Venezuela: a maneira dura de Trump tratar com a ditadura não vai funcionar, como não funcionou com Cuba ou Nicarágua - Francisco Rodriguez (Foreign Affairs)

 The Case for Engagement With Venezuela

Maximum Pressure Will Only Strengthen Maduro

By Francisco Rodríguez

Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2024

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/venezuela/case-engagement-venezuela?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Case%20for%20Engagement%20With%20Venezuela&utm_content=20241128&utm_term=EDZZZ003ZX#author-info

 

Among the most complex foreign policy challenges facing the new U.S. administration is the situation in Venezuela. Over the past 12 years, Venezuela has transitioned from a fragile democracy to an entrenched authoritarian regime, experiencing one of the most severe economic collapses and migration crises in modern history outside wartime. And in recent years, these problems have increasingly affected the United States. During the past five years, U.S. authorities have apprehended more than 900,000 Venezuelans attempting to cross the southern border.

[Lea la versión de este artículo en español aquí.]

Many expect that Donald Trump’s presidency will mean the return of the maximum-pressure approach to Venezuela that defined his first term, when Washington imposed sweeping oil and financial sanctions, backed efforts at an armed uprising, and even floated the possibility of direct military action. At a rally in Florida just three days before the election, Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, asserted that under the new administration, “we will have a very different position, much tougher and much clearer, not only in Venezuela, but also in Cuba and Nicaragua.” Rubio has cosponsored legislation to codify sanctions on Venezuela, conditioning any sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro relinquishing power and an opposition-led transition.

But a return to the failed strategy of maximum pressure by the new administration would be a grave mistake. Sanctions are rarely effective in achieving regime change, and Venezuela is no exception. Far from destabilizing Maduro, U.S. sanctions have helped him consolidate control, increasing the asymmetry of power between the state’s apparatus and an impoverished and weakened civil society. More than seven million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2014, and doubling down on pressure could further worsen the living conditions of those remaining. Maximum pressure will, therefore, cut against Washington’s effort to reduce irregular migration and ensure a stable energy supply.

The United States should continue to condemn Maduro’s authoritarian government for its human rights violations and dismantling of democratic institutions. But Trump and his administration should adopt a strategy of targeted engagement with Venezuela’s authorities. Such a strategy would prioritize maintaining or strengthening economic and diplomatic linkages between the United States and Venezuela—the types of connections that can empower stakeholders committed to fostering a democratic transition. The first priority of U.S. policy should be to alleviate the suffering of Venezuelans, recognizing that broad economic sanctions have exacerbated that suffering. Where possible, Washington should leverage engagement—including the gradual easing of sanctions—to encourage improvements in human rights and political freedoms. This strategy of targeted engagement offers a path to immediately improve conditions in Venezuela while enhancing the prospects for a democratic transition in the medium to long term.

SANCTIONING CATASTROPHE

From 2017 to 2022, the United States imposed some of the harshest sanctions on Venezuela that it has levied on any country. The Trump administration halted all trade with Venezuela’s state-owned oil, gold, and banking sectors (transactions with private banks were still allowed) and blocked the national government and the oil industry from borrowing, restructuring debt, or receiving dividends from its offshore subsidiaries (like Citgo). In 2019, Washington handed control over Venezuela’s overseas assets to the U.S.-recognized opposition, led by Juan Guaidó, and blocked the country’s access to international reserve holdings, including special drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund.

The first Trump administration also imposed secondary sanctions, barring Venezuela from selling oil abroad by targeting foreign companies and vessels involved in its oil trade. Between 2019 and 2021, 47 vessels and 12 companies were sanctioned for assisting in Venezuelan oil exports. (In contrast, despite similar U.S. sanctions on Russian oil today, non-U.S. tankers can still sell Russian oil at $60 per barrel without being sanctioned themselves.)

This pressure has compounded Venezuela’s economic crisis. The country’s contraction in per capita incomes began in 2013 because of severe macroeconomic imbalances created by years of populist policies. Yet starting in 2017, sanctions significantly worsened the economy by severing Venezuela’s access to vital oil and financial markets, which led to a sharp decline in oil production. Sanctions contributed substantially to falling oil output, imports, and productivity; without them, Venezuela’s economy would have started to recover when oil prices rose in 2017. Sanctions accounted for around 52 percent of Venezuela’s economic contraction between 2012 and 2020. Without sanctions, Venezuela would have still faced a severe crisis, with per capita incomes dropping by 34 percent. With sanctions, however, GDP per capita declined by an extraordinary 71 percent—equivalent to almost three successive Great Depressions.

Venezuela’s migration crisis stems from this collapse in economic opportunities. Although the country’s human rights violations are horrific, they are not on the scale of the ethnic cleansing, genocide, or armed conflict that typically drives mass displacement. Instead, millions of Venezuelans have left to escape an economic catastrophe. If the U.S. government resumes policies that target Venezuelans’ livelihoods, it should not be surprised when many of those affected end up at its doorstep.

GAINING FROM ENGAGEMENT

In 2022, the Biden administration reestablished contact with the Maduro government, pursuing a dual track that gradually eased sanctions and encouraged renewed negotiations with the opposition. In November of that year, the U.S. Treasury issued a license for Chevron—the only U.S. oil company with production capacity in Venezuela—to export Venezuelan oil to the United States, coinciding with the resumption of talks between the Maduro government and its opposition.

Critics claimed that the Biden administration was giving Maduro sanctions relief without gaining anything in return. Yet this critique overlooks a key achievement. In October 2023, Maduro publicly committed to holding free and fair presidential elections. Though the election ended up being minimally transparent, this concession ultimately allowed the opposition coalition to register Edmundo González as a candidate after María Corina Machado, who had won the opposition’s primary in October 2023, was barred from running. Washington also successfully encouraged the opposition to abandon its failed electoral boycotts and to engage in the election process despite facing an unlevel playing field.

These decisions helped pave the way for González to defeat Maduro in the July 28 presidential election by more than a two-to-one margin. The opposition documented its victory with tally sheets from the country’s electronic voting system, reenergizing the coalition and demonstrating its broad support among Venezuelans. Although this victory did not produce immediate change, with Maduro’s electoral council blatantly altering the election’s results to declare Maduro the winner, it marked the opposition’s strongest challenge yet to Maduro’s authoritarian rule.

Critics might argue that the opposition’s electoral victory was meaningless because Maduro ultimately retained power and intensified repression. But such a critique misses the broader significance of the outcome. The elections played a crucial role in revitalizing and legitimizing Venezuela’s opposition, demonstrating its broad popular support, and strengthening its internal cohesion. These developments are essential preconditions for any successful challenge to an entrenched regime. Whether these gains can translate into meaningful change will depend on how realistic the opposition’s objectives are and how well it leverages its newfound strength in future negotiations.

