda: “Foi tudo um grande desencontro...”. Ele estava errado. Embora aparentados do ponto de vista “macro ideológico”, o liberalismo democrático e o neoliberalismo, como já se percebia então, são ideologias distintas.

O liberalismo democrático, que representa o tronco principal da linhagem, na segunda metade do século 19 já havia, por meio de Stuart Mill, renunciado a aspectos secundários da doutrina, como o voto censitário e o liberalismo econômico, vinculados ao governo oligárquico e plutocrático.

O neoliberalismo, ao contrário, surgiu como uma reação conservadora à adaptação do liberalismo ao ambiente democrático, destinado a preservar a dimensão oligárquica e plutocrática do Estado de Direito. Onde os liberais viam democracia, os neoliberais passaram a ver socialismo. Longe de preservar o liberalismo oitocentista, os neoliberais deliberadamente o reformularam, modificando seus fundamentos, para se concentrar, quase que exclusivamente, na defesa do Estado mínimo.

O atual contencioso em torno do autoritarismo conservador de Bolsonaro demonstra com clareza a distinção de neoliberais e liberais democratas. A adesão de Paulo Guedes e seus admiradores ao bolsonarismo representa somente a manifestação, nos dias de hoje, do genótipo característico dos neoliberais brasileiros, de natureza plutocrática e oligárquica.

Basta lembrar que no passado apoiaram as ditaduras dos marechais Deodoro da Fonseca e Floriano Peixoto, a oligárquica República Velha e o regime militar de 1964 durante pelo menos dez anos. Como diz o Eclesiastes, não há nada de novo sob o sol...


domingo, 7 de junho de 2020

Colaboradores ou colaboracionistas? - Ensaio de Anne Applebaum

History Will Judge the Complicit - Anne Applebaum
The AtlanticJuly/August 2020 print edition with the headline “The Collaborators.”

O artigo da reputada historiadora americana Anne Applebaum – autora de muitos livros sobre o mundo comunista, entre eles sobre o Gulag, a Europa central sob dominação soviética, o Holodomor stalinista na Ucrânia e vários outros – trata de uma questão que me interessa particularmente, não tanto da perspectiva prática, mas do ponto de vista da história das ideias, e da postura que pessoas com envolvimento político podem ou devem adotar no caso de mudanças relevantes de orientação política, ou até de regime. Ela começa pela história do comunismo na Europa dominada pela União Soviética, mas também trata da situação dos EUA atualmente, sob um presidente "heterodoxo", digamos assim. Seu julgamento está resumido no título: a História julgará os cúmplices (mas que poderíamos talvez minimizar para “complacentes”).
Meu interesse se centra justamente nessa questão: por que alguns escolhem colaborar com um governo, ou um regime qualquer, e como essas pessoas são levadas a isso, e por que outros decidem se afastar, ou até a se opor à nova situação? Não se pode afastar a realidade objetiva que aproxima a situação do Brasil daquela do comunismo soviético, ou da administração Trump, atualmente.
Estas são as motivações que me levaram a selecionar alguns trechos do longo artigo de Anne Applebaum, que pode ser lido em sua integridade no link acima indicado. 
Convido todos a lê-lo, mas creio que minha seleção de trechos ajuda a apresentar os argumentos mais relevantes.
Ela começa por apresentar a história de dois jovens comunistas alemães, educados na União Soviética durante a “grande guerra patriótica”, e que depois seguiram caminhos diferentes na instalação da RDA: um continuou servindo ao regime, e se tornou o famoso chefe da espionagem da Stasi, o outro fugiu para o Ocidente em 1949. 
A pergunta central de Anne Applebaum é esta: 
One man proved willing to betray ideas and ideals that he had once stood for. The other refused. Why?
