A diplomacia do Eixo Alemanha-Japão-Itália, 1940-1945 - Christian Goeschel, reviewed by Sarah Panzer (H-Diplo)

 

H-Diplo Article Review 1151- Panzer on Goeschel. “Performing the New Order: The Tripartite Pact, 1940-1945"

by christopher ball

H-Diplo Article Review 1151

13 December 2022

Christian Goeschel. “Performing the New Order: The Tripartite Pact, 1940-1945.” 

Contemporary European History (2022): 1-17. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777322000340.

https://hdiplo.org/to/AR1151

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Masami Kimura 

Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Sarah Panzer, Missouri State University

Until recently, the concept of fascist diplomacy may have struck many as an oxymoron. After all, fascist regimes are historically not known for playing well with others, and the longstanding assumption among historians has been that this belligerence extended even to their presumptive allies. At best the Axis was an “alliance without allies.”[1] At worst, it was a “long and uneasy engagement, maintained long past the hope of eventual union.”[2] An ongoing historiographic re-evaluation of the relationships between fascist parties and regimes, however, has challenged the older paradigm and offered a new perspective on fascism as a global project to deconstruct and replace the liberal world order.[3]

In Christian Goeschel’s most recent contribution to the field, he makes a persuasive case for taking tripartite diplomacy seriously as more than just the means by which Germany, Italy, and Japan hoped to construct a racialized new order, indeed as a mirror of fascist political sensibilities more generally. Whereas previous scholarship interpreted the lack of substantive military cooperation between the regimes as evidence of their disinterest in ‘real’ diplomacy, Goeschel argues that it was the performative displays of the alliance’s power, “mass spectacles of unity and strength,” which animated the alliance (2). Tripartite diplomacy may have been “carefully stage-managed political theatre,” but that did not make it any less effective in binding together regimes that were collectively intent on restructuring the global political order (5). Goeschel thus constructs a compelling new interpretation of fascist diplomacy as the point of convergence between style and political substance, where the representative and the substantive mutually reinforced each other. 

In discussing the trajectory of the tripartite pact from its signing in 1940 to its suspension in 1945, Goeschel frames his analysis around the official performances staged by the three regimes celebrating the pact and what they represented about fascist politics and diplomacy. The article’s first section thus understandably discusses the spectacle surrounding the signing of the pact, while the second and third analyze the performative staging of the alliance as a simulacrum of fascist mass politics. Ultimately, Goeschel argues that events marking the anniversary of the pact continued late into the war, even in the face of increasingly certain defeat, because the logic and momentum of tripartite diplomacy demanded that the three regimes continue to perform strength and unity until the bitter end. 

The tripartite pact was a major victory for German Chancellor Adolf Hitler; not only did it commit Japan to an alliance with Germany, a development Hitler saw as strategically useful in discouraging US involvement with the war in Europe, it also symbolically clarified Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s increasingly subordinate position vis-à-vis Germany. The ceremonial signing of the pact, held in Berlin in recognition of Germany’s dominant role within the Axis, was an elaborately staged event performed as much for the benefit of foreign journalists as it was for the crowds lining the route to the Reich Chancellery. As Goeschel notes, the version of the pact signed by the foreign ministers of the three regimes was not printed in German, or even in French—the traditional language of diplomacy—but in English, and the ceremony was carefully choreographed for maximum dramatic impact as newsreel footage (8). Observers at the time commented upon the performativity of the spectacle, but the media campaign accompanying the pact’s signing created its own political momentum and reinforced the underlying political project at the heart of the tripartite pact. 

Spectacle was central to the practice of fascist diplomacy, just as it was to the carefully choreographed performance of fascist power domestically. Fascism’s aestheticized approach to politics, which was first theorized by Walter Benjamin in 1935, has been a dominant theme in scholarship on the Axis regimes individually for some time now, and Goeschel is particularly persuasive in analyzing how fascist tactics of mass mobilization were adapted in order to legitimize and animate tripartite diplomacy.[4] In annual celebrations of the pact staged across the Italian, German, and Japanese empires, crowds were mobilized as essential ‘supporting cast’ for the various speeches, pronouncements, and statements of support delivered by fascist dignitaries. More than just providing a visually striking tableau, the “presence of the masses” was integral to the performance of fascist diplomacy in what it communicated about how the tripartite regimes sought to distinguish themselves from the “furtive bureaucratic diplomacy of the bygone age of liberal democracy… In tripartite diplomacy, crowds stood not only for the unity between leader and nation, but also for closed ranks between empire and leader” (11). This choice to frame the alliance as a performance of strength and unity—both within and between the tripartite regimes—was in the end a double-edged sword; in the absence of any meaningful military coordination, the regimes were forced to keep up appearances long past the point that defeat became a certainty, lest they risk losing credibility and undermining the alliance. 

Although framed as an analysis of tripartite diplomacy, Goeschel’s article relies principally on German archives. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw with respect to his conclusions, especially given Germany’s dominant role in constructing and maintaining the alliance, but it would be interesting to consider how the inclusion of more Italian and Japanese perspectives might offer a more nuanced understanding of how the pact was not just performed, but also translated for multiple audiences across the diverse spaces of the Axis empires. 

A more substantive critique of Goeschel’s analysis might be made, however, of his choice to focus exclusively on the more rigidly “stage-managed” performances of the alliance. Goeschel repeatedly cites Daniel Hedinger’s work on the Axis, yet Hedinger argues that engagement between Germany, Italy, and Japan created the conditions for a process of “cumulative radicalization” within the alliance, as each regime observed the others in action and modeled new policies in response.[5] Goeschel’s model of the alliance, by contrast, is somewhat static, an endless feedback loop in which repeated performances of the pact’s anniversaries functioned mainly to preserve the “credibility” of the alliance as worthy of celebration (16). While this certainly may have been the case with regards to the official events commemorating the pact, given the significant planning and resources that they required, Goeschel’s choice to exclusively focus on these carefully choreographed performances of unity naturally leads him to depict the alliance as endlessly replicating itself, rather than acknowledging the possibility that it might also have been evolving and adapting. 

