923) Ano Judaico: 5769

Sem dúvida é excepcional que um povo, no planeta Terra, possa comemorar esse longo período de história, não exatamente contínua, mas apresentando de toda forma certa linearidade cultural e sobretudo religiosa.
Isso corresponde, aproximadamente a 273 gerações (considerando-se que cada geração possa corresponder a 25 anos).
Nem o povo chinês, provavelmente outro dos mais longevos, histórica e culturalmente falando, do mundo, pode exbir tal linearidade histórica ou religiosa.
Meus cumprimentos ao povo judeu, aos seus atuais descendentes, sobretudo meus agradecimentos intelectuais pelo imenso aporte que esse pequeno povo fez em benefício de toda a humanidade, nos campos da filosofia, da medicina, das ciências em geral, e sobretudo em benefício da tolerância mútua, do respeito à vida, de valores elevados de direitos humanos e de solidariedade.
Shalom e longa vida ao povo judeu.
São os meus modestos votos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

922) Homenagem a um amigo historiador

A propósito do falecimento do historiador gaúcho Braz Augusto Aquino Brancato

Carmen Licia e eu, amigos de longa data do Professor Braz Brancato, colegas de pesquisa histórica e espectadores interessados na sua fecunda obra de pesquisador, de docente e de avaliador de cursos de história, gostariamos de deixar nosso testemunho de sentida admiração e de reconhecimento profissional pela grande obra realizada pelo professor Brancato. À Sandra Maria Lubisco Brancato, sua esposa de todas as horas, aos seus filhos, nossas mais sentidas condolências pelo seu passamento e nossa reafirmação de sincero elogio pela seriedade com que ele conduziu suas múltiplas atividades na área da História durante toda a sua vida.

Braz Augusto Aquino Brancato
Ex-embaixador comenta o falecimento de Braz Augusto Aquino Brancato
Rubem Amaral Jr.
Revista de História da Biblioteca Nacional
24.09.2008

Através da coluna "Diálogo com o autor" da Revista de História, recebi a triste notícia do falecimento de meu bom amigo Braz Augusto Aquino Brancato. Conheci-o em Madrid nos idos de 1980, quando ele e sua esposa ali se encontravam fazendo doutorado em História na Universidade Complutense. Desde então, mantivemos regular contato. Anos depois, tive o prazer de hospedá-lo alguns dias em Lisboa e, há alguns meses, recebi sua visita em Brasília, por ocasião de uma reunião da CAPES, órgão de que era consultor.

Resultado de sua tese de doutorado, o livro "Don Pedro I de Brasil, Posible Rey de España" foi prefaciado pelo seu antigo mestre espanhol Professor Emérito Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois e recebeu da banca examinadora a qualificação "Sobresaliente cum laude", a máxima nota. O Instituto Espanhol de Cooperação Ibero-Americana também concedeu-lhe o Primeiro Prêmio de Teses Doutorais em 1984.

Braz era graduado em História e em Direito pela PUCRS, universidade onde lecionou e exerceu diferentes cargos por longos anos, inclusive de Presidente do seu Conselho Editorial e da revista Estudos-Ibero-Americanos, na qual colaborou com numerosos trabalhos. Seu nutrido currículo acadêmico incluía, além das atividades docentes, uma extensa lista de participações em bancas examinadoras, orientação de pós-graduandos, apresentação de trabalhos em congressos, publicação de artigos em diversos órgãos nacionais e estrangeiros, coordenação e edição de obras coletivas e etc.

Além de seu sólido preparo intelectual, era um homem cordial de grande integridade, excelente chefe de família e leal amigo de seus amigos. Com as minhas reiteradas condolências aos familiares, gostaria de deixar esse testemunho de minha estima, admiração e saudade.

921) Perolas do processo de seleçao academica

Apenas para registro, a modo de informaçao, muito postergada, sobre justificativas esfarrapadas das entidades de fomento acadêmico. Compreendo inteiramente que as possibilidades efetivas sejam em número desproporcionalmente menor em relação às demandas realizadas, mas a desculpa não poderia ser mais incoerente e sem sentido.

Oliveira Lima e a diplomacia brasileira
Em julho de 2004, respondendo a iniciativa do Centro de Memória do CNPq, eu encaminhei um projeto, na temática acima descrita, para ser eventualmente acolhido como um livro na Coleção Memória do Saber do CNPq.
Em meados daquele mês, recebi telefonema do vice-presidente do CNPq, dizendo que tinha aprovado o projeto, mas recomendava ampliação do trabalho para outros aspectos que não apenas a diplomacia, com participação de outros estudiosos. Encaminhei coorrespondência a outros pesquisadores, com vistas a verificar a possibilidade dessa ampliação.
Entretanto, por carta de 6 de outubro de 2004, assinada pelo Secretário Executivo da Coleção Memória do Saber, fui informado que meu projeto não tinha sido retido nos 20 projetos selecionados dentre os 137 recebidos.
Esta foi a justificativa:
“Informamos que o seu projeto não foi aprovado, considerando a segunte avaliação dos pareceristas: ‘A proposta é pouco fundamentada, não situando historicamente o personagem”.

Bem, para que cada um possa julgar, efetivamente, que a minha proposta era pouco fundamentada, eu a transcrevo agora, aqui abaixo:

Coleção Memória do Saber do CNPq
Apresentação de Proposta

1. Nome do referencial objeto de estudo:
Oliveira Lima e a diplomacia brasileira

2. Nome do proponente:
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

3. Justificativa da proposta:
Examinar a contribuição de Oliveira Lima, como intelectual diplomata, para o pensamento diplomático, como pesquisador, para o campo da história diplomática, e, como diplomata da ativa, para a formacao de uma agenda de política externa do Brasil.
O trabalho fará uma reflexão sobre a política externa na época de transição do Império para a República e na era do Barão do Rio Branco (e um pouco mais além, até meados dos anos 1920), com base na contribuição de OL, a partir dos principais escritos publicados, no que se refere aos principais problemas de sua época (e que de certa forma ainda são desafios de hoje): diplomacia regional, conteúdo econômico da diplomacia, papel do diplomata, relações com os EUA, Japão, América Latina etc. Poderá terminar por uma reflexão sobre alguém que foi obscurecido por personalidades mais fortes (Barão do Rio Branco) e sobre sua importância para a atual diplomacia brasileira.
O trabalho servirá também para recuperar alguns “papéis perdidos” para os atuais historiadores brasileiros, assim como para o público em geral e para os diplomatas em particular (seleção de textos mais relevantes).

Esquema provisório de trabalho
Oliveira Lima e a diplomacia brasileira
1. Introdução: por que Oliveira Lima?
(recuperação de seu papel, seus escritos e sua importância para a diplomacia brasileira; principais fontes primárias e secundárias sobre sua obra; a Biblioteca Oliveira Lima da Universidade Católica de Washington: livros e escritos de OL)

Primeira Parte:
Oliveira Lima e sua época
2. Um diplomata belle-époque
(breve resumo da vida e da produção acadêmico-jornalístico-historiográfica de OL, no contexto brasileiro e internacional )
3. Oliveira Lima e a diplomacia brasileira na transição para a República
(itinerário funcional de OL e principais características da diplomacia brasileira entre 1889 e 1902)
4. O acadêmico e o Barão: choque de concepções diplomáticas
(razões e circunstâncias dos desentendimentos e entrechoques: questões pessoais e de definições de política externa)
5. Ascensão e queda do “Dom Quixote Gordo”
(fama intelectual e desencontros funcionais: incidentes de carreira, “desgraça política”, auto-exílio, obscurecimento posterior)

Segunda Parte:
Visões da política externa brasileira: a contribuição de Oliveira Lima
6. O Brasil e o mundo: alianças e preferências continentais
(visão geral das concepções diplomáticas de OL, com base nas suas várias obras publicadas, escritos jornalísticos e papéis pessoais)
7. O Brasil e os Estados Unidos: autonomia e aproximação
(relações americanas, doutrina Monroe, o papel dos EUA no contexto regional e internacional, relações com o Brasil; ver arquivos diplomáticos e os ofícios produzidos por OL)
8. Diplomacia regional: o cone sul e as repúblicas bolivarianas
(a visão de OL das relações platinas e andinas do Brasil, com destaque para a Argentina: visão hegemônico-imperial ou de cooperação regional?, o papel das grandes potências européias e dos EUA nos problemas regionais; corolário Roosevelt à doutrina Monroe)
9. Diplomacia econômica: promoção comercial avant la lettre
(a renovação do papel econômico do diplomata, em complemento ao mandato consular, e as funções de apoio à atividade exportadora pelo MRE)
10. Direito internacional e emergência do multilateralismo
(questões da paz e segurança internacional , meios pacíficos de solução de conflitos: as conferências de paz da Haia, conferências americanas, a opção pelo arbitramento e os problemas do equilíbrio regional)
11. Diplomacia funcional: o diplomata e a modernização do serviço exterior
(críticas de OL à estrutura e funcionamento da diplomacia brasileira: antecipação de mudanças ou irrelevância funcional?)

Terceira Parte:
Duas épocas da política externa brasileira: modernidade de Oliveira Lima?
12. O Brasil e os grandes atores: Europa, Argentina, Estados Unidos, Japão
(as posições de OL são relevantes para a nossa época?)
13. O Brasil e a cooperação regional: do conflito à integração
(da desconfiança à de aliança e integração: OL antecipou algo?)
14. Diplomacia econômica: emergência e afirmação de um estilo diplomático
(das conferências americanas ao multilateralismo econômico contemporâneo)
15. Conclusões: podemos aprender algo com Oliveira Lima, ainda hoje?
(lições, ensinamentos, equívocos de OL; sua utilidade para a diplomacia brasileira na perspectiva do século XXI)

Quarta Parte:
Antologia de Oliveira Lima?
1) Nos Estados Unidos, impressões politicas e sociaes (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1899; 524 p.) (trechos)
2) Panamericanismo (Monroe – Bolivar – Roosevelt)
(Rio de Janeiro [etc.] H. Garnier, 1907; 342 p.) (trechos)
3) América Latina e América Inglesa: a evolução Brasileira comparada com a Anglo-Americana (Rio de janeiro. Livraria Garnier [1914?] (trechos)
4) “O Panamericanismo e a Liga das Nações” in Boletim da União Pan-Americana,
Washington: ano XX, nº 3, março 1921, p. 154-169 (trechos)

Apêndice:
Cronologia da vida e da obra de OL e etapas da política externa brasileira
Fontes e bibliografia:
Fontes primárias (arquivos diplomáticos, papéis e manuscritos OL, depoimentos da época
Fontes impressas e publicadas (relatórios do MRE, jornais e periódicos contemporâneos)
Obras de Oliveira Lima
Fontes secundárias (obras sobre Oliveira Lima e a diplomacia brasileira)
Obras gerais

4. Programa de trabalho:
(a ser definido em função da aceitação do projeto)

5. Relação de colaboradores e de suas atribuições:
Assistente de pesquisa (a ser definido entre alunos de mestrado)

6. Estimativa de despesas:
1. Remuneração do autor: R$ 3.000,00
2. Assistente de pesquisa, três meses (R$ 1.000,00 por mês = R$ 3.000,00)
3. Secretária-digitadora, um mês: R$ 700,00
4. Pesquisas no Arquivo Diplomático do RJ, passagens e diárias: R$ 2.000,00
Total: R$ 8.700,00

7. Cronograma de atividades:
( a ser definido em função da aceitação do projeto)

8. Curriculum abreviado do autor:
Paulo Roberto de Almeida é doutor em Ciências Sociais pela Universidade de Bruxelas, mestre em Planejamento Econômico pela Universidade de Antuérpia e diplomata de carreira desde 1977. Tem atuado como professor convidado em diversas instituições brasileiras e estrangeiras e é pesquisador autônomo em temas de história diplomática brasileira e de relações econômicas internacionais. Publicou inúmeros trabalhos e diversos livros nessas áreas, com destaque para o processo de integração regional, o multilateralismo econômico e a diplomacia econômica do Brasil (ver principais publicações e outros dados do autor em www.pralmeida.org).

