O CEBRI me informa que a versão em inglês do meu texto "Rupturas e continuidades na política externa brasileira, 1985-2023" (Brasília, 4215: 7 agosto 2022), foi publicado no site do CEBRI (https://cebri.org/revista/en/artigo/54/ruptures-and-continuities-in-brazilian-foreign-policy-1985-2023):
Ruptures and Continuities in Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1985-2023
Vicissitudes of diplomacy in Brazil
THE LONG AND SLOW CONSTRUCTION OF AN AUTONOMOUS FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME
Of all the public policies defined and implemented during the military regime from 1964 to 1985, foreign policy was possibly the one that suffered the fewest disruptions during the transition from dictatorship to democracy in that last year. This was due to several reasons, not all of them political or ideological, since there was already a long tradition of close cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Armed Forces since the Paraguayan War, a cooperation that was significantly reinforced during the Baron's era and in special periods, such as the two global conflicts of the first half of the 20th century and during the bipolarity of the post-World War II era. Professional diplomacy naturally incorporated the technocratic and nationalist vision of the military establishment, and even reinforced the foundations of a development diplomacy that was almost the "official ideology" of Itamaraty from the Estado Novo until practically the present day.
Despite the anti-communist paranoia and obsessions typical of the Cold War, in the 1950s and early 1960s, diplomats became far more progressive and alternative than the military, flirting with non-alignment and enthusiastically embracing the concepts introduced by the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP), even before it was known by that name, as seen in the proposal for Operation Pan-America made in the second half of Juscelino Kubitschek's government. Decolonization, the promises of détente, and even the defense of a legally sound position at the Punta del Este conference (1962; when the Americans pressured for Cuba's expulsion from the OAS - Organization of American States) were very well received by the young diplomats, who soon found themselves frustrated by the coup and the beginning of a regime that declared itself to belong to "Western and Christian civilization," as a motto to align Brazil with American positions during an initial (and short) phase.
The first major break with the typically non-ideological, and basically developmentalist, patterns of foreign policy from 1951-1964 was precisely the "diplomacy of concentric circles" announced by General Castelo Branco, the first president of the dictatorship, to the graduates of the Rio Branco Institute in 1964. Little by little, however, this "deviation" from more independent stances was gradually reversed during the second general-president, when the basic principles of the IFP (Independent Foreign Policy) practically returned, albeit obviously without the name: non-acceptance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a demanding stance at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other UN negotiating meetings, when the alleged (by the Americans) "Third-Worldism" of Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) began in its defense of theses that hardly coincided with Washington's worldview.
Already under the fourth president of the dictatorial cycle–notwithstanding a kind of "shielded diplomacy" towards leftist regimes in South America, such as the support given in 1973 to General Pinochet's coup in Chile and the understandings with hardline military officers in Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia–the "continuity" with the line of autonomy in foreign policy was completed, with the establishment of diplomatic relations with communist China and the recognition of the new regimes that emerged from the independence of the former Portuguese-speaking African colonies. The convergence of military and diplomats was based on mutual trust, so much so that three diplomats succeeded one another at the head of Itamaraty, starting with the third military President, not to mention some less prestigious "missions," such as the surveillance of exiled leftist militants abroad. For the rest, foreign policy was practically determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the few exceptions of the taboo subjects of the military era (Cuba, threats of foreign cooperation with guerrillas in the country, in short, world communism).
Thus, with the beginning of the "New Republic," one cannot properly speak of a rupture in diplomatic patterns, or even in foreign policy, which continued to follow the canons of that time: multilateralism, developmentalism, UNCTADism, defense of access to technologies and markets of Northern countries, adherence to the New International Economic Order, in short, all the demands of the G77 and the Latin American Group (such as the theses of the Cartagena Consensus on the renegotiation of the region's external debt).