BEYOND ISOLATION

A realistic foreign policy toward Venezuela must begin with the recognition that Washington has limited influence over political dynamics in authoritarian countries. In a world where 71 percent of people live under autocratic regimes, it is not only futile but also dangerous to target select countries—such as Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela—for regime change. Singling out specific regimes risks alienating allies, undermining U.S. moral authority, and reinforcing authoritarians’ claims that Washington meddles in other countries’ domestic affairs. In Venezuela, a principled, pragmatic approach—focused on humanitarian relief and diplomatic engagement—would better serve the interests of both the United States and the Venezuelan people.

Trump’s administration should thus continue easing economic sanctions. It should do so, in part, simply because the restrictions have needlessly immiserated millions. But improving the country’s living conditions also serves a political purpose. The more tolerable life becomes for Venezuelans, the less likely they are to flee to the United States. Managing migration flows from Venezuela will also require sustained communication and coordination with Caracas. Reopening the U.S. embassy in Venezuela is therefore a critical step to safeguarding American interests in the country, as well.

A return to the failed strategy of maximum pressure would be a grave mistake.

Easing sanctions could afford the Trump administration an opportunity to secure concessions on human rights. Licenses for new oil projects, for example, could be conditioned on revenues being allocated to international organizations that can address Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. Likewise, the Trump administration could use sanctions relief to induce political reforms. It should work to secure the release of political prisoners. It should negotiate for institutional changes that reduce the stakes of power and create space for coexistence between Venezuela’s political factions. It should push Venezuela to appoint new electoral authorities and commit to inviting in international observers for upcoming elections. All three of these steps would provide vital space for electoral competition. They remain the best path to fostering a democratic transition. (The United States should also work with regional partners, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, to forge a realistic political settlement.)

Should the Trump administration embrace a policy of limited engagement, it would be bowing to reality. Punitive policies may appeal to policymakers, but they often corner regimes, making behavioral change unlikely. A government whose leaders fear U.S. prosecution will do everything to remain in power, including stealing elections. Strategic engagement, on the other hand, can incentivize positive shifts and strengthen local actors who support a negotiated resolution. The political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have shown that countries with economic, social, and institutional ties to the West are more likely to democratize than those subjected solely to punitive measures.

Likewise, Trump would be accepting that when people become poorer in an authoritarian country, the state becomes stronger, not weaker. At the height of the Venezuelan economy’s contraction, a large segment of the population depended on politically conditioned government handouts. In contrast, Venezuela’s economic recovery of the past four years, due in part to the easing of oil sanctions, has helped reduce low-income voters’ dependency on government programs, making them less susceptible to electoral blackmail.

No U.S. administration can overhaul Venezuela’s political system. But by setting achievable goals that address immediate needs, promote economic recovery, and support fundamental freedoms, the United States can help the Venezuelan people. A pragmatic approach that prioritizes economic recovery and gradual political progress will be far more effective in bringing Venezuela closer to change than a strategy of suffocation.

 

• FRANCISCO RODRÍGUEZ is Rice Family Professor of the Practice of International and Public Affairs at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies.

Trump 2.0 promete um choque econômico global - Otaviano Canuto

Trump 2.0 promete um choque econômico global

Otaviano Canuto

Center for Macroeconomic Development, November 7, 2024

Se republicano sobrepujar limites legais do mercado internacional e implementar algo próximo do que prometeu, economia global sofrerá fortes impactos

A vitória eleitoral de Trump foi completa. Além do colégio eleitoral e dos votos absolutos, seu partido retomou o senado e deve manter a maioria de deputados na câmara. A execução de sua agenda, portanto, não precisará ficar limitada ao que pode fazer com medidas executivas, ganhando força para também incorporar o legislativo quando este for necessário.

Ao longo de sua campanha, Trump aludiu a vários caminhos nos quais poderia colocar sua agenda de política econômica. Espera-se que tire o pé no pedal na agenda de descarbonização presente na política econômica americana, algo que, pelo peso e tamanho da economia do país, terá impacto global. Também se espera o retorno da inclinação desfavorável à imigração na gestão pública que marcou seu primeiro mandato.

Dúvidas e apreensões estão também dirigidas a suas promessas de uso novamente de políticas comerciais sob a forma de tarifas sobre importações, em escala e abrangência geográfica e setorial maiores do que foi em seu mandato anterior. Caso isto se cumpra em intensidade próxima ao que aludiu durante a campanha, pode-se contar com algum grau e intensidade de choque sobre o país e a economia global.

Dentre outras medidas de política comercial, Trump já mencionou duas possíveis: uma tarifa de 60% sobre as importações chinesas e uma tarifa universal de 10-20% sobre todas as importações. Ao longo da campanha mencionou outras de tamanhos variados sobre produtos de outros países. Até ameaçou estabelecer tarifas de 100% sobre países que ameacem abandonar o dólar americano como moeda global de escolha.

Enquanto a administração democrata perseguiu uma “redução de risco” na exposição à economia chinesa – alegando razões de segurança nacional, mediante políticas de proteção, bloqueio de acesso à tecnologia e subsídios à produção local em semicondutores e energia limpa – pode-se dizer que os anúncios de Trump apontam na direção da busca de um “descolamento ou dissociação” total entre as duas economias.

Como em todas as políticas mercantilistas, baseadas na crença de que o adversário perde e a produção local ganha, há sempre uma subestimação dos impactos negativos sobre todos os lados, inclusive terceiros países. Como abordamos aqui em 2020, as tarifas de Trump contra a China em seu governo anterior acabaram impactando negativamente o próprio emprego manufatureiro dos EUA, para não falar da agricultura perdida para o Brasil no mercado chinês.

Para aqueles que acham que terceiros países podem se beneficiar como “conectores” entre EUA e China –como México, Vietnã, Malásia e outros têm feito desde a guerra no primeiro mandato de Trump– cumpre observar que um “descolamento” perseguido pela administração dos EUA não vai deixar tais conexões intocadas.

Trump já comparou guerras comerciais a lutas de boxe. Cabe observar que a elevação do custo de vida para os cidadãos norte-americanos como resultado das tarifas será parte do impacto sofrido pelo lado que golpeia no caso. Não por acaso, Kamala Harris chamou a proposta tarifária de Trump de “imposto sobre os consumidores dos EUA”.

