Como derrotar a Rússia em sua guerra de agressão contra a Ucrânia
Anton Geraschenko, 5/12/2023
“The Soviet Union lost about 15,000 soldiers dead in Afghanistan over 10 years. In the First Chechen war, the number of Russian casualties amounted to 5,000-14,000 in almost two years (estimates differ). In both cases, USSR/Russia acknowledged their defeat and left (with Chechnya, Russia returned three years later).
Russian losses due to their aggression in Ukraine already amount to hundreds of thousands. Yet, Putin shows no intention to stop, and Russians seem to be OK with that.
Both Ukrainian military leadership (this was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny) and our allies assumed that there is a certain number of losses that Russia will consider unacceptable. Then, either Russian leadership would make the political decision to look for ways to exit the conflict or the Russian population would somehow revolt against such a huge number of pointless deaths (e.g., in both Afghanistan and Chechen wars, committees of soldiers' mothers were eventually an influential power).
As we now know, these assumptions were wrong. The Kremlin regime has mostly mobilized and recruited men from the poorer parts of Russian society where the value of human life is smaller than the chance to receive a free Lada car.
In the same logic, our Western allies also believed that Russian authorities would somehow be more pragmatic and rational. So their idea was to "make the war too costly for Putin" (with sanctions, for example) but at the same time not to threaten Putin and allow him to keep a good face. "Making the war too costly" assumes that there is a "price" after which the war is recognized as "unprofitable" and the regime then would look for a way out.
(In many instances, this position remains strong among our allies).
The logic of the Kremlin regime is completely different. There is no "acceptable" or "unacceptable" price, there is only victory or defeat. The Kremlin has decided that winning the war is the only way for the current regime to retain power, and for the people at the top to stay alive and free. Thus, defeat in the war is a "point of no return" and any price of victory is acceptable.
What to do, then? First - accept the new reality. Then, look for the enemy's weak points that are more valuable and painful to them than loss of cannon fodder.
Undermining and lessening Russia's combat potential still remains a key task. When given the right tools, Ukraine is very effective at that. Therefore, Ukraine needs to receive what we need - in full amounts and on time. Some decisions might need to be reconsidered (like forbidding strikes on Russian territory. Such strikes would undermine Russian logistics significantly and would save a lot of Ukrainian lives).
Sanctions still remain a key area. Closing loopholes that are used to circumvent them is crucial.
While Russia remains in its current state, it will continue being a threat to the security of the region, the whole world and itself. The imperial behemoth is incapable of real change, which plays into the hands of Putin's regime.
Ukrainian victory must mean Russia's defeat, not deterrence. That is a crucial paradigm shift that would allow to end this war sustainably and not just be a ceasefire to restore Russia's military potential.”
Source: Yevhen Dykyj, Ukrainian military analyst, and thoughts and comments from Anton Geraschenko
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