FEW DISCONTINUITIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY OF THE NEW REPUBLIC
The basic principles and major guidelines of foreign policy established during the Sarney administration, largely continuing the approach adopted during the previous decade and regime, remained practically intact in the following decades, except for the deepening of trends already present previously–such as regional integration and the priority given to relations with neighboring countries–, the “developmentalist ideology”, the active participation in economic negotiating forums–especially in international trade and finance–, the insistence on disarmament, but with new stances regarding issues that had “peculiarities” under the military governments: human rights and the environment, above all. The second government of the democratic era, that of Fernando Collor, innovated in several areas of substantive importance, such as the great impetus given to integration in the Southern Cone–with a much more open vision than the traditional economic dirigisme followed until then–and, above all, the updating of Brazilian “environmental diplomacy,” with the hosting of the second Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The nuclear issue also advanced, both domestically–including through provisions enshrined in the 1988 Constitution–and internationally, in building trust with Argentina, in the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (on the non-introduction of nuclear weapons in Latin America), in the establishment of ABACC (the Argentine-Brazilian binational agency for accounting and control of nuclear material), and in the quadripartite treaty between this agency, the two countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In human rights and social issues, free from the constraints of the dictatorial period, diplomats were able to express fully, in multilateral forums and major international diplomatic conferences, the new stance of a foreign policy fully engaged in advancing problems and proposals compatible with this progressive vision: racism and discrimination, women's and minority rights, torture, humanitarian law, housing, health, etc. It can be said that there is a continuous upward trend in Brazil's active participation in all areas relevant to the objectives of economic growth and social development debated in international forums, making Brazil a major player in all these discussions, especially international trade, health, and disarmament; in the rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the meetings of the World Trade Organization, Brazil has become indispensable.
The process of macroeconomic stabilization achieved, after successive failed plans, under the Finance Minister, later President for two terms, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, projected a new image of Brazil, not only in its dialogue with developed countries, but also with large emerging countries of the South, especially towards South America, which became the defining concept of Brazil's new regional diplomacy, replacing the previous relatively vague term of Latin America. One of its initiatives, the accession to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, enshrined Brazil's adherence to one of the central canons of the international security system, but in rupture with the previous stance of diplomacy–and the Armed Forces–of not accepting discriminatory treaties, contradicting one of the doctrinal bases of Brazilian diplomacy, the sovereign equality of States. In practice, the issue was already covered by a constitutional provision and represented a concession in exchange for greater unimpeded access to cutting-edge technologies and cooperation in sensitive areas.
THE SMALL RUPTURE OF THE LULA ERA: THE COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING HUNGER AND POVERTY
The three and a half governments of the Workers' Party, especially the two terms of President Lula, represented more of a conceptual than a practical "rupture," at least in relation to almost all the themes and working methods mobilized by professional diplomacy in defending the almost permanent themes of the Brazilian foreign policy agenda: national development policies, combating inequalities between countries, strong support for multilateralism and regional integration, constructive dialogue between advanced and developing countries, progressive social policies, and new activism in human rights and the environment. New developments emerged in the creation of regional and plurilateral forums of interest to this diplomatic activism, in the pursuit of strategic partnerships to achieve a more emphasized objective during this period–the "democratization of international relations," through the reform of the UN Charter and the expansion of its Security Council, including the G4 alliance with India, Japan, and Germany–and in the priority reaffirmation of the fight against poverty and hunger in the world, which led to the conquest of the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Strategic partnerships have developed both towards countries in the North–especially with European countries–and in the establishment of links and new consultation and coordination groups towards the so-called Global South: the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), BRICS, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), forums convened by Brazil bringing together presidents of South America and their African (AFRAS) and Arab (ASPA) counterparts, as well as greater engagement in international cooperation for development and in UN peacekeeping missions (among them, emphatically, MINUSTAH, for the stabilization of Haiti). Brazil's participation has increased both qualitatively and in volume in all forums that rewarded the ingenuity and skill of a diplomacy of great technical sophistication and excellent intellectual preparation, even if some issues were more influenced by the PT's "partisan diplomacy"–as acknowledged by the President himself–than by the official channels of professional diplomacy (especially relations with Cuba and the "Bolivarian" countries).