Esta é também a pergunta que faço, em relação ao governo atual. Deixo as respostas em aberto, para a consciência de cada um.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Brasília, 7 de junho de 2020


Trechos selecionados

(…)

In English, the word collaborator has a double meaning. A colleague can be described as a collaborator in a neutral or positive sense. But the other definition of collaborator, relevant here, is different: someone who works with the enemy, with the occupying power, with the dictatorial regime. In this negative sense, collaborator is closely related to another set of words: collusioncomplicityconnivance. This negative meaning gained currency during the Second World War, when it was widely used to describe Europeans who cooperated with Nazi occupiers. At base, the ugly meaning of collaborator carries an implication of treason: betrayal of one’s nation, of one’s ideology, of one’s morality, of one’s values.
Since the Second World War, historians and political scientists have tried to explain why some people in extreme circumstances become collaborators and others do not. The late Harvard scholar Stanley Hoffmann had firsthand knowledge of the subject—as a child, he and his mother hid from the Nazis in Lamalou-les-Bains, a village in the south of France. But he was modest about his own conclusions, noting that “a careful historian would have—almost—to write a huge series of case histories; for there seem to have been almost as many collaborationisms as there were proponents or practitioners of collaboration.” Still, Hoffmann made a stab at classification, beginning with a division of collaborators into “voluntary” and “involuntary.” Many people in the latter group had no choice. Forced into a “reluctant recognition of necessity,” they could not avoid dealing with the Nazi occupiers who were running their country.
Hoffmann further sorted the more enthusiastic “voluntary” collaborators into two additional categories. In the first were those who worked with the enemy in the name of “national interest,” rationalizing collaboration as something necessary for the preservation of the French economy, or French culture—though of course many people who made these arguments had other professional or economic motives, too. In the second were the truly active ideological collaborators: people who believed that prewar republican France had been weak or corrupt and hoped that the Nazis would strengthen it, people who admired fascism, and people who admired Hitler.
Hoffmann observed that many of those who became ideological collaborators were landowners and aristocrats, “the cream of the top of the civil service, of the armed forces, of the business community,” people who perceived themselves as part of a natural ruling class that had been unfairly deprived of power under the left-wing governments of France in the 1930s. Equally motivated to collaborate were their polar opposites, the “social misfits and political deviants” who would, in the normal course of events, never have made successful careers of any kind. 
What brought these groups together was a common conclusion that, whatever they had thought about Germany before June 1940, their political and personal futures would now be improved by aligning themselves with the occupiers.
Like Hoffmann, Czesław Miłosz, a Nobel Prize–winning Polish poet, wrote about collaboration from personal experience. An active member of the anti-Nazi resistance during the war, he nevertheless wound up after the war as a cultural attaché at the Polish embassy in Washington, serving his country’s Communist government. Only in 1951 did he defect, denounce the regime, and dissect his experience. In a famous essay, The Captive Mind, he sketched several lightly disguised portraits of real people, all writers and intellectuals, each of whom had come up with different ways of justifying collaboration with the party. Many were careerists, but Miłosz understood that careerism could not provide a complete explanation. To be part of a mass movement was for many a chance to end their alienation, to feel close to the “masses,” to be united in a single community with workers and shopkeepers. 
For tormented intellectuals, collaboration also offered a kind of relief, almost a sense of peace: It meant that they were no longer constantly at war with the state, no longer in turmoil. Once the intellectual has accepted that there is no other way, Miłosz wrote, “he eats with relish, his movements take on vigor, his color returns. He sits down and writes a ‘positive’ article, marveling at the ease with which he writes it.” Miłosz is one of the few writers to acknowledge the pleasure of conformity, the lightness of heart that it grants, the way that it solves so many personal and professional dilemmas.
We all feel the urge to conform; it is the most normal of human desires. 

(…) 
To the American reader, references to Vichy France, East Germany, fascists, and Communists may seem over-the-top, even ludicrous. But dig a little deeper, and the analogy makes sense. The point is not to compare Trump to Hitler or Stalin; the point is to compare the experiences of high-ranking members of the American Republican Party, especially those who work most closely with the White House, to the experiences of Frenchmen in 1940, or of East Germans in 1945, or of Czesław Miłosz in 1947. These are experiences of people who are forced to accept an alien ideology or a set of values that are in sharp conflict with their own.
