Trabalho mais recente publicado:
1680. “Brazil at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919”, Cadernos de
Política Exterior (IPRI/MRE, ano XII, nº 18, ano 2026, ISSN: 3086-2434).
Relação de Originais n. 5319.
BRAZIL AT
THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Cadernos de Política Exterior (IPRI/MRE, ano XII, nº 18, 2026, ISSN: 3086-2434).
Relação de Originais n. 5319; Relação de Publicados n. 1680.
Abstract: After some huge
funding loans at the end of the Monarchy and in early Republic, to consolidate
old debt into new debt, the Great War represented a serious disturbance for
Brazil’s fragile economy: reduction of its exports (mainly coffee) to Europe
and no one cent lent by Brazil’s official bankers, the London Rothchilds,
during the whole duration of the war. Brazil had a minor participation in the
fights, either naval or terrestrial, having declared a state of war against the
German Empire only in the second semester of 1917, with some naval patrols in
the Atlantic waters and a “Brazilian hospital” in Paris, but most of the
personnel sent to Europe succumbed to the Spanish flu at the end of the
conflict. Brazilian participation in the peace conference was assured by an
especial delegation, having at the head a prestigious envoy, Mr. Epitácio
Pessoa, who was not only selected as presidential candidate, but also was to be
elected while in Paris, without any campaign at home. Main issues in defense of
Brazilian interests at the Paris Peace Conference were the payment of Brazilian
coffee stocks in Hamburg and Trieste, retained by the central empires, and a
financial or material compensation to be offered against German ships retained
in Brazilian ports. Brazil signed only the Versailles treaty, was admitted in
the League of Nations, but choose to quit the organization five years later,
when Germany was elected to a post Brazil expected to be assigned for it.
Keywords: Great
War. Paris Peace negotiations. Brazil’s delegation. Epitácio Pessoa.
1. Brazil at the historical juncture
of the Great War
Starting with its “discovery” by Portuguese navigators in 1500 and up to
the Independence in 1822, Brazil’s integration into the world economy was
essentially made through the “colonial pact,” and as an exporter of commodities,
especially of “dessert products” (sugar, and since from Independence, coffee
and cocoa), as well as a few other products: cotton, rubber, iron ore etc. Those
basic goods, together with the current addition of soya beans, meat products
and orange juice, continue to be at the top of the list of Brazilian commodity supply
to the world. Since the start of its nation-building, at the beginning of the
third decade of the 19th century, Brazil has been chronically dependent
on foreign financing, both for investments, and, especially, for financing the State,
which has ever been a concern for a country without sufficient domestic savings.
For the whole duration of the monarchical period (1822-1889), contrary to some of
its South American neighbours, Brazil was a responsible debtor, even if resorting
sometimes to funding loans. Starting with the Republic’s loose federal system, it
eventually turned into a ruined debtor, and remained so throughout the Great
War. After the 1929 crisis and with the Depression in the 1930s, a technical moratorium
on its foreign debts became inevitable.
The Great War represented a serious disturbance for Brazil’s fragile
economy. Despite a huge funding loan obtained shortly before the conflict, to
consolidate old debt into new debt, the war caused a serious reduction of Brazil’s
exports (mainly coffee) to Europe and a complete halt – not a single cent – on
lending to Brazil by its official bankers, the London Rothschilds, during the
whole duration of the war. Brazil had a minor combat role, either on land or at
sea, having declared a state of war against the German Empire only in October 1917.
Some naval patrols were sent to the South Atlantic waters and a “Brazilian
hospital” was established in Paris. Many among the military personnel sent to Europe fell victim to the
Spanish flu epidemics before seeing action – which would have been at the end
of the conflict, anyway. The Spanish flu swept the globe in 1918-1919 and in a
few months made more victims than the total number of battlefield deaths during
the war. Estimates range from approximately 20 to 50 million deaths worldwide,
making it one of the most devastating public health crises of recent history.
One of the most interesting memorialists among Brazilian diplomats,
Heitor Lyra, a historian by training, with a long trajectory in the Foreign
Service – from 1916 to 1958 –, and distinguished author of many works on
Brazilian diplomatic history, presents a more colourful picture of the
Brazilian decision to declare war against the Central Empires, more
specifically against Germany, which took place soon after the replacement of a
“Germanic” Foreign minister in the Brazilian chancery, known as Itamaraty:
When Lauro
Muller left [the Foreign Ministry], on May 3rd, 1917, he was replaced
by Nilo Peçanha, governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro state, who was assigned
to Itamaraty two days later. This appointment had no other significance than to
bring Brazil into war against Germany…
Together, in
this manner, with the war program that he brought, he ordered, a month after taking
office, the “fiscal possession” of the German ships docked in our ports; and
revoked, at the same time, our neutrality in the war in favour of the United
States of America. Shortly thereafter, he extended this measure to other Allied
countries. And, three months later, the state of war was proclaimed.
It was a drôle
de guerre, which remained, for us, little more than ink on paper. Because it
was declared at the final phase of the hostilities, only to pay lip service to a
League for the Allied, we barely had time to prepare our disjointed
Fleet, which crept through the seas towards the European naval theatre… [but]
didn’t arrived [on time]: it was caught by surprise, near the port of Dakar, by
the Spanish flu, that decimated a great share of our troops, delayed its march
– enough time for the fight to end with the allied forces’ victory, without
time to allow our participation in it. (Lyra, 1981, 1: 45)
Indeed, only in a few places the
pandemic was as deadly as among the Brazilian fleet sent to the coast of
Senegal. In Dakar, the cemetery still has the graves of the more than a hundred
Brazilian soldiers (over one-tenth of the entire crew) who succumbed to the flu
outbreak. The reports of that experience make a grim reading and describe one
of the most tragic episodes in the history of the Brazilian armed forces.
Nilo Peçanha remained only one year at the head of Itamaraty, being
replaced by a career diplomat, Domício da Gama, a former assistant to the great
Baron of Rio Branco (1902-1912, who served under four presidents), and a long
time ambassador in Washington (from 1911 to 1918, and the only ambassador that
belonged to the professional staff at that time), where he made many goods
friends, among them Robert Lansing, Wilson’s Secretary of State, the Undersecretary
Frank Polk, and even Wilson himself, through his friend, Colonel House, alter
ego of the American president (Lyra, 87). As both Great Britain and France –
or, perhaps, Lloyd George and Clemenceau – converged on the idea that the
presence of countries such as Brazil should be very limited, under the correct
assumption that our participation in the actual war effort was indeed limited,
Brazil’s role in Paris was only secured thanks to Domício’s friends in the
American government.
