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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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terça-feira, 21 de maio de 2024

"Ninguém está acima da lei", diz o procurador do TPI, emitindo decisão de processo contra Netanyahu e líderes do Hamas

 Na verdade, alguns permanecem à margem da lei, como as grandes potências e potências menores como Israel, mas também grupos terroristas. Mas a condenação MORAL é necessária.

Alguns poucos aliados dos criminosos, à direita e à esquerda, tentam ignorar a seriedade do trabalho do TPI contra indivíduos que cometem crimes de guerra e contra a humanidade. Entre eles se encontra, infelizmente, o presidente do Brasil, Lula, por razões que sinceramente desconheço.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

“Nobody is above the law.”

CNN Meanwhile in America, May 21, 2024


This is how Karim Khan, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, on Monday explained his application for arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his defense minister and several top Hamas leaders.

The ICC’s decision to accuse Netanyahu, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and others of war crimes and crimes against humanity created global shockwaves – and caused uproar in the internal politics of Israel and its close ally, the United States.

It is unlikely that anyone named will go on trial anytime soon. Neither Israel nor the United States recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC, although the court says Gaza falls within its writ after Palestinian leaders formally agreed to be bound by the court’s founding principles in 2015. There is also no clear way to extricate Sinwar from Gaza to face justice.

Hamas' October 7 attacks in Israel killed 1,200 people and took around 240 hostage. Israel’s subsequent campaign in Gaza has killed tens of thousands of people and spread hunger across the enclave, as it tries to eradicate the terror group. Supporters of Khan's move on Monday would argue that the victims on both sides – many of them civilians – deserve some kind of justice. But the great power politics that have long hampered the ICC are already threatening to make its latest attempt to take action as impossible to implement as its previous arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin over his invasion of Ukraine.

The United States has long opposed the ICC because of the possibility that it could prosecute Americans. Like Russia and China, it does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court, blunting its effectiveness. Yet again, we saw the contradictions exposed when the US bemoans Israel’s failure to do more to protect civilians – but balks at serious attempts to make those responsible pay a legal price.

US President Joe Biden called Khan’s request for arrest warrants “outrageous” and said “whatever this prosecutor might imply, there is no equivalence — none between Israel and Hamas.” Republicans are already warning of sanctions against the court. “The ICC has no authority over Israel or the United States, and today’s baseless and illegitimate decision should face global condemnation,” House Speaker Mike Johnson said. “International bureaucrats cannot be allowed to use lawfare to usurp the authority of democratic nations that maintain the rule of law.”

Biden has been at odds with Netanyahu recently over the prime minister’s unwillingness to take US advice to roll back his plan for an even bigger incursion into the southern Gaza city of Rafah. While his defense of Israel on Monday might ease some of the criticism to his right, the politics of Monday’s developments are horrible for the president. Every time Biden defends Netanyahu, he gets in trouble again with the progressive and younger voters who are irate about the terrible civilian toll in Gaza and whose indifference to Biden threatens his hopes in November’s election. 

 

And the US’ defense of what many see as Israel's disproportionate response to the horror of Hamas' original terrorist crime will only increase cynicism, even among its friends, the next time Washington raises human rights and the global rule of law.

segunda-feira, 20 de maio de 2024

José Guilherme Merquior sobre a poesia de Alberto da Costa e Silva - Elixir do Apocalipse (1983)

 José Guilherme Merquior 


NO MAR DO INSTANTE
 
        Alberto da Costa e Silva não é poeta bissexto. Pelo contrário: até que vem versejando mais que antes, e não faz muito tempo nos deu esse admirável As Linhas da Mão, um dos mais puros vôos líricos da década passada. Mas é um poeta do intensivo; e neste magro livrinho, A roupa no estendal, o muro, os pombos, a própria ausência da numeração das páginas parece sublinhar a natureza nada copiosa desse verso feito de limpidez e contenção. Lirismo sempre em surdina, alheio a toda oratória e, na verdade, a todo efeito retórico.  

        Há uma “ars poetica” do verso oratório, muito eficaz em d’Aubigné, Hugo, ou, entre nós, Castro Alves, Menotti del Picchia ou Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna; apenas não é esta a família poética dos textos de Alberto da Costa e Silva. Neles, nada se salvas de tropos, nem música (por mais bela) externa; nenhum jogo pelo jogo. A linhagem albertina não se prendeu ao idioma neoparnasiano de 45, nem à neovanguarda seguinte. Como Octavio Mora ou Marly de Oliveira, trata-se de um poeta nem antimoderno, nem experimental ? mas muito menos “literário” que esses dois. “Jardim imaginário com sapos reais dentro dele” ? essa miniestética de Marianne Moore, epigrafando A roupa no estendal..., situa acuradamente o espírito antiornamental da poesia de Alberto.  
John Bailey, o fino crítico de Oxford, costuma cobrar da poesia contemporânea o senso perdido da magia. De magia não como dúbio reflexo de supostas transcendências, mas como encapsulamento verbal do encanto das coisas, de certa aura das situações. Os antigos sabiam disso quando falavam das “lacrimae rerum”, do pranto da natureza. Alberto canta sempre algo assim: uma discreta vibração do quotidiano, o claro mistério das situações mais singelas, do espetáculo, nada espetacular, da vida à mão. Intermitente comunhão da alma com um súbito sentido da existência,  

     ... neste assombro do tempo que só é o que já fomos, um céu parado sobre o mar do instante.  
        “Tudo é eterno quando nós o vemos”, sentencia esse poeta de modo algum sentencioso. E a partir dai, dessa quieta mística do átimo, a melodia de seus sóbrios “enjambements” se torna irmã da luz dos Vermeer e Morandi. Alberto pertence à raça dos contemplativos ardentes, que extraem seiva lírica da matéria mais humilde, do gesto mais banal, do momento mais precário. Como, por exemplo, tomar café na copa; ou lembrar os ritos da infância; o rever uma avó junto à máquina de costura:  
      ... Sonho vê-la no seu vestido negro, a gola branca contra o corpo de cão, negro, da máquina: a roda, de perfil, parece imóvel e a vida não se exila na beleza  
        Realmente não se exila: não se alonga fugindo e vai morar no esteticismo. E por isso é que a meditação, nesse tipo de poesia, flui desimpedida do álbum dos dias simples, qual pura emanação de vivências ao alcance da solidariedade imaginativa de cada um. Assim, na “Elegia de Lagos”, a impressão da morte:  
    A morte  
    debulha-se  
    como uma fava: caem  
    de dentro dela os dias,  
    até o mais antigo,  
    em que ouvimos o seu nome pela vez primeira.  
    Ela nos põe o, focinho, sendo um cão, nos joelhos  
    e está cheia de sarna, de infância e de medo.  

