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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

quarta-feira, 24 de agosto de 2016

Brasil 1962-1964: documentos americanos sobre o processo politico nos anos Goulart - Dept. State, CIA, etc.

Graças a meu amigo James Herschberg, e ao embaixador Rubens Ricupero, minha atenção foi despertada para este conjunto de documentos americanos, referenciados abaixo, com uma ênfase na dramática conversação entre Robert Kennedy, enviado especial do seu irmão, presidente John F. Kennedy, e o presidente João Goulart. 
O relato foi feito pelo embaixador Lincoln Gordon, uma vez que nenhum outro interlocutor brasileiro esteve presente, sequer como "note taker" (Goulart não queria testemunhas brasileiros, talvez por desconfiar do Itamaraty, ou por não desejar que nenhum outro brasileiro ouvisse o que ele iria dizer, sinceramente ou não, ao enviado especial, já num processo de desgaste inevitável de Goulart junto aos americanos).
O National Security Archive, projeto mantido pela George Washington University, mantém dezenas, centenas, milhares de documentos como estes, liberados pelas autoridades americanos, ou a pedido do NSA, usando o FOIA (Freedom of Information Act).
Aproveitem. Todos os links estão devidamente transcritos por inteiro.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 



Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup
On 50th anniversary, Archive posts new Kennedy Tape Transcripts on coup plotting against Brazilian President Joao Goulart
Robert Kennedy characterized Goulart as a "wily politician" who "figures he's got us by the ---."
Declassified White House records chart genesis of regime change effort in Brazil
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 465
Posted April 2, 2014
Edited by James G. Hershberg and Peter Kornbluh
For more information contact:
James G. Hershberg, 202/302-5718
Peter Kornbluh, 202/374-7281

nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Washington, DC, April 2, 2014 Almost two years before the April 1, 1964, military takeover in Brazil, President Kennedy and his top aides began seriously discussing the option of overthrowing Joao Goulart's government, according to Presidential tape transcripts posted by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the coup d'tat. "What kind of liaison do we have with the military?" Kennedy asked top aides in July 1962. In March 1963, he instructed them: "We've got to do something about Brazil."
The tape transcripts advance the historical record on the U.S. role in deposing Goulart — a record which remains incomplete half a century after he fled into exile in Uruguay on April 1, 1964. "The CIA's clandestine political destabilization operations against Goulart between 1961 and 1964 are the black hole of this history," according to the Archive's Brazil Documentation Project director, Peter Kornbluh, who called on the Obama administration to declassify the still secret intelligence files on Brazil from both the Johnson and Kennedy administrations.
Revelations on the secret U.S. role in Brazil emerged in the mid 1970s, when the Lyndon Johnson Presidential library began declassifying Joint Chiefs of Staff records on "Operation Brother Sam" — President Johnson's authorization for the U.S. military to covertly and overtly supply arms, ammunition, gasoline and, if needed, combat troops if the military's effort to overthrow Goulart met with strong resistance. On the 40th anniversary of the coup, the National Security Archive posted audio files of Johnson giving the green light for military operations to secure the success of the coup once it started.
"I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding U.S. support for a coup as the Brazilian military moved against Goulart on March 31, 1964.
But Johnson inherited his anti-Goulart, pro-coup policy from his predecessor, John F. Kennedy. Over the last decade, declassified NSC records and recently transcribed White House tapes have revealed the evolution of Kennedy's decision to create a coup climate and, when conditions permitted, overthrow Goulart if he did not yield to Washington's demand that he stop "playing" with what Kennedy called "ultra-radical anti-Americans" in Brazil's government. During White House meetings on July 30, 1962, and on March 8 and 0ctober 7, 1963, Kennedy's secret Oval Office taping system recorded the attitude and arguments of the highest U.S. officials as they strategized how to force Goulart to either purge leftists in his government and alter his nationalist economic and foreign policies or be forced out by a U.S.-backed putsch.
Indeed, the very first Oval Office meeting that Kennedy secretly taped, on July 30, 1962, addressed the situation in Brazil. "I think one of our important jobs is to strengthen the spine of the military," U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon told the President and his advisor, Richard Goodwin. "To make clear, discreetly, that we are not necessarily hostile to any kind of military action whatsoever if it's clear that the reason for the military action is…[Goulart's] giving the country away to the...," "Communists," as the president finished his sentence. During this pivotal meeting, the President and his men decided to upgrade contacts with the Brazilian military by bringing in a new US military attaché-Lt. Col. Vernon Walters who eventually became the key covert actor in the preparations for the coup. "We may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year," Goodwin suggested, "if they can." (Document 1)
By the end of 1962, the Kennedy administration had indeed determined that a coup would advance U.S. interests if the Brazilian military could be mobilized to move. The Kennedy White House was particularly upset about Goulart's independent foreign policy positions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although Goulart had assisted Washington's efforts to avoid nuclear Armageddon by acting as a back channel intermediary between Kennedy and Castro — a top secret initiative uncovered by George Washington University historian James G. Hershberg — Goulart was deemed insufficiently supportive of U.S. efforts to ostracize Cuba at the Organization of American States. On December 13, Kennedy told former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek that the situation in Brazil "worried him more than that in Cuba."
On December 11, 1962, the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council met to evaluate three policy alternatives on Brazil: A. "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue; B. collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow; C. seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government." [link to document 2] Option C was deemed "the only feasible present approach" because opponents of Goulart lacked the "capacity and will to overthrow" him and Washington did not have "a near future U.S. capability to stimulate [a coup] operation successfully." Fomenting a coup, however "must be kept under active and continuous consideration," the NSC options paper recommended.
Acting on these recommendations, President Kennedy dispatched a special envoy — his brother Robert — to issue a face-to-face de facto ultimatum to Goulart. Robert Kennedy met with Goulart at the Palacio do Alvarada in Brazilia on December 17, 1962. During the three-hour meeting, RFK advised Goulart that the U.S. had "the gravest doubts" about positive future relations with Brazil, given the "signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration into civilian government positions," and the opposition to "American policies and interests as a regular rule." As Goulart issued a lengthy defense of his policies, Kennedy passed a note to Ambassador Gordon stating: "We seem to be getting no place." The attorney general would later say that he came away from the meeting convinced that Goulart was "a Brazilian Jimmy Hoffa."
Kennedy and his top aides met once again on March 7, 1963, to decide how to handle the pending visit of the Brazilian finance minister, Santiago Dantas. In preparation for the meeting, Ambassador Gordon submitted a long memo to the president recommending that if it proved impossible to convince Goulart to modify his leftist positions, the U.S. work "to prepare the most promising possible environment for his replacement by a more desirable regime." (Document 5) The tape of this meeting (partially transcribed here for the first time by James Hershberg) focused on Goulart's continuing leftward drift. Robert Kennedy urged the President to be more forceful toward Goulart: He wanted his brother to make it plain "that this is something that's very serious with us, we're not fooling around about it, we're giving him some time to make these changes but we can't continue this forever." The Brazilian leader, he continued, "struck me as the kind of wily politician who's not the smartest man in the world ... he figures that he's got us by the---and that he can play it both ways, that he can make the little changes, he can make the arrangements with IT&T and then we give him some money and he doesn't have to really go too far." He exhorted the president to "personally" clarify to Goulart that he "can't have the communists and put them in important positions and make speeches criticizing the United States and at the same time get 225-[2]50 million dollars from the United States. He can't have it both ways."
As the CIA continued to report on various plots against Goulart in Brazil, the economic and political situation deteriorated. When Kennedy convened his aides again on October 7, he wondered aloud if the U.S. would need to overtly depose Goulart: "Do you see a situation where we might be—find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" The tape of the October 7 meeting — a small part of which was recently publicized by Brazilian journalist Elio Gaspari, but now transcribed at far greater length here by Hershberg — contains a detailed discussion of various scenarios in which Goulart would be forced to leave. Ambassador Gordon urged the president to prepare contingency plans for providing ammunition or fuel to pro-U.S. factions of the military if fighting broke out. "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention," Gordon told President Kennedy, "which would help see the right side win."
Under Gordon's supervision, over the next few weeks the U.S. embassy in Brazil prepared a set of contingency plans with what a transmission memorandum, dated November 22, 1963, described as "a heavy emphasis on armed intervention." Assassinated in Dallas on that very day, President Kennedy would never have the opportunity to evaluate, let alone implement, these options.
But in mid-March 1964, when Goulart's efforts to bolster his political powers in Brazil alienated his top generals, the Johnson administration moved quickly to support and exploit their discontent-and be in the position to assure their success. "The shape of the problem," National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told a meeting of high-level officials three days before the coup, "is such that we should not be worrying that the [Brazilian] military will react; we should be worrying that the military will not react."
"We don't want to watch Brazil dribble down the drain," the CIA, White House and State Department officials determined, according to the Top Secret meeting summary, "while we stand around waiting for the [next] election."


THE DOCUMENTS
Document 1: White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.)
The very first Oval Office meeting ever secretly taped by President Kennedy took place on July 30, 1962 and addressed the situation in Brazil and what to do about its populist president, Joao Goulart. The recording — it was transcribed and published in book The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One — captures a discussion between the President, top Latin America aide Richard Goodwin and U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon about beginning to set the stage for a future military coup in Brazil. The President and his men make a pivotal decision to appoint a new U.S. military attaché to become a liaison with the Brazilian military, and Lt. Col. Vernon Walters is identified. Walters later becomes the key covert player in the U.S. support for the coup. "We may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year," Goodwin suggests, "if they can."