For all of these resources that were devoted to monopolizing media access within their borders, fascist states were never able to entirely control how their propaganda was received, even by their own citizens. An internal memorandum circulated within the Security Division of the SS in 1942, to give one example, raised concerns that German propaganda about Japanese victories in the Pacific had been too effective, with the unintended consequence that an “inferiority complex” had recently emerged among Germans vis-à-vis their allies.[6] Although the memorandum’s author was discomforted by the realization that the German public had read far more into the regime’s propaganda than intended, he concluded that this unexpected development could be exploited, albeit with some minor adjustments to the press coverage of the Pacific War moving forward. On the one hand this episode confirms Goeschel’s basic argument regarding the innately performative nature of tripartite diplomacy, wherein the representative and the substantial were frequently indistinguishable from each other, and yet it also reminds us that the success of any performance depends more on its reception by its intended audience than on the skill of its actors. Although it is entirely understandable that Goeschel does not address the question of reception in the context of this particular article, one hopes that he or another historian will take up this challenge in the near future. 

In providing both a clear synthesis of the current “state of the field” and a persuasive re-evaluation of the performative essence of fascist diplomacy, Christian Goeschel’s new article simultaneously maps the topic’s historiographic trajectory and points to where it might be headed next. Clearly written and persuasively argued, it will be of interest to scholars working in a variety of fields, including global fascism, twentieth-century diplomatic history, and the Second World War

 

Sarah Panzer is Assistant Professor of Modern European History at Missouri State University. Her dissertation “The Prussians of the East: Samurai, Bushido, and Japanese Honor in the German Imagination, 1905-1945” (University of Chicago) won the 2015 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize. Her recent publications include “The Archer and the Arrow: Zen Buddhism and the Politics of Religion in Nazi Germany,” Journal of Global History (2022) and “Death-Defying: Voluntary Death as Honorable Ideal in the German-Japanese Alliance,” Central European History (2022). She is currently finishing her first monograph, which examines the German-Japanese relationship during the first half of the twentieth century as an alternative or counter-modernity. 

 

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[1] Ernst L. Presseisen, Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 281-320. See also, Gerhard Krebs and Bernd Martin, eds., Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tōkyō (Munich: Iudicium, 1994); Bernd Martin, Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Vom Angriff auf Pearl Harbour bis zur deutschen Kapitulation (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969). 

[2] Johanna Meskill, Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance (New York: Atherton, 1966), 3.

[3] Hans-Joachim Bieber, SS und Samurai: Deutsch-japanische Kulturbeziehungen, 1933-1945 (Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 2014); Reto Hofmann, The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy, 1922-1952 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Ricky W. Law, Transnational Nazism: Ideology and Culture in German-Japanese Relations, 1919-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Benjamin G. Martin, The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

[4] Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Sukrkamp, 2006). See also, George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2023); Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Alan Tansman, The Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism (Berkeley: University of California Pess, 2009); Julia Adeney Thomas and Geoff Eley, eds., Visualizing Fascism: The Twentieth-Century Rise of the Global Right (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020).

[5] Daniel Hedinger, Die Achse Berlin-Rom-Tokio 1919-1946 (Munich: CH Beck, 2021), 13.

[6] “Die Sicht Japans in der Bevölkerung.” Security Division Report (No. 306), August 6, 1942. Heinz Boberach, ed. Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938-1945. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes des SS. Vol. 11 (Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984), 4043.

História: Crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba: o dia mais perigoso do mundo - Tom Blanton (H-Diplo)

 

National Security Archive: The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60: The Most Dangerous Day

by Michael Evans

Joint Chiefs: “The president has a feeling that time is running out”

Cascade of human errors, nuclear-armed flashpoints on October 27 nearly started World War III by accident

JFK: “always some SOB who doesn’t get the word”

By Tom Blanton

Washington, D.C., October 27, 2022 - The most dangerous 24 hours of the Cuban Missile Crisis came on Saturday, October 27, 1962, 60 years ago today, as the U.S. moved closer to attacking Cuba and nuclear-armed flashpoints erupted over Siberia, at the quarantine line, and in Cuba itself—a rapid escalation that convinced both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev to strike the deal that would stop events from further spiraling out of control.

The surviving notes of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on that day, October 27, depict a six-and-a-half-hour cascade of crises where human error, miscalculation, reckless deployment of nuclear weapons, and testosterone ruled the day. The JCS notes from October and November 1962, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and published today by the National Security Archive, are all that survive after the Chiefs’ decision, in the 1970s, to destroy the tapes and transcripts from over two decades of JCS meetings.

The notes depict how top U.S. military officials reacted to the unfolding crisis in real time, including the shootdown of a U-2 spy plane over Cuba that afternoon—seen as a major escalation—while at the same time the JCS were unaware that U.S. naval forces were dropping grenades on a Soviet sub armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo near the quarantine line. As they continued to prepare for a full-scale invasion of Cuba, JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor told the Chiefs that President Kennedy was “seized with the idea of trading Turkish for Cuban missiles” and “has a feeling that time is running out.”

Today’s posting features the JCS notes along with photographs and additional context about the most dangerous day of the missile crisis, and the sequence of events that persuaded both Kennedy and Khrushchev to reach the trade that would ultimately end the superpower confrontation.

READ THE DOCUMENT

READ THE DOCUMENT

Book Review: Wallace J. Thies. Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War - Dorle Hellmuth (H-Diplo)

A contenção funciona? Talvez de um país grande a um país pequeno. Entre os EUA e a China dificilmente funcionará.

