The 2026 Elections in Brazil: The Disappearance of Parties, Platforms, and Impartial Regulators
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomat and professor
A note on the 2026 elections in Brazil
The 2026 Brazilian general elections possess unique, negative characteristics that distinguish them from all previous ones since the return to democracy in the 1980s. For the first time in this political-electoral cycle, political parties are conspicuously absent. With the exception of a few left-wing parties—notably the PT and the PSB, the most prominent and influential among them—all major traditional parties (generally centrist or right-wing) seem to have vanished entirely from the campaign materials of candidates running for various executive offices (the presidency and the governorships of the 27 states) and even legislative seats (federal and state deputies, and senators). The Senate is set to renew two-thirds of its 81 seats—meaning two senators out of the three representing each state—while the distribution of seats for deputies involves highly debatable proportionality between the most populous states (subject to a maximum cap) and the least populous ones (guaranteed a minimum of eight representatives, creating a massive distortion at the federal level).
The most surprising aspect of the relationship between candidates and parties is the complete disappearance of party names and logos from campaign flyers and even from the mandatory free airtime slots on radio and broadcast television. Candidates for various offices simply announce their bids, highlighting their personal "qualities" and proposals, yet conclude by mentioning only the numbers assigned to them by the Electoral Court—a highly bureaucratic body ostensibly responsible for ensuring fairness among all parties officially registered with the TSE. While these numbers incorporate each party's two-digit code, the sheer profusion of parties registered with the TSE—likely numbering over forty—means few voters can identify which "ideological stripe" a candidate represents; indeed, this is another aspect glossed over in these advertisements. It appears as though all candidates stand above the fray—transcending Left and Right and devoid of major political affiliations—relying solely on their own individual "qualities."
All parties—typically organized into coalitions of three or more—were required to register their presidential candidates' platforms (totaling 13 coalitions or individual parties), yet at no point did a debate take place among the candidates based on these respective platforms. The defining characteristic of the 2026 elections was the mutual criticism exchanged by candidates over petty squabbles, usually involving accusations of corruption or fraud regarding public funds. If there is one thing that leveled the playing field for virtually all candidates—across various executive and legislative offices—it was the widespread hypocrisy shared by them and their respective parties regarding the massive sums of public money allocated to the parties (controlled by political bosses) and directly to lawmakers through various mechanisms that funnel funds to the political caste.
The Party Fund has existed since practically the inception of the 1988 Constitution, operating in a very generous manner that grants access to public funds and "free" media advertising. The original provision in Article 17—"§ 3. Political parties are entitled to resources from the party fund and free access to radio and television, as provided by law"—was restricted in 2017, requiring a minimum vote threshold in general elections and a parliamentary caucus of at least 15 elected members. A new financial benefit was secured for them after the Supreme Federal Court (STF) banned corporate funding in 2017; this led to the creation of an Electoral Fund, financed by public resources, distributed as follows: 2% of the total goes to all parties; 35% to parties with at least one deputy; 48% distributed among parties in proportion to their number of deputies; and 15% based on the number of senators. By 2026, this Party Fund will reach over R$ 1.4 billion.
However, it is important to note that, year after year and election after election, both funds have been growing exponentially. From less than 1 billion reais a few years ago, the Electoral Fund has now reached nearly 5 billion—an amount three times the total budget allocated to fostering science and technology programs through the CNPq (1.7 billion). When combined with party-directed budget amendments—which until recently totaled over 50 billion—it becomes clear that petty partisan activities have begun to attract a whole caste of opportunists across the ideological and political spectrum, including a growing number of common criminals, particularly "members" of criminal organizations.
From criminal organizations infiltrating politics, we move directly to a pervasive entity that has become a central figure in these elections: political corruption. This has long coexisted seamlessly with the "ordinary" corruption traditional to Brazil's business environment, yet it has grown exponentially in political circles and—exceptionally—within the judiciary, spanning from lower courts to the highest echelons of the legal system across its three superior courts: the STJ, the TSE, and, above all, the STF—the latter having been regarded, until recently, as the guardian of institutional stability and the rule of law in disputes involving civil society and the political sphere.
Historically, the corruption rampant in Brazil—whether or not intertwined with political circles—has always been “democratic,” spanning the entire political spectrum; in other words, it cut horizontally across all ideologies and political affiliations. Since 2025, when the equally “democratic” scope of the largest banking fraud in Brazilian history was revealed, it became evident that corruption had extended vertically into a wide range of the Republic’s institutions—particularly the Legislature (where it might be considered almost “normal”)—and, in a new development, reached the very heart of the country’s highest court, the Supreme Federal Court.
Never before in Brazil’s history had a deliberate financial fraudster managed to corrupt such a wide array of politicians—lawmakers, party bosses, and even the presidents of both houses of Congress—while simultaneously seducing judges from various courts, reaching all the way to their highest-ranking members, the guardians of the Brazilian constitutional order. In other words, corruption permeated the entire horizontal spectrum and every vertical tier alike, ensnaring politicians of diverse leanings, various masters of "theoretical" law, and—above all—those who administer the law in practice.
For the first time in the annals of Justice—or whatever name the Judiciary goes by in the real Brazil—a “civil war” has broken out among robed autocrats who issue unilateral injunctions and contradict colleagues from their own court or partners from another—namely, the TSE. This “civil war” has become entangled, for entirely extraneous reasons, with another conflict—seemingly “religious” in nature but fundamentally political—between Catholics (the faith of the majority of Brazilians until recently) and “Evangelicals.” The latter group represents a rising trend across various social strata—especially among the working class—and constitutes a distinct form of “pastoral” enterprise driven by direct profit motives (facilitated by the ever-expanding tax exemptions associated with the pastoral work of those who crudely propagate a Bible instrumentalized precisely for such prosaic ends).
To sum up the unsettled state of affairs, the Brazilian electorate faces—as early as the first round of voting (which is decisive for legislative seats)—a scenario of “supreme instability” and electoral unpredictability. There was not a single debate on policy platforms among the leading national presidential candidates; instead, there was nothing but a series of mutual accusations—some even scandalous—dragging technocrats and politicians from all three branches of government into the same mire, to the general astonishment of Brazilians.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 5477: October, 1st, 2026
Link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2026/10/the-2026-elections-in-brazil.html