One area that grew enormously in the last two decades of this century was assistance to Brazilians abroad. This represented a significant effort by professional diplomats in consular work, generally less prestigious in previous times, but which began to receive special attention from Itamaraty, as Brazil ceased to be a country of immigration and became an "exporter" of its own workforce, initially poorly qualified, but in the recent period even involving specialized personnel and highly trained staff. Overall, the so-called Lula-era diplomacy preserved the basic lines of traditional foreign policy–especially regarding the central methods of multilateralism–but innovated considerably in its style, as reflected in the triumphalist slogan of "South-South diplomacy". In this vein, relations with South American, African, and Middle Eastern countries, as well as the major emerging economies that were part of IBSA and later BRICS, received the most attention from the PT governments. This cannot be seen exactly as a break from previous patterns, but rather as a reinforced emphasis on the old "Third Worldism" so often criticized by American partners. Indeed, the leaders at the head of Lula's PT diplomacy were keen to link the PT's foreign policy to the Independent Foreign Policy of the early 1960s.
ON THE ROAD TO A MAJOR RUPTURE: DISAFFECTION WITH THE PT AND THE RISE OF AN EXTREME RIGHT WING
The third government of Lula's Workers' Party was a disaster, especially in the economic field, but also an operational setback given the great international prominence of Lula's presidential diplomacy. Dilma Rousseff did not hide her dislike for Itamaraty, nor her weariness with dialogue with foreign partners, even though professional and parallel–"partisan"–diplomacy continued to defend the major themes of the PT's foreign policy: South American protagonism–a leadership contested and, in part, challenged by other regional leaders, including Chávez and Néstor Kirchner–, plurilateral projection through BRICS–which established a "development bank" and a contingent reserve mechanism at the Fortaleza summit in 2014–and great leadership on social and environmental issues. However, the massive corruption revealed by Operation Lava Jato, which began in 2014, as well as the largest economic crisis and recession in Brazilian history in 2015-2016, precipitated popular disaffection and discord between the President and her congressional base, culminating in impeachment in the middle of this year.
The new government led by then-Vice President Michel Temer represented a slight break with the immediately preceding foreign policy, but simply a return to more traditional standards followed by the professional diplomacy of the years before Lula's Workers' Party, without the resounding appeals to a vaguely defined "Global South," and especially in the field of regional foreign policy, in which the parallel diplomacy of alliances with the "Bolivarian" countries and with Cuba disappeared. Chavista Venezuela, which had been opportunistically incorporated into Mercosur (and even illegally, since it did not meet any of the bloc's formal requirements, including adherence to the Common External Tariff), ended up being suspended from the integration scheme, just as Temer's Brazil and Macri's Argentina decided to withdraw from Unasur, which had been practically controlled by the "Bolivarians."
The "great rupture" actually occurred during the 2018 presidential campaign, when, for the first time in republican history, a government openly aligned with the far right, which was already making progress internationally, managed to secure enough support from the electorate to initiate a government and a foreign policy never before seen in the annals of the independent state. For the first time in almost two hundred years of history, a government broke with patterns normally accepted by all previous administrations by acting pragmatically with neighbors and the international community, regardless of any political orientation of the countries with which formal diplomatic relations were maintained. The government program of candidate Bolsonaro, officially announced in August 2018, stated that he would carry out a small revolution in foreign policy and diplomacy, even if its wording was as schizophrenic as possible. The announced break with all the standards and guidelines of previous foreign policies and diplomacy was so explicit that its basic lines, contained in the document delivered to the Superior Electoral Court (2018, 79)–probably written by complete amateurs in international affairs–deserve to be transcribed in full (and that was all):
- We will stop praising murderous dictatorships and despising or even attacking important democracies like the US, Israel, and Italy. We will no longer make spurious trade agreements or hand over the patrimony of the Brazilian people to international dictators.
- In addition to deepening our integration with all our Latin American brothers and sisters who are free from dictatorships, we need to redirect our focus on partnerships.