H-Diplo Review Essay 455, Hellmuth on Thies, Why Containment Works

by christopher ball

H-Diplo REVIEW ESSAY 455

27 October 2022

Wallace J. Thies. Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020  ISBN13: 9781501749483

https://hdiplo.org/to/E455
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Andrew Szarejko | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Dorle Hellmuth, The Catholic University of America

In Why Containment Works, Wallace Thies convincingly shows that there was never a need for the 2003 invasion of Iraq had Bush administration policymakers stuck to the containment and deterrence concepts that had been utilized during much of the Cold War. But this powerfully argued book is not merely about the contentious Iraq invasion that has been much debated elsewhere; Thies makes a compelling case for containment as an invaluable policy tool, and one that is easier to craft and sustain than commonly thought. 

In a world where states’ military assets rely on finite resources, Thies contrasts two vastly different strategic outlooks—theories of victory—of how these military resources are best utilized strategically: The Bush Doctrine which centered on action-oriented preventive use of force versus the more nuanced, long-term application of containment. 

Thies defines containment strategy “as a form of managed conflict that seeks to prevent the target state from overturning the local, regional, or global distribution of power” (vii). It is a long-term approach which is often slow and requires a lot of patience, and in true George Kennan fashion, the containing state will focus on defending vital interests and tailor its responses accordingly. In short, it is best understood as a game of “move and countermove” (10). Containment also defies more traditional, clearcut measures of success aimed at the immediate elimination of a threat: A containment policy is deemed successful as long as the target state does not manage to do anything that the container state would consider unacceptable. But that’s precisely what might make it less appealing to policymakers or the public, and a seeming relict of the Cold War: It is grey as opposed to black and white; drawn out instead of quick; often more passive rather than about initiative. It is not designed to win conclusively, but rather to live with problem states. 

As the contest is fluid and the various moves and countermoves are often staged simultaneously, a containment strategy may “seem disjointed, reactive, overtaken by events,” (10) improvised, or even worse, the containing state may appear in over its head and outplayed by the target state. There is room for error and failure, to be sure: Containing states might become exasperated and randomly rush on to the next tactic(s); upcoming elections might create pressures for action; or containment policies might resemble too much of a watered-down compromise to be effective. Most of the time, however, there is much potential, vast room for creativity, and remarkable versatility: “A containment policy is bounded only by the imagination and the resourcefulness of those who set it in motion and then carry it out,” (18) Thies explains. What is more, policy options available to the container state usually increase when containment works. Generally involving a mix of “threats (verbal and nonverbal), sanctions or rewards, and if need be, forceful actions,” containment resembles “the art of thwarting an adversary’s plots and schemes, and not just once but again and again” (7). In the case of pre-2003 invasion Iraq, the US containment toolbox came with no less than five different options: United Nations WMD inspections of Iraqi offices and suspected WMD facilities; UN control of oil revenues and imports; multinational naval interdictions of WMDs and ballistic missile technology; and the enforcement of no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq which, starting in 2001, also featured US and British airstrikes against Iraqi command-and-control centers near the capital as well as numerous other military targets. 

Chapter 1 (fittingly titled Preventive War vs. Containment) develops the conceptual framework of the book. What policy prescriptions flow from the 2002 Bush Doctrine when viewed as a theory of victory, and how do they compare to an alternative theory of victory based on containment and deterrence? According to the Bush Doctrine, containment and deterrence had run its course in a world with “unbalanced dictators” (2), “outlaw regimes” (3), rogue states in possession or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and “shadowy terrorist networks” (3) without country allegiances, putting a high prize on the proactive, unilateral, and preventive use of swift and decisive force.  

Having examined the claims that make up the Bush Doctrine, Thies argues the opposite: Containment and deterrence are neither outdated, weakened, nor unsustainable concepts; buying time and wait-and-see approaches are often preferable to (rushing into) action; defense is the preferable, often superior choice to offense (precisely because superpowers like the US can rely on seemingly infinite supplies of resources against often smaller states and wear them down over time, usually without the use of military force); and preventive wars do not hold answers for the many unresolved issues and uncertainties that follow military strikes and invasions. Thies’s ‘anti-Bush Doctrine’ thus boils down to four essential factors: the willingness to 1., engage in a long-term contest against a target state via constant moves and countermoves; 2., relinquish the initiative as it often reduces the need for fighting in the first place; 3., identify potential allies and build coalitions; while being able to 4., rely on the innovative and tenacious nature of democracies (Thies is especially partial to the US separation of powers system, whose features, he argues, bring about such vetted policymaking that only the best policy ideas can survive). In fact, creating and sustaining a long-term containment strategy is not as difficult as conventional wisdom might suggest because relinquishing the initiative to the target state is “an effective way of thwarting an opponent’s plots and schemes”; regional allies increasingly threatened by the target state will opt to assist the US; and democratic containing states are especially well equipped to negate the “rise of would-be hegemons” (19) due to their resourcefulness and staying power. 

Chapters 2 to 6 are devoted to testing these claims as part of five case studies from the Cold and post-Cold War world, each spanning at least two decades: the containment of Libya (1979-2003), the dual containment of Iraq and Iran (1981-2003), the containment of Iraq (1980-2003), the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing containment of Iran (since 1979). Thies measures containment success by whether the US was able to block aggressive actions by Libya, Iraq, and Iran, including “support for terrorist or other military operations,” (46) or whether those countries’ quest for nuclear weapons ceased or significantly decreased. Because the United States can rely on such a massive array of resources, there usually is no need to resort to blunt force let alone preventive war, allowing for a more cost-effective and variable approach when dealing with smaller states. 