9. Estimativa do número de páginas (texto e ilustrações):
350 a 400 pp. (poucas ilustrações)

Brasília, 7 de julho de 2004

920) Hayek sobre as limitações humanas na antecipação do futuro

O filósofo austriaco e prêmio Nobel de economia Friedrich Hayek já figura neste blog, em posição preeminente (ver coluna da direita) sobre a melhor atitude a se adotar em relação aos dogmaas humanos. Agora ele comparece com uma seleção de frases coletadas pelo economista brasileiro Rodrigo Constantino a propósito da liberdade humana e a visão de futuro.

"Human reason can neither predict nor deliberately shape its own future. Its advances consist in finding out where it has been wrong."

"To make the best available knowledge at any given moment the compulsory standard for all future endeavor may well be the most certain way to prevent new knowledge from emerging."

"Freedom granted only when it is known beforehand that its effects will be beneficial is not freedom."

"Our freedom is threatened in many fields because of the fact that we are much too ready to leave the decision to the expert or to accept too uncritically his opinion about a problem of which he knows intimately only one little aspect."

"It is his concern with the impersonal process of society in which more knowledge is utilized than any one individual or organized group of human beings can possess that puts the economists in constant opposition to the ambitions of other specialists who demand powers of control because they feel that their particular knowledge is not given sufficient consideration."

"Most of the advantages of social life, especially in its more advanced forms which we call 'civilization', rest on the fact that the individual benefits from more knowledge than he is aware of."

"It would be an error to believe that, to achieve a higher civilization, we have merely to put into effect the ideas now guiding us; if we are to advance, we must leave room for a continuous revision of our present conceptions and ideals which will be necessitated by further experience."

"Liberty is essential in order to leave room for the unforeseeable and unpredictable."

"Humiliating to human pride as it may be, we must recognize that the advance and even the preservation of civilization are dependent upon a maximum of opportunity for accidents to happen."

919) Livre acesso a periodicos academicos

Um diretorio de revistas acadêmicas de livre acesso
http://www.doaj.org/

Welcome to the Directory of Open Access Journals.
This service covers free, full text, quality controlled scientific and scholarly journals.
There are now 3611 journals in the directory.
Currently 1249 journals are searchable at article level.
As of today 208.720 articles are included in the DOAJ service.

Subjects:
Agriculture and Food Sciences
Arts and Architecture
Biology and Life Sciences
Business and Economics
Chemistry
Earth and Environmental Sciences
General Works
Health Sciences
History and Archaeology
Languages and Literatures
Law and Political Science
Mathematics and Statistics
Philosophy and Religion
Physics and Astronomy
Science General
Social Sciences
Technology and Engineering

918) Indigenismo: uma utopia ingenua, e talvez perigosa, ou pelo menos equivocada...

Um excelente artigo de um sociólogo latino-americano, vivendo nos EUA, sobre o indigenismo (ou talvez fosse o caso de dizer: sobre a ideologia indigenista).
Acredito que o presidente boliviano Evo Morales faria bem em ler este artigo, mas acredito também que ele não iria gostar...

Reflections from Latin America
Indigenism and Economics
Ibsen Martinez*
September 1, 2008

In some of my articles on Latin America I have used the word "indigenism".
Last April, I received a courteous e-mail from my editor. I cannot resist quoting an excerpt:
As an ordinary American, I don't know very well what it ['indigenism'] means or connotes. It's apparently a term that has come to have a lot of connotations in Latin America. To a native English-speaking reader like myself trying to make sense of it, the word 'indigenous' suggests native peoples—that is, the people who inhabited Latin America before the Spanish explorers ever arrived there. A word like 'indigenism' might suggest that they—the people who lived there before the Spanish ever arrived—should have greater influence in modern politics. But obviously the fact that there is a new word also suggests that maybe the word means something more complex and modern—for example, that there is a modern culture, perhaps intertwined, involving both the originally-indigenous peoples and whatever influences have occurred since.

I looked the word up in several English dictionaries and all I could find was "indigenous", "indigenizing" or even "indigenization". Obviously, "indigenism", at least as I have used it in my past columns, is an ambiguous cognate meaning something complex and modern, as my editor suggests. Something that has many connotations in our region, too. And something that runs deep in the minds of millions of ordinary Latin Americans in many countries like Mexico, Brazil, Paraguay and the Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.
All together, they have a population of more than 300 million people. And in each one of these countries various forms of indigenism thrive with disparate consequences for their economies.
Instead of a single paragraph, I decided to write a full article on indigenismo. I thought that it might help me get a better grasp of one of the most perplexing Spanish words currently used throughout Latin America by politicians, scholars, journalists, talk-show hosts and, at times, even by truly indigenous persons. I shall try to delve as best as I can into what indigenismo entails when it comes down to Latin American economic matters.
The VOX General Dictionary of Spanish defines indigenismo as
1. The study and extolling of the ancient cultural traits of autochthonous peoples of [Latin] America that have become part of the local European civilization,
2. Political doctrine aimed at vindicating both indigenous and mestizo people's rights
3. Any Spanish American idiomatic expression that appropriates any indigenous word's common usage.

All three entries are essentially correct, but I would also point out that indigenism was primarily an opinion current favorable to the autochthonous peoples that attained great influence as far back as the 16th century. Thus, it is not a modern concept.
Yet, this ancient humanist-inspired current, however diffuse, has been permanent ever since the first contacts between Europeans and the indigenous peoples of South America to this day. Columbus' first idealized depictions of the population he had just met this side of the Atlantic clearly deserve to be held as the earliest products of Latin American indigenism.
First conceived and nurtured by Catholic priests during the colonial era, indigenism has survived through all the stages of Latin American history. It was kept alive after the Independence by countless associations dedicated to protect the indios and it cannot distinctly be identified with any particular social class.
Of course, indigenism drags the burden of the conquistadores's bad conscience as well as that of the criollos—white settlers of Spanish descent—and mestizos in face of the aboriginal populations' backwardness and sufferings. Indigenism, however, has seldom placated that everlasting bad conscience.
Furthernore, indigenism is also a literary, artistic and political movement that began developing itself during the second half of the 19th century in many of our newly-born "republics". It those times it was clear to many intellectuals and politicians that, even after independence, segregation of the indios from the mainstream society hindered the foundation of true nations.
One of the paradoxes involved in Latin American indigenism lies in the fact that, more often than not, it has been a white meditation on the indio, usually written in the conqueror's language, Spanish.
Subcomandante Marcos, the witty and masked leader of the zapatista guerilla in Chiapas, Mexico, is an apt example of this paradox: he is a sociologist of white upper middle-class origins and a prolific indigenista essayist, too. From another point of view, Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa affirms in his book Archaic Utopia (1996) that current Latin American indigenism, such as the one represented by Marcos, is still mostly a "European mythologizing" of Rousseau's "good savage". Still, ever since independence from Spain was attained, indigenism has posed some very difficult questions to our societies.
How to eliminate ethnic and cultural differences that kept the various constituents of the population apart—the indios, the white creole elite, and the mestizo—so that they could merge in a society that could truly be called a nation? How to absorb the aboriginal otherness into the fabric of a nationality? At the same time, how to assert any common national identity based exclusively on aboriginal values and mores?
These are just a few of the contradictions indigenism tried to solve during the 19th and 20th centuries. But if there is something that remains clear it is that the 21st century's Latin American indigenism is tightly connected with all forms of nationalist radical populism. Henri Favre, a respected French expert on the subject, goes as far as saying that "indigenism is the most privileged form of nationalism in Latin America".1
In a sense, Latin American ongoing indigenism is the flip side of globalization. In terms of its application to history, it attempts to invent an aboriginal "collectivist tradition" and retain it as something essentially different from other cultures and societies, to build a estate-oriented, populist ideology on such a tradition.
To be true, today there are as many indigenist currents in Latin American as there are countries where the indigenous population is significantly large.
The Mexican revolution ( 1910-1920) was the great period of intellectual and artistic indigenism in Latin America. The Mexican muralist movement, embodied in the works of José Clemente Orozco or Diego Rivera, became, in the eyes of many other Latin American artists, something worthy of imitation. The same can be said of the various literary indigenista trends—in essays, novels and poetry—that spread out in Latin America during the first half of the 20th century. But it was radical politics what cleared the way to transform indigenism in a major political force throughout the region.
1927 was a good year for both the New York Yankees and political indigenism in Latin America. José Carlos Mariátegui, a brilliant Peruvian Marxist writer, began publishing a series of essays asserting, for the first time in Latin American intellectual history, that indigenism should be inseparable from socialism.
According to Mariátegui, only a Marxist-oriented collectivism could successfully replace feudal and capitalist societies in the Andean countries —Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia—and bring justice and welfare to the descendants of the ancient Incan Empire.
Neither [European] civilizaton nor the white man's alphabet—he wrote—will upbring the indigenous soul. The myth, the idea of a socialist revolution will. The indio's only hope must be revolutionary.
The Marxist perspective that Latin American indigenism acquired ever since misrepresents pre-Hispanic indigenous communities as collective and philanthropic "good savage" societies. Furthermore, it posits the impossibility of founding democratic and liberal institutions on "feudal and neocolonial economies".
To deny Spanish atrocities during the Conquest period would be as loathsome as denying the Holocaust. But it is just as deceitful to describe pre-Hispanic societies as egalitarian Utopias.
Yet, more than eighty years after Mariátegui's book was first published, a diversity of indigenisms thrives throughout the continent. Certainly, it is more nuanced in those countries where mestizaje—a Spanish word that refers to peoples of mixed race—is a distinctive trait of their societies, such as Colombia or Venezuela. Miscegenation, it would seem, attenuates segregationism and scolds racist attitudes.
Though there have been Mayan Indians guerrillas in Guatemala, especially active during the 1980s, the end of the Cold War extinguished them the same way as it put an end to all Central American civil wars. The Zapatista irregulars in Chiapas, Mexico, might still attract scores of radical U.S. and European tourists, but it never posed a credible threat to Mexican democratic institutions.
Today, indigenism is a major political force only in the Andean countries, a 3 million square-Km region once called Tahuantinsuyo, the greatest and oldest empire ever developed in pre-Hispanic America.
This Incan Empire, as it was also known, was headquartered in the now Peruvian city of Cuzco. Its Pacific coastline stretched for more that 5000 km. When the Spaniards first arrived during the early 15th century, the Incan Empire extended over what now is Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. At the height of its might, during the 13th century, it comprised large expanses of what now are Colombia and Northern Chile and Argentina. This only fact would explain why indigenism in the Andean countries has morphed into a force that simply will not go away and must be reckoned with.
Nobody can deny that president Evo Morales, who is the first indigenous ruler of after 500 hundred years of Bolivian history, represents a majority of his country's indigenous population.
According to a 2001 official census, 45 percent out of a total of some 8 million inhabitants consider themselves to be pueblos originarios—native peoples. They all sit on South America's second-biggest gas reserves. Yet, excepting Haiti, Bolivia is undeniably one of the most unequal countries in Latin America.
Mr. Morales is intent in having a new constitution approved via referendum. His "indigenous constitution", as it is called, vindicates the same fictional ancient forms of pre-Hispanic collectivism that, according to Mariátegui, chastized personal profit and produced wealth for all.
The irony of it is that a majority of followers of Mr. Morales simply cannot imagine that Tahuantinsuyo was in fact a ruthless theocracy, a tyrannical regime with an economy based on slave work. Furthermore, they reject the idea that integrating into a globalized world economy should not necessarily imply bowing to any foreign imperialism.
Should Mr. Morales go his way, his constitution would only strengthen presidential powers and embed a state-led socialist economy.
For all its philanthropic ideals, indigenism has only made it more difficult to attain true economic growth and it has done so just when the Andean countries should be going through the best of its times.