- Countries that sought closer ties but were overlooked for ideological reasons have much to offer Brazil in terms of trade, science, technology, innovation, education, and culture.
- Emphasis on bilateral relations and agreements.
The foreign policy "program" for the "new Itamaraty" may seem bizarre, and even ridiculous, but incredibly, it was followed in its entirety, if not in letter, at least in the spirit of its outlandish recommendations, by the first foreign minister appointed by the government that took office on January 1, 2019. In the weeks following his victory in October 2018, he had already announced that he would withdraw Brazil from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, that he would disassociate the country from the Global Compact on Migration, that he would move the Brazilian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, that he would promote a reassessment of bilateral relations with China–denounced by the candidate himself for wanting to "buy Brazil" after visiting Taiwan–and, above all and especially, that he would form a close alliance with the American government (in reality, a policy of near submission to everything President Trump wanted, with emphasis on the overthrow of the Chavista government in Venezuela). In fact, the foreign policy ordered by the President–assisted by a bunch of amateurs and a chancellor visibly subservient to this "lunatic fringe"–was much worse than what was outlined in the "program" registered with the Superior Electoral Court, which was characterized by hostility towards progressive governments in Latin America and even personal disagreements with European leaders whose only stance had been to express legitimate concern about the truly disastrous anti-environmental policy that has become Brazil's negative international trademark since the first days of the new government.
The succession of confrontations, both regionally and globally, led by the President himself, as well as by members of the "lunatic fringe," has built an international isolation for Brazil never before seen in the annals of our diplomacy, not even during the military dictatorship, when news about political repression, censorship, and the elimination or "disappearance" of political opponents frequented the pages of major international newspapers. Some truly embarrassing, even surreal, episodes, from the point of view of professional diplomacy, have become frequent in Brazilian and international news, such as the diatribes of the President and the accidental chancellor against the Chavista dictatorship, against the new Peronist President of Argentina, against European leaders, and against the "communist dictatorship" of China, as done on several occasions by the President's own son, Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, the virtual (and real) boss of the merely formal chancellor. Alongside and in opposition to these confrontations, the only relationships desired and sought by the avowedly right-wing government in Brazil were those with leaders of the small illiberal and anti-multilateralist arc of countries, namely President Trump (the subject of a virtually servile declaration: "I love you Trump"), the far-right leader of Italy, Matteo Salvini (later removed from a new coalition government), the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban, and a few other representatives of this right wing proud of being so.
Brazil's international isolation was engineered by the President himself and his government, including the foreign minister, who even acknowledged that the country had become a "pariah" in the world community, in one of the most embarrassing episodes for diplomats, which occurred on "Diplomat's Day" in 2020. The foreign minister's growing disagreements with congressional leaders led to his resignation in March 2021, which, while providing some relief from the diplomats' perspective, did not significantly alter the President's posture or statements. He continued to provoke discord both domestically and internationally through a completely anti-diplomatic stance and a foreign policy that followed the same ideological line as before, albeit mitigated by a virtual distancing of the head of state from international meetings, except for formal speeches prepared by Itamaraty and his most responsible advisors.
In the first weeks of 2022–already amidst escalating disagreements with ministers of the Supreme Federal Court and the Superior Electoral Court regarding the electronic voting system, likely motivated by an intention to ignite the electoral process–another disagreement arose between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supported by presidential advisors, and the President himself, concerning a planned visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was demonstrably preparing a military invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Bolsonaro insisted on visiting even after numerous warnings issued by American leaders. The trip cemented yet another of the President's disastrous initiatives, as it prompted a declaration of "solidarity" with the Russians that caused further embarrassment to professional diplomacy, shortly before the war of aggression launched by the Russian leader against Ukraine. This was another break with the prudent and pragmatic diplomacy of Itamaraty, traditionally conducted with strict respect for International Law and the UN Charter, flagrantly violated by Russia, even though this same indifferent stance towards established principles and values of international law had already been recorded in the invasion, by the same Russia, of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, an act of aggression ignored at the time, in 2014, by President Dilma Rousseff.