Based on evidence obtained in the five case studies, Chapter 7 reappraises containment by revisiting Thies’s alternative claims – the powerful value of ‘move and countermove’ amid constant bargaining; the willingness to relinquish the initiative because it forces the dreadful responsibility of having to fire the first shot and start a war upon the target state; the importance of attracting regional allies; and the sustaining strengths and ingenuity of (especially presidential) democracies – further reiterating that containment works best under the aforementioned conditions. Like chapter 1, the final chapter is peppered with examples, anecdotes, and debates from the Cold War, essentially tying the Cold War and post-Cold War lessons of containment together. 

Why Containment Works offers rigorous analysis, meticulously researched case studies, and a crisp, succinct structure. Thies pays close attention to the many fascinating nuances, or ‘nooks and crannies,’ that have made up US containment strategy during the Cold War and after, against especially smaller regional states, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, but also vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Another major strength of the book is that Thies explores the different arguments presented by containment optimists and pessimists from all possible angles. 

Above all, Thies’s findings come with crucial policy implications and should give US decisionmakers pause. When contemplating the next preventive war, containment should be considered first – because, under the right circumstances, it can work and has worked so many times. This has particular relevance for the ongoing Iranian nuclear dilemma, which continues to haunt the United States and the international community. Thies’s analysis of US containment of Iran ends in 2016, and President Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018. While the US and Iran have returned to the negotiation table under President Biden, the future of the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, and the Iranian nuclear program is arguably further along than ever. Preventive military action is likely bound to become a hot button issue once again in the foreseeable future. 

Even if Thies portrays the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate of the Iranian nuclear program or the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in too much of a positive light, the bottom line remains: Fifteen years later, there is no Iranian bomb, and Iran was willing to restrain its ambitions by conceding to the 2015 nuclear deal. Furthermore, containment does not have to end even if Iran were to go nuclear. While Thies does associate containment success with Iran’s not having produced a nuclear weapon, the historical record, according to Thies, still suggests a nuclear Iran could be contained and deterred like the Soviet Union and others before.

As the scope of any book is naturally limited, this excellent work comes with only few potential weaknesses that may best be considered avenues for further research. Since the Bush Doctrine placed such importance on preventing the next terrorist attack by striking first, such future research might examine under which circumstances terrorist networks and/or insurgent groups can be contained. Even more, what would an assessment of contemporary US policies involving larger adversaries, such as a resurgent, bellicose Russia and an increasingly assertive China, tell us about the potency of containment?  Even if the United States has a larger containment arsenal, and therefore more policy options, than any other opponent, presidential democracy in the US has been in decline in recent years; this leads to questions as to whether US democracy is still robust enough – and still allowing for only the best ideas to become policy despite significant political polarization -- to weather drawn-out cat-and-mouse-games that make up containment contests with large states?

Having said that, the book fills a crucial gap precisely because it demonstrates the overall value of containing smaller states, both during and after the Cold War, as well as containment during the Cold War (against a fellow superpower, the Soviet Union, and major regional player, China). In other words, this is an invaluable contribution to the literature on containment theory. I have no doubt that this exquisite book will become a must-read standard work, alongside John Lewis Gaddis’ Strategies of Containment^[1] (2005) widely considered the seminal work on the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. While several other noteworthy works since 9/11 have concentrated on the global war on terror, ^[2] Thies’s book offers a refreshing take on containment against traditional state opponents and challenges pre- and post-9/11. Thies’s comprehensive account of U.S. containment practices involving five different countries also goes beyond other recent books with a more limited focus on Iran.^[3]

On a more personal note, I consider this book Wallace Thies’s final masterpiece. A leading NATO specialist and scholar (Why NATO Endures and Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO),^[4] Thies sadly passed away in July 2020. When he told me about the manuscript that would turn into Why Containment Works a few months before his retirement, Thies humbly referred to his book project as a compilation of lecture notes (accumulated during decades of teaching international relations classes at The Catholic University of America). This book clearly goes above and beyond that. As a former doctoral student and colleague of Wallace Thies, I am incredibly grateful that his critical analysis will continue to inspire and assist current and future policymakers and students of IR theory. I highly recommend this book to any decisionmaker involved in the crafting or implementation of containment policies, as well as any serious student of containment strategy. 

Dorle Hellmuth is Associate Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America and the author of Counterterrorism and the State (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Her research and teaching interests include (counter)terrorism and -radicalization; political violence; NATO; transatlantic security; and US foreign policy. 

  

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[1] John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[2] Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Jonathan Stevenson, Counter-terrorism: Containment and Beyond, Adelphi Paper 367 (London: Routledge: 2005).

[3] Kenneth Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy (London: Schuster & Schuster, 2013); Ehud Eilam, Containment in the Middle East (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2019). 

[4] Wallace Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2009); Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (London: Routledge: 2015).

China-Russia Relations - Scott Moore (H-Diplo)

H-Diplo Essay 449- Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “China-Russia Relations and a World Transformed”

by George Fujii

H-Diplo Essay 449

26 July 2022

Commentary Series on Putin’s War: “China-Russia Relations and a World Transformed” 

https://hdiplo.org/to/E449

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii

Essay by Scott Moore, University of Pennsylvania

A favorite observation of American officials is that the United States and its allies, combined, constitute by far the world’s largest concentration of economic and military power, and can therefore present an effective counterweight to China’s own growing power. The same framing is revealing when applied to China and Russia. Though even when combined their resources do not approach those of the advanced liberal democracies, China and Russia offer each other important complementarities, most notably in natural resources, military capabilities, and foreign policy. By some measures, China’s relations with Russia are the most positive of those with any other major power.^[1] China alone is a formidable competitor, and potential adversary, for liberal powers. But it is considerably more so if it is durably aligned or allied with Russia.  

