Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks
segunda-feira, 11 de agosto de 2014
Chefe da CIA tem de se demitir ou ser demitido: numa democracia tem de ser assim...
Neste caso, funcionários seus penetraram computadores do Comitê congressual justamente encarregado do monitoramento das atividades de inteligência.
Ele já deveria ter sido demitido, ou ter apresentado sua demissão.
Vamos ver quanto tempo vai demorar essa nova novela do governo Obama.
Numa democracia, tem de ser assim.
Em outros países, ao contrário, não apenas funcionários da presidência mantém atividades criminosas, como os chefes políticos mentem a respeito.
Uma pequena diferença...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
CIA Chief John Brennan Needs to Go
The Lighthouse (The Independent Institute) - Volume 16, Issue 32 - August 12, 2014
The Central Intelligence Agency has made a mockery of the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers. The basic facts of its latest known abuses are undisputed: the agency's own inspector general admits the CIA broke into computers used by the Senate Intelligence Committee--a chamber tasked with ensuring that spy agencies comply with the law. This outrage warrants the immediate firing of CIA Director John Brennan, whether or not he knew the agency was engaging in the misconduct, according to Independent Institute Senior Fellow Ivan Eland. A former congressional investigator tasked with helping to monitor the U.S. intelligence community, Eland calls for stronger congressional oversight of the CIA and lauds members of the Senate Intelligence Committee for calling out the agency on its blatantly unconstitutional malfeasance--a scandal that, constitutionally speaking, is worse than Iran-Contra and Watergate.
Read More
domingo, 6 de abril de 2014
Doutor Jivago, agente da CIA? - Washington Post
Uma história da Guerra Fria, absolutamente verdadeira. A CIA ajudou a divulgar o romance famosos do Prêmio Nobel de literatura que foi impedido de receber esse prêmio pelo totalitarismo soviético.
During Cold War, CIA used ‘Doctor Zhivago’ as a tool to undermine Soviet Union
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After first attempting to arrange a secret printing of the novel through a small New York publisher, the CIA contacted the Dutch intelligence service, the BVD. Agency officials had been following reports of the possible publication of “Doctor Zhivago” in Russian by an academic publishing house in The Hague and asked whether it would be possible to obtain an early run of copies.Both the United States and the Soviet Union had built huge pavilions to showcase their competing ways of life. What was especially interesting to the CIA: The fair offered one of those rare occasions when large numbers of Soviet citizens traveled to an event in the West. Belgium had issued 16,000 visas to Soviet visitors.
The spies in Washington watched the coverage with some dismay, and on Nov. 15, 1958, the CIA was first linked to the printing by the National Review Bulletin, a newsletter supplement for subscribers to the National Review, the conservative magazine founded by William F. Buckley Jr.The contract was never signed, and the Russian-language edition printed in The Hague was illegal. The Italian publisher, who held the rights to “Doctor Zhivago,” was furious when he learned about the distribution of the novel in Brussels. The furor sparked press interest and rumors, never confirmed, of involvement by the CIA.
By July 1959, at least 9,000 copies of a miniature edition of “Doctor Zhivago” had been printed “in a one and two volume series,” the latter presumably to make it not so thick and easier to split up and hide. The CIA attempted to create the illusion that this edition of the novel was published in Paris by a fictitious entity, the Société d’Edition et d’Impression Mondiale. A Russian emigre group also claimed it was behind the publication.The agency already had its own press in Washington to print miniature books, and over the course of the Cold War it had printed a small library of literature — each book designed to fit “inside a man’s suit or trouser pocket.”
sábado, 15 de março de 2014
Golpe de 1964: participacao americana - documentos do governo Johnson (NSA)
Almas cândidas, como diria Raymond Aron se espantam e ficam indignadas com o anti-comunismo do governo americano.
Seria surpreendente se fosse de outra forma.
Que capitalistas em geral, militares em particular, e em especial os governos americanos não gostem de comunistas é o natural.