Brazil participated in the peace conference with an important delegation,
headed by a prestigious envoy, Mr. Epitácio Pessoa, who was not only to be selected
as presidential candidate shortly thereafter, but would even be elected while in
Paris, without campaigning at home. Other members of the Brazilian delegation
were João Pandiá Calógeras, deputy head, who was an eminent intellectual,
political figure, and future minister of the War (Army); Olyntho de Magalhães,
Brazilian minister in Paris; Raul Fernandes, a distinguished jurist; Rodrigo
Octavio de Menezes, a professor of International Law in Rio de Janeiro; two senior
military officials (Army and Navy) and some other diplomats. One of the first cables
from the Delegation to Rio de Janeiro, after Pessoa and other members arrived
in Paris (January 28), complained about the meagreness of their accommodations
in Paris, and the lack of automobiles, alluding to the more than 25 new cars at
the service of the American delegation (Pessoa, 1961: 15).
Key Brazilian interests at the
Versailles Peace Conference were the payment for Brazilian coffee stocks in European
ports, held by the Central Empires, and a financial or material compensation to
be offered against German ships seized two years earlier in Brazilian ports.
Brazil signed the Versailles treaty, and joined the League of Nations, but
choose to leave the organization five years later, when Germany was admitted as
a permanent member of the Executive Council, a position Brazil expected to be assigned
for itself. This is the general framework within which Brazilian participation
in the Paris peace negotiations must be analysed: besides building up political
prestige, the main objectives were of an economic nature: the first one
grounded on the real, and unique strength of the Brazilian economy, that is coffee,
the second one related to our main predicament, finances and foreign capital.
2. Impacts in
Brazil of the Great War
A little more than a century ago, Brazil was
coffee and coffee was Brazil (indeed since the middle of the 19th
century, and it so remained for the most part of the 20th). The main
source of state revenue were foreign trade tariffs, including a tax on coffee
exports, but starting with the Republican Constitution (1891) federal receipts
were based on import taxes, while states retained or could introduce tariffs on
exports (thus, the relative “riches” of São Paulo, the main coffee producer in
the federation, allowing it to pay for the “importation” of immigrants). For a
while, from 1870 to 1913, the booming rubber exports from the Amazonia region was
also an important provider of foreign exchange, until the Malaysian production,
developed by the British with the use of Hevea brasiliensis seeds from
Brazil, displaced Brazilian rubber in the most important markets. Brazil’s main
trade partners were, of course, European countries, first United Kingdom,
followed by Germany. But United States was, since the end of the Civil War, the
biggest importer of Brazilian coffee and of its rubber. Financing, both for the
central government and for direct investments and infrastructure works (mainly
railways), was assured by UK bankers and investors; Brazilian bonds used to
sell relatively well, and the London Rothschilds became exclusive
representatives of the Brazilian Treasury from the second half of the 19th
century up to the 1930s.
Ten years before the Great War, Brazil offered one
innovation to the English economic vocabulary, the concept of “valorisation”,
the outcome of an economic pact among most the important coffee producing
states – São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais –to retain huge amounts of
excess production, stocks that had to be financed by a foreign emission and a
supplementary tax on its exports. As the Rothschilds bankers refused to finance
such a distortionary device, and Brazilian planters had to resort to American
banks in New York to sustain the anti-competitive scheme. Brazil supplied,
then, almost 4/5 of the world’s supply of coffee, and that position allowed the
producers to use their market power to increase prices (Colombia, still
developing its coffee plantations, and thus unable to compete with Brazil in
volume, started to leverage the quality of its yields, a strategy that returned
higher prices, albeit only a few cents, for its produce in the New York exchange).
Later, Brazil was sued in New York tribunals for this kind of unfair manoeuvres.
This occurred about the same time when
financial markets suddenly closed for Brazil and other peripheral borrowers,
with the start of the Great War, in August 1914. They would not be open again until
1919, but a big funding loan had been concluded shortly before the debacle (amounting
to 13,7 million pounds). For almost a century, since its first loan agreed with
London bankers and businessmen, in 1824, Brazil had depended on foreign
financing to cope with its State expenditures, including interests of old
debts, and some investments in transportation and urban improvements. Most often,
those investments took the form of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), where a
company, usually established in London, would have a guaranteed yearly return
of 6%, almost the double of the normal rates practiced in central capitalist
countries. Brazil had previously contracted a huge funding loan in 1898 (8.6
million pounds), that is, a consolidation agreement exchanging various former
bonds for new debt titles, putting forward payment of principal, and interests
funded by the receipts of Rio customs. After a new one before the war, there
would be no more relief for Brazil in capital markets, which represented a
tremendous challenge for the Brazilian economy. Compounded with the closing of
some commodity markets in continental European countries, that would be one of
the most pressing problems for the economic authorities.
The outbreak of the Great War in August 1914,
and the naval battles that ensued, brought in a serious disturbance to bear
upon maritime communication lines, as Imperial Germany had built a war navy
almost as powerful as that of old Britain. During events, German U-boats sank almost 5,000 ships with nearly 13
million gross register tonnage. Later, the Royal Navy regained some form
of control over the Atlantic and North Sea waters, but commercial
transportation was seriously affected by the unforeseen performance of the
German U-boats. In addition to some coffee in the German North Sea ports, even
stocks in the Mediterranean, in Trieste, were blocked by the central empires,
in this case by Austro-Hungarian control of that city. Brazil lost an important
portion of its coffee sales abroad, even to the American markets, which also
experienced some cuts. After a century of domination of its foreign trade by
Great-Britain, Germany had become an important, and growing, market for
Brazilian products, adding in the new partnership some financing and a few
direct investments in industry and trade. Other European markets were also engulfed
in the continental conflict, adding to Brazil’s losses.