With this importance in mind, this essay provides an overview of modern China-Russia relations. On this basis it distills some lessons and implications for understanding their evolution following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Its central claim is that, barring dramatic political change in either country, Sino-Russian ties will evolve asymptotically closer to a formal alliance relationship while stopping short of the formal establishment of one. This close military, economic, and diplomatic partnership will continue to pose the most vexing geopolitical challenge for the United States and other liberal powers in the decades ahead.

This essay provides a historical overview of the development of China-Russia relations in the modern period, in the belief that this history reveals key factors that will continue to shape bilateral ties going forward. It admittedly arbitrarily divides this history into two phases, the first of which dates roughly from 1949 to the onset of the first Ukraine crisis in 2014 that was marked by profound tensions and ambivalent attempts to forge a durable partnership. The second phase, dating roughly from 2014 to the present, has on the other hand been marked by significantly closer military and diplomatic ties combined with the addition of more significant economic and ideological dimensions to the relationship. These shifts indicate that China-Russia ties have evolved into something considerably more robust than an alignment of convenience and towards something approaching a formal military and diplomatic alliance. 

While this essay is not intended to provide a theoretical treatment of China-Russia relations, it is worth briefly noting this assessment’s relationship to the academic literature. Broadly speaking, the academic analysis of China-Russia relations has taken place within the basic international relations constructs of realism and constructivism. The preponderance of scholarly work has placed relations between Moscow and Beijing within the realist framework and characterized them largely as classic hedging or balancing behavior in response primarily to the actions of the United States.^[2] A smaller body of work instead emphasizes constructivist relationships based on shared values, post-communist history and, more recently and more tentatively, trade, migration, and cultural linkages.^[3] This essay broadly supports the view that China-Russia relations, while reflecting strong realist influences, have nonetheless also developed some important constructivist dimensions. 

Rupture and Reluctant Partnership

By far the most important foreign relationship for the People’s Republic of China in its first decade was with the former Soviet Union. Its first major foreign policy alignment was the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow, which committed the world’s two largest Communist states to a wide-ranging partnership. In the decade that followed, thousands of Soviet advisers flowed into China, playing critical roles in influencing everything from urban planning to military force structure. Moscow also notably provided considerable direct support for China’s military intervention in the Korean War, including supplying and training the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. Chairman Mao Zedong’s government, for its part, assented to a major, uncharacteristic concession to Moscow by recognizing the independence of Outer Mongolia, which had been claimed by the Republic of China as part of the previous Qing Empire.^[4]

Yet though it is often seen as the apogee of Sino-Soviet bonhomie, even this period was marked by considerable diplomatic and political tensions that presaged a difficult relationship in succeeding decades. Beijing’s diplomacy in Asia, and especially the 1954 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, soon betrayed friction with Moscow’s priorities, and a putative rapprochement with the United States under Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership was viewed with deep suspicion in the People’s Republic. Mao’s determination to reduce China’s reliance on foreign expertise and technology, both from the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and instead to leapfrog ahead of other industrialized nations, provoked similar ire in Moscow.^[5] At the same time, while under Khrushchev Soviet Communism became slightly more liberal, Mao’s own spin on traditional Marxist-Leninist thought was gradually codified into a seemingly competitive theoretical system, challenging Moscow’s ideological leadership over the Communist bloc.^[6]  

These developments precipitated the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, one of the most dramatic episodes in the diplomatic history of the People’s Republic. All of the Soviet advisers were withdrawn from China, and in the subsequent decade a number of minor confrontations and conflicts occurred between Soviet and Chinese military forces, including the 1962 Xinjiang border crisis.^[7] This period in turn set the stage for the equally dramatic 1972 visit of President Richard Nixon to Beijing, launching a rapprochement between China and the United States. Beijing’s continued animosity toward Moscow was sustained by the latter’s intervention in both Southeast and Central Asia, provoking a fear of encirclement that was strikingly similar to that which was directed at the United States in subsequent decades. Sino-Soviet relations did, however, improve considerably in the 1980s. In 1982, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev called for an end to the two countries’ hostile relationships and recognized Beijing’s claim over Taiwan. Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, meanwhile, proposed the expansion of cooperation in a range of areas including space, hydropower, and rail. This thawing in relations did not last and was quickly interrupted in 1989 by both the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Incident in China.^[8]

Following these epochal events for both Russia and China, it was only in the mid-1990s that China-Russia relations were substantively renewed. Though in its early years the newly independent Russian Federation enjoyed close ties with the West, it quickly expressed dissatisfaction with many aspects of Western policy and turned once more toward China. The foundation for the contemporary China-Russia relationship was set by the 1996 summit between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin, which established a “strategic partnership” between the two nations – the strongest expression of bilateral ties since the 1950 treaty. This was followed by the 2001 Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, which notably featured a mechanism for the two nations to share military technology and expertise.^[9] The same year, Russia became a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which included an anti-terrorism focus.[10]

Throughout this period, China-Russia relations in the military and security spheres continued to expand. In the decade prior to 2007, Russia accounted for some 80% of China’s arms imports, including highly sophisticated fighter jets and submarines. In 2005, the two countries carried out joint military exercises for the first time in decades and appeared to simulate operations against a sophisticated adversary like the United States. During a 2008 visit by President Dimitry Medvedev, Beijing expressed support for one of Moscow’s foremost security priorities, countering a missile-defense system planned by the United States.^[11]

The early 2010s, meanwhile, witnessed the addition of an important economic as well as diplomatic dimension to China-Russia relations. In 2010, China replaced Germany as Russia’s largest trading partner.^[12] In early 2011, meanwhile, an oil pipeline between China and Russia, with a capacity of 30 million tons per year commenced operation.^[13] Yet economic matters also stoked considerable tension. Chinese migration and economic influence in the Russian Far East registered as a significant political and geopolitical concern. Moreover, the considerable economic imbalance between China and Russia continued to cause friction in Moscow.^[14] Russian leaders reacted coolly to Chinese proposals to re-orient the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) towards economic development, and instead began to promote alternative frameworks for Eurasian economic integration that effectively excluded China.^[15] These tensions set the stage for a period of closer alignment amidst an autocratic revival in both China and Russia during the 2010s. 

