O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

terça-feira, 9 de fevereiro de 2016

Paulo R. Almeida na Amazon books: um abuso e um roubo...


Caindo na Amazon para ver o preço de um livro que me interessava (ainda estava muito caro, mesmo em Kindle edition, que em vários casos ficou mais cara do que o livro impresso), resolvi testar o meu nome para saber o que estava sendo oferecido (sem o meu consentimento) e a que preços.
Encontrei livros de que participei, outros dos quais sou indiscutivelmente o autor, vários que editei e outros que sequer desconfio por que estão sob o meu nome (um ou outro porque escrevi uma frase para a quarta capa, mas a maioria provavelmente porque sou apenas citado por algum autor).
Em todos os casos, com exceção dos que eu mesmo ofertei em formato digital, os livros estão muito caros, dificultando o acesso aos interessados.
Eliminei os homônimos (e a Amazon recupera mesmo os "quase homônimos", o que é errado), e os livros nos quais sou apenas citado, e deu isso que está abaixo:

1-12 of 85 results for Books :
"Paulo Roberto de Almeida"


Jun 16, 2009
by Michael Schiffer and David Shorr
$39.99Prime


Other Formats:Hardcover
Paulo Roberto de Almeida is Ph.D. in Social Sciences (University of Brussels, 1984) and Master in International Economy (University of Antwerp, 1977). He is also a career diplomat since 1977. Besides his professional duties, has engaged in academic activitiesMore about Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Sep 8, 2013
by Paulo Roberto Almeida and Pedro Paulo Palazzo de Almeida
Kindle edition: $4.35to buy
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Sep 26, 2014
by Ted Goertzel and Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Auto-delivered wirelessly
5 out of 5 stars 1

Sep 16, 2005
by Marshall C. Eakin and Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Kindle Edition: $21.95
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Nov 2, 2014
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Kindle Edition: $0.99to buy
Auto-delivered wirelessly

Sep 17, 2015
by de Almeida, Paulo Roberto
Paperback: $66.00Prime

Sep 2, 2015
by de Almeida, Paulo Roberto
Paperback: $47.00Prime



Oct 15, 2014
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida
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Nov 4, 2014
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Nov 4, 2014
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Kindle Edition: $0.99

Nov 30, 2015
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida

2006

2001

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2010
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida
               
1605
by Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Contributor)

1993
Currently unavailable

Jan 6, 2009
by J. Love and W. Baer
Hardcover: $130.00Prime
Table of Contents : ... Global Strategies 167 Paulo Roberto de Almeida Part Four The Impact ...See a random page in this book.

2006
by Rubens Antonio Almeida Paulo Roberto De^Barbosa
Currently unavailable

Oct 1, 2008
by Andrew Fenton Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz

Table of Contents : ... Denise Gregory and Paulo Roberto de Almeida 137 7 South Africa ...See a random page in this book.



A era de "depressao" permanente, ou da Grande Estagnacao? - Robert Romano

Será?
Vamos ver...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Is the era of economic growth ending?
By Robert Romano
Americans for Limited Government, February 9, 2016

The economy of Japan has not grown nominally in 20 years, according to data published by the Statistics Bureau of Japan.

Nor has its population aged 15 to 64 —those in the prime working years of their lives — which has declined from 86.9 million in 1995 to 76.7 million today.

Inflation has barely budged, too, averaging just 1.1 percent a year the past 20 years, even with a torrent of monetary expansion by the Bank of Japan.

Interest rates have also declined on a long-term basis, from an average of 3.4 percent in 1995 to just 0.04 percent today. Those may even go negative in the near future, chief bond strategist at Tokai Tokyo Securities Co., Kazuhiko Sano, predicts. Sano accurately called the rate dropping below 0.5 percent, 0.25 percent and 0.1 percent.

Just imagine that. For the privilege of lending money to the Japanese government, it costs banks and investors money. The only way it might pay to buy the bonds is in an outright deflationary environment, prices declined even faster than the interest rates. But even then, keeping cash would seem to be a better deal.

It all coincides with the Bank of Japan charging banks for excess reserves with a negative interest rate.