Not even Trump’s supporters can contest this analogy, because the imposition of an alien ideology is precisely what he was calling for all along. Trump’s first statement as president, his inaugural address, was an unprecedented assault on American democracy and American values. Remember: He described America’s capital city, America’s government, America’s congressmen and senators—all democratically elected and chosen by Americans, according to America’s 227-year-old Constitution—as an “establishment” that had profited at the expense of “the people.” “Their victories have not been your victories,” he said. “Their triumphs have not been your triumphs.” Trump was stating, as clearly as he possibly could, that a new set of values was now replacing the old, though of course the nature of those new values was not yet clear.

Almost as soon as he stopped speaking, Trump launched his first assault on fact-based reality, a long-undervalued component of the American political system. We are not a theocracy or a monarchy that accepts the word of the leader or the priesthood as law. We are a democracy that debates facts, seeks to understand problems, and then legislates solutions, all in accordance with a set of rules. Trump’s insistence—against the evidence of photographs, television footage, and the lived experience of thousands of people—that the attendance at his inauguration was higher than at Barack Obama’s first inauguration represented a sharp break with that American political tradition. 
Like the authoritarian leaders of other times and places, Trump effectively ordered not just his supporters but also apolitical members of the government bureaucracy to adhere to a blatantly false, manipulated reality. American politicians, like politicians everywhere, have always covered up mistakes, held back information, and made promises they could not keep. But until Trump was president, none of them induced the National Park Service to produce doctored photographs or compelled the White House press secretary to lie about the size of a crowd—or encouraged him to do so in front of a press corps that knew he knew he was lying.
The lie was petty, even ridiculous; that was partly why it was so dangerous. In the 1950s, when an insect known as the Colorado potato beetle appeared in Eastern European potato fields, Soviet-backed governments in the region triumphantly claimed that it had been dropped from the sky by American pilots, as a deliberate form of biological sabotage. Posters featuring vicious red-white-and-blue beetles went up all across Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. No one really believed the charge, including the people making it, as archives have subsequently shown. But that didn’t matter. The point of the posters was not to convince people of a falsehood. The point was to demonstrate the party’s power to proclaim and promulgate a falsehood. Sometimes the point isn’t to make people believe a lie—it’s to make people fear the liar.
These kinds of lies also have a way of building on one another. It takes time to persuade people to abandon their existing value systems. The process usually begins slowly, with small changes. Social scientists who have studied the erosion of values and the growth of corruption inside companies have found, for example, that “people are more likely to accept the unethical behavior of others if the behavior develops gradually (along a slippery slope) rather than occurring abruptly,” according to a 2009 article in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. This happens, in part, because most people have a built-in vision of themselves as moral and honest, and that self-image is resistant to change. Once certain behaviors become “normal,” then people stop seeing them as wrong.
This process happens in politics, too. In 1947, the Soviet military administrators in East Germany passed a regulation governing the activity of publishing houses and printers. The decree did not nationalize the printing presses; it merely demanded that their owners apply for licenses, and that they confine their work to books and pamphlets ordered by central planners. Imagine how a law like this—which did not speak of arrests, let alone torture or the Gulag—affected the owner of a printing press in Dresden, a responsible family man with two teenage children and a sickly wife. Following its passage, he had to make a series of seemingly insignificant choices. Would he apply for a license? Of course—he needed it to earn money for his family. Would he agree to confine his business to material ordered by the central planners? Yes, to that too—what else was there to print?
After that, other compromises follow. Though he dislikes the Communists—he just wants to stay out of politics—he agrees to print the collected works of Stalin, because if he doesn’t do it, others will. When he is asked by some disaffected friends to print a pamphlet critical of the regime, however, he refuses. Though he wouldn’t go to jail for printing it, his children might not be admitted to university, and his wife might not get her medication; he has to think about their welfare. Meanwhile, all across East Germany, other owners of other printing presses are making similar decisions. And after a while—without anyone being shot or arrested, without anyone feeling any particular pangs of conscience—the only books left to read are the ones approved by the regime.