Autocratic Revival and Alignment

In a speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Vladimir Putin surprised many observers with a tirade against the western-led world order. Four years after the US invasion of Iraq, Putin lambasted the United States for unleashing an “uncontained hyper-use of force” and “disdain for the basic principles of international law.” He then turned his attention to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, he charged “has put its front-line forces on our borders,” a move that “represents a serious provocation.”^[16] The following years witnessed a cascade of increased tensions between Russia and western countries, including American recognition of an independent Kosovo in 2008 and the NATO Summit of the same year, where the alliance declared its intention to eventually admit Georgia and Ukraine as members. The decision proved to be a fateful one, as Russia unleashed a military operation against Georgia the same year and resolved to prevent Ukraine’s drift into the orbit of the west.^[17] The latter had especially serious consequences when, following the ouster of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych as a result of mass protests, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and instigated an insurgency in eastern Ukraine.^[18]

The impact of political upheaval in Ukraine and other nations bears further mention for the impact it had on decision-makers in both Beijing and Moscow. The 2011-2014 period was marked by political upheaval around the world, including in Syria, where Russia later became a critical player, and in China, where President Xi Jinping’s accession to supreme power was marked by the dramatic fall of rising Communist Party star Bo Xilai. Russia also witnessed protests around the re-election of Putin to the presidency, but of more importance were the “color revolutions” that swept across Russia’s near abroad, most consequentially in Ukraine. This political upheaval raised alarm bells for the autocrats both in Moscow and Beijing, guiding them once again closer together as the first phase of the Ukraine conflict approached.^[19]

Following the imposition of western sanctions and the suspension of some high-level Russia-western engagement, Beijing was quick to affirm its support for Russia – a resolve that appeared to strengthen even as the Ukraine crisis deepened. The 2014 crisis revealed a critical element of Beijing’s orientation toward Moscow: “China does not want to see Russia fail.”^[20] During a presidential summit the same year that included discussion of events in Ukraine, Xi noted that China’s position was that “responsible parties should deal with the roots of the problem and that China supported a comprehensive political solution of the Ukraine crisis.” During a subsequent meeting, Xi went much further, pledging “evergreen” friendship and that “No matter how the international landscape shifts, we must insist on giving priority to the development of Sino-Russian ties.”^[21]

It quickly became apparent that neither side viewed events in Ukraine as a barrier to expanded economic ties: an October visit by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev witnessed the launch of 38 agreements in areas ranging from rail to banking. Indeed, for Moscow, it was evident that China was quickly becoming an alternative source of investment and trade opportunities in the face of western sanctions. At least one significant tension persisted, however: Beijing continued to be frustrated by the slow pace of economic integration via the SCO, which remained in its view one of the most important mechanisms for China-Russia relations.^[22]

Perhaps the most important outcome of Beijing’s support for Moscow during the 2014 Ukraine crisis was a more fulsome and deliberate discussion in both countries about the long-term future of their strategic partnership, including whether it should extend to building a formal alliance relationship. Russian analysts increasingly viewed China as an important source of investment and economic opportunities, but government officials were careful to temper the scope of Russia’s expanded partnership with Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, for example, declared that while western “sanctions spur on relations with partners in the East…we would like to do so not as a replacement but as a process simultaneous with the normal development of traditional interaction with the west.”^[23] For China’s part, an alliance with Russia appeared to contradict longstanding tenets of foreign policy, including a suspicion of mutual defense agreements. Leading Chinese commentators accordingly expressed ambivalence towards the notion of alliance, with one leading security analyst arguing that China should pursue a “quasi alliance” with Russia that would avoid burdening Beijing with any responsibility for contributing to Russia’s security while preserving the opportunity to pursue a full-fledged alliance in the future.^[24]

These tensions and ambiguities continued to be reflected in China-Russia ties. Importantly, during the first Ukraine crisis Beijing offered to extend financial aid to Moscow. Specifically, in December 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged to “provide necessary assistance within our capacity.”^[25] Days later, the two sides signed a currency-swap agreement worth US$24 billion. Yet Moscow welcomed this support with tempered enthusiasm. In an interview, Russia’s ambassador to China declared that “Russia does not need China’s assistance but [its] support.”^[26] Moscow’s aims for expanded economic cooperation with China appeared to be considerably more ambitious and extend to advanced technologies. In November 2014, Lavrov gave a speech in which he gushed that “We can now even talk about the emerging technological alliance between the two countries.”[27] Chinese state media, however, featured several pointed criticisms of Russian policy, including its sale of advanced submarines to Vietnam – criticisms that were widely viewed as veiled expressions of displeasure from Chinese officialdom at Moscow’s seeming attempts to play multiple sides in Asian geopolitics.^[28]   

China-Russia ties in between the 2014 and subsequent 2022 Ukraine crises were on firmer ground in the diplomatic and military spheres. China proved a reliable vote on the United Nations Security Council to stymie attempts by western powers to impose sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria, which was a close Russian ally. China vetoed at least four such Security Council resolutions and compiled a 99% record of voting alongside Russia on matters before the United Nations Human Rights Council.^[29] Military ties also continued to expand. In 2013 a joint naval exercise became the largest that the People’s Liberation Army Navy had ever undertaken with a foreign force, and in 2015 the two countries’ navies pointedly conducted an exercise in the Mediterranean, which was widely seen as a provocation against NATO. The most visible sign of deepening military-military ties was Xi’s historic participation in Moscow’s highly symbolic annual Victory Day parade, which featured the striking sight of Chinese soldiers marching in the former Red Square.^[30] In 2018, meanwhile, Russia launched its largest military exercises since the fall of the Soviet Union which involved significant participation by Chinese forces.^[31]