    Abandona-me o que vejo  
    e fica em mim represo.  
    Fui  
    o que não pensei ter sido. Sei que os dias  
    se abraçam comigo.  
    Tive o amor e a beleza.  
    Por isso,  
    agora,  
    passo a mão humildemente sobre o pêlo do cachorro,  
    quase a pedir  
    ao escorraçado,  
    ao esquecido,  
    que se aconchegue aos meus pés  
    e aqui  
    fique.  

        Esta metafísica domesticada fala baixinho e devagar. O verso sincopado é o seu respiro, cheio de ênfases lacônicas ? pausas ? ditadas por um sentimento do mundo como que destilado. Pois se essa poesia, intimista por vocação, não comenta o mundo de maneira abrangente, não é por estreiteza de registro moral:  

     Existe o rio.  
     Existe o campo. Existem  
     papoulas e um céu que era cedo.  
     Existem o não, e a páscoa, e a noite obesa,  
     e o ócio furioso. O iluminado  
     gosto de febre e de ferida existe.  
     Existem o eterno e a sombra  
     de um céu fosco e deserto  
     sobre o quando o esquecemos.  
     

        “Emoção recolhida em tranqüilidade”... Ainda há poesia que não se envergonha do lirismo ? mas que nem por isso faz dele um a priori postiço, mascarando a crueza e, em última análise, a própria beleza da realidade nossa de cada dia. 
 [O Elixir do Apocalipse,
Rio de Janeiro, Nova Fronteira, 1983]

How Jimmy Carter Changed American Foreign Policy: An Enduring—and Misunderstood—Legacy - Stuart E. Eizenstat Foreign Affairs

 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-jimmy-carter-changed-american-foreign-policy?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Dangers%20of%20an%20Ungovernable%20Gaza&utm_content=20240520&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

On September 17, 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter faced a momentous crisis. For nearly two weeks, he had been holed up at Camp David with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, trying to hammer out a historic peace deal. Although the hard-liner Begin had proven intransigent on many issues, Carter had made enormous progress by going around him and negotiating directly with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, and Legal Adviser Aharon Barak. On the 13th day, however, Begin drew the line. He announced he could compromise no further and was leaving. The talks on which Carter had staked his presidency would all be for naught.

But then, Carter made a personal gesture. Knowing that Begin had eight grandchildren and was exceptionally devoted to them, Carter signed photographs of the three leaders, which he addressed to each grandchild by name, and then personally carried them over to Begin’s cabin, where Begin was preparing to depart. As Begin read the names of his grandchildren, his lips quivered and his eyes watered and he put down his bags. Later that same day, he reached a breakthrough agreement with Sadat on what became the framework for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty six months later.

In the years after Carter left office, in early 1981, the consensus in Washington was often that his foreign policy had been a failure. Carter began his term warning that he would not succumb to an “inordinate fear of communism,” which many critics took as a sign of weakness. It was also on his watch that the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the ensuing U.S. hostage crisis unfolded. Moreover, Carter’s frequent mixing of soft and hard power made his approach to the world difficult to define and easy to misunderstand. And his accomplishments were quickly obscured by his decisive loss to Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election.

But as that final day at Camp David makes clear, during his one term in office, Carter left an enduring and positive foreign policy legacy that few presidents who have served two can match. Carter, who has been in hospice for over a year, should take great satisfaction in his track record. He was a liberal internationalist and a peacemaker who shunned the use of military force in favor of diplomacy, an approach that would continue for decades after he left office and for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002. He advocated for free trade and believed that U.S. foreign policy should reflect the country’s best values. And although he was prepared to take a hawkish line on key Cold War policies, he was proud of the fact that no American died in combat during his time in office.

OUTGUNNING MOSCOW

By the time Carter entered the White House in 1977, the Cold War was deeply entrenched. The Soviet Union was aggressively expanding in Africa through various proxy armies in Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia, and the Horn of Africa. It was also building up its nuclear arsenal, further suppressing internal dissent, making it harder for Soviet Jews to emigrate, and exerting absolute control over the communist Eastern bloc. Meanwhile, pro-American, anticommunist dictators flourished throughout Latin America, as well as in parts of Asia and Africa, having been supported by the Nixon and Ford administrations. And the Middle East, still in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was a tinderbox.

At the same time, the military and economic power of the United States and its allies was waning. U.S. defense spending had declined in real terms since the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam four years earlier. NATO members had not invested in their military capabilities. And the United States’ international economic leadership was challenged by a declining dollar and an impasse at the Tokyo Round of international trade negotiations.

Carter had campaigned in 1976 as a foreign policy liberal. He pledged to freeze the number of atomic missiles and warheads, reduce defense spending by $5 billion to $7 billion annually, and withdraw all U.S. ground troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea. He promised to make human rights central to his foreign policy, in contrast to the realpolitik favored by his predecessors, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and Henry Kissinger, who served both of them as secretary of state.

But once he took office, Carter realized that, given the Soviet Union’s rapid military and nuclear buildup, the United States needed more hard power, too, and took steps to augment it. He was often caught between the advice of his hawkish national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and his dovish secretary of state, Cyrus Vance. Instead of cutting defense spending, he raised it, reversing the post-Vietnam reductions and seeking to rebuild the U.S. military; in real terms, he increased defense spending by about 12 percent over his four-year term. In fact, most of the major weapons systems deployed by the Reagan administration had actually been approved by Carter: the stealth bomber, the MX mobile missile, and modern cruise missiles among them. A 2017 Pentagon study concluded that “the Reagan revolution in defense spending began during the later years of the Carter administration.”

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter took an even more hawkish turn. He called the conflict “the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War,” and even his critics applauded his tough stance. He embargoed grain to the Soviet Union, announced a U.S. boycott of the Olympics in Moscow, imposed economic sanctions on the Soviet Union, and reinstituted the draft. Moreover, he asserted that the United States would use force to ensure that oil flowed freely through the Persian Gulf—a concept that would come to be known as the Carter Doctrine and which remains a tenet of U.S. foreign policy today.