The built-in vision of themselves as American patriots, or as competent administrators, or as loyal party members, also created a cognitive distortion that blinded many Republicans and Trump-administration officials to the precise nature of the president’s alternative value system. After all, the early incidents were so trivial. They overlooked the lie about the inauguration because it was silly. They ignored Trump’s appointment of the wealthiest Cabinet in history, and his decision to stuff his administration with former lobbyists, because that’s business as usual. They made excuses for Ivanka Trump’s use of a private email account, and for Jared Kushner’s conflicts of interest, because that’s just family stuff.
One step at a time, Trumpism fooled many of its most enthusiastic adherents. Recall that some of the original intellectual supporters of Trump—people like Steve Bannon, Michael Anton, and the advocates of “national conservatism,” an ideology invented, post hoc, to rationalize the president’s behavior—advertised their movement as a recognizable form of populism: an anti-Wall Street, anti-foreign-wars, anti-immigration alternative to the small-government libertarianism of the establishment Republican Party. Their “Drain the swamp” slogan implied that Trump would clean up the rotten world of lobbyists and campaign finance that distorts American politics, that he would make public debate more honest and legislation more fair. Had this actually been Trump’s ruling philosophy, it might well have posed difficulties for the Republican Party leadership in 2016, given that most of them had quite different values. But it would not necessarily have damaged the Constitution, and it would not necessarily have posed fundamental moral challenges to people in public life.
In practice, Trump has governed according to a set of principles very different from those articulated by his original intellectual supporters. Although some of his speeches have continued to use that populist language, he has built a Cabinet and an administration that serve neither the public nor his voters but rather his own psychological needs and the interests of his own friends on Wall Street and in business and, of course, his own family. His tax cuts disproportionately benefited the wealthy, not the working class. His shallow economic boom, engineered to ensure his reelection, was made possible by a vast budget deficit, on a scale Republicans once claimed to abhor, an enormous burden for future generations. He worked to dismantle the existing health-care system without offering anything better, as he’d promised to do, so that the number of uninsured people rose. All the while he fanned and encouraged xenophobia and racism, both because he found them politically useful and because they are part of his personal worldview.
More important, he has governed in defiance—and in ignorance—of the American Constitution, notably declaring, well into his third year in office, that he had “total” authority over the states. His administration is not merely corrupt, it is also hostile to checks, balances, and the rule of law. 
He has built a proto-authoritarian personality cult, firing or sidelining officials who have contradicted him with facts and evidence—with tragic consequences for public health and the economy. (…) Trump has attacked America’s military, calling his generals “a bunch of dopes and babies,” and America’s intelligence services and law-enforcement officers, whom he has denigrated as the “deep state” and whose advice he has ignored. He has appointed weak and inexperienced “acting” officials to run America’s most important security institutions. He has systematically wrecked America’s alliances.
His foreign policy has never served any U.S. interests of any kind. Although some of Trump’s Cabinet ministers and media followers have tried to portray him as an anti-Chinese nationalist – and although foreign-policy commentators from all points on the political spectrum have, amazingly, accepted this fiction without questioning it – Trump’s true instinct, always, has been to side with foreign dictators, including Chinese President Xi Jinping. 
One former administration official who has seen Trump interact with Xi as well as with Russian President Vladimir Putin told me that it was like watching a lesser celebrity encounter a more famous one. Trump did not speak to them as the representative of the American people; he simply wanted their aura—of absolute power, of cruelty, of fame –to rub off on him and enhance his own image. This, too, has had fatal consequences. In January, Trump took Xi’s word when he said that COVID‑19 was “under control,” just as he had believed North Korea’s Kim Jong Un when he signed a deal on nuclear weapons. Trump’s fawning attitude toward dictators is his ideology at its purest: He meets his own psychological needs first; he thinks about the country last. The true nature of the ideology that Trump brought to Washington was not “America First,” but rather “Trump First.”
