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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

Mostrando postagens com marcador integração europeia. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador integração europeia. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2019

A economia do entre-guerras e as origens da integracao europeia - Jean Monnet Chair, Univ. Lisboa

Acontecendo hoje e amanhã na Universidade de Lisboa: 

Dear colleagues,
This Monday and Tuesday, February 11-12, the Jean Monnet Chair of UFMG’s School of Economics (co-funded by the Erasmus+ program of the European Union) and the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lisbon, will host in Lisbon the workshop “Interwar Economics and the Intellectual Origins of European Integration”. Please check the program below.
Venue: “Polivalente Room” - Instituto de Ciências Sociais / Universidade de Lisboa (Av. Prof. Aníbal de Bettencourt, no 9. Lisboa, Portugal)
Participation is open to all interested.

Best regards,

Alexandre Mendes Cunha
Jean Monnet Chair – School of Economics
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

(February 11-12, 2019 / ICS-ULisboa – Polivalente Room)

February 11, 2019

09:00-09:30: Opening Remarks (Alexandre Cunha, José Luís Cardoso & Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak)
09:30-10:15: I. Giuliana Laschi: “A laboratory of different paths of integration in Europe. Proposals that prepared the process of European integration, 1919-1939”
10:15-11:00: II. António Costa Pinto: “Technocracy, Corporatism, and the Development of ‘Economic Parliaments’ in Interwar Europe”
11:00-11:30: Coffee
11:30-12:15: III. Alexandre Mendes Cunha: “Third way perspectives and ideas on international order in Interwar France”
12:15-13:00: IV. Katia Caldari: “Between neo-corporatism and planning: a French version of the European project”
13:00-14:00: Lunch
14:00-14:45: V. Erwin Dekker: “The construction of an international order in the work of Jan Tinbergen”
14:45-15:30: VI. Harald Hagemann: “The Formation of Research Institutes on Business Cycles in Europe in the Interwar Period”
15:30-16:00: Coffee
16:00-16:45: VII. Pierre-Hernan Rojas: “At the origins of the European Monetary Cooperation: Triffin, Bretton Woods and the European payments Union”

February 12, 2019
09:30-10:15: VIII. Raphaël Fèvre: “Exploring the Keynesian/Ordoliberal Divide: An Historical Perspective”
10:15-11:00: IX. Timo Miettinen: “Ordoliberalism and the Rethinking of Liberal Rationality”
11:00-11:30: Coffee
11:30-12:15: X. Antonio Masala & Alberto Mingardi: “Classical Liberalism, Non-Interventionism and the Origins of European Integration”
12:15-13:00: XI. Valerio Torreggiani: “British Pluralism, Tripartism and the Foundation of the International Labour Organization”
13:00-14:00: Lunch
14:00-14:45: XII. Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak: “Pluralism and Political Economy in Interwar Britain: G. D. H. Cole on Economic Planning”
14:45-15:30: XIII. Oksana Levkovych: “Liberalism’s Last Gasp: Walter Runciman against the Tide”
15:30-16:00: Coffee
16:00-16:45: XIV. Roberto Lampa: “Divided by an uncommon language? The Oxford Institute of Statistics and the British academia (1935-1944)”
16:45-17:15: Closing remarks (José Luís Cardoso & James Ashley Morrison) 20:30: Workshop Dinner

Jointly hosted by the Jean Monnet Chair (“Economics, Political Economy and the Building of the European Integration Project” - EPEbEIP) of UFMG’s School of Economics and the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lisbon (Research Group Power, Society and Globalization) UID/SOC/50013/2013

quarta-feira, 13 de dezembro de 2017

Espanha: de imperial a decadente, e agora ameacada de desmembramento - Manuel Muniz

