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terça-feira, 30 de dezembro de 2025

A Internacional Iliberal - Nic Cheeseman, Matías Bianchi, Jennifer Cyr Foreign Affairs

 A Internacional Iliberal

A cooperação autoritária está remodelando a ordem global

Republicamos aqui importante artigo da Foreign Affairs, de dezembro de 2025, com um alerta inicial. A internacional iliberal não congrega apenas governos ou regimes nacional-populistas, considerados de direita ou extrema-direita. Boa parte dos países que compõe hoje o eixo autocrático - como China, Coreia do Norte, Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Cuba, Venezuela e Nicarágua - tem governos auto-declarados de esquerda e socialistas. Isso para não falar da Rússia (hoje na vanguarda da segunda grande guerra fria) e do Irã e das ditaduras islâmicas (que não podem ser adequadamente classificados como sendo de direita ou de esquerda).

A Internacional Iliberal

A cooperação autoritária está remodelando a ordem global

Nic Cheeseman , Matías Bianchi e Jennifer Cyr

Janeiro-fevereiro de 2026, publicado em Foreign Affairs em 16/12/2025

Durante o período entre guerras, o apoio da Internacional Comunista liderada pelos soviéticos a partidos revolucionários e anticapitalistas lançou as bases para a expansão do comunismo após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Após o fim da Guerra Fria, a ordem internacional liderada pelos EUA promoveu o liberalismo e a democracia, ainda que de forma desigual, possibilitando ondas de transições democráticas em todo o mundo. Hoje, a cooperação política transfronteiriça está impulsionando a autocracia. O ímpeto reside em uma combinação de governos autoritários e iliberais, partidos antissistema — tipicamente, mas não exclusivamente, de extrema-direita — e atores privados simpatizantes que coordenam suas mensagens e oferecem apoio material uns aos outros.

O que une esses atores não é sua posição no espectro político, mas sim sua relação com as instituições democráticas e os valores liberais, incluindo as restrições ao poder executivo, as garantias das liberdades civis e o Estado de Direito. De líderes iliberais em Estados historicamente democráticos, como o presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, a autocratas plenamente estabelecidos, como o presidente bielorrusso Alexander Lukashenko — frequentemente chamado de “o último ditador da Europa” —, eles compartilham a disposição de personalizar o poder, enfraquecer os mecanismos de controle e equilíbrio e disseminar desinformação para corroer a responsabilização. Ao minar o pluralismo e deslegitimar seus oponentes, esses líderes, em diferentes graus, restringem os direitos políticos e as liberdades civis. E, ao reunir recursos, amplificar a desinformação e proteger-se mutuamente por meio de diplomacia, participam de redes iliberais transfronteiriças cuja crescente capacidade e influência estão inclinando a balança global em favor da autocracia.

Essa “internacional iliberal” talvez tenha ficado mais visível em Pequim, em setembro de 2025, quando três dos autocratas mais proeminentes do mundo — o líder chinês Xi Jinping, o governante norte-coreano Kim Jong Un e o presidente russo Vladimir Putin, cujos países cooperam estreitamente em questões econômicas e de segurança — estiveram juntos, demonstrando desafio às normas liberais. Mas essa cúpula foi apenas a ponta do iceberg. Somente em 2024, o Índice de Colaboração Autoritária, publicado pela organização sem fins lucrativos Action for Democracy, sediada nos EUA, registrou mais de 45.000 reuniões de alto nível, parcerias com a mídia e outros incidentes de coordenação entre “regimes autoritários, governos com tendências autoritárias e partidos de oposição com tendências autoritárias” em todo o mundo.

Entretanto, a cooperação entre as democracias está vacilando. O apoio ocidental à democracia no século XX foi frequentemente interesseiro e inconsistente, mas, em seu auge, incentivou a liberalização política por meio de incentivos econômicos, uma forte marca ideológica e pressão diplomática coordenada. Após a Guerra Fria, as condições para ajuda, acesso comercial e engajamento diplomático continuaram a recompensar a reforma e isolar a repressão. Contudo, o financiamento, a energia e as capacidades da aliança democrática diminuíram à medida que as instituições da ordem liberal perdem sua força e a convicção dos membros remanescentes vacila. Alguns antigos defensores da democracia — principalmente os Estados Unidos sob Trump — estão ativamente permitindo ou legitimando redes iliberais. Mesmo países que se mantiveram orgulhosamente democráticos tornaram-se mais cautelosos e reativos, tomando medidas para mitigar a interferência em seus próprios assuntos, mas sem chegar a confrontar regimes iliberais.

À medida que a disparidade de capacidades entre redes autoritárias e democráticas aumenta, o regime autoritário torna-se mais fácil de sustentar e o retrocesso democrático mais difícil de combater. Este desenvolvimento deve preocupar não só aqueles que se importam com os direitos políticos e as liberdades civis. Os países autoritários são mais propensos a conflitos, instabilidade e repressão do que os democráticos, e a maioria deles apresenta um desempenho fraco em termos de desenvolvimento inclusivo, produzindo um mundo menos seguro, menos livre e menos próspero. E enquanto a coordenação democrática permanecer menos audaciosa e menos inspirada do que a sua contraparte autoritária, há todos os motivos para esperar que a autocracia continue a espalhar-se.