Maybe it isn’t surprising that the implications of “Trump First” were not immediately understood. After all, the Communist parties of Eastern Europe – or, if you want a more recent example, the Chavistas in Venezuela – all advertised themselves as advocates of equality and prosperity even though, in practice, they created inequality and poverty. But just as the truth about Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution slowly dawned on people, it also became clear, eventually, that Trump did not have the interests of the American public at heart. And as they came to realize that the president was not a patriot, Republican politicians and senior civil servants began to equivocate, just like people living under an alien regime.
In retrospect, this dawning realization explains why the funeral of John McCain, in September 2018, looked, and by all accounts felt, so strange. Two previous presidents, one Republican and one Democrat—representatives of the old, patriotic political class—made speeches; the sitting president’s name was never mentioned. The songs and symbols of the old order were visible too: “The Battle Hymn of the Republic”; American flags; two of McCain’s sons in their officer’s uniforms, so very different from the sons of Trump. Writing in The New Yorker, Susan Glasser described the funeral as “a meeting of the Resistance, under vaulted ceilings and stained-glass windows.” In truth, it bore an uncanny resemblance to the 1956 funeral of László Rajk, a Hungarian Communist and secret-police boss who had been purged and murdered by his comrades in 1949. Rajk’s wife had become an outspoken critic of the regime, and the funeral turned into a de facto political rally, helping to set off Hungary’s anti-Communist revolution a couple of weeks later.
(…) 
Nothing quite so dramatic happened after McCain’s funeral. But it did clarify the situation. A year and a half into the Trump administration, it marked a turning point, the moment at which many Americans in public life began to adopt the strategies, tactics, and self-justifications that the inhabitants of occupied countries have used in the past – doing so even though the personal stakes were, relatively speaking, so low. Poles like Miłosz wound up in exile in the 1950s; dissidents in East Germany lost the right to work and study. In harsher regimes like that of Stalin’s Russia, public protest could lead to many years in a concentration camp; disobedient Wehrmacht officers were executed by slow strangulation.
(…)
Nevertheless, 20 months into the Trump administration, senators and other serious-minded Republicans in public life who should have known better began to tell themselves stories that sound very much like those in Miłosz’s The Captive Mind. Some of these stories overlap with one another; some of them are just thin cloaks to cover self-interest. But all of them are familiar justifications of collaboration, recognizable from the past. (...) 
(…) 
A few months ago, in Venezuela, I spoke with Víctor Álvarez, a minister in one of Hugo Chávez’s governments and a high-ranking official before that. Álvarez explained to me the arguments he had made in favor of protecting some private industry, and his opposition to mass nationalization. Álvarez was in government from the late 1990s through 2006, a time when Chávez was stepping up the use of police against peaceful demonstrators and undermining democratic institutions. Still, Álvarez remained, hoping to curb Chávez’s worst economic instincts. Ultimately, he did quit, after concluding that Chávez had created a loyalty cult around himself—Álvarez called it a “subclimate” of obedience—and was no longer listening to anyone who disagreed.
In authoritarian regimes, many insiders eventually conclude that their presence simply does not matter. Cohn, after publicly agonizing when the president said there had been “fine people on both sides” at the deadly white-supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, finally quit when the president made the ruinous decision to put tariffs on steel and aluminum, a decision that harmed American businesses. Mattis reached his breaking point when the president abandoned the Kurds, America’s longtime allies in the war against the Islamic State.
But although both resigned, neither Cohn nor Mattis has spoken out in any notable way. Their presence inside the White House helped build Trump’s credibility among traditional Republican voters; their silence now continues to serve the president’s purposes. As for Anonymous, we don’t know whether he or she remains inside the administration. For the record, I note that Álvarez lives in Venezuela, an actual police state, and yet is willing to speak out against the system he helped create. Cohn, Mattis, and Anonymous, all living freely in the United States of America, have not been nearly so brave.