Document 2: NSC, Memorandum, "U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil," Secret, December 11, 1962
In preparation for a meeting of the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council, the NSC drafted an options paper with three policy alternatives on Brazil: A. "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue; B. collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow; C. seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government." Option C was deemed "the only feasible present approach" because opponents of Goulart lacked the "capacity and will to overthrow" him and Washington did not have "a near future U.S. capability to stimulate [a coup] operation successfully." Fomenting a coup, however "must be kept under active and continuous consideration," the NSC options paper recommended. If Goulart continued to move leftward, "the United States should be ready to shift rapidly and effectively to…collaboration with friendly democratic elements, including the great majority of military officer corps, to unseat President Goulart."
 
Document 3: NSC, "Minutes of the National Security Council Executive Committee Meeting, Meeting No. 35," Secret, December 11, 1962
The minutes of the EXCOMM meeting record that President Kennedy accepted the recommendation that U.S. policy "seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government."

Document 4: U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, "Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 December 1962," December 19, 1962
In line with JFK's decision at the Excom meeting on December 11 to have "representative sent specially" to talk to Goulart, the president's brother made a hastily-prepared journey to "confront" the Brazilian leader over the issues that had increasingly concerned and irritated Washington-from his chaotic management of Brazil's economy and expropriation of U.S. corporations such as IT&T, to his lukewarm support during the Cuban missile crisis and flirtation with the Soviet bloc to, most alarming, his allegedly excessive toleration of far left and even communist elements in the government, military, society, and even his inner circle. Accompanied by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, RFK met for more than three hours with Goulart in the new inland capital of Brasília at the modernistic lakeside presidential residence, the Palácio do Alvorada. A 17-page memorandum of conversation, drafted by Amb. Gordon, recorded the Attorney General presenting his list of complaints: the "many signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration" into civilian government, military, trade union, and student group leaderships, and Goulart's personal failure to take a public stand against the "violently anti-American" statements emanating from "influential Brazilians" both in and out of his government, or to embrace Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Turning to economic issues, he said his brother was "very deeply worried at the deterioration" in recent months, from rampant inflation to the disappearance of reserves, and called on Goulart to get his "economic and financial house in order." Surmounting these obstacles to progress, RFK stressed, could mark a "turning point in relations between Brazil and the U.S. and in the whole future of Latin America and of the free world." When Goulart defended his policies, Kennedy scribbled a note to Ambassador Gordon: "We seem to be getting no place." JFK's emissary voiced his fear "that President Goulart had not fully understood the nature of President Kennedy's concern about the present situation and prospects."
 
Document 5: Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, "Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil," Secret, March 7, 1963
In preparation for another key Oval office meeting on Brazil, the Department of State transmitted two briefing papers, including a memo to the president from Amb. Gordon titled "Brazilian Political Developments and U.S. Assistance." The latter briefing paper (attached to the first document) was intended to assist the President in deciding how to handle the visit of Brazilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas to Washington. Gordon cited continuing problems with Goulart's "equivocal, with neutralist overtones" foreign policy, and the "communist and other extreme nationalist, far left wing, and anti-American infiltration in important civilian and military posts with the government."
 
Document 6: Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Friday March 8, 1963 (Meeting 77.1, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)
On March 8, 1963, a few days before Dantas' arrived, JFK reviewed the state of US-Brazilian relations with his top advisors, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, his ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, and his brother Robert. Unofficially transcribed here by James G. Hershberg (with assistance from Marc Selverstone and David Coleman) this is apparently the first time that it has been published since the tape recording was released more than a decade ago by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. As the comments by Rusk, Gordon, and RFK make clear, deep dissatisfaction with Goulart persisted. "Brazil is a country that we can't possibly turn away from," Secretary of State Rusk told the president. "Whatever happens there is going to be of decisive importance to the hemisphere." Rusk frankly acknowledged that the situation wasn't yet so bad as to justify Goulart's overthrow to "all the non-communists or non-totalitarian Brazilians," nor to justify a "clear break" between Washington and Rio that would be understood throughout the hemisphere. Instead, the strategy for the time being was to continue cooperation with Goulart's government while raising pressure on him to improve his behavior, particularly his tolerance of far-leftist, anti-United States, and even communist associates-to, in JFK's words, "string out" aid in order to "put the screws" on him. The president's brother, in particular, clearly did not feel that Goulart had followed through since their meeting a few months earlier on his vows to put a lid on anti-U.S. expressions or make personnel changes to remove some of the most egregiously leftist figures in his administration. Goulart, stated RFK, "struck me as the kind of wily politician who's not the smartest man in the world but very sensitive to this [domestic political] area, that he figures that he's got us by the---and that he can play it both ways, that he can make the little changes…and then we give him some money and he doesn't have to really go too far."

