Book by Hongshan Li: Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War - Review by Zeno Leoni (H-Diplo)

H-Diplo: New posted content

• H-Diplo Review Essay 597: Leoni on Li, _Fighting on the Cultural Front_

H-Diplo: New posted content

H-Diplo Review Essay 597: Leoni on Li, _Fighting on the Cultural Front_

christopher ball

H-Diplo Review Essay 597

Hongshan Li. Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9780231207041 (hardcover, $150.00); 780231207058 (paperback, $37.00); 9780231556781 (e-book, $36.99).

27 November 2024 | PDF: https://hdiplo.org/to/E597 | X: @HDiplo | BlueSky: @h-diplo.bsky.social

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Kevin Grimm | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Zeno Leoni, King’s College London

At the end of the 1940s, shortly after the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), William Johnstone Jr., director of the Office of Education Exchange within the Department of State, “proposed a meeting with presidents from more than a dozen universities to solicit their views on how to deal with Chinese students [in the US] so as to ‘strengthen and encourage democratic forces in China’” (43). As part of an “anti-communist ideological campaign,” US legislation offered financial support for Chinese students who were stuck in the United States in the aftermath of the civil war (41). This also involved, among many other things, “helping liberal Chinese writers publish periodicals, pamphlets, and books in Chinese,” or “strengthening the Voice of America (VOA).” Not long before that, meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was keen to “establish absolute control over all cultural institutions and activities in the newly liberated areas” as the Chinese civil war was approaching the end (17). The rationale for this was the principle of dasao fangzi—“cleaning house,” in the sense that China was “like a dirty house” that was “filled with trash, dirt, flea, bedbugs, and lice”—a metaphor for imperialist forces and their friends (16).

In 1950, furthermore, 961 faculty and staff from Peking University “signed a convention refusing to listen to the VOA and issued a statement to call on the people of the nation to do the same” (56). Later on, the CCP pursued an “alliance between Beijing and several radical African American leaders” in the United States, which is reminiscent of China’s critique of the United States when on 25 of May 2020, George Perry Floyd, Jr. was murdered by a police officer while held on the ground, while the United States issued a travel ban to “American leftists” (242-245). Considering that “[w]hen American and Chinese merchants met for the first time in 1784, they knew practically nothing about each other” (2), there was quite a lot going on during the Cold War. Yet these are just a handful of examples extracted among many other anecdotes that Hongshan Li discusses in his rich history of cultural war, Fighting on the Cultural Front: US-China Relations in the Cold War.

One is tempted to say that, overall, nothing has changed between the United States and China since then. Nor had anything changed then compared to the previous century. On the one hand, the United States—like other Western countries, especially the United Kingdom—has sought to influence China and to open it up to the global economy, ultimately for their own benefit, since the time of the Open Door policy at the end of nineteenth century and with even greater energy and success since the rapprochement in 1972. On the other hand, China continues to be ruled by elites who seek to control both the material and ideological dimensions of state borders, and to protect a relatively closed society and culture whose “fundamental precepts,” as the US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger put it, “endured, tested by the strain of periodic calamity.”[1]

Aficionados of the study of US-China relations will be able to relate to the essence and the continuity of this relationship in the longue durée in light of Li’s statement that the United States and China “kept viewing each other as their most dangerous enemy” while they also “became aware that it was extremely difficult if not impossible for either side to win a prolonged military confrontation against the other” (85-86). In other words, the United States and China, back then as much as nowadays, have continued to be entangled in what seems to be a forced coexistence. Rivalry has never disappeared though, and if nowadays there are references to a divide marked by democracy versus authoritarianism, in the past Beijing and Washington clashed as the United States was said to be “built on clearly articulated ideals and values,” while China had an “enduring cultural legacy” (2).

This overall picture emerges from a very thorough analysis which offers many more nuances and details than those that can be captured in a review. The author endeavors to answer three main questions in this book: first, “why were the [positive] historical trends in Sino-American cultural relations reversed during the Cold War, and why did the United States and the PRC become mortal enemies on the cultural front?”; second, “[h]ow did the two sides utilize cultural interactions as weapons against each other in the Cold War years?”; and third, “[w]hat impact did the Sino-American confrontation on the cultural front have in shaping US-China Cold War relations and rebuilding bilateral cultural ties during as well as after the rapprochement?” (4). Ultimately, by addressing these questions, Li aims to provide the very first study of this kind on US-China cultural exchanges during the Cold War that considers both state and non-state actors. 

The book is structured chronologically and divided in three parts. Part 1 focuses on the aftermath of World War II and, in particular, on the shift from cultural engagement to “termination of existing cultural ties” (8). The “cultural front” arises in the aftermath of the Second World War, during which the United States had supported the Chinese nationalists, when the “limited collaboration” with communists against Japan ended (14-15). Prior to the late 1940s, there were “three clear trends,” such as the “constant expansion of Sino-American cultural interactions [,]…. increasing government involvement in bilateral cultural interactions …[and] continued improvement in mutual knowledge and understanding” (2-3). But as the Communists were getting closer to victory in the civil war, they started to “prohibit foreigners from publishing newspapers or magazines” that were produced in liberated areas (17). These tough restrictions brought “immediate and drastic changes” to US-China cultural relations (20). The United States became the enemy because it was imperialist and supported the Nationalists in an anti-communist perspective. The CCP was determined to establish “absolute control” over all cultural institutions and activities in the newly liberated areas” (17). 