Aqui abaixo documentos liberados aos 40 anos do golpe, em 2004:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/
BRAZIL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY COUP
DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE
Audio tape: President Johnson urged taking "every step that we can" to support overthrow of Joao Goulart
U.S. Ambassador Requested Pre-positioned Armaments to aid Golpistas; Acknowledged covert operations backing street demonstrations, civic forces and resistance groups
Edited by Peter Kornbluh
peter.kornbluh@gmail.com / 202 994-7116 |
Washington D.C., 31 March 2004 - "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding preparations for a coup in Brazil on March 31, 1964. On the 40th anniversary of the military putsch, the National Security Archive today posted recently declassified documents on U.S. policy deliberations and operations leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government on April 1, 1964. The documents reveal new details on U.S. readiness to back the coup forces.
The Archive's posting includes a declassified audio tape of Lyndon Johnson being briefed by phone at his Texas ranch, as the Brazilian military mobilized against Goulart. "I'd put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity…[CIA Director John] McCone…[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara" on making sure the coup went forward, Johnson is heard to instruct undersecretary of State George Ball. "We just can't take this one," the tape records LBJ's opinion. "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."
Among the documents are Top Secret cables sent by U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon who forcefully pressed Washington for direct involvement in supporting coup plotters led by Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Castello Branco. "If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here-which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s-this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed," Gordon wrote to high State Department, White House and CIA officials on March 27, 1964.
To assure the success of the coup, Gordon recommended "that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo." In a subsequent cable, declassified just last month, Gordon suggested that these weapons be "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence," to be used by paramilitary units and "friendly military against hostile military if necessary." To conceal the U.S. role, Gordon recommended the arms be delivered via "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos."
Gordon's cables also confirm CIA covert measures "to help strengthen resistance forces" in Brazil. These included "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business." Four days before the coup, Gordon informed Washington that "we may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future." He also requested that the U.S. send tankers carrying "POL"-petroleum, oil and lubricants-to facilitate the logistical operations of the military coup plotters, and deploy a naval task force to intimidate Goulart's backers and be in position to intervene militarily if fighting became protracted.
Although the CIA is widely known to have been involved in covert action against Goulart leading up to the coup, its operational files on intervention in Brazil remain classified-to the consternation of historians. Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh called on the Agency to "lift the veil of secrecy off one of the most important episodes of U.S. intervention in the history of Latin America" by completely declassifying the record of CIA operations in Brazil. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations conducted significant declassifications on the military regimes in Chile and Argentina, he noted. "Declassification of the historical record on the 1964 coup and the military regimes that followed would advance U.S. interests in strengthening the cause of democracy and human rights in Brazil, and in the rest of Latin America," Kornbluh said.
On March 31, the documents show, Gordon received a secret telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that the Administration had decided to immediately mobilize a naval task force to take up position off the coast of Brazil; dispatch U.S. Navy tankers "bearing POL" from Aruba; and assemble an airlift of 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment including "CS agent"-a special gas for mob control. During an emergency White House meeting on April 1, according to a CIA memorandum of conversation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told President Johnson that the task force had already set sail, and an Esso tanker with motor and aviation gasoline would soon be in the vicinity of Santos. An ammunition airlift, he reported, was being readied in New Jersey and could be sent to Brazil within 16 hours.
Such U.S. military support for the military coup proved unnecessary; Castello Branco's forces succeeded in overthrowing Goulart far faster and with much less armed resistance then U.S. policy makers anticipated. On April 2, CIA agents in Brazil cabled that "Joao Goulart, deposed president of Brazil, left Porto Alegre about 1pm local time for Montevideo."
The documents and cables refer to the coup forces as "the democratic rebellion." After General Castello Branco's takeover, the military ruled Brazil until 1985.