Carter also ramped up pressure on the Soviet Union by persuading reluctant European allies, especially German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, to agree to host intermediate nuclear weapons on their soil to counter the Soviet mobile missiles. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev later said that this move helped convince him of the need to disarm. Reagan often gets credit for SALT II, the landmark nuclear arms reduction treaty with Moscow that he implemented, but it was Carter who negotiated it.

Carter also challenged the Soviets by cultivating relations with China. Nixon and Kissinger initiated the historic thaw between the United States and China in 1972, but it was Carter who then normalized relations with the People’s Republic—at the time an enemy of the Soviet Union—by granting it full diplomatic recognition in 1979. And although this step required ending formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Carter also created a new relationship with the island under the Taiwan Relations Act, which established the astute concept of “strategic ambiguity,” by which the United States maintains the capability to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion without explicitly promising to do so. The law remains the basis for U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan today.

HUMAN RIGHTS CRUSADER

Although Carter could get tough when needed, the centerpiece of his foreign policy was human rights, as he had promised in his campaign. He profoundly transformed the United States’ relationship with Latin America. He negotiated the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977, which transferred the canal to eventual Panamanian control—rectifying a long-standing grievance for many Latin Americans—and fought the hardest congressional battle of his presidency to get the Senate to ratify the deal. He cut military assistance to dictators, such as Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina, Ernesto Geisel in Brazil, and Augusto Pinochet in Chile. And he threatened to withhold aid to countries, including Guatemala and Uruguay, if they did not release thousands of political prisoners. In 1977, at the initiative of Congress and with Carter’s enthusiastic backing, the U.S. State Department issued its first annual worldwide Human Rights Report, a public assessment of the state of human rights in nearly 200 countries that has continued under every presidential administration since.

Carter’s human rights policy struck a blow to the Soviet Union. He publicly supported Soviet dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, championed the emigration of Soviet Jews, and took up the cause of Soviet Jewish refuseniks such as Natan Sharansky. Soviet diplomat Anatoly Dobrynin, who served as Moscow’s ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986, conceded that Carter’s human rights policies “helped end the Cold War” because they “played a significant role in the long and difficult process of liberalization inside the Soviet Union.”

The crown jewels of Carter’s foreign policy were the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that followed in 1979, one of the greatest personal diplomatic achievements by any U.S. president before or since. As a deeply religious Baptist, Carter prioritized the Middle East because he wanted to bring peace to the Holy Land. And as a Cold War realist, he correctly saw the region as a key battleground for influence with the Soviet Union. Plunging headlong into the fiendishly complicated Middle East peace process, he took one of the biggest gambles of his presidency. After the Egyptians and Israelis failed to reach a peace agreement on their own, he invited—over the objections of his advisers—Sadat and Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David. Over 13 excruciating days, Carter personally wrote more than 20 drafts of a peace agreement, mostly by shuttling between the Egyptian and Israeli teams because the relationship between Sadat and Begin was so poisonous. In the end, it took him to the last hours—and the tribute to Begin’s grandchildren—to bring around Begin, who believed that Israel should extend from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.

As historic as they were, however, the Camp David accords were a nonbinding framework that was meant to be converted within three months to a legally binding treaty. When six months passed without an agreement, Carter took another risk for peace—again against the advice of his advisers—by going to the region to personally negotiate the treaty, now shuttling between Israel and Egypt with his own draft agreements. At the 11th hour, he reached a deal with Begin in the presidential suite of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem that ended 40 years of conflict between the two countries. It laid the foundations for a bilateral peace that endures today—even amid the terrible fighting that has engulfed the region since October 2023.

THE IRANIAN BLIND SPOT

No fair assessment of Carter’s foreign policy legacy can avoid his dealings with Iran. In the space of a few weeks in early 1979, the Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a decades-long ally to a self-proclaimed enemy. Later that same year, radical Iranian students breached the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took more than 50 Americans hostage for 444 debilitating days. Carter made many mistakes leading up to the crisis. His administration’s focus on the peace process between Egypt and Israel left Iran in a blind spot. The president had called Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza an “island of stability” in a toast to the Iranian leader on New Year’s Eve 1977, just a year before he was forced to leave the country. In failing to predict the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. intelligence community saddled Carter with the worst intelligence failure in modern American history. The CIA had failed to notice that the shah had lost support from all segments of society and did not know that he had incurable cancer. Just six weeks before the shah fled, the agency told the president that Iran was not primed for a revolution.

Some critics, including Kissinger, believe that Carter’s human rights policy undermined the shah. But Carter never publicly criticized the shah’s human rights record, despite massive violations by Iran’s intelligence service, and only privately advised him to reach out to moderate elements in Iranian society. Instead, Carter assured the shah that the United States would support a military crackdown to quell the growing unrest, sent General Robert Huyser to back the shah’s last prime minister over Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and authorized covert action to undermine Khomeini’s regime. Nonetheless, despite American missteps, it was the shah, and not Carter, who lost Iran. It is no fairer to blame Carter for the collapse of Iran’s pro-Western government than to blame President Dwight Eisenhower for losing Cuba to Fidel Castro.

When it came to getting the U.S. hostages back, Carter ultimately chose diplomacy over hard power. He put the safety of the hostages first by rejecting advice Brzezinski and I gave to mine or blockade the harbors of Kharg Island, from where most of Iran’s oil was exported. In the end, Carter negotiated their release but only after he lost the election. There is also now evidence that William Casey, Reagan’s campaign manager and eventually his CIA director, played a hand in slowing the release of the hostages. In 2023, Texas Lieutenant Governor Ben Barnes told The New York Times that Casey conveyed to Iran—through a proxy—that it would get a better deal from a Reagan administration if they kept the hostages until after the U.S. presidential election. When I asked James Baker, who became Reagan's chief of staff and then his treasury secretary, about Casey’s involvement in the Iran hostage crisis, he told me, “There’s nothing I wouldn’t believe about Casey.” Baker also admitted that Casey stole Carter’s presidential debate book, which I had prepared. Casey, who died in 1987, denied the accusation. Whatever the case, the delay in a hostage deal probably cost Carter the presidency.

THE LAST PEACEMAKER

Following his defeat, Carter created the Carter Center, a nonprofit that carries out many of the unfinished initiatives of his presidency, such as promoting peace and fighting disease. Under his leadership, the center monitored over 115 elections, hosted dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians, and contributed to the near eradication of Guinea worm, a parasitic disease. In 1986, there were 3.5 million cases of Guinea worm worldwide; by 2023, there were 14. In their own retirement, President George W. Bush and President Bill Clinton have both emulated the Carter Center’s model. Working with Habitat for Humanity, Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter also helped over 4,000 families in 14 countries move into safe, affordable housing.

