"Liberdade" religiosa no Egito: familia condenada por se converter aocristianismo

Egyptian court sentences Christian family to 15 years for converting from Islam
By Benjamin Weinthal
FoxNews.com, January 16, 2013

Critics fear Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's regime is taking the nation further toward Islamic extremism. 
Egypt is home to an estimated seven million Christians. (Reuters)

The 15-year prison sentence given to a woman and her seven children by an Egyptian court for converting to Christianity is a sign of things to come, according to alarmed human rights advocates who say the nation's Islamist government is bad news for Christians in the North African country.
A criminal court in the central Egyptian city of Beni Suef meted out the shocking sentence last week, according to the Arabic-language Egyptian paper Al-Masry Al-Youm. Nadia Mohamed Ali, who was raised a Christian, converted to Islam when she married Mohamed Abdel-Wahhab Mustafa, a Muslim, 23 years ago. He later died, and his widow planned to convert her family back to Christianity in order to obtain an inheritance from her family. She sought the help of others in the registration office to process new identity cards between 2004 and 2006. When the conversion came to light under the new regime, Nadia, her children and even the clerks who processed the identity cards were all sentenced to prison.
Samuel Tadros, a research fellow at Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom, said conversions like Nadia's have been common in the past, but said Egypt's new Sharia-based constitution "is a real disaster in terms of religion freedom.”
"Now that Sharia law has become an integral part of Egypt's new constitution, Christians in that country are at greater risk than ever."
- Jordan Sekulow, executive director of the American Center for Law and Justice
"The cases will increase in the future," Tadros said. "It will be much harder for people to return to Christianity."
President Mohamed Morsi, who was elected last June and succeeded the secular reign of Hosni Mubarak, who is now in prison, pushed the new constitution through last year.
Tadros said the constitution limits the practice of Christianity because “religious freedom has to be understood within the boundaries of Sharia.” He added that the constitution prescribes that the highest Sunni authority should be referred to as an interpreter of the religion clause contained in the constitution.
Opponents of the constitution, including Coptic Christians and secular and liberal groups, protested at the time against passage of the document because of the mix of Islamic-based Sharia law and politics. Roughly 10 percent of Egyptians are Coptic Christians.
A government spokeswoman told FoxNews.com she would determine “who is responsible for this and covers this issue in Beni Suef,“ a city of 200,000 located about 75 miles south of Cairo. She did not offer further comment.
The case is the latest example of the increasingly dire plight of the nation's roughly 7 million Christians, say human rights advocates.
"Now that Sharia law has become an integral part of Egypt's new constitution, Christians in that country are at greater risk than ever," said Jordan Sekulow, executive director of the American Center for Law and Justice. "This is another tragic case that underscores the growing problem of religious intolerance in the Muslim world. To impose a prison sentence for a family because of their Christian faith sadly reveals the true agenda of this new government: Egypt has no respect for international law or religious liberty.”
Morsi has been under fire for failing to take action against rising violence inflicted on Egypt’s Christians. In August, the roughly 100-family Christian community in Dahshour was forced to flee after Muslim neighbors launched attacks against the Christians’ homes and property. Morsi said the expulsion and violence was “ blown out of proportion.” Radical Salafi preachers -- who have formed alliances with Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood -- called for Muslims to shun Christians during Christmas.
Sekulow urged U.S. diplomatic intervention in Egypt to promote religious freedom. Morsi is scheduled to meet with President Obama, possibly in March.
”The U.S. State Department must play more of a role in discouraging this kind of persecution," Sekulow said. "The U.S. should not be an idle bystander. The U.S. provides more than $1 billion to Egypt each year. The State Department should speak out forcefully against this kind of religious persecution in Egypt.”

Benjamin Weinthal is a journalist who reports on Christians in the Middle East and is a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow Benjamin on Twitter: @BenWeinthal.
Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/01/16/egyptian-court-sentences-entire-family-to-15-years-for-converting-to/#ixzz2IQqQ9kZ6

Fim do secularismo no Egito? Inicio da ditadura islamica? - Der Spiegel

Nervous on the NileMinorities Fear End of Secularism in Egypt

By Daniel Steinvorth and Volkhard Windfuhr

REUTERS

When he took office as Egypt's new president in June, Mohammed Morsi pledged to follow a pluralist policy that respected the rights of women and non-Muslim minorities. But everything he has done since then indicates that he intends to replace the secularist dictatorship of his predecessor with an Islamist one.

