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Mostrando postagens com marcador renuncia de soberania. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador renuncia de soberania. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 2 de setembro de 2013

Medicos cubanos: um caso especial de renuncia de soberania

Da Carta ao Leitor, da revista Veja desta semana.

(...) Nem o pior inimigo externo brasileiro poderia conceber um plano mais eficiente de desmoralização da soberania nacional. Mas esse plano foi concebido aqui mesmo pelo próprio governo. Um estrangeiro residente no Brasil tem de viver de acordo com as leis locais. O fato de um alemão poder guiar a 180 quilômetros por hora sem ser multado em estradas de seu país não lhe dá o direito de esperar igual tratamento no Brasil. Aqui ele tem de respeitar os limites máximos de velocidade impostos pelas regras brasileiras de trânsito Um chinês que abre uma empresa aqui tem de contratar empregados de acordo com a legislação trabalhista brasileira. Isso é óbvio. Por que razão os médicos cubanos podem viver e exercer a profissão no Brasil obedecendo às leis cubanas? Essa situação é juridicamente insustentável e, pelo fato de Cuba ser uma ditadura, moralmente condenável. 

Digamos que um médico cubano decida abandonar o programa, casar-se com uma brasileira, ter filhos e fixar residência, o que acontece? Ele seria imediatamente extraditado para Cuba, é o que afirmam com todas as letras Alexandre Padilha, ministro da Saúde, um dos arquitetos do plano, e Gilberto Carvalho, secretário-geral da Presidência da República. É urgente lembrar a suas excelências que, para ser extraditado do Brasil, um cidadão estrangeiro precisa, antes de mais nada, ter cometido um crime. Casar-se, ter filhos e mudar de país não constitui crime pelas leis brasileiras. Se constitui crime em Cuba, isso é problema da ditadura castrista. Resta evidente que nada aconteceria a um médico espanhol, português, suiço, canadense, pouco importa, que se encontrasse no Brasil na mesma situação. Ou seja, a esses outros estrangeiros aplica-se a lei brasileira. Mas, para os cubanos no Brasil, vale a lei cubana. É acintoso.

Se já é vergonhoso e ilegal obrigar os profissionais de saúde cubanos a entregar mais da metade dos seus ganhos à ditadura militar de Havana, prendê-los e devolvê-los à força seria uma violação da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos (...).

terça-feira, 31 de janeiro de 2012

A volta da diplomacia das canhoneiras (com luvas de pelica...): Alemanha e Grecia

No século XIX, e até a primeira metade do século XX, países que declaravam moratória ou se revelavam incapazes de honrar suas dívidas, quando não eram diretamente ocupados pelas potências imperiais, eram submetidos a "intervenção branca", ou seja, funcionários do Tesouro de alguma potência imperial passavam a controlar suas aduanas, suas administrações financeiras, ou seja, o tesouro real (ou do sultão, ou quem mais fosse o soberano).
Assim ocorreu com vários Estados dependentes do Mediterrâneo (Egito, por exemplo, mas também a Grécia), com a China, alguns caribenhos (o Haiti, administrado durante mais de 20 anos pelos americanos) e centro-americanos (idem), e outros pela periferia do capitalismo avançado. Até o velho Reino de Portugal foi humilhado duas vezes nesse processo.
Atualmente ocorre mais ou menos o mesmo com a Grécia, mas o "interventor" é agora um eurocrata, o que apenas torna mais deprimente a humilhação.
Ninguém mandou se comportar mal, gastando à tripa forra, como se dizia antigamente.
Ou paga, ou declara bancarrota, como a Argentina.
Dá para sobreviver, mas o custo, num e noutro caso, é sempre muito grande.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Germany's Role in Europe and the European Debt Crisis


By George Friedman
The German government proposed last week that a European commissioner be appointed to supplant the Greek government. While phrasing the German proposal this way might seem extreme, it is not unreasonable. Under the German proposal, this commissioner would hold power over the Greek national budget and taxation. Since the European Central Bank already controls the Greek currency, the euro, this would effectively transfer control of the Greek government to the European Union, since whoever controls a country's government expenditures, tax rates and monetary policy effectively controls that country. The German proposal therefore would suspend Greek sovereignty and the democratic process as the price of financial aid to Greece.
Though the European Commission rejected the proposal, the concept is far from dead, as it flows directly from the logic of the situation. The Greeks are in the midst of a financial crisis that has made Greece unable to repay money Athens borrowed. Their options are to default on the debt or to negotiate a settlement with their creditors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union are managing these negotiations.
Any settlement will have three parts. The first is an agreement by creditors to forego repayment on part of the debt. The second is financial help from the IMF and the European Union to help pay back the remaining debt. The third is an agreement by the Greek government to curtail government spending and increase taxes so that it can avoid future sovereign debt crises and repay at least part of the debt.