Since then, the author tells us, “Sino-American cultural relations [have been] transformed from mostly a constructive force in the making of bilateral relations into sharp swords constantly wielded in hot as well as cold wars since the late 1940s” (1). Part 1 explores how the United States and China became “open enemies” since the late 1940s; the involvement in the Korean War (25 June 1950–27 July 1953); and competition for influencing “Chinese students and scholars stranded in the United States” (8-9). Part 2’s focus is on the cultural front “at the height of the Cold War” (9). Chapters in this part cover issues such as the US cultural offensive against China by supporting Chinese students in Taiwan; the relationship between Beijing, Washington, and American journalists, and efforts in the 1950s to keep the cultural relationship “as dead as could be”; Beijing’s efforts to control and influence US citizens, for instance by inviting “a carefully selected small group of American citizens to China for a short amount of time”; and the fascinating history of efforts by Beijing to spread communist ideology to the United States through African American activists (9-11). 

Part 3 of the book covers less ground, as it seeks to capture a mild “brief de-escalation” in the early 1970s, in line with the process of rapprochement and normalization which was happening during those years (11). The epilogue maintains that the business of cultural confrontation continued as usual, with China seeking to prevent “bourgeois spiritual pollution”—jingshen wuran—while seeking to access US technology (page citation). With an emerging pragmatism dictated by China’s need for modernization and US interests at including China in the global economy, cultural confrontation might have been a relief valve for tensions.

The book puts forward three arguments. First, the United States and China competed in the cultural front after the 1940s not only because they were “foes” in “hot” wars, but specifically because they “each viewed the ideas and values espoused and disseminated by the other as real threats to its security and survival” (4). Second, because of these competing political systems and social values, the United States and China confronted one another in different approaches, the United States through laws and regulation and China through “violent political movements and tight ideological control.” Third, such cultural confrontation had a “profound and lasting impact” on the Cold War experience of US and Chinese people and on US-China relations before and after normalization (6-8).

The narrative of the book is successful in smoothly merging specific details with international events and the diplomatic development of US-China relations, which is always in the background. Li introduces the geopolitical context at the start of each chapter, and is very careful to provide a clear signposting for the reader. From a methodological viewpoint, while also relying on secondary sources, the book is distinguished by the author’s gathering of a rich amount of primary sources from archives in the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan, including local and national archives, institutional archives, and libraries.

This book makes for a rare contribution to the literature. The study of cultural relations between the United States and China remains underexplored, not only with regard to the Cold War era, but also with respect to more recent events, as the hard diplomatic dimension tends to gather greater interest. At the same time, it could have been even more engaging. a summary of the literature on this or closely related topics would have offered a background to readers who are not familiar with the topic. More to the point, it would have been interesting to get a sense of how the author sees this work situated in the context of previous publications on the history of US-China relations during the Cold War.[2] Some of these contributions are those of Hongshan Li himself.[3] There have been publications focusing specifically on a cultural perspective of the relationship between the US and China. One paper provided an analysis of the wartime years of WWII.[4] Others have looked at the Cold War period more broadly.[5]

This would emphasize even more the book’s value. While Fighting on the Cultural Front is based on rigorous historical research, it would have been interesting to see the author’s personal viewpoint emerge more from the narrative. The book could bear even greater contemporary relevance had it contained a reflection on the “so what” for current US-China relations, at a time when ideology appears again to have become a battleground, albeit in a much less prominent manner compared to the confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nonetheless, Hongshan Li’s exploration of the relationship between the United States and China with this sort of long term perspective reveals a positive message in the sense that it shows that the relationship has had highs and lows; that this has been going on for a long time; that the two countries often managed to move on from dangerous impasses; and that they need each other to achieve important interests.

Zeno Leoni is a Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, and an Affiliate to the Lau China Institute of the same university. His latest work is A New Cold War: US-China Relations in the 21st Century (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2024).

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[1] Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).

[2] Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War(Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 2017); Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

[3] Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li, China and the United States: A New Cold War History (New York: University Press of America, 1998).

[4] Frank Ninkovich, “Cultural Relations and American China Policy, 1942–1945,” Pacific Historical Review 49: 3 (1980): 471-498.

[5] Ellen D. Wu “‘America's Chinese’: Anti-Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War,” Pacific Historical Review 77:3 (2008): 391-422.

O Brasil na maior encruzilhada de sua história: pode-se escolher uma “nova ordem mundial”? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O Brasil na maior encruzilhada de sua história: pode-se escolher uma “nova ordem mundial”?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ordens mundiais — não necessariamente universais, ou globais, mas simplesmente dominantes regionalmente — não estão livremente disponíveis nos supermercados da História, para que um Estado qualquer, como um cliente entrado para as compras, possa escolher a que melhor lhe agrada ou aquela que seja a mais adequada às suas conveniências peculiares. O mundo não funciona assim, com um leque aberto de ordens econômicas e politicas entre as quais o cliente-Estado possa se servir à vontade, ao melhor de suas opções.