Note: Documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Hear/Read the Documents
l) White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964
This audio clip is available in several formats:2) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Rio De Janiero, March 27, 1964
Windows Media Audio - High bandwidth (7.11 MB)
Windows Media Audio - Low bandwidth (3.57 MB)
MP3 - (4.7 MB)
In this 5:08 minute White House tape obtained from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, President Johnson is recorded speaking on the phone from his Texas ranch with Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Thomas Mann. Ball briefs Johnson on that status of military moves in Brazil to overthrow the government of Joao Goulart who U.S. officials view as a leftist closely associated with the Brazilian Communist Party. Johnson gives Ball the green light to actively support the coup if U.S. backing is needed. "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do" he orders. In an apparent reference to Goulart, Johnson states "we just can't take this one." "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little," he instructs Ball.
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon wrote this lengthy, five part, cable to the highest national security officers of the U.S. government, including CIA director John McCone and the Secretaries of Defense and State, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. He provides an assessment that President Goulart is working with the Brazilian Communist Party to "seize dictatorial power" and urges the U.S. to support the forces of General Castello Branco. Gordon recommends "a clandestine delivery of arms" for Branco's supporters as well as a shipment of gas and oil to help the coup forces succeed and suggests such support will be supplemented by CIA covert operations. He also urges the administration to "prepare without delay against the contingency of needed overt intervention at a second stage."3) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Amb. Lincoln Gordon, March 29, 1964
Ambassador Gordon updates high U.S. officials on the deterioration of the situation in Brazil. In this cable, declassified on February 24, 2004 by the LBJ Presidential Library, he reiterates the "manifold" need to have a secret shipment of weapons "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence" to be "used by paramilitary units working with Democratic Military groups" and recommends a public statement by the administration "to reassure the large numbers of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution here."4) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerias," March 30, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil transmitted this field report from intelligence sources in Belo Horizonte that bluntly stated "a revolution by anti-Goulart forces will definitely get under way this week, probably in the next few days. The cable transmits intelligence on military plans to "march toward Rio." The "revolution," the intelligence source predicted, "will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody."5) State Department, Secret Cable to Amb. Lincoln Gordon in Rio, March 31, 1964
Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends Gordon a list of the White House decisions "taken in order [to] be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done." The decisions include sending US naval tankers loaded with petroleum, oil and lubricants from Aruba to Santos, Brazil; assembling 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment for pro-coup forces; and dispatching a naval brigade including an aircraft carrier, several destroyers and escorts to conduct be positioned off the coast of Brazil. Several hours later, a second cable is sent amending the number of ships, and dates they will be arriving off the coast.6) CIA, Secret Memorandum of Conversation on "Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964 Subject-Brazil," April 1, 1964
This memorandum of conversation records a high level meeting, held in the White House, between President Johnson and his top national security aides on Brazil. CIA deputy chief of Western Hemisphere operations, Desmond Fitzgerald recorded the briefing given to Johnson and the discussion on the progress of the coup. Defense Secretary reported on the movements of the naval task force sailing towad Brazil, and the arms and ammunition being assembled in New Jersey to resupply the coup plotters if necessary.7) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," April 2, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil reports that the deposed president, Joao Goulart, left Brazil for exile in Uruguay at l pm, on April 2. His departure marks the success of the military coup in Brazil.
quinta-feira, 9 de janeiro de 2014
A censura que os companheiros gostariam de ter: controle de livros nos paises socialistas durante a Guerra Fria
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7829/j.ctt2tt25z.14
se refere a um dos capítulos sobre a Guerra Fria no terreno cultural, ou seja, como a CIA financiou a edição de livros para alimentar o debate de ideias nos países da Cortina de Ferro na era "clássica" (se isso existe) da Guerra Fria, dos anos 1950 ao final da década seguinte.
Toda a censura soviética era ainda moldada no padrão leninista da Tcheka, ou seja, repressão total contra os inimigos do regime.