Tarifas são um imposto sobre importações. Trump disse que o imposto será pago por estrangeiros, ou seja, que estes absorveriam o impacto sem repasse a preços. Mas isso significaria a ausência do efeito de substituição de importações por produção local.

O resultado mais provável será a elevação de preços domésticos. Alguns alegam que os efeitos inflacionários das tarifas de Trump em seu primeiro governo foram mínimos. Contudo, as novas propostas de Trump se aplicariam a uma parcela muito maior das compras externas. O impacto nos preços será muito maior do que o relativamente modesto “protecionismo inicial” do primeiro mandato de Trump.

Cabe observar que um imposto sobre importações é, também, um imposto sobre exportações, pelo fato de que em parte as tarifas viram um custo para os exportadores que dependem de insumos importáveis. Isso necessariamente tornará tais exportações menos competitivas. Assim, as tarifas elevadas pré-anunciadas por Trump tenderão a expandir indústrias de substituição de importações menos competitivas, mas contrair as exportadoras altamente competitivas. A retaliação estrangeira contra as exportações dos EUA agravaria esse dano. Assistiu-se a tais efeitos durante a elevação de barreiras comerciais por Trump em seu primeiro mandato.

Onde resta pouca dúvida é quanto ao efeito recessivo para a economia global, particularmente com as prováveis respostas retaliatórias dos demais países. Passando por uma desaceleração chinesa, mas também em outros países. Na reunião anual do FMI em Washington, D.C., em outubro, Christine Lagarde, chefe do Banco Central Europeu, disse que novas barreiras comerciais poderiam renovar as pressões inflacionárias mundiais e reduzir o PIB global em até 9%, em seu cenário mais grave.

Uma segunda área onde Trump já deu sinais é a tributária e fiscal. No campo fiscal, o déficit público nos EUA tende a se elevar substancialmente. Isto também tende a trazer impactos macroeconômicos em escala global.

Trump mostrou inclinação para tornar permanentes todos os cortes aprovados pelo Congresso em 2017, o que será facilitado pela vitória republicana no senado e na câmara de deputados. Naquele ano os cortes nas taxas de imposto de renda corporativo foram permanentes, ao passo que os cortes nos impostos de renda individual e de herança deveriam expirar no final de 2025. Trump quer torná-los todos permanentes, além de acrescentar outros itens – como gorjetas. Trump falou em recomposição de arrecadação tributária via tarifas, mas ninguém estima ser isso possível.

No lado das despesas, mesmo cortando a despesa prevista nas leis dos semicondutores e da energia limpa (“Chips Act” e “Inflation Reduction Act – IRA ”), cortes substanciais não serão possíveis sem encolher gastos sociais, como o “Medicare”. Analistas projetam que as propostas de Trump aumentarão a dívida federal. O Comitê para um Orçamento Responsável, apartidário, estima que os planos de Trump podem adicionar US$ 7,5 trilhões.

Muitos economistas e investidores destacam um risco de um longo período de taxas de juros mais altas nos EUA. Temem que não apenas novas tarifas, mas também déficits americanos maiores, possam aumentar a pressão inflacionária dos EUA, levando o Federal Reserve a estender seu período de política monetária mais rígida.

E o Brasil? Mais imediatamente, a eleição de Trump já está trazendo impacto sobre o Brasil mediante os canais de transmissão monetária e cambial. A valorização do dólar em relação às demais moedas que já acompanhou as pesquisas eleitorais favoráveis a ele também atingiu o real. Ontem, no primeiro dia após as eleições, a desvalorização do real foi acentuada, mesmo tendo revertido até o final do dia.

O que se pode depreender para o futuro é a uma perspectiva de juros mais altos nos EUA, empinando sua curva temporal, acompanhando não só a perspectiva de inflação mais alta nos EUA, mas também de déficits públicos maiores. Mais do que nunca, aumentará a demanda de que o governo brasileiro dê sinais mais firmes de redução de seu desequilíbrio fiscal no futuro próximo, de modo a evitar que o prêmio de risco-país intensifique o efeito da valorização do dólar e das taxas de juros longas mais altas nos EUA sobre a taxa de câmbio e a inflação no Brasil.

Na área comercial, é possível até que o deslocamento de demanda agrícola chinesa dos EUA para o Brasil que ocorreu durante a guerra comercial EUA-China no primeiro governo Trump – deslocamento não revertido posteriormente – possa receber impulso adicional em novas rodadas de retaliação chinesa na guerra comercial.

O comercio bilateral Brasil-EUA evoluiu, no passado recente, de déficits do primeiro para saldos próximos de zero. A subida nas exportações agrícolas brasileiras – carne, açúcar, óleos e gorduras – e a redução nas compras brasileiras de combustíveis fósseis ajudaram naquela direção, enquanto o déficit brasileiro bilateral nas manufaturas cresceu nos últimos anos.

Há sensibilidade, por outro lado, quanto às exportações brasileiras de produtos metalúrgicos. Deve-se ter em vista as demandas por fabricantes de aço dos EUA de que tarifas sejam impostas sobre as exportações brasileiras de aço.

O Brasil não aparenta estar no foco da política comercial de Trump, como China e os “países conectores”. Mas vale notar que em uma entrevista em abril para a revista Time, Trump se referiu ao Brasil como “um país dê tarifas muito altas”. O não-alinhamento geopolítico brasileiro e as seguidas referências à substituição do dólar, porém, podem vir a aproximá-lo daquele foco.

Em resumo, as políticas comercial e fiscal no governo Trump 2.0 podem trazer choques macroeconômicos para a economia global e o Brasil. A possibilidade de desaceleração no crescimento econômico chinês, como consequência da política comercial Trump 2.0, pode vir a ser também um canal de transmissão sobre a economia brasileira através de suas exportações de commodities para aquele país.

No lado fiscal, há menor impedimento para o governo Trump 2.0. Já quanto as tarifas, há quem – como John H. Welch, CEO da Research for Emerging Markets Inc– destaque limites legais que dificultariam o cumprimento das promessas significativas feitas por Trump durante a campanha. Caso este venha a de fato a sobrepujar tais limites e implementar algo próximo do que prometeu, a economia global e o Brasil enfrentarão um verdadeiro choque macroeconômico.

 

Otaviano Canuto, 68 anos, é integrante-sênior do Policy Center for the New South, integrante-sênior não-residente do Brookings Institute e diretor do Center for Macroeconomics and Development em Washington. Foi vice-presidente e diretor-executivo no Banco Mundial, diretor-executivo no FMI e vice-presidente no BID.