A Espanha já foi um dos impérios mais poderosos do mundo. Começou a decair justamente por ser um império desmesurado, por ambição de seus dirigentes -- os imperadores que dominavam metade da Europa e metade do mundo, pelo menos teoricamente -- e pelo fato desses pretenderem ter mais do que podiam administrar, gastando recursos preciosos não para administrar bem o que já tinham, mas para aumentar ainda mais a extensão de seu poderio, em lugar de cuidar adequadamente da educação dos súditos espanhois. Foi derrotado pelo império americano em ascensão, e depois não conseguiu se corrigir no século XX, caindo ainda mais no enfrentamento das duas ideologias autoritárias desse "breve século XX", o fascismo e o comunismo. Triste Espanha, no dizer de Ortega y Gasset, invertebrada, talvez, mas sobretudo vítimas das ideologias. Pode ser que a Europa seja uma solução ao maior perigo que países ou impérios enfrentam: esse nacionalismo estreito, mas existe também outro, que é a mediocridade dos dirigentes, das elites... e esse perigo também é enfrentado por países não imperiais, como o Brasil.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Brasília, 13 de dezembro de 2017

Europe As A Solution To Nationalism

Manuel Muñiz
Manuel Muñiz
José Ortega y Gasset, one of Spain’s pre-eminent intellectuals of the 20th century, wrote in his 1922 seminal work “Invertebrate Spain” that what underpins the existence of nations is not a common history but rather a “compelling project for tomorrow”. For Ortega it was not a shared past that brought and kept diverse peoples together but a captivating vision for the future.
For him, Spain’s territorial decomposition, first with the loss of overseas possessions, and ultimately with the emergence of pro-independence movements in the Iberian Peninsula itself – mainly in Catalonia and the Basque Country – was a product of prolonged decline and the dissolution of the Imperial project. The Empire had acted for centuries as a centripetal force bringing together widely varied political communities under one same roof and justifying that co-existence through a civilizational narrative in which Spain’s role was central. As the Empire began to collapse this narrative was slowly eroded and different political communities started to build – or in some instances re-build – narratives of their own.
When one tries to understand the current troubles in Catalonia it is important to keep Ortega’s analysis in mind. It is no coincidence that Catalan pro-independence sentiment only began in earnest with the collapse of the Empire and that it has since ebbed and flowed according to the economic and political climate in Spain and Europe. The latest swing of that pendulum has been particularly strong. Before the financial crisis began in 2007 support among Catalans for an independent Catalonia was scarcely above 10%. Today, after what could be described as the worst economic crisis in recent Spanish history, it stands at just below 50%. This period of economic contraction has also seen a great deal of corruption scandals affecting national political leaders, political parties and institutions, which has strengthened the idea that Catalans might do better if they had their own state.

Original sin

The reason that led Ortega to write about nationalism was his deep concern about its consequences. He could see, just as many of his contemporaries, that in its desire to exacerbate national identities it carried the seeds of conflict. Nationalism lives off the creation of narratives that instead of including as many as possible seek to elevate a few over others that are depicted as different, inferior or less worthy. This is the reason why it flourishes in moments of pain and misery. Through the lens of nationalism, the origin of such evils is but the other, a certain minority, an external group or a corrupt political class. This adoration of the particular, of that which makes some people different to others, is nationalism’s original sin and the source of its many pernicious consequences.
Not all nationalists would subscribe to this description of their ideology and many believe their actions will in the end produce open and cosmopolitan societies. This is particularly true in the Catalan case with many pro-independence supporters proclaiming to be at the same time nationalists, liberals and globalists. And yet one cannot on the one hand proclaim the value of openness and on the other the impossibility of living within a democratic society shared by peoples that speak different languages or manifest different cultural traits. This is as contradictory as attempting to build a global Britain while at the same time extirpating the country from the world’s largest single market and its most diverse political community.
The parallels between the British and Spanish cases are actually startling in many regards. The United Kingdom was itself a product of the Imperial project. Perhaps the most powerful force that brought together the different nations of the British Isles was the prospect of empire. Scottish nationalism, despite its many claims to deeper roots, only really took hold after the 1950s and gained pace only after de-colonisation. Also, Scottish independence became a far more attractive proposition once the UK decided to leave the European Union and deprive the Scots of the overarching political framework they desired. By voting for Brexit the British hurt their Union more than they could have anticipated. This is particularly tragic in the case of English nationalists that in a display of great short-sightedness rabidly criticise European integration and at the same time praise British integration, when they are today more than ever two sides of the same coin.