Egypt's president sat cross-legged on a green rug with his eyes closed and hands raised in prayer. His lips moved as Futouh Abd al-Nabi Mansour, an influential Egyptian cleric, intoned: "Oh Allah, absolve us of our sins, strengthen us and grant us victory over the infidels. Oh Allah, destroy the Jews and their supporters. Oh Allah, disperse them, rend them asunder."
This was a Friday prayer service held in the western Egyptian port city of Marsa Matrouh on October 19. The words of this closing prayer, taken from a collection of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, seemed quite familiar to Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's new president. A video clip obtained by the US-based Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) shows Morsi murmuring the word "amen" as this pious request for the dispersal of the Jews is uttered.
The Muslim Brotherhood, which backs Morsi, has since removed a note concerning the president's visit to Marsa Matrouh from its website, and the daily newspaper al-Ahram has reported that the president must have been "very embarrassed" over the matter. Are such statements enough to dispel the incident?
Fighting to Keep Church and State Apart
Morsi has been in power for four months. In June, with the backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi won a narrow victory over a representative of the country's former regime. Many voters supported Morsi only out of fear of a return to the days of dictatorship. But the new president has remained an enigma to his people. Who is this man with an American Ph.D. in engineering, who sometimes presents himself as a democrat and a peacemaker and sometimes as a hard-line Islamist?
The tasks facing Egypt's first freely elected president remain unresolved. Indeed, these are immense economic and social problems that can't simply be waved away. At the same time, precisely the thing that secularists, leftists and Christians have long feared is coming true: Egypt is growing ever more religious.
For the last three weeks, the activists who previously protested against the country's military council and the old regime of Hosni Mubarak have once again been gathering regularly on Cairo's Tahrir Square. Their new opponent is the Muslim Brotherhood, which the demonstrators believe is in the process of establishing a new dictatorship -- but an Islamist one.
The protests are primarily directed against the Islamists' attempts to push a religious constitution on the country. A constitutional council convened by Egypt's parliament has suggested redefining the roles of church and state, with the "rules of Sharia" becoming the basis for the country's laws. This would also entail re-examining and renegotiating the issue of equality between men and women.
The committee is dominated by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and by Salafists; the secularists and Christians who once sat on it abandoned it in protest. "Laws like these will land us in the Middle Ages," says Ahmed al-Buraï, a lawyer who stepped down from the committee. "This would be the end of our 200-year-old civil state."
Broken Promises
On October 12, when Morsi's detractors took to Tahrir Square for the first time, buses of Muslim Brotherhood supporters arrived, as well. These bearded men set one of the secularists' platforms on fire, threw stones at their opponents and shouted: "We love you, oh Morsi." More than 150 people were injured.
One Muslim Brotherhood spokesman later claimed that those who committed the violence were not organization members. Instead, he said they were so-called baltagiya, or groups of thugs hired by "dark forces" trying once again to drag the Brotherhood's name through the mud. Yet bloggers have proved that the Islamists had long-established plans to sabotage the event.
Images of protests against the president don't look very good on television, especially not when they are held on the very square that has become the global symbol of the Arab Spring. But although the atmosphere in Egypt is tense, Morsi is doing little to connect with his critics. After his electoral victory, he promised to be the president of "all Egyptians." He even announced his intention to leave the Muslim Brotherhood so as to be able to perform his role neutrally as well as his plan to install women and representatives of the country's Coptic Christian minority in high government positions. So far, nothing has come of those promises.
"He has yet to internalize the idea that the existence of an opposition is an important instrument of democracy," says Amr Hamzawy, a Cairo-based political scientist. "He's well on his way to creating a single-party system, just as it was under Mubarak."
The 'Ikhwanization' of Egypt
Egypt's critical newspapers call this trend "ikhwanization," with "ikhwan" meaning "brothers." The process has seen the president and the Muslim Brotherhood bringing all state-run institutions under their control within a short period of time. This includes state-owned media, where critical editors-in-chief have been replaced with Morsi supporters.
The "Holy Koran," a state-run radio service that has traditionally been moderate in terms of religion, has also become "ikhwanized." It has declared that so-called liberals are nothing more than immoral heretics who have "fallen" from Islam and are bent on the single goal of destroying society, and it has asserted that only the president can lead the country to "true Islam."
In some parts of the country, Egyptians seem to be trying to outdo one another in their displays of piety. A teacher in the Luxor governorate, in southern Egypt, recently cut off the hair of two 12-year-old students after the girls refused to wear headscarves. The incidents sparked protests, and the teacher was transferred to another school.
When a Coptic Christian tried to order a beer in a suburb of Cairo last week, the waiter reacted violently. The government plans to massively restrict the consumption of alcohol, a move whose effects will also be felt by members of the country's Christian minority. Especially in Upper Egypt and in Alexandria, where religious tensions already existed under Hosni Mubarak, thousands of Christians are believed to have applied for visas for the United States and European countries.
The Men Behind the President
What has become of Morsi's promise to be an impartial president? "The boundaries between the office of the president and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood aren't defined," says Hamzawy, the political scientist, in an understated way.
Many Egyptians believe Morsi is still taking his cues from two men in particular. One is Mohammed Badie, a 69-year-old professor of veterinary science and the man to whom all members of the movement swear lifelong loyalty as the Brotherhood's "supreme guide."
The other, Khairat el-Shater, was initially the Muslim Brotherhood's presidential candidate, but he was disqualified before the election on account of having once been imprisoned for money-laundering -- although this was admittedly under Mubarak, who used his justice system to sideline political opponents. Shater, a millionaire with good connections to the Gulf states, is considered an important financial backer of the Muslim Brotherhood and is believed to have been Morsi's direct superior within the organization.