Notes:
1 Henri Favre, L'Indigenisme, Presses Universitaires de France, Col. Que sais-je?, Paris, 1996.

* Ibsen Martinez is a columnist, journalist, and award-winning playwright from Caracas, Venezuela. His writings have appeared in El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Letras Libres, Madrid, and El Pais in Madrid. Since 1995, he has written a weekly column for El Nacional.

For more articles by Ibsen Martinez, see the Archive.
Register for announcements of new columns.

917) O investimento direto estrangeiro no crescimento: um estudo sobre os EUA

Com alguma caução para as diferenças estruturais entre as duas economias, esse estudo sobre o papel do IED na economia americana pode servir para alguma inferência indireta sobre seu papel na economia brasileira, supondo-se que algumas relações econômicas em nível microeconômico permaneçam válidas independentemente das dimensões ou características macroeconômicas do país focado.

Working Paper
Policy Liberalization and FDI Growth, 1982 to 2006 [pdf]
Matthew Adler and Gary Clyde Hufbauer

Global economic expansion over the last three decades has been remarkable. While nominal world GDP has increased four times, world trade flows have grown more than six-fold, and the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown by roughly 20 times since 1980. The sources of global trade and investment growth are well known—general economic expansion, policy liberalization, and better communications and technology—but the impact of each source is unclear.

Adler and Hufbauer attempt to uncover the contribution of policy liberalization to the rising ratios of US inward and outward FDI stocks to GDP over the last three decades. Drawing on stylized facts and an unorthodox calculation method the authors estimate that roughly 30 percent of US inward FDI stock growth and 18 percent of US outward FDI stock growth between 1982 and 2006 can be attributed to policy liberalization. In total, and as a conservative measure, US inward and outward FDI stock growth between 1982 and 2006 contributed roughly $234 billion annually to the level of US real GDP in 2006. Of this annual gain, roughly $77 billion results from the expected rate of FDI stock growth (as a simple consequence of GDP growth); $48 billion is attributable to FDI stock growth from policy liberalization; and $112 billion is attributable to FDI stock growth from "everything else"—a combination of market forces and technological change.

>> Read full working paper [pdf]

>> See also Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?

916) Ambicoes nucleares do Brasil: uma analise a partir dos EUA

Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions: Worrisome?
Council on Hemispheric Affairs

On Thursday, July 31, Brazilian authorities gave the final go ahead to the civilian nuclear power company, Electronuclear, to continue construction of the country's third nuclear power plant. Though the decision to revitalize the 22-year-old nuclear reactor, Angra 3, came late last year, plans were finalized in July by the government's environmental regulatory agency. Electronuclear, a subsidiary of the state-owned energy firm Electrobras, plans to begin construction in February.

Brazilian officials must constantly address the country's still inadequate supply of energy if they hope to see Brazil continue on the path to becoming a superpower. For this reason, together with several major new discoveries of oil deposits off Brazil's coastline, a confident President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hails the developing nuclear initiative as one that could ensure an increased supply of energy to the population. However, there are grave political and economic implications of any turn to nuclear energy that he is taking, that should not be overlooked or minimized.

For Full Article Click Here

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Elizabeth Reavey.

915) Um novo conceito de busca na internet: www.cuil.com

Muitos já sabem da nova ferramenta de busca disponível na internet: www.cuil.com
Ele tem um conceito diferente de busca, com ferramentas mais direcionadas para o que interessa no conceito, ou nos termos selecionados, aparentemente de forma relacional, não por meio do volume bruto de consultas, como parece ser o sistema do Google.
Fiz um pequeno teste, colocando meu próprio nome, entre aspas, como referência básica e os resultados podem ser resumidos como segue:

Cuil: o retorno foi de apenas 3,659
Google: o retorno foi de 29.600, obviamente com muitos homônimos e muitas repetições.

O que parece distinguir o Cuil é o cuidado com a informação substantiva, em si, não a busca por terceiros. Obviamente, também neste sistema, a ferramenta direcionou para outros "PRAs", ou até a "Paulos" isolados, mas de modo geral, as referências são consistentes, como estes exemplos (alguns desconhecidos até para mim) podem permitir constatar:

1) UW Press - : Envisioning Brazil: A Guide to Brazilian...
Marshall C. Eakin, professor of history at Vanderbilt University and the executive director of the Brazilian Studies Association, is the author and editor of several books, including Tropical Capitalism: The Industrialization of Belo Horizonte and Brazil: The Once and Future Country. Paulo Roberto de Almeida is...

2) Table of contents for Envisioning Brazil
Geography Cyrus B. Dawsey III xxx Part Three Counterpoints: Brazilian Studies in Britain and France 13. The British Contribution to the Study of Brazil Leslie Bethell xxx 14. Comparative Development of the Study of Brazil in the United States and France Edward A. Riedinger xxx Part Four Bibliographic and Reference...

3) Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos : assimetrias e...
All about Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos : assimetrias e convergências by Paulo Roberto de Almeida (org. ). LibraryThing is a cataloging and social networking site for booklovers.

4) Environment: Brazilians See Plot to Steal Amazonian...
Diplomat Paulo Roberto de Almeida, then serving at the Brazilian embassy in Washington, drew up a report about the fraud, available (in Portuguese) at www.pralmeida.org. There, the Web site www.brasil.iwarp.com is identified as the origin of the rumors. The site's slogan, "Brasil, ame-o ou deixe-o" (Brazil, love...

5) EconPapers: Políticas de Integração Regional no...
By Paulo Roberto de Almeida; Abstract: Presentation and analysis of the regional diplomacy of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva s government (2003-2006), with a. EconPapers Home About EconPapers. Working Papers Journal Articles Books and Chapters Software Components. Authors. JEL codes New Economics Papers. Advanced Search...

(e assim por diante)

Segundo artigo publicado no Financial Times, e reproduzido no Valor Econômico em 29 de julho último, o novo sistema de buscas contaria com um número de páginas indexadas três vezes superior ao do Google. O novo mecanismo classifica as buscas por seu conteúdo, não por sua popularidade, o que parece ser relevante para pesquisadores, como eu, que estão atrás de conteúdo, e no Google se deparam com zillhões de referências, nem todas pertinentes.

Curioso que o sistema vai buscar coisas aparentemente perdidas em listas de discussões, como esta participação minha numa lista de historia economica, da qual nem me lembrava mais:

HES: Re: QUERY--All pre-1936 economists were laissez faire
Paulo Roberto de Almeida pralmeida at mac.com
Fri Jan 26 14:02:30 EST 2007

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Paul Johnson's Modern Times also gives special emphasys to the
dirigisme of Herbert Hoover (an almost Saint Simonien "ingenieur
social") and early technocratism during the twenties. He dismisses
the so called laissez-faire of this period, pointing to early signs
of state interventionism, much before the rise of proto-forms of
keynesianism.
So, cloks have to be turned back almost ten years, before the
official start of keynesian policies in middle thirties.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

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A conferir: www.cuil.com

914) O Brasil na presidencia pro-tempore do Mercosul: segundo semestre de 2008

Presidência Pro Tempore do Brasil no Mercosul
Mensagem do Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Celso Amorim

O Brasil assumiu, no mês de julho, a Presidência Pro Tempore do Mercosul. Temos pela frente um semestre de muito trabalho para, em conjunto com nossos sócios, consolidarmos as conquistas recentes do Bloco e avançarmos nos temas mais importantes para o processo de integração.

O Mercosul permitiu aos nossos cidadãos se conhecerem melhor e se sentirem cada vez mais partes de um projeto comum de integração, que, nas palavras do Presidente Lula, “nos faz mais fortes, respeitados e independentes”. Ao facilitar os fluxos de comércio e de investimentos e a circulação de pessoas entre seus Estados Partes, o Mercosul contribuiu de maneira notável para a consolidação da democracia e da paz na região. Trata-se de um projeto complexo e ambicioso. Por isso mesmo, há, ainda, muitos desafios a enfrentar.

No campo econômico-comercial, pretendemos, durante a PPTB, continuar aperfeiçoando a União Aduaneira. Atuaremos para fortalecer a Tarifa Externa Comum e incrementar ainda mais o comércio intrazona. Daremos continuidade aos esforços de promoção da integração produtiva. Há significativo espaço para que nossas empresas estabeleçam conexões e parcerias em nível regional. Pretendemos, nesse contexto, desenvolver as normas que permitirão o pleno funcionamento, no futuro próximo, do Fundo de Apoio a Pequenas e Médias Empresas. O tratamento das assimetrias permanecerá uma prioridade de nossa atuação e permeará todas as nossas iniciativas.

As questões sociais também receberão especial atenção. Buscaremos aprimorar a coordenação nas áreas de educação, cultura, saúde, trabalho, meio ambiente, direitos humanos, para citar apenas alguns setores da maior importância para nossas sociedades. Graças ao processo de integração, as autoridades dos Estados Partes dialogam, hoje, com grande freqüência e intensidade. Essa troca de experiências reforça a aproximação entre nossas sociedades.

Seguiremos apoiando os trabalhos do Parlamento do Mercosul, importante espaço para o fortalecimento da institucionalidade democrática do Bloco.

Agiremos, igualmente, na esfera do “Mercosul Cidadão”, que tem influência direta na vida daqueles que residem e trabalham nos Estados Partes. Facilitar o trânsito entre as fronteiras e reduzir os entraves para a circulação das pessoas são ações fundamentais para que o Mercosul seja visto como uma realidade concreta e positiva por todos os habitantes da região.

Estamos confiantes que, durante a Presidência brasileira, daremos a contribuição necessária para que o Mercosul continue a ser motivo de orgulho para todos nós ao promover a solidariedade, a prosperidade, a justiça social e a democracia em todos os países da região.

http://www.mercosul.gov.br/

===========

Salamaleques diplomáticos à parte, que são inevitáveis nesse tipo de documento, referências sempre otimistas quanto ao futuro do desenolvimento econômico e social na região e a seus progressos "democráticos", que tambem percorrem todo discurso nessa área, vamos deixar de lado tudo o que é "fortalecer", "consolidar", "avançar" e
outros verbos ativos desse tipo que apenas rendem homenagem ao déjà vu, ao lugar comum e ao more of the same.
De tudo o que vejo, as duas únicas coisas que se pretende empreender, mesmo, e fazer avançar, são estas aqui:

"Pretendemos, nesse contexto, desenvolver as normas que permitirão o pleno funcionamento, no futuro próximo, do Fundo de Apoio a Pequenas e Médias Empresas. O tratamento das assimetrias permanecerá uma prioridade de nossa atuação e permeará todas as nossas iniciativas."

Ou seja, o Mercosul confirma uma vocação, reforçada na presente administração, de pretender resolver problemas econômicos não pela via do mercado, da abertura e da competição, mas pela via da atuação estatal, da distribuição governamental de recursos públicos, do dirigismo econômico. Acredito, pessoalmente, que esse tipo de atuação represente uma gota d'agua no oceano de "necessidades" e que o melhor a fazer, para os governos, seria reforçar as externalidades positivas -- infra-estrutura, comunicação, capacitação educacional, ambiente de negocios, de modo geral -- que possam permitir a atuação facilitada das empresas privadas, as únicas, finalmente, que criam oportunidades de emprego e que geram, portanto, renda e riqueza na região e fora dela. Governos apenas reciclam recursos que eles capturam na esfera privada, e ao faze-lo nem sempre agem de modo eficiente ou imparcial.

913) Uma homenagem a um lutador contra o totalitarismo: Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Dois textos em homenagem a um simples escritor, mas um dos mais poderosos do século XX: primeiro Christopher Hitchens, depois o The Economist.

The Man Who Kept On Writing
Alexander Solzhenitsyn lived as if there were such a thing as human dignity.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Aug. 4, 2008

Every now and then it happens. The state or the system encounters an individual who, bafflingly, maddeningly, absurdly, cannot be broken. Should they manage to survive, such heroes have a good chance of outliving the state or the system that so grossly underestimated them. Examples are rather precious and relatively few, and they include Nelson Mandela refusing an offer to be released from jail (unless and until all other political detainees were also freed) and Alexander Solzhenitsyn having to be deported from his country of birth against his will, even though he had become—and had been before—a prisoner there.