Is the Bank of Japan forecasting deflation in Japan? Certainly wouldn't be the first time.

But in a broader context, do the rapidly falling interest rates project a no-growth, or slow-growth environment?

Certainly something to question over here in the U.S., where the economy has not grown above 4 percent since 2000, and not above 3 percent since 2005, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As for 2015, it came in at a tepid 2.4 percent growth.

The average annual growth from 2006 to 2015 was 1.41 percent, the worst decade since the Great Depression.

U.S. 10-year treasuries stand at just 1.75 percent.

The consumer price index only increased 0.7 percent in 2015.

The working age population in the U.S. has certainly been slowing, and will be growing at an even slower pace for the next few decades.

The labor force participation rate for 16- to 64-year-olds has not been faring much better, according to data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It peaked in 1997 at 77.37 percent and has dropped to 72.61 percent in 2015, accounting for 9.7 million people who otherwise might have been in the labor force since then but are not.

Note that excludes those of retirement age, correcting for drops in labor participation associated with Baby Boomers retiring. Yes, that has reduced the participation rate some, but so has the working age population exodus from the work force too.

What emerges is a spiral of slower growth, less asset price appreciation, lower interest rates and fewer jobs.

What's to like?

But worse still, could this point to a longer trend where the global economy itself is slowing down until, one day, it stops growing all together?

Is the era of growth ending? Never mind the degrowth movement.

Perhaps Japan and Europe, too, which is in a similar stagnation, are just windows into the future.

What is most alarming, however, may be the declines the U.S. is seeing in labor participation. Slower growth might be seen as a benign indicator if it still proportionately produced the same number of jobs.

But it is not, with the 16- to 64-year-old labor participation rate dropping to levels not seen since 1981 when women were still entering the work force. Slower growth has been toxic.

All this, after the U.S. has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in college educations with students with tens of thousands of dollars of debt predicated on the idea that there would be enough jobs for everyone. Well, there aren't, every year it keeps getting worse and we need to start asking ourselves why.

Robert Romano is the senior editor of Americans for Limited Government.

A Parceria Trans-Pacifica: uma analise do Congressional Research Service (2016)


The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications

Brock R. Williams, Coordinator, Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Ben Dolven, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance

Congressional Research Service
February 3, 2016
7-5700
R44361


Summary
On October 5, 2015, Ministers of the 12 Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries announced conclusion of their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations.
The agreement is one of the Obama Administration’s signature trade policy initiatives, an effort to reduce and eliminate trade and investment barriers and establish new rules and disciplines to govern trade and investment among the 12 countries.
TPP proponents, including Administration officials, argue that the proposed TPP would have substantial strategic benefits for the United States in addition to its direct economic impact.
They argue that the agreement would enhance overall U.S. influence in the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region and advance U.S. leadership in setting and modernizing the rules of commerce in the region and potentially in the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Congress plays a key role in the TPP. Through U.S. trade negotiating objectives established in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation and informal consultations and oversight, Congress has guided the Administration’s negotiations.
Ultimately, Congress would need to pass implementing legislation if the concluded agreement is to take effect in the United States.
The geo-political arguments surrounding TPP are widely debated, as are the arguments about its potential economic impact. To some, the TPP is an important |litmus test of U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific region.
As the leading economic component of the Administration’s “strategic rebalancing” to the region, the TPP, proponents argue, would allow the United States to reaffirm existing alliances, expand U.S. soft power, spur countries to adopt a more U.S.-friendly foreign policy outlook, and enhance broader diplomatic and security relations.
Many Asian policymakers – correctly or not – could interpret a failure of TPP in the United States as a symbol of the United States’ declining interest in the region and inability to assert leadership.
Some critics argue that TPP backers often do not identify specific, concrete ways that a successful deal would invigorate U.S. security partnerships in the region, and that an agreement should be considered solely for its economic impact.
They maintain that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics and that U.S. bilateral relations are based on each country’s broader national interests.
The Administration is also pursuing strategic economic goals in the TPP. Through the agreement, proponents argue, the United States can play a leading role in “writing the rules” for commerce with key trading partners, addressing gaps in current multilateral trade rules, and setting a precedent for future regional and bilateral FTA negotiations or multilateral trade talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The core of this argument is the assertion that the TPP’s potential components – including tariff and non-tariff liberalization, strong intellectual property rights and investment protections, and labor and environmental provisions – would build upon the U.S.- led economic system that has expanded world trade and investment enormously
since the end of World War II.
Although most U.S. observers agree it is in the U.S. interest to lead in establishing global and regional trade rules, less consensus exists on what those rules should be, yielding some criticism on the strength and breadth of various TPP provisions.
In addition, some argue that crafting new rules through “mega-regional” agreements rather than the WTO could undermine the multilateral trading system, create competing trading blocs, lead to trade diversion, and marginalize the countries not participating in regional initiatives. China is not a TPP member, but features prominently in discussion of the agreement’s potential strategic effects.
Some argue that China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to minimize U.S. presence and power. In this line of reasoning, the TPP serves as a counter to growing Chinese economic and political influence, implying that failure to conclude TPP could, in effect, allow China to shape regional rules of commerce and diplomacy through its own trade and investment initiatives.
Others, however, argue that TPP is complementary to other FTAs and trade agreements throughout the region, including those championed by China, and that new members –possibly including China –will be critical for the TPP to influence regional norms.
Trade agreements occur at the intersection of foreign and domestic policy, which can create tensions in balancing competing policy priorities. Key issues Congress faces as it continues its role regarding TPP include: (1) how strongly to weigh geo-political implications of TPP; (2) the potential impact of the TPP on the multilateral trading system and other trade and economic institutions; and (3) the possible expansion of the agreement to include additional members.