Shater has considerably expanded his empire of supermarket chains and textile and furnishings shops in the new Egypt. Likewise, he's viewed as a model businessman among the Muslim Brotherhood, which has so far continued Mubarak's neoliberal economic policies. It's an approach meant to win the trust of the foreign investors that Egypt so desperately needs.
Mubarak left his successor a country deeply in debt, where millions of people are unemployed and a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line. For years, salaries were constantly kept low and unions were suppressed.
Keeping Egypt from national bankruptcy will eventually require unpopular decisions, such as cuts to gas and bread subsidies. But, so far, Morsi has decided to wait it out. The only area where he has been active is a different one entirely: In a television address last week, Morsi announced a new religious campaign that will see an army of preachers fan out through the country "spreading the true word among the people." It's a re-education measure that may yet help to dislodge Western ideas from people's heads -- such as the absurd belief that religion is a private matter.

Translated from the German by Ella Ornstein

Egito: democradura ou ditablanda? - The Economist

Egypt's revolution

Slipping backwards?

The Economist, Jun 15th 2012, 9:31 by I.A. | CAIRO

EGYPT'S Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on Thursday that Ahmed Shafiq, a former chief of the Egyptian air force and the last prime minister of the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak, will after all be able to contest the second round of the presidential election that will take place on June 16th and 17th. That is a relief for Mr Shafiq and those who dreaded the prospect of last month's first round being annulled and the elections starting all over again. They include Muhammad Morsi, the front-runner backed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Mr Morsi might have had more to fear from alternative candidates than Mr Shafiq, who is closely associated with Mr Mubarak's regime.

But that decision may be less controversial than another ruling by the same court, which effectively dissolves parliament on the grounds that the electoral law under which it was elected, which was passed last year, is unconstitutional. This is a political earthquake. It removes the Islamist parliamentary majority (which is backing Mr Morsi), and transfers legislative authority back to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which has led Egypt's haphazard transition since February of last year. The military leaders may now appoint the constituent assembly tasked with writing a new, permanent constitution—a parliamentary privilege—further limiting civilian political forces' say in the country's affairs.

For many Egypt watchers, this amounts to a soft military coup through the proxy of the country's most important court—all of whose judges were appointees of Mr Mubarak. The court found that the third of parliamentary seats that were elected under the first-past-the post system (as opposed to proportional representation through party lists) were invalid; they should have been reserved for independents and should not have been contested by members of political parties. Explaining the ruling, the head of the court, Farouq Sultan, said that resolving this would entail the dissolution of parliament. While the Islamists might have lived with new elections for a third of the seats, how they will react to losing all power is unclear.

That such an important decision comes just two days before the presidential race says a great deal about how judicial decisions have been used as threats and bargaining chips during Egypt's transition. Almost a year and a half after Mr Mubarak stepped down, the country finds itself once again under absolute military rule. Even if a president is elected next week, it is not clear when he will assume his powers, since he is constitutionally required to swear his oath before parliament. He may now have to do so in front of the generals. Combined with a recent government decree (which was to be contested by parliament) giving the army the power to arrest civilians without a warrant, post-Mubarak Egypt is looking as though it is regressing, not advancing, with the armed forces from which Mr Mubarak came firmly in charge.

Egyptians are battle-scarred from this transition. It is not yet clear whether many will join the mass protests already being planned. The Muslim Brothers, who have accepted the decision about Mr Shafiq, have not yet responded to the dissolution of parliament. But if their candidate loses the presidential election, they will be left with little to show for their many compromises with SCAF over the last 16 months.

Mr Morsi has tried—thus far unsuccessfully—to present himself as the candidate of the revolution. But he has won few endorsements from secular-minded revolutionaries, many of whom have preferred to boycott the polls. Mr Shafiq, on the other hand, has rallied both died-in-the-wool power brokers of the Mubarak regime and establishment secularists who fear the Muslim Brotherhood. Within a week, a former general could once again lead the country, with his old colleagues controlling all the other levers of government.

« The Economist: Digital highlights, June 16th 2012

O provavel futuro presidente do Egito: Irmandade Muculmana

Da coluna do ex-prefeito Cesar Maia: 

QUEM É..., PROVÁVEL FUTURO PRESIDENTE DO EGITO? Khairat El-Shater é um empresário (móveis e têxteis) formado em engenharia que a Irmandade Muçulmana, pela primeira vez em 83 anos, está lançando como candidato presidencial. Aos 16 anos de idade aderia à ala jovem da nasserista União Soicialista Árabe, com base em Alexandria. Participou dos protestos contra o governo em 1968. É um ativo membro da Irmandade Muçulmana desde 1995, sendo seu dirigente máximo no Cairo. Esteve preso pelas Forças Armadas de 2007 a 2011. É considerado o mais forte defensor no Egito da liberdade de mercado em seu partido.