Bankruptcy and the Nation State

The Germans don't trust the Greeks to keep any bargain, which is not unreasonable given that the Greeks haven't been willing to enforce past agreements. Given this lack of trust, Germany proposed suspending Greek sovereignty by transferring it to a European receiver. This would be a fairly normal process if Greece were a corporation or an individual. In such cases, someone is appointed after bankruptcy or debt restructuring to ensure that a corporation or individual will behave prudently in the future.
A nation state is different. It rests on two assumptions. The first is that the nation represents a uniquely legitimate community whose members share a range of interests and values. The second is that the state arises in some way from the popular will and that only that popular will has the right to determine the state's actions. There is no question that for Europe, the principle of national self-determination is a fundamental moral value. There is no question that Greece is a nation and that its government, according to this principle, is representative of and responsible to the Greek people.
The Germans thus are proposing that Greece, a sovereign country, transfer its right to national self-determination to an overseer. The Germans argue that given the failure of the Greek state, and by extension the Greek public, creditors have the power and moral right to suspend the principle of national self-determination. Given that this argument is being made in Europe, this is a profoundly radical concept. It is important to understand how we got here.

Germany's Part in the Debt Crisis

There were two causes. The first was that Greek democracy, like many democracies, demands benefits for the people from the state, and politicians wishing to be elected must grant these benefits. There is accordingly an inherent pressure on the system to spend excessively. The second cause relates to Germany's status as the world's second-largest exporter. About 40 percent of German gross domestic product comes from exports, much of them to the European Union. For all their discussion of fiscal prudence and care, the Germans have an interest in facilitating consumption and demand for their exports across Europe. Without these exports, Germany would plunge into depression.
Therefore, the Germans have used the institutions and practices of the European Union to maintain demand for their products. Through the currency union, Germany has enabled other eurozone states to access credit at rates their economies didn't merit in their own right. In this sense, Germany encouraged demand for its exports by facilitating irresponsible lending practices across Europe. The degree to which German actions encouraged such imprudent practices -- since German industrial production vastly outstrips its domestic market, making sustained consumption in markets outside Germany critical to German economic prosperity -- is not fully realized.
True austerity within the European Union would have been disastrous for the German economy, since declines in consumption would have come at the expense of German exports. While demand from Greece is only a small portion of these exports, Greece is part of the larger system -- and the proper functioning of that system is very much in Germany's strategic interests. The Germans claim the Greeks deceived their creditors and the European Union. A more comprehensive explanation would include the fact that the Germans willingly turned a blind eye. Though Greece is an extreme case, Germany's overall interest has been to maintain European demand -- and thus avoid prudent austerity -- as long as possible.
Germany certainly was complicit in the lending practices that led to Greece's predicament. It is possible that the Greeks kept the whole truth about the Greek economy from their creditors, but even so, the German demand for suspension of Greek national self-determination is particularly striking.
In a sense, the German proposal merely makes very public what has always been the reality. For Greece to have its debt restructured, it must impose significant austerity measures, which Athens has agreed to. The Germans now want a commissioner appointed to ensure the Greek government fulfills its promise. In the process, the debt crisis will profoundly circumscribe Greek democracy by transferring fundamental elements of Greek sovereignty into the hands of commissioners whose primary interest is the repayment of debt, not Greek national interests.

