Livro: como os bandidos e os piedosos moldam as politicas públicas

O livro, que vai ser debatido em um Book Forum do Cato Institute, em Washington, trata unicamente das políticas regulatórias nos EUA, e não tem nada a ver, aparentemente, com o Brasil.

Na verdade, ele tem tudo a ver, e pode ser simplesmente traduzido da seguinte maneira:

Como mafiosos, traficantes e bandidos de alto coturno estabelecem, deliberada ou involuntariamente, uma coalizão prática com fundamentalistas religiosos, piedosos morais, mas totalmente ingênuos e ignorantes, para introduzir e manter políticas nocivas que afetam a todos e fazem a sociedade retroceder.

E então? Tem ou não tem a ver com o Brasil atual?

Pena que não vou estar para assistir...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics

Book Forum

Thursday, October 9, 2014 12:00PM

Featuring the authors Adam Smith, Assistant Professor of Economics and Director, Center for Free Market Studies, Johnson & Wales; and Bruce Yandle, Dean Emeritus of the College of Business and Behavioral Science, and Alumni Distinguished Professor of Economics Emeritus, Clemson University; with comments by Susan Dudley, Research Professor of Public Policy and Public Administration and Director, Regulatory Studies Center, George Washington University. Moderated by John Samples, Vice President and Publisher, Cato Institute.

The “Bootlegger and Baptist” theory, an innovative public-choice theory developed more than 30 years ago, holds that for a regulation to emerge and endure, both the “bootleggers,” who seek to obtain private benefits from the regulation, and the “Baptists,” who seek to serve the public interest, must support the regulation. Economists Adam Smith and Bruce Yandle provide an accessible description of the theory and cite numerous examples of coalitions of economic and moral interests that desire a common goal. The book applies the theory’s insights to a wide range of current issues, including the recent financial crisis and environmental regulation, and provides readers with both an understanding of how regulation is a product of economic and moral interests and a fresh perspective on the ongoing debate of how special-interest groups influence politics. Please join us for an engaging discussion of why government regulation fails so often to attain the public interest.
 

or Watch online Oct 9