Document 7: CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, "Plotting Against Goulart," Secret, March 8, 1963
For more than two years before the April 1, 1964 coup, the CIA transmitted intelligence reports on various coup plots. The plot, described in this memo as "the best-developed plan," is being considered by former minister of war, Marshal Odylio Denys. In a clear articulation of U.S. concerns about the need for a successful coup, the CIA warned that "a premature coup effort by the Brazilian military would be likely to bring a strong reaction from Goulart and the cashiering of those officers who are most friendly to the United States."
 
Document 8: State Department, Latin American Policy Committee, "Approved Short-Term Policy in Brazil," Secret, October 3, 1963
In early October, the State Department's Latin America Policy Committee approved a "short term" draft policy statement on Brazil for consideration by President Kennedy and the National Security Council. Compared to the review in March, the situation has deteriorated drastically, according to Washington's point of view, in large measure due to Goulart's "agitation," unstable leadership, and increasing reliance on leftist forces. In its reading of the current and prospective situation, defining American aims, and recommending possible lines of action for the United States, the statement explicitly considered, albeit somewhat ambiguously, the U.S. attitude toward a possible coup to topple Goulart. "Barring clear indications of serious likelihood of a political takeover by elements subservient to and supported by a foreign government, it would be against U.S. policy to intervene directly or indirectly in support of any move to overthrow the Goulart regime. In the event of a threatened foreign-government-affiliated political takeover, consideration of courses of action would be directed more broadly but directly to the threatened takeover, rather than against Goulart (though some action against the latter might result)." Kennedy and his top aides met four days later to consider policy options and strategies--among them U.S. military intervention in Brazil.
 
Document 9: Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Monday, October 7, 1963 (tape 114/A50, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)
"Do you see a situation where we might be-find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" John F. Kennedy's question to his ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, reflected the growing concerns that a coup attempt against Goulart might need U.S. support to succeed, especially if it triggered an outbreak of fighting or even civil war. This tape, parts of which were recently publicized by Brazilian journalist Elio Gaspari, has been significantly transcribed by James G. Hershberg (with assistance from Marc Selverstone) and published here for the first time. It captured JFK, Gordon, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other top officials concluding that the prospect of an impending move to terminate Goulart's stay in office (long before his term was supposed to come to an end more than two years later) required an acceleration of serious U.S. military contingency planning as well as intense efforts to ascertain the balance between military forces hostile and friendly to the current government. In his lengthy analysis of the situation, Gordon — who put the odds at 50-50 that Goulart would be gone, one way or another, by early 1964 — outlined alternative scenarios for future developments, ranging from Goulart's peaceful early departure ("a very good thing for both Brazil and Brazilian-American relations"), perhaps eased out by military pressure, to a possible sharp Goulart move to the left, which could trigger a violent struggle to determine who would rule the country. Should a military coup seize power, Gordon clearly did not want U.S. squeamishness about constitutional or democratic niceties to preclude supporting Goulart's successors: "Do we suspend diplomatic relations, economic relations, aid, do we withdraw aid missions, and all this kind of thing — or do we somehow find a way of doing what we ought to do, which is to welcome this?" And should the outcome of the attempt to oust Goulart lead to a battle between military factions, Gordon urged study of military measures (such as providing fuel or ammunition, if requested) that Washington could take to assure a favorable outcome: "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention in such a case, which would help see the right side win." On the tape, McNamara suggests, and JFK approves, accelerated work on contingency planning ("can we get it really pushed ahead?"). Even as U.S. officials in Brazil intensified their encouragement of anti-communist military figures, Kennedy cautioned that they should not burn their bridges with Goulart, which might give him an excuse to rally nationalist support behind an anti-Washington swerve to the left: Washington needed to continue "applying the screws on the [economic] aid" to Brazil, but "with some sensitivity."
 
Document 10: State Department, Memorandum, "Embassy Contingency Plan," Top Secret, November 22, 1963
Dated on the day of President Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, this cover memo describes a new contingency plan from the U.S. Embassy in Brazil that places "heavy emphasis on U.S. armed intervention." The actual plan has not been declassified.
 