Crime contra a cultura no Egito

Confrontos destroem relíquias no Egito – pág. A18 Violência entre manifestantes e governo gera incêndio em instituto criado por Napoleão, com 192 mil documentos Entre os tesouros perdidos estão mapas e manuscritos que datam do final do século 18; prédio pode desabar DAS AGÊNCIAS DE NOTÍCIAS O Instituto do Egito, centro de pesquisas criado pelo francês Napoleão Bonaparte no final do século 18, pegou fogo durante os confrontos entre manifestantes e militares egípcios no sábado, no Cairo. Voluntários passaram os últimos dois dias tentando recuperar o que sobrou de cerca de 192 mil livros, jornais e manuscritos queimados. O instituto abrigava tesouros como os 24 volumes do manuscrito "Descrição do Egito", uma das mais abrangentes obras sobre o país, da Antiguidade e seus monumentos ao dia a dia no início do século 19. A obra foi escrita por 150 estudiosos e cientistas durante a ocupação francesa, de 1798 a 1801. Uma das cinco cópias originais foi perdida no incêndio. Um mapa raro do século 18 do país e da região da Abissínia (atual Etiópia) também foi queimado. Além disso, há risco de o edifício que abriga o instituto desabar. MORTES "O incêndio desse edifício tão rico significa que grande parte da história egípcia chegou ao fim", lamentou o diretor da instituição Mohammed al Sharbouni. O diretor disse que a maior parte da coleção do instituto foi queimada no incêndio, que durou cerca de 12 horas. Os bombeiros usaram água para apagar o incêndio, o que aumentou os danos. Os militares que governam o Egito acusaram ontem a imprensa de trabalhar para desestabilizar o país. As críticas foram lançadas pelo general Adel Emara, em pronunciamento que aconteceu horas depois de as tropas de choque do governo atacarem novamente os manifestantes na praça Tahrir. Ao menos 3 pessoas morreram, elevando para 14 o número de mortos depois de quatro dias de embates. Os confrontos ocorrem no Cairo desde sexta feira, quando as forças de segurança reprimiram os protestos pró-democracia que duravam três semanas. Os manifestantes pedem a saída da junta militar -no poder desde a queda do ditador Hosni Mubarack em fevereiro O secretário geral da ONU, Ban Ki-moon, disse estar "muito preocupado" com o "uso excessivo" de força contra os manifestantes na capital do Egito. Ele pediu aos militares "moderação e respeite os direitos humanos".

Troca de prisioneiros entre Israel e Egito

Israel e Egito trocam prisioneiros sob acordo mediado pelos EUA

Reportagem de Dan Williams e Ori Lewis, em Jerusalém; e de Shaimaa Fayed e Omar Fahmy, no Cairo

Reuters, 28/10/2011

JERUSALÉM/TABA, Egito - O Egito libertou um americano-israelense que estava detido como um suposto espião e Israel liberou 25 egípcios em uma troca de prisioneiros nesta quinta-feira que irá aliviar as tensões entre os novos governantes do Cairo e os Estados Unidos e Israel.

Ilan Grapel, de 27 anos, viajou para Israel acompanhado por dois enviados israelenses nomeados pelo primeiro-ministro israelense, Benjamin Netanyahu, com quem ele se reuniu no final do dia. Sorrindo, ele abraçou sua mãe, que o esperava na pista do aeroporto de Tel Aviv.

Os egípcios libertados cruzaram por terra até o deserto do Sinai, alguns deles de joelhos em uma oração de agradecimento. “Eu não posso descrever meus sentimentos hoje”, afirmou um dos egípcios libertados, Fayez Abdel Hamid, a repórteres.
O Egito prendeu Grapel em junho sob suspeita de que ele estava fora para recrutar agentes e monitorar eventos na revolta que derrubou Hosni Mubarak, um aliado de Israel e dos Estados Unidos.

Israel negou que Grapel, que emigrara de Nova York em 2005 e foi ferido como um paraquedista israelense na guerra do Líbano em 2006, era um espião. Suas ligações com Israel eram aparentes em sua página no Facebook, que continha fotos dele com o uniforme militar israelense.

Estudante de direito nos Estados Unidos, Grapel trabalhava para o Serviço de Refugiados de Saint Andrew, uma agência não-governamental, quando foi detido.

Os Estados Unidos, que concedem bilhões de dólares em ajuda militar ao Exército que agora dirige o Egito, haviam exigido a libertação de Grapel. Ele foi libertado três semanas depois que o secretário de Defesa dos EUA, Leon Panetta, visitou o Egito.

O acordo de troca mediado pelos EUA foi atingido pouco depois de um acordo diplomático mais amplo mediado pelo Egito entre Israel e o grupo islâmico Hamas que possibilitou a libertação do soldado israelense Gilad Shalit em troca de mais de 1.000 prisioneiros palestinos.

Eli Avidar, um ex-diplomata que chefiou a missão de Israel no Catar, afirmou que garantir a libertação de prisioneiros egípcios poderia ajudar os novos líderes do Cairo nacionalmente.

“O governo egípcio precisa disso para o seu prestígio”, disse ele na televisão israelense.

Israel é amplamente impopular no Egito, que assinou um tratado de paz com seu vizinho do norte em 1979.

O Brasil e a revolta no Egito - Saad Eddin Ibrahim

O jornal O Globo, em sua edição desta segunda-feira, 7 de fevereiro de 2011 (O Mundo, p. 23), traz entrevistas com um dos mais famosos militantes democráticos do Egito, levado ao exílio pela repressão do regime de Hosni Mubarak, o sociólogo (atualmente nos EUA) Saad Eddin Ibrahim, que falou com a correspondente do jornal em NY, Fernanda Godoy.