Had Carter been reelected, he would have fought to ratify the SALT II nuclear arms treaty. (The agreement was never ratified, though both the Soviet Union and the Reagan administration honored the deal.) He also would have pressed for more comprehensive nuclear arms agreements with the Soviet Union, as Reagan did. Most important, he would have pushed for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. The Camp David accords and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty stipulated that Israel would grant “full autonomy” to the Palestinians, but the implementation of that article would have required another agreement, which his administration had already begun. Unfortunately, Reagan did not want to use the political capital Carter was willing to expend to secure greater Palestinian rights, which might have led to a Palestinian state and a more peaceful Middle East.

Even with his missteps in Iran, Carter’s foreign policy made a lasting positive mark on the world. Traces of Carter’s approach can be seen in the Biden administration today: the combination of hard and soft power, the focus on human rights and democracy, the courage to stand up to aggression from Moscow, and the continued commitment to strategic ambiguity with China. And of course, several presidents since Carter have tried to pull off a Middle East peace deal that matches Camp David’s success. It may in part be the failure of later administrations to accomplish such a feat that accounts for the terrible conflict the region finds itself in today. More than ever, the Middle East desperately needs the brave, deft diplomacy Carter was able to deliver.

CORRECTION APPENDED (MAY 20, 2024)

An earlier version of this article misstated James Baker’s role in the Reagan administration. He served as chief of staff and treasury secretary under Reagan, not as secretary of state—a post he later held under President George H. W. Bush.

  • STUART E. EIZENSTAT is Senior Counsel at Covington and Burling and the author of President Carter: The White House Years. He served as White House Domestic Policy Adviser in the Carter administration and in a number of roles in the Clinton administration, including Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.

  • III Simpósio Pombalino Internacional - Universidade de Alagoas, 3-5/06/2024


    A Cátedra Marquês de Pombal convida a todo(a)s para participar do III Simpósio Pombalino Internacional, que decorrerá entre os dias 3 e 5 de junho, de forma presencial, no Auditório da Reitoria da UFS. O tema deste ano é Paradoxos do Iluminismo

    III Simpósio Pombalino Internacional
    Universidade de Alagoas
    3-5/06/2024
     

    Autor de Marquês de Pombal - Paradoxo do Iluminismo, uma das obras mais influentes sobre a matéria publicada nas últimas décadas, Kenneth Maxwell, professor aposentado da Universidade de Harvard, Professor Visitante em várias universidades anglófonas e lusófonas e membro honorário da Cátedra Marquês de Pombal (Camões, I.P./UFS), é um historiador britânico especialista em História Ibérica e no estudo das relações entre Brasil e Portugal no século XVIII, sendo um dos mais importantes brasilianistas da atualidade. O III Simpósio Pombalino Internacional, reconhecendo a sua importância, decidiu homenageá-lo de duas maneiras: primeiro, organizando um evento em referente à sua obra, e em seguida concedendo um título de Doutor Honoris Causa da Universidade Federal de Sergipe. O evento contará com a participação de pesquisadores de várias universidades do país, além da equipe da UFS, sempre presente desde a organização da primeira edição do evento.

    As inscrições são gratuitas e devem ser feitas através do SIGAA UFS (https://www.sigaa.ufs.br/sigaa/public/extensao/paginaListaPeriodosInscricoesAtividadesPublico.jsf

    Seguem anexos os cards de divulgação e a programação do evento.

    Atenciosamente,

    Luiz Eduardo Oliveira

     
    Prof. Dr. Luiz Eduardo Oliveira (Coordenador)
    Lattes

    Petrobras: Sucesso e fracasso - André Gustavo Stumpf (Correio Braziliense)

     Petrobras: Sucesso e fracasso

    Agora, o presidente Lula demonstra sua inclinação a repetir as políticas de seus dois primeiros governos e o de sua sucessora do Planalto. A Petrobras está segurando o preço dos combustíveis para aliviar a inflação e, ao mesmo tempo, favorecer seus candidatos na eleição de novembro.

    André Gustavo Stumpf
    Correio Braziliense, 20/05/2024

    A Petrobras, empresa brasileira de petróleo, impressiona pelo seu tamanho, imenso valor (mais de US$250 bilhões), importância na economia brasileira e enorme capacidade de ser vítima da ação dos políticos. Seu sucesso é seu fracasso. No governo Lula 2, foi descoberto o fabuloso pré-sal que vai da costa do Espírito Santo até a de São Paulo com cerca de 15 bilhões de barris de petróleo. A descoberta permitiu que o Brasil assumisse a posição de importante exportador de petróleo. As necessidades do mercado interno foram atendidas, mas com o preço internacional.

    No governo Dilma, a Petrobras foi para o centro do debate político por motivo inglório. Foi descoberto o rentável esquema de corrupção na petroleira. Diretores admitiram receber fortunas para beneficiar empresas que redistribuíam parte dos lucros para o Partido dos Trabalhadores. Em 2006, a Petrobras pagou 360 milhões de dólares por 50% da refinaria de Pasadena, no Texas. Em 2008, a petroleira brasileira e a empresa belga de petróleo se desentenderam e uma decisão judicial obrigou a Petrobras a comprar a parte de sua sócia. A aquisição da refinaria de Pasadena acabou custando 1,18 bilhão de dólares à Petrobras, mais de 27 vezes o que a Astra teve de desembolsar. Foi o começo da história cabulosa.

    A Operação Lava-Jato da Polícia Federal, a partir de março de 2014, apurou um esquema de lavagem de dinheiro suspeito de movimentar mais de R$ 10 bilhões montante que, atualizado, alcança mais de R$ 20 bilhões. Até abril de 2014, a operação envolveu 46 pessoas indiciadas pelos crimes de formação de organização criminosa, crimes contra o sistema financeiro nacional, falsidade ideológica, lavagem de dinheiro e 30 foram presas, entre elas o doleiro Alberto Youssef e o ex-diretor da Petrobras, Paulo Roberto Costa. Pedro Barusco disse que o esquema de pagamento de propinas na Petrobras começou em 1997. 