O capítulo 9 do livro se chama
A Lasting Enemy
e faz o histórico da censura e dos censores de 1956 a 1968.
Os companheiros gostariam, mas não podem, fazer o mesmo no Brasil.
Mas de certa forma já fazem aquilo que os soviéticos sempre fizeram: lavagem cerebral nos incautos e desprevenidos, como aliás são todos os alunos de vários níveis de ensino.
Eterna vigilância, recomendam os prevenidos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Hot books in the cold war The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain
This study reveals the hidden story of the secret book distribution program to Eastern Europe financed by the CIA during the Cold War. At its... (read more)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- Pages: IX-XXVIII
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union waged “political warfare” against each other and their respective allies. This form of interaction, unlike the global military standoff between the two sides, was intended by each superpower to affect the perceptions, attitudes, motives, and—ultimately—political behavior of the other side’s organizations, groups, individuals, and government officials.¹ The aim of the operations was to overcome (or at least diminish) the opposition of those who were most hostile, to gain the allegiance of those who were neutral or uncommitted (i.e., to “win their hearts and minds”), to reinforce the...
- Pages: 3-6
My original intent when planning this book was to write up the entire story of the West’s secret Cold War book distribution project, a period of 35 years, from July 1956 until the end of September 1991. For reasons beyond my control, I was able to locate and access only the first 17 years of the complete archival documents covering the project. Financed throughout by the CIA, fourteen of these years (1956 to 1970) were run under the aegis of the Free Europe Committee in New York, and the remaining 21 years up to 1991 under the cover of an...
- Pages: 7-22
On the basis of the documents found at the Hoover Institution Archives, it can be ascertained that the idea of creating Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and of using radio to penetrate the Iron Curtain with news from the West first grew out of discussions held in 1948 between former Ambassador to Moscow George F. Kennan, then director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and other government officials.¹ Among them was Frank Wisner, who served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Europe during the war. In 1948, he became director of the office of Special Projects,...
- Pages: 23-38
The Minden Papers in the Hoover Institute Archives do not contain materials on the early book mailings operations in which the Munich office of Free Europe Press (FEP) played a crucial role. Fortunately, close to 40 monthly statistical reports and 36 summaries of responses received have been preserved by John Matthews, then director of the FEP Office in Munich. They cover the first three-and-half years of the book mailing project period, from July 1956 through December 1959. These reports, averaging 15 to 20 pages, contain the exact titles and the number of copies of the books and other publications (magazines...
- Pages: 39-54
During the 1970s, new covers—the International Advisory Council, inc., and, after 1975, the International Literary Centre, Ltd.—were used to make the book project even less visible to the “other side.” Following the resignation of Sam Walker, the Free Europe Organization and Publication (FEOP) Division was established on July 1, 1959, through the merger of Free Europe Press and Free Europe European Operations (FEEO) under the direction of Robert Minton, with George C. Minden as supervisor of the division’s book mailing project. Two years later, Minden became director of the newly created Communist Bloc Operations Department (CBOD), and thereafter...
- Pages: 55-72
During the long lifespan of the book project under the short directorship of Sam S. Walker Jr., and the much longer directorship of George Minden, a fairly small group of dedicated people were involved with its practical implementation in the so-called New York Book Center. Many of them have since passed away, and most of those still alive have reached a ripe age. This chapter will both reveal the identities of these unknown and unsung actors of the long ideological Cold War, and examine what their tasks were in the framework of the secret book project.
In July 1956, at...
- Pages: 73-86
Although no monthly reports for the years 1960 through 1962 (except for October 1961) were found among the Minden Papers at the Hoover Institution Archives, a number of FEP office memos and a draft summary from 1962 prepared by Minden that includes annual and cumulative totals help fill the gap. the worsening of the international situation in 1959–1960 did not influence the book mailing project; nor had the fiscal measures against gift parcels in Poland been extended to books.
A few preserved monthly reports by PSPD’s national editors reported a “real bursting of the dam” in Hungary, with a...