Entre suas declarações registradas sobre a crise no Egito, encontram-se esta duas últimas perguntas e respostas dadas pelo dissidente democrata:

"Espero que Obama não seja enganado"
Entrevista: Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Fernanda Godoy
O Globo, 7/02/2011

O senhor acha que outros países, como o Brasil, deveriam se engajar nesse processo de negociação?
IBRAHIM: Espero que sim. Sou muito crítico de três países: Brasil, África do Sul e Índia. Esses três países nos desapontaram, faltaram conosco.

Por que o senhor diz isso?
IBRAHIM: Porque esses são países do Terceiro Mundo. Se eles tivessem tomado uma posição em defesa da democracia no Egito, teria sido recebido de outra maneira. Todas as vezes que os EUA ou a Europa falavam em democracia, os representantes do regime gritavam: 'Imperialismo!', 'Colonialismo!!'. Mas se a Índia, o Brasil ou a África do Sul tivessem ficado do nosso lado, como nós fizemos quando eles lutavam contra o apartheid ou a ditadura militar brasileira, se esses países, que são democracias emergentes, sem aspirações colonialistas, tivessem se colocado do lado da democracia, teriam ajudado muito. O governo não poderia dizer que estávamos convidando a uma intervenção.

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Sem comentários...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Egito democratico?: The Economist muito otimista

A revista Economist sempre lança uma questão de interesse público para debate entre seus leitores. Da última vez até enviei meus comentários sobre um problema de políticas públicas em matéria de tecnologia e sociedade do conhecimento.
Desta vez é sobre o Egito, claro, e esta é a posição da revista:

This House believes that Egypt will become a democracy within a year.
The Economist, February 4th 2011

Os votos dos leitores, até o momento,desmentem essa crença: 65% não, 35% concordam com a afirmativa.
Abaixo as opiniões dos dois comentaristas convidados, por um e outro lado:

Representing the sides

Defending the motion
Anoush Ehteshami
Professor, Durham University and Joint Director, Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World
The forces for reform and democratisation will become so overwhelming in the next few months that in a year's time, and despite setbacks and more tragedies on the way, Egypt will be becoming a democracy.
READ MORE

Against the motion
Daniel Pipes
Director, Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford
It is out of the question that an Egypt with minor experience in democracy can put together enough of these components in 12 months to establish a fully democratic order.

The moderator's opening remarks
Josie Delap

Events have moved fast in Egypt in the past ten days. Huge demonstrations calling for the resignation of Egypt's ageing president, Hosni Mubarak, have rocked the country. Mostly peaceful for the first week, they have turned violent leaving hundreds dead and thousands injured. In an attempt to calm the protesters Mr Mubarak appointed a vice-president, his first in his 30-year reign. But his attempts at conciliation look too little, too late. The protesters want him to go now. Cairo's walls are daubed with slogans telling him so: "game over, Mubarak".

A debate is raging not just in Arab countries but all over the world about whether democracy in Egypt is possible or desirable. The history of revolutions is mixed. Those who have long mourned the dearth of democracy in the Middle East are full of hope that this will be an "Arab spring". Others remember more gloomily the massive protests in Iran in 2009. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians surged onto the streets after a disputed election, calling for democracy, freedom and change in Iran. The government crushed the opposition Green movement with an iron fist and a year and a half later, there is no sign of any significant reforms in Iran.

Others are more doubtful. Even if the protests succeed in unseating Mr Mubarak, it is unclear what the future holds for Egypt. After three decades of Mr Mubarak's authoritarian rule, many of Egypt's institutions look rotten to the core. Corruption is rife, press freedom is curtailed, and any elections that have been held have been rigged by the ruling party.

Some worry whether democracy would be a good thing in Egypt at all. Their concern is that in the absence of those institutions, chaos will reign. Or perhaps worse in their minds, were elections to be held, they fear that they would be hijacked by the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that has been Egypt's best-organised and most prominent opposition force for many years. They point fearfully to Palestinian and Lebanese elections where Islamists have done well. Israel is particularly uneasy, anxious about the end of its "cold peace" with Egypt and the instability that could bring.

Others argue that Islamists are not antithetical to democracy; look at Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia. They say too that Egypt has a well-educated middle class, a sophisticated elite and enough of a sense of national pride to turn the chaos of this week's demonstrations into the beginnings of democracy. Egypt has reached a tipping point, they say. The genie is out of the bottle and there is no stuffing it back in. Egyptians have tasted freedom and are now shrugging off autocracy and seizing their chance for democracy.

We have two of the best-qualified people in the world to debate these issues on our website. They are both long-time Middle East watchers. Anoush Ehteshami, who is proposing the motion, is professor of international relations at Durham University, and has written extensively on Middle Eastern politics—foreign and domestic—and security in the region. Daniel Pipes, opposing it, is the founder and director of the Middle East Forum, a think-tank, and has written extensively about Islam and militant Islamism, within both the Middle East and the West.