Document 11: NSC, Memcon, "Brazil," Top Secret, March 28, 1964
As the military prepared to move against Goulart, top CIA, NSC and State Department officials met to discuss how to support them. They evaluated a proposal, transmitted by Ambassador Gordon the previous day, calling for covert delivery of armaments and gasoline, as well as the positioning of a naval task force off the coast of Brazil. At this point, U.S. officials were not sure if or when the coup would take place, but made clear their interest in its success. "The shape of the problem," according to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, "is such that we should not be worrying that the military will react; we should be worrying that the military will not react."

Document 12: U.S. Embassy, Brazil, Memo from Ambassador Gordon, Top Secret, March 29, 1964
Gordon transmitted a message for top national security officials justifying his requests for pre-positioning armaments that could be used by "para-military units" and calling for a "contingency commitment to overt military intervention" in Brazil. If the U.S. failed to act, Gordon warned, there was a "real danger of the defeat of democratic resistance and communization of Brazil."
 
Document 13: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cable, [Military attaché Vernon Walters Report on Coup Preparations], Secret, March 30, 1964
U.S. Army attaché Vernon Walters meets with the leading coup plotters and reports on their plans. "It had been decided to take action this week on a signal to be issued later." Walters reported that he "expects to be aware beforehand of go signal and will report in consequence."

Document 14 (mp3): White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964.
 
Document 15: White House, Memorandum, "Brazil," Secret, April 1, 1964
As of 3:30 on April 1st, Ambassador Gordon reports that the coup is "95% over." U.S. contingency planning for overt and covert supplies to the military were not necessary. General Castello Branco "has told us he doesn't need our help. There was however no information about where Goulart had fled to after the army moved in on the palace.
 
Document 16: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Cable, "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," Secret, April 2, 1964
CIA intelligence sources report that deposed president Joao Goulart has fled to Montevideo.
================

Transcrição complete de um documento revelador:

Document 4: U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, "Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 December 1962," December 19, 1962
In line with JFK's decision at the Excom meeting on December 11 to have "representative sent specially" to talk to Goulart, the president's brother made a hastily-prepared journey to "confront" the Brazilian leader over the issues that had increasingly concerned and irritated Washington-from his chaotic management of Brazil's economy and expropriation of U.S. corporations such as IT&T, to his lukewarm support during the Cuban missile crisis and flirtation with the Soviet bloc to, most alarming, his allegedly excessive toleration of far left and even communist elements in the government, military, society, and even his inner circle. Accompanied by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, RFK met for more than three hours with Goulart in the new inland capital of Brasília at the modernistic lakeside presidential residence, the Palácio do Alvorada. A 17-page memorandum of conversation, drafted by Amb. Gordon, recorded the Attorney General presenting his list of complaints: the "many signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration" into civilian government, military, trade union, and student group leaderships, and Goulart's personal failure to take a public stand against the "violently anti-American" statements emanating from "influential Brazilians" both in and out of his government, or to embrace Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Turning to economic issues, he said his brother was "very deeply worried at the deterioration" in recent months, from rampant inflation to the disappearance of reserves, and called on Goulart to get his "economic and financial house in order." Surmounting these obstacles to progress, RFK stressed, could mark a "turning point in relations between Brazil and the U.S. and in the whole future of Latin America and of the free world." When Goulart defended his policies, Kennedy scribbled a note to Ambassador Gordon: "We seem to be getting no place." JFK's emissary voiced his fear "that President Goulart had not fully understood the nature of President Kennedy's concern about the present situation and prospects."


Augusto de Franco: a quadrilha mafiosa quer melar a Lava-Jato

A trama é conhecida: todo mundo sempre fez e faz igual, então não adianta punir um ou outro sem punir todos. 
Se a cidadania ativa não se unir contra a tramoia, a maior organização criminosa do hemisfério vai continuar fraudando a democracia.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

DAGOBAH

NL 0020 - 23/08/2016



Leo e Marcelo: uma confusão para esconder o fundamental

Não há como negar. As confissões industriadas de Leo e Marcelo já eram uma fraude para melar a Lava Jato. Eles queriam colocar todo mundo no mesmo bolo: quem apenas recebeu doações de campanha (sem questionar a origem dos recursos, como é de praxe) e quem estava no esquema criminoso do PT, usando as doações para financiar a "revolução pela corrupção" que o partido operava antes do impeachment. Isso tem nome: chama-se "Golpe Thomaz Bastos" (que consiste em nos empulhar com o seguinte truque: tudo não passou de caixa 2, que todo mundo faz). 

Agora Janot interrompe, sem explicações, o acordo com Leo (abrindo precedente para sustar também a premiação de Marcelo), dando a senha para que jornalistas e analistas comprometidos com as estratégias de salvação de Lula e do PT insinuem que quem se beneficiará com tudo isso serão Aécio e Temer que, diz-se - "segundo consta" - também foram citados pelo chefe da quadrilha empresarial conhecida como OAS. 

