Um excelente relatório analítico de conjuntura, e também de exame das crises financeiras em perspectiva global, comparada e histórica, por parte de economistas do Deutsche Bank.
Agradeço ao meu amigo André Eiras ter me chamado a atenção para este relatório.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Deutsche Bank Markets Research
Global Economics
Date: 15 May 2013
Global Economic Perspectives: Financial Crises: Past and Present
Responsáveis:
Peter Hooper, Chief Economist
Michael Spencer, Chief Economist
Torsten Slok, Chief Economist
Thomas Mayer, Advisor
Sumário:
Financial crises seem to be as old as fractional reserve banking. They are different from pure asset price bubbles in that credit plays a major role. The costs of a financial crisis appear in two forms: (1) directly, in the form of costs for the government to fund the recapitalization or resolution of banks; and (2) indirectly, in the form of output losses.
„ The history of financial crises is long and not all events may have been properly recorded. However, reviews in the economic literature point to the credit cycle as the underlying cause of financial crises since the Middle Ages. Recent estimates of the costs of financial crises point to large output losses associated with these crises, reinforcing the view that policies should be directed towards avoiding credit booms and busts. The empirical evidence suggests that while output losses are larger in advanced economies, the direct fiscal costs of banking crises are lower than in
emerging economies.
„ Apart from Basle 3, the official response to the latest financial crises is reflected in the various plans advanced by Paul Volcker in the US, John Vickers in the UK, and Erki Liikanen in the euro area. All these plans have in common that they seek to separate the "risky" parts of the banking business from its "safe" parts. Proprietary trading (in fact, all trading) and investment banking activities are seen as "risky", while credit extension and deposit taking--the so-called traditional banking activities--are presumed to be relatively safe. However, as it should be clear from our historical review of financial crises, this is a grave error. The (admittedly porous) dividing line between more or less risky banking activities does not run vertically through financial institutions, separating capital markets related (presumably risky) from traditional (presumably safe) banking activities, but horizontally through banking activities according to the leverage employed in these activities.
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