Nunca existiu, até a comunidade de nações precariamente organizada em Bretton Woods e logo em seguida em San Francisco, uma “ordem global” tal como a existente desde 1945, formalmente agrupada nas instituições onusianas (e alguns derivativos temáticos ou regionais) e dispondo de certa legitimidade dada por tratados e acordos em princípio aceitos por todos os Estados contemporâneo. O membership da ONU compreende, com certa boa vontade, a quase universalidade de Estados (ou circunscrições aduaneiras) legitimamente reconhecidos entre si: são 193 Estados, mais alguns observadores (como a Palestina, por exemplo) e duas partes contratantes ao Gatt com status especiais de territórios aduaneiros: Hong Kong, por um lado, Taiwan, por outro. A FIFA supera largamente a “universalidade” da ONU, com 211 federações nacionais (embora algumas, presentes apenas por razões históricas, como Escócia e País de Gales, por exemplo).

Anteriormente à ONU, nenhuma organização multilateral — mais exatamente interestatal — podia aspirar a tal abrangência “global”, muito menos a Liga das Nações, sua precária e muito incompleta antecessora. Todas as “ordens mundiais” precedentes não passavam de impérios regionais com maior ou menor abrangência geográfica ou populacional. O mundo, na visão abrangente de um Arnold Toynbee, assistiu à dominação concorrente ou sucessiva de duas dezenas de grandes civilizações, várias organizadas no formato de impérios, das quais a maior e mais bem-sucedida teria sido a civilização ocidental (na perspectiva dos anos 1930, quando ele comecou a escrever os diversos volumes de seu monumental Estudo da História, isso parecia fazer sentido, pois que impérios europeus e o americano “mandavam” no resto do mundo, à exceção do império russo-soviético).

O Brasil, incorporado colonialmente ao grande império marítimo lusitano (apud Charles Boxer) durante três séculos, passou a fazer parte, de modo informal, na sua independência, dos impérios europeus e americano (este um pouco mais tarde), ou seja, pertencíamos, por destino, herança e escolha própria, à “civilização ocidental” toynbeeana, dominante no mundo, desde os Descobrimentos, passando por Westfália e o arranjo oligárquico de Viena, até a Liga das Nações (da qual nos afastamos atabalhoadamente  por caprichos do presidente Arthur Bernardes). Mas confirmamos nosso pertencimento à “civilização ocidental” desde Bretton Woods e San Francisco, mesmo quando insistíamos em afirmar nossa autonomia diplomática em face do arrogante Big Brother, representado pelo hegemon quase universal, o império americano do pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial.

A “ordem liberal ocidental” foi dominante enquanto o antigo Império do Meio — transmutado de República da China em República Popular, já na ONU desde 1972 — ainda atravessava seu declínio secular, desde os Qing até Deng Xiaoping, e enquanto o império soviético só era importante belicamente, em sua mediocridade econômica, financeira e política.

A plena inserção do Brasil na ordem liberal ocidental foi especialmente relevante, no plano diplomático, enquanto o mundo vivia a bipolaridade da “primeira” Guerra Fria, mesmo com um alinhamento onusiano mais próximo do que hoje se chama (equivocadamente) de Sul Global, ou do G77, do que dos votos e posturas do “núcleo duro” do bloco ocidental: EUA, Europa ocidental, G7, Ocde, Otan etc. Nunca tivemos de “escolher” uma outra “ordem mundial”, porque ela simplesmente inexistia, como proposta alternativa concreta. Nosso alinhamento autônomo à ordem economicamente, politicamente, culturalmente dominante do Ocidente foi confirmado mesmo nos momentos mais representativos de uma “politica externa independente”: a própria PEI, do início dos anos 1960, depois a partir do final dessa década, sem esse nome, mas, em tudo e por tudo, autônoma vis-à-vis os dois grandes blocos geopoliticos da segunda metade do século XX (até os anos 1990). Um “alinhamento ocidental” verdadeiramente independente, pois que nunca trocamos o status de observador pelo de membro do Movimento Não Alinhado, por exemplo. 

Tal consistência diplomática foi mantida durante toda a segunda metade do século XX, até que algo começou a mudar, na substância e na forma, com o advento da diplomacia partidária lulopetista, já neste século, quando Lula e o PT assumem o poder em 2003. Nos dois primeiros mandatos, a diplomacia foi apenas parcialmente partidária e alternativa, mas não havia nenhuma proposta de alguma outra “ordem global” sendo oferecida nos supermercados da História: a Rússia recém emergia da “maior catástrofe geopolítica do século XX” e a China, recém admitida no Gatt-OMC, ainda não tinha começado a flexionar os seus músculos econômicos, o que ela fez muito rapidamente a partir de então.

Lula e o PT, para não mencionar os diplomatas mais “autonomistas”, reforçaram as demandas por uma “reforma das instituições multilaterais da governança global”, com especial atenção para as de Bretton Woods, a OMC e, no coração da matéria, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU. Mas o conceito de “nova ordem global”, com o adjetivo multipolar agregado em seguida, não tinha sido ainda aventado de forma explícita nos primeiros três lustros do século. Ele passou a ser mencionado, primeiro de forma tímida ou ocasional, a partir da invasão e da anexação ilegais da península ucraniana da Crimeia (de fato historicamente russa, mas pertencente à jurisdição da República da Ucrânia desde 1991), por Putin, em fevereiro de 2014, numa aventura militar mais ousada do que suas incursões igualmente ilegais na Georgia e na Moldávia alguns anos antes.

Com a guerra de agressão de Putin contra a Ucrânia em fevereiro de 2022, o conceito se firmou, em declarações de Putin e de Xi Jinping, e rapidamente se tornou o princípio organizador de uma nova concepção de “ordem mundial”, ou global, com o apêndice “multipolar”, ele próprio uma recusa direta ou indireta da “ordem mundial ocidental”, agora expressamente recusada por suas tonalidades hegemônicas e, supostamente, por não ser verdadeiramente “democrática”.

Esta é pois a encruzilhada “existencial” para a qual o Brasil e sua política externa podem ter sido encaminhados, sem qualquer consulta mais ampla à nação, pela diplomacia partidária lulopetista, sem muita elaboração conceitual em torno de suas implicações mais relevantes para o pais por parte do corpo profissional do Itamaraty ou de outros setores da sociedade brasileira. 

O tema apresenta importância maior na vida da nação para merecer reflexões mais profundas sobre o significado e as consequências dessa “adesão” governamental — talvez apenas personalista — a um conceito e um projeto mal definido ou explicitado, sendo patrocinado abertamente por duas grandes potências que já se colocaram em oposição declarada à alegada “ordem liberal ocidental”, ainda dominante. Um exercício reflexivo sobre essa “adesão não oficial” (mas repetida de forma recorrente) deve começar a fazer parte das preocupações conceituais e pragmáticas daquela pequena tribo de pensadores engajados no terreno das relações internacionais do país e da própria diplomacia da nação.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 30/11/2024

===========

Addendum:

Um comentário adicional, na sequência desta nota acima, postada neste mesmo blog Diplomatizzando: 

https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/11/o-brasil-na-maior-encruzilhada-de-sua.html?m=1

Durante a maior parte do século XX o Brasil se considerou não exatamente como um participante ativo do bloco liderado pelos Estados Unidos, mas como integrante desse conceito maior que se chama civilização ocidental, mantendo sua autonomia decisória e plena independência diplomática nos confrontos geopolíticos interimperiais. 

Aparentemente, já adentrado o século XXI, certa diplomacia partidária e algum entusiasmo acadêmico, parecem conduzi-lo a um projeto indefinido e altamente questionável de “nova ordem global multipolar”, proposto por duas grandes autocracias, que contestam a ordem liberal ocidental em vigor desde o final da IIGM, e que pretendem claramente se colocar como alternativa não ocidental, e não democrática, a uma ordem bem mais identificada com os princípios e valores de nossa politica externa tradicional. Personalismo megalomaníaco explica parte dessa tendência diplomática insuficienteme debatida pela cidadania bem-informada; o resto é antiamericanismo primário de parte da academia.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 30/11/2024

DDB: Documentos Diplomáticos Brasileiros? - Uma possibilidade longinqua, ao que parece... Documentos Diplomáticos Suíços

DDB: Documentos Diplomáticos Brasileiros? - Uma possibilidade longinqua, ao que parece... Documentos Diplomáticos Suíços 

A diplomacia brasileira dispõe de um um Consultor Jurídico – o primeiro foi instituído pelo pai do Barão, o Visconde do Rio Branco –, mas nunca "sentiu necessidade" de dispor de um historiador oficial, ou seja, alguém encarregado de selecionar os documentos diplomáticos mais interessantes e de divulgá-los em prazos regulares.

Não temos, por exemplo, o equivalente do U.S. Foreign Relations series, volumes temáticos com documentos cronologicamente agrupados, mesmo confidenciais (depois de liberados), que servem ao público em geral, mas mais precisamente aos historiadores, como guias documentais em seu trabalho analítico e interpretativo. Sempre propus a criação de um cargo de Historiador Diplomático no Itamaraty, mas nunca fui ouvido.

Até o Reino do Marrocos possui um quadro estratégico das relações internacionais do país, preparado pelo seu instituto de pesquisas da área diplomática, que pode ser visto neste link: https://www.ires.ma/fr/publications/rapports-generaux/tableau-de-bord-strategique-evolution-du-positionnement-international-du-maroc-douzieme-edition

Abaixo, um exemplo interessante: a série da Suíça, liberada a cada 30 anos, ou seja, na desclassificação.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Diplo: New posted content

• H-Diplo Roundtable XXVI-11 on Zala et al., _Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 1992_

H-Diplo: New posted content

H-Diplo Roundtable XXVI-11 on Zala et al., _Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 1992_

christopher ball

H-Diplo Roundtable XXVI-11

Sacha Zala et al., Documents Diplomatiques Suisses, 1992. Bern: Dodis, 2023. ISBN 978-3-907261-10-1.

28 November 2024 | PDF: https://hdiplo.org/to/RT26-11 | X: @HDiplo | BlueSky: @h-diplo.bsky.social

Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Liliane Stadler | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Contents

Introduction by Georg Kreis, University of Basel 2

Review by Stéphanie Ginalski, Université de Lausanne.. 6

Review by Marianne von Grünigen, formerly of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA). 11

Response by Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala, Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland.. 18

 

Introduction by Georg Kreis, University of Basel

The scholarly discussion revolving around the Dodis Research Centre’s volume on Swiss diplomatic documents from 1992 gives us the opportunity to reflect on the importance of this type of scientific endeavor in a recapitulatory way. The volumes of the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS), which have been published since 1979, occupy a key position in the landscape of Switzerland’s diplomatic history and historiography.

Since 2021, the Dodis Research Centre annually selects and publishes approximately 1,800 of the most important documents on Swiss foreign policy at the exact expiry date of the 30-year protection and embargo period—just like a proverbial Swiss clock, so to speak. At the beginning of each year, Dodis uploads these documents via its website and publishes a small, carefully selected sub-set of approximately 62 documents both digitally and in print. The print volume of documents from 1992 was presented to the public at a well-attended book launch on 3 January 2023.[1]

In fact, the annual book launches of the DDS series have become somewhat of an institution in and of themselves and enjoy great popularity among scholars, students, journalists, as well as Swiss and foreign diplomats. They also receive considerable press coverage in Switzerland on the day they are held. Media professionals pour over the compiled documentation and convey a “selection of the selection” from the always rich and meaningful collections of documents, which continue to a wider public debate on the continued relevance of Swiss diplomatic history for the present day.[2] We know that documents that were previously classified as secret are of particular interest.

What is special about the way in which Dodis makes Swiss diplomatic documents accessible to the public is that they are primarily intended to allow interested citizens to encounter historical primary-source material with a sound balance of proximity and distance. The aim is to stimulate curiosity and inquiry. Thanks to the interactive format of both the print and digital versions of the DDS volumes, the index, and the table of contents, interested readers can find out more with little effort, about what was thought and done on their behalf in the arena of foreign affairs thirty years ago. The Dodis volumes also draw interest from the many bilateral and multilateral diplomatic missions based in Switzerland. Of course, current-day policymakers at the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs are interested too in what their predecessors have left behind in written reflections. 

Yet what significance do these editions have for historical research and for the ongoing academic debates surrounding Swiss foreign policy? They are important intermediate products in a continuous process of academic debate on the history of Swiss foreign relations. These can be used to gauge what has already been—as always—provisionally worked out in the existing literature. In the case of the present volume, Swiss reactions to the possibility of becoming part of the European Economic Area (EEA) have received considerable attention.[3] On the basis of the documentation now available, it is possible to guess what is still waiting to be recorded in an in-depth investigation. 

More broadly speaking, the selection of files contained in DDS 1992 provides a condensed overview of the most important foreign policy challenges—big and small—which occurred that year. With its layout, based primarily on archival holdings from the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne, it can provide a glimpse into issues and topics that have received little attention to date. The detailed note of a conversation that took place in Geneva in May 1992 between the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela, and Swiss State Secretary Franz Blankart, is particularly significant and catalogued as Document Number 19 in DDS 1992 (115-118). In this document, Mandela comments that Switzerland had a “most negative image” in South Africa because of its non-participation in international sanctions and because of the behavior of several Swiss companies. Nevertheless, he added, “Let bygone be bygone, let us now normalize the perception,” referring primarily to financial support for the ANC (118).[4]

On the whole and in the spirit of “blue skies research,” DDS 1992 leaves open which research questions could or should be developed on the basis of the materials provided. Most Dodis volumes are products of what is called Grundlagenforschung in German—research that forms a solid basis for further investigations. They are intended as entry points into specific topics for those interested in historical research on Swiss foreign policy. The substantial introduction that precedes the documents provides both context and overview for the selection of documents that essentially mark the beginning of a new year in the declassification calendar at the Swiss Federal Archives (XXXI-LI). It is now also accompanied by a detailed review in the Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, an academic journal dedicated to new research on Swiss history.[5]

I do want to stress, however, that while this roundtable primarily revolves around the edited volume of 1992, the publication of these documents in an edited volume—as much as they form the material core of the edition—is only half of the achievement. The other half—which cannot be valued highly enough, especially for further research—is the digital enrichment of the document corpus with metadata and its breakdown according to relevant core themes and key words, which makes targeted research much easier. The editors aptly state soberly in their contribution to our roundtable that, “this is the primary work we do on sources.” In her contribution, Stéphanie Ginalski correspondingly highlights the diversity of diplomatic activities and emphasizes, among other things, the negotiations on climate issues that were conducted in 1992—more than 30 years ago. She also reflects on the reorientation of the conventional understanding of Swiss neutrality that occurred that year, stressing Switzerland’s participation in international sanctions “without inciting a revolution.” 

Marianne von Grünigen, meanwhile, dwells on the strengthening of the CSCE and its successor organization over time, as well as on the “soft” institutionalization of its involvement in various conflicts leading up to and including 1992. She emphasizes that the year 1992 was significant in terms of enhanced cooperation among the existing international organizations in Europe. The year 1992 was a turning point after two decades of growing optimism for a more peaceful, secure and democratic Europe. Finally, Thomas Bürgisser and Sacha Zala, the two editors of the volume, respond to the two preceding contributions. They confirm Ginalski’s observation concerning the “glaring absence of women” in diplomacy at the time. Women remained heavily underrepresented in the diplomatic corps throughout the 1990s. Von Grünigen herself is a notable exception in the Swiss diplomatic corps and thankfully, the gender balance has since improved considerably. 

(...)

Ler a íntegra neste link: 

https://networks.h-net.org/group/discussions/20051318/h-diplo-roundtable-xxvi-11-zala-et-al-documents-diplomatiques-suisses

Biblioteca Digital da Funag: mais de mil livros disponíveis gratuitamente

A Biblioteca Digital da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão tem, em seu estoque de livros disponíveis, 1033 obras, um volume continuamente alimentado por novos acréscimos:

 https://funag.gov.br/biblioteca-nova/todos/0

A Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG) coloca à disposição do público obras relativas ao estudo dos grandes temas de interesse da política externa brasileira e das relações internacionais. As obras encontram-se em formato digital para download gratuito na biblioteca digital.

Bolsonaro nu - Editorial O Estado de S. Paulo

Bolsonaro nu

Editorial O Estado de S. Paulo, 28/11/2024

Ninguém precisava da PF para saber que Bolsonaro é golpista. Mas as investigações são úteis porque o despem de vez dos trapos retóricos com os quais ele tentou se travestir de democrata

O relatório final da Polícia Federal (PF) sobre a tentativa de golpe de Estado que teria sido urdida no seio do governo de Jair Bolsonaro para aferrá-lo ao poder decerto não surpreendeu quem acompanhou minimamente a vida pública do ex-presidente. Desde quando saiu do Exército em desonra, passando por uma frívola carreira parlamentar – que, se prestou para alguma coisa, foi para enriquecê-lo, além de sua família – até chegar à Presidência da República, Bolsonaro jamais traiu seu espírito golpista. De mau militar e mau deputado a mau presidente, foram quase 40 anos de exploração da insurreição e da infâmia como ativos políticos.

Este jornal, seguramente, não está surpreso com o que veio a público após o ministro Alexandre de Moraes, do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), levantar o sigilo sobre o referido relatório. Afinal, faz quase 25 anos que já sublinhávamos nesta página o vezo parasitário de Bolsonaro no Brasil pós-redemocratização, chamando-o pelo que é: um desqualificado que se serve das mesmas liberdades democráticas que sempre quis obliterar (ver o editorial Dejetos da democracia, 8/1/2000).

A rigor, ninguém precisava de um relatório policial de mais de 800 páginas para saber que Bolsonaro é um golpista inveterado. Quem já votou nele ao longo da vida pode alegar tudo, menos desconhecimento de sua índole destrutiva. Mas, para quem quiser, aí está o portentoso material reunido pela PF a encadear fatos e personagens com notável robustez, além de desnudar o espírito insurreto que jamais deixou de guiar o ex-presidente ao longo de sua trajetória.

Segundo a PF, Bolsonaro “planejou, atuou e teve domínio de forma direta e efetiva” das tramoias para impedir a posse do presidente Lula da Silva, o que teria incluído até um suposto plano para assassiná-lo, entre outras autoridades. E não só entre novembro e dezembro de 2022, mas durante todo o mandato – que, recorde-se, começou com a disseminação de mentiras sobre a suposta “fragilidade” das urnas eletrônicas. Ainda de acordo com a PF, essa desabrida campanha de desqualificação do sistema eleitoral já era parte do plano golpista de Bolsonaro para se insurgir contra um resultado nas urnas que não fosse a sua reeleição, contando que a desconfiança que semeou entre milhões de brasileiros poderia lhe ser útil no futuro.

É fundamental frisar que ainda se está em fase de inquérito policial. De modo que o contraditório e a ampla defesa só estarão plenamente garantidos aos 37 indiciados, como é próprio do Estado Democrático de Direito, mais à frente, vale dizer, se e quando a Procuradoria-Geral da República (i) oferecer denúncia contra eles, (ii) as acusações forem aceitas pelo STF e (iii) o caso, então, entrar na fase judicial propriamente dita. Entretanto, as eventuais provas que poderão ser apresentadas à Justiça pelo parquet, obviamente, serão decisivas apenas, por assim dizer, para o destino penal de Bolsonaro. Já sobre seu golpismo não há prova mais cabal de que se trata de um inimigo figadal da democracia do que seu próprio passado.

Nesse sentido, é estarrecedor ainda haver no seio de uma sociedade que se pretende livre e democrática quem admita a presença de alguém como Bolsonaro na vida política. Ou pior, que enxergue como “democrata”, “patriota”, “vítima do sistema” ou baboseira que o valha um sujeito de quinta categoria que já defendeu o fechamento do Congresso, lamentou o “baixo número” de concidadãos torturados e mortos nos porões da ditadura militar, pregou o fuzilamento do presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso e trata adversários políticos como inimigos a serem eliminados, inclusive fisicamente. Ademais, Bolsonaro jamais desestimulou as manifestações de teor golpista realizadas em seu nome, como os acampamentos na frente de quartéis País afora. Tudo indica que não o fez para falsear um “clamor popular” pelo golpe e, assim, pressionar as Forças Armadas a apoiálo na intentona – o que, para o bem do Brasil, não ocorreu.

A Justiça, primeiro, e a História, depois, hão de ser implacáveis com Bolsonaro e todos os que flertaram com a destruição da democracia no Brasil.

How the Global Distribution of Wealth Has Changed (2000-2023) - Visual Capitalist

 How the Global Distribution of Wealth Has Changed (2000-2023)

This was originally posted on our Voronoi app. Download the app for free on iOS or Android and discover incredible data-driven charts from a variety of trusted sources.

People worldwide are becoming increasingly wealthier—and not just those who already own great wealth.

Over recent decades, the share of the global population with wealth between $10,000 and $100,000 has more than doubled, while the group in the lowest wealth segment (less than $10,000) has been nearly cut in half.

This graphic illustrates the shifts in global wealth distribution between 2000 and 2023, based on data from Art Basel and UBS.

Key Takeaways

The percentage of adults in the lowest wealth segment (under $10,000) decreased from 75% in 2000 to 40% in 2023. Most of these individuals reside in poorer countries, predominantly in Africa.

Meanwhile, the group with wealth between $10,000 and $100,000 has seen the most significant growth over the last two decades.