At the domestic political and cultural level, Brazilian
intellectuals and politicians engaged in a fierce and passionate debate about
which side the country should take in the conflict. Most people in the
Brazilian elite, for obvious raisons, expressed sympathy to the Allied cause,
especially towards Belgium and France, since Brazilian travellers enjoyed
disbursing their “mil-reis” (in principle a convertible currency) in Parisian
cabarets. Some others sided with Germany, though few expressed openly positive
feelings for that cause. In 1915, Ruy Barbosa, former Finance minister at the
beginning of the Republic, delegate to the Second Hague Peace Conference (in
1907), became the president of Brazilian League for the Allied. One year later,
in July 1916, in a famous speech as Brazilian envoy to the centennial
anniversary of Argentinian independence, Barbosa insisted that Brazil could not
remain neutral after the invasion of Belgium by German troops. He remains, up
to this day, one of the most important doctrinaires in Foreign Policy, and his
lessons, articles and speeches, together with those of the Baron of Rio Branco
(Foreign minister from 1902 to 1912), are an integral part of the Brazilian contribution
to International Law, a kind of Brazilian Weltanschauung in diplomacy
and foreign matters.
One of the victims in the dispute between “Germanophiles”
and “Francophiles” was the minister of Foreign Affairs himself, Lauro Muller,
of German descent, who had to renounce the post after Brazil declared cessation
of diplomatic relations with the German Empire, in April 1917. Most important,
the Germans helped to push Brazil towards the Franco-British alliance with
their torpedoes directed against Brazilian ships, both freight and passenger
carriers, when Brazil was still officially neutral. After a long overdue
decision, a state of war was declared, in October 1917, and a protracted and modest
supportive force was sent in two modalities: a small navy taskforce in charge
of patrolling South Atlantic waters (around Cape Verde) and a Brazilian medical
battalion sent to France, but arriving just at the end of field battles (yet
still providing much-needed relief for the gas and bombing victims, by means of
the Hôpital Brésilien, in Paris).
Overall, the Great War involved substantial
commercial and financial losses for Brazil, even if the participation in actual
war travails was almost ineffectual. The country’s involvement in the Paris
peace negotiations, in 1919, was enthusiastic. Brazil obtained modest
compensations for its coffee stocks retained in European ports, as well as in
relation to the German ships blockaded in Brazilian ports, which were, for some
part, delivered to France before the end of the conflict. The Europeans powers,
themselves, were actively engaged in squeezing Germany of all kinds of its assets,
and Brazil was not so important a belligerent to be given a place at the main
table.
But there were also indirect effects of the
Great War for Brazil and for many other countries. Consequences of the war were
not limited to the military or commercial domains; they were critical in the
economic field. Besides the brutal interruption of financial links, of the almost
free flows of goods, capital, payments and even people, the war
“administration” changed irrevocably economic policies, public finance,
monetary patterns, not to forget the nationalization of domestic and foreign
properties. Inflation and public debt gathered strength during the war, and were
never driven out of the terrain of the distorted public policies that followed.
Direct state intervention in the productive sector also started for good, in
almost every country engaged in the war, including in distant states such as
Brazil. The world would never be the same again, as new doctrines and economic
conceptions opened the door to “innovations” in political and social ideas,
notably fascism, communism, as well as other collectivist experiments. Brazil
was also contaminated by the corporatist appeal of the interwar period,
reflected in the Vargas dictatorship of the “Estado Novo” (1937-1945).
Material losses and overall costs of the war
were of course important, but the change in mentalities also generated new
perceptions, transferring those new ideas to the realm of governance. In Brazil,
protectionism, interventionism, dirigisme, picked up from a modest level
during the 19th century and the beginning of the Republic, and acquired
a new vigour. Nationalism was reinforced, preference for Brazilian products
followed the need to develop domestic industries, to supply manufactures no longer
coming from Europe. Military intervention in political affairs began or intensified
in the post-war period, starting in the early 1920s, and was to go on
recurrently up to the 1980s. If militarism receded afterwards, nationalism,
interventionism and protectionism never faded away since then. Internal market,
state guidance, corporatism became ingrained in Brazil, acquiring a legitimacy
that persists up to our days.
3. Brazil goes to the Paris peace conference: coffee and ships
Brazilian bilateral trade with Germany was
practically paralyzed in the first months of the war, due to the maritime
blockade exerted by the Allies, but Brazil maintained its neutral stance. It
was the “black lists” (Statutory List) imposed by Great Britain that inflicted
significant losses on the Brazilian trade relations with the continent, even
more so because of the British classification of coffee as a “superfluous” good
in the context of war restrictions. In 1915, Ruy Barbosa was inaugurated as the
first president of the Brazilian League for the Allies: they thought that a
Brazilian participation in the war would increase its exports of foodstuffs and
other primary products to them. Foreign minister Lauro Muller still insisted on
neutrality, but a German U-boat torpedo that sunk a Brazilian ship in April
1917 also provoked the dismissal of Muller and the Brazilian decision to enter
war against the Central Empires.
Brazilian military involvement in the war had
no major significance – a naval taskforce reached Gibraltar on the eve of the
Armistice, after plenty of troubles in the Atlantic trip –, but, together with
the Brazilian Hospital installed in Paris, it served to justify Brazilian demands to be an active
participant of the peace talks on the basis of president Wilson’s 14
points and Brazil’s clear support for his proposal of a League of Nations. American
support was decisive in the acceptation of a Brazilian delegation in the peace
talks, albeit limited to three delegates, compared to five, in the case of great
powers (United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan), not to mention the
more vexing disappointment represented by the distinction made by them between
“powers with general interests”, and the lesser powers, with only “limited
interests”.
At the beginning, the name of the great international
legal scholar Ruy Barbosa was mentioned as the suitable Brazilian head of
delegation for the Paris peace process, almost immediately after the armistice
of November 1918 was signed, as his many titles justified the choice: notable jurist,
counsellor during the Empire (even though he was a monarchist, himself, he supported
the Republic because of his “federalism”, as opposed to the unitarian structure
of the monarchical regime), the first Finance minister of the Republic, diplomatic
envoy in short term “embassies”, senator and three times presidential candidate.
Nevertheless, Barbosa refused to travel to Paris because he was in bad terms
with the Foreign minister Domício da Gama (who, by the way, also aspired to be
appointed by the president), but also because the appointed deputy head of the
delegation would be a colleague from the Senate and former Supreme Court judge,
Epitácio Pessoa, who had somewhat endorsed federal intervention in Barbosa’s
native state of Bahia, in the context of regional uprisings during the First
Republic.
The choice was then made by the President
Rodrigues Alves (inaugurated in November 1918, returning to office many years
after a previous presidency) in the person of that same jurist, Epitácio
Pessoa, who possessed as many titles as Barbosa: representative of his North-East
state of Paraíba at the first republican Constitutional Assembly (1890-91);
professor at the Law School of Recife (1891-98); Justice minister (1898-1901);
attorney general and Supreme Court judge (1902-12), author of a first Brazilian
Code of International Public Law, but also of controversial rulings on the occasion
of the Union’s intervention in Bahia (which aroused Barbosa’s ire against his
inaction); after that a long term senator (1912-19) and again in 1924-1930, at
the same time as he acted as judge at the International Permanent Court of
Justice in Hague; among many other achievements as Congressman, he was the rapporteur
of the 1916 Brazilian Civil Code.
Two ironies concerning these two distinguished Brazilian
personalities must be recorded here. First, Pessoa and delegates embarked, on January
the 2nd, 1919, on the new Brazilian Lloyd “acquisition”, the ship Curvelo,
formerly known as Bremen, a German freight ship seized, among some seventy
others, soon after April 1917, when Brazil, a few months before entering the
war, severed diplomatic relations with the German Empire. The question of the allocation
of German ships apprehended (not confiscated) by Brazil was to be one of the
central issues of the delegation in Paris, together with the payment for the
coffee held in European ports, both with frustrating practical results, even if
some formal acquiescence from the major powers was obtained.
Almost immediately a second surprise intervened:
in a January 26 layover in the port of Lisbon, they were informed of the
untimely death (January 17) of Brazilian president Rodrigues Alves, at the very
start of negotiations. A few weeks later, Pessoa was handpicked by the oligarchic
Republican leaders to be their presidential candidate, notwithstanding his
Parisian mission. For the opposition, Ruy Barbosa presented himself for the
fourth time: his historic “civilist” campaign in 1910 was deemed a “moral
victory”, but he lost to an Army Marshal in rigged elections. Not surprisingly,
Pessoa, without abandoning the conference, was elected on April 13 to be the
new Brazilian president for the remaining three years of that period, until November
1922. He was the sole Brazilian president to be elected without never campaigning,
and without even being in Brazil, a detail that made no difference at all, consistent
with the prevalent pattern of “fake” elections in Brazil’s political traditions
of the old patrimonial first Republic.
Already being in Paris for the opening of the
Conference, on January 18, Pandiá Calógeras, deputy head of the Brazilian
delegation, reacted almost immediately to the first article of the Regulations,
establishing a difference between the powers with “general interests” and those
with “particular interests”, to be admitted only in the sessions about which
they could effectively have direct interest. Arguing with his European
counterparts, Calógeras tried to demonstrate, how “illogic [it was to] proclaim
the principle of the League of Nations, based on the equality of all Nations
according to the Law, and to deny it in its application” (Diary of Calógeras,
in Simonsen, 1934: 66; apud Garcia, 2006: 53). Nevertheless, Foreign minister
Domício da Gama obstructed any opposition to this unequal treatment, seeking
not to enter a political skirmish against his American friends. In a cable to
Paris, he stated that the main responsibility was an attribute of the winners,
and that the main interests of Brazil in the conference could suffer in case of
an early challenge related to procedural questions (Gama to Magalhães, January
23; apud Garcia, 2006: 54).
In a second cable to Rio de Janeiro, after his
late arrival in Paris, Pessoa renders a record of his meeting (February 1st)
with Georges Clemenceau, the French chief delegate, who didn’t hide his
differences with the Americans in connection with the organization of the
League of Nations. He also gives his “general impressions” of the Peace
conference, where the presence of minor powers and declared “democratic
principles” served only to give a “liberal feature” to the whole exercise:
The general
impression here is that all will be decided exclusively by the Five Great
Powers according to their interests or individual viewpoints, as the presence
of small nations will only serve to confer a liberal appearance to the
conference. I am still excited by the hope of obtaining something out of the
agreement of France, whose dispositions Olyntho [de Magalhães, Brazilian
ambassador in Paris] and Calógeras see as hostiles. It would help if you cabled
to Lansing [the U.S. Secretary of State] to have Wilson read our briefs to
support our positions. (Cable n. 6, Pessoa to Foreign minister Domício da Gama)
At the first meeting of the Commission in charge
of drafting the project for the League, Pessoa witnessed an alternate draft being
presented to compete with the original Wilson proposal – that of an Executive
Council made up of delegates from major States and some other representatives
from the small states – by Cecil Rhodes, from Great Britain, who preferred just
five delegates from the Great Powers, and representatives of other countries
only if the issues being considered by the Council could have some direct interest
to them. That was too unbalanced, if not a mockery, from the view point of the
Brazilian delegates. Following the precedent of Ruy Barbosa at Hague II, Pessoa
defended the principle of equality of status for all States. The new project
was approved by middle February and presented in a plenary session by Wilson
himself: the future Council would be composed of five delegates from the Great
Powers, plus four temporary representatives of small states, to be elected by
the Assembly. Pessoa cabled immediately to the Foreign minister, suggesting a démarche
toward the American Ambassador in Rio, asking him to contact Lansing and Wilson
to obtain a place for Brazil in the forthcoming designation as one of four
nations with “intérêts particuliers” in the first Executive Council (Cable n.
61, Feb. 12).
Together with Brazil, effectively supported by
the Americans, the three other countries elected to the first Council were Spain,
Belgium and Greece (Article 4 of the Versailles Treaty). Among the most
pressing issues for Brazil, the coffee from São Paulo retained by the Central
Powers, and the German ships seized by Brazil in 1917, the first had only a minor
importance for European powers, while the second had a more complex treatment,
because of their value as assets to be counted in the reparations. As for many
other subjects of its central or secondary interests, the Brazilian delegation endeavoured
to obtain the support of the American delegation, to overcome the disdain or
resistance from France and Great Britain regarding its concrete objectives. A
kind of asymmetric alliance – in fact, a practical dependence – started to be
established between the United States and Brazil – following the years of an
“unwritten alliance”, said to be informally inaugurated during the Rio Branco
years (1902-1912) –, which would be reinforced at the inter-war period, and further
strengthened during and immediately after World War II, when a sort of
“Americanization of Brazil” endured for the first twenty years of the Cold War,
ending, paradoxically, in frustration during the right-wing military regime
(1964-1985).
The Brazilian Foreign minister, Domício da
Gama, expressed his satisfaction to Pessoa with this first “victory” by the
sole South American country involved in the war. He also sent a letter to
Secretary of State Robert Lansing to thank him for the American support for the
Brazilian objective, stressing the need for an “implicit understanding”,
between the two largest countries of the Hemisphere, which for the Brazilian
minister would be preferable to a formal agreement or alliance:
As you know,
an understanding is almost always better than an alliance or an association
under precise terms. It covers a larger domain, is comprehensive and flexible
(‘elastic’), and, more honourable in its absence of other obligations than
those of a moral nature, connected to esteem and reciprocal trust. I believe
that this is easy and natural, either for Brazil or the United States. I also
believe that Brazil has a satisfactory position in the world, which we owe in a
large part to the consideration of our friends towards our national and
international policies. (apud Garcia, 2006: 68)
The relationship between the two delegations
went beyond this kind of general political matter. The fact is that even though
most of its pressing interests were on the fringes of the peace conversations, the
Brazilian delegation had to, with the help of the American Big Brother, bring
home positive results for its general and specific political objectives: not
only to be diplomatically recognized as a respectable nation, desiring to be
involved in issues of war and peace among the Great Powers, but also to find a satisfactory
solution to the two single most important economic subjects penned in the
memorials in respect of which Pessoa wanted the attention of Lansing and even Wilson:
the payment for the Brazilian coffee quarantined in European ports, and German
ships kept in custody by Brazil for almost two years. In fact, beyond the
initial questions of procedure and diplomatic representation, the whole set of
Brazilian claims against Germany was much larger, as presented in a research
work of one of the best-known Brazilian historians specializing in this period
of Brazilian diplomatic history, Eugenio Garcia:
The Brazilian
government was planning to obtain the definitive regularization of its main contentions
arising from the state of war. For Domício da Gama, those questions should be
treated and resolved as early as possible, not depending on the resuming of
relations with Germany, ‘because our position would be less solid then’. Brazil
expected to collect from Germany indemnities related to: a) expenditures by the
Brazilian fleet in the Atlantic (Naval Division in War Operations) and other expenses
of the Navy, with a total amount of 3,686,000 pounds; b) ships apprehended or
sunk before the war declaration, causing some 462,000 pounds in costs to
Brazilian Lloyd; c) indemnities to parents of Brazilian sailors dead or wounded
serving in ships sunk before and after the breaking of diplomatic relations; d)
charges related to the preparation for war, including the reimbursement of 500,000
pounds paid in advance to Krupp; and e) various. The total amount that Brazil
was considering claiming [from Germany] would attain the impressive amount of
20 million pounds as indemnities. (Cable from Gama to Magalhães, December 28,
1918). The Brazilian delegation, however, had no opportunity to discuss in
detail all these claims, a complex and controversial issue that would be
transferred to the competence of the Reparation Commission, after the
conclusion of the conference. Coffee and ships would be, in fact, the main
questions which would retain the attention of the Brazilian delegates to the
Peace conference. (Garcia, 2006: 56)
A brief description of those two issues have to
be made, because they were at the centre of the concerns of the Brazilian
government. But, before entering the details of the negotiations by the
Delegation in Paris, a first remark must be advanced as regards the different
conceptual understanding of the issues. The Brazilian government in Rio de
Janeiro considered that a good deal could be made if Germany kept the sum of
the coffee stocks retained in Europe, and Brazil took possession of the ships. Epitácio
Pessoa, for his side, disagreed since the beginning with that conception. As a
jurist and professor of Law, his advice was that the two questions should be
dealt with separately, because they were, from both a legal and a factual
standpoint, independent in nature and not correlated in principle. The value of
the coffee retained should be paid in full, and with interests; the value of
the ships seized should be subject to a balancing of accounts, bearing in mind
the value of the two Brazilian merchant ships torpedoed by the Germans.
At the beginning of the war, the main producer
of coffee in Brazil, the state of São Paulo, possessed almost two million sacks
in stock in the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp and Trieste, which served as
a collateral for loans contracted earlier with four European banking houses: J.
Henri Schroeder, from London; S. Bleischroeder, from Berlin; and Société
Générale and Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas. Those stocks were seized, and
almost sequestered by the Central Empires, which led São Paulo to sell all of
them to the Berliner banking house Bleischroeder, for a total amount of 125
million gold marks; that value was later blocked by Germany, announcing that
the deposit would be immobilized until the end of the war. At the Paris
conference, Brazil tried hard to receive the entire amount, plus interests, at
the exchange rate in vigour at the moment of the sale contract. This was
crucial for Brazilian negotiators, as the Reich mark, with a parity of 700
Brazilian reis at that time, was valued less than 80 reis in 1919.
Unhappily for them, Brazil was not represented
at the Financial Commission, which was to debate the question of German
arrears. A first advice on the matter stated that the matter was of a private
nature, and thus, should be discussed between the state of São Paulo and the
house Bleischroeder. A second approach resulted in a still worse situation, as
the amount owed to Brazil should be incorporated to the war payments Germany
would be obliged to pay for the ensuing 30 years, in annual instalments divided
among the parties in the agreement, in proportion with their respective losses.
Pessoa insisted on a legalist argument: that the amount owed to Brazil was
related to legitimate assets existing before the war, without any connection to
losses thereafter incurred, never transferred to Germany by any decision
related to the conflict, and should not be included in values to be spread
among war belligerents; the case was to be treated as the restitution of a
deposit, not as damage reparation.
The situation was discussed again in the
Financial Commission, and after many other démarches and allers et
retours, with Brazilian delegates always in contact with American partners,
at that juncture the U.S. Treasure representative Norman Davis, a final
decision was inserted in an article of the Versailles treaty, but without an explicit
reference to gold marks, as follows:
ARTICLE 263
Germany gives
a guarantee to the Brazilian Government that all sums representing the sale of
coffee belonging to the State of Sao Paolo in the ports of Hamburg, Bremen,
Antwerp and Trieste, which were deposited with the Bank of Bleischroeder at
Berlin, shall be reimbursed together with interest at the rate or rates agreed
upon. Germany, having prevented the transfer of the sums in question to the
State of Sao Paolo at the proper time, guarantees also that the reimbursement
shall be realized at the rate of exchange of the day of the deposit.
In the following years, the question of the
exact rate of exchange and the transfer of the amount from Berlin to London was
kept in the bilateral agenda between Brazil and the new Republican government
of Germany, without an immediate solution, due as well to the fact that
payments to Brazil remained a lower priority, in face of all other commitments held
in favour of the direct targets of German aggression. In the end, Germany
finally paid to the state of São Paulo the 125 million gold marks, converted
into sterling pounds, at the exchange rate of the deposit date. (Pardellas,
2018: 344)
The question of the German ships was tackled in
another framework, also with some difficulties in relation to Brazilian
expectations and the crude realities of the bargaining procedures followed by
the main contestants in a tough competition for the German assets. The initial
move was the arrest of some 70 ships docked at various Brazilian ports in April
1917, as a measure of “police and security”, not of confiscation, as stated in
a message delivered to the Congress in May 26. Those ships represented a
considerable tallying to the Brazilian fleet at that moment:
Brazil
counted at that time with a merchant fleet of 169 ships of high seas, with a
total of 297,800 tons, of which 63 were owned by the Brazilian Lloyd, 23 belonged
to the Company of Trade and Navigation, twenty to the National Company of Coastal
Navigation, and the rest to small companies. German ships arrested represented
thus more than a quarter of Brazil’s merchant fleet. (1918 Report of the
Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry, p. 66-71; Navy Ministry, História naval
brasileira, 1985, v. 5, t. II, p. 246; apud Garcia, 2006: 57)
The following June, two presidential decrees
authorized the use of those ships, with the Brazilian flag. Responding to a
protest by the German government, represented at that moment by the Netherlands
legation in Rio, Brazilian authorities argued that those seized ships “could
serve as a reparation of injured interest”, if needed. After the declaration of
the state of war between the two countries, those ships could be declared
“battle prey”, as in the case of Portugal, recognized by the Conference as a
legitimate owner of a certain number of German ships apprehended; Brazil,
nevertheless, preferred to keep the former status, for “absolute respect for
private property”, and at the end of the hostilities could no more resort to
the same argument.
The first proposal by the Brazilian delegation
suggested a reasonable indemnity to the shipowners, as assessed at the moment
of the seizure, to be paid later, in a balance of respective accounts. The
Conference opposed such an outcome, and the Financial Commission decided in
favor of all German merchant vessels being distributed among the Allies, in
proportion of their maritime losses, excepted those submitted to Prizes courts
or used by the United States. This represented a big disappointment for the Brazilian
delegation, since their maritime losses had been negligible indeed. Pessoa complained
(April 25) against this decision; but all his efforts were in vain, as the
Council of the Four rejected his remonstration; this new “council” was created
only in late March, to try to speed up the complicated deliberations in plenary
or commissions. Two weeks later, a protocol presented by Wilson and Lloyd
George to deal with the apportioning of German ships among the nations – in
proportion of the verified losses of each one – was approved against the
opinion of France. A Reparations Commission would have full power to proceed with
the distribution, after collecting all information available about the
“existing enemy vessels, captured, seized or retained by any of the allies or
associated during the war”.
The French, who had earlier (December 1917)
leased some 30 of the German ships apprehended in Brazil, declared their
willingness to buy those ships, but, later, at the Conference, also offered to
renew the existing arrangement. The delegation tried to use this disposition as
a “proof” that France recognized some kind of Brazilian property over the
crafts. Pessoa was personally favourable in the selling of the ships to the
French, to use those proceeds to buy new vessels adapted to Brazilian ports. Though,
in a new surprising move, the French declared that they could not pay in cash
the full amount, inducing Pessoa, already in his quality as president-elect, to
look for another opportunity with a New York freight company. No solution
emerged from either side, and the French continued to protract any definitive
solution, sometimes dealing directly with Brazil, other times mentioning the
Reparations Commission, as a possible partaker in the affair; the leasing was
renewed twice, until 1921; after that, a bilateral commission decided for the
devolution of the remaining ships to Brazil, the less desired solution for this
country.
4. Brazil between Paris (1919) and Geneva (1926)
As president elect, Pessoa left Paris as soon
as he could. In fact, before returning to Brazil, at the end of July, and as a
consequence of his vigorous, but amiable, performance during the negotiations,
he received a number of invitations from the governments of Belgium, Italy, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, the United States, Canada,
Peru, Chile, and Argentina (Pardellas, 2018: 357). He could only accept the
visits to Belgium – King Albert would come to Brazil in 1920 –, Italy (and an
interview with the Pope in the Vatican), after a return to France (to receive
the Legion d’Honneur offered by president Poincaré), before going to meet
George V in England and, eventually, while in Europe, a brief layover in the
young Republic of Portugal. Crossing the Atlantic, and with Wilson still in
Paris, Pessoa was received by the vice-president Marshall in Washington, and
paid a two-day visit to Canada.
In his last, long, cable (n. 91, June 2nd)
to the Foreign Minister, before leaving Paris, Pessoa made a thorough summary
of his accomplishments in the framework of the peace negotiations (Pessoa,
1961: 48-51). Starting by declaring that, in the treaty proposed by Allies, and
“due to it being signed by the Germans,” Brazil’s “reclamations” were “duly
attended,” Pessoa signalled his personal efforts to have the question of coffee
retained in European ports inserted in a specific clause in the Treaty, stating
that the due amount would be paid at the exchange rate at the time of sale,
“with interests of 5%, counting from that date,” a detail not inscribed in the
Article 263 (actual wording in the official version of the Treaty only says:
“shall be reimbursed together with interest at the rate or rates agreed upon”).
As regards the question of the ships, Pessoa
recognizes that the issue was “much more complex,” due to the “significance of
the act stated by the Brazilian government at the moment of apprehension” (p.
49). He takes that opportunity of a final “report” to make a comparison between
Brazil and other affected parties in connection to the matter of the total
tonnage lost among maritime vessels, with an implicit understanding that the
German ships apprehended by Brazil would be incorporated into the Brazilian
fleet:
…. England lost about 8 million tons
and captured only 500 thousand; France lost 900 thousand and caught only 45
thousand; whereas Brazil lost 25 thousand and apprehended 232 thousand… United
States [losing only 389 thousand, ready to gain 628], later England joined the Brazilian
viewpoint, signing a Protocol with this understanding. France refuses to sign
it, albeit agreeing with an exception open to the United States. This is the
current state [of the situation]. A perspective that is favourable to Brazil,
either France eventually signing the Protocol, recognizing our property [over
the ships], or refusing to do it, and in this case the text of the Treaty will
prevail…. which contains this acceptance by Germany about the ships apprehended
by the Allies. …Our claims against Germany amount to 106 million gold marks.
Ships were calculated before the war at 75. … I presume thus that my presence
here is not indispensable… ask permission to return to Brazil. … I find it appropriate
to publish this cable, to bring knowledge to the country about the work of this
Delegation.… (Pessoa, 1961: 49-50)
The two last cables, sent from Lisbon, June 9
and 10, told about his visit to England, the refusal to pay similar visits to
Switzerland, Chile, Peru, or Cuba, and the decision put forward by the Foreign
minister of France, Pinchon, to create an embassy of France in Rio de Janeiro. The
same collection of “complete works” by Epitácio Pessoa (vol. XIV, p. 69)
includes another draft, with the same date as the “long cable” (June 2nd),
which provides another version of the same information, with the same detail of
the 5% interests to be paid by Germany not having been included in the final
wording of the Treaty.
The treaty, signed in Versailles on June 28,
carried the signatures of the three remaining Brazilian delegates: Mr. João
Pandiá Calógeras, the deputy head of mission – who would go on to be appointed
first and the sole civilian minister of the Army in the 20th
century, from October 1919 to the end of Pessoa’s term in office, in 1922 –;
Mr. Raul Fernandes, a jurist, Brazilian representative at the Reparations
Commission from 1919 to 1921, delegate to the League from 1920 to 1925, and
future minister, twice, of Foreign Affairs, but only after the Second World
War; and Mr. Rodrigo Octavio de Menezes, professor of International Law in Rio
de Janeiro, elected vice-president in the first Assembly of the League, in
1920. It was approved by the Brazilian Parliament in November, without any
major difficulty (Rocha, 2010: 248).
The League of Nations came into existence on
January 10, 1920, when Germany ratified the Versailles treaty, which included
the Pact. The Assembly was one of the main bodies of the League of Nations,
together with the Council, and a Secretariat, based in Geneva. The Council
should have five permanent members, but with the empty space created by the
U.S. Senate refusal to ratify the treaty, only four were present on January 16,
for its first meeting, to which Brazil, Greece, and Belgium sent
representatives (Duroselle, 1993: 58-9). The non-permanent members grew to six
in 1922 and to nine in 1926, the year when Brazil decided to leave the
organization, on the grounds of not being reappointed to its Council, vacating the
place to please Germany. The election of a Republican president (Warren
Harding) in November 1920 implied also the replacement of the Wilsonian
idealism by a new American isolationism: the non-approval of the Versailles
treaty by the Senate of United States – even with amendments, which would
compel new negotiations with the Allied nations – required the signing of
separate peace agreements between the U.S. and Germany, Austria, and Hungary,
but the geopolitical consequences of this terrible absence would be greater
than those of any other diplomatic arrangements.
As the United States retracted from international
commitments, Brazil came to lose the most important of its preferred “partners”
among the Great Powers, having already lost any trust in diplomatic
understandings with France and Great Britain. Despite having representatives
both in the Council and in the new International Court of Justice, Brazil’s
participation in the activities of the League was somewhat erratic, limited to
the Reparations Commission and to some other minor questions. Among the reasons
that could explain the low profile adopted by the Brazilian diplomacy
afterwards, one could point out the personality of the new Foreign minister
designated by President Epitácio Pessoa as president, an obscure professor of
Law in São Paulo, to replace Domício da Gama, the commander of Pessoa during
the Paris conference: José Manuel de Azevedo Marques, whose credentials to lead
Itamaraty, according to the memorialist Heitor Lyra, were only the facts of
being a man “rich and well-travelled.”
This historian of the “old” Itamaraty makes a
devastating portrait of the new minister – his boss –, who has “an incredible
ignorance of diplomacy, not to say a total ignorance of everything” (Lyra,
1981: 82). In a short, but shocking chapter of his memoirs, titled tersely “The
minister of Mr. Epitácio,” Lyra cannot explain why this obscure “provincial professor
of Law,” totally unknown in Brazil, was chosen to command the external policy
of Brazil:
Indeed,
Azevedo Marques was the embodiment of mediocrity.…
I think that
the mediocrity of Azevedo Marques as Foreign minister went beyond Epitácio’s
expectations, who became remorseful for having appointed him to the Government.
That was the impression he gave to me in a meeting… in the summer of 1921, when
he deplored the disorder existing in Itamaraty, and confessed that in fact he
had no ‘Foreign minister’.…
In Itamaraty
we had to depend upon the lack of authority and passivity of the minister of
State, as well as his shortage of capacity for the task. (…)
He had a
confused and a clumsy spirit. (Lyra, p. 103-5)
The same opinion was held by foreign envoys in
Rio de Janeiro. As recorded in the history of this period by Eugenio Garcia,
the British ambassador, John Tilley, reported to the Foreign Office, in April
1921, that the “incompetence of the minister of Foreign Relations” was so
evident to the point of being a “public scandal,” pointing out that his
attitude was not unusual among his pairs: “To do justice to His Excellency, I
can add that, to my knowledge, he is not worse than the minister of Finance and
probably others among his colleagues” (Garcia, 2006: 98). As an overall
evaluation, this historian considers that the priorities of Brazil at that
juncture stood in strengthening the approximation with the United States and
pursuing the politics of prestige in Europe, where Brazil believed in the
general acknowledgment of its status as a distinct Latin American member of the
first league of the world powers.
At the first meetings of the League of Nations,
Brazil was the sole representative of the American Hemisphere in the new
organization, a position without precedent in its diplomatic history,
especially among other Latin American nations. One of the consequences was the
establishment of diplomatic relations with almost all the States that emerged
in the follow-up to the peace treaties in Europe and elsewhere. In May 1920,
Brazil recognized the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland,
followed in August by that of Iceland and Austria, and in November by that of Armenia.
In March 1921, legations in Warsaw and Prague were inaugurated, and in December
of that year Brazil recognized the sovereignty of the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (it is
worthy of note that Brazil never recognized the suppression of the sovereignty
of those States by the Soviet
Union in 1940). In parallel decisions, the governments of Great Britain, Italy,
and later France, all in 1919, decided to upgrade the status of the legations
in Rio de Janeiro to the level of embassies, a move immediately followed by
Brazil in reciprocity. A remarkable indication of the new acquired prestige was
the visit to Brazil, in 1920, of the “hero-king” of Belgium, Albert I and his
wife Elisabeth, responding to the invitation made personally by Epitácio Pessoa
one year earlier.
Brazil believed to have an “implicit mandate”
from other Latin American states to represent them in the League, especially in
the absence of the United States. At the first formal meeting of the Council, on
January 16, 1920, the Brazilian representative, the ambassador in Paris, Gastão
da Cunha, declared that his country was sitting as the “spokesman of the
Pan-American consciousness” (Cable from Paris, January 17; apud Garcia, 2006:
350). The Brazilian representative in the discussion of the Statute for the
Permanent International Court of Justice, Raul Fernandes, gave a valuable
contribution to its Article 36, introducing the “facultative clause” for the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in cases of juridical litigation among
member States. Later, in 1923, Epitácio Pessoa was elected a judge of the
Court, succeeding to Ruy Barbosa, who had been the first Brazilian member,
elected in 1921.
The hypothesis of a “continental
representation” of the American Hemisphere by Brazil would be put to a severe
test in the following years, as the different positions of European countries
and the nations in other continents started to become more visible, in terms of
representation, permanent membership, or other issues. Of particular interest
for Brazil was the choice of a method for the selection of new non-permanent
members, in the context of a competition among small powers for this temporary
membership and the increase in the number of seats, from four to six. The great
powers only accepted this resolution with the expectation that the number of
permanent members would also be increased; in 1922, Brazil was re-elected to
the Council, but the thesis of roulement gained support among many other
states, including from Latin America.
To circumvent a possible “ejection,” Brazil
started a campaign for a permanent seat in the Council, a quest that was to
dominate the foreign policy of the next government. The successor of Epitácio
Pessoa in the presidency, Arthur Bernardes, obsessed with the idea of prestige
for Brazil, set as a goal for himself this status upgrade for the country in
the international arena, irrespective of its many fragilities, both in terms of
domestic problems and a low ability of external exposure, not to mention the likely
opposition of the Latin American neighbours. The candidacy was presented first
in a confidential letter of September 1923 to certain members, defending the
accession of Spain (already in consideration) and of Brazil, as the best
qualified member of the Latin American family; the idea was that the two
countries should occupy places reserved for the United States and Germany. The
idea received only indifference from two great powers, Great Britain and the
United States, approached by Brazil, but excusing themselves due to not being a
member of the League.
Notwithstanding the establishment of a full Brazilian
delegation in Geneva – with a future foreign minister, Afranio de Melo Franco,
designated as ambassador there –, the cause of a permanent seat for Brazil
remained a very difficult one; even though, a new mandate was accepted for
Brazil as a non-permanent member. Raul Fernandes was sent by the president in a
tour to various European capitals, trying to convince those countries – France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain – of the legitimacy of the
Brazilian request. Brazil was even willing to accept an interim seat, as a
temporary substitute for the United States, in the expectation that this
country would eventually join the League.
In the meantime, Germany expressed, in
September 1924, its interest in joining the organization, an intention
officially confirmed by a letter in February 1926, while many Latin American
countries appeared to be “conspiring” against Brazil in Geneva or elsewhere, a
move evident in thesis of the “alternation,” or roulement, defended by
many of them. Adding to the bitterness, a resolution submitted by a Latin
American group, and approved by all in 1925, declared that a new vote should be
required in 1926 for the temporary seats: that move practically implied in the
“expulsion” of Brazil by its Latin American “colleagues.” New candidacies for a
permanent seat in the Council, other than those of Spain and Brazil, were put
forward by Poland, Belgium and China. From all sides, the Brazilian
pretentiousness was being sabotaged in an atmosphere of great confusion and
cynicism.
It was in an ambiance of acrimony and with an
inappropriate policy formulation, enshrined in a slogan directing the Brazilian
diplomacy “to win or, at least, to not be defeated,” that the Brazilian
president gave instructions to the delegation in Geneva to support, in the
meeting of March 1926, the twin candidacy of Germany and Brazil to two permanent
seats in the Council, or to use, otherwise, its veto right, blocking the choice
of Germany to that position. President Bernardes, against the advice of the
Brazilian delegate in Geneva, elevated his stubbornness to a triple point of
national dignity, a matter of honour and self-esteem, and refused to retreat
from his intransigence, thus condemning Brazil and its diplomacy to a condition
of universal isolation, with additional negative repercussions for the
financial sector of its economy.
The first semester of 1926 was characterized by
many indecisions, vacillations and doubts, within the professional diplomacy of
Brazil, concerning the proper attitude to be taken by Brazil in the League and
in its relationship with Latin American countries, as well as with major and mid-level
European powers. The Brazilian delegate in Geneva, Melo Franco, tried, without
success, to favor a rational behaviour in connection with the next meeting of
the League, which would be in September. However, without even alerting Melo
Franco, the president and his foreign minister decided to sustain their erratic
policy of impulsiveness towards the League, even to the point of short-circuiting
procedure and announcing directly to the Secretary of the League their decision
to leave the Geneva organization in June 1926.
That was the end of a diplomatic adventure that
had started so well in 1919, with a very good understanding with the United
States, France, and Great Britain, and that ended with a pathetic gesture of withdrawal
by Brazil from its first great exercise in the realm of multilateral diplomacy.
For the first time in its centenary trajectory as an independent nation, Brazil
was alone, not only in America, but also in Europe, and perhaps in the world. This
“international parenthesis”, opened with the Brazilian decision to enter the
Great War in 1917, was closed almost a decade later with this melancholic break
and a new immersion into asymmetric Pan-Americanism, until a new world order started
to be built after Bretton Woods, under the multilateral guidance of the United
States. Woodrow Wilson would approve of that…
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Relações Exteriores. Guerra da Europa: documentos diplomáticos, atitude do
Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1918.
Lyra, Heitor. Minha vida
diplomática. Brasília: UnB, 1981, 2 vols.
Pessoa, Epitácio. Pela
Verdade. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves, 1925.
_____ . Obras completas,
vol. XIV: Conferência da Paz; diplomacia e direito internacional. Rio de
Janeiro: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1961
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Livro, 1956.
U.S. Library of Congress, Treaty of
Versailles; text in English; available at: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf ; access in June 4, 2019.
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