A few other developments in the 2015-2022 period bear mention. Several important China-Russia infrastructure projects were completed in 2019, including the 38 billion cubic meter-capacity “Power of Siberia” gas line.^[32] United States policy toward Iran under the Trump Administration, especially the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in early 2020, was criticized by both Beijing and Moscow. During the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, on the other hand, an ugly spate of xenophobic incidents against Chinese nationals in Russia caused a temporary flare-up in bilateral tensions. These actions, while noteworthy, soon subsided in the midst of generally warm Sino-Russian relations for the duration of the pandemic^.[33] By the end of 2021, Xi reportedly used a string of superlatives to describe China-Russia relations, including that they had achieved “the highest level in history” and were in “a league of their own.”^[34] Putin, for his part, observed admiringly that “China is moving quickly towards superpower status.”^[35] Sino-Russian ties also appeared to be reinforced by the perception of political and policy instability in the United States, including the turmoil surrounding the 2020 presidential election and the Biden Administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan the following year.^[36] These developments set the stage for Beijing’s reaction to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. 

The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and its Implications for China-Russia Relations 

Beijing’s response to the most serious international security crisis of the post-war period was, for the first few months at least, similar to that of 2014, with China offering fulsome support to Russia. Only a few weeks before the invasion, Xi famously pledged that Sino-Russian relations had “no limits.”^[37] Publicly at least, Beijing continued to express support for Russia and China-Russia relations despite Russia’s near-total isolation from the west and as the human and economic costs of the Ukraine invasion mounted. Echoing language deployed in 2014, Beijing called in June 2022 for all parties to seek a “proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis.”^[38] At the same time, Xi went further, saying that “China is also willing to work with Russia to promote solidarity and cooperation among emerging market countries…and push for the development of the international order and global governance towards a more just and reasonable direction.”^[39] Even so, Beijing’s support did appear to have some limits: despite reports that Russia had specifically requested military assistance from China, United States and other officials were quoted as saying that there were no signs any such assistance was being provided to Russia.^[40]

The most pressing question, of course, is whether this alignment will last. Here previous features of Sino-Russian ties provide important clues. First, and most fundamentally, it is apparent that in the post-1945 period China-Russia relations have been principally shaped by the state of their respective relations with the west, especially the United States. A consistent dynamic has been that Moscow’s periodic, usually fleeting, turns westward have been matched by a cooling of its ties with Beijing, while the opposite tilt produces a predictable warming. While this dynamic has been evident for decades, it has been strengthened by developments since 2014 including the color revolutions. Given the dramatic worsening of relations between the major western countries and both China and Russia over roughly the same period, it is likely that China-Russia relations will continue to deepen in large part in opposition to the west.  

Second, military matters have historically formed the bedrock of the relationship and are likely to continue to strengthen. Military-military ties, and especially the sale and transfer of military technology, have long been one of the most substantively important dimensions of China’s relationship with Russia. Moscow’s value as a dependable source of military technology was highlighted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, when Russia continued to supply China with arms even as the west imposed wide-ranging sanctions.^[41] Despite China’s drive to become self-reliant in key defense technology and the poor military performance of Russian military forces in Ukraine, Russia remains a significant inspiration for the People’s Liberation Army and continues to be seen by Chinese strategic commentators as a useful tool to tie down western military forces outside the Indo-Pacific theater. The importance of the military relationship is thus likely to continue.  

Third, Moscow and Beijing have seen important reasons to maintain diplomatic alignment, but the diplomatic arena is also one in which significant tensions are evident. China and Russia are likely to continue to present a united front, especially at the United Nations. In the eyes of Chinese strategic thinkers, the primary appeal of Russia as an ally is to secure China’s northern and western border regions while also securing an important diplomatic partner on the UN Security Council.^[42] But Moscow has viewed with ambivalence core Chinese priorities in regions like the South China Sea, where it has pursued expanded economic and military ties with Vietnam, and the Arctic, where it views Chinese ambitions with suspicion.^[43] Especially if China adopts a more belligerent posture with respect to territorial claims in these regions, it may find that Russia is unwilling to support them. On the other hand, Moscow does appear likely to continue to support Beijing’s highest diplomatic priority, namely its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. 

Fourth, both countries have struggled to expand economic ties, and their ability to do so will be an important determinant of how strong China-Russia relations will be in the years ahead. Economic ties have steadily become more significant for both sides but remain highly uneven and a source of some tension. In 2011, Putin reportedly reacted to a prediction by an American CEO that China would eventually overtake the United States as the locus of the world economy by calling the prospect “an uneasy situation.”^[44]Russia’s imports have China increased dramatically in the first decades of the twenty-first century, but Russia is a minor trading partner for China. Moreover, Russia’s exports to China are dominated by oil and gas, while China’s exports to Russia include more specialized and higher-value-added machinery and equipment.^[45]The most important question, and certainly one of strong relevance to the west in an era of perceived technological competition, is whether the two countries can successfully expand joint research and investment in advanced technologies. 