 

Um ataque frontal à democracia americana - Carmen Lícia Palazzo e Lourival Sant’Anna (O Estado de S. Paulo)

 Carmen Lícia Palazzo transcreveu e introduziu este artigo impecável de Lourival Sant'Anna, sobre o neofascista Trump, amigo e chantageado pelo neoczar Putin.

“Bom resumo da situação, feito pelo Lourival [Sant’Anna].

E acho que devemos nos preocupar, sim, inclusive com o nosso compatriota tosco e com tendências neofascistas. 

Acrescento da minha parte [CLP] o que eu penso, lendo os dados sobre quem votou no Trump e na Kamala:

O fascismo, em qualquer lugar do mundo, chega ao poder pelas vias da democracia, com o voto das pessoas mais simples, com um discurso que "levanta as massas" (li muito sobre como o Mussolini chegou ao poder na Itália). E a maioria do eleitorado nos EUA (e certamente também no Brasil) não é letrada e nem faz grandes considerações mais sofisticadas. Foi o caso dos chamados rednecks norte-americanos. Aí mora o perigo. E o poder de alcance dos discursos eivados de ignorância, de incitação à violência é que dá a muitos uma ideia de pertencimento a um grupo liderado por alguém que é percebido como um macho forte e que conduz a tropa a algum hipotético futuro, fantasiosamente melhor. 

Copio o artigo do Lourival:

"Trump vai eliminar a separação de Poderes e os freios concebidos pelos ‘pais fundadores’

Trump está mobilizado pelo desejo de ver materializada a sua delirante visão de mundo

Por Lourival Sant'Anna

09/11/2024 | 17h00

A volta de Donald Trump à Casa Branca equivale a um terremoto no alicerce da democracia, da diversidade, da valorização da ciência e dos fatos, uma derrota no combate às mudanças climáticas e uma vitória para as ditaduras que contestam a ordem mundial, lideradas por China e Rússia. É a revanche de setores de baixa renda e sem ensino superior contra a elite intelectual.

Trump está mobilizado pelo desejo de ver materializada a sua delirante visão de mundo. Dessa vez, não haverá “adultos na sala” — assessores civis e militares que sutilmente descumpriram suas ordens e heroicamente mitigaram os efeitos desastrosos de seu primeiro mandato. 

Trump conta que em 2016 não conhecia muita gente em Washington — a capital que tanto despreza — e acabou sendo vítima da traição de inúmeros colaboradores. Esse é um dos combustíveis de seu rancor. 

Desta vez, Trump se cerca de pessoas escolhidas não pelo critério da competência ou reputação, mas da lealdade. Ele deixou claro que usará o Departamento de Justiça, equivalente à Procuradoria-Geral da República, para perseguir seus adversários políticos, a começar pela ex-presidente da Câmara Nancy Pelosi. 

Com maioria na Suprema Corte, no Senado e provavelmente na Câmara, e o propósito explícito de colocar o Estado a seu serviço, Trump procurará eliminar a separação de Poderes e os freios e contrapesos concebidos pelos chamados “pais fundadores” no século 18 para criar uma república e evitar a tirania representada, na época, pela monarquia absolutista e colonialista britânica, de cujo jugo acabavam de libertar sua jovem nação. 

Esse sistema, aperfeiçoado ao longo dos séculos para incorporar os direitos das mulheres, dos negros e de outras minorias, pressupõe a existência de uma elite guiada pelos valores do Iluminismo. A falibilidade e o egoísmo humanos eram limitados por um contrato social de busca do bem comum e de patriotismo. Quando esse consenso falhasse, o Congresso, a Justiça, a academia e a imprensa disparariam mecanismos de correção. É esse arcabouço que o trumpismo se dedica a destruir.

Trump e seus seguidores nutrem teorias conspiratórias contra o establishment político, jurídico e estatal, incluindo os órgãos de inteligência, contra a ciência e a imprensa, como cúmplices de um complô para extorquir a população e destruir sua identidade e tradições. 

Com vitória de Trump, republicanos veem sinais de uma nova coalizão de eleitores para se manter no poder

Em seu governo, a saúde deve ficar a cargo do ex-candidato independente à presidência Robert Kennedy Jr., que pretende retirar o flúor da água, responsável pelo quase desaparecimento das cáries; revisar o uso de vacinas e adotar terapias alternativas. Suas teses têm a qualidade daquele lampejo de Trump de injetar detergente no sangue para combater o vírus da covid. 

Kamala perdeu a eleição porque os eleitores de renda e escolaridade mais baixas deram preferência a Trump, e eles são a maioria. Ela teve 47% dos votos dos que ganham menos de US$ 50 mil por ano (27% dos eleitores) e 46% da faixa entre US$ 50 mil e US$ 100 mil (32%). Só ganhou entre os que recebem mais de US$ 100 mil (40% dos eleitores), com 51%, segundo a boca-de-urna da CNN.

Dos eleitores com ensino superior, 55% votaram em Kamala. Mas eles são apenas 43%. Na maioria, que não tem diploma, ela teve 42% dos votos. Kamala recebeu 53% dos votos das mulheres, que representam 53% de quem votou, mas apenas 42% dos homens. Obteve 52% dos votos dos latinos (12% dos votantes) e 85% dos negros (11% dos que compareceram às urnas).

Joe Biden teve mais apoio desses três grupos em 2020, embora Kamala seja mulher, filha de imigrantes e negra. Suas margens não foram suficientes para compensar a preferência dos brancos, que representam 71% dos eleitores, por Trump, que teve 57% dos votos deles. Até mesmo um quarto das mulheres pró-aborto dos Estados-pêndulo da Pensilvânia, Michigan e Wisconsin votou em Trump.

Esses resultados são a expressão da frustração com o alto custo de vida e da sensação de que o poder de compra era maior no governo Trump. Esses sentimentos se combinam com a percepção mais estrutural e profunda de que a elite intelectual, representada por Biden e Kamala, construiu um mundo que lhe favorece.

O livre comércio e a imigração levaram para longe as fábricas que davam empregos de qualidade para os operários e trouxeram os estrangeiros que aceitam trabalhar por salários menores. Trump entendeu isso e se elegeu prometendo elevar as tarifas de importação, deportar e barrar os imigrantes ilegais. Diante disso, a democracia, os direitos individuais, a ciência, o meio ambiente, a ordem internacional baseada em regras e a imprensa parecem distrações de intelectuais."”