Mas foram citados em que circunstâncias? Por acaso Leo Pinheiro reformou um triplex para Aécio no Guarujá? Ou, quem sabe, reconstruiu um sítio para Temer em Atibaia? 

Por trás da armação, recende um mau odor denunciando que o beneficiário principal da nulificação da confissão de Leo só pode ser Lula, que - "segundo também consta" - receberia mesada do empreiteiro há muito tempo (antes mesmo de ser presidente) e que fez falsas palestras mundo a fora, corretadas pela Odebrecht, em troca do aporte do BNDES para viabilizar contratos milionários da empreiteira no exterior (sobretudo com ditaduras africanas e latino-americanas aliadas do PT). 

A confusão proposital serve para esconder o fundamental: 

1) Lula e Dilma foram eleitos e reeleitos com o dinheiro do crime (roubado da Petrobrás e de outras estatais e de vários órgãos públicos). 

2) A organização chefiada por Lula e Dirceu recebeu esse dinheiro e usou-o somente em parte para fins eleitorais (e nem mesmo isso foi bem caixa 2 e sim, muitas vezes, dinheiro lavado via caixa 1). 

3) Essa parte do dinheiro do crime recolhida pela organização criminosa chefiada por Lula e Dirceu teve usos bem diversos (dos eleitorais): além de locupletar alguns membros dessa organização com benesses pessoais de toda ordem, o dinheiro foi para o caixa 3, usado para comprar representantes eleitos, falsificando a correlação de forças emanada das urnas e para montar estruturas ilegais de poder (que podem então - por hipótese - praticar espionagem, fabricar dossiês contra adversários, patrocinar veículos de comunicação para difundir e replicar falsas versões, alugar pessoas para escrever a favor do governo e detratar as oposições, pagar agentes para ganhar ou recrutar e treinar militantes para os círculos do "Partido Interno" e ameaçar ou neutralizar pessoas que se tornam obstáculos à consecução dos planos criminosos ou antidemocráticos). E essa parte do dinheiro que sobrou, ao que tudo indica, ainda está escondida em contas bancárias no exterior em nome de laranjas ou nas offshores que foram abertas, inclusive, pela própria Odebrecht.

ESTE ARTIGO É PARTE DE UMA ANÁLISE PROFUNDA DISPONÍVEL AOS ASSINANTES. PARA RECEBER O ARTIGO COMPLETO E OS COMENTÁRIOS DE AUGUSTO DE FRANCO EM VÍDEO, 
ASSINE DAGOBAH - INTELIGÊNCIA DEMOCRÁTICA
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VEJA NOSSOS DESTAQUES


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Como os moralistas fazem o jogo do PT

Veja por que você - que quer combater toda corrupção, venha de onde vier - pode ser um aliado objetivo [...]

Olimpíadas, sociedade e Estado

Não consigo ser intimidado pela crença de que devemos elogiar as Olimpíadas para não parecer que somos contra o Brasil [...]

TEXTOS TEÓRICOS

INAUGURAMOS UMA NOVA ÁREA EM DAGOBAH 
COM TEXTOS TEÓRICOS SOBRE DEMOCRACIA. 
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Mandonismo e patrimonialismo: origens antigas no Brasil - livro de Adelto Goncalves

A coisa vem de longe: nossos mandarins sempre tiveram privilégios nesta terra onde quem é amigo do rei, ou tem um cargo estratégico, nunca fica órfão. A lei só vale para os pobres e desprovidos de influência.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Privilégios ancestrais

Livro sobre a Justiça em São Paulo na época colonial descreve as raízes dos desmandos públicos no Brasil