    Em 14 de novembro de 2014, foram presos os presidentes e diretores de grandes empresas do Brasil, como OAS, Iesa Óleo e Gás, Camargo Corrêa, UTC Engenharia e Construtora Queiroz Galvão. A força-tarefa da Lava-Jato identificou R$ 10 bilhões em propinas, recuperou R$ 870 milhões, bloqueou outros R$ 2,4 bilhões e prendeu 105 envolvidos no escândalo. Em novembro de 2015, a PF estimou que o prejuízo da Petrobras com corrupção chega a R$ 42 bilhões, mas somente R$ 6 bilhões foram divulgados oficialmente pela empresa. A estimativa tem como base laudo da perícia criminal baseado em tabelas que mostram os pagamentos indevidos envolvendo 27 empresas apontadas como integrantes do cartel na Petrobras. 

    O governo Temer, que sucedeu o de Dilma Rousseff, tratou a empresa como ente privado. Saneou as dívidas, proporcionou ótimos dividendos para os acionistas. A mesma fórmula foi repetida no governo Bolsonaro. Agora, o presidente Lula demonstra sua inclinação a repetir as políticas de seus dois primeiros governos e o de sua sucessora do Planalto. A Petrobras está segurando o preço dos combustíveis para aliviar a inflação e, ao mesmo tempo, favorecer seus candidatos na eleição de novembro. Ele entende que o lucro da empresa deve ser investido em projetos sociais que gerem empregos. O mais conhecido deles é o sonho da indústria naval, que foi tentado várias vezes e virou pesadelo na forma de prejuízos monumentais.

    O presidente Lula tem exibido sua face analógica e a dificuldade em se situar no novo cenário globalizado e informatizado. Os novos negócios e os recentes caminhos do comércio internacional modificaram as referências no mundo moderno. Mas os dirigentes do PT ainda não perceberam. O chefe do governo custou a entender que ele precisaria definir uma pessoa para atuar em nome do governo federal no Rio Grande do Sul. Demorou muito. Escolheu o ministro Paulo Pimenta, que se tornou um evidente candidato ao governo daquele estado. Fez o anúncio em comício na cidade de São Leopoldo. O assembleísmo do PT ditou o rumo dos acontecimentos. Politizou o problema.

    A substituição de Jean Paul Prates na presidência da Petrobras está dentro da moldura da política petista, que pretende botar a mão nos lucros da empresa. Magda Chambriard, que dirigiu a Agência Nacional do Petróleo durante o governo Dilma, foi funcionária da Petrobras por mais de 20 anos. Conhece bem o assunto e sabe das intenções do presidente Lula. Os presidentes da Petrobras não costumam ficar muito tempo no cargo. Eles estão sempre no meio de interesses multimilionários e da vontade política do partido que está no poder. A substituição na presidência da Petrobras é apenas mais um capítulo na luta entre acionistas privados e o governo federal. O perigo é que os dois terminem perdendo dinheiro e o cidadão brasileiro pague o prejuízo ao final.


    A interminável novela do acordo Mercosul-UE - Oliver Pieper Deutsche Welle

     O que ainda segue travando o acordo UE-Mercosul

    Deutsche Welle, 19/05/2024

    A maior zona de livre-comércio do mundo não sairá do papel antes das eleições europeias no início de junho. Enquanto a França aperta o freio, Alemanha apoia ratificação do pacto. Já ambientalistas torcem pelo fracasso.


    Se for concluído, o acordo de livre-comércio entre a União Europeia (UE) e o Mercosul será o maior tratado desse tipo no mundo, atingindo um total de 780 milhões de pessoas. Contudo, em visita ao Brasil no fim de março, o presidente da França, Emmanuel Macron, avaliou que o pacto, "tal como está sendo negociado agora, é um péssimo acordo".

    A fala de Macron pode ter sido uma tentativa de evitar dar aos partidos populistas de direita franceses – como o Reunião Nacional, de Marine Le Pen – munição gratuita para sua campanha antes das eleições para o Parlamento Europeu no início de junho. Ou uma tentativa de não irritar ainda mais os agricultores franceses, que paralisaram as ruas do país durante semanas com seus protestos.

    As palavras do presidente francês ainda ressoam semanas depois, e o acordo entre a UE e países sul-americanos, finalizado há cinco anos, segue até hoje sem ratificação. A história se repete: foi também a França que bloqueou o acordo em 2019 – à época, em resposta ao ex-presidente de extrema direita Jair Bolsonaro e suas políticas controversas na Amazônia.

    Alemanha avança, e França freia

    Agora, Macron está preocupado com o fato de que a Argentina, o Brasil e o Uruguai possam inundar a União Europeia com carne mais barata – e que os agricultores franceses voltem a fazer barricadas. Por outro lado, o setor industrial alemão está pressionando para que o acordo seja concluído, se necessário por uma maioria qualificada, mesmo sem a ratificação da França.

    Grandes empresas químicas, como a Basf e a Bayer, bem como automotivas, incluindo a Daimler e a Volkswagen, veem o acordo como uma grande oportunidade de negócios. A Volkswagen disse à DW que "apoia uma política comercial aberta, livre e baseada em regras, e está defendendo a rápida ratificação do acordo com o Mercosul".

    Em Bruxelas, os negociadores permanecem notavelmente calmos, apesar do atraso. "As equipes do [acordo] UE-Mercosul continuam em contato em nível técnico para resolver as questões pendentes. A UE continua se concentrando em garantir que o acordo atenda às metas de sustentabilidade da UE, ao mesmo tempo em que leva em consideração as sensibilidades da UE no setor agrícola", afirma Olof Gill, porta-voz da Comissão de Comércio e Agricultura do bloco.

    E assim se desenha mais um capítulo na história aparentemente interminável das negociações entre a UE e o Mercosul. Elas começaram em 1999, com o objetivo de facilitar o comércio entre os dois continentes em determinados produtos e reduzir as tarifas. No entanto, esses 25 anos parecem ter sido uma crônica de oportunidades perdidas. A mais recente foi no final de 2023, quando o clima na França ainda estava calmo, os tratores ainda não passavam pelas cidades francesas, e o momento era de fato muito favorável.

    Argentina favorável

    Do outro lado do Atlântico, o autoproclamado anarcocapitalista Javier Milei, antes de ser eleito presidente da Argentina, chegou a fazer campanha para deixar o Mercosul e descreveu o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva como um "comunista furioso" e um "criminoso". Agora chefe de Estado, Milei não fala mais em sair do bloco sul-americano. Em vez disso, o entusiasta do livre-comércio já sinalizou que poderá assinar o contrato com a UE imediatamente.