Fifth and finally, the normative dimension to China-Russia relations is the biggest and most interesting question pertaining to the bilateral relationship. Historical memory plays an important, if difficult to describe, role in China-Russia ties. In the eyes of analysts in both countries, the two nations share a broadly complementary view of modern history, including a belief that both nations’ contributions to the defeat of Germany and Japan during the Second World War are under-appreciated and opposition to the dominant global position enjoyed by the United States in the postwar period.^[46]Both countries have placed increasing emphasis on historical revisionism and nationalism, and the extent to which these narratives are mutually reinforcing and accepted by their respective publics will determine how deep, as well as how broad, Sino-Russian relations become in the years ahead. 

On balance, these lessons and implications suggest that China-Russia relations will continue to strengthen in the economic and ideological as well as more traditional military and diplomatic domains, but that fundamental tensions will persist that will prevent them from concluding a fully-fledged alliance relationship. Even so, their combined resources will present serious challenges for western interests, including the ability to block action in the Security Council and other United Nations bodies, to present the west with a two-front security dilemma well into the future, and to provide China with a stable, secure, and virtually sanctions-proof source of critical natural resources. Together China and Russia do not approach the combined and united strength of the liberal powers. But they have meaningfully narrowed the gap and have therefore created a source of serious concern to political leaders across the west. 

 

Scott Moore is Director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives and Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He previously worked for the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

 

Notes

^[1] Alexander Korolev and Vladimir Portyakov, “Reluctant Allies: System-Unit Dynamics and China-Russia Relations,” International Relations 33:1 (2019), 40-66. 

^[2] Brock Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security Studies 21:2 (2012), 192-231; Alexander Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9:4 (2016): 375-397 and Xiaodi Ye, “Explaining China’s Hedging to the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy,” China Review 20:3 (2020), 205-238.

^[3] Liu Ying, “Strategic Partnership or Alliance? Sino-Russian Relations from a Constructivist Perspective,” Asian Perspective 42:3 (2018): 333-354 and Brandon Yoder, “Theoretical Rigor and the Study of Contemporary Cases: Explaining Post-Cold War China-Russia Relations,” International Politics 57 (2020): 741-759. 

^[4] Jing-yun Hsu and Jenn-Jaw Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011),” The Chinese Economy 47: 3 (May-June 2014): 70-87 and Alexander Muraviev, “Comrades in Arms: The Military-Strategic Aspects of China-Russia Relations,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1:2 (2014): 163-185. 

^[5] On this relationship see Kenneth Whiting, Evolution of the Sino-Soviet Split: A Summary Account (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1975); Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological dilemma (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).  

^[6] Hsu and Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011).” 

^[7] Whiting, Evolution of the Sino-Soviet Split: A Summary Account and Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World.

^[8] Hsu and Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011).”

^[9] Hsu and Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011).”

^[10] Janko Scepanovic, “Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Question of the Commitment Capacity,” European Politics and Society 2021, https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1932081  

^[11] Hsu and Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011).” 

^[12] Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Between Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics,” Comparative Connections 13:3 (2012), 1-10. 

^[13] Hsu and Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011).”

^[14] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Between Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics,” and Hsu and Soong, “Development of China-Russia Relations (1949-2011).”

^[15] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Between Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics.”  

^[16] See Vladimir Putin, “Conference on Security Policy Munich, Germany, February 10, 2007,” Air Force Magazine, April 1, 2007, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0407keeperfile/

^[17] Michael Kofman, “The August War, Ten Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War,” War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/

^[18] On these events see Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2017). 

^[19] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Succession, Syria…and the Search for Putin’s Soul,” Comparative Connections14:1 (May 2012): 139-140.

^[20] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Succession, Syria…and the Search for Putin’s Soul.”.

^[21] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Succession, Syria…and the Search for Putin’s Soul.” 

^[22] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power,” Comparative Connections 16:3 (January 2015), 123-140

^[23] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power.”

^[24] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power.” 

^[25] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power.”

^[26] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power.”

^[27] Alexander Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9:4 (2016): 375-397. 

^[28] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power.”

^[29] Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations.”

^[30] Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations.”

^[31] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Crouching Army, Hidden Alliance?” Comparative Connections 20:3 (2019): 107-116.

^[32] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: The Art and Agony of Avoiding an Alliance,” Comparative Connections21:3 (2020):129-142.

^[33] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Ending Strategic Distancing in the Era of Social Distancing,” Comparative Connections 22:1 (2020): 127-136

^[34] Yu, "Light at the End of the Tunnel?” Comparative Connections, 22:3 (2021), 141-150.

^[35] Yu, “Light at the End of the Tunnel?”

^[36] Yu, “Light at the End of the Tunnel?”

^[37] Simone McCarthy, “China Will Support Russia on Security, Xi tells Putin in Birthday Call,” CNN, June 16, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/15/asia/china-support-russia-security-xi-birthday-putin-intl-hnk/index.html  

^[38] McCarthy, “China Will Support Russia on Security, Xi tells Putin in Birthday Call.”

^[39] McCarthy, “China Will Support Russia on Security, Xi tells Putin in Birthday Call.”

^[40] McCarthy, “China Will Support Russia on Security, Xi tells Putin in Birthday Call.” 

^[41] Alexander Muraviev, “Comrades in Arms: the Military-Strategic Aspects of China-Russia Relations,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1:2 (2014): 163-185.

^[42] Brian Carlson, “China-Russia Relations and the Inertia of History,” Survival 58:3 (2016): 213-222. 

^[43] Korolev, “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations.”

^[44] Yu, “China-Russia Relations: Between Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics,” Comparative Connections 13:3 (December 2011): 129-138.

^[45] Alicia Garcia Herrero and Jianwei Xu, “The China-Russia Trade Relationship and its Impact on Europe,” Bruegel Working Paper 4: 2016. 

^[46] Alexander Korolev and Vladimir Portyakov, “China-Russia Relations in Times of Crisis: A neoclassical realist explanation.” Gaye Christoffersen, Ed. Russia in the Indo-Pacific: New approaches to Russian Foreign Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021).

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