Events may overtake this debate. We will try to keep up with them. I want to encourage the audience to comment and vote. A bit of democracy in action would be a good thing.

The proposer's opening remarks
Anoush Ehteshami

The scale of protest in Egypt since early January 2011 has been unprecedented and energising, even for a country used to riots and open expressions of discontent. The situation in Egypt in early February remains tense and the path opening up between the state and society is uncharted. But change is in the air, and against the backdrop of rapid regime change in Tunisia and protests taking root in many neighbouring Arab countries, one is left with a sense of anxiety that we are reaching a tipping point in the region. Change in Egypt will tip the balance towards the advocates of meaningful and rapid reform in the rest of the Arab region. So, what happens in Egypt in the coming days will have deep and long-lasting impact. Egypt, a country whose modern history can count only three presidents in office since 1954, is pivotal to the direction and intensity of change, and yet this is an Arab country ill equipped for rapid change. Its ruling political party institutions are strong, and despite the spectacular burning of the National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters on Friday 28th January, the state machinery remains penetrated by party members and Mubarak loyalists. Also, the wider security establishment is thoroughly controlled by the Mubarak-created ruling elite. So, the imminent end of this regime and this president may have been exaggerated—for now.

In the months to come, though, even if Hosni Mubarak survives this intense period of domestic and Western pressure, I expect the political character of the establishment to change—towards what could be loosely referred to as a rocky road to democratisation. The widening of the political base and the broadening of public space will take place and in this process reformist forces will, like rainwater pouring into the cracks of rocks, penetrate the crust of the regime and the institutions and bureaucracy for so long dominated by the NDP and Mr Mubarak's allies and cronies. As they do they will flex their muscles and drive for transparency and the rule of law. Once these are established, the opposition will build on its street base to proceed towards negotiations.

Internally, the opposition forces will organise around a broad "rainbow" coalition, which will of course have to make its own compromises if it is to stick as a credible force. But this coalition is unlikely to survive the transition phase, and as open elections beckon we will see the consolidation of parties and platforms competing for power. The Muslim Brotherhood will be pitted against nationalist, liberal, pan-Arab, secular parties and this will be good for democracy and democratisation. The process will be long and painful, but the train of change has already left the station and with Mr Mubarak no longer a presidential candidate in 2011 his NDP has quickly lost its political fig leaf and also its legitimacy as the country's ruling party. With the NDP fatally weakened, I would anticipate the next president and indeed the next parliament to be wearing very different political clothes. What the leadership will be like is not the issue; the important point is that the new political leaders will have arrived in their posts credibly and with the open and transparent support of the electorate.

Externally, too, the constellation of forces lined up against the incumbent is likely to insist on a credible democratisation process being introduced in the next few weeks. Again, even if Mr Mubarak survives the current period of pressure, his regime will find it almost impossible to secure external support without the introduction of change and dialogue with the opposition. Mr Mubarak will have to give an inch and with every inch the opposition will try to take a foot. The balance will shift and the shift will become irreversible over time. Another external dimension is of course the country's trade and investment relations. Instability is anathema to business but it is unlikely that authoritarian stability will be acceptable either. In the age of the internet and the sight of the masses lined up against the incumbent, the international business community will find it impossible to support the president or advocate investment in the country. Economic imperative will generate its own pressures against the government and the momentum for broad economic reforms and transparency will provide more energy for pro-reform forces. Egypt cannot isolate itself from external pressure and that pressure now is for liberalisation and democratisation.

So, on balance, I believe that the forces for reform and democratisation will become so overwhelming in the next few months that in a year's time, and despite setbacks and more tragedies on the way, Egypt will be becoming a democracy.

The opposition's opening remarks
Daniel Pipes

Two reasons lead me to assert that the Arab Republic of Egypt will not boast a democratic political system this time next year.

First, democracy is more than holding elections; it requires the development of civil society, meaning such complex and counterintuitive institutions as the rule of law, an independent judiciary, multiple political parties, minority rights, voluntary associations, and freedom of expression, movement and assembly. Democracy is a learned habit, not an instinctive one, which requires deep attitudinal changes such as a culture of restraint, a commonality of values, a respect for differences of view, the concept of loyal opposition and a sense of civic responsibility.

Further, elections need to be practised to be made perfect. Ideally, a country starts electing at the municipal level and moves to the national, it begins with the legislative branch and moves to the executive. Simultaneously, the press needs to acquire full freedoms, political parties should mature, parliament should gain authority at the expense of the executive, and judges should adjudicate between them.

Such a transformation of society cannot take place within months or even years; the historical record shows that it takes decades fully to implement. It is out of the question that an Egypt with minor experience in democracy can put together enough of these components in 12 months to establish a fully democratic order.

Second, whichever scenario plays out, democracy is not in the offing.