Pesquisa Fapesp, n. 234 | AGOSTO 2015

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© ACERVO FUNDAÇÃO BIBLIOTECA NACIONAL
Charge de Manuel  de Araújo Porto-Alegre satirizava, no século XIX, as relações corruptas na Colônia
Charge de Manuel de Araújo Porto-Alegre satirizava, no século XIX, as relações corruptas na Colônia
Reconstituir o funcionamento da Justiça no Brasil colonial é, ao mesmo tempo, mapear as estruturas de poder do período, reconhecer arraigados maus costumes e observar a formação de uma elite que se manteria dominante até as primeiras décadas do século XX. Esse recorte define o livro Direito e justiça em terras d’el rei na São Paulo colonial 1709-1822, de Adelto Gonçalves, lançado em julho pela Imprensa Oficial do Governo do Estado de São Paulo. Verificar e descrever as atribuições dos membros de uma rede de poder que ocupava cargos de ouvidores, juízes de fora, provedores, corregedores, juízes ordinários e vereadores foi um dos objetivos primordiais de Gonçalves, que procurou seguir uma tendência recente na historiografia brasileira, “que procura privilegiar as pesquisas sobre as formas de governar”.
O autor, no entanto, não é da área de história e adquiriu familiaridade com o período que estudou pela porta da literatura. Jornalista aposentado, Gonçalves é doutor em Letras – Literatura Portuguesa pela Universidade de São Paulo (USP) e até 2014 lecionou língua portuguesa no curso de direito da Universidade Paulista (Unip), em Santos, que financiou sua pesquisa sobre a Justiça colonial em São Paulo. Seu interesse pelo assunto foi despertado por suas pesquisas de doutorado sobre o poeta e inconfidente Tomás Antônio Gonzaga (1744-1810) e pós-doutorado sobre o poeta português Manuel Maria de Barbosa du Bocage (1765-1805), esta realizada com apoio da FAPESP. Gonzaga foi ouvidor em Vila Rica e o pai de Bocage fez carreira no Judiciário em Portugal até ser acusado de desvios e cair em desgraça política. As suas pesquisas no Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino e no Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, em Lisboa – complementadas no acervo do Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo –, permitiram estabelecer as atribuições dos altos funcionários do estado, começando pela relação completa dos governadores e capitães-generais (cargos concomitantes) no período estudado, corrigindo erros de listas anteriores.
“Fui levantando a nobreza da terra, as pessoas que mandavam e recorriam à Justiça para conseguir privilégios, como cargos e títulos”, diz o pesquisador. Eram os chamados “homens bons”, “que usufruíam tanto quanto podiam de suas relações com os representantes do poder”. Dessa casta saíam os camaristas ou vereadores – membros das câmaras municipais –, que, até fins do século XVII, acumulavam funções administrativas com o exercício da Justiça ordinária. Em geral, as vilas, tanto de Portugal quanto das colônias, mantinham apenas um juiz ordinário e um juiz de órfãos. No Brasil os casos criminais ficavam a cargo dos primeiros, que se baseavam, para julgá-los, apenas nos usos e costumes. Muitas vezes as câmaras nem sequer tinham sede apropriada. “Os julgamentos eram feitos embaixo de árvores por autoridades que não tinham formação em direito nem a quem recorrer, porque raramente havia nas colônias alguém formado em leis”, diz Gonçalves. Essas autoridades eram chamadas de “juízes pedâneos” porque julgavam de pé.
Já havia nessa época a figura do ouvidor-geral, criada por um regimento de 1628 que revogava a atribuição concedida aos titulares das capitanias hereditárias (capitães donatários) a fazer justiça nas terras de seu domínio. O envio regular de ouvidores e juízes de fora por Portugal, no entanto, só se deu no século XVIII. “Eram, pela primeira vez, especialistas em direito vindos da Universidade de Coimbra e tinham a missão de disciplinar e uniformizar a execução da Justiça”, diz Gonçalves. Como medida moralizante, os ouvidores não podiam se casar com mulheres residentes no Brasil sem autorização da Coroa, para não se envolver com as famílias poderosas e seus interesses econômicos. “Mas acabavam se envolvendo mesmo assim”, diz o pesquisador. “E, com o tempo, as famílias abastadas começaram a mandar seus filhos estudar em Coimbra e voltar aptos a ocuparem o cargo de juiz de fora.”
Na prática, apenas os pobres eram condenados pela Justiça colonial. Segundo um regimento de 1669, o ouvidor tinha autoridade para executar a pena de morte, sem apelação, para os crimes cometidos por escravos e índios. Mas, se um juiz ou ouvidor pretendesse punir um grande proprietário de terra, estava correndo risco. “Os que tinham prestígio ou haviam prestado favores à Coroa eram intocáveis.”
O ouvidor não podia ser preso ou suspenso por nenhuma autoridade local, nem mesmo o capitão-general. Suas decisões não se baseavam propriamente em leis formalizadas. Somente com o Regimento dos ouvidores-gerais do Rio de Janeiro, de 1669, e o Regimento dos ouvidores de São Paulo, de 1770, surgiram referências explícitas para aplicação geral de princípios. Foi também com esses decretos que o ouvidor-geral passou a ter o cargo civil mais alto das possessões portuguesas de ultramar. As apelações tinham duas instâncias, o Tribunal de Relação da Bahia e a Casa da Suplicação, em Lisboa, mas raramente os processos passavam da instância primária.