Perverse politics

How one views the issue of diversity within a society is as a matter of fact one of the most defining features of one’s ideology. Those who find meaning in closed groups with strong and excluding identities are in one camp. Those that seek to build open, diverse and cosmopolitan societies are in the other. Given the historical record of nationalism and its perverse political and geopolitical consequences, it is somewhat startling to find people in the 21st century ascribing to the latter.
Ortega, himself a convinced liberal, was certain that nationalism was a force to be contained. He believed that imperialism was also perverse and that even though it had provided a solid narrative for the existence of numerous European nations, it did so at the expense of the rights of many others. So, for him the only solution to the troubles affecting Spain and other European powers was European political integration. Only together could Europeans build a peaceful and prosperous project and to matter in the world. He suggested moving in the direction of a European Union with a common foreign and defence policy and others. The alternative would be division, mistrust and ultimately conflict. It is of course tragic that Europeans opted at first for the latter and began two wars that ended up engulfing the entire world and costing millions of lives. It was from the ashes of those wars that the European integration spirit re-emerged in the 1950s.
The ultimate solution to the Catalan problem – and to that of many of Europe’s secessionist movements – is, therefore, the construction of a compelling political project for tomorrow and in particular the completion of a federal Europe. The European goal of an ever-closer union is now more important than ever. The alternative is not just a weaker EU but quite probably the breakup of many European states, dissension and conflict.

sexta-feira, 3 de janeiro de 2014

Extrema direita na Europa contra a integracao europeia - Andrea Mammone (NYT)

Europeans United, in Hating Europe
Andrea Mammone, Opinion Article
The New York Times, January 2, 2014

LONDON — It may seem bizarre that two far-right, nationalist politicians — Marine Le Pen of France and Geert Wilders of the Netherlands — have reached across borders to form a Pan-European group dedicated to weakening the European Union. Their aim is a transnational political alliance that would compete in the May elections for the European Parliament; once in power, they would cooperate to try to rein in the power of Brussels. 
Are these politicians, who share an opposition to immigration and a skepticism about the free flow of labor and capital across the Continent, simply hypocritical opportunists, as many Europeans of the left believe?
But in fact, since the early 20th century, Europe’s far-right nationalists have often united in search of an “other” to oppose, exclude, resist, restrict or oppress — historically, minorities like Jews, homosexuals, the disabled, Roma, Marxists and, more recently, Arabs, Africans and Asians. What emerged after World War I was a philosophy that could be called Euro-fascist. The most extreme proponents, of course, were the Nazis: Notwithstanding their doctrine of racial supremacy, even they formed alliances with Mussolini’s Italy and the militarists of Japan and found keen fascist collaborators in nations they invaded. 
This vision did not die with the end of World War II. Transnational links among right-wing parties, based on common fears of minorities and immigrants, endured. The right-wingers, while speaking different languages, borrowed ideals, strategies, slogans and theorists from one another. The National Front in France, founded in 1972 by Ms. Le Pen’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, imitated the symbol and political tactics of the original neo-Fascist party, the Italian Social Movement, which was formed in 1946 by admirers of Mussolini and, in 1979, coordinated with like-minded French and Spanish parties to compete (with little success) in the first popular elections for the European Parliament.  
So when observers marvel about the “new” nationalist parties of Europe, they are capturing only part of the truth. These right-wingers mistrust or even detest the Continent’s core institutions — the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Parliament — but they are perfectly happy to join up with extremists in other countries to weaken those institutions.  
Which raises a question: What makes the European Union so appealing as a target? 
The answer may (and should) shock complacent left-leaning and center-right Europeans alike. “Europe,” as an idea and a community, has weakened. The European Union’s byzantine governance makes it seem unaccountable. Its leaders — notably José Manuel Barroso of Portugal, the president of the European Commission, the union’s executive body; Herman van Rompuy of Belgium, the president of the European Council, which comprises the 28 heads of government; and Catherine Ashton, the union’s top diplomat — are little known outside of elite circles.  
Soaring youth unemployment, stringent fiscal policies, German-led monetary clout and the presence of Muslim immigrants have created a perfect target for the likes of Mr. Wilders and Ms. Le Pen, who blame outside forces like the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Union for their nations’ woes. Conveniently, they overlook structural problems like the costs of social welfare and pension programs, declining birthrates, aging populations, stagnant labor productivity and intensifying competition from the economies of Asia and Latin America.  
Surveys show that the anti-European Union forces may win more than 90 of the 751 seats to be contested in the May elections for the European Parliament. That might be enough to form an official parliamentary group — and to make them eligible, like the transnational alliances of socialists and center-right Christian democrats, for European Union financing and full political recognition. Even as a tiny, noisy voice within the European Parliament, this alliance could create a lot of trouble. Just think of the successes that Tea Party Republicans have had in impeding decision making in the United States.  
The perception that bureaucrats in Brussels, bankers in Frankfurt and European lawmakers in Strasbourg, France, are haughty and indifferent has made it possible for demagogues to pose as populists who are alone in understanding “the people.”  
For example, in November, Lorenzo Fontana, an Italian member of the European Parliament from the right-wing Northern League, boasted — ahead of a gathering with leaders of the National Front and similarly oriented Swedish, Austrian and Flemish parties — that they spoke in the name of a “shared ideal of Europe, a Europe of people.” The League’s newspaper, La Padania, on Nov. 14, put it this way: “It will be up to the voters, but this time the troops, willing but disorganized, have the opportunity to unite in a single ‘army’ behind an able leader.”  
How would these right-wingers reshape Europe? They say they would give power back to nations by dismantling the technocratic decision-making power amassed in Brussels and returning powers back to individual member states. They would pause, if not quite reverse, six decades of growing integration.  
Tragically, in the face of this assault, calls for European solidarity are few. This is a sign of how far Europe has come from the dream that helped lift it from the ashes of war. It is a sign of the fading of the vision — common markets, democratic institutions and societal integration — promoted by the postwar founders of European integration: thinkers and statesmen like Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Altiero Spinelli.  
The European Union must reclaim its reputation as a champion of the people. Its leaders should abandon their embrace of technocratic solutions, their support for the banking sector and their stoic austerity. Unless they deliver more jobs, and more of a sense that citizens are in charge, the far right will only keep growing.  