The Judgment of Athens

The Greeks have two choices. First, they can accept responsibility for the debts on the terms negotiated and accede to the constraints on their budget and tax discretion whether imposed by a commissioner or by a less formal structure. Second, they can default on all debts. As we have learned from corporate behavior, bankruptcy has become a respectable strategic option. Therefore, the Greeks must consider the consequences of simply defaulting.
Default might see them frozen out of world financial markets. But even if they don't default, they will be present in those markets only under the most constrained circumstances, and to the primary benefit of creditors at that. Moreover, as many corporations have found, borrowing becomes more attractive after default, as it clears the way to new post-default debt. It is not clear that no one would lend to Greece after a default. In fact, Greece has defaulted on its debt several times and managed to regain access to international lending.
More significantly, defaulting would allow Greece to avoid fueling its internal political crisis by forfeiting its national sovereignty. Much of the political crisis inside of Greece stems from the Greek public's antipathy to austerity. But another part, which would come to the fore under the German proposal, is that the Greeks do not want to lose national sovereignty. In their long history, the Greeks have lost their sovereignty to invaders such as the Romans, the Ottomans and, most recently, the Nazis. The brutal German occupation still lives in Greek memories. The concept of national self-determination is thus not an abstract concept to the Greeks. Its loss plus austerity imposed by foreign powers would create a domestic crisis in which the Greek state would be seen as an economic and political enemy of Greek national interests along with the commissioner or some other mechanism. The political result could be explosive.
It is unclear if the Greeks will opt not to default. The certain price of default -- being forced to use their national currency instead of the euro -- actually would increase national sovereignty. There will be economic pain if the Greeks continue with the euro, and there will be economic pain if the Greeks leave the euro; the political consequences of losing sovereignty in the face of such pain could easily be overwhelming. Default, while painful to Greece, might well be less painful than the alternative.

The German Dilemma

The Germans are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, Germany is the last country in Europe that could afford general austerity in troubled states and the resulting decline in demand. On the other hand, it cannot simply tolerate Greek-style indifference to fiscal prudence. Germany must have a structured solution that to some degree maintains demand in countries such as Spain or Italy; Germans must show there are consequences to not complying with the orderly handling of debt without default. Above all, the Germans must preserve the European Union so they can enjoy a European free-trade zone. There is thus an inherent tension between preserving the system and imposing discipline.
Germany has decided to make an example of the Greeks. The German public largely has bought into Berlin's narrative of Greek duplicity and German innocence. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has needed to frame the discussion this way, and she has succeeded. The degree to which the German public is aware of the complexities or the consequences of a generalized austerity for Germany is less clear. Merkel must now satisfy a German public that questions bailouts and sees Greece as simply irresponsible. Capitulation from Greece is necessary for her as a matter of domestic politics.
The German move into questions of sovereignty has raised the stakes in the debt crisis dramatically. Even if the Germans simply back off this demand, the Greek public has been reminded that Greek democracy is effectively at stake. While Greece may have borrowed irresponsibly, if the price of that behavior is yielding sovereignty to an unelected commissioner, that price not only would challenge Greek principles, it would bring Europe to a new crisis.
That crisis would be political, as the ongoing crisis always has been. In the new crisis, sovereign debt issues turn into threats to national independence and sovereignty. If you owe too much money and your creditors distrust you, you lose the right to national self-determination on the most important matters. Given that Germany was the historical nightmare for most of Europe, and it is Germany that is pushing this doctrine, the outcome could well be explosive. It could also be the opposite of what Germany needs.
Germany must have a free-trade zone in Europe. Germany also needs robust demand in Europe. Germany also wants prudence in borrowing practices. And Germany must not see a return to the anti-German feeling of previous epochs. Those are several needs, and some of them are mutually exclusive. In one way, the issue is Greece. But more and more, it is the Germans that are the question mark. How far are they willing to go, and do they fully understand their national interests? Increasingly, this crisis is ceasing to be a Greek or Italian crisis. It is a crisis of the role Germany will play in Europe in the future. The Germans hold many cards, and that's their problem: With so many options, they must make hard decisions -- and that does not come easily for postwar Germany.

sábado, 28 de agosto de 2010

Militares dos EUA ocupam postos de generais no Exército brasileiro...

Calma, calma, não é bem isso. O título, assim cheio de renúncia à soberania e de cenas explícitas de entreguismo ao império, era só para chamar a atenção para uma situação "semelhante", que ocorre entre Cuba e Venezuela.
Este último país parece ter renunciado completamente à sua soberania, fazendo com mais de 20 mil (alguns dizem 60 mil) militares e homens da inteligência cubana trabalhem em instituições de defesa e de informações da Venezuela.
Não se sabe o que pensam a respeito os militares venezuelanos, mas os generais brasileiros devem ficar horrorizados. Seria como se eles permitissem que militares americanos servissem como generais em nosso exército.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Cuba-Venezuela: Mas de 20 Altos Oficiales Cubanos ocupan puestos claves
ABC (Espanha), 27 Agosto 2010

«Somos la misma cosa», dijo el presidente cubano Raúl Castro cuando pasaba revista a los oficiales venezolanos en su última visita a Caracas tras la reunión de la Alianza Bolivariana (ALBA), hace un mes. Sin embargo, su anfitrión, Hugo Chávez, le corrigió: «Somos la misma patria», haciendo valer su afinidad con el lema inmortalizado por Fidel Castro: «Patria o muerte, venceremos». La frase de identidad y similitud compartida por los dos aliados viene a confirmar la fuerte y sistemática presencia militar cubana y su influencia en el alto mando de la Fuerza Armada de Venezuela, denunciada recientemente por el general Antonio Rivero González, ex director de Protección Nacional de Defensa Civil. Una alianza que se ha acelerado en los últimos meses: hasta 20 altos oficiales -coroneles y generales- son ya cubanos en el Ejército venezolano, ocupando puestos clave.

El matrimonio de conveniencia entre los regímenes es denominado como «el milagro de la Viagra» por la analista venezolana Elizabeth Burgos -ex esposa del escritor y filósofo francés Regis Debrais, amigo íntimo de Fidel Castro-. Burgos señala que los hermanos Castro han encontrado en Chávez «el sostén financiero después del derrumbe de la URSS», no es solo un aliado más.

Ésta no es la primera vez que el régimen castrista intenta acaparar los recursos económicos y energéticos de Venezuela y convertir la patria de Simón Bolívar en su punta de lanza para su proyecto continental. «En los años 60, Fidel Castro intentó tres veces invadir las costas venezolanas», recuerda el vicealmirante Iván Carratú, ex director del Instituto de Altos Estudios de Defensa Nacional.

Lo que Cuba no logró en los años sesenta en Venezuela, ahora lo está consiguiendo sin pegar un solo tiro. Esta vez «el Ejército cubano no nos ha invadido, en el sentido literal de la palabra. La sumisión del chavismo no es consecuencia de una derrota militar, tampoco existen condiciones en el mundo que justifiquen una alianza de esta naturaleza», explica el analista Manuel Felipe Sierra.

La penetración cubana se intensificó en 2007 con la reforma de la Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales, que politiza el sector militar venezolano e incorpora el concepto de «las milicias populares» con el fin de defender la revolución y a su máximo líder.

Oficialmente Chávez sostiene que la presencia cubana no pasa de 30.000 agentes. Sin embargo, otras cifras oficiales hablan de 60.000 cubanos distribuidos en áreas claves como seguridad, inteligencia, asesoramiento policial y militar, control de los sistemas de registro de identidad, pasaportes y notarías.

También la importación de alimentos está en manos de los cubanos, incluidas las 70.000 toneladas de comida que ha llegado a los puertos venezolanos. Y el aeropuerto caraqueño de Maiquetía recibe dos vuelos diarios de cubanos como si fueran «fantasmas» por la falta de registro oficial.

Como la KGB o Stasi
Más que ideológica, la relación entre Chávez y los Castro es simbiótica. Nace de las necesidades de ambos regímenes. «El plan de perpetuarse en el poder de Chávez necesita de una estructura de seguridad y espionaje cultivada durante 50 años por la KGB soviética y la Stasi alemana y con sobrada experiencia en actividades contra la CIA. Eso lo tiene Cuba», señala Sierra.

Con el suministro gratuito de 95.000 barriles diarios de petróleo, Chávez le garantiza la prolongación al agónico fidelismo. Además, a medida que baja en los sondeos la popularidad de Chávez -como sucede ahora por la crisis económica: el 66% de los venezolanos afirma estar totalmente insatisfecho con su gestión-, el mandatario venezolano «necesitará cada vez más ayuda de los cubanos para consolidar su proyecto totalitario». Una simbiosis en torno al «Patria o muerte». Y es que Castro y Chávez quieren que Cuba y Venezuela sean la misma «cosa».