Energias verdes na America do Sul - Joana Castro Pereira (Lusiada)

Um artigo extremamente bem informado, descritivo, analítico, interpretativo, que recomendo sem hesitação:

Green Energy Integration in South America: a winding path
Joana Castro Pereira, Professora Auxiliar da Universidade Lusíada do Norte (Porto)
 in: Lusíada. Política Internacional e Segurança, n.º 12 (2015)
Neste link: 
http://revistas.lis.ulusiada.pt/index.php/lpis/article/viewFile/2265/2389


Abstract:
Economic and social development is inseparable from energy, therefore, since the second half of the twentieth century, some of the major South-American regional actors have been seeking to implement and strengthen projects regarding energy production and energy integration. Thus, energy is a common interest in the region. Furthermore, South America reveals a significant potential to move towards a low carbon economy and Brazil, as an important green pole in the region and the central figure in the process of energy integration, seemed to be in the position to foster cooperation around green energy integration. However, there are a number of challenges to the achievement of such an ambitious goal, especially those associated with the Pacific Alliance, which has been increasing Mexico’s influence over South America, and the Brazilian political, economic and social situations’ deterioration from 2013 until today.
Key-words: South-America; Brazil; regional integration; energy; low carbon economy; Pacific Alliance

Resumo:
O desenvolvimento económico e social é indissociável da questão energética, de modo que, desde a segunda metade do século XX, alguns dos principais atores regionais sul-americanos têm vindo a procurar implementar e fortalecer projetos no âmbito da produção e integração energéticas. A energia é, portanto, um interesse comum entre os países sul-americanos. Ademais, a região revela um potencial significativo para avançar rumo a uma economia de baixo carbono e o Brasil, enquanto importante polo verde na região e principal ator do processo de integração energética, poderia promover a cooperação em torno da integração regional verde. No entanto, existem vários obstáculos à concretização de um objetivo tão ambicioso, sobretudo os que se encontram relacionados com a criação da Aliança do Pacífico, que tem vindo a aumentar a influência do México na América do Sul, e a deterioração da situação política, económica e social brasileira desde 2013.
Palavras-chave: América do Sul; Brasil; integração regional; energia; economia de baixo carbono; Aliança do Pacífico

segunda-feira, 8 de fevereiro de 2016

Chilcote's book: interesting but too costly, even used...

Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity: Chilcote, Ronald H.
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Chilcote, Ronald H.
Published by Cambridge University Press
ISBN 10: 1107071623 ISBN 13: 9781107071629
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O Real vai continuar caindo, diz o Financial Times

Brazil's real: how low can it go?
Joe Leahy and John Paul Rathbone
Financial Times, February 8, 2016

Currency has further to fall given the state of the economy, analysts say
When Dilma Rousseff attended the 2016 opening session of Brazil's congress this week, she appealed to lawmakers to approve tax increases to tackle a widening gap in the country's public finances.
Most critically, the president called for the reintroduction of a tax on financial transactions, known as the CPMF, that was abandoned in 2007 after objections from business. Opposition congressmen booed her.
But with Brazil reporting a budget deficit last year that was the biggest among emerging economies except for Saudi Arabia at over 10 per cent, unpopular measures are needed to save the country from a deepening fiscal hole, analysts say.
Indeed, some economists argue that given Brazil's growing political and budget crises, its currency, the real, should be trading at closer to R$5 against the dollar than today's level of around R$4. Only intervention by the central bank with its large reserves and Brazil's high interest rates are keeping hedge funds at bay, they say.
"Most of us think that if it were just based on fundamentals, the real should be closer to R$5 to the dollar not R$4," said a senior banker with a foreign institution in São Paulo.
Ms Rousseff made a rare appearance in congress because she will need all the support she can get in 2016. Not only is the economy heading into its worst recession in more than a century but lawmakers will resume an impeachment process against her after the annual carnival festivities end next week.
A central bank survey of economists shows most predicting gross domestic product will contract by more than 3 per cent this year, compounding what is expected to have been a more than 3 per cent fall in 2015. They are also forecasting inflation of 7.3 per cent, above the central bank's target range of 4.5 per cent plus or minus 2 percentage points and carrying on from last year's blowout rise in prices of 10.7 per cent.
The survey also shows economists predicting the real will end the year at R$4.35 to the dollar compared with about R$3.90 on Wednesday.
However, even though a rate of R$4.35 would be a record nominal low for the currency, it could have much further to fall, economists say. In spite of the much more negative economic situation today, Brazil's currency remains stronger against the dollar in real terms than when it last hit record lows in 2002. At that time, the currency was struck by pessimism over the election of a leftwing firebrand president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who later turned out to be more market-friendly than expected.
On a real effective exchange rate basis, the real today is trading at about 15-25 per cent below its historical average while in 2002 it fell as much as 50 per cent below its average. Indeed, the currency's "equilibrium" - the level at which it would represent fair value in real terms - would be R$5.45 if it were allowed to float without intervention, said Marcos Casarin, economist with Oxford Economics.
"This [R$5.45 to the dollar] is where the model says OK now your external adjustment is done and now this rate will ensure you have some capacity for your export industry to be competitive in external markets," Mr Casarin said.
This fact has not been lost on hedge fund managers. Just before the Christmas break, Brazilian hedge fund, Verde Asset Management, led by Luis Stulhberger, known for his long history of market outperformance, said in a report it saw the currency as overvalued.
"The time will come to have much higher exposure in US dollars [versus the real]," Verde said. "We remain very attentive."
The obstacle facing hedge funds is the prospect of central bank intervention to defend the currency. Brazil has one of the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world at about $369bn. Betting against the real by going short is also expensive given Brazil's high interest rates, with the central bank's benchmark Selic rate at 14.25 per cent.
"I think it [the real] will be held back by central bank intervention and also by those fat interest rates they offer, which discourage shorting of the real," said Mr Casarin of Oxford Economics.
Another factor potentially helping the real is a collapse in trade, with imports contracting faster than exports in recent months. This has generated a positive trade balance - a factor that could curb depreciation of the Brazilian currency, Nomura said in a report.
However, most analysts say that even if the real can withstand Brazil's internal problems, it is extremely vulnerable to an external event, such as a significant devaluation of the renminbi. China is one of Brazil's most important trading partners. Such a shock could open the currency up for attack.
"There are a lot of mines along the way, external and internal, so the real, as much as it has moved down, probably hasn't seen its bottom yet," said Jorge Mariscal, emerging markets chief investment officer with UBS Wealth Management.