UM MUNDO SEGURO PARA A AUTOCRACIA

A democracia liberal tornou-se uma espécie em extinção. O mundo está há um quarto de século em recessão democrática; de acordo com o amplamente citado Índice de Variedades da Democracia (V-Dem), 45 países abandonaram a democracia e caminharam rumo à autocracia em 2025. Apenas 29 países podem agora ser considerados democracias plenas.

Analisando mais a fundo, a perspectiva é ainda pior. Durante grande parte do século XX, as democracias geralmente conseguiam se recuperar após retrocessos. No Uruguai, uma restauração democrática ocorreu menos de dez anos após um golpe de Estado em 1933; na Índia, as eleições de 1977 inauguraram uma retomada democrática instável, porém duradoura, após a centralização do poder promovida pela primeira-ministra Indira Gandhi na década de 1970. Nas últimas décadas, contudo, as recuperações tornaram-se raras e precárias. Em uma pesquisa publicada no Journal of Democracy , constatamos que, desde 1994, dos 19 países que vivenciaram um período de autocratização e, posteriormente, recuperaram com sucesso seu nível anterior de democracia, 17 começaram a retroceder novamente em cinco anos. Em vez de se reerguerem, as instituições democráticas permanecem fragilizadas.

Uma das maiores mudanças das últimas três décadas é a ascensão da rede de apoio que autocratas e aspirantes a autocratas agora desfrutam. Existem precedentes históricos de coordenação transfronteiriça entre autocratas, desde o eixo fascista da década de 1930 até as redes apoiadas pelos soviéticos durante a Guerra Fria. Mas a aliança autoritária que emergiu desde o início da década de 1990, quando a autocracia estava em declínio mundial, difere em forma e conteúdo daquelas que a precederam.

Em primeiro lugar, os regimes autoritários estão cada vez mais bem equipados. Atualmente, existem aproximadamente tantos países autoritários quanto democráticos no mundo, mas as autocracias, coletivamente, têm mais habitantes e estão se tornando mais ricas. Hoje, os governos do espectro autoritário (incluindo muitos que realizam eleições, como a Índia) representam juntos mais de 70% da população mundial. Eles também detinham uma participação de 46% do PIB global (medido pela paridade do poder de compra) em 2022 — um aumento em relação aos meros 24% em 1992 —, de acordo com dados do V-Dem. Espera-se que esse número aumente ainda mais. A disposição dos estados autoritários em manipular a política além das fronteiras cresceu com seu poder econômico e militar, e sua capacidade de fazê-lo se expandiu com os avanços na tecnologia digital. Um novo grupo de potências médias com influência regional, que inclui países como a Turquia e os Emirados Árabes Unidos, fortaleceu ainda mais a influência global dos regimes autoritários. Enquanto os anos após o fim da Guerra Fria viram o estabelecimento de novos organismos regionais democráticos ou o fortalecimento de outros já existentes, como a Organização para a Segurança e Cooperação na Europa, nas últimas décadas a maioria das novas organizações regionais, como a Organização de Cooperação de Xangai em 2001 e a Aliança dos Estados do Sahel em 2023, foram formadas entre regimes autoritários.

A internacionalização iliberal de hoje não é dirigida por Pequim ou Moscou, como a Internacional Comunista liderada pelos soviéticos, ou Comintern, e posteriormente o Pacto de Varsóvia estruturaram a coordenação ideológica e militar durante a Guerra Fria. Em vez disso, opera como uma coleção de redes sobrepostas que fornecem terreno fértil para a construção de um mundo mais autoritário. Os elementos díspares desse sistema — mercenários russos, dinheiro das dinastias governantes dos estados árabes do Golfo, tecnologias de vigilância chinesas e americanas e partidos políticos de extrema-direita na Europa e na América do Norte — não são organizados a partir de um único centro de comando, nem sempre trabalham para o mesmo propósito. Mas suas atividades frequentemente se reforçam mutuamente. Os regimes autoritários na República Centro-Africana e no Mali, por exemplo, receberam assistência de segurança de empresas militares privadas russas, que, por sua vez, foram financiadas por negócios ilícitos de ouro entre empresas nesses países e os Emirados Árabes Unidos. Enquanto isso, os Emirados Árabes Unidos usaram mercenários russos para fornecer armas a seus aliados em países como o Sudão. Juntas, essas relações consolidam o controle autoritário.

A colaboração assume diversas formas. Uma delas envolve a cooperação direta entre potências não democráticas, principalmente China, Irã, Coreia do Norte, Rússia e Venezuela. Esses países frequentemente compartilham informações de inteligência militar e estendem proteção diplomática uns aos outros. Por meio de vetos nas Nações Unidas (no caso da China e da Rússia), declarações conjuntas em fóruns multilaterais e acordos de defesa e comércio que carecem de mecanismos de supervisão, eles contribuem para a criação de um ambiente permissivo no qual a repressão é normalizada e a responsabilização, diluída. Ao oferecerem auxílio econômico a países sancionados, reduzem a eficácia dos esforços ocidentais para promover a democracia e deter a repressão. E, ao defenderem mutuamente seus históricos de direitos humanos e promoverem instituições como a Organização do Tratado de Segurança Coletiva, liderada pela Rússia, como alternativas a grupos liderados pelo Ocidente, sinalizam a potenciais autocratas que a governança autoritária pode obter legitimidade e apoio no cenário global.