I, personally, will benefit. These, of course, are words that few people ever say out loud. Perhaps some do quietly acknowledge to themselves that they have not resigned or protested because it would cost them money or status. But no one wants a reputation as a careerist or a turncoat. (…) 
Many people in and around the Trump administration are seeking personal benefits. Many of them are doing so with a degree of openness that is startling and unusual in contemporary American politics, at least at this level. As an ideology, “Trump First” suits these people, because it gives them license to put themselves first. (…) 
(…) 
I must remain close to power. Another sort of benefit, harder to measure, has kept many people who object to Trump’s policies or behavior from speaking out: the intoxicating experience of power, and the belief that proximity to a powerful person bestows higher status. (…)
In any organization, private or public, the boss will of course sometimes make decisions that his underlings dislike. But when basic principles are constantly violated, and people constantly defer resignation — “I can always fall on my sword next time” — then misguided policies go fatally unchallenged.
In other countries, the effectiveness trap has other names. In his recent book on Putinism, Between Two Fires, Joshua Yaffa describes the Russian version of this syndrome. The Russian language, he notes, has a word — prisposoblenets — that means “a person skilled in the act of compromise and adaptation, who intuitively understands what is expected of him and adjusts his beliefs and conduct accordingly.” In Putin’s Russia, anyone who wants to stay in the game—to remain close to power, to retain influence, to inspire respect—knows the necessity of making constant small changes to one’s language and behavior, of being careful about what one says and to whom one says it, of understanding what criticism is acceptable and what constitutes a violation of the unwritten rules. Those who violate these rules will not, for the most part, suffer prison—Putin’s Russia is not Stalin’s Russia—but they will experience a painful ejection from the inner circle.
For those who have never experienced it, the mystical pull of that connection to power, that feeling of being an insider, is difficult to explain. Nevertheless, it is real, and strong enough to affect even the highest-ranking, best-known, most influential people in America. 
LOL [Laughing Out Loud] nothing matters. Cynicism, nihilism, relativism, amorality, irony, sarcasm, boredom, amusement—these are all reasons to collaborate, and always have been. Marko Martin, a novelist and travel writer who grew up in East Germany, told me that in the 1980s some of the East German bohemia, influenced by then-fashionable French intellectuals, argued that there was no such thing as morality or immorality, no such thing as good or evil, no such thing as right or wrong—“so you might as well collaborate.”
This instinct has an American variation. Politicians here who have spent their lives following rules and watching their words, calibrating their language, giving pious speeches about morality and governance, may feel a sneaking admiration for someone like Trump, who breaks all the rules and gets away with it. He lies; he cheats; he extorts; he refuses to show compassion, sympathy, or empathy; he does not pretend to believe in anything or to abide by any moral code. He simulates patriotism, with flags and gestures, but he does not behave like a patriot; his campaign scrambled to get help from Russia in 2016 (“If it’s what you say, I love it,” replied Donald Trump Jr., when offered Russian “dirt” on Hillary Clinton), and Trump himself called on Russia to hack his opponent. And for some of those at the top of his administration, and of his party, these character traits might have a deep, unacknowledged appeal: If there is no such thing as moral and immoral, then everyone is implicitly released from the need to obey any rules. If the president doesn’t respect the Constitution, then why should I? If the president can cheat in elections, then why can’t I? If the president can sleep with porn stars, then why shouldn’t I?
This, of course, was the insight of the “alt-right,” which understood the dark allure of amorality, open racism, anti-Semitism, and misogyny long before many others in the Republican Party. Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian philosopher and literary critic, recognized the lure of the forbidden a century ago, writing about the deep appeal of the carnival, a space where everything banned is suddenly allowed, where eccentricity is permitted, where profanity defeats piety. The Trump administration is like that: Nothing means anything, rules don’t matter, and the president is the carnival king.
My side might be flawed, but the political opposition is much worse. When Marshal Philippe Pétain, the leader of collaborationist France, took over the Vichy government, he did so in the name of the restoration of a France that he believed had been lost. Pétain had been a fierce critic of the French Republic, and once he was in control, he replaced its famous creed—Liberté, égalité, fraternité, or “Liberty, equality, fraternity”—with a different slogan: Travail, famille, patrie, or “Work, family, fatherland.” Instead of the “false idea of the natural equality of man,” he proposed bringing back “social hierarchy”—order, tradition, and religion. Instead of accepting modernity, Pétain sought to turn back the clock.
