1384) Keynes de volta à preeminencia: nao acho que ele merece todos esses elogios...

Comento, rapidamente, a transcrição abaixo, na verdade uma resenha da biografia resumida de Keynes por Robert Skidelsky.

O mais importante do ensinamento de Keynes é isto aqui, que supostamente resumiria o seu pensamento: "markets are not self-correcting".

Sinto muito, mas trata-se de um erro monumental de Keynes: os mercados SEMPRE se corrigem, ainda que não o façam de acordo com a vontade dos agentes presentes nesses mercados, distribuindo penalidades e prêmios ao acaso das posições de cada participante.
QUEM IMPEDE os mercados de se auto-corrigirem, na verdade, são os governos, ou as autoridades econômicas, pois elas se dão ao trabalho de fixar taxas de juros SEM QUALQUER CORRESPONDENCIA COM OS DADOS DO MERCADO, emitir dinheiro sem respeitar equilibrios basicos da economia -- obviamente os governos dispoem do monopólio de emissão justamente por isso, para impedir que outros lhes façam concorrencia, e criar inflação, que é o que os políticos mais fazem -- e muitas coisas mais que distorcem as regras do jogo, posto que justamente feitas para evitar perdas aqui e permitir ganhos acolá.
Keynes podia não gostar da maneira como os mercados corrigem os desequilíbrios, por vezes de forma muito lenta -- para inverter um ciclo depressivo, por exemplo -- ou em outras vezes de forma muito rápida -- quebrando bancos, empresas, particulares, que dependendo do poder de barganha, sempre encontram alguem no governo quem os salve, para supostamente evitar "perdas sociais", desemprego, colapso de atividades, essas coisas. Que ele não gostasse disso, não tem nada a ver com a incapacidade dos mercados de se corrigirem, pois o que eles mais fazem, justamente, é corrigir os desequilíbrios acumulados redistribuindo ativos de acordo com sua valoração de mercado: esta pode ser certa ou errada (não importa, pois isso depende da percepção de quem está no mercado), mas ela sempre se dá de acordo com o timing de entrada e saída no mercados dos agentes econômicos primários, empresas ou indivíduos.
Portanto, a afirmação de Keynes não tem NENHUM sentido econômico, tratase apenas de um julgamento pessoal, de uma preferência subjetiva de sua parte.
O que Keynes pretendia, assim como outros aprendizes de feiticeiro, era retirar seu pais do ciclo depressivo. Suas politicas podem ter prolongado um pouco mais a depressao.

No plano mais geral, aAs pessoas simplesmente nao se dao conta de que, ao "salvar" empresas e empregos, os governos estão simplesmente retirando dinheiro do conjunto da sociedade -- por via de mais taxação ou de mais emissao inflacionária -- e colocando esse dinheiro no bolso de alguns poucos privilegiados.
Trata-se de uma dificuldade conceitual que é dificil de enfiar na cabeca das pessoas, assim como a questao do livre comércio: sempre voce encontra alguem disposto a proteger os empregos no pais, taxando ou obstruindo a entrada de produtos concorrentes do exterior. As pessoas simplesmente nao conseguem medir as perdas sociais -- que sao pequenas individualmente, posto que distribuidas por toda a populacao -- ao passo que é "facil" medir os ganhos: alguns milhares de empregos "salvos".

Volto a dizer: os mercados sempre se corrigem, mesmo contra a vontade dos keynesianos...
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Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Books of The Times
The Old Economist, Relevant Amid the Rubble
By DWIGHT GARNER
The New York Times, September 18, 2009

Dwight Garner reviews Robert Skidelsky:
Keynes: The Return of the Master
221 pages. PublicAffairs. $25.95

John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) was, on the page and off, formidable. He was tall, an impeccable dresser in dark suits and homburgs, a product of Eton and Cambridge, a director of the Bank of England. His words could be withering. “When I argued with him,” the philosopher Bertrand Russell said, “I felt that I took my life in my hands.”

Keynes also had, paradoxically, the sensitive soul of a poet. He was a member of the Bloomsbury group and a favorite of Virginia Woolf’s. He collected modern art and rare manuscripts. He married a Russian ballerina. He was an early environmentalist, given to utterances that stick in the mind. “We are capable of shutting off the sun and the stars,” he warned in 1933, “because they do not pay a dividend.”