Esses cinco países também interferem além das fronteiras em diferentes graus. Apesar de invocarem regularmente a soberania para desviar críticas às suas próprias violações de direitos humanos, não hesitam em intervir nos sistemas políticos e instituições cívicas de outros países para fortalecer grupos alinhados com suas visões de mundo ou para desacreditar críticos e forças pró-democracia. A Rússia, por exemplo, financiou secretamente partidos políticos simpáticos, disseminou desinformação por meio de veículos de notícias estatais como a RT e a Sputnik, e lançou campanhas nas redes sociais e ataques cibernéticos para distorcer o debate público e influenciar eleições em países como França, Moldávia e Romênia. Da mesma forma, a China utilizou sua rede de Institutos Confúcio (organizações que promovem a língua e a cultura chinesas), associações da diáspora e mídia estatal para moldar o debate político e suprimir críticas no exterior, inclusive pressionando universidades, intimidando jornalistas e apoiando candidatos pró-Pequim em locais como Austrália e Taiwan. Na prática, esses esforços estendem a influência autoritária para as arenas democráticas, ao mesmo tempo que corroem as normas de transparência e pluralismo das quais a democracia depende.

Potências médias autoritárias também estão utilizando ferramentas militares e financeiras para consolidar governos iliberais e suprimir aberturas democráticas no exterior. O fornecimento de drones Bayraktar TB2 pela Turquia a líderes autoritários em países em guerra, como Azerbaijão e Líbia, conferiu a esses líderes vantagens decisivas no campo de batalha e fortaleceu regimes militares resistentes à responsabilização internacional. Os Emirados Árabes Unidos também apoiaram atores repressivos na África e no Oriente Médio, incluindo as Forças de Apoio Rápido do Sudão, um dos beligerantes na guerra civil do país, acusada pela ONU de cometer atrocidades horrendas. A Arábia Saudita, por sua vez, tem apoiado líderes autocráticos e movimentos contrarrevolucionários desde a Primavera Árabe, notadamente fornecendo ajuda financeira e diplomática ao regime do presidente Abdel Fattah el-Sisi no Egito desde o golpe militar de 2013 que o levou ao poder — e que pôs um fim definitivo à breve abertura democrática do Egito.

Redes ilícitas ou criminosas são frequentemente parte integrante dessas colaborações internacionais. Empresas de fachada, doações secretas e empreendimentos imobiliários obscuros lavam dinheiro que financia atores políticos no exterior. Esses fluxos exacerbam a corrupção e representam uma ameaça direta à democracia, infiltrando-se em legislaturas e partidos nos próprios países que ainda aspiram a defender normas liberais. A rede de corrupção conhecida como “Lavanderia” no Azerbaijão, por exemplo, gastou quase US$ 3 bilhões em subornos a pessoas, incluindo parlamentares europeus, que silenciariam críticas às violações de direitos humanos no país e encobririam seu histórico no Conselho da Europa, uma organização regional de direitos humanos. Na Espanha, o partido de extrema-direita Vox, que defende restrições aos direitos das minorias e se opõe à legislação sobre igualdade de gênero, confirmou ter recebido um empréstimo de cerca de US$ 10 milhões do MBH Bank (na época, MKB Bank) na Hungria para sua campanha eleitoral de 2023. De acordo com reportagens da Reuters e do Politico Europe, o MBH Bank é parcialmente controlado por um aliado próximo e ex-sócio do primeiro-ministro húngaro Viktor Orbán. Embora a legalidade do empréstimo seja contestada, a ocorrência de uma transação entre uma campanha de extrema-direita e uma instituição financeira inserida na rede de influência de Orbán é significativa. Com esse tipo de financiamento disponível por meio de regimes iliberais, aspirantes a autocratas e defensores do autoritarismo podem manter suas causas vivas com mais facilidade e obter vantagem financeira sobre seus rivais pró-democracia.

DESTRUIDORES DE TRUSTS

Outra parte fundamental do projeto iliberal é a difusão de ideologias favoráveis ​​ao autoritarismo. Governos, políticos, intelectuais e grupos da sociedade civil iliberais em todo o mundo elaboram e compartilham narrativas que rejeitam as normas e os valores democráticos. Raramente compartilham as mesmas visões de mundo — líderes iliberais e autocratistas podem estar em extremos ideológicos opostos —, mas suas mensagens tendem a ter características em comum. Frequentemente, incluem apelos para a revogação dos direitos das mulheres e a limitação da proteção às comunidades LGBTQ+, por exemplo. Na Europa e nos Estados Unidos, partidos e organizações de direita geralmente enquadram esses direitos como ameaças às estruturas familiares tradicionais, à liberdade religiosa ou à identidade nacional, enquanto seus pares na Rússia e em partes da África e da América Latina frequentemente retratam a igualdade de gênero e os direitos reprodutivos como imposições estrangeiras e ocidentais que minam a soberania cultural. Mais importante do que essas variações, no entanto, é o objetivo comum das mensagens: semear dúvidas sobre as instituições democráticas, a universalidade dos direitos humanos e a legitimidade da moralidade e do governo ocidentais.

Essas tentativas tornaram-se onipresentes. O Serviço Europeu para a Ação Externa, a agência diplomática da UE, compila desde 2023 um Relatório Anual sobre Manipulação de Informação Estrangeira e Ameaças de Interferência, que documenta os esforços de atores como a China e a Rússia para disseminar desinformação prejudicial e divisiva. O terceiro relatório, divulgado em março de 2025, analisou uma amostra de mais de 500 incidentes de manipulação de informação promovidos por meio de mais de 38.000 canais. Muitas dessas campanhas de informação reforçaram mensagens associadas à política de direita e ao populismo, mas seu efeito mais amplo é o de corroer a confiança na governança democrática e normalizar discursos iliberais ou antidemocráticos.

Uma campanha de 2024 na França, por exemplo, exibiu cinco caixões cobertos com a bandeira francesa e com a inscrição “Soldados franceses na Ucrânia” perto da base da Torre Eiffel, uma ação planejada para gerar atenção tanto online quanto offline. As autoridades francesas suspeitam que agentes ligados à Rússia planejaram a exibição para inflamar a indignação pública contra o governo francês por suas políticas de apoio à resistência da Ucrânia à invasão russa de 2022. Anteriormente, em uma operação russa conhecida como Doppelgänger, revelada no final de 2022, agentes ligados a Moscou criaram versões clonadas de importantes veículos de comunicação europeus. Esses sites disseminaram desinformação pró-Kremlin sobre a Ucrânia, as Olimpíadas de Paris e outros temas da política europeia. As matérias produzidas foram então reproduzidas por contas diplomáticas russas em países como Bangladesh, Malásia e Eslováquia, bem como por veículos de mídia de extrema direita e influenciadores digitais na Europa e nos Estados Unidos, ampliando o alcance da campanha.

Algumas narrativas são difundidas de forma mais coordenada. O comício “Make Europe Great Again” em Madri, em fevereiro de 2025, coorganizado pelo partido europeu de direita Patriots.EU, reuniu partidos de extrema-direita de todo o continente. A Conferência de Ação Política Conservadora (CPAC), um encontro anual de ativistas e políticos conservadores, teve início nos Estados Unidos, mas também foi realizada na Hungria e na Polônia nos últimos anos, atraindo milhares de participantes de países da Europa, América Latina e outros continentes. Os participantes apoiam-se mutuamente em discursos, cultivam redes de contatos e compartilham ideias, construindo conexões internacionais que proporcionam visibilidade e legitimidade aos movimentos nacionais. E como esses eventos incluem tanto o discurso conservador convencional quanto a desinformação pura e simples, podem confundir a fronteira entre os dois, tornando as mensagens autoritárias mais palatáveis ​​para o público em geral.

Por vezes, a promoção de visões iliberais de governança e desenvolvimento é ainda mais explícita. O Partido Comunista Chinês, por exemplo, intensificou os programas de formação que oferece regularmente a líderes partidários e funcionários governamentais em países africanos, incluindo a Namíbia, a África do Sul e a Tanzânia. As sessões foram descritas, por pelo menos um participante, como um ensino aos funcionários governamentais sobre o que pode ser alcançado “sem a complexidade da democracia”.

Líderes empresariais simpáticos à causa também aproveitaram novas oportunidades para amplificar narrativas antiliberais para públicos globais. Por exemplo, desde que assumiu o controle do Twitter (agora X) em 2022, Elon Musk tem usado a plataforma para disseminar desinformação de direita sobre políticos e candidatos aos quais se opõe. Ele também desmantelou mecanismos de proteção contra conteúdo extremista e atacou implacavelmente a grande mídia. Essas intervenções altamente visíveis na política, tanto dentro quanto fora dos Estados Unidos, amplificam o discurso de ódio, colocam em risco a liberdade de imprensa, empoderam políticos e cidadãos que têm como alvo minorias e grupos marginalizados e impedem a capacidade dos cidadãos de fazer escolhas informadas nas urnas.

Se o objetivo da retórica antiliberal é reduzir a confiança popular nas instituições democráticas, parece estar funcionando. Segundo o cientista político Will Jennings, a confiança nos parlamentos nacionais em países democráticos diminuiu cerca de oito por cento desde 1990, refletindo um “descontentamento público com a política” que “se expandiu em termos de alcance e intensidade”. Por sua vez, a erosão da confiança enfraqueceu o contrato social que sustenta o governo representativo, tornando as democracias mais vulneráveis ​​a demagogos populistas, à paralisia institucional e à gradual normalização de alternativas autoritárias.

DE HOMEM PARA HOMEM

Uma última forma pela qual líderes autocráticos e com tendências autoritárias se apoiam mutuamente além-fronteiras é por meio de relações pessoais. Quando o ex-presidente brasileiro Jair Bolsonaro enfrentou um processo por uma suposta conspiração para anular o resultado da eleição brasileira de 2022, por exemplo, Trump condenou publicamente o judiciário brasileiro, e o Departamento do Tesouro dos EUA sancionou o juiz responsável pelo caso. Trump também impôs uma tarifa adicional de 40% sobre produtos brasileiros, o que Brasília interpretou em parte como punição pela perseguição do governo a Bolsonaro.