By Pétain’s reckoning, collaboration with the Germans was not merely an embarrassing necessity. It was crucial, because it gave patriots the ability to fight the real enemy: the French parliamentarians, socialists, anarchists, Jews, and other assorted leftists and democrats who, he believed, were undermining the nation, robbing it of its vitality, destroying its essence. “Rather Hitler than Blum,” the saying went—Blum having been France’s socialist (and Jewish) prime minister in the late 1930s. One Vichy minister, Pierre Laval, famously declared that he hoped Germany would conquer all of Europe. Otherwise, he asserted, “Bolshevism would tomorrow establish itself everywhere.”
(…) 
The three most important members of Trump’s Cabinet—Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Attorney General William Barr—are all profoundly shaped by Vichyite apocalyptic thinking. All three are clever enough to understand what Trumpism really means, that it has nothing to do with God or faith, that it is self-serving, greedy, and unpatriotic. Nevertheless, a former member of the administration (one of the few who did decide to resign) told me that both Pence and Pompeo “have convinced themselves that they are in a biblical moment.” All of the things they care about—outlawing abortion and same-sex marriage, and (though this is never said out loud) maintaining a white majority in America—are under threat. Time is growing short. They believe that “we are approaching the Rapture, and this is a moment of deep religious significance.” Barr, in a speech at Notre Dame, has also described his belief that “militant secularists” are destroying America, that “irreligion and secular values are being forced on people of faith.” Whatever evil Trump does, whatever he damages or destroys, at least he enables Barr, Pence, and Pompeo to save America from a far worse fate. If you are convinced we are living in the End Times, then anything the president does can be forgiven.
I am afraid to speak out. Fear, of course, is the most important reason any inhabitant of an authoritarian or totalitarian society does not protest or resign, even when the leader commits crimes, violates his official ideology, or forces people to do things that they know to be wrong. In extreme dictatorships like Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia, people fear for their lives. In softer dictatorships, like East Germany after 1950 and Putin’s Russia today, people fear losing their jobs or their apartments. Fear works as a motivation even when violence is a memory rather than a reality. When I was a student in Leningrad in the 1980s, some people still stepped back in horror when I asked for directions on the street, in my accented Russian: No one was going to be arrested for speaking to a foreigner in 1984, but 30 years earlier they might have been, and the cultural memory remained. 
In the United States of America, it is hard to imagine how fear could be a motivation for anybody. There are no mass murders of the regime’s political enemies, and there never have been. Political opposition is legal; free press and free speech are guaranteed in the Constitution. And yet even in one of the world’s oldest and most stable democracies, fear is a motive. The same former administration official who observed the importance of apocalyptic Christianity in Trump’s Washington also told me, with grim disgust, that “they are all scared.”
They are scared not of prison, the official said, but of being attacked by Trump on Twitter. They are scared he will make up a nickname for them. They are scared that they will be mocked, or embarrassed, like Mitt Romney has been. They are scared of losing their social circles, of being disinvited to parties. They are scared that their friends and supporters, and especially their donors, will desert them. John Bolton has his own super PAC and a lot of plans for how he wants to use it; no wonder he resisted testifying against Trump. Former Speaker Paul Ryan is among the dozens of House Republicans who have left Congress since the beginning of this administration, in one of the most striking personnel turnovers in congressional history. They left because they hated what Trump was doing to their party—and the country. Yet even after they left, they did not speak out.
They are scared, and yet they don’t seem to know that this fear has precedents, or that it could have consequences. They don’t know that similar waves of fear have helped transform other democracies into dictatorships. They don’t seem to realize that the American Senate really could become the Russian Duma, or the Hungarian Parliament, a group of exalted men and women who sit in an elegant building, with no influence and no power. Indeed, we are already much closer to that reality than many could ever have imagined.