These things matter about Keynes because his economic ideas, relevant again amid the rubble of the global financial crisis, had a humane and moral dimension, one that Robert Skidelsky underlines in “Keynes: The Return of the Master.”

Mr. Skidelsky is the author of a magisterial three-volume biography of Keynes (the final volume was published in 2000) and is emeritus professor of political economy at the University of Warwick in England. He knows more about Keynes than anyone alive, but his new book is not a pocket-size distillation of his earlier biography. It’s an attempt to translate and update Keynes’s ideas for a sleek, turbulent era.

This is not an obviously simple task. Keynes’s most influential book, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” (1936) published during the Great Depression, is famously impenetrable. But its central idea held sway for nearly 30 years after World War II: that markets are not self-correcting.

In “Keynes: Return of the Master,” Mr. Skidelsky surveys the vast body of Keynes’s work. But he boils the thinking down to a few essential points. Central among them is that market economies are fundamentally uncertain; large shocks like the recent meltdown are not anomalies but normal if unpredictable events. Government should intervene in a crisis — as the Obama administration has since the fall of Lehman Brothers last year — supplying a judicious but firm hand on the tiller.

Mr. Skidelsky is righteous in his thunder about how Keynes’s ideas have been spurned in recent decades. He scolds the free-market ethos of the Reagan and Thatcher eras as well as the thinking of anti-Keynesian New Classical economists. He does not entirely blame the usual suspects (banks, hedge funds, credit-rating agencies, the Fed) for the current crisis. He indicts laissez-faire philosophy.

“The root cause of the present crisis lies in the intellectual failure of economics,” Mr. Skidelsky writes. “It was the wrong ideas of economists which legitimized the deregulation of finance, and it was the deregulation of finance which led to the credit explosion which collapsed into the credit crunch. It is hard to convey the harm done by the recent dominant school of New Classical economics. Rarely in history can such powerful minds have devoted themselves to such strange ideas.”

When Mr. Skidelsky pulls out a napkin and begins to scribble down figures, this book is slower going. It is probably safe to say that “Keynes: The Return of the Master” is aimed at the general reader, if that general reader owns excellent reading glasses and enthusiastically devours the daily business section from front to back.

A not entirely untypical sentence is: “The most general I.M.F. commodity-price index (fuel + nonfuel) peaked in July 2008 at 218 (2005 = 100) and dropped to its lowest level in December, when it was down at 98, recovering to 102 in January 2009 and falling again to 100 in March.” Oof.

This book is provocative in its discussion of the moral aspect of Keynes’s thinking. He had the curious and refreshing idea that financial institutions have a duty to the public interest as well as to shareholders. He worried about the pursuit of money at the expense of all else. What ethical value, he asked, attends a life of “moneymaking and bridge”?

Mr. Skidelsky observes: “His conclusion was that the pursuit of money — what he called ‘love of money’ — was justified only to the extent that it led to a ‘good life.’ And a good life was not what made people better off: it was what made them good. To make the world ethically better was the only justifiable purpose of economic striving.”

Keynes’s altruism sometimes made him sound like Custer at the last stand. “I find no shame at being found still owning a share when the bottom of the market comes,” he wrote. “Any other policy is antisocial, destructive of confidence and incompatible with the working of the economic system.” Maybe this was how he explained himself to Virginia Woolf when, in 1920, he lost the money the Bloomsbury group had invested with him. (The debt was later cleared.)

Keynes ultimately saw economics not as a natural science but a moral one. He was loath to rely on pure mathematics and risk models. Not everything could be reduced to numbers.

When it comes to deciphering Keynes’s ideas for the current moment, we can only speculate about details and particulars. As Mr. Skidelsky points out, “Keynes had little specific to say about financial regulation, since the banking system was not at the center of the storm of the early 1930s.”

But Keynes has always seemed at his most appealing and prophetic at times of roiling financial discontent. Robert Lucas, the University of Chicago economist, joked last year that “everyone is a Keynesian in a foxhole.” If the American economy stabilizes and begins a genuine rebound, there will be plenty of born-again Keynsians outside of those foxholes too.