  Andrea Mammone  is a lecturer in modern European history at Royal Holloway, the University of London.  

segunda-feira, 30 de abril de 2012

Integracao europeia: rede internacional de pesquisa historica

Réseau international de chercheurs en histoire de l'intégration européenne

Chers collègues,
Le réseau RICHIE (Réseau international de chercheurs en histoire de l'intégration européenne), créé en 2005, rassemble plus de 500
chercheurs en Europe et ailleurs. L'histoire de l'intégration européenne est entendue au sens large, associant également les pays d'Europe
orientale et les perspectives des pays candidats, associés ou simplement extérieurs, comme les États-Unis. Elle couvre l'histoire politique,
économique ou l'histoire des relations internationales entre autres.

Le réseau RICHIE n'a aucun parti-pris téléologique ou politique, et ne s'engage pas pour ou contre la construction européenne. Il est animé par
une équipe internationale de jeunes chercheurs, doctorants, post-doctorants ou enseignants-chercheurs, et cherche à favoriser les contacts entre chercheurs travaillant sur les mêmes thématiques. RICHIE est indépendant de toute institution, entreprise, mouvement ou université. Pour  en savoir plus :

Un nouveau site Web a été lancé au début de l'année 2012, radicalement transformé, incluant :
- une interface bilingue français/anglais
- un agenda scientifique interrogeable
- une base de données bibliographiques
- des formulaires en ligne pour proposer un événement scientifique,
  ajouter ses propres publicatios, créer une fiche personnelle, etc.
- un annuaire de chercheurs indexé par mots-clés communs à tout le site
- une gestion en ligne de l'abonnement à la liste de diffusion
- des flux RSS pour l'agenda et la base bibliographiques
- la synchronisation ICal de l'agenda
- l'importation/exportation BibTeX (Zotero) des données bibliographiques