A NEW “DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE” IN 2023?
In early August 2022, electoral polls pointed to a likely victory in the first or second round of the October presidential election for former president Lula, with "diplomatic" statements already made by him and his former foreign minister, and possible future presidential advisor, Celso Amorim. The rupture, obviously, is first and foremost with Bolsonaro's diplomacy, an exotic and disastrous accident in two hundred years of foreign policy characterized by certain basic traits that not even dictatorships or exceptional episodes dared to contest, but which were terribly deformed during four years of ignorant amateurism and primitive instincts close to a very rustic extreme right. However, it could also represent a new break with established patterns of foreign policy and diplomacy that have been invariably followed throughout almost the entire trajectory of the independent state: pragmatism, balance in bilateral relations, respect for international law, the avoidance of ideological or partisan considerations in conducting the state's external actions, the emphasis on multilateralism, and the universalism of diplomatic relations. Not that a future PT (Workers' Party) government will break with such patterns and methods of work, but, based on the record of previous experience, a return to a certain geographical determinism–represented by this myopia of the Global South–and a preference for deepening plurilateral relations within the BRICS framework is possible. This group is currently increasingly manipulated by China, and now by Russia, to serve its strictly national and anti-Western objectives and interests.
Both former President Lula and his main advisor on international affairs have stated that the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), if not the Ukrainian President himself, bear some responsibility for the crisis that resulted in what is called a "conflict" between Russia and Ukraine, but which is in reality simply a war of aggression by a militarily powerful neighbor against a weaker country, sanctioned as such by the UN Charter and the most elementary principles of International Law. This, incidentally, is a point of convergence–practical, not doctrinal–with Bolsonaro's diplomacy, which has also clearly manifested a stance of not censuring Russia, of not following in any way the sanctions imposed against it by "Western" countries, as well as resolutely opposing the supply of weapons and military equipment for the defense of Ukraine against its aggressor.
In the absence of defined prospects for the regional diplomacy of a likely Workers' Party government–given that political and ideological fragmentation is a reality in South America–as well as for the phantom "Global South," torn apart by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the stance of Brazil's future diplomacy in relation to the most serious conflict that has unexpectedly arisen on the international agenda should be the main challenge for this government, in addition to its own policy regarding a BRICS that is quite different from its initial format and objectives.
In the absence of defined prospects for the regional diplomacy of a likely Workers' Party (PT) government–given that political and ideological fragmentation is a reality in South America–as well as for the phantom "Global South," torn apart by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the stance of Brazil's future diplomacy regarding the most serious conflict that has unexpectedly arisen on the international agenda should be the main challenge for this government, in addition to its own policy regarding a BRICS that is quite different from its initial format and objectives. The rupture, in this case, would not even be in relation to the Bolsonaro government or the traditional standards of Itamaraty, but with respect to the very principles of International Law, seriously compromised by the current war of aggression waged by a "partner" of Brazil in one of the groups privileged by Lula's PT diplomatic policies, contradicting stances that even the Estado Novo (New State) did not dare to transgress (by refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the violent invasion of Poland by Nazi forces and the invasion and incorporation of the three Baltic countries by the Soviet Union). Yet another rupture in the long history of Brazilian diplomacy...
References
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. 2018. O Caminho da Prosperidade - Proposta de Plano de Governo. TSE - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. https://divulgacandcontas.tse.jus.br/candidaturas/oficial/2018/BR/BR/2022802018/280000614517/proposta_1534284632231.pdf.
Received: August 7, 2022
Accepted for publication: September 26, 2022
Translation published: July 22, 2026
* Translated by Theo Pereira with the support of digital machine translation tools: Google Translate (initial draft), Grammarly (grammatical and syntactic revision), and ChatGPT (selective phrasing refinements). Reviewed by the author.
Copyright © 2026 CEBRI-Revista. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited.