Two words will always be indissolubly connected to the name of Alexander Isayevich: the acronym GULAG (for the initials of the Stalinist system of penitentiary camps that dotted the Soviet landscape like a pattern of hellish islands) and the terse, harsh word Zek, to describe the starved and overworked inhabitants of this archipelago of the new serfdom. In an especially vivid chapter of his anatomy of that ghastly system, Solzhenitsyn parodied Marxist-Leninist theories of self-determination to argue that the Zeks were indeed a nation unto themselves. In his electrifying first book, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, he did in a way delineate the borders and customs of an undiscovered country with a doomed and unknown citizenry. He became an anthropologist of the totalitarian in a way not understood since David Rousset's L'Univers Concentrationnaire. If you are interested in historical irony, you might care to notice that any one chapter of Ivan Denisovich, published in Novy Mir during the Khrushchev de-Stalinization, easily surpassed in its impact any number of books and tracts that had taken "Socialist Realism" as their watchword. The whole point about "realism"—real realism—is that it needs no identifying prefix. Solzhenitsyn's work demonstrates this for all time.

To have fought his way into Hitler's East Prussia as a proud Red Army soldier in the harshest war on record, to have been arrested and incarcerated for a chance indiscretion, to have served a full sentence of servitude and been released on the very day that Stalin died, and then to have developed cancer and known the whole rigor and misery of a Soviet-era isolation hospital—what could you fear after that? The bullying of Leonid Brezhnev's KGB and the hate campaigns of the hack-ridden Soviet press must have seemed like contemptible fleabites by comparison. But it seems that Solzhenitsyn did have a worry or a dread, not that he himself would be harmed but that none of his work would ever see print. Nonetheless—and this is the point to which I call your attention—he kept on writing. The Communist Party's goons could have torn it up or confiscated or burned it—as they did sometimes—but he continued putting it down on paper and keeping a bottom drawer filled for posterity. This is a kind of fortitude for which we do not have any facile name. The simplest way of phrasing it is to say that Solzhenitsyn lived "as if." Barely deigning to notice the sniggering, pick-nose bullies who followed him and harassed him, he carried on "as if" he were a free citizen, "as if" he had the right to study his own country's history, "as if" there were such a thing as human dignity.

And, once he succeeded in getting The Gulag Archipelago into print, even in pirate editions overseas, it became obvious that something terminal had happened to the edifice of Soviet power.

Of course, one cannot have everything. Nelson Mandela has been soft on Daniel arap Moi, Fidel Castro, Muammar Qaddafi, and Robert Mugabe, and soft on them even when he doesn't need them anymore as temporary allies in a difficult struggle. When Solzhenitsyn came to the United States, he was turned away from the White House, on Henry Kissinger's advice, by President Gerald Ford. But, rather than denounce this Republican collusion with Brezhnev, he emptied the vials of his wrath over Americans who liked rock music. The ayatollahlike tones of his notorious Harvard lecture (as I called them at the time) turned out not to be misleading. As time went by, he metamorphosed more and more into a classic Russian Orthodox chauvinist, whose work became more wordy and propagandistic and—shall we be polite?—idiosyncratic with every passing year.

His most recent book, Two Hundred Years Together, purported to be a candid examination of the fraught condition of Russian-Jewish relations—a theme that he had found it difficult to repress in some of his earlier work. He denied that this inquiry had anything in common with the ancient Russian-nationalist dislike of the cosmopolitan (and sometimes Bolshevik-inclined) Jew, and one must give him the benefit of any doubt here. However, when taken together with his partisanship for Slobodan Milosevic and the holy Serb cause, his exaltation of the reborn (and newly state-sponsored) Russian Orthodox Church, and his late-blooming admiration of the cold-eyed Vladimir Putin, the resulting mixture of attitudes and prejudices puts one in mind more of Dostoyevsky than of Tolstoy. Having denounced "cruel" NATO behavior in the Balkans, without ever saying one word about the behavior of Russian soldiers in Chechnya, Solzhenitsyn spent some of his final days in wasteful diatribes against those Ukrainian nationalists who were, rightly or wrongly, attempting to have their own Soviet-era horrors classified as "genocide."

Dostoyevsky even at his most chauvinistic was worth a hundred Mikhail Sholokhovs or Maxim Gorkys, and Solzhenitsyn set a new standard for the courage by which a Russian author could confront the permafrost of the Russian system. "A great writer," as he put it in The First Circle, "is, so to speak, a secret government in his country." The echo of Shelley's remark about poets being the "unacknowledged legislators of the world" may or may not be deliberate. But it serves to remind us that writers, however much they may disown the idea, are nonetheless ultimately responsible for the political influence that they do choose to exert. Therein lies the germ of tragedy.


An icon of his age
The Economist,Aug 4th 2008

The death of Alexander Solzhenitsyn gives Russia a chance to reflect on authoritarianism

PROPHETS are without honour in their own country—at least until they die. For most of his adult life in the Soviet Union, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was persecuted. In exile in the West from 1974, his gloomy philippics and increasingly turgid prose aroused more bafflement than appreciation. After he returned to Russia in 1994, he was welcomed but then ignored.

His death is a chance to make amends, although whether a Russia that is increasingly nostalgic for its totalitarian past will chose to take it is another matter. In an online poll (admittedly wildly unscientific) taken in recent weeks, the totalitarian leader Joseph Stalin is a front-runner for the title of greatest Russian. It was criticism of Stalin, expressed privately in a letter to a friend, that landed Mr Solzhenitsyn with an eight-year sentence in the camps. It counted for little that he was a twice-decorated artillery officer, on the front-line of the Red Army's triumph over Nazi Germany.

Having experienced the crimes of Stalinism at first hand, he exposed them in both fiction and factual form. "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich", published in 1962, gave Soviet citizens their first opportunity to read about the brutality, squalor, humiliation and fear of daily life in a prison camp, all told in the matter-of-fact style of a Russian folk tale. "The Gulag Archipelago" described the system, its tortures, rules and subculture, in relentless, gruesome, encyclopedic form. Modern scholars, able to research the subject with a freedom that Mr Solzhenitsyn could never have dreamed of, say it is astonishingly accurate.

His other books are more patchy. Although he detested the ravages of communist rule on Russian language and culture, the clunky techniques of Socialist Realism are all too visible in works such as "The Cancer Ward". His later works are mostly panoramic histories of Russia in the past century that most readers found impenetrable. His latest work, a lengthy series of reflections on Jewish-Russian relations, prompted charges of anti-semitism that he furiously denied.

Mr Solzhenitsyn was a loyal communist in his youth. As a young man, he dreamed of writing a history of the Russian revolution, oblivious to the Stalinist terror going on around him. As a bright, young maths student, he once said he could easily have ended up being recruited by the NKVD, the secret police, to perpetrate terror. Instead he became its most potent critic. His political awakening came from long talks in prison with Arnold Susi, an Estonian lawyer jailed for being a minister in a non-communist government. That friendship survived for many years after both men were released.

As well as the gulag, Mr Solzhenitsyn's titanic willpower triumphed over other adversaries: cancer, censorship and Soviet bureaucratic intimidation. In 1970 he won the Nobel prize for literature, but declined to accept it in person for fear that he would not be allowed to return to the Soviet Union. But by 1974, the Soviet authorities had had enough: he was bundled onto a plane to West Germany, to spend two decades abroad. Those in the West who had championed his cause were disconcerted to find that he saw the capitalist system as little better than communism. He denounced materialism and moral emptiness, and lived in increasing seclusion in a remote corner of New England.

As communism collapsed, his books, once read only in flimsy, blurred carbon copies, could all be published legally inside the Soviet Union. But he detested the man who brought that about: Boris Yeltsin, the first freely-elected leader in Russia's history, spurning his offer of a state decoration. He could not, he said accept honours from a man who had brought misery on his people.

To the consternation of some of his supporters, he did accept an award from the ex-KGB officer who became Mr Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin. He even seemed to downplay Mr Putin's role in the KGB, saying that every country needed an intelligence service. Yet, although he praised the self-respect and stability that Russia had regained under Mr Putin, he remained deeply critical of its politics and the corruption and greed that capitalism had exposed and fuelled.

That message, often delivered in sententious, near messianic tones, had little appeal. A television programme consisting largely of all but unwatchable monologues lingered painfully on the airwaves and then died, unlamented. Few read his books.

But his death is a chance for Russia's rulers to say what they think about totalitarianism. Was the collapse of the Soviet Union the "geopolitical catastrophe" of the last century? Or is the real disaster the failure of an independent Russia to cast off the chains of authoritarianism and empire? If Russia's new president, Dmitry Medvedev, goes beyond simply offering condolences to the Solzhenitsyn family, his thoughts on that would be eagerly awaited.

912) Os democratas nem sempre foram protecionistas...

OPINION
Democrats Once Did Free Trade
By DOUGLAS A. IRWIN and AMITY SHLAES
The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2008; Page A11

The failure of the Doha Round of trade negotiations seven years after its launch does not call for despair. The removal of trade barriers and the reduction of subsidies remain worthwhile objectives, and past experience has shown that difficult multilateral negotiations can be completed. But turning talks into agreements will require leadership that can endure a long, lurching process, without instant success.

Cordell Hull, America's longest serving secretary of state (1933 to 1944), was one such leader. Even today, the Tennessee Democrat should be a model for politicians of all backgrounds.

Hull believed that trade was one of the best ways to prevent a repeat of the carnage of World War I. He wrote: "Though realizing that many other factors were involved, I reasoned that, if we could get a freer flow of trade -- freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions -- so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another, and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance for lasting peace."

Removing obstacles to trade was not easy. Congress kept tight control over its ability to write the tariff laws that governed imports of thousands of itemized products. The Republicans ruled the 1920s and were committed to protectionism. Britain turned against free trade and adopted discriminatory imperial preferences. Other countries kept wartime controls on trade in place.

Franklin Roosevelt named Hull secretary of state in 1933, but at first lent scant support to Hull's cause. New Dealers, believing that the government should manage trade and not free it, were suspicious of him. But Hull fought a hard battle to get the administration to propose and Congress to enact the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.

This legislation, a forerunner to what we today call Trade Promotion Authority, authorized the executive branch to undertake trade agreements. It also got Congress out of the business of determining tariffs on an item-by-item basis that bred the infamous Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930. After the act, Hull traveled to Latin America and negotiated tariff reductions that strengthened the credibility of America's "Good Neighbor Policy."

Hull's efforts to reduce trade barriers were not a big success in his day. Then, as now, Democrats were divided in their support for freer trade. With Europe heading toward war, the secretary of state's initiatives were too little too late.

Hull understood that trade was a long-term project whose benefits might emerge after he and Roosevelt left the stage. During World War II, he continued to work to foster multilateral cooperation by creating the United Nations as well as promoting trade. He worked himself sick, but Roosevelt so appreciated his drive that he nominated Hull to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, which he won in 1945.

Even after Hull retired, his spirit continued to animate U.S. policy. In 1947, the U.S. and 22 other nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to finalize the text of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. It did not go smoothly. The defiant Republican Congress passed legislation restricting imports of wool. Australia, a major wool exporter, threatened to walk out of the negotiations and bring the British Commonwealth with it, dooming the GATT.

In what Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton called "the greatest act of political courage that I have ever witnessed," President Harry Truman not only vetoed the bill, but snubbed Congress by authorizing a 25% reduction in the wool tariff. Many other stumbling blocks were overcome to conclude the agreement.

According to one recent study, the initial GATT agreements increased the trade of participating countries by nearly 100% relative to nonparticipants in the late 1940s. Nevertheless, the American plans to fold the GATT into a broader agreement under a new body, the International Trade Organization, failed completely by 1950.