A decisão geopolítica mais relevante deste século - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 A decisão geopolítica mais relevante para o resto deste século é a decisão de Trump se ele forçará, ou não, a Ucrânia a capitular em face de Putin. Se o fizer, estaremos de volta aos anos 1930. No comércio internacional já é o caso, aliás direto ao mercantilismo. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 9/11/3024

Trump: um narcisista incurável - Michael J. Brenner (The Globalist)

 É absolutamente surpreendente como o velho Partido Republicano e milhões de americanos “normais”, cidadãos eleitores, se deixaram capturar por um debiloide total. PRA

https://theglobalist.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=fe900a29e67b9f5bd30ac3091&id=32f5c83882&e=23ed0dfe5f 

Narcissism and Trump: The Long Story

Dear reader, The U.S. presidential TV debate last week underscored two points about Donald Trump that increasingly stun even many Republican politicians in the United States.    The first one is his deep-seated narcissism. The second one is his exhibiting a level of ADHD (attention deficit disorder) that makes it so hard to connect any of the dots of what he may be saying.   In our weekend feature "Narcissism and Trump: The Long Story,” Michael J. Brenner explores the clinical psychology of narcissism epitomized by Trump and how U.S. political culture is becoming progressively more related to conduct associated with narcissism.    Cheers, Stephan Richter Publisher and Editor-in-Chief

A antidiplomacia de Trump deixaria o mundo mais instável - Stephen Collinson and Shelby Rose (CNN Meanwhile inAmerica)

 

Stephen Collinson and Shelby Rose

The world will be watching America’s elections often reverberate through the lives of millions of people overseas who, unlike US voters, have no capacity to influence the result.   So, the critical first debate between President Joe Biden and ex-President Donald Trump, on CNN on Thursday night, will be just as closely watched overseas as in the US.   The showdown comes at a perilous global moment. And Trump's first term was volatile enough. A possible second is already shaping up as even more disorientating for US allies abroad.   The global system that enshrined American power for 80 years is under extreme pressure from adversaries seeking to destroy it, including Russia and the new superpower China. The Kremlin is intensifying its onslaught on Ukraine and threat to wider Europe.    Israel’s war in Gaza, which incessantly threatens to boil over, is a painful vulnerability for a sitting president, as his rival warns World War III could be nigh. Trump’s main critique is that Biden is weak – a caricature that could resonate with some voters. But his own plans are as nebulous as his unlikely promise to end the Ukraine war in 24 hours and his unprovable claim that conflicts in Europe and the Middle East would “never have happened” if he’d been in office. Trump appears convinced that the strength of his personality alone would change the world and make America “more respected” — a trap that many presidents fall into. Foreign powers tend to act on their own national interests and don't just fall into line because a US president says they should.    Trump also seems more at home with authoritarians like Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who dream of crushing US power, than democratic allies America liberated in the last cataclysmic global conflict. Trump’s theory of international relations is that every country should act unilaterally to pursue its own goals. In such a way, big countries like the US, China and Russia will therefore naturally be in charge of sharing the spoils. This leaves no room for seeking multilateral solutions to problems that threaten all, like climate change. And small countries are out of luck.   Some of the ex-president’s former White House officials warn he might try to pull the United States out of NATO, the cornerstone of Western security, if he returns to the White House. Others suspect his hostility to the alliance is just a ruse to get them to pay more for their own defense and is rooted in his view of foreign alliances as a protection racket.   Foreign nations — and many of their leaders — will be watching the debate for clues about whether they can expect a reprieve for Biden’s traditional internationalism or a return of Trump’s "America First" unilateralism that turned the United States from a bulwark of the West’s stability into its most destabilizing force.

Joe Biden e a imigração: limitações justificam postura de Trump

 CNN While in America

Stephen Collinson, Caitlin Hu and Shelby Rose

'We have to act' June 4, 2024

US President Joe Biden speaks in at the White House on Tuesday.

Just like Europe, America has an immigration problem that's out of control.   So, President Joe Biden has come up with a new idea — try some of Donald Trump’s approaches.   He’s not planning to mount the biggest mass deportation from the United States in history as Trump promises. And he’s not separating child migrants from their parents at the border as his predecessor notoriously did. But he does plan to use presidential power to bypass Congress, like Trump, in order to block most migrants from being able to request asylum after crossing from Mexico illegally, during periods when the border is overwhelmed by the volume of crossings – as it is now.   This move has no chance of actually solving the problem of a swamped asylum system that means many applicants wait months or years for a decision. But in the short-term, the White House hopes it will curb the number of people currently crossing the US-Mexico border. Biden’s move is also sharply political, because everything about immigration is hopelessly politicized in a way that has thwarted every effort to fix immigration laws for decades.   It’s no coincidence that the president acted just three weeks before he’s due to stand opposite Republican presumptive nominee Donald Trump at a CNN debate. He badly needed political insulation on immigration, which the ex-president is using as a platform for his campaign again after riding the issue to victory in 2016.   People familiar with Biden’s strategy point out the contrast between the president taking action and the Republicans doing nothing on immigration after the GOP twice blocked the most conservative immigration bill in decades in Congress to keep the issue alive for Trump.   The danger is that Biden simply draws attention to his own failure so far to effectively respond to an issue on which Trump is more trusted by many voters despite his dehumanizing and often racist rhetoric. The president is also again infuriating progressive voters from whom he is already estranged over his Israel policy.   As he rolled out his new measures on Tuesday, Biden insisted that he would rather work for permanent solutions to the immigration overflow with Congress, but that Trump had stopped them. “He didn't want to fix the issue,” Biden said, accusing the GOP presumptive nominee for preferring to use immigration to attack him. “It’s a cynical, an extremely cynical political move.” He also took pains to distinguish himself from Trump’s most extreme policies: “I will not use the US military to go into neighborhoods all across the country to pull millions of people out of their homes and away from their families to put (in) detention camps while awaiting deportation.”   For decades, the hope behind harsh immigration measures has been that they will deter people from coming to the border. But the conditions that people from Central and South America are fleeing – economic blight, gang warfare and the effects of climate change – are so dire that the deterrence factor is often ineffective. And until a fractured Congress finally resolves to act instead of using immigration as a political tool, an asylum system designed for a long-ago era will continue to fail.

Uma amostra do que Trump poderia fazer, se retornar - Editorial Valor Econômico

 Trecho de um Editorial do Valor Econômico:

(3/06/2024)

“ O primeiro mandato de Trump pode ter sido uma experiência em moderação se comparado ao que Trump declara que pretende fazer se ganhar um segundo. Ele ameaça nomear um procurador especial para investigar Biden e família e realizar o mesmo contra rivais políticos, remover “marxistas” do Departamento de Educação, mobilizar a Guarda Nacional para intervir nas cidades contra o crime, fazer com que Estados republicanos levem à Justiça mulheres que realizem aborto, revogar ações afirmativas pela equidade de gênero e racial etc.