- Pages: 87-102
Since 1957, FEC regularly sent the Polish émigré periodical Kultura and the Czechoslovak émigré magazine Svĕdeství to Poland and Czechoslovakia, respectively. Throughout the 1960s, Free Europe’s West European Operations Division (WEOD), later renamed Press and Special Projects Division (PSPD), financially supported a large number of East European émigré political and literary journals and magazines, whose very existence often depended on this kind of support. This was done through the purchase of a large quantity of copies for mailing to Eastern Europe or direct distribution to East European visitors to the West. In 1966, Free Europe supported, in whole or in...
- Pages: 103-112
From its beginning, the Free Europe Committee was eager to establish and become actively engaged in contacts with the East. An unsigned office memorandum from 1959 dealt with the ways in which to conduct successful new operations in the field of East-West contacts by creating new instrumentalities and improving existing techniques. FEC recognized the fact that, because it was known as a “cold war propaganda organization,” it could only play a “small direct role in these contacts.” Many organizations, foundations, and universities active in the contacts field were reluctant to jeopardize their own contact programs through an open association with...
- Pages: 113-124
Minden’s PSPD semi-annual report for the period 1 January to 30 June 1970, the last report he submitted to Free Europe’s new President William Durkee,¹ was based on a survival budget of $419,985, 33% less than the $619,858 budgeted in the first half of 1969. This made it possible to distribute roughly 111,000 books and periodicals to approximately 39,000 persons and institutions in six countries of East Europe, 14% less than in the second half of 1969. There was a decrease in the number of books in each distribution method, with the exception of personalized mailings, which totaled 1,841. At...
- Pages: 125-206
Much has been written about the internal state censorship system of the East European communist regimes modelled after the system launched by the Bolsheviks as early as October–November 1917. Emulating the Soviet model of central censorship office established in 1922, known as “Glavlit,” the authorities achieved within their borders complete state control over the press and all communication media by being the sole providers of everything needed by the publishing industry. This economic control, from printing presses and typewriters to newsprints, also applied to periodicals and publishing houses. In fact, censorship was not even needed because nothing could be...
- Pages: 207-232
The communist regimes of Eastern Europe and their Soviet overseers could not fail to notice the steadily growing flow of Western literature reaching them from different points of origin in the U.S. and in Western Europe. Being well aware of the inherent threat these ideologically unwanted and unsuitable books and periodicals posed to their monolithic political control, they mostly resorted to censorship to intercept any book or magazine they considered “subversive.” The relevant party committees held regular meetings, sometimes at the highest level, to discuss the problem, and instructions were issued to post offices, libraries, and other institutions that received...
- Pages: 233-254
The person-to-person distribution program for Polish visitors to the West started in January 1958 under the auspices of the Free Europe Press (FEP) in New York, with Andrzej Stypułkowski, a young Polish émigré, coordinating the program from London. On December 1, 1958, the program’s activities were transferred to the East Europe Institute, Inc. (EEI), with offices at 35 East 53rd Street in New York. EEI was described as a private organization incorporated into the state of New York, and “its purpose [was] to facilitate distribution of literature to Eastern Europe, particularly to Poland, with emphasis on exchanges and individual contact.”¹...
- Pages: 255-294
Because mailed books were subject to censorship, most of the books about international affairs and politics, as well as selected books with political impact about philosophy, religion, law, history, social sciences, economics, business, and labor, were distributed hand to hand to East European visitors to the West. This method was given the name “person-to-person distribution program.” This chapter is based on general data and selected accounts of hand-to-hand distribution to visitors from all the target countries of the book program. From the start, book distributors were to use an initial for each East European visitor and to avoid precise identification,...