• If Hosni Mubarak stays in power, unlikely but possible, he will be more of a tyrant than ever. As shown by his actions in recent days, he will not go quietly.
• If the military asserts more directly the power that it has wielded behind the scenes since its coup d'état of 1952, Omar Suleiman, the newly-appointed vice president, would presumably become president. He would make changes to the system, eliminating the most obvious abuses under Mr Mubarak, but not fundamentally offering Egyptians a say in the regime that rules them. Algeria 1992, where a military-backed government repressed Islamists, provides a precedent.
• If Islamists come to power, they will foment a revolution along the lines of Iran in 1979, in which their belief in God's sovereignty trumps political participation by the masses. The inherently anti-democratic nature of the Islamist movement must not be obscured by the Islamists' willingness to use elections to reach power. In the prescient words of an American official in 1992, the Islamists forward a programme of "one person, one vote, one time".

However looked at – abstractly or specifically – Egyptians are in for a rough ride, without the prospect of choosing their leaders.

Ler os comentarios aqui.

A charge do dia: Egito

China: medo de uma "praga" do Egito - Arnaud Parienty

Um interessante comentário de um professor francês sobre o medo, ou paranóia, dos dirigentes chineses em relação ao que se passa atualmente no Egito:
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Pourquoi le mot Egypte est tabou en Chine
Arnaud Parienty
Alternatives Economiques, 30/01/2011

Parmi les nouvelles surprenantes apparues ces derniers jours, le fait que le mot « Egypte » ne donne plus accès à aucun lien sur l’Internet chinois semble anecdotique. Est-ce une illustration supplémentaire de la paranoïa des autorités chinoises ? En réalité, leur crainte de la contagion contestataire n’est pas dénuée de fondement, même si on peut douter qu’un exemple aussi exotique à leurs yeux inspire beaucoup les jeunes Chinois. En plongeant dans les classements produits par le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement dans son rapport annuel, on trouve en effet des points communs intéressants entre l’Egypte, la Tunisie et la Chine.

L’IDH, ou indice de développement humain, étant l’indicateur synthétique par lequel il est habituel de mesurer le degré de développement économique et social d’un pays, classons par ordre d’IDH décroissant les pays ayant connu la plus forte progression de leur IDH depuis trente ans. Ce classement est le suivant, l’IDH pouvant varier de 0 à 1 :

1 - Tunisie, 0,436 en 1980 et 0,683 en 2010
2 – Chine, 0,368 en 1980 et 0,663 en 2010
3 – Egypte, 0,393 en 1980 et 0,620 en 2010
4 – Maroc, 0,351 en 1980 et 0,567 en 2010
5 – Inde, 0,320 en 1980 et 0,519 en 2010

La Chine se trouve donc en bien dangereuse compagnie par les temps qui courent !

Une idée persistante mais fausse est que les soulèvements populaires interviennent dans les pays où les choses vont très mal. Marx, au contraire, attendait la révolution dans les pays capitalistes les plus développés (et donc les plus proches de leur crise finale, selon lui). Les choses sont un peu plus compliquées.

Les peuples sont-ils satisfaits de leur sort ?

Des enquêtes internationales menées par des équipes de sociologues et coordonnées par Ronald Inglehart sont désormais conduites dans plus de cent pays pour mesurer la satisfaction des individus à l’égard de leur vie et de la société. Ces enquêtes révèlent qu’il n’y a pas de relation claire entre la satisfaction à l’égard de leur propre vie déclarée par les répondants et la croissance économique de leur pays. Parmi ceux dont la satisfaction a le plus augmenté figurent les coréens (forte croissance) et les russes (croissance catastrophique). Parmi ceux dont la satisfaction diminue se trouvent les chinois (croissance brillante) et les suédois (faible croissance).

La relation entre satisfaction et niveau de vie est également très floue. Ainsi, les chinois sont nettement moins satisfaits de leur vie que les guatémaltèques, ce qui n’est pas en phase avec la situation matérielle dans ces deux pays. Il faut donc ajouter des variables pour comprendre.

Du pain et la liberté

Utilisant les techniques statistiques habituelles (analyse multivariée) pour trier les causes les plus importantes qui agissent sur le sentiment de satisfaction, Ronald Inglehart et ses collègues aboutissent à la conclusion que l’augmentation de la satisfaction dépend d’abord du sentiment accru de liberté. Celui-ci résulte moins de la démocratie politique que de la libéralisation sociale (droits des femmes, libertés religieuses,…). Le développement économique contribue dans une certaine mesure à ce sentiment de liberté et agit directement sur la satisfaction des individus. Mais il arrive loin derrière.

Le développement ne suffit donc pas à contenter la population, même si le deal implicite du parti communiste chinois est « nous garantissons la paix et la prospérité et vous nous laissez gérer l’espace public comme nous voulons ». Au contraire, on peut penser qu’en Chine comme en Tunisie et, à un moindre degré en Egypte, un cocktail assez détonnant associe croissance économique et hausse du niveau d’instruction, qui permettent la hausse de l’IDH, et inégalités et absence de libertés publiques, qui engendrent la frustration. L’absence de démocratie est particulièrement ressentie par les diplômés, qui ont une opinion informée sur les affaires publiques (et savent mieux que d’autres comment les choses se passent ailleurs).