Com suas indicações, Trump deu à Suprema Corte uma maioria conservadora, que decidiu que o aborto não é mais um direito constitucional. Ela aceitou examinar, e não o fará antes da eleição, a alegação de Trump de que ele não pode ser julgado por atos realizados durante o mandato, um salvo conduto para cometer as ilegalidades que bem desejar.

A volta de Trump seria um pesadelo para aliados e adversários igualmente. Ele promete estabelecer tarifas de 10% sobre todas as importações e aumentá-las para 60% no caso dos produtos oriundos da China. Toda a legislação de proteção ambiental deve ser revista. O multilateralismo, já atacado em seu primeiro governo, sofrerá novos golpes.”

Trump não segue prescrições pós-condenação: pode ser preso - Marty Taylor

 Uma especialista em legislação penal indica o que Trump precisar fazer e que não está fazendo:

“ Following his felony convictions. Donald Trump was required to report to probation services to prepare a post conviction pre sentencing report for Judge Merchan. Trump blew off the requirement and left the courthouse before he visited with his new probation officers. That may have been a big mistake  Judge Merchan depends on the probation report to determine Trump’s sentence. If he cannot follow the rules of probation. Prison may be the necessary sentence. 

         Whether Trump is sentenced to prison, probation or a ‘split sentence’ of prison and probation. Probation services are about to be a big part of Donald Trump’s life. Criminals on probation are supposed to accept their guilt and show some signs of remorse and retribution for their crimes. Trump is not likley to do that. If Trump doesn‘t follow the rules. He can and will be violated and sentenced to prison. 

         As a convicted felon,Trump no longer has the freedoms that are afforded to those of us without a felony conviction. One restriction will be on Trump’s travel. As a convicted felon Trump will need permission to leave his state of residence. His passport will be seized and any foreign travel will be prohibited or greatly restricted by his rules of probation. Not only that but many countries do not allow felons to enter their county.  This conviction will drastically change Trump‘s life. I do not see Trump successfully completing a sentence of probation if that is his sentence.”

Acréscimo:

“ I have been criticized for this post. I wrote the post based on the reporting of a Business insider article. What we do on X is in the moment. And so was this article. The BI reporting said Trump was making a big mistake by not showing up at probation and filling out the probation report for Judge  Merchan. I agree. That was my own opinion. Is that ”misleading”?  I don't think so. 

      I subsequently heard conflicting reports that Trump was and was not told to report.  I welcome that information. But based on what was reported at the time from Business Insider and other reports.  Trump blew off reporting to probation. That was the entire point of this article. No one intentionally lied or was misleading.  I respect my followers and anyone who takes the time to read my posts.  I will always strive for accuracy.  If I am wrong I will admit it but in this case I reported what was known at the time. Trump did not report to probation and that may have very negative( for Trump) impact on his sentencing.”

Robert De Niro sobre Trump

 O ator Robert De Niro fez uma declaração sobre o estado das coisas politicas nos EUA:

“Eu amo essa cidade, eu amo essa cidade, eu não quero destruí-la. Donald Trump quer destruir não só a cidade, mas o país e eventualmente ele poderia destruir o mundo. Eu devo muito à cidade e é por isso que é tão estranho que Donald Trump esteja bem do outro lado da rua porque ele não pertence à minha cidade. Eu não sei a onde ele pertence, mas certamente ele não pertence a esta cidade. Nós, nova-iorquinos, costumávamos tolerá-lo quando ele era apenas mais um negociante imobiliário sujo fingindo ser importante, um playboy barato mentindo para entrar nos tabloides, fingindo ser um porta-voz, um porta-voz para ele mesmo. 

Ele estava se fazendo passar por outra pessoa para enganar a imprensa e inflando seu patrimônio líquido, um palhaço. Mas esta cidade é bem tolerante. Nós abrimos espaço para palhaços. Nós os temos por toda a cidade, pessoas que fazem coisas loucas na rua, nós toleramos isso. Faz parte da cidade, faz parte. 

Mas não alguém como Trump, que eventualmente poderá governar o país. Isso não funciona e todos nós sabemos disso. De alguma forma, ele conseguiu até que supostos patriotas o apoiassem, um homem que clamou por liquidar a Constituição e em 6 de janeiro liderou uma multidão enfurecida para ameaçar a democracia, deixando morte e destruição em seu rastro. 

É por isso que eu preciso estar envolvido e queria estar envolvido no novo comercial de campanha de Biden/Harris porque mostra a violência de Trump e nos lembra que ele usará violência contra qualquer um que fique em seu caminho em sua megalomania e ganância. 

Quando Trump concorreu em 2016, foi como uma piada, esse palhaço concorrendo à presidência, não, nunca poderia acontecer. Tínhamos esquecido as lições da história que nos mostraram outros palhaços que não foram levados a sério até tornarem-se ditadores vis. 

Com Trump, temos uma segunda chance e ninguém está rindo agora. Este é o momento de detê-lo votando para tirá-lo de uma vez por todas. Não queremos acordar após a eleição dizendo o que novamente, meu Deus, o que diabos nós fizemos. Não podemos deixar isso acontecer de novo. 

Ontem foi o Memorial Day, é um bom momento para refletir sobre como os americanos lutaram e morreram para que pudéssemos desfrutar das liberdades garantidas a nós por um governo democrático, um governo que como o presidente Lincoln disse do povo, pelo povo para o povo não perecerá da face da terra. 

Sob Trump, esse tipo de governo perecerá…”

Depois de Trump, Biden abre nova guerra comercial contra a China: isso não vai acabar bem - Jordan Schneider, Lily Ottinger (China Talk)

EMERGENCY POD: Sester on Biden's Electric Curtain

The IRA was the carrot. Here comes the stick. 