In February, many members of the Republican Party leadership, Republican senators, and people inside the administration used various versions of these rationales to justify their opposition to impeachment. All of them had seen the evidence that Trump had stepped over the line in his dealings with the president of Ukraine. All of them knew that he had tried to use American foreign-policy tools, including military funding, to force a foreign leader into investigating a domestic political opponent. Yet Republican senators, led by Mitch McConnell, never took the charges seriously. They mocked the Democratic House leaders who had presented the charges. They decided against hearing evidence. With the single exception of Romney, they voted in favor of ending the investigation. They did not use the opportunity to rid the country of a president whose operative value system — built around corruption, nascent authoritarianism, self-regard, and his family’s business interests — runs counter to everything that most of them claim to believe in.
(…)
The price of collaboration in America has already turned out to be extraordinarily high. And yet, the movement down the slippery slope continues, just as it did in so many occupied countries in the past. First Trump’s enablers accepted lies about the inauguration; now they accept terrible tragedy and the loss of American leadership in the world. Worse could follow. Come November, will they tolerate—even abet—an assault on the electoral system: open efforts to prevent postal voting, to shut polling stations, to scare people away from voting? Will they countenance violence, as the president’s social-media fans incite demonstrators to launch physical attacks on state and city officials?
Each violation of our Constitution and our civic peace gets absorbed, rationalized, and accepted by people who once upon a time knew better. If, following what is almost certain to be one of the ugliest elections in American history, Trump wins a second term, these people may well accept even worse. Unless, of course, they decide not to.
(…) 
What would it take for Republican senators to admit to themselves that Trump’s loyalty cult is destroying the country they claim to love? What would it take for their aides and subordinates to come to the same conclusion, to resign, and to campaign against the president? (…) 
If, as Stanley Hoffmann wrote, the honest historian would have to speak of “collaborationisms,” because the phenomenon comes in so many variations, the same is true of dissidence, which should probably be described as “dissidences.” People can suddenly change their minds because of spontaneous intellectual revelations (…). They can also be persuaded by outside events: rapid political changes, for example. Awareness that the regime had lost its legitimacy is part of what made Harald Jaeger, an obscure and until that moment completely loyal East German border guard, decide on the night of November 9, 1989, to lift the gates and let his fellow citizens walk through the Berlin Wall – a decision that led, over the next days and months, to the end of East Germany itself. Jaeger’s decision was not planned; it was a spontaneous response to the fearlessness of the crowd. “Their will was so great,” he said years later, of those demanding to cross into West Berlin, “there was no other alternative than to open the border.”
But these things are all intertwined, and not easy to disentangle. The personal, the political, the intellectual, and the historical combine differently within every human brain, and the outcomes can be unpredictable. (…) 
(…) At some point, after all, the calculus of conformism will begin to shift. It will become awkward and uncomfortable to continue supporting “Trump First,” especially as Americans suffer from the worst recession in living memory and die from the coronavirus in numbers higher than in much of the rest of the world.
Or perhaps the only antidote is time. In due course, historians will write the story of our era and draw lessons from it, just as we write the history of the 1930s, or of the 1940s. The Miłoszes and the Hoffmanns of the future will make their judgments with the clarity of hindsight. They will see, more clearly than we can, the path that led the U.S. into a historic loss of international influence, into economic catastrophe, into political chaos of a kind we haven’t experienced since the years leading up to the Civil War. (…) 
In the meantime, I leave anyone who has the bad luck to be in public life at this moment with a final thought from Władysław Bartoszewski, who was a member of the wartime Polish underground, a prisoner of both the Nazis and the Stalinists, and then, finally, the foreign minister in two Polish democratic governments. Late in his life – he lived to be 93 – he summed up the philosophy that had guided him through all of these tumultuous political changes. It was not idealism that drove him, or big ideas, he said. It was this: Warto być przyzwoitym — “Just try to be decent.” Whether you were decent — that’s what will be remembered.

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