    "O governo do presidente Milei quer reformar a economia argentina, abrindo-a para um maior comércio e uma presença internacional mais forte", avalia Marcela Cristini, economista sênior da Fundação de Investigações Econômicas Latino-Americanas (FIEL) da Argentina. "Juntamente com os outros países do Mercosul, já foram assinados acordos de livre-comércio com Cingapura e os países da EFTA [Islândia, Liechtenstein, Noruega e Suíça]."

    Portanto, a surpresa em Buenos Aires é ainda maior porque agora a UE, ou mais precisamente a França, está no caminho. Cada vez mais vozes se levantam na Argentina para que o acordo seja novamente revisto em busca de benefícios para seu próprio país. A União Europeia insiste numa declaração adicional com sanções a quem descumprir os objetivos ambientais do acordo.

    Cristini acredita que as exigências ambientais da UE são excessivas. Segundo ela, a pecuária argentina é muito mais ecologicamente correta do que a pecuária europeia. "A competitividade da indústria agrícola do Mercosul é reconhecida mundialmente, e teme-se a concorrência de suas exportações. Ao mesmo tempo, a pegada de carbono dos países do Mercosul em produtos agroindustriais está entre as mais baixas do mundo", afirma a especialista.

    China se beneficia de negociações paralisadas

    Por sua vez, a China vem acompanhando de perto as negociações paralisadas do acordo UE-Mercosul. "Os países do Mercosul são comerciantes globais, e a China é um dos principais compradores de produtos agrícolas e industriais, o que explica o crescimento dos fluxos comerciais bilaterais", explica Cristini.

    "Essa situação não poderá mais ser revertida. No caso do Mercosul, a China é o parceiro comercial número um ou número dois de cada país", acrescenta.

    Ambientalistas esperam fracasso

    Enquanto isso, Macron é a última esperança para aqueles que se opõem fundamentalmente ao acordo de livre-comércio. Organizações ambientais e de direitos humanos da Europa e da América do Sul vêm lutando contra os planos há anos. Um breve comentário do presidente francês, sugerindo a negociação de um novo tratado que "leve em conta o desenvolvimento, o clima e a biodiversidade", fez com que esses grupos se organizassem.

    Na vanguarda da oposição está a advogada de direito ambiental Roda Verheyen. Em um parecer jurídico encomendado pelo Greenpeace Alemanha, ela concluiu que o acordo viola a lei climática internacional.

    "Esse acordo não deveria mais ser negociado, porque simplesmente não representa um acordo de livre-comércio moderno e legal, não importa o que eles acrescentem a ele", disse Verheyen à DW. "O acordo UE-Mercosul está simplesmente desatualizado e inadequado, do ponto de vista atual, para combinar proteção climática e abordagens políticas globais."

    A advogada ambiental já defendeu com sucesso uma maior proteção climática na Alemanha, perante o Tribunal Constitucional Federal em Karlsruhe, em 2021. Ela afirma que, devido ao aumento do desmatamento e das emissões de gases de efeito estufa, a meta de proteção climática do Acordo de Paris de limitar o aquecimento global a um máximo de 2 graus, de preferência 1,5, está ficando fora de alcance.

    Em vez disso, Verheyen exige que, no mundo de hoje, os acordos de livre-comércio se concentrem principalmente na transferência e no compartilhamento de tecnologias.

    "Como o acordo com a Nova Zelândia, por exemplo, e acordos menores também, que se concentram na transformação em ambas as direções", diz. "Nosso objetivo certamente não pode ser importar produtos agrícolas do exterior mais baratos e, por outro lado, exportar motores de combustão interna para o exterior. Isso é prejudicial para todos."


    domingo, 19 de maio de 2024

    18 novos paises no mundo desde o fim da Guerra Fria

    A maior parte desses 18 países é formada pelos saídos da implosão do maior império do mundo, o finado soviético (URSS). Mas, o império russo é ainda o maior do mundo, vai implodir também?

    Mas antes da implosão da URSS, outros estados se tornaram independentes, alguns reconhecidos imediatamente, como Angola, Moçambique e Guiné Bissau, além de Cabo Verde e São Tomé e Príncipe; faltou incluir o Timor Leste, que se declarou independente desde 1975, mas que foi invadido pela Indonésia no mesmo ano; durou mais de duas décadas e foi finalmente reconhecido como Estado membro da ONU em 2002.

    Falta ainda a Palestina, que não sabemos se virá, quando virá. Não esqueçamos os curdos, quem sabe Taiwan?

    The world’s newest countries:

    🇸🇸 South  Sudan -  2011

    🇲🇪 Montenegro -  2006

    🇷🇸 Serbia -  2000

    🇵🇼 Palau -  1994

    🇨🇿 Czech Republic -  1993

    🇸🇰 Slovakia -  1993

    🇪🇷 Eritrea -  1993

    🇲🇰 North Macedonia -  1993

    🇺🇿 Uzbekistan -  1992

    🇰🇿 Kazakhstan -  1992

    🇦🇿 Azerbaijan -  1992

    🇹🇯 Tajikistan -  1992

    🇰🇬 Kyrgyzstan -  1992

    🇹🇲 Turkmenistan -  1992

    🇭🇷 Croatia -  1992

    🇬🇪 Georgia -  1992

    🇲🇩 Moldova -  1992

    🇧🇦 Bosnia and Herzegovina -  1992



    The State of Russia in 2024: Documentary by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)


    Atkinson on Rollo, 'Terminus: Westward Expansion, China, and the End of American Empire' [Review] (H-Net Reviews)


    Estamos vivenciando o fim de uma era? O fim da expansão contínua do império americano e o início da re-ascensão do Império do Meio (em sua fase política comunista), depois de dois séculos e meio de ascensão do primeiro e do declínio do segundo? 

    Pode ser, mas é um processo que pode se passar pacificamente, ou envolver algum conflito bilateral, uma vez que se trata de um processo diferente do que houve durante a era anterior, quando os dois impérios estavam relativamente ou absolutamente desconectados. Desta vez, há uma grande interdependência (já foi melhor) e intensos contatos entre os dois impérios, diretamente e nas zonas de fricção (Taiwan e Rússia, para mencionar apenas duas), o que pode comandar uma convivência em bons termos ou atiçar conflitos já existentes. Este livro trata do passado e não do presente ou do futuro, mas ele oferece boas indicações sobre como abordar essa MAIS IMPORTANTE relação da atual geopolítica mundial, mais até do que o desafio da Rússia, que pode ser contido no continente europeu.

    As próximas décadas já são a de uma nova corrida armamentista, nuclear e espacial, e de uma disputa de arrogâncias que pode descambar para um conflito direto. O que significa que não haverá muito espaço para a cooperação conjunta em benefício dos países mais pobres, mas uma competição sem qualquer convergência de objetivos entre os dois grandes impérios da atualidade.

    Paulo Roberto de Almeida

    Brasília, 19/05/2024


    Atkinson on Rollo, 'Terminus: Westward Expansion, China, and the End of American Empire' [Review]

    H-Net Reviews

    Rollo, Stuart.  Terminus: Westward Expansion, China, and the End of American Empire. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023. 296 pp. $55.95 (cloth), ISBN 9781421447384.

    Reviewed by David C. Atkinson (Purdue University)
    Published on H-Diplo (May, 2024)
    Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

    Printable Version: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=60309

    Stuart Rollo’s Terminus: Westward Expansion, China, and the End of American Empire is a richly kaleidoscopic contribution to the ever-burgeoning literature on US-China relations. Rollo situates the Sino-US relationship in terms of the rise and fall of American empire, and this is the book’s most important interpretive contribution. Focusing on the context and character of Americans’ evolving disposition toward China over the last 250 years, he begins with an overview of US continental colonization and Americans’ subsequent expansion into the Pacific Ocean. He concludes with President Joseph Biden’s attempt to resuscitate the diminished structures of the US-dominated liberal internationalist order. In between, Rollo entwines his evaluation of American engagements with China with an expertly rendered narrative of imperialism and foreign relations, blending historical and international relations perspectives throughout. It is an erudite and informative synthesis that should appeal to all H-Diplo readers, as well as our students and members of the public who seek a clear understanding of why contemporary US-Chinese relations remain so fraught in our present moment, and how we got here.

    Terminus is a versatile book that can be read in multiple registers. Rollo’s narrative is especially valuable for the way he weaves four distinct narrative threads together. On one level, it is a useful survey of Sino-US relations, albeit one that emphasizes the perspectives of American rather than Chinese interlocuters in that relationship. Readers looking for the Chinese perspective, or a greater focus on traditional diplomatic relations, will find it lacking compared to Warren I. Cohen’s still essential America’s Response to China (2019), for example. But that is not Rollo’s purpose. Rather, Terminus seeks to integrate that story into the history of American empire and expansion. On that level, it offers something particularly novel. Historians of American imperialism might balk at Rollo’s emphasis on the imperial rather than colonial manifestations of Americans’ desire for economic, if not territorial, suzerainty in Aisa, but again, that is not his objective: how Americans conceived of China (Qing, Nationalist, and Communist) in relation to the rise and fall of American empire (commercial, financial, territorial, military, and ideational) is the focus. In addition to interlacing these themes, on another level Rollo pays regular attention to the ideas of those theorists and strategists who whetted American appetites when it came to China, combining historical and international relations scholarship and perspectives throughout the narrative. We hear from a large cast of both critics and boosters of American power from across the centuries, including Karl Marx, John Atkinson Hobson, Nicholas Spykman, William Appleman Williams, and Andrew Bacevich to name a few. Finally, the book can be read as a very engaging survey of US foreign relations writ large, since Rollo never confines himself to the transpacific lens, and instead constantly keeps American visions of China in the same frame as Americans’ conceptions of a broader global imperium.

    Terminus is therefore best understood as an alloy, in that it derives its strength from the mixture of these four interlacing narratives and frames. The result is a concise and accessible book that offers an adept historical overview of China’s changing significance to American policymakers, theorists, and strategists from independence to the present.

    The book is divided into three sections, each encompassing a distinct phase of American ambitions for China. Part 1 traces the story from the aftermath of independence to the turn of the twentieth century and focuses on the commercial and financial aspirations of American merchants, statesmen, and strategists during that century. In the first two chapters, Rollo roots his narrative in a familiar story of westward expansion characterized by violent Native dispossession and the insatiable drive for land and commercial access to Asia. In that context, China especially enraptured those seeking to exploit Asia’s potentially lucrative markets, goods, and raw materials. Rollo is attentive to the domestic and international contexts that both facilitated and inhibited the realization of these prospects—whether real or imagined—and he emphasizes the internal and external ruptures that catalyzed the Qing dynasty’s nineteenth-century decline. This part of the book culminates in the convulsion of late nineteenth-century US imperialism, and Rollo rightly focuses on the major manifestations of that paroxysm in the Asia-Pacific region. The Open-Door Notes and the Boxer Rebellion receive particular attention, and Rollo is attentive to the racial and geostrategic anxieties that suffused the most capacious cravings of those who viewed China as an outlet not only for American goods, but also American capital and civilization.

    Part 2 addresses the twentieth-century phase of US economic and strategic predominance, from the emergence of American power following the First World War to the ostensive triumph of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Rollo unsurprisingly foregrounds the American and Japanese competition for East Asian predominance at the core of this section’s first chapter, orienting his analysis productively toward modern industrial warfare’s thirst for strategic raw materials. From this perspective, both contenders perceived China as a repository of essential minerals like manganese and tungsten that would consolidate their prospective regional—and in the case of the United States, global—primacy. Chapter 5 broadens its frame commensurate with the now truly global aspirations of American power. The allure of potential markets and investment opportunities in China and elsewhere now gave way to more sophisticated geostrategic conceptions of global capitalist integration and cooperation. Commercial dominance remained an important objective, but security and prosperity now required the creation and management of an intricate, internationally panoptic liberal-democratic architecture, one dominated of course by the United States. In Asia, that manifested in what Rollo provocatively calls an “American-led Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” anchored by Japan (pp. 120-121).

    The sixth chapter addresses the emergence of the People’s Republic and the Cold War, which in Rollo’s interpretation sees China evoke a more dangerously existential threat to the broader hegemonic project fostered by the United States, not just in Asia but around the world. He sees the wars in Korea and Vietnam as exemplars of that project, but also harbingers of its demise. It is the one chapter in which Rollo’s argument might have benefited from more room to breathe, since we are hurled at breakneck speed through some of the most consequential moments in the history of Sino-US relations. This includes not only those devasting American wars in Southeast and East Asia, but also President Richard Nixon’s rapprochement, President Jimmy Carter’s fulfillment of recognition, and the profound economic transformations of the Ronald Reagan years, not to mention those of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.

    The third part of Terminus transitions to the post-Cold War era through the present. Here, Rollo recounts the flush of victory that encouraged American policymakers to confidently thrust the open door upon the globe. The desire to secure markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities reigned supreme, as successive US presidents and their counselors inside and outside government tried to reshape the world in America’s apparently transcendent image. For Rollo, economic access and predominance remained paramount, but contemporary presidents differed in their enthusiasm for strategic competition with China. It waned during the Bill Clinton years, during which American officials believed the gospel of globalization would convert Chinese Communist leaders to the benefits of democratization and neoliberal economics. Strategic competition nevertheless waxed under the presidency of George W. Bush, exacerbated by the events of September 11 and the global war on terror. American imperial overreach during the Bush years diminished the United States’ capacity to reshape the world in its image, and China seized the opportunity to reorient and strengthen its own economy, eventually supplanting the US as the global economic hegemon by many metrics.

    Chapters 8 and 9 deal with American attempts to alternatively understand, manage, resist, or reset that reality. The final chapter is, from my perspective, the most generative and thought-provoking. Rollo proves as fluent in the lexicon of modern security studies as he is with its historical antecedents. His assessment of our contemporary options to grapple with the threat and possibilities posed by Xi Jinping’s resurgent China is clear-eyed and judicious. Rollo’s estimation of the most productive path forward reflects that most venerable analogy, favored by generations of American national security personnel: the Goldilocks principle. While President Donald Trump favored a white-hot porridge laced with quid pro quos, zero-sum transactions, and military superiority, others have mooted the cold gruel of retrenchment. Rollo not surprisingly favors the more palatable oats of “offshore balancing and mutual deterrence and denial” (p. 206). That might not set the taste buds alight, but it is much less likely to cause irreparable indigestion.

    The final chapter concludes with one of the book’s most intriguing points. Here, Rollo posits our contemporary conundrum: how to ensure peace between “a rising Chinese empire and a declining American one” (p. 208). This brief recognition that China is erecting an imperial structure of its own—one that reflects its own interests and yet echoes many elements of the now deteriorating edifice constructed by the United States—is a tantalizing gesture toward the next century of US-Chinese relations. It also demands that we retrain our focus less on American intentions and possible rear-guard actions, and more on the objectives of China’s ruling class as it looks toward the next century. Others are already doing that work, of course, and Rollo’s Terminus will be a very useful text for them as they come to grips with the American half of that equation.[1] The nightly gaggle of pundits who confidently espouse the unique dangers of China’s rise would do particularly well to take cognizance of Rollo’s historicization of the United States’ attitudes toward global power across the last two centuries. They may find more resonances than dissonances between the waning American imperium they lament, and the expanding Chinese imperium they decry.

    Note

    [1]. See. for example, Suisheng Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022); Susan L. Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022); and Bates Gill, Daring to Struggle: China’s Global Ambitions under Xi Jinping (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).

    David C. Atkinson is associate professor of history at Purdue University. He is the author of The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Labor Migration in the British Empire and the United States (2017), along with numerous articles and chapters on international migration, diplomacy, and empire.

    Citation: David C. Atkinson. Review of Rollo, Stuart. Terminus: Westward Expansion, China, and the End of American Empire. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2024.
    URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=60309

    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

    ===========

    From Amazon: 

    Terminus: Westward Expansion, China, and the End of American Empire Kindle Edition


    A sweeping narrative of America's imperial history and its long entanglement with China.

    In Terminus, Stuart Rollo examines the origins and trajectory of American empire in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on its westward expansion and historic entanglement with China. American foreign and strategic policy in this region, Rollo argues, has always been shaped by broader economic and political concerns centered on China. China's current rise, and the economic and strategic systems that China is developing, represents the most serious challenge to the structure of American empire to date.

    Rollo paints a sweeping historical narrative of American imperial history and its relationship with China from 1776 to the present. Grounded in archival research, official and personal correspondence, policy documents, declassified intelligence material, and congressional records, 
    Terminus traces the development of American empire building from the pre-independence period to the eve of World War I, arguing that this new empire was primarily driven by commercial interests in China. Rollo explores shifts in global power, resource politics, and international economic structures that led the United States to transition from one of several imperial powers to the world's sole superpower by the last decade of the twentieth century. Finally, he examines the decline of American empire since its brief period of unipolarity in the 1990s, explaining the new pressures and challenges posed by the rise of China.

    Rollo proposes three scenarios for how the United States might manage its inevitable imperial decline: a vain attempt to shore up and extend the empire, an exploitative hegemony, or a post-imperial foreign policy. This last option would work to repair the damaged fabric of American social and political life, providing a long-term, stable foundation for national security, prosperity, and the well-being of its citizens. All empires eventually end, but with the benefit of hindsight, Rollo urges us to consider how to engineer a softer landing.

    Editorial Reviews

    Review

    Important, insightful, and timely, this is an extraordinary synthesis of an incredibly comprehensive subject. I could never have imagined it possible to summarize the economic, political, and cultural history of US-Chinese relations over 225 years, yet Rollo has succeeded. The research is impressive, both for its thoroughness and selectivity.
    ―Walter Allan McDougall, University of Pennsylvania, author of The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy: How Civil Religion Betrayed the National Interest

    The first book to develop a historical analysis of the American empire through the lens of the US-China relationship, Terminus addresses the most challenging issue in the contemporary world: the great power rivalry between the United States and China. Rollo offers a comprehensive survey of the rivalry, entanglement, and decoupling of the United States and China in global trade, investment, and production as well as the growing role of China in undermining the US empire in such areas as capital formation, technology innovation, and global production and supply chains.
    ―Baogang He, Deakin University, author of Contested Ideas of Regionalism in Asia

    Narrating the rise and decline of the American empire through the prism of US-China relations, Stuart Rollo has written a succinct, sophisticated, and hard-hitting critique. The appearance of Terminuscould not be more timely―nor or its contents more worrisome.
    ―Andrew Bacevich, Chairman and Cofounder, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

     

    About the Author

    Stuart Rollo (SYDNEY, AUS) is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney.

     

    Product details

    Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023. 296 pp. $55.95 (cloth), ISBN 9781421447384

    ASIN ‏ : ‎ B0BWSKD9VM

    Publisher ‏ : ‎ Johns Hopkins University Press (October 31, 2023)

    Publication date ‏ : ‎ October 31, 2023

    Language ‏ : ‎ English

    File size ‏ : ‎ 4171 KB