Os ouvidores tinham enorme poder econômico em mãos, uma vez que cabia a eles a fiscalização do recolhimento de tributos e outras fontes de receita. Desde o século anterior, a maior parte dos ingressos financeiros de Portugal vinha das colônias ou das alfândegas. Também cabia ao ouvidor fiscalizar os gastos e a atuação de vereadores e juízes ordinários – embora não pudesse se imiscuir nas funções da Câmara, que, a essa altura, tinha suas atribuições autônomas reduzidas à execução de pequenas obras. O poder das Câmaras, ocupado por filhos e netos das primeiras elites, manteve-se de modo mais ou menos simbólico. “Eram ocupados por aqueles potentados que viriam décadas depois a ser chamados de ‘coronéis’”, diz Gonçalves.
O poder nas mãos dos prepostos da Coroa era tal que, para obter e manter privilégios e recursos indevidos, jogavam com a possibilidade de estimular a secessão da Colônia. “Portugal era, a rigor, um país pobre nessa época”, diz Gonçalves. “Não tinha Exército ou outros meios para reprimir rebeliões pela força.” Foi assim que proliferaram as figuras dos “grossos devedores”, autoridades locais que desviavam tributos até que a Coroa, para recuperar essa “dívida”, entrava em acordo com vistas a um ressarcimento parcial. Segundo Gonçalves, “a questão fundamental residia na própria fragilidade do reino, que, para sobreviver, sempre permitia brechas para ações praticadas sob a proteção do próprio Estado”.
A própria narrativa histórica dominante até há poucas décadas traz sinais desse modelo – enquanto os posseiros ricos e, até certo ponto, aliados da Coroa foram identificados como desbravadores, os lavradores que ocupassem terras eram “invasores” ou “intrusos”. “Como mostram os documentos, os juízes quase sempre usaram o direito para interpretar cartas de doação, revogação de sesmarias, sucessões e desmembramentos de terras de acordo com os interesses dos poderosos locais”, diz o pesquisador.
© REPRODUÇÃO
Reprodução de documento relativo a processos de feitiçaria que estão sendo transcritos e estudados na USP
Reprodução de documento relativo a processos de feitiçaria que estão sendo transcritos e estudados na USP
Justiça Eclesiástica
Outro aspecto da Justiça em São Paulo no mesmo período histórico é tema de um projeto de pesquisa em andamento no Departamento de Letras Clássicas e Vernáculas da Faculdade de Filosofia Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH) da USP. Um grupo de pesquisadores coordenado pelo professor Marcelo Módolo está às voltas com documentos que registram processos relativos à suposta prática de feitiçaria. A pesquisa intitulada Bruxas paulistas: edição filológica de documentação sobre feitiçaria consiste no estudo e na transcrição dos 12 processos desse tipo abertos entre 1739 e 1771 pela Justiça eclesiástica, braço do Tribunal do Santo Ofício (Inquisição) no Brasil, depositados no Arquivo da Cúria Metropolitana de São Paulo.
A Justiça eclesiástica corria paralelamente à Justiça comum, que, no entanto, acatava as decisões da primeira, uma vez que o Estado assumia para si a fé católica. Promotores e juízes eclesiásticos eram membros da Igreja que avaliavam denúncias, procediam às investigações e proferiam a sentença. A execução cabia à Justiça comum. “Eram procedimentos parecidos com o atual inquérito policial”,  explica a doutoranda em Letras Nathalia Reis Fernandes, graduada em Letras e Direito, integrante do grupo de pesquisa. Entre as penas possíveis estavam a morte e a perda de bens – nesses casos, o processo era enviado para a sede do Tribunal do Santo Ofício em Portugal. Foi o que aconteceu com dois dos casos estudados, mas não é possível, pela documentação acessível no Brasil, saber se eles resultaram em execuções.
Os réus eram quase sempre negros e muitas das acusações estavam ligadas a práticas das religiões de origem africana. Há desde processos supostamente relacionados a mortes, como a da escrava Páscoa, acusada de “uso de magia” para causar pelo menos quatro mortes numa mesma família, até casos banais, como o do escravo Pascoal José de Moura (um dos poucos réus identificados por nome e sobrenome nos documentos), processado por confeccionar patuás. “Há também o caso de um grupo de homens negros que foram presos por participar de um batuque em que havia uma cabra e um casco de cágado”, conta Módolo.
O estudo coordenado por Módolo está na fase do estudo filológico e linguístico, começando pela transcrição “semidiplomática” dos documentos – aquela que procura manter a ortografia e a sintaxe originais. O trabalho é dificultado por lacunas causadas pela deterioração do material, caligrafia particularmente complicada e ortografia desafiadora numa época em que as pessoas letradas eram minoria e não havia padronização rígida da língua escrita. Uma segunda fase deverá se debruçar sobre os reflexos historiográficos dos processos relatados nos documentos. n
LivroGONÇALVES, Adelto. Direito e Justiça em terras d’El Rei na São Paulo colonial 1709-1822. Imprensa Oficial. São Paulo, 2015