JORDAN SCHNEIDER AND LILY OTTINGER China Talk, MAY 15 The Biden administration has announced a slew of tariffs against China, including a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs. What took so long? How did regulators decide what to tariff, and how much the tariffs would be? To discuss, ChinaTalk interviewed economist Brad Setser, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a former economist in Biden’s USTR. We discuss: Whether the national security justification for tariffs on EVs makes sense; Why the Biden admin waited so long before imposing these tariffs; Whether the tariffs will unjustly protect low-quality American carmakers from healthy competition; How the policy response to today’s Chinese EV manufacturers differs from the response to Japanese automakers in the 1980s; How the different tariff percentages were chosen;  … and more! What is being tariffed and why? Jordan Schneider: Let’s start with a brief history of how we got here. What is the process that ended up concluding on May 14, 2024? Brad Setser: The process started with the imposition of Section 301 tariffs in the Trump administration. 301 is sort of like the US unilateral judge-and-jury tariff law. It states that if there's an undue burden on US commerce, then the US can impose tariffs that are meant to offset that undue burden.  The original 301 case was centered around technology transfer and IP theft, which led to a series of negotiations with China. China responded to the initial $50 billion of tariffs with their own $50 billion of tariffs, and then Trump responded with an ever-escalating and expanding set of tariffs. $50 billion became $250 billion, and then another $110 billion was added by the Trump administration. Trump granted some exclusions to these tariffs, and the Biden administration inherited an open question of what to do with these tariffs. There is also a statutory review of 301 tariffs after a four-year period.  Today, Biden announced the conclusion that some of the tariffs needed to be increased to better serve the goals of the original 301 case. Those goals include holding China to its commitments, which it didn't meet under the phase one agreement. Thus, what the Biden administration eventually concluded was that this review should change the structure of tariffs around a set of products that the Biden administration judged to be of strategic importance to America's future industrial development. Those areas also happen to generally be areas where China itself has had an active industrial policy. The net effect is, to a significant degree, fighting to fire with fire.  China has a pretty restrictive policy towards imports of electric vehicles and batteries. It doesn't need to be that restrictive because companies have become competitive. But when China’s EV and battery industry was getting started, China didn't let foreign producers’ imports qualify for its subsidies. China’s always had actually pretty high tariffs around the auto sector and solar ships. China built the first deep-sea floating solar plant off the coast of Shandong province in 2022. Source. China has clearly had industrial policies. These tariffs took on an aspect of responding to China's industrial policies in support of the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act. Biden’s goal is to make sure that an indigenous American electric vehicle and battery industry doesn't get overwhelmed by Chinese supply.  Jordan Schneider: I did a show way back in 2019 with Doug Irwin, who has a fascinating book about the political economy of tariffs. Tarriffs, taxes, and trade: Doug Irwin on ChinaEconTalk Jordan Schneider Episode Clearly, some of these industries have real political salience. The Detroit automakers in 2008 were prominent enough to get a bailout. But this also includes tariffs on some novel things –  such as lagging edge semiconductors, shipped-ashore cranes, syringes, and needles – which don’t appear to be motivated by a protectionist impulse to save unproductive jobs.  Instead, the Biden administration has decided that dependence on China is a national security issue that needs rectifying, and his solution is to use trade barriers as well as subsidies and industrial policy.  Brad Setser: That's right. In manufacturing, China is now a superpower. 30% to 33% of global manufacturing is in China, which is 15% to 20% of the global economy. China is a superpower. The US has gone through three phases in its response to the challenge created by China's emergence as the world's greatest manufacturing power. The first phase was a dominant sense that China's emergence as a manufacturer was complementary to the US economy. This was the idea that US companies could get cheap inputs and make certain consumer goods at a lower cost, which would be good for the US economy. This idea assumed that over time, a wealthier China would be a growing market for things like solar cells, aircraft, semiconductors, and patent-protected pharmaceuticals, which the US economy stood to benefit from also. The second phase was a recognition that the organic development of China's economy and its manufacturing power wasn't simply complimentary, and that in some specific sectors, telecommunications equipment being the obvious one, Chinese firms were emerging as potent competitors and they were doing so with a certain element of state backing. Huawei wasn't state-owned, but Huawei got plenty of support through contracts inside China from the state, telcos, a lot of support when it's going out and exporting, and a lot of subsidies for the development of its chip business. There was a hope that through negotiation you could convince China to change its ways, to back away from certain industrial policy practices, to liberalize, to go back to reform and opening up. Upgrade to paid Now we're in a third phase where no one expects China to reform and open up. We are now responding with our own industrial policies. We're not going to abandon sectors just because China has used state resources to prioritize them and built up capacity. We're trying to develop those sectors ourselves, and we're using both money and border restrictions to achieve that goal. Jordan Schneider: This gets at one of the things that is a sort of pet peeve for me. When Biden talks about trade policy, he says things such as, “American workers and businesses can out-compete anyone as long as they have fair competition.” Well, I'm sorry, but “fair” doesn't have a lot to do with it. China's actually really good at making stuff now. The concern I have is that this mindset doesn't internalize the fact that America is can lose because of domestic political decisions.  US failure on EVs isn’t simply a downstream consequence of the fact that BYD got some undermarket loans back in 2015. There are clear firm dynamics and regulatory dynamics that have made the EV rollout in the US a lot less successful. Both Western and East Asian carmakers are less capable of producing vehicles at the quality and price that China is offering.  I worry that there is actually a skill issue, and tariffs will just get us into the same position we’re in with US steel. Is the Biden administration just buying time for GM to make poor-quality cars? Could there be potential benefits to forcing US automakers to out-compete BYD in the US?  Brad Setser: Competition can strengthen you because you have to emerge as the best form of yourself. College basketball coaches want to have tough games to prepare themselves for the tournament for a reason. But competition can also wipe out your industry.  If competition risks killing the US EV industry, making us totally reliant on China, then that competition isn't a helpful strategy for making a strong, competitive domestic industry either. There was, to a degree, a risk that Chinese supply would come to dominate the US market. This isn’t just about BYD – Tesla's economic dynamics made them decide to produce cars in China for sale in the US market. GM and GM's partners could produce EVs in China for sale to the US. Same with Ford. That would not strengthen our own capacity to make our own EVs. It might help GM and Ford survive as brands, but it wouldn't bring that technology nor that expertise into the US.  I share the Biden administration's judgment that there was a real risk that the end result of open competition would have been the transfer of the whole industry to China, not a stronger US industry.  Next, I don't think it is quite right to either say “China's industry has only emerged because of the subsidies,” or to conversely make the argument that “China's industry just reflects the strategic and technological prowess of a few Chinese firms, which is why we should welcome them into our markets so that we can learn from them.”  The history is much more complex. Some of China's early EVs were not great. They clearly were benefiting from subsidies. There were a lot of subsidies thrown into the development of both batteries and the supply chain for minerals that eventually become batteries.  This was a conscious, strategic decision to shift to EVs, in part because China wanted to shake up the industry because Chinese brands weren't succeeding at building conventional combustion vehicles. There are cases where failed EV manufacturers in China are resurrected with investments from Three Gorges, which is a power company in the local province, which is hardly this story of great innovation leading to winning the market.  All that said, the EV industry drew on China’s existing manufacturing skill set – making an EV is analogous to producing high-quality electric machinery or appliances. EVs and cell phones are both powered by the same underlying battery technology.  But I also don't think it is fair to say that the Chinese government played no role in this. The reality is that it was a government policy that was very successful at nurturing these very efficient and innovative firms that we are now seeing today.  Jordan Schneider: For a deep dive on that specific topic, check out our show with John Helvaston, who wrote a number of papers exploring the interaction between the Chinese EV and the state sector in great detail.  Why Chinese EVs Will Take Over the World Jordan Schneider Episode Are these tariffs unprecedented, or just a repeat of the 1980s?  Jordan Schneider: Let's talk about the potential resolution of this. We're up to 100% tariffs if you are importing directly from China, which basically means that there are not going to be cars imported directly from China. Interestingly, the US hit the same roadblock in the 1980s with Japanese and Korean automakers. The compromise that American policymakers landed on was to accept foreign car brands as long as they were manufactured in Mississippi, for example. Now we have a lot of Hyundai and Toyota factories in the US. It seems like that is not necessarily going to happen with BYD.  What's your take on whether such a resolution might be applicable in today’s EV market? Brad Setser: Well, just as an observation, I think the history of the eighties is actually not very helpful. There are obvious differences. One difference is that Korea, Japan, and Europe are allies. Second, the incentives didn't just come from tariffs, they came from a big adjustment in the dollar. Toyota, BMW, and Mercedes set up shop here because they actually had an economic incentive to invest and build out their US supply chain.  By the way, in the US we still import a meaningful number of cars from Japan, Korea, and Germany. We are still the biggest market in the world for imported cars by far. We shouldn't forget that. But the third thing is that, in the 1980s we weren't in a world of smart cars and the internet of things. A self-driving car is a surveillance camera on steroids connected to the global ether. There's massive computing power processing all the images and telling that computer how to process all the information it is receiving. There's a surveillance angle that didn't exist in the 1980s. I don't think we are so far behind the Chinese carmakers. I wouldn't go so far as to say we need to import all the technical know-how from China. Tesla’s leadership has maybe spent too much time pursuing extracurriculars, but Tesla knows how to make competitive electric cars, no question about it. I actually don't think GM is that far behind either. They just went a different route. They went for costly builds because they wanted to build electric substitutes for their money-making models, which are their heavier pickups and SUVs. Hyundai, which is going to produce in the US, has already built a pretty significant business with a broader range of electric vehicles.  China’s vehicles are available at a much lower price point — that’s what makes them competitive. But they are cheap because the yuan is weak and because there hasn't been much upward pressure on wages in China. And in some cases Chinese manufacturers, because the domestic market has been very competitive, have just abandoned performance and went for a luxury vehicle experience where you're driven around in a home entertainment system. We could probably do the same thing. The question is whether there's a market for it. I'm not as pessimistic as some. I do think we are going to import some of China's battery technology through licensing arrangements, and I think that's fine. The harder questions will arise when we confront the technology for self-driving and AI-powered cars. You can get some pretty scary national security scenarios when all those cars are connected to computers run out of Beijing.  Jordan Schneider: Well, in any industry you can come up with a national security rationale for wanting to have domestic production. The question is — how important is it and how much are you willing to pay? The cost for now is that we're basically going to have a bifurcated car industry for the foreseeable future. Brad Setser: I guess I agree it's a big decision, but just for the record — we've already had a bifurcated car industry. Cars for the US market were made in the US, Korea, and Japan. Cars for the Chinese market were made in China. The Chinese market has a very low import penetration and used to have almost no exports. It was self contained in part because of the joint venture requirements of that industry.  The question was whether we were going to have an integrated market that included China. We have not in the past. But the decision not to integrate our auto markets at this point when China's auto sector is genuinely innovative and genuinely competitive is a consequential one. Jordan Schneider: One industry where the trade is not going to be zeroed out by these new tariffs is batteries. There’s a 25% increase for lithium-ion EV batteries and a 25% increase in 2026 for non-EV lithium-ion batteries. What's going on here, Brad?  Brad Setser: Well, weirdly, the Trump battery tariffs were inconsistent. There was a 25% tariff on EV battery cells for cars and a 7.5% tariff on EV battery packs, which led to some pretty significant imports of EV battery packs. If you look at dollar figures, the tariff on EV batteries is the biggest one because a large unnamed American electric vehicle producer is relying more and more on Chinese battery packs.  Source. If you want an independent battery industry and an independent battery supply chain, these restrictions are necessary because there is so much potential capacity coming out of China. We want a battery industry. Simple. We're spending a lot of money on it with the IRA, and we wanted to make sure there was a demand for all the capacity that the US is trying to build.  What’s the difference between a 100% tariff and a 200% tariff? Are the percentages just darts at a wall? Jordan Schneider: It strikes me that all of these are round numbers – hopefully there was some sophisticated analysis that went into picking these percentages — is that the case? Brad Setser: It's not a secret that the 301 tariff lists were initially created to hit a dollar amount that Trump wanted.  For the 301 tariffs, which are basically punitive, you can't calculate the tariff level based on an estimate of damages. Hence, why make anyone's life more complicated with something that is not a simple round number? The general rule of thumb is that for every percentage point you increase, the tariff trade falls by 2%. A 25% tariff should lead to a 50% fall on your imports. A 50% tariff should be prohibitive. If it's not, that tells you something. And then when you go from 50% to 100%, you're making a point. The point is — we don't want to be dependent on China for electric vehicles. All these calculations end up being arbitrary, but with an anti-dumping duty or a CVD counter-subsidy duty, there is pressure to be overly precise in calculating the offset in damages. In reality, no model is clear enough to recommend an 8.9% tariff. Conversely, in the 301 space, because the structure is tied to an undue burden on US commerce, it's an offset to Chinese retaliation, and it’s been modified over time – there's no point in trying to have a decimal point estimate because that is not the basis for this kind of tariff action. Do we really need 100%, or is that just a political statement? 50% should be prohibitive. For some sectors, 50% may not be prohibitive because Chinese battery producers are really quite competitive, but they also don't qualify for IRA incentives.  Then, for some other sectors, like legacy chips, the tariff actually doesn't matter that much, because most legacy chips aren't imported as chips, they're imported as part of a final product. Solar is also performative because the US imports a lot of Chinese solar content through Southeast Asia. We import wafers and cells that are put into panels in Southeast Asia.  It doesn't really matter what the tariff is if the product is already tariffed out the wazoo. Jordan Schneider: Fair enough. You know, Trump said today that his plan is to make the tariff 200%.  Brad Setser: Ha, Biden should have countered with 400%. Why not, right?