Year	< $10k	$10k-$100k	$100k-$1m	> $1m
2000	75%	17%	8%	1%
2010	56%	32%	12%	1%
2019	57%	33%	10%	1%
2022	53%	34%	12%	1%
2023	40%	43%	16%	2%

While the share of millionaires has doubled since 2000, they still account for only 2% of the global population. North America and the Middle East have experienced the largest percentage increase in the number of millionaires since 2016, with +52% and +50% growth, respectively.

Individuals with assets worth $100,000–$1 million have grown from 8% to 16% of the population.

According to UBS, the data shows that in every wealth band and over any time horizon, it’s consistently likelier for people to climb up the wealth ladder than slip down it, at least on a global level.

Learn More on the Voronoi App 

To learn more about this topic, check out this graphic that shows the global wealth distribution by region in 2023.

Venezuela: a maneira dura de Trump tratar com a ditadura não vai funcionar, como não funcionou com Cuba ou Nicarágua - Francisco Rodriguez (Foreign Affairs)

 The Case for Engagement With Venezuela

Maximum Pressure Will Only Strengthen Maduro

By Francisco Rodríguez

Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2024

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/venezuela/case-engagement-venezuela?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Case%20for%20Engagement%20With%20Venezuela&utm_content=20241128&utm_term=EDZZZ003ZX#author-info

 

Among the most complex foreign policy challenges facing the new U.S. administration is the situation in Venezuela. Over the past 12 years, Venezuela has transitioned from a fragile democracy to an entrenched authoritarian regime, experiencing one of the most severe economic collapses and migration crises in modern history outside wartime. And in recent years, these problems have increasingly affected the United States. During the past five years, U.S. authorities have apprehended more than 900,000 Venezuelans attempting to cross the southern border.

[Lea la versión de este artículo en español aquí.]

Many expect that Donald Trump’s presidency will mean the return of the maximum-pressure approach to Venezuela that defined his first term, when Washington imposed sweeping oil and financial sanctions, backed efforts at an armed uprising, and even floated the possibility of direct military action. At a rally in Florida just three days before the election, Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, asserted that under the new administration, “we will have a very different position, much tougher and much clearer, not only in Venezuela, but also in Cuba and Nicaragua.” Rubio has cosponsored legislation to codify sanctions on Venezuela, conditioning any sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro relinquishing power and an opposition-led transition.

But a return to the failed strategy of maximum pressure by the new administration would be a grave mistake. Sanctions are rarely effective in achieving regime change, and Venezuela is no exception. Far from destabilizing Maduro, U.S. sanctions have helped him consolidate control, increasing the asymmetry of power between the state’s apparatus and an impoverished and weakened civil society. More than seven million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2014, and doubling down on pressure could further worsen the living conditions of those remaining. Maximum pressure will, therefore, cut against Washington’s effort to reduce irregular migration and ensure a stable energy supply.

The United States should continue to condemn Maduro’s authoritarian government for its human rights violations and dismantling of democratic institutions. But Trump and his administration should adopt a strategy of targeted engagement with Venezuela’s authorities. Such a strategy would prioritize maintaining or strengthening economic and diplomatic linkages between the United States and Venezuela—the types of connections that can empower stakeholders committed to fostering a democratic transition. The first priority of U.S. policy should be to alleviate the suffering of Venezuelans, recognizing that broad economic sanctions have exacerbated that suffering. Where possible, Washington should leverage engagement—including the gradual easing of sanctions—to encourage improvements in human rights and political freedoms. This strategy of targeted engagement offers a path to immediately improve conditions in Venezuela while enhancing the prospects for a democratic transition in the medium to long term.

SANCTIONING CATASTROPHE

From 2017 to 2022, the United States imposed some of the harshest sanctions on Venezuela that it has levied on any country. The Trump administration halted all trade with Venezuela’s state-owned oil, gold, and banking sectors (transactions with private banks were still allowed) and blocked the national government and the oil industry from borrowing, restructuring debt, or receiving dividends from its offshore subsidiaries (like Citgo). In 2019, Washington handed control over Venezuela’s overseas assets to the U.S.-recognized opposition, led by Juan Guaidó, and blocked the country’s access to international reserve holdings, including special drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund.

The first Trump administration also imposed secondary sanctions, barring Venezuela from selling oil abroad by targeting foreign companies and vessels involved in its oil trade. Between 2019 and 2021, 47 vessels and 12 companies were sanctioned for assisting in Venezuelan oil exports. (In contrast, despite similar U.S. sanctions on Russian oil today, non-U.S. tankers can still sell Russian oil at $60 per barrel without being sanctioned themselves.)

This pressure has compounded Venezuela’s economic crisis. The country’s contraction in per capita incomes began in 2013 because of severe macroeconomic imbalances created by years of populist policies. Yet starting in 2017, sanctions significantly worsened the economy by severing Venezuela’s access to vital oil and financial markets, which led to a sharp decline in oil production. Sanctions contributed substantially to falling oil output, imports, and productivity; without them, Venezuela’s economy would have started to recover when oil prices rose in 2017. Sanctions accounted for around 52 percent of Venezuela’s economic contraction between 2012 and 2020. Without sanctions, Venezuela would have still faced a severe crisis, with per capita incomes dropping by 34 percent. With sanctions, however, GDP per capita declined by an extraordinary 71 percent—equivalent to almost three successive Great Depressions.