- Pages: 295-308
Because of its geographical proximity to communist-ruled Eastern Europe, Austria and its Vibrant capital city, Vienna, played a key role throughout the duration of the book distribution and book mailing programs. Many people, Austrians and East European émigrés, were involved in this endeavor, as well as a number of Austrian organizations. But the key role was played by one single man who, for close to a quarter of a century, became George Minden’s most important man in Vienna. After 1990 until his retirement in 2002, he managed the Wiener Spielzeugschachtel, a children’s toyshop in Vienna. Today, Peter Straka enjoys the...
- Pages: 309-346
For a period of over 30 years, thousands of letters acknowledging receipt of books sent and requesting other books arrived at the New York Book Center, forwarded by the numerous sponsors involved in the book program in the U.S. and in Western Europe. The original letters are no longer available; they may have been shredded when the book program ended in 1991 or were perhaps shipped to Washington and stored away in some government agency warehouse. Yet, excerpts from the most interesting letters were carefully selected by the national editors and translated into English. A country-by-country selection from these excerpts...
- Pages: 347-398
Because censorship was most severe and cautiousness prevailed in Czechoslovakia, responses barely trickled in when the book program was launched: 12 responses in the last five months of 1956, 103 by the end of 1957, and a cumulative total of 1,142 by the end of 1959. From 1960 onwards, responses and requests doubled every year. Following the de-Stalinization of 1963, requests surged forward, jumping from close to 1,000 in 1962 to some 3,500 in 1963. On average, it took three months from the time a book was mailed to the time an acknowledgement of receipt was received. Moreover, European publishers...
- Pages: 399-438
While most responses from Hungary came from individuals, letters from institutions rose to more than 15% of the total at the beginning of 1963, many from organizations that had long received books but had never replied before. Letters from institutions continued to increase steadily in 1965, again with many of them responding for the first time. Letters from Hungary showed a constant and notable enthusiasm for increased cultural exchanges with the West, for works on literature, Western languages, modern art, architecture, music, in particular jazz, religion, philosophy, history, and general culture. Books on politics and the humanities also began to...
- Pages: 439-480
Between July 1956 and December 1959, a total of 97,000 books were mailed to Romania, but only 218 responses with 146 requests for books were received—a rather discouraging result.¹ Very few letters arrived during March (22 responses and 28 requests) and April 1963 (21 and 10). Minden reported: “The Rumanian regime’s ongoing reassessment of cultural relations with the West was still affecting the number of responses, and no discernible trend came out of the few letters received in april.”²
In May 1963, the Romanian Academy of Sciences confirmed the receipt of a dictionary and requested six other specialized reference...
- Pages: 481-504
Of the five East European countries targeted by the book project, Bulgaria, together with Romania, was in the hold of a very strict censorship. This was one of the main reasons why responses and requests were initially very modest as compared to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In 1963, except for the month of December, Bulgaria was ahead of its northern neighbor Romania. In March 47 responses and 62 requests were received, with a high of 108 responses and 66 requests in November, and with both falling below 100 (63/41) in December.¹ One year later, Bulgaria still accounted for only 41...
- Pages: 505-520
There is evidence that the involvement of Free Europe’s Radio Liberty in the book mailings to the Soviet Union was preceded by a similar project undertaken by the American Committee for liberation from Bolshevism (AMCOMLIB), an organization set up in January 1951 with financial support from the CIA to deal with Russian refugees and émigrés.Reader’s Digest editor Eugene Lyons was its first president. After undergoing a series of name changes, in January 1964 it became the Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. (RLC), with radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union.¹ Between January 1, 1960 and April 30, 1961, AMCOMLIB also sent...
- Pages: 521-526
A U.S. Government official aptly described the power of the book when he stated at a senate hearing: “Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily because one single book can significantly change the reader’s attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other single media.”¹ A recent U.S. Government document briefly mentions the non-radio programs of Free Europe, Inc. and Radio Liberty, namely their sponsorship of book distribution programs. According to the report, from the late 1950s until 1970 the two organizations distributed a total of two-and-a-half million books and periodicals in Eastern Europe and...