A despeito de ser um artigo de opinião de janeiro de 2007, a matéria ainda guarda seu valor, tanto para os EUA, cuja política o artigo visa influenciar, quanto para o mundo, contexto no qual não haverá entendimento a respeito. Em todo caso, cabe a reflexão responsável sobre um assunto que também interessa à diplomacia brasileira. Esta reclama, desde sempre, que os detentores de armas nucleares cumpram com suas obrigações sob o TNP, o que é compreensível, mas ao mesmo tempo recusa as inspeções abrangentes de suas instalações nucleares, que estão a cargo da AIEA, o que é menos compreensível (pois as justificativas são suposições, não fatos).
Mas o Brasil não é exatamente um problema ou um obstáculo nessa questão.
Meu argumento é outro, e está contemplado no artigo: terrorismo.
Observando as coisas claramente, constato que o Paquistão, por exemplo, um Estado nuclear, é, tecnicamente, socialmente, politicamente, um Estado falido, por mais que digam que seus militares controlam adequadamente os equipamentos e materiais nucleares. Militares não são imunes a loucuras individuais.
Constato que a Coreia do Norte é um Estado falido e delinquente, capaz de matar sua própria população de fome, por políticas de suas elites dirigentes. Se o problema do Paquistão são os conflitos étnicos, religiosos, raciais e tribais dos povos que integram o país, o problema da Coreia do Norte é a delinquência moral de seus dirigentes.
Poderia falar de outros países -- alguns felizmente revertidos na loucura nuclear, como Líbia, do coronel Kadafy -- mas estes dois já bastam para indicar o perigo real do terrorismo nuclear.
O Brasil deveria refletir sobre a questão.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Opinion
By GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN
The Wall
Street Journal, January 4, 2007
Nuclear
weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity.
U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a
solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital
contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous
hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.
Nuclear
weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold
War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the
doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to
be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other
states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly
hazardous and decreasingly effective.
North Korea's
recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium --
potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the
precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood
that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is
increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons
are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with
nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and
present difficult new security challenges.
Apart from the
terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be
compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious,
psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold
War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the
old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing
number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing
the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the
benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War
to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United
States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal.
Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during
the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world
be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?
* * *
Leaders
addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace"
address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's
"determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its
entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."
John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said,
"The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his
execution."
Rajiv Gandhi,
addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear
war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand
million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life
as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your
support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."
Ronald Reagan
called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he
considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing
but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization."
Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous
American presidents.
Although
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an
agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the
arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions
in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the
elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.
What will it
take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a
world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading
to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address
the challenge posed by these two questions.
The
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It
provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree
not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest
themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since
Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon
states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear
powers.
Strong
non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security
Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide
powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger
world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on
proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the
permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially
important. They must be energetically pursued.
But by
themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20
years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision
shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes
of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest
arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful
weapons.
* * *
What should be
done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik
be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by
the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.
First and
foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of
nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a
joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the
disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight
to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North
Korea and Iran.
The program on
which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and
urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear
threat. Steps would include:
·
Changing the Cold War posture of
deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger
of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
·
Continuing to reduce substantially
the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
·
Eliminating short-range nuclear
weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
·
Initiating a bipartisan process with
the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for
periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure
ratification by other key states.
·
Providing the highest possible
standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and
highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
·
Getting control of the uranium
enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power
reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or
other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with
proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing
electricity.
·
Halting the production of fissile
material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium
in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities
around the world and rendering the materials safe.
·
Redoubling our efforts to resolve
regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.
Achieving the
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to
impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening
to the security of any state or peoples.
Reassertion of
the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward
achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative
consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly
positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision,
the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the
vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
We endorse
setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically
on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures
outlined above.
Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr.
Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of
Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is
former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and
Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr.
Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the
following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin
Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby,
Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack
Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald
Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer.