Venezuela’s migration crisis stems from this collapse in economic opportunities. Although the country’s human rights violations are horrific, they are not on the scale of the ethnic cleansing, genocide, or armed conflict that typically drives mass displacement. Instead, millions of Venezuelans have left to escape an economic catastrophe. If the U.S. government resumes policies that target Venezuelans’ livelihoods, it should not be surprised when many of those affected end up at its doorstep.

GAINING FROM ENGAGEMENT

In 2022, the Biden administration reestablished contact with the Maduro government, pursuing a dual track that gradually eased sanctions and encouraged renewed negotiations with the opposition. In November of that year, the U.S. Treasury issued a license for Chevron—the only U.S. oil company with production capacity in Venezuela—to export Venezuelan oil to the United States, coinciding with the resumption of talks between the Maduro government and its opposition.

Critics claimed that the Biden administration was giving Maduro sanctions relief without gaining anything in return. Yet this critique overlooks a key achievement. In October 2023, Maduro publicly committed to holding free and fair presidential elections. Though the election ended up being minimally transparent, this concession ultimately allowed the opposition coalition to register Edmundo González as a candidate after María Corina Machado, who had won the opposition’s primary in October 2023, was barred from running. Washington also successfully encouraged the opposition to abandon its failed electoral boycotts and to engage in the election process despite facing an unlevel playing field.

These decisions helped pave the way for González to defeat Maduro in the July 28 presidential election by more than a two-to-one margin. The opposition documented its victory with tally sheets from the country’s electronic voting system, reenergizing the coalition and demonstrating its broad support among Venezuelans. Although this victory did not produce immediate change, with Maduro’s electoral council blatantly altering the election’s results to declare Maduro the winner, it marked the opposition’s strongest challenge yet to Maduro’s authoritarian rule.

Critics might argue that the opposition’s electoral victory was meaningless because Maduro ultimately retained power and intensified repression. But such a critique misses the broader significance of the outcome. The elections played a crucial role in revitalizing and legitimizing Venezuela’s opposition, demonstrating its broad popular support, and strengthening its internal cohesion. These developments are essential preconditions for any successful challenge to an entrenched regime. Whether these gains can translate into meaningful change will depend on how realistic the opposition’s objectives are and how well it leverages its newfound strength in future negotiations.

BEYOND ISOLATION

A realistic foreign policy toward Venezuela must begin with the recognition that Washington has limited influence over political dynamics in authoritarian countries. In a world where 71 percent of people live under autocratic regimes, it is not only futile but also dangerous to target select countries—such as Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela—for regime change. Singling out specific regimes risks alienating allies, undermining U.S. moral authority, and reinforcing authoritarians’ claims that Washington meddles in other countries’ domestic affairs. In Venezuela, a principled, pragmatic approach—focused on humanitarian relief and diplomatic engagement—would better serve the interests of both the United States and the Venezuelan people.

Trump’s administration should thus continue easing economic sanctions. It should do so, in part, simply because the restrictions have needlessly immiserated millions. But improving the country’s living conditions also serves a political purpose. The more tolerable life becomes for Venezuelans, the less likely they are to flee to the United States. Managing migration flows from Venezuela will also require sustained communication and coordination with Caracas. Reopening the U.S. embassy in Venezuela is therefore a critical step to safeguarding American interests in the country, as well.

A return to the failed strategy of maximum pressure would be a grave mistake.

Easing sanctions could afford the Trump administration an opportunity to secure concessions on human rights. Licenses for new oil projects, for example, could be conditioned on revenues being allocated to international organizations that can address Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. Likewise, the Trump administration could use sanctions relief to induce political reforms. It should work to secure the release of political prisoners. It should negotiate for institutional changes that reduce the stakes of power and create space for coexistence between Venezuela’s political factions. It should push Venezuela to appoint new electoral authorities and commit to inviting in international observers for upcoming elections. All three of these steps would provide vital space for electoral competition. They remain the best path to fostering a democratic transition. (The United States should also work with regional partners, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, to forge a realistic political settlement.)

Should the Trump administration embrace a policy of limited engagement, it would be bowing to reality. Punitive policies may appeal to policymakers, but they often corner regimes, making behavioral change unlikely. A government whose leaders fear U.S. prosecution will do everything to remain in power, including stealing elections. Strategic engagement, on the other hand, can incentivize positive shifts and strengthen local actors who support a negotiated resolution. The political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have shown that countries with economic, social, and institutional ties to the West are more likely to democratize than those subjected solely to punitive measures.

Likewise, Trump would be accepting that when people become poorer in an authoritarian country, the state becomes stronger, not weaker. At the height of the Venezuelan economy’s contraction, a large segment of the population depended on politically conditioned government handouts. In contrast, Venezuela’s economic recovery of the past four years, due in part to the easing of oil sanctions, has helped reduce low-income voters’ dependency on government programs, making them less susceptible to electoral blackmail.

No U.S. administration can overhaul Venezuela’s political system. But by setting achievable goals that address immediate needs, promote economic recovery, and support fundamental freedoms, the United States can help the Venezuelan people. A pragmatic approach that prioritizes economic recovery and gradual political progress will be far more effective in bringing Venezuela closer to change than a strategy of suffocation.

 

• FRANCISCO RODRÍGUEZ is Rice Family Professor of the Practice of International and Public Affairs at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies.