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sexta-feira, 19 de novembro de 2010
A OTAN, num encontro "crucial" (segundo dizem)
Senior Eurasia analyst Lauren Goodrich examines the prospects for this weekend’s crucial NATO summit in Lisbon on the alliance’s future.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Colin Chapman: NATO is at a crossroads. Friday and Saturday see the most important meeting of the organization since the end of the Cold War. The meeting to be held in the Portuguese capital Lisbon will be attended by the president of Russia for the first time. So does NATO face just a facelift or a transformation?
Welcome to Agenda. And joining me to discuss this is STRATFOR Senior Eurasia Analyst Lauren Goodrich. Lauren, the agenda looks very different at this NATO summit. It’s not going to be about Afghanistan, is it?
Lauren Goodrich: Not at all. This is the most critical NATO summit in over a decade because they’re going to be drafting the Strategic Concept Document. This Strategic Concept Document is pretty much the mission statement of NATO. It’s the third one drafted since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Strategic Concept during the Cold War, of course, was to contain the Soviets. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic concept changed to pretty much deal with the fall of the Soviet Union at first, and then shifted again in 1999 in order to expand NATO’s ability to intervene outside the Eurasian theatre. This allowed NATO to militarily intervene in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, etc… So now it’s time for the third strategic concept document to actually be drafted. This one is going to set what is NATO’s focus for the next decade. What is the threat for the next decade?
Chapman: So what is the threat in the next decade?
Goodrich: Well that’s the problem. You have 28 members now of NATO all with differing interests and different definitions of what a threat is. This is where we go into pretty much how NATO is divided into three camps.
The first camp is what I would call the Atlanticists – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark. The Atlanticists are interested in the non-Eurasian theatre. They want NATO to focus on the threats that we’ve seen recently such as the war in Afghanistan and nontraditional threats such as terrorism.
The second camp is actually the core Europeans led by the French and Germans. They are interested in limiting NATO, a leaner NATO, having the members not be as committed and limiting their ability to commit. And also having NATO work with other organizations such as the United Nations.
The third group within NATO which is the Intermarium states. This is the more interesting group because it’s newer NATO members - mainly the ones from Central Europe. What they see as a threat is what the core and the root level NATO theat was going back to the beginning of NATO - the Soviets. And the Central Europeans want NATO to focus back on the Russians.
Chapman: It’s called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but after this is it going to emerge as something completely different?
Goodrich: Well that depends on the Strategic Concept Document that’s drafted this weekend. But how do you draft a common document when you have so many diverging interests in NATO at this moment? The Strategic Concept Document looks like it’s only going to show how divided the alliance is now.
Chapman: Let me throw that question back to you. Could this all really be resolved in just two days?
Goodrich: Well the negotiations over this concept document have been going on for quite a while now. But we are not seeing any ability for them to come together. Even in the past week we’ve seen statements out of France and the Poles, the United States, United Kingdom, the Germans - everyone’s on a different page.
Chapman: Lauren – why did the Russians accept an invitation to attend – what do they expect to get out of it?
Goodrich: Well the NATO summit is actually in two parts. The first part is the NATO summit in which they will be discussing the Strategic Concept Document. The second part is actually the Russian-NATO summit, which is why Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was invited. Medvedev is going with two goals. The first goal is to see what comes out of the first part of the summit. The more divided NATO is especially over the Strategic Concept Document, the better it is for the Russians. The Russians know that as long as NATO is divided, it can never agree on things like expansion – especially into the former Soviet states. Or declaring Russia as the target of their focus.
The second is for Medvedev to sit down with U.S. President Barack Obama. This is the very first one-on-one since the U.S. elections. The Russians were very wary going into these elections because they know the Republicans tend to have a firmer, more aggressive take on Russia. Since the elections, which did not go in Obama’s favor occurred, Russia has grown wary as to whether Obama would stick to his previous commitments on having warmer relations with Russia.
Chapman: I suppose one of the ironies of all this is just as things look as if they could change, they might not change because of the state of America’s politics.
Goodrich: Very much so. The United States and Russia seemed as if they were on a warming period under Barack Obama – starting in about April – but really fleshing out over the summer. The United States and Russia decided that it was better to have a temporary detente between their two countries in order to focus on more important issues of the moment.
For the United States this meant that they needed Russia to agree to sanctions on Iran and logistical support for Afghanistan. For Russia, this meant that they needed the U.S. to cease support for Georgia and Ukraine, freeze ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe, as well as aiding Russia in its modernization and privatization programs. Both sides actually agreed to all of this until the elections.
The START Treaty ended up being the bellwether of whether this temporary detente was being successful or not. It looked like it was going to slide through both legislatures in both Russia and the United States easily - until the elections. So now we have a stall on START.
Chapman: So summing up, its’t NATO really just playing into Russia’s hands? As these groups in NATO argue about the future, the Russians just get on about their own business.
Goodrich: Very much so. They’re counting on the divisions within NATO. As long as it’s divided Russia will have a much easier time in order to clamp down on its resurgence especially in its former Soviet states and be able to start even pushing on the NATO members themselves.
Chapman: Thanks very much Lauren. Lauren Goodrich there, and that’s Agenda for this week. I’m Colin Chapman. See you next time.
4 comentários:
Comentários são sempre bem-vindos, desde que se refiram ao objeto mesmo da postagem, de preferência identificados. Propagandas ou mensagens agressivas serão sumariamente eliminadas. Outras questões podem ser encaminhadas através de meu site (www.pralmeida.org). Formule seus comentários em linguagem concisa, objetiva, em um Português aceitável para os padrões da língua coloquial.
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tô na área
ResponderExcluiré sempre uma satisfação imensa a possibilidade de ler e aprender com seus comentários.
Realmente.
abraços
karlos
Professor,
ResponderExcluirO senhor vê a possibilidade da guinada pelo Atlântico Sul muito querida pelo portugueses tendo potencial de complicar as relações do Brasil com membros da OTAN. Já que a paranóia nacional deve escolher isso como novo bicho-papão.
Mario,
ResponderExcluirVou escrever sobre isso depois da declaração final do encontro do Lisboa, pois ainda não tenho elementos suficientes para fazê-lo.
De tudo o que li, conclui que a Rússia pretende chantagear a OTAN, pedindo não apenas paridade estratégica absoluta, mas também envolvimento em cada aspecto da doutrina e das disposições operacionais.
Ou seja, eles querem acesso à tecnologia de graça e o direito de veto sobre as decisões da OTAN.
Quem for ingênuo, pode até discutir essa hipótese, em nome, quem sabe?, de uma tal de "democratização das relações internacionais". Quem é realista, sabe que não há menor chance disso ocorrer. Ou seja, fica tudo como está: a Rússia de um lado, e a OTAN de outro, cada um botando areia nas engrenagens do outro. More of the same...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Mario,
ResponderExcluirEsqueci que você comentou sobre o Brasil.
Bem, o Brasil não tem a menor importância prática para a OTAN, não por enquanto. No futuro talvez.
Por enquanto, vão ficar metendo a colher no angu dos outros...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida