Can Ukraine Win? — A Balanced Assessment - devrowe-hill (Threads)

 From: devrowe-hill (July 22, 2026)

🇺🇦🇷🇺 Can Ukraine Win? — A Balanced Assessment 

🎯 First: What Does "Win" Even Mean?

The most important thing to understand: "unconditional surrender" — like Germany/Japan in 1945 — is realistically not on the table. No serious analyst considers that a plausible outcome. Russia is a nuclear-armed state with 144 million people; its army hasn't been broken, its society hasn't collapsed, and it has vast depth to absorb losses.

Instead, experts define Ukrainian victory in three realistic tiers:

✅ Tier 1: Strategic Victory (Most Plausible)

• Russia fails to achieve its original goals — it cannot erase Ukraine as a sovereign state, cannot force regime change in Kyiv, and cannot stop Ukraine from moving toward Europe/NATO.

• Ukraine survives as a free, independent, defensible nation.

• Russia emerges strategically weaker — its military degraded, economy stagnant, international standing diminished.

• As one analyst put it: "Russia invaded to eliminate Ukraine — against that aim, a free, armed, prosperous Ukraine is already a Russian defeat."

✅ Tier 2: Full Territorial Restoration (Possible but Hard)

• Ukraine regains all internationally recognized territory, including Crimea and Donbas.

• Requires: sustained Western support at higher levels, deep degradation of Russian supply lines and logistics, Crimea cut off and untenable, and mounting internal/economic pressure on Russia.🇷🇺

• This is possible but would take years and depends heavily on Western aid not wavering.

✅ Tier 3: Unconditional Surrender (Extremely Unlikely)

• For Russia to capitulate  would require: total military collapse, loss of will to fight, leadership decapitation or sudden internal regime change, and the complete inability to continue war.

• Even if Russia lost every battle and retreated, it would still have massive depth, nuclear weapons, and the ability to keep fighting.

There is no plausible path to "unconditional surrender" — and anyone suggesting it misunderstands the scale of this conflict.

Disclaimer: This reflects my analysis based on publicly available expert data as of July 2026. There is no certainty in war — any view is probabilistic, not a prediction of fact.

#UkraineRussiaWar

#WarAnalysis

#Geopolitics

#ConflictUpdate

#FactualPerspective

Notas para uma entrevista a um canal da mídia brasileira - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

  

Notas para uma entrevista a um canal da mídia brasileira

 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Temas: Eduardo Bolsonaro, prisão Netanyahu, Tarifaço contra Brasil, Guerra Irã

  

Em 21 de julho fui chamado para falar sobre alguns temas atuais da agenda externa do Brasil. Independentemente da entrevista ser veiculada ou não, transcrevo aqui algumas notas preparadas rapidamente para essa ocasião.

:

Green card de Eduardo Bolsonaro:

            Condenado no Brasil a 4 anos por coação no processo judicial contra o pai, pode ser objeto de pedido de extradição, que provavelmente não será atendido no governo Trump, mas isso pode mudar a partir de 2029, sob um outro presidente. Mas, o Bananinha está “preso” nos EUA, isto é, não pode sair, sequer viajar para o Caribe, nos próximos anos, pois o pedido de Green Card, que é uma permissão de residência, não implica em naturalização americana, exige que o demandante não saia dos EUA durante 10 anos de estada contínua. Você quer desgraça maior do que ter de viver no país de Trump por anos a fio?

 

Trump nega prisão de Netanyahu

            O prefeito de NY, Zhoran Mamdani, disse que se Netanyahu aparecer em NY para a AGNU, em setembro, poderá ser preso e extraditado para Haia. O prefeito não tem esse poder, mesmo se algum juiz da cidade requeira tal prisão: os EUA não fazem parte do Estatuto de Roma que regula as regras do Tribunal Penal Internacional sobre violações graves dos direitos humanos. A ameaça é puramente retórica, e de natureza política. Netanyahu merece, sim, se preso, pelos crimes de guerra cometidos na Faixa de Gaza e no sul do Líbano, mas isso não vai ocorrer, a menos que ele sobrevoe algum país que resolva atuar em conformidade com o espírito desse tratado internacional, o que parece improvável. O mais provável é que ele seja preso pela própria justiça israelense por crimes políticos no país.

 

Tarifaço do governo Trump contra o Brasil

            A medida entra em vigor neste dia 22 de julho, e vai provocar perdas relevantes em setores dos mais avançados tecnologicamente do Brasil, mas também em alimentos e manufaturas leves, como máquinas, calçados, produtos do mar. Não houve negociações, a despeito de muitos contatos e conversas mantidos em níveis presidencial, ministerial e técnico. De forma geral, os diversos tarifaços trumpistas não possuem objetivos comerciais muito claros, sendo bem mais uma imposição política, unilateral e muitas vezes ilegal, de um governo que já destruiu o sistema multilateral de comércio como uma das bases de seu relacionamento com países soberanos com os quais os EUA sempre mantiveram intensas relações comerciais. Ou seja, o Brasil não é o único país a sofrer tal tipo de agressão econômica, mas o caráter da ofensiva contra o Brasil possui também um componente político bastante explícito, seja em termos eleitorais, seja no que toca à atitude do presidente Lula com respeito à pessoa de Trump.

O que o governo Trump quer do Brasil são tarifas zeradas em setores americanos de bens industriais, químico, aeroespacial e automotivo, ademais do etanol, ausência de regulação em plataformas digitais, assim como o próprio PIX, o que é "indigno" e "inaceitável". O impacto de atender os desejos americanos pode ser maior do que o causado pelas novas taxas a serem aplicadas. Cabe lembrar, contudo, que o Brasil não possui tarifas brasileiras sobre esses diversos produtos, pois o que vigora é a Tarifa Externa Comum do Mercosul. No caso da União Europeia, ela negociou conjuntamente, por meio da Comissão de Bruxelas, algumas tarifas mais moderadas do que as ameaçadas por Trump; o Reino Unido também aceitou comprar etanol americano e reduzir tarifas de outros produtos dos EUA, na ausência de um acordo de livre comércio, o que tampouco seria impedimento para Trump, haja visto o que fez com o Nafta, desde o primeiro mandato, e com o próprio acordo tripartite com México e Canadá agora no segundo mandato.

 

⁠Guerra entre os EUA e o Irã

Não declarada, ou seja, Trump não possui autorização do Congresso para efetuar essa guerra, mas ele alega perigo iminente para os EUA. Na verdade, trata-se de uma violação da legislação sobre atos de guerra, uma das muitas, dezenas de violações da legislação americana que Trump já cometeu, até aqui impunemente.

Não há perspectiva de terminar pela via diplomática, e os EUA estão saindo do enfrentamento completamente humilhados pelos iranianos, sem atingir qualquer um dos objetivos declarados por Trump, e com perdas materiais, de vidas, soldados mortos e bases atingidas, e diplomáticas, pela perda de credibilidade no Oriente Médio: aliados não vão mais confiar nos EUA, e podem adotar uma atitude completamente neutra, se não oposta, aos interesses dos EUA na região.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 5405, 21 julho 2026, 2 p.

Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (22/07/2026; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2026/07/notas-para-uma-entrevista-um-canal-da.html).

 

 

Contra o conceito de Dark Ages para designar o período medieval - jan1513musix (Threads)

Contra o conceito de Dark Ages para designar o período medieval. Uma série no Threads da parte de um connoisseur:

From: jan1513musix (?!?)

The phrase is repeated so often it has hardened into certainty. The Dark Ages, we are told, began when the Roman Empire collapsed and Christianity smothered the light of classical civilization. Science vanished. Learning died. Europe stumbled blindly through a thousand years of superstition until the Renaissance finally rescued reason from the grip of priests.

It is a tidy story. It is also wrong.

When the Western Roman Empire collapsed in the fifth century, the disaster was not theological—it was civilizational. Cities emptied. Trade routes collapsed. Roads crumbled. Literacy declined. Political authority fractured into a patchwork of Germanic kingdoms that possessed neither the administrative machinery nor the cultural inheritance of Rome.

The darkness that followed did not descend because monks burned books. It descended because the world that produced those books had collapsed.

And yet, in the wreckage of that fallen order, something remarkable happened. In lonely valleys and along forested hillsides, small communities of Christian monks began doing something that no conquering army, no new king, and no collapsing city seemed interested in doing: they preserved the memory of the ancient world.

Inside monastic scriptoria, by candlelight and patient discipline, monks copied manuscripts—line by line, page by page. They copied the Scriptures, of course.

But they also copied Virgil, Cicero, Ovid, Livy, and countless other works of classical antiquity. Without those quiet labors, much of what we know about Greece and Rome might simply have vanished.

The men doing this work were not secular humanists ahead of their time. They were Christians. They believed that truth, wherever it appeared, ultimately belonged to God. Preserving learning was not rebellion against faith. It was an act of devotion.

Monasteries became islands of stability in a turbulent world. They cultivated fields, organized communities, and preserved literacy at a moment when most of Europe had forgotten how to read. Their libraries became reservoirs of memory while kingdoms rose and fell around them.

Over time those small islands of learning began to connect. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries a new intellectual revival was underway. Cathedral schools evolved into institutions dedicated entirely to scholarship.

These institutions would soon receive a new name—universities.

The University of Bologna, Paris, and Oxford did not emerge in defiance of the Church. They were born inside it. Theology stood beside law, medicine, and philosophy as part of a unified search for truth. Scholars argued fiercely over Aristotle, debated logic, experimented with natural philosophy, and tried to reconcile reason with revelation.

The medieval world was not anti-intellectual. It was intensely intellectual.

Figures like Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and Roger Bacon wrestled with the newly rediscovered works of Aristotle and the expanding body of knowledge flowing from the Islamic world. They did not treat faith and reason as enemies. They believed both ultimately pointed toward the same reality.

Even the foundations of what would later become modern science were quietly forming during these centuries.

Medieval thinkers developed the idea that nature operated according to rational laws because it had been created by a rational God. If the universe was ordered rather than chaotic, then studying it was not impiety—it was a form of worship.

The irony is striking. The very civilization accused of plunging Europe into darkness built the intellectual institutions that would eventually illuminate it.

None of this means the medieval world was idyllic. It was violent, unequal, and often brutal.

Wars were frequent. Plagues were devastating. Superstition and ignorance certainly existed. But these were not the unique failings of Christianity. They were the universal conditions of premodern life.

What Christianity provided was something different: continuity.

While political power fractured and empires dissolved, the Church preserved a transnational network of literacy, scholarship, and moral authority that stretched across Europe. Monasteries safeguarded texts. Universities trained scholars. Cathedrals became centers of art, architecture, and education.

The world that later produced the Renaissance did not emerge from a thousand years of darkness. It emerged from a civilization that had spent centuries preserving the light.

History rarely fits into the neat morality plays modern culture prefers. The medieval centuries were neither a golden age nor a pit of ignorance.

They were something far more interesting: a long and difficult bridge between the ancient world and the modern one. And if we insist on calling them “dark,” we should remember who it was that kept the lamps burning.

End

How Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Are Reshaping Russia’s Strategic Choices - Lesia Bidochko, and Andreas Umland (The National Interest)

How Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Are Reshaping Russia’s Strategic Choices

The National Interest, July 21, 2026

By:  Lesia Bidochko, and Andreas Umland Umlan

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Russia has three possible options to respond to Ukraine’s strategically successful mid- and long-range strikes into its territory.

Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has rapidly expanded a long-range strike campaign, with droneshitting targets ever deeper within Russia’s hinterland and with more impact on the Russian industry as well as the military. Kyiv’s new strategy is changing the character of the Ukraine War: Rather than seeking stabilization or breakthrough at the front, Kyiv aims to degrade the economic, logistical, and social systems that sustain the Russian troops deployed against Ukraine.

Ukrainian deep strikes with drones and cruise missiles into Russia’s rear are disrupting, damaging, or destroying more and more military-industrial, transportation, and energy infrastructure. According to Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, the number of strikes inflicted on Russia’s operational and strategic depth has grown by 1,150 percent since the beginning of 2026. Ukraine’s front strikes now reach up to 150 kilometers (93 miles), middle strikes approximately to 300 kilometers (186 miles), and deep strikes up to 2,000 kilometers (1243 miles).

This is driving Russia into a broader socio-economic crisis. Moscow has had to restrict access to gasoline and diesel in 60 of 83 Russian regions amid rising fuel prices. Especially in annexed Crimea, the supply of fuel, water, electricity, and food has become a major problem, and economic life has largely halted. In several Russian regions, the state-backed messenger “Maks” is blocking public chats where drivers exchange information about the gasoline supply and queues at gas stations.

Ukraine’s Mid-Strike Attacks on Russia’s Frontline Troops

Yet, the increasing deep strikes into Russia’s far-away hinterland are not Moscow’s only problem. More and more so-called “mid-strikes” on areas behind frontline troops complicate the Russian army’s supply even when sufficient fuel and other supplies are available. Ukraine is attempting to disrupt the functioning of Russia’s logistics networks by connecting still-operational fuel plants and storage facilities to Russian fighting troops with its growing mid-range UAV fleet. To do that, Ukraine has developed and is now deploying a new generation of FPV drones optimized for near- and mid-range logistics strikes.

In June 2026, Russia’s Ministry of Defense proudly reported that it had intercepted 8,849 Ukrainian drones in May 2026. That would seem to indicate a large success when compared to 3,676 interceptions in January 2026 and 2,504 in May of the previous year. There are reasons to doubt the accuracy of the Russian government’s data, which may overstate interception rates. Whether that is the case or not, the growing Russian figures also indicate that the pace of Ukrainian attacks has been rising. The drones deployed by Ukraine are more and more saturating the Russian air defense and obviously grow faster than the capabilities of Russia’s air defense.

Russia’s Insufficient Drone Interception

That is even more so the case as an entirely new type of weapon, anti-drone drones, at the front are highlighting the continued fundamental Russian equipment inadequacies. For instance, the most widely used Russian anti-aircraft system, the Pantsir-S1, is designed to engage large, radar-reflective targets such as cruise missiles. Yet, it largely fails against low-signature drones made of plastic and plywood.

Unlike Ukraine, Russian industry has only recently begun developing the capability to mass-produce interceptor drones. Its new Yolka and Lys-2 anti-drone UAVs exist only as prototypes so far. Russia lacks the integrated radar-and-software ecosystem that lets Ukrainian interceptor operators act on real-time targeting data across an assigned sector.

Defending thousands of kilometers of critical infrastructure requires vastly more resources than attacking selected high-value targets. Every improvement in Ukrainian strike capability therefore expands Russia’s defensive burden disproportionately. As a result, Russia reaching Ukraine’s current level of air-defense effectiveness is assessed by military-industrial experts as currently unachievable. Contrary to Russian propaganda narratives, the interception rates against Ukrainian deep- and mid-strike drones will remain low—at least, for the foreseeable future.

None of these pressures mechanically determines Russian behavior. Authoritarian regimes can, in general, absorb economic losses that would be politically unacceptable in democracies. The question is less about whether pressure exists than about how the Kremlin chooses to respond. Three obvious strategic pathways can be distinguished, yet they do not exclude one another; rather, they appear in combination.

Scenario One: Russia Adapts to Ukrainian Attacks

Either implicitly or explicitly, many commentators on Russia’s currently growing economic, social and logistical problems assume that they are temporary, moderate and/or secondary. From such a viewpoint, even if these issues may, at the moment, look grave, the Russian state will be able to adapt and preserve its political stability, integrity and course. The Kremlin will successfully neutralize social discontent through repression, compensation, or—most likely—a combination of both.

Temporary rationing of fuel, electricity, food, and water—as is already partly happening on Russia’s occupied Ukrainian territories—can be introduced temporarily and framed as patriotic sacrifice. Moscow will, according to this scenario, eventually find ways to largely restore the supply, transportation, and distribution lines via importing, for instance, gasoline from Central Asia. 

In such a scenario, the Russian state would view the current crisis as partial and transitory or bearable from the standpoint of Russian society. The reduction in quality of life will be insufficient to prompt major protests, constraints on foreign adventurism, or political change. Even if ordinary Russians’ standard of living sinks, a new equilibrium can be reached and sustained.

Scenario Two: Russia Moderates Its Objectives in Ukraine

The moderation scenario assumes that Moscow’s current social challenges, resulting from ongoing deep Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure and parallel economic challenges such as low oil prices, are steep and will continue to worsen. A cascade of effects from further air-defense fragmentation, refinery damage, supply deficits, logistical bottlenecks, and related disruptions leads to a fundamental structural shift in Russia’s societal mood and political outlook. Recognizing this, the Russian leadership—either with or without President Vladimir Putin—temporarily moderates its maximalist war aims and negotiating position.

At the very least, the diplomatic theater around peace talks may give way to a more serious process of consultations driven by Moscow’s genuine interest in pausing the fighting. To be sure, social hardship alone will not compel an accommodative course of action, as long as the leadership can absorb political costs and deprioritize civilian welfare.

Yet, under increasing societal pressure, the Kremlin will, in this scenario, seek an at least temporary de-escalation of the conflict and a shift to low-intensity fighting. Moderation would mean, in such a turn of events, not a Russian ideological reorientation but a mere military and economic re-calculation. Serious search for compromise and interest in a ceasefire will occur only when Moscow concludes that the war is, at the moment, unwinnable—a threshold not yet visibly reached.

Scenario Three: Russia Escalates Attacks on Ukraine and the West

As in the second scenario, the third ideal-typical script considered here also assumes that mounting military and economic pressure will prompt the Kremlin to change course radically; Moscow may escalate rather than moderate. Russian escalation can have both political-psychological and military-material purposes, and be designed to scare or/and bomb Ukraine and its Western partners into capitulation or, at least, an acceptance of Russian terms for a ceasefire—a strategic approach sometimes labeled “escalate to deescalate. 

Among others, escalation could aim to restore Russia’s initiative on the battlefield, decapitate the leadership of the Ukrainian state, disrupt Ukraine’s long-range drone development and production, or dismantle supply logistics of Ukrainian frontline troops. Arguably, this scenario has already started to materialize with the heavy drone attacks and missile bombardment of Kyiv on the nights of July 1–2 as well as 5–6.

While being the obviously preferred course of action by the Kremlin in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russian infrastructure, Moscow’s options for and benefits from escalation are today more constrained than they were when the full-scale invasion started in 2022. Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself and its support from abroad have significantly increased compared to four years ago. The strategic rationale for escalation is becoming weaker with every additional successful Ukrainian hit of Russia’s infrastructure.

Moscow would benefit from an interruption of the war and a halt of Ukrainian deep strikes. In addition, it would benefit greatly from sanctions relief. A continuing tit for tat will only deepen Russia’s already significant economic dislocations. Intensified strikes on Ukrainian rear areas, including Kyiv, will hardly resolve Russia’s core problems. Moscow cannot easily break the Ukrainian innovation cycle, which continues to outpace the Russian one, which is mostly adaptive and belated.

Still, as long as Moscow is not driven solely by rational motives, it has several escalation options. Internally, this can mean the start of large-scale conscription and broadening of repression against dissent in Russia. Apart from already increasing terror against Ukrainian civilians, the Kremlin may try to force Belarus’ involvement in the war as an active co-belligerent. Even a credible threat from the north may force Ukraine to divert air defenses and ground forces from the front line. Moscow may also try to further expand its hybrid measures, such as cyberattacks, sabotage activity in Europe, and nuclear signaling to the West to deter it from supporting Ukraine.

Russia and the War of Attrition

Instead of focusing on immediate territorial defense and gains, Kyiv is increasingly targeting the material and social structures in Russia’s rear that enable its warfare in Ukraine and hybrid actions elsewhere. This shift has created a strategic environment in which defense rather than offense dominates. To be sure, Russia can still gather troops at the front and mobilize industrial resources.

Yet every additional layer of protection it has to establish in reaction to Ukraine’s rapidly growing deep and mid-strike capabilities requires spreading limited air-defense assets further across its vast territory. Defending critical infrastructure along thousands of kilometers is harder than attacking select weak points of Ukraine. The cost of Russian defense is increasing more rapidly than the cost of offense.

The Ukrainian successes in striking Russia’s energy infrastructure and military-industrial complex will not produce a Russian military collapse. In principle, authoritarian regimes such as Russia can withstand, ignore, or neutralize discontent emerging from civilian hardship while preserving military capacity. The decisive variable is thus not the economic pain inflicted itself. The key question is whether Ukrainian strikes with new long-range weapons can progressively reduce Russia’s ability to sustain and generate combat power faster than Moscow can adapt to the innovation cycle.

For Europe, the challenge is greater than simply helping Ukraine somehow prevail. It is to recognize that the future character of warfare and structure of European security are being written in Ukraine today. Against this background, the European Union has to ensure that the institutions and policies tasked to preserve the sovereignty of its member states and of the European project as a whole evolve as rapidly as the changes on the Ukrainian battlefield demand.

About the Authors: Andreas Umland and Lesia Bidochko

Dr. Andreas Umland is a policy fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and an associate professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. He has previously worked at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, Harvard’s Weatherhead Center, St. Antony’s College Oxford, Urals State University in Yekaterinburg, National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (ІЄАС) and Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIM) in Kyiv, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, and Institute of International Relations (UMV) in Prague.

Dr. Lesia Bidochko is a policy fellow at EPIK, an assistant professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and a non-resident fellow at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). Her professional experience includes serving as deputy head of the Detector Media Research Center, where she specialized in Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), information campaigns, social media monitoring, and strategic communications to disrupt propaganda networks.

EPIK is co-funded by the European Union and theSwedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

A Geopolítica sendo empurrada a frio nas costas da Rússia por Beijing - Jean Dekkers, Hana Gauer

 Nota inicial PRA: dificuldades para identificar o exato autor do longo texto abaixo, recuperado numa das inúmeras listas sobre a Ucrânia que sigo em diversos paises, sobretudo França e Estados Unidos.

==========

Quand la Moscovie appelle discrètement l’Europe à l’aide pour ne pas sombrer entièrement sous l’emprise de la Chine

Jean Dekkers:

Quatre scénarios pour la suite du règne de Poutine :

1. La Russie conserve son autonomie économique et devient une sorte d'Iran du Nord, mais figé dans le passé.

2. Elle perd son autonomie économique et devient un satellite de Pékin.

3. Le régime commet une erreur fatale qui déclenche une révolution.

4. Après la mort de Poutine, la situation de 1953 se reproduit et, comme après Staline, ses successeurs adoptent une ligne plus modérée.

==========

Hana Gauer

Avis aux amateurs de formats courts : passez votre chemin. Voici mon 1601e texte totalement inadapté à la génération TikTok. 

Je n'ai toujours pas acquis le super-pouvoir de contracter des basculements géopolitiques d'empires en trois lignes. Ici, il faudra savoir lire. (Et pour les impatients, vous pouvez toujours demander à Gemini de vous le résumer !)  

A : Le dernier message de la Chine à la Russie

Pour décrire la relation entre la Chine et la Russie, Alexander Gabuev (Carnegie) a utilisé une bonne formule : « laisser mariner ». Chaque mois qui passe réduit les alternatives de la Russie et augmente le pouvoir de négociation chinois.

Sur le gazoduc Power of Siberia 2, les informations du Wall Street Journal sont très fortes. 

Pékin ne dit pas « non », il dit mieux. Les responsables chinois auraient, selon les journalistes du WSJ, demandé aux Russes de "ne plus revenir sur le dossier"  tant que Moscou n'accepte pas leurs nouvelles conditions. Exiger un prix proche du tarif intérieur russe (environ 50 dollars pour 1 000 m³) revient pratiquement à demander à la Russie de subventionner ses exportations vers la Chine ! C'est une démonstration de rapport de force pure et simple.

Mais ce n'est pas tout.

La Chine durcit également les restrictions sur la vente de certaines technologies sensibles liées au secteur maritime et arctique. 

Dans le même temps, Gazprom et Rosneft manquent d'argent, de capacités industrielles et de technologies. Tout cela est essentiel pour l'avenir du pays, car une grande partie de son potentiel repose sur l'exploitation des richesses de l'Arctique et de son sous-sol.

La liste des difficultés devient en ce moment impressionnante !

Gazprom a enregistré des pertes records. L'agence Interfax a révélé le report de plusieurs grands projets d'exploration et d'infrastructures offshore dans l'Arctique russe : en mer de Kara sur les blocs Obsky, Rusanov et Nyameysky, ainsi qu'en mer de Barents sur les sites de Medvezhye et Fersmanovsky.

La compagnie d'État ne dispose plus des moyens financiers nécessaires pour développer ces gisements et doit rééchelonner ses projets. Les recettes provenant de la Chine ne compensent ni les volumes ni les marges perdus en Europe. Les infrastructures d'extraction en eaux profondes de l'Arctique sont devenues, au moins temporairement, hors de portée financière sans les technologies et les capitaux occidentaux.

Pour Rosneft, le projet Vostok Oil n'est pas abandonné, mais fortement ralenti.

 Le principal goulot d'étranglement reste la logistique arctique : pétroliers brise-glace, chantiers navals privés de composants sous sanctions et absence d'accès aux technologies occidentales.

Et sur ce sujet, que répond l'ami chinois au Kremlin ?

Niet.

The Moscow Times résume parfaitement la situation : La Chine attend que la situation économique de la Russie se détériore encore, qu'elle soit véritablement à genoux, avant de signer des accords aux conditions favorables à la Chine. 

Pourtant, la Chine est très intéressée par la Route maritime du Nord ?  Elle l'a intégrée à son initiative de la « Route de la soie polaire » et investit depuis plusieurs années dans Yamal LNG et Arctic LNG 2. Réduire le temps de transport vers l'Europe et sécuriser une voie moins exposée que le détroit de Malacca reste un objectif stratégique.

Alors pourquoi n'aide-t-elle pas davantage ?

Par crainte des sanctions secondaires, bien sûr, mais pas seulement. 

Elle n'est visiblement surtout pas prête à financer n'importe quel projet russe.

Et, surtout les intérêts des deux pays convergent, mais ils ne sont pas identiques. La Russie considère la Route maritime du Nord comme une voie nationale placée sous son contrôle exclusif. La Chine préférerait qu'elle fonctionne comme une grande route maritime internationale, avec beaucoup moins de contraintes imposées par Moscou.

Je pense que Pékin raisonne ainsi :

« Nous voulons utiliser cette route, mais pourquoi dépenser aujourd'hui des milliards pour sauver Gazprom ou Rosneft, alors que la Russie sera peut-être obligée demain de nous ouvrir davantage l'accès à ses ports, à ses infrastructures ou à ses ressources ? »

Si l'on met bout à bout le blocage du gazoduc, les négociations commerciales en arrêt, les difficultés de Rosneft et de Gazprom, ainsi que l'attitude prudente de nombreuses entreprises chinoises, une hypothèse prend forme : Pékin sait que le temps travaille pour elle.

Elle calibre donc son soutien dans une seule direction : une coopération militaire étroitement contrôlée. 

Une défaite politique de Poutine ou une Russie affaiblie et dépendante servent probablement les intérêts de Xi Jinping... Mais, jusqu'à un certain point.

La limite : Pékin partage plus de 4 000 kilomètres de frontière avec la Russie. Elle ne souhaite pas une crise politique trop profonde. Pire encore, un éclatement de la Fédération de Russie créerait une incertitude géopolitique majeure sur sa frontière nord.

Elle fait donc le minimum nécessaire...pour elle.

B : Un message russe à l'Europe

C'est dans ce contexte que je relis un article récent que j'avais gardé sous le coude et qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre dans les milieux russophones. ( Voir la couv.)

Il s'agit de la longue interview d'Andreï Melnitchenko dans The Economist. Un oligarque dont les entreprises, comme sa liberté personnelle, dépendent directement de l'État russe.

 Il est donc peu probable qu'il ait entrepris seul une intervention politique aussi spectaculaire. 

Notons également que cette interview a été publiée juste AVANT les dernières annonces marquant le durcissement de la position chinoise face aux demandes russes. Un timing intéressant.

Je vais faire court sur le long baratin « autorisé » par le Kremlin. 

Melnitchenko explique que la Russie agresse ses voisins parce qu'elle ne se sent pas suffisamment respectée, et on dirait que l'Ukraine n'est finalement qu'un « incident technique ».

 Il ajoute le chantage habituel au chaos : sans Poutine, ce serait l'apocalypse. Ensuite, il prépare déjà le blanchiment politique de son milieu pour l'après-guerre : « Nous n'avons rien décidé. Nous avons été contraints. Nous pouvons être utiles à la reconstruction d'une Russie raisonnable. »

Ce qu'il ne dit pas est tout aussi intéressant.

 Il ne demande évidemment pas le départ de Poutine,  Andreï n'est pas suicidaire.

 Il ne reconnaît jamais clairement la responsabilité russe dans l'invasion. C'est un vieux réflexe de la culture politique russe : se présenter comme la victime résiliente de toutes les crises qu'elle provoque elle-même. 

Il ne propose ni démocratisation, ni restitution des territoires ukrainiens, ni justice pour les crimes de guerre. Bref, Moscou n'est pas coupable. Le jour J, on trouvera quelques lampistes pour porter le chapeau...

Alors pourquoi remplit-il les pages de The Economist au nom de la haute bourgeoisie russe ?

 Parce qu'il doit visiblement nous faire passer ce message :

« Nous pouvons arrêter cette guerre... mais il faut intégrer Moscou dans le futur système de sécurité européen. » WTF ? On a presque envie de lui répondre : « Tu veux qu'on échange nos missiles, sérieux ? »

En réalité, la partie essentielle de l'interview suit tout de suite après et c'est plus clair :

« Ouvrez-nous une porte avant que nous ne soyons complètement absorbés par la Chine. » !!!

J'ai déjà écrit que les industriels, les hauts fonctionnaires et les grandes fortunes russes sont tous montés dans le train conduit par Poutine. Ils ont aidé à construire la voie, ont payé le carburant et ont largement profité du voyage. Ils découvrent maintenant que le conducteur refuse de freiner, qu'il roule droit vers Pékin, que les sorties sont condamnées, que le train devient franchement inconfortable... et que, pendant ce temps-là, on leur vide leurs valises Vuitton. Aujourd'hui, il ne reste pratiquement qu'une seule façon de quitter le train : passer par la fenêtre à 300 km/h.

Mais cette élite économique et technocratique ne veut toujours pas, ou ne peut plus, faire dérailler le train.

 Elle cherche simplement à convaincre l'Occident de lui aménager une voie de garage où elle pourrait conserver sa fortune.  

Ces gens n'ont ni le pouvoir de négocier, ni le courage de renverser Poutine dans son bunker gardé par les siloviki. Ils ont seulement peur de la direction prise.

 Ils ont probablement compris que la Chine utilise la guerre menée par la Russie et son industrie militaire comme un immense laboratoire pour préparer ses propres conflits potentiels, notamment autour de Taïwan. En revanche, Pékin n'est absolument pas là pour reboucher les trous de l'économie civile russe.

 Au contraire, elle profitera de chaque faiblesse pour renforcer sa position dominante.

Je vais aller plus loin en risquant une hypothèse. Le rôle idéal de la Russie, vu de Pékin, pourrait finalement être assez simple : la Russie et la Corée du Nord entretiennent la tension, la Chine tient le magasin ouvert.

Je m'explique. La Russie maintient une insécurité permanente en Europe dans la zone grise et fixe ainsi une partie des ressources occidentales sur le flanc est. La Corée du Nord joue le même rôle en Asie du Nord-Est. Pendant ce temps, la Chine bénéficie d'un environnement où les États-Unis dispersent leurs moyens entre plusieurs foyers de crise. Et elle continue à commercer avec une grande partie du monde grâce à sa puissance industrielle, qu'elle se garde bien de partager.

Le messager de Moscou joue donc sa dernière carte sous forme de menace :

« Si vous ne trouvez pas un accord avec nous, vous aurez demain face à vous un bloc stratégique Russie-Chine beaucoup plus dangereux. »

Il dit de facto à l'Europe : « Ne nous poussez pas davantage vers la Chine. »

 Mais ce texte s'adressait peut-être aussi un peu à Pékin : « Regardez, nous avons encore une autre option. » Ce à quoi la Chine a répondu, quelques jours plus tard : « Eh bien.Non. »

Oui, nous le savons, une Russie entièrement dépendante de la Chine n'est pas dans l'intérêt européen. Elle créerait un bloc eurasiatique dans lequel Pékin disposerait durablement des ressources russes ( énergie, minerais, espace, technologies militaires ) sans avoir eu besoin de les conquérir. Et ces ressources contribuent à maintenir le coût de son appareil industriel à un niveau qui rendrait la concurrence européenne encore plus difficile.

Le problème est que les paroles de Melnitchenko et de ses semblables regardent vers l'Europe, tandis que les structures profondes de la Russie continuent de basculer vers la Chine.

Et la Chine, en quelques jours, répond à son « ami éternel » : non au gaz acheté au prix du marché ; non aux technologies stratégiques dont la Russie a besoin pour relancer son économie arctique. Oui, peut-être... mais plus tard, et uniquement à ses propres conditions. Xi Jinping sait que la Russie n'a pratiquement plus d'alternative crédible, car l'Europe ne peut plus revenir au "business as usual" . 

En revanche, Pékin accepte volontiers une coopération toujours plus étroite sur le plan militaire.

C : Que devons-nous faire ?

Il est impossible de faire confiance à la Russie actuelle. Les « élites russes » demandent à l'Europe de leur ouvrir une porte... sans pour autant remettre en cause les choix qui les ont conduites dans cette dépendance envers la Chine. 

C'est une demande de restauration de la confiance sans la moindre contrepartie, alors même que la coopération militaire entre Pékin et Moscou continue de s'approfondir.

Si l'on prend le texte de Melnitchenko au pied de la lettre, il demande à l'Europe de refaire, sous une autre forme, ce que l'Ostpolitik allemande et la politique d'interdépendance économique ont tenté pendant des décennies : développer les échanges, bâtir une sécurité commune et postuler que "le commerce réduit les risques de guerre" . Or, c'est précisément ce modèle que Moscou a méthodiquement détruit.

Pour l'Europe, un rééquilibrage ne sera pas simple, mais il ne sera pas impossible pour toujours. 

Une dépendance géopolitique n'est pas une annexion. La Russie conservera son élite, son arsenal nucléaire, ses ressources et une profonde méfiance historique envers la Chine. Un futur pouvoir russe ( un jour, qui sait?)  pourrait donc chercher à retrouver une marge de manœuvre vis-à-vis de l'Europe. Mais également , plus l'intégration économique, technologique et militaire avec Pékin progressera, plus le coût d'une telle réorientation augmentera. Et les Russes le savent pertinemment.

Le véritable problème pour les Européens est ailleurs : il s'appelle la confiance.

Un changement de dirigeant ne suffira pas à débarrasser la Russie de son impérialisme. Je le répète encore, celui-ci ne repose pas uniquement sur Poutine. Il est inscrit dans la structure même de l'État, dans le récit national, dans l'éducation, dans le rapport historique aux peuples voisins et dans cette idée profondément ancrée que la sécurité de la Russie exige la faiblesse ou la subordination de ses périphéries.

Pour sortir de cette logique, il faudrait probablement une défaite clairement comprise comme telle, une perte durable de la capacité d'imposer sa volonté à ses voisins, une transformation profonde des institutions et l'émergence d'un nouveau récit national.

Rien de tout cela ne peut être rapide.

 L'Allemagne et le Japon n'ont changé qu'après une rupture totale : une défaite militaire écrasante, une forte contrainte extérieure et une reconstruction politique en profondeur. La Russie pourrait peut-être évoluer autrement, mais certainement pas grâce à une simple dépoutinisation cosmétique. Nous étions naïfs en 1991, j'espère que nous le sommes moins après la guerre dévastatrice en Ukraine.

C'est pourquoi je crois que l'Europe ne devrait pas construire sa stratégie autour de l'espoir de récupérer la Russie à court terme. Elle doit D'ABORD bâtir une position de force qui permettra, peut-être un jour, d'amorcer une autre relation avec une nouvelle génération de ce pays.

Et je vais essayer de montrer dans mon prochain texte qu'il me semble parfaitement possible de contenir la Russie à nos frontières, même si cela nous conduit probablement vers une décennie de confrontation en zone grise.