En fait, le développement conduit toujours à la démocratisation et à l’extension des libertés publiques, à mesure que le niveau d’instruction augmente et que les besoins matériels fondamentaux sont satisfaits ; car les aspirations de la population à participer à la vie de la cité et être traitée de façon adulte augmentent, alors que la corruption et le népotisme d’élites illégitimes deviennent plus insupportables. L’évolution de Taiwan et de la Corée du Sud au cours des années 1980 est un bon exemple de ce mécanisme. La situation est donc dangereuse lorsque ces évolutions sociales butent sur un blocage politique, comme c’est le cas dans les pays arabes ou en Chine. La situation est particulièrement préoccupante en Chine, malgré la qualité de ses dirigeants, car il n’y a pratiquement aucune démocratisation (la démaoïsation n’a même jamais eu lieu, les atrocités et les erreurs politiques du grand Timonier restant ignorées de la grande majorité de la population) et parce qu’il s’agit d’un pays immense.

C’est parce que les dirigeants chinois sont bien conscients de la situation qu’ils craignent comme la peste la contagion démocratique, qui se produira un jour, quoi qu’ils fassent.

(Recebido de Mauricio David em 3/02/2011)

O Big Brother em acao: George Orwell is alive and kicking...

O Estado mais orwelliano do mundo, o que recomendaria uma segunda edição, revista e atualizada de 1984, mostra que é possível, pelo menos temporariamente, controlar o fluxo das informações nesta era de internet amplamente acessível.
Mesmo sendo disseminado o uso da internet na China, seus mandarins -- e hackers contratados especialmente para estes objetivos, espécies de thugs sob o comando do Grande Irmão -- demonstram que é possível, sim, isolar mais de um bilhão de pessoas do fluxo político da contemporaneidade. Talvez seja por pouco tempo, mas um George Orwell revisitado certamente teria muito a dizer sobre isso.
Um desafio para os cientistas políticos, para os simples observadores de relações internacionais.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

El Gobierno chino teme el contagio y censura la palabra Egipto en los ”microblogs’
El País, 30/01/2011

Pequim – Las autoridades chinas no quieren correr riesgos ante la posibilidad de un efecto decontagio de las protestas en favor de la democracia ocurridas en Egipto, Túnez y otros países musulmanes. Pekín ha bloqueado la palabra “Egipto” en los microblogs de portales como Sina.com y Sohu.com, que, cuando se efectúa una búsqueda, devuelven el mensaje “De acuerdo con las leyes, regulaciones y políticas relevantes, los resultados no pueden ser mostrados” o dicen que no han sido encontrados.

Los microblogs chinos son similares a Twitter -que, al igual que Facebook y Youtube, está bloqueado en el país asiático-, y se han convertido en una potente herramienta de difusión de información, aunque también de rumores, debido a la falta de confianza de los jóvenes en los medios oficiales. El servicio de Sina.com cuenta con más de 50 millones de usuarios, un campo de cultivo demasiado sensible para que los censores lo descuiden.

Pekín posee uno de los sistemas de censura de Internet más sofisticados del mundo, gracias, en parte, a tecnología suministrada por empresas extranjeras, con el que logra con bastante éxito controlar lo que pueden ver, leer y publicar sus 450 millones de internautas.

Las revueltas en Egipto y las imágenes de los tanques en las calles de El Cairo han traído a la memoria de muchos chinos los recuerdos de las protestas de Tiananmen, en la primavera de 1989, y la consiguiente represión a manos del Ejército, en la que murieron entre cientos y miles de personas, según las fuentes. Las manifestaciones, a favor de reformas políticas y democracia, fueron catalizadas por la corrupción y la inflación.

China es hoy muy distinta de la de aquellos años. La economía ha progresado a un ritmo vertiginoso y la conciencia política de la inmensa mayoría de los jóvenes -más interesados en ganar dinero que en pedir libertades- está anestesiada, en gran parte por la ausencia de información en los medios de comunicación y los libros de historia sobre lo ocurrido en 1989, y por la falta de cualquier debate político en una prensa totalmente controlada por el Gobierno.

Sin embargo, la corrupción sigue siendo rampante, las desigualdades sociales están entre las mayores del mundo, la inflación ha alcanzado niveles peligrosos (4,6% en diciembre pasado) y entre los intelectuales hay demandas crecientes de libertad y reformas.

La prensa oficial ha informado en los últimos días de las revueltas en Egipto, e incluso de los cortes de Internet y el servicio de telefonía móvil en El Cairo. Pero lo ha hecho de forma limitada, y ha aprovechado lo sucedido para lanzar un mensaje que más parece destinado al consumo de su propia población. El diario Tiempos Globales, publicado por el Partido Comunista, asegura hoy en un editorial que la democracia no es compatible con las condiciones existentes en Egipto y Túnez, y que “las revoluciones de color” -en referencia al término aplicado por primera vez para describir las protestas en favor de reformas políticas en las antiguas repúblicas soviéticas- no pueden lograr democracia real.

“La democracia está todavía muy lejos en Túnez y Egipto. Para que la democracia tenga éxito son necesarios cimientos sólidos en economía, educación y temas sociales. Cuando se trata de sistemas políticos, el modelo occidental es solo una de las opciones”, señala la publicación. Los dirigentes chinos han declarado en repetidas ocasiones que China nunca copiará el sistema de democracia occidental.