Still, there was mounting evidence of the validity of Hull's ideas. Trade fostered postwar economic recovery, which ensured that Western Europe remained our ally. West Germany and Japan began to move from basket cases to economic miracles. We tend to take all this for granted today, but it did not happen by accident.

Those who are frustrated by the pace of the Doha trade negotiations today might take comfort in knowing that the U.S. and its trading partners did not reach a major tariff-reduction agreement until the conclusion of the Kennedy Round in 1967, 20 years after the original Geneva conference. One of those who fought for those advances was Sen. Al Gore (D., Tenn.) a friend of Hull and the father of Vice President Al Gore.

In light of this history, the collapse of the Doha Round should be viewed as a temporary setback. With persistence, the goal of liberalizing world trade can still be reached.

Mr. Irwin, an economics professor at Dartmouth, is co-author of "The Genesis of the GATT," just published by Cambridge University Press. This article is excerpted from "Cordell Hull and the Case for Optimism," a working paper published this week by the Council on Foreign Relations, where Ms. Shlaes is a senior fellow.

============

From the Council of Foreign Relations website:

Trade Liberalization: Cordell Hull and the Case for Optimism
A CGS Working Paper
Author:
Douglas A. Irwin, Robert E. Maxwell ’23 Professor of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College
Council on Foreign Relations Press
July 2008
35 pages

DOWNLOAD THE FULL TEXT OF THE PAPER HERE (178K PDF)

Overview:
The news that the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization has broken down in Geneva has made many Americans pessimistic about the future of multilateral trade agreements. Politicians on both sides view such protracted negotiations as not worth the effort. Still, multilateral trade agreements are indeed worth pursuit. Often, rounds that appear to have failed in the end do succeed—that holds for the Uruguay Round, which preceded the current one. Over the past seventy-five years trade agreements have helped the United States not only on the economic front but also as a tool in foreign policy. Binding Europe within a multilateral framework, for example, helped secure European nations as allies for the duration of the Cold War. In the multilateral discussion, not only governance but also individual people have mattered. The key to advancing the free-trade cause is political leadership of the sort demonstrated by a heroic but near-forgotten figure, the late secretary of state Cordell Hull of Tennessee.

In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, Douglas A. Irwin of Dartmouth makes the case for optimism. He traces Cordell Hull’s path through the decades and shows how Hull’s legacy lights the way for leaders of both political parties.

The Author:
Douglas A. Irwin is the Robert E. Maxwell professor of arts and sciences in the department of economics at Dartmouth College. He is coauthor of The Genesis of the GATT and author of Free Trade Under Fire and Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, and is currently working on a history of U.S. trade policy from colonial days to the present.

911) Observatorio das independências ibero-americanas: 200 anos de historia

O Real Instituto Elcano, da Espanha, dá início a uma série que pode demorar muitos anos, talvez 15 anos, uma vez que se trata de comemorar os 200 anos do início dos processos de independência das colônias ibéricas das Américas.
Abaixo os dois primeiros artigos da série.

Análisis: América Latina

Los riesgos de España frente a los bicentenarios: populismos, nacionalismos e indigenismos
Carlos Malamud
Los Bicentenarios de la independencia son importantes conmemoraciones de carácter nacional y en esta oportunidad tendrán un alto contenido simbólico para la mayor parte de los socios hispanoamericanos de España, dado su carácter fundacional. Se trata, además, de una conmemoración que incumbe a la vez a España y a los países hispanoamericanos como protagonistas de los mismos hechos históricos.

Materiales de interés
Observatorio de los Bicentenarios
A partir de 2008 y a lo largo de más de 15 años, las repúblicas latinoamericanas conmemorarán los bicentenarios de su independencia de las coronas ibéricas. Se trata de unas celebraciones cuyo protagonismo recae fundamentalmente en los países de América Latina, pero a las que España, en virtud de sus tradicionales lazos históricos, culturales y lingüísticos, y dada la importancia de sus relaciones actuales, quiere sumarse. Para ello, piensa asociarse a algunas iniciativas impulsadas desde diversos ámbitos sociales destinadas a acercar más las dos orillas del Atlántico.

El 4 de mayo pasado, el Consejo de Ministros creó la Comisión Nacional para la Conmemoración de los Bicentenarios, encargada de implementar el programa de actividades conmemorativas. Esta Comisión, de la que forma parte el Real Instituto Elcano a través de su presidente, Gustavo Suárez Pertierra, tiene como finalidad la preparación, programación, organización y coordinación de todo tipo de actividades para conmemorar estos acontecimientos, impulsando y coordinando las acciones que se lleven a cabo desde las Administraciones Públicas, así como desde otras privadas. Preside la Comisión, en calidad de embajador extraordinario plenipotenciario, el ex presidente del Gobierno Felipe González, figura de gran prestigio en España y América Latina.

Elcano y los Bicentenarios

La actuación del Real Instituto Elcano en relación a los Bicentenarios no se agota en la Comisión Nacional. El Instituto cuenta con un plan de actuación propio a través del cual, y en colaboración con otras instituciones, pretende participar en las celebraciones fomentando –en su calidad de Centro de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos–, el diálogo y la reflexión para impulsar el acercamiento de las visiones sobre nuestro pasado común y las relaciones presentes y futuras entre España y América.

Dentro de este plan más amplio de actividades, que incluye conferencias, seminarios y mesas redondas, además de publicaciones monográficas, presentamos este Especial, pensado como un observatorio desde el que mirar, dar a conocer y poner en común las propuestas y debates sobre la temática de los Bicentenarios que vayan surgiendo. Para ello hemos diseñado una sección de fichas–país, con amplia información y análisis de la independencia de los diferentes países así como actos y otras iniciativas públicas de conmemoración. Igualmente, incluimos una sección de noticias, bibliografía y enlaces seleccionados a través de los cuales queremos ofrecer a nuestros lectores toda la información y herramientas de análisis que se vayan produciendo desde ahora y en los próximos años.

Calendario de las independencias
Argentina: 25 de mayo de 1810
(Primer Gobierno Patrio)
9 de Julio de 1816
(Declaración de la Independencia)

Bolivia: 5 de mayo de 1809
(Grito de Independencia en la antigua ciudad de Chuquisaca, hoy Sucre)

Brasil: 7 de septiembre de 1822
(Declarada)

Chile: 18 de septiembre de 1810
(Primera Junta)
12 de febrero de 1818
(Declaración de la Independencia)

Colombia: 20 de julio de 1810
(Declaración)
7 de agosto de 1819
(Definición)

Ecuador: 10 de agosto de 1809
24 de mayo de 1822
(Batalla de Pichincha)

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: 15 de septiembre de 1821
1 de julio de 1823
(El Congreso Centroamericano declara la independencia de España, México y de cualquier otra nación)

México: 16 de septiembre
(Grito de independencia)
27 de septiembre de 1821
(Declaración de la Independencia)

Paraguay: 14 de mayo de 1811
(Alzamiento militar)
3 de octubre de 1813
(celebración del Congreso)

Perú: 28 de julio de 1821
9 de diciembre de 1824
(consolidada – Batalla de Ayacucho)

Uruguay: 25 de agosto de 1825
28 de agosto de 1828
(reconocida – Convención Preliminar de Paz)

Venezuela: 5 de julio de 1811
(Firma del Acta de Declaración de Independencia)

910) Off topic: pausa para uma boa causa, a do direito dos cidadãos a conhecer a vida pregressa (e a ficha corrida) dos seus candidatos...

Secao direitos do cidadao:
votar em quem merece ser votado.

Tentei acessar há pouco a página da Associação dos Magistrados Brasileiros, que traz a lista de candidatos envolvidos em algum tipo de processo:
neste link.

Deu isto: HTTP/1.1 Server Too Busy
Ou a lista é muito longa, ou tem muita gente interessada em ver. Talvez os proprios, interessados em que ela nao seja vista...
Opçoes abertas para apostas...

Parece que um conhecido político paulista, prefeito, governador, prefeito e governador novamente, candidato a presidente contra Tancredo Neves na última eleição presidencial indireta do regime militar, lidera a lista dos transgressores, com muitos processos por crimes financeiros e outras falcatruas...

909) I Encontro de Historiadores Sul-Americanos. Rio de Janeiro, 24 de julho de 2008

A Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão e o Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais
convidam para

I Encontro de Historiadores Sul-Americanos
“200 Anos de Independência. Olhar o Futuro numa Perspectiva Sul-Americana”
Rio de Janeiro, Palácio Itamaraty, 24 de Julho de 2008

Programa:
9 horas - Abertura
Embaixador Jeronimo Moscardo, Presidente da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão
Embaixador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Secretário-Geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores
Embaixador Carlos Henrique Cardim, Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais

9 e 30 às 13 horas - Debate

Debatedores:
Argentina – Professor Doutor Mário Rapoport
Bolívia – nome a confirmar
Brasil – Professor Doutor Amado Cervo (UnB)
Chile – Professor Doutor Luciano Tomassini
Colômbia – nome a confirmar
Equador – Professor Marco Naranjo
Guiana – Professor Doutor Tato C. Mangar
Paraguai – Professor Doutor Juan Carlos Herken Krauer
Peru – Professor Doutor Manuel Burga
Suriname – Professor Doutor Jerome Egger
Uruguai – Professor Doutor Gerardo Caetano
Venezuela – Professor Doutor Jorge Pérez Mancebo

Convidados:
Professor Doutor Gilmar Masiero (UnB)
Professora Doutora Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida (USP)
Professora Doutora Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo (UNESP)
Jornalista Mauro Santayana (JB) – falta confirmar
Professor Doutor Eiiti Sato (UnB)
Professor Doutor Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (UCAM)
Professor Doutor Willians Gonçalves (UERJ)

Encerramento – 13 horas

Local: Palácio Itamaraty Rio de Janeiro
Data: 24 de julho de 2008 às 9 horas
Contato e dúvidas: funag@mre.gov.br ou ipri@mre.gov.br
Telefone de contado: (61) 3411-9124 ou 3411-9115

Download dos Textos Acadêmicos
An Overview of Suriname’s Economy in the 19th and 20th Century - Jerome Egger, Suriname
La História económica del Paraguay: balance de realizaciones y desafios - Juan Carlos Herken Krauer, Paraguai
Una Historia Económica de Venezuela: balance de realizaciones y desafios - Jorge Perez Mancebo, Venezuela
Argentina: Economia y Política Internacional, los procesos históricos - Mário Rapoport Argentina
A História Econômica do Brasil: balanço de realizações e desafios - Amado Luiz Cervo, Brasil
Economia y Sociedad en Chile: un bosquejo histórico - Luciano Tomassini, Chile

908) O Brasil visto pela Stanley Foundation

Brazil and the Changing Global Order
Stanley Foundation
July 2008

Across politics, economics, culture, military strength, and more, a new group of countries have growing influence over the future of the world. And a number of issues vital to US and global security are rapidly evolving due to a changing global order. "Rising Powers: The New Global Reality" takes an in-depth look at the rapidly changing global order and what it means for the United States. This article is a part of a series related to this Stanley Foundation effort.

Brazil is one of nine countries that the Stanley Foundation sees as changing the global scene. With vast natural resources the country has seemingly unending potential to grow and develop. Brazil is already flexing its muscle as a regional leader and a real player in key international venues.

Today, Brazil is one of the fastest growing parts of the global economy, a bio-fuels pioneer on the fast track to energy self-sufficiency, a booming haven for foreign investment, and a test case for a new approach to governance in Latin America. On the other hand, barriers to global leadership for Brazil include a long history of political volatility with only a short tenure of democratic rule coupled with unstable economic growth and high levels of poverty, inequality, and crime.

Still, it is clear that Brazil is already playing an influential role in international affairs, and it has a place among major global players if it can overcome its obstacles to growth and keep itself on a path toward stable development.

The foundation has produced a one-hour public radio documentary about Brazil titled "Brazil Rising." The full audio and transcript are available here. And our Rising Powers special Web feature has even more about Brazil including video, interviews, and suggested articles from around the world.

Please send us your thoughts about Brazil, the changing global order, and the materials offered in our Rising Powers effort. Comments may be reprinted on the Web, in this newsletter, and in related materials.

Radio Documentary
Brazil Rising (Now Available)
Produced by the Stanley Foundation with KQED Public Radio and KUT Austin

But a new Brazil is emerging on the world stage. Brazil today is one of the fastest growing players in the global economy, a bio-fuels pioneer on the fast track to energy self-sufficiency, a booming haven for foreign investment, and a test case for a new approach to governance in Latin America.

Can Brazil successfully chart a new path that overcomes the country’s grinding poverty and its tide of violent crime, while still preserving the country’s unique environment?

Will the new Brazil continue as a strategic partner for the United States or could it become a formidable competitor? How will the rest of the world accommodate Brazil’s seemingly unstoppable growth?

In “Brazil Rising,” released in June 2008, veteran public radio journalist David Brown takes listeners on a personal journey across the country, exploring Brazil’s view of itself, its neighbors, and the world.

“Brazil Rising”—produced by Simon Marks, Kristin McHugh, and Keith Porter —is a Stanley Foundation production in association with KQED Public Radio and KUT Austin.

The full program is available as a MP3 file here. A complete transcript is available here.

For radio stations, the full program along with promotional materials are now available on PRX.

More information about Brazil's role in the shifting global order is here.

907) Forcas navais: capacidade de projecao de poder externo

Um excelente artigo do historiador da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, publicado originalmente no blog Mundorama Net, neste link.

Os porta-aviões e o domínio dos mares: estratégia naval contemporânea
João Fábio Bertonha
16 Jul 2008

Até a Segunda Guerra Mundial, uma grande potência naval se media pelo número e a qualidade dos seus encouraçados. Assim, todas as grandes Marinhas, como a francesa ou a dos Estados Unidos, procuravam reunir o maior número possível desses navios e de suas unidades de apoio, como cruzadores e destróieres. Do mesmo modo, países que procuravam ascender ao domínio dos mares não podiam se furtar a adquiri-los. Foi este o caso da Alemanha pré-1914, que se lançou numa verdadeira corrida com a Inglaterra pela posse da maior frota de encouraçados, e mesmo o de Brasil, Argentina e Chile, que tiveram sua própria corrida naval, em escala menor, no início do século XX.
No decorrer da Segunda Grande Guerra, contudo, a capacidade dos aviões embarcados em porta-aviões de eliminarem, com bombas e torpedos, as grandes frotas de encouraçados, cruzadores e navios menores mudou de vez o cenário da guerra naval. Nos ataques britânicos à frota italiana em Taranto, em 1940, ou no bombardeio japonês em Pearl Harbour, em 1941, esta capacidade ficou evidente e a batalha de Midway, em 1942 - a primeira grande batalha naval na qual as duas frotas não viram uma a outra - é simbólica da transição entre um mundo dominado por encouraçados para outro onde o domínio dos mares se centra na posse de porta-aviões, o que não se modificou até os dias atuais.
O que se alterou, com certeza, foi a capacidade destes navios de combate, cada vez maiores, com mais aviões e armas, e os custos e capacidade industrial e logística para a sua construção e manutenção. Se, na Segunda Guerra Mundial, era possível construir um porta-aviões leve a partir do casco de um navio mercante, essa possibilidade é muito menor atualmente.
De qualquer modo, a simples verificação de uma listagem dos porta-aviões construídos, em atividade e planejados, disponível em sites como Wikipédia e outros, é um excelente canal para verificarmos as pretensões navais e estratégicas da maioria das potências do planeta e a evolução dessas pretensões no passado, no presente e no futuro.
Em primeiro lugar, temos os países que tiveram algum tipo de contato com porta-aviões, mas que acabaram por abdicar da sua posse. É o caso da Alemanha ou do Japão, cujas experiências com porta-aviões foram suspensas pós-1945 ou de países como Argentina, Canadá e Holanda, que não operam mais porta-aviões há alguns anos.
Temos aqui claramente, no primeiro caso, um reflexo da derrota na Segunda Guerra Mundial, que levou Japão e Alemanha a abdicarem de um papel mais ativo no cenário mundial, e, no segundo, a incapacidade de certos países para dar conta das imensas despesas necessárias para a manutenção de uma força embarcada e/ou a decisão de concentrar os recursos navais em outras missões. No caso argentino, a decisão de não substituir o seu antigo porta-aviões por outro, em 1999, foi quase uma admissão de derrota na tradicional corrida naval com o Brasil.
Temos também o caso de um país que começou a construir, ainda que em caráter embrionário, uma força de porta-aviões que ambicionava disputar o domínio dos mares com o Ocidente, mas cuja decadência econômica e implosão política levou o projeto a um final melancólico: a União Soviética. Ela começou a experimentar com porta-aviões e porta-helicópteros de menor capacidade nos anos 70 e estava caminhando para construir modelos mais poderosos quando da ruína do Estado.
Hoje, a sua herdeira, a Rússia, tem apenas um navio deste tipo. É um barco - o Almirante Kuznetsov - muito superior aos projetos soviéticos anteriores, mas, ainda assim, tem capacidade limitada de projeção de poder. Se, nos anos 70 e 80, a URSS imaginou contestar o domínio ocidental nos mares, a Rússia, hoje, não tem mais esta pretensão, o que se reflete na renúncia, ao menos por agora, a uma grande força aeronaval.
Certas potências emergentes, até por desejarem uma maior participação nos assuntos mundiais e saberem da importância de alguma capacidade de projeção de poder nos oceanos para dar sustentação a esta, já estão experimentando, há algum tempo, com porta-aviões. É o caso de Brasil, Índia e China.
No caso brasileiro, a compra de um porta-aviões, nos anos 50, foi mais uma questão de política interna do que outra coisa. A decisão, contudo, de substituí-lo por um mais moderno, em 2000, talvez reflita as crescentes aspirações internacionais do país. É claro que a compra do atual São Paulo também atendeu a interesses corporativos da Marinha. Também está claro que a capacidade de projeção de poder que o Brasil dispõe com seu porta-aviões - que tem antigos caças A-4; eletrônica, em geral, ultrapassada e pouca, ou nenhuma, capacidade de ação longe das costas brasileiras - é, com certeza, mínima ou nula. Mas o simples fato de o Brasil ser um dos poucos países a dispor de uma aviação embarcada - e o único na América Latina - talvez indique algum desejo de maior projeção internacional.
No caso indiano, sua Marinha opera antigos porta-aviões desde os anos 60 e ela adquiriu um modelo ex-soviético em 1997. Mais importante, contudo, é que ela encomendou duas unidades da classe Vikrant, de quase 40 mil toneladas, para entrada em serviço nos próximos anos. Aqui, parece evidente o esforço de dotar o país de capacidade real de projeção de poder, ao menos no oceano Índico.
A China ainda não está construindo uma força real de porta-aviões, até porque isto, provavelmente, geraria imensa desconfiança por parte dos Estados Unidos, o que não interessa a Pequim no momento. Mas o fato de eles terem adquirido cascos de antigos porta-aviões soviéticos da Rússia e da Ucrânia para desmonte e estudo (depois de que se tornaram, curiosamente, atrações turísticas) indica que eles sabem que suas pretensões de grande potência demandarão, no futuro, uma marinha oceânica e que esta só será viável com uma forte aviação embarcada, pelo que eles parecem estar interessados em acumular know-how sobre o assunto.
Antigas potências européias também parecem estar procurando alternativas para recuperar alguma capacidade de projeção oceânica, mas tentando dar conta das realidades financeiras e econômicas. Itália e Espanha, por exemplo, após experiências com porta-aviões leves, normalmente com aviões de decolagem vertical e helicópteros, estão agora construindo navios um pouco maiores e com maior capacidade. A Austrália também parece retomar este caminho. Estes países não têm os recursos para construírem grandes porta-aviões, mas o fato de procurarem adquirir unidades um pouco maiores é um reconhecimento de que elas são necessárias para as ambições internacionais de seus países.
Ninguém parece ter entendido melhor esta lição, contudo, do que França e Inglaterra. A França, sempre desejosa de garantir o seu espaço no cenário internacional, tem operado com porta-aviões convencionais desde 1945 e, em 2001, com o Charles de Gaulle, passou a contar com o maior porta-aviões convencional que não pertence à Marinha dos EUA. Ainda que seja um barco pequeno perto dos gigantes americanos, é imenso frente aos pequenos porta-aviões dos outros países da Europa, num sinal claro das ambições da França no terreno naval.
Outro país europeu que reconheceu que a posse de pequenos porta-aviões com meia dúzia de aeronaves de decolagem vertical pode ser útil em alguns casos (como quando da Guerra das Malvinas), mas que é insuficiente para sustentar uma real política de projeção de poder foi a Inglaterra. País com tradição naval conhecida e que operou uma forte aviação embarcada por todo o século XX, o governo inglês havia optado, nas últimas décadas, por renunciar aos porta-aviões convencionais em favor dos menores e mais baratos. Hoje, contudo, o governo inglês planeja a construção de duas unidades dos gigantes da classe Queen Elisabeth, que, quando em serviço, voltarão a dar à Royal Navy uma real capacidade oceânica.
A grande senhora dos oceanos, contudo, é ainda a Marinha dos Estados Unidos. Com seus doze super porta-aviões, quase todos da classe Nimitz, e seus grupos de batalha, sua capacidade de controle dos oceanos é insuperável. O mesmo número de navios de desembarque anfíbio e controle de área marítima, das classes Wasp e Tarawa, com mais ou menos o mesmo tamanho e a mesma combinação de aeronaves de decolagem vertical e helicópteros dos novos porta-aviões leves europeus, garante ainda maior capacidade de projeção de poder.
Com a construção de mais um porta-aviões da classe Nimitz e outro da classe Wasp e a projetada entrada em serviço da classe Gerald Ford (ainda maior e mais poderosa), a Marinha dos EUA procura garantir o controle dos oceanos ainda por muitas décadas no futuro. Dada a imensa superioridade dos seus porta-aviões e de sua Marinha em geral sobre todos os outros, parece provável que os esforços americanos serão bem sucedidos. Se os EUA continuarão a ser o centro do sistema internacional nos anos a seguir, é ponto em aberto, mas seu controle dos oceanos é um excelente ativo a favor desta pretensão.

João Fábio Bertonha é Professor da Universidade Estadual de Maringá - UEM (fabiobertonha@hotmail.com).

906) Petite histoire de l'inflation: best: superhigh inflations

Este resumo das hiperinflações mais conhecidas na história.
O Brasil, infelizmente, participa dessa história.

History of inflation - Tuesday 16th October 2007
A history of hyperinflation from Angola to Zimbabwe via the USA...
http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/inflation_history_Zimbabwe_USA_101620073

Angola (1991-1999)
Angola went through the worst inflation from 1991 to 1995. In early 1991, the highest denomination was 50,000 kwanzas. By 1994, it was 500,000 kwanzas. In the 1995 currency reform, 1 kwanza reajustado was exchanged for 1,000 kwanzas. The highest denomination in 1995 was 5,000,000 kwanzas reajustados. In the 1999 currency reform, 1 new kwanza was exchanged for 1,000,000 kwanzas reajustados. The overall impact of hyperinflation: 1 new kwanza = 1,000,000,000 pre-1991 kwanzas.

Argentina (1975-1991)
Argentina went through steady inflation from 1975 to 1991. At the beginning of 1975, the highest denomination was 1,000 pesos. In late 1976, the highest denomination was 5,000 pesos. In early 1979, the highest denomination was 10,000 pesos. By the end of 1981, the highest denomination was 1,000,000 pesos. In the 1983 currency reform, 1 Peso Argentino was exchanged for 10,000 pesos. In the 1985 currency reform, 1 austral was exchanged for 1,000 pesos argentine.

Hyperinflation continued reaching a peak annualized rate of 4,923.3 percent in December 1989. At that time, government expenditure reached 35.6 percent of GDP and the fiscal deficit was 7.6 percent of GDP.

In 1990 the Argentine government announced a stabilization plan which included:
Comprehensive liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements
Privatization of public enterprises and the deregulation of the economy
Reduction in the size of the public sector and reconstruction of the tax system
Creation of a new monetary system, including the establishment of a Currency Board in April 1991.
Disinflation was gradual, with inflation falling from 1,344 percent in 1990, 84 percent in 1991. In the 1992 currency reform, 1 new peso was exchanged for 10,000 australes. The overall impact of hyperinflation: 1 new peso = 100,000,000,000 pre-1983 pesos. The inflation rate for 1992 was 17.5 percent, 7.4 percent in 1993, 3.9 percent in 1994 and 1.6 percent in 1995. By 1995, government expenditure represented 27 percent of Argentina's GDP.

Austria (1921-1922)
Austria became a republic after World War I. It continued to use the Krone as before in the Austria-Hungarian empire. However, post-war inflation, reaching a peak of 134 percent between 1921 and 1922, led to its collapse. The Krone was replaced by the Schilling at the rate of 10,000 Kronen equal 1 Schilling.

Belarus (1994-2002)
Belarus went through steady inflation from 1994 to 2002. In 1993, the highest denomination was 5,000 rublei. By 1999, it was 5,000,000 rublei. In the 2000 currency reform, the ruble was replaced by the new ruble at an exchange rate of 1 new ruble = 2,000 old rublei. The highest denomination in 2002 was 50,000 rublei, equal to 100,000,000 pre-2000 rublei.

Bolivia (1984-1986)
Before 1984, the highest denomination was 1,000 pesos bolivianos. By 1985, the highest denomination was 10 Million pesos bolivianos. In the 1987 currency reform, the peso boliviano was replaced by the boliviano which was pegged to US dollar.

Brazil (1986-1994)
For most of the early part of then 20th century, Brazil's money was called Reis, meaning "kings". By the 1930s the standard denomination was Mil Reis meaning a thousand kings. By 1942 the currency that devalued so much that the Vargas government instituted a monetary reform, changing the currency to cruzeiros (crosses) at a value of 1000 to 1.

In 1967 the cruzeiro was renamed to cruzeiro novo (new cruzeiro), and three zeros were dropped from all denominations. In 1970 the cruzeiro novo was renamed, dropping the "novo" and once again being called simply the cruzeiro. During the 1970's while the Brazilian economy was growing at 10% a year, inflation was running anywhere between 15 to 300%.

By the mid 1980s inflation was out of control reaching a peak of 2000 percent. In 1986 three zeros were dropped and the cruzeiro became the cruzado (crusade). In 1989, another three zeroes are dropped and the cruzado becomes the cruzado novo.

In order to avoid confusion and not associate the new currency with previous monetary policy, the cruzado novo is renamed the cruzeiro with no change in value in 1990. By 1993, three more zeros are dropped from the cruzeiro which becomes known as the cruzeiro real. In 1994 the cruzero real is replaced by the real (royal), worth 2.75 old cruzeiros reais.

A 1960s cruzeiro was, in 1994, worth less than one trillionth of a US cent, after adjusting for multiple devaluations and note changes. In 1994, the following measures were enacted:
A constitutional amendment in 1994 which empowered the Central Bank not to finance the budget deficit
The Central Bank made it illegal for regional banks to buy government-issued bonds
Wages were frozen and a new currency -- the real -- was introduced as part of measures to de-index the economy.
As a result of these measures, prices dropped dramatically from July 1994 onwards and by 1997, inflation had been reduced to standard international levels. The overall impact of hyperinflation: 1 (1994) real = 2,700,000,000,000,000,000 pre-1930 reis.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993)
Bosnia-Hezegovina went through its worst inflation in 1993. In 1992, the highest denomination was 1,000 dinara. By 1993, the highest denomination was 100,000,000 dinara. In the Republika Srpska, the highest denomination was 10,000 dinara in 1992 and 10,000,000,000 dinara in 1993. 50,000,000,000 dinara notes were also printed in 1993 but never issued.

Chile (1971-1973)
Beginning in 1971, during the presidency of Salvador Allende, Chilean inflation began to rise and reached peaks of 508% in 1973. As a result of the hyperinflation, food became scarce and overpriced. The economic and social troubles culminated in the 1973 coup d'état that deposed the democratically-elected Allende and installed a military government led by Augusto Pinochet.

China (1939-1950)
China first started using paper money under the reign of Emporer Hien Tsung in 806-821 AD due to a shortage of copper for making coins. The Europeans would not know about paper money till Marco Polo account of it in his Travels some 450 years later. Paper was issued again in 910 A.D. and become regular after 960 A.D.

By 1020, the quantity of Chinese paper money has reached excessive levels. In 1160, the paper issues have become so numerous that they have become worthless. Emporer Kao Tsung begins reforms with a new issue to replace the old. By 1166 China is experiencing hyperinflation. This occurs again in 1448 with the Ming note.

Some years later, around 1455, China abandons paper money after over 600 years of experience. Europe would not begin using bank notes till 1661 with the first issue from the Bank of Sweden.

China saw an extended period of hyperinflation shortly after the Central Bank of China took complete control of the money supply and began issuing fiat currency. In June 1937, 3.41 yuan traded for one US dollar. By May 1949, one US dollar fetched 23,280,000 yuan for anyone who cared to have some. For more information on the subject click here.

Free City of Danzig (1923)
Danzig went through the worst inflation in 1923. In 1922, the highest denomination was 1,000 mark. By 1923, the highest denomination was 10,000,000,000 mark.

Ecuador (2000)
Officially pegged its currency to the US dollar on September 2000 after a 75% drop in value in early January that same year.

England (12th century onwards)
Under Henry I, the quality of England's silver coins fall dramatically. In 1124, the right hands of the mint masters were cut off causing a temporary improvement in the quality. Henry II reformed the English coinage in 1158 thereby restoring the prestige of English money which was maintained for the next three centuries.

By the end of the War of the Roses (1455-1485), the English currency suffered badly from clipping and counterfeiting of coins. Henry VII tried to prohibit the use of foreign coins in 1498. The mainly European and Irish coins were also underweight but not to the extent of the English coins.

Henry VIII debased the coinage of England as a means of raising revenue from 1543 to 1551 in what is known as the "Great Debasement". In 1560, Elizabeth I and her advisors, foremost among them being Sir Thomas Gresham (of Gresham's Law) brought about stability by establishing the pound sterling and began to recall the earlier debased coinage and reminting them to remove the base metal component. The pound sterling was valued as one troy pound of high purity sterling silver.

In 1696 England's silver coins, many of which are worn or clipped, were replaced with new. Full-weight silver coins.

Britain suffered through a long period of moderate inflation from 1935 to 1970. Below is a chart showing the falling value of the current British currency since inception (data from MeasuringWorth.com).

Greece (1944-1953)
During the German occupation of Greece (1941 to 1944), the monthly inflation rate peaked at 8.55 billion percent in 1944. Prices doubled every 28 hours. In 1943, the highest denomination was 25,000 drachmai. By 1944, the highest denomination was 100,000,000,000,000 drachmai

In the 1944 currency reform, 1 new drachma was exchanged for 50,000,000,000 drachmai. Another currency reform in 1953 replaced the drachma at an exchange rate of 1 new drachma = 1,000 old drachma. The overall impact of hyperinflation: 1 (1953) drachma = 50,000,000,000,000 pre-1944 drachmai.

France (1789-1797)
France did not start using paper notes until much later than other European nations due in part to the Mississippi Company debacle of 1719-1720.

In the spring of 1789 the French Assemblee decreed the issuance of 400 million paper livres, known as assignats, secured by the properties that had been confiscated from the Church during the revolution. Over the following years, the Assemblee continued issuing greater quantities of assignats and in addition to price controls, dictated a death sentence on anyone selling the notes at a discount to gold and silver livres. By late-1795 the amount had reached 40 billion and a new currency was issued, the mandat, which promptly lost 97% of its value over the next two years.

In 1797, both paper currencies were recalled and a new monetary system based upon gold was instituted. France also suffered through a long period of moderate inflation from 1944 to 1960.

Georgia (1995)
Georgia went through the worst inflation in 1994. In 1993, the highest denomination was 100,000 laris. By 1994, the highest denomination was 1,000,000 laris. In the 1995 currency reform, 1 new lari was exchanged for 1,000,000 laris.

Germany (1923-1924 and 1945-1948)
During WWI, Germany borrowed heavily expecting that they would win the war and have the losers repay the loans. In addition to these debts, Germany faced huge reparation payments. Together, these debts exceeded Germany's GDP.

In 1923, when Germany could no longer pay reparations, French and Belgium troops moved in to occupy the Ruhr, Germany's main industrial area. Without this major source of income, the government took to printing money which resulted in hyperinflation took hold. At its most severe, the monthly rate of inflation reached 3.25 billion percent, equivalent to prices doubling every 49 hours. The US Dollar to Mark conversion rate peaked at 80 billion.

Inflation 1923-24: A German woman feeding a stove with currency notes, which burn longer than the amount of firewood they can buy

Some countries eased off on Germany's war reparation burden and a new interim currency, the Rentenmark, secured on mortgages on land and industrial property restored stability. In 1924, the Reichmark, replaces the Rentenmark and has an equivalent to the pre-war gold mark.

Germany suffered high inflation again after WWII. In the official markets ration cards and permits are more important than currency while on the black market cigarettes, soap, tinned beef and chocolate serve as currency. In 1948, Germany replaced the Reichsmark with the Deutschemark and abolished the price and wage controls and most of the rationing system.

Greece (1944-1953)
During the German occupation of Greece (1941 to 1944), the monthly inflation rate peaked at 8.55 billion percent. Prices doubled every 28 hours. Two currency reforms, one in 1944 and another in 1953, saw the new drachma replace 50 trillion pre-1944 drachma.

Hungary (1922-1924 and 1944-1946)
Hungary went through two hyperinflationary periods. From 1922 and 1924 the inflation in Hungary reached 98%. This seems quite timid when compared to the inflation rate of 41.9 quintillion percent reached in mid-1946 recorded as being the worst in modern history. At this rate prices doubled every 15 hours. By July 1946, the 1931 gold pengo is worth 130 trillion paper pengos.

The Hungarian National Bank has the dubious honour of circulating the largest denomination banknote – that being the 100 quintillion pengo.
A Hungarian man sweeps paper notes out of the gutter

Israel (1979-1985)
Inflation accelerated in the 1970s, rising steadily from 13% in 1971 to 111% in 1979. From 133% in 1980, it leaped to 191% in 1983 and then to 445% in 1984. In 1985 Israel froze all prices by law. In 1985, inflation fell to 185% (less than half the rate in 1984).

Within a few months, the authorities began to lift the price freeze on some items; in other cases it took almost a year. In 1986, inflation was down to just 19%.

Japan (1944-1948)
Japan first began printing paper money in the early part of the 14th century but the experiment was short lived.

In more recent times, Japan experienced post-WWII hyperinflation in which consumer prices rose by 5,300%. There is also the issuance of military yen (also known as banana money) to soldiers of both the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. This currency was first issued during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and reached a crescendo during the Pacific War.

During this time, military yen was forced upon the local population of occupied territories. Military yen was printed without regard for inflation, unbacked by gold and could not be exchanged for Japanese yen. When the Japanese occupied Hong Kong, military yen was forcibly exchanged with Hong Kong dollars at a ratio of 1 to 2. Anyone caught with Hong Kong dollar was to be tortured.

After the exchange, the Japanese military purchased supplies and strategic goods from the neutral Portuguese port of Macau using Hong Kong dollars. On 6 September 1945, the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced that all military yen became void thereby leaving overseas holder of military yen with pieces of worthless paper.

Krajina (1993)
Krajina went through the worst inflation in 1993. In 1992, the highest denomination was 50,000 dinara. By 1993, the highest denomination was 50,000,000,000 dinara. This unrecognized country was reincorporated into Croatia in 1998.

Madagascar (2004)
The Madagascan franc lost nearly half its value in 2004. On 1 January 2005 the Madagascan ariary replaced the previous currency at a rate of 1 ariary for five Madagascan francs. In May 2005 there were riots over rising inflation suggesting the situation wasn't over.

Mexico (2004)
Mexico defaulted on its external debt in 1982, and experienced several years of inflation. On 1 January 1993, the Bank of Mexico introduced a new currency, the nuevo peso which was equal to 1,000 old pesos.

Since the Mexico Peso Crisis of 1994 the value of the Mexico peso has plummeted by almost 60%. The government contends that the devaluation was necessary to decrease the account deficit.

Mongolian Empire (13th and 14th centuries)
Genghis Khan's empire went through two hyperinflationary periods. Kublai Khan, the grandson of Genghis and then emperor of China, circulated paper money to replace that of the Chinese provincial governments. This currency was known as The First Mongol Issue. It depreciated rapidly after its short-lived success from 1260 to 1263. Currency reform occurred in 1264, and The Second Mongol Issue, equally irredeemable, and unlimited in issue, replaced the earlier notes at a ratio of 1:5.

This currency lasted for 1290 at which time it began falling in value till about 1310. It was replaced by a third issue at the same ratio of 1:5. Over-issue of these notes once again destroyed their value. During the final phase of the Mongol Dynasty in around 1350 huge efforts were unsuccessful in fixing the monetary situation.

"Population and trade had greatly increased, but the emissions of paper notes were suffered to largely outrun both, and the inevitable consequence was depreciation," writes Alexander Del Mar in his History of Monetary Systems (1886). "All the beneficial effects of a currency which is allowed to expand with a growth of population and trade were now turned into those evil effects that flow from a currency emitted in excess of such growth.

"These effects were not slow to develop themselves. Excessive and too rapid augmentation of the currency, resulted in the entire subversion of the old order of society. The best families in the empire were ruined, a new set of men came into the control of public affairs, and the country became the scene of internecine warfare and confusion."

The usurping Ming Dynasty issued yet more paper currency with the solemn legend: "This paper money shall have currency, and be used in all respects as if it were copper money". There was no public confidence in the firmness of this declaration and at the outset the paper traded at 17:13 against copper coinage. Before long the ratio fell to 300:1.

Nicaragua (1987-1990)
Before 1987, the highest denomination was 1,000 cordobas. By 1987, it was 500,000 cordobas. Nicarauga went through a currency reform in 1988 which saw 1 new Cordoba replace 1,000 old cordobas. In the mid-1990 currency reform, 1 gold Cordoba equaled 5,000,000 new cordobas. Total impact of hyperinflation: 1 gold Cordoba = 5,000,000,000 pre-1987 cordobas.

Persian Empire (1294)
The city of Tabriz begins issuing paper money over a two month period with disastrous effects. Rashid al Din, prime minister of Persia describes both printing and paper money in his History of the World.

Peru (1984-1990)
Peru went through the worst inflation from 1984 to 1990. The highest denomination in 1984 was 50,000 soles de oro. By 1985, it was 500,000 soles de oro. In the 1985 currency reform, 1 intis was exchanged for 1000 soles de oro. In 1986, the highest denomination was 1,000 intis. It was 5,000,000 intis by 1990. In the 1991 currency reform, 1 nuevo sol was exchanged for 1,000,000 intis. The overall impact of hyperinflation: 1 nuevo sol = 1,000,000,000 pre 1985 soles de oro.

Poland (1922-1924 and 1990-1993)
Poland suffered two bouts of hyperinflation. The first occurred from 1922 to 1924 when inflation rates reached 275%. After three years of hyperinflation, the 1994 currency reform saw 10,000 old zlotych exchanged for 1 new zloty.

Romania (2000-2005)
Romania is still working through steady inflation. The highest denomination in 1998 was 100,000 lei. By 2000 it was 500,000 lei. In early 2005 it was 1,000,000 lei. In July 2005 the leu was replaced by the new leu at 10,000 old lei = 1 new leu. Inflation in 2005 was about 10%. In 2006 the highest denomination is 500 lei (= 5,000,000 old lei).

Ancient Rome
Early Roman coinage was entirely representative. It was copper and issued with a face value of about 3 times its commodity value. It was carefully made using the innovation of striking, rather than casting, and the dies used were of the highest quality and artistic complexity. They were extremely difficult to forge and the penalties were heavy.

The Romans were probably the first to obey their own monetary laws limiting the supply of coins. As a result for 178 years there is no evidence of demonetization. On the contrary, the value of money increased in value as did the population and economy.

This changed during the Second Punic War. Hannibal and his legendary elephants conquered from Carthage in North America, through silver rich Spain, to the Roman copper mines in northern Italy (modern-day Tuscany) and threatened Rome from the north. In response, the Romans began to over-issue underweight and overvalued coinage to finance the massive military effort which was required to repulse the enemy.

What came out afterwards was a very different Rome. It was much more militarist and expansionist in order to support its large military. Within 100 years Rome's republican politics had subsided into what was effectively dictatorship.

By 270 AD, the precious metal content of Roman coins had fallen to only 4%. Emperor Diocletian issued vast amounts of debased copper coins which inevitably lead to price increases. Diocletian blamed the greed of merchants and in 301 AD issued the Edict of Prices declaring fixed prices with a death penalty for anyone selling above them. Merchants stopped selling goods but this led to penalties against hoarding. When merchants left their trade Diocletian countered with laws saying that every man had to pursue the occupation of their father. The penalty for not doing so was death.

In the words of Del Mar in his History of Monetary Systems, "for nearly two centuries, during which all that was admirable of Roman civilization saw its origin, its growth and its maturity. When the system fell Rome had lost its liberties. The state was to grow yet more powerful and dreaded, but that state and its people were no longer one."

The former republic of Rome descended into essentially what was serfdom.

Russia (1921-1922 and 1992-1994)
Russia experienced 213% inflation during the Bolshevik Revolution and again during the first year of post-Soviet reform in 1992 when annual inflation peaked at 2520%. In 1993 the annual rate was 840%, and in 1994, 224%. The ruble devalued from about 100 r/$ in 1991 to about 30,000 r/$ in 1999.

Taiwan (late 1940s)
Severe inflation existed in the late 1940s due to factors such as corruption and the 2-2-8 Incident. Increasingly higher denominations were issued on the island, up to one million yuan. The new Taiwan dollar was issued in 1949 at a ratio of 40,000-to-1 against the old Taiwan yuan.

Turkey (1990s)
Throughout the 1990s Turkey dealt with severe inflation rates that finally crippled the economy into a recession in 2001. The highest denomination in 1995 was 1,000,000 lira. By 2000 it was 20,000,000 lira. Recently Turkey has achieved single digit inflation for the first time in decades, and in the 2005 currency reform, introduced the New Turkish Lira; 1 was exchanged for 1,000,000 old lira.

A 1,000,000 lira banknote, issued by Turkey

Ukraine (1993-1995)
Ukraine went through the worst inflation between 1993 and 1995 with inflation rates peaking at 1400% per month. Before 1993, the highest denomination was 1,000 karbovantsiv. By 1995, it was 1,000,000 karbovantsiv.

In 1996, the karbovantsiv was taken out of circulation, and was replaced by the hryvnya at an exchange rate of 100,000 karbovantsivi = 1 hryvnya (approx. US$0.20 at the time).

A 100,000 Ukrainian Karbovantsiv bank note

United States (1812-1814 and 1861-1865)
The United States has experienced two currency collapses. The first was the Continental Currency ("Not worth a Continental") the American colonists used to finance the Revolutionary War. While the Americans won their independence, their currency was destroyed in the process.

The second were the Confederation notes. In an effort to finance the civil war with the north, the Confederate States of America issued vast amounts of money. At one point, the Secretary of the Treasury recommended that counterfeit money be utilized. Anyone holding a counterfeit bill was to exchange it for a government bond. The government would then stamp it "valid" and spend it.

Below is a chart showing the falling value of the current American currency since inception (data from MeasuringWorth.com).

Yap (late 1800s)
The island of Yap in the Pacific Ocean used varying sized stones as money, of which the largest weighing several tons were the most valuable. The stones had been brought by sea from the Island of Palau 210 km away. The journey was very perilous given the length of the voyage and the rough seas between the islands of Palau and Yap. Many of the stones were lost at sea.

The risk associated with procurement of the "money stones" initially made them highly valuable. The Yapese valued them because large stones were quite difficult to steal and were in relatively short supply. However, in 1874, an enterprising Irishman named David O'Keefe hit upon the idea of employing the Yapese to import more "money" in the form of shiploads of large stones, also from Palau. O'Keefe then traded these stones with the Yapese for other commodities such as sea cucumbers and copra.

Over time, the Yapese brought thousands of new stones to the island, debasing the value of the old ones. Today they are almost worthless, except as a tourist curiosity.

A large (approximately 8 feet in height) example of Yapese stone money

Yugoslavia (1989-1994)
Second worst hyperinflationary period in recent history with a monthly inflation rate of 5 quintillion percent. Between Oct 1, 1993 and January 24, 1994 prices doubled every sixteen hours on average.

At the end of it, one novi dinar = 1,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 pre-1990 dinars. One account of the breakdown of the social structure is the example of a postman who waited a day to pay 780 phone bills with the equivalent of a few American pennies instead of trying to collect from the customers.

A 500,000,000,000 (500 billion) Yugoslav dinar banknote circa 1993, the largest nominal value ever officially printed in Yugoslavia, the final result of hyperinflation

Zaire (1989-1996)
Zaire went through a period of inflation between 1989 and 1996. In 1988, the highest denomination was 5,000 zaires. By 1992, it was 5,000,000 zaires. In the 1993 currency reform, 1 nouveau zaire was exchanged for 3,000,000 old zaires. The highest denomination in 1996 was 1,000,000 nouveaux zaires. In 1997, Zaire was renamed the Congo Democratic Republic and changed its currency to francs. 1 franc was exchanged for 100,000 nouveaux zaires. The overall impact of hyperinflation: One 1997 franc = 300 billion pre-1989 dinars.

Zimbabwe (1999-present)
The Rhodesian dollar (R$), adopted in 1970, following decimalization and the replacement of the pound as the currency, was set at a rate of 2 Rhodesian dollars = 1 pound (R$ 0.71 = USD $1.00). At the time of independence in 1980, one Zimbabwean dollar (of 100 cents) was worth US$1.50.

Since then, rampant inflation and the collapse of the economy have severely devalued the currency, with many organizations using the US dollar instead.

On 16 February 2006, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Dr Gideon Gono, announced that the government had printed ZWD 21 trillion in order to buy foreign currency to pay off IMF arrears.

In early May 2006, Zimbabwe's government began rolling the printing presses (once again) to produce about 60 trillion Zimbabwean dollars. The additional currency was required to finance the recent 300% increase in salaries for soldiers and policemen and 200% for other civil servants.

In August 2006, the Zimbabwean government issued new currency and asked citizens to turn in old notes; the new currency (issued by the central bank of Zimbabwe) had three zeroes slashed from it.

In February 2007, the central bank of Zimbabwe declared inflation "illegal" and outlawed any raise in prices on certain commodities between March 1 and June 30, 2007. Officials have since arrested executives of some Zimbabwean companies for increasing prices on their products.

Mike Hewitt, 16 Oct '07

Mike Hewitt is the editor of www.DollarDaze.org, a website pertaining to commentary on the instability of the global fiat monetary system and investment strategies on mining companies. The opinions expressed are not intended to be taken as investment advice. It is to be taken as opinion only, and Mike encourages you to complete your own due diligence when making any investment decision.


Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe is approaching the status of the post World War I Weimar Republic and post World War II Hungary, the worst recorded inflations in history.