O engajamento personalizado nem sempre é confiável. Orbán e Putin já compartilharam uma estreita relação de trabalho, baseada em acordos energéticos e um iliberalismo mútuo. A cooperação entre eles tornou a Hungria altamente dependente do gás russo e deu a Moscou um canal de influência dentro da UE. Mas a parceria azedou após a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia em 2022, quando as sanções e o congelamento de financiamentos da UE forçaram Budapeste a buscar discretamente fontes alternativas de energia, levando a tensões em seu relacionamento com Moscou. Uma aliança de conveniência semelhante uniu o primeiro-ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, e os Emirados Árabes Unidos no início da década de 2010, quando investimentos emiratis ajudaram Erdoğan a consolidar suas redes de clientelismo e centralizar o poder. Mas o relacionamento da Turquia com os Emirados Árabes Unidos logo entrou em colapso durante os protestos da Primavera Árabe, motivados pelo apoio de Erdoğan a grupos islâmicos políticos aos quais o governo emiradense se opunha. A cooperação autoritária pode ser conveniente, mas tende a ser frágil. A cooperação também nem sempre é bem-sucedida na proteção de figuras autoritárias. O Supremo Tribunal Federal do Brasil condenou Bolsonaro em setembro por seu papel na tentativa de golpe, apesar das provocações e tarifas de Trump.

Ainda assim, esses laços informais importam. Ter apoiadores no exterior oferece aos líderes autoritários uma tábua de salvação financeira, cobertura diplomática e evidências de legitimidade externa — vantagens que podem atenuar a pressão interna e ajudá-los a sobreviver a sanções ou dissidências internas. Por sua vez, esse apoio transnacional aumenta os riscos para potenciais opositores, que têm menos motivos para acreditar que o governo hesitará em retaliar contra eles. A resistência à expansão autoritária torna-se, portanto, mais arriscada e com menos probabilidade de sucesso.

FORA DA LUTA

Durante décadas, as redes democráticas detiveram a vantagem. As democracias moldaram a ordem global do século XX ao criarem e manterem instituições como as Nações Unidas, a União Europeia, a OTAN e uma ampla gama de organismos financeiros e jurídicos internacionais que incorporaram normas liberais, forneceram garantias de segurança coletiva e demonstraram os benefícios materiais de pertencer à aliança democrática. Contudo, as democracias não conseguiram preservar suas vantagens. A preferência das instituições democráticas pela neutralidade processual e pelo consenso permitiu que atores iliberais testassem os limites — e muitas vezes manipulassem — essas instituições por dentro. Além disso, as democracias têm dificuldade em atrair outros países para o seu lado. Em regiões como a América Latina, onde os Estados Unidos passaram grande parte do século XX apoiando regimes militares, muitos países já se mostravam céticos em relação à guinada pós-Guerra Fria de Washington, que incentivava os governos à democratização. Em toda a África e Ásia, os líderes que são regularmente solicitados a “escolher a democracia” veem cada vez menos razões para fazê-lo, à medida que seus cidadãos se tornam cada vez mais insatisfeitos com sistemas eleitorais que não produzem os resultados econômicos desejados.

Até mesmo a narrativa pró-democracia, que inspirou cidadãos e movimentos ao longo do século XX, tornou-se obsoleta e pouco inspiradora. Algumas das principais democracias começaram a evitar o termo “democracia” por completo. No Reino Unido, por exemplo, sucessivos governos descreveram sua política externa em termos de promoção de “sociedades abertas”, minimizando deliberadamente a defesa da democracia para não constranger parceiros autoritários. E as tentativas de revitalizar a imagem da democracia — como a Cúpula para a Democracia, convocada pelo presidente dos EUA, Joe Biden, em 2021, 2023 e 2024 — revelam, ao contrário, suas deficiências, gerando pouco entusiasmo na sociedade civil e atraindo ainda menos atenção pública.

A atual administração dos EUA também abdicou da liderança da aliança democrática. Em julho de 2025, o Secretário de Estado Marco Rubio instruiu os diplomatas americanos a “evitar opinar sobre a justiça ou integridade” de eleições estrangeiras e sobre “os valores democráticos” de outros países. Além disso, o desmantelamento da Agência dos Estados Unidos para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (USAID) pela administração retirou financiamento essencial para jornalistas investigativos, monitores de direitos humanos, observadores eleitorais e outros grupos pró-democracia em todo o mundo. É improvável que a Europa, onde as medidas de austeridade e as crescentes restrições fiscais reduziram os orçamentos de ajuda externa, consiga suprir essa lacuna. Grupos que, de outra forma, poderiam atuar em defesa das normas democráticas estão, portanto, lutando para cobrir custos essenciais, abrindo caminho para governos e movimentos autoritários.

Os democratas estão jogando pelas regras de um jogo que não existe mais. Eles se baseiam em comunicados estéreis, conferências previsíveis e diplomacia cautelosa, enquanto seus oponentes se tornaram mais implacáveis, mais criativos e mais bem conectados. Impedir a expansão da internacionalização iliberal exigirá que os defensores da democracia repensem sua abordagem.

O primeiro passo é resgatar a narrativa. Os atores pró-democracia precisam tornar os valores democráticos culturalmente relevantes, encontrar os cidadãos onde eles estão e mostrar-lhes como a democracia melhora o dia a dia. Um exemplo recente na França ilustra o potencial dessa estratégia: antes das eleições legislativas de 2024, uma rede de WhatsApp com 130 ativistas, influenciadores e organizadores de base — figuras de confiança em suas comunidades — produziu vídeos curtos, memes e modelos de mensagens que explicavam a importância da eleição, combatiam informações enganosas e incentivavam as pessoas a votar com um tom pessoal, esperançoso e criativo. Os participantes da rede também criaram um grupo aberto no Telegram para compartilhar dicas de como se envolver na campanha, incluindo maneiras de se voluntariar no dia da eleição, com mais de 30.000 usuários.

As democracias também precisam combater a desinformação autoritária de forma mais eficaz. A UE fez alguns progressos: a sua Lei de Serviços Digitais de 2022 exigiu que grandes plataformas como a Meta e a X removessem rapidamente conteúdo ilegal, divulgassem os seus algoritmos de moderação de conteúdo e restringissem a amplificação da desinformação através de funcionalidades de recomendação, e diplomatas europeus denunciam regularmente os meios de comunicação e as redes de trolls ligados ao Estado chinês e russo por espalharem notícias falsas. Mas um esforço regional isolado não basta. Tal como os governos autoritários partilham táticas e amplificam as mensagens uns dos outros, os governos democráticos devem reunir recursos e informações e estabelecer em conjunto normas claras para as plataformas online, de forma a promover a integridade da informação.

O financiamento é fundamental. Governos democráticos devem expandir e proteger os canais de financiamento para garantir que ativistas, jornalistas independentes e organizações da sociedade civil possam investigar a corrupção, expor a desinformação e mobilizar cidadãos sem medo de represálias financeiras. Podem oferecer deduções fiscais, subsídios equivalentes e parcerias público-privadas, por exemplo, para incentivar o setor privado a direcionar fundos de responsabilidade social corporativa para a liberdade de imprensa e a inovação cívica. As democracias também devem interromper os fluxos financeiros ilícitos que abastecem os cofres dos regimes autoritários. Isso exige compartilhamento de informações, rastreamento de ativos transfronteiriços e maior aplicação de instrumentos legais, como as diretivas da UE contra a lavagem de dinheiro, sanções como as da Lei Magnitsky dos Estados Unidos, que visam violadores dos direitos humanos, e disposições anticorrupção e de recuperação de ativos da Convenção das Nações Unidas contra a Corrupção. A UE começou a avançar nessas áreas e pode tomar novas medidas no âmbito da sua iniciativa recentemente anunciada, o “Escudo da Democracia”, mas, no geral, os governos democráticos precisam fazer muito mais para isolar os atores autoritários dos sistemas financeiros e diplomáticos que os sustentam.

Por fim, a aliança democrática atual precisa de uma liderança diversificada. Os países europeus e norte-americanos não devem ser os únicos a definir a agenda. A promoção da democracia exige uma ampla coalizão com novas ideias e novas energias, e esse ímpeto provavelmente virá de outras partes do mundo. Em julho, por exemplo, os participantes da cúpula Democracia Siempre (Democracia Sempre), sediada no Chile e com a presença de líderes do Brasil, Colômbia, Espanha e Uruguai, concordaram em formar uma rede internacional de representantes governamentais e da sociedade civil para trabalhar em prol da construção de democracias inclusivas e responsivas.

A democracia está sendo contestada em todas as esferas e precisa ser defendida em cada uma delas. Isso exigirá que governos democráticos — e grupos da sociedade civil pró-democracia, a mídia e instituições internacionais — não apenas fortaleçam seus sistemas políticos internos, mas também enfrentem as redes iliberais que estão dando poder aos movimentos autoritários ao redor do mundo. Uma coordenação superior está dando vantagem à autocracia. Enquanto os membros restantes da aliança democrática não atualizarem suas próprias estratégias, tudo o que enfrentarão será um declínio ainda maior.

Revista ID é uma publicação apoiada pelos leitores.

quinta-feira, 4 de dezembro de 2025

The West Is Running Out of Time - Alexander Stubb, (Foreign Affairs)

The West Is Running Out of Time

Alexander Stubb

Foreign Affairs, Dec 2025

The President of Finland, Alexandrr Stubb, has published an important article, “The West’s Last Chance,” arguing that the post–World War II order — built on cooperation, rules, and shared values — is breaking down. Wars are multiplying, alliances are fracturing, and rising powers across the global South are reshaping the geopolitical landscape.

This may be the West’s last chance to rebuild an international order that protects freedom, stability, and smaller nations like Ukraine. If the West fails, the alternative is a world governed by raw power — where aggression goes unpunished and borders mean nothing.

Key Points:

1. The old world order is collapsing.

The rules-based system that kept global peace for decades is unraveling under the pressure of wars, authoritarianism, and great-power competition.

2. A fragmented, multipolar world is emerging.

Influence is shifting to regional and “middle” powers — from India and Brazil to Turkey and Saudi Arabia — who no longer accept a Western-led system.

3. Global conflict is rising because institutions are failing.

The UN, EU, WTO, and other bodies lack the cohesion, authority, or legitimacy to stop aggression or resolve crises.

4. The West is dangerously divided.

Political polarization, inconsistent leadership, and short-term thinking weaken the ability of democracies to respond to global threats.

5. The global South feels ignored — and is choosing its own path.

Many countries believe the old system served Western interests, not theirs, and are now shaping alternative alliances and norms.

6. If the West does nothing, “might makes right” becomes the new global law.

A world where russia can invade neighbors, China redraws borders, and small countries lose basic security guarantees.

7. The West still has a narrow window to act.

Not to restore the old world, but to build a new one — inclusive, modernized, and capable of protecting sovereignty and stability.

8. The solution is renewed, reformed multilateralism.

Western democracies must modernize global institutions, bring rising powers into decision-making, and rebuild trust in shared rules.

9. Leadership matters: hesitation is fatal.

Without coordinated Western leadership, authoritarian regimes will reshape the global order in their image.

10. The stakes are existential for countries like Ukraine.

If the world shifts to a system where aggression is rewarded and sovereignty becomes negotiable, Ukraine will be the first — not the last — victim.

Source: Foreign Affairs

The President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, has published an important article, “The West’s Last Chance,” arguing that the post–World War II order — built on cooperation, rules, and shared values — is breaking down. Wars are multiplying, alliances are fracturing, and rising powers across the global South are reshaping the geopolitical landscape.

This may be the West’s last chance to rebuild an international order that protects freedom, stability, and smaller nations like Ukraine. If the West fails, the alternative is a world governed by raw power — where aggression goes unpunished and borders mean nothing.


quarta-feira, 19 de novembro de 2025

BRICS Is Missing Its Chance - Oliver Stuenkel and Alexander Gabuev (Foreign Affairs)

BRICS Is Missing Its Chance

United by Trump’s Hostility, but Too Divided to Seize the Moment

Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-africa/brics-missing-its-chance# 

This year, the BRICS—a ten-country group whose first five members were Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has gained a renewed sense of purpose thanks to one catalyst: the United States. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the bloc looks, more than ever, like a necessary hedge against an increasingly erratic and fragmented global order. Many of Trump’s actions—including his chaotic tariff crusade against friends and foes, strikes on Iran and legally dubious military actions in Latin America, and withdrawal from the UN-supported Paris agreement on climate change—have sparked condemnation from the BRICS. Trump’s policies have put in stark relief BRICS’ raisons d’être: to help its members adapt to and build a less Western-centric world, gain greater leverage in their dealings with Washington, and find alternatives to Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

But despite their shared interests, BRICS as a grouping is not ready to seize the moment. Its members—which now include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates—are too divided to turn the group into a real challenge to Washington. They vary significantly in their degree of antagonism toward the United States, and each wishes to maintain strategic autonomy. As a result, the bloc will struggle to mount joint action. To unite and marshal their collective strength, the BRICS would have to turn into something akin to the G-7—a U.S.-led group of economically advanced countries that, in the interest of promoting their common purpose and values, willingly sacrifice a significant degree of strategic autonomy. But the BRICS countries, whose bond is based mainly on a collective rejection of U.S. hegemonic power, won’t find the cohesion that could make the bloc an effective geopolitical force.

POWER IN NUMBERS

While previous U.S. presidents have largely ignored the BRICS, Trump has adopted a more confrontational stance. He has called the BRICS an “anti-American bloc” and has repeatedly threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on its members if they were to replace the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. For now, the Trump administration is not going after the bloc as a whole but picking fights with individual countries. Some BRICS members, such as China and Russia, are better equipped to weather U.S. pressure than others, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. But all now have a clearer understanding that they are stronger together than apart: the more domineering the United States behaves, the more important the group is to its members.

For years, Beijing has warned fellow BRICS members that the U.S.-led order is unstable and subject to the political mood swings of Washington and its allies. The Chinese leadership has presented Trump’s return, and the United States’ unreliability as a partner in development, as evidence that Beijing’s push to build parallel institutions, such as the New Development Bank, was not premature but prescient. And the consequences of Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, including volatility in the U.S. bond market and a fluctuating U.S. dollar, have spurred some developing countries to take steps to hedge against their exposure to the dollar. For China and its partners in the BRICS, these developments present an opportunity to leverage financial services that are not controlled by the United States, develop tools to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar, and facilitate trade in alternative currencies.

Moscow, too, sees advantage in the chaos that the Trump administration has sown. During the Biden administration, the United States and other Western countries imposed unprecedented sanctions against Russia in response to the Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Trump’s return to the White House presented Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opening to improve, if not normalize, relations with Washington. Trump has dramatically scaled back financial support for Ukraine, but he continues to issue periodic threats against Moscow and has sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil producers. This is why Russia realizes that it needs to strengthen its partnership with fellow BRICS countries and leverage the grouping as a support network to withstand the Western sanctions pressure and to erode U.S. global dominance in finance and technology.

Trump’s crusade against Brazil, India, and South Africa has likewise set in motion forces that should, in theory, bring the BRICS members closer. Trump imposed 50 percent tariffs on Brazilian imports earlier this year, arguing that an investigation of former president Jair Bolsonaro was politically motivated. When Brazil’s top court convicted Bolsonaro of attempting a coup, Trump escalated further, sanctioning a Brazilian Supreme Court justice tied to the case and cancelling the visas of several Brazilian judicial and government officials. These measures have only pushed Brazil to deepen its ties with fellow BRICS members. As one of Lula’s advisers recently pointed out, Trump’s attacks “are reinforcing our relations with the BRICS, because we want to have diversified relations and not depend on any one country.” Even before the Bolsonaro conviction, Lula had been currying favor with BRICS allies and paying official visits to China and Russia as well as Vietnam, which became a BRICS partner in June. But Trump’s bellicose approach is sure to accelerate this trend.

South Africa’s diplomatic friction with the United States has had similarly predictable results. Relations hit a new low following Trump’s meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in May. In a tense encounter that was widely broadcast and dissected across South African media, Trump ambushed Ramaphosa with false and inflammatory claims about a “white genocide” targeting Afrikaner farmers. Trump’s rhetoric echoed fringe conspiracy theories and played to segments of his domestic base, but it left South Africans across the political spectrum shocked and offended. The Trump administration had previously expelled South Africa’s ambassador, threatened to impose steep trade penalties, and canceled aid programs. For the South African leadership, the disastrous White House meeting was yet more evidence that the United States had ceased to be a trustworthy partner. Facing a peculiarly hostile administration in Washington, Pretoria has ample reason to pursue greater intra-BRICS cooperation—not out of ideological affinity with its members but out of the strategic necessity to protect itself against an erratic and punitive United States.

Even in India, a country that has spent the better part of the past two decades cultivating close ties with Washington, policymakers are keenly aware that they must hedge in the face of Trump’s unpredictability. This year, Washington has deported thousands of Indian nationals, stalled negotiations over a bilateral trade agreement, and imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian products. Indian policymakers are now firmly committed to a strategy of “multialignment,” in which BRICS serves not just as a platform for cooperation among countries of the so-called global South but also as a geopolitical insurance policy when U.S. commitments are no longer credible.

Similar sentiments are palpable throughout the other BRICS capitals, where leaders fear that close partnership with the United States may become a liability. Unsurprisingly, the number of countries hoping to join BRICS, either as full members or partner countries, keeps growing. That list includes Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The desire to diversify partnerships has not emerged because of Trump alone, of course. Turkey, for example, expressed interest in becoming a full member of BRICS well before Trump’s return. But the president’s second term has elevated multialignment from distant aspiration to urgent strategy.

MUDDLING THROUGH

And yet BRICS is not ready to take advantage of this moment. As the group has grown in size, so have its internal contradictions. This is not entirely surprising. Both Brazil and India, fearing the loss of their own influence and concerned about the group’s cohesion, had long opposed expansion, before giving in to Chinese pressure in 2023. Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates all joined in the last three years.

At a BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Rio de Janeiro in April, member states failed, for the first time, to issue a joint communiqué. The deadlock underscored mounting divisions within the bloc over the pace and direction of de-dollarization, the level of antagonism toward the United States, and Beijing’s aspirations for leadership in the grouping. In this case, the source of disagreement was a topic of long-standing symbolic importance to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: reform of the United Nations Security Council. Both Egypt and Ethiopia objected to language that would have acknowledged South Africa’s aspirations for a permanent seat, highlighting the complications introduced by the group’s recent expansion. And this July, in an unprecedented development, several heads of state failed to participate in-person in a BRICS summit, and only half of the bloc’s ten member countries sent delegations; the others attended remotely.

The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in June could have unified BRICS. Several member governments were appalled by the strikes, arguing that the United States acted unilaterally, dangerously, and without regard for international norms. For China and Russia, the strikes confirmed long-standing critiques of U.S. militarism; for Brazil and South Africa, countries that have historically prioritized nonintervention and peaceful conflict resolution, the attack was seen as a reckless move that undermined global stability. For India, the assault was not only a violation of international law, but also an attack on a vital energy supplier. Yet in the end, the BRICS’ joint statement, published several days after the bombing, was remarkably vague, failing even to mention Israel or the United States, revealing the grouping’s incapacity to speak with one voice.

Friction is visible on other fronts, as well. China’s heavily subsidized exports, including steel, textiles, and cars, threaten local industries in countries such as Brazil and South Africa. The resulting tensions complicate intra-BRICS economic coordination, as governments face domestic pressure to adopt protectionist measures against Chinese goods. Although China is eager to use BRICS as a platform to expand its influence and advertise its governance model, other members remain wary of subordinating their interests to Beijing’s ambitions. A recent virtual summit of BRICS leaders, convened by Lula and aimed at developing a common strategy against U.S. tariffs, produced few tangible results.

Despite renewed urgency created by Trump’s return to power, BRICS remains hamstrung by the same structural weaknesses that have long limited its effectiveness: divergent national interests, conflicting economic priorities, and a deep mistrust of one another’s geopolitical ambitions. Expansion has only magnified those challenges, adding more actors and contradictions to an already unwieldy organization. Beijing may view Trump’s bellicosity as conclusive proof of the United States’ unreliability, but other members are reluctant to align too closely with China or to subordinate their own national agendas to a single leader. Group cohesion remains a long way off.

For the foreseeable future, the grouping is likely to continue muddling through—attracting new members, producing grand declarations, and occasionally coordinating positions, but falling well short of becoming the basis of a new model of global governance. Trump has reminded BRICS members why the bloc matters, while simultaneously exposing why it cannot rise to the occasion.



domingo, 7 de setembro de 2025

O Brasil na Foreign Affairs de setembro de 2025: julgamento dos golpistas

 O Brasil na Foreign Affairs de setembro de 2025:

(…)

What is unfolding in Brazil these days—and what is about to unfold—is of extraordinary importance.

On September 2, Brazil’s Supreme Court opened the final phase of the trial against former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro. Alongside him stand seven other defendants, including senior military officers and former cabinet members. 

This marks a turning point in Brazilian history.

A verdict is expected by September 12. Should Bolsonaro be convicted—as appears likely given the weight of evidence—he faces more than forty years in prison.

Since early August, the former president has been under house arrest. Security around his residence in Brasília has been reinforced after Justice Alexandre de Moraes warned of a serious risk of flight. Investigators discovered a letter addressed to Argentina’s libertarian president Javier Milei, in which Bolsonaro sought political asylum.

At 70 and in fragile health, Bolsonaro has also been barred from using phones or social media, approaching foreign embassies, or maintaining contact with foreign authorities.

The charges against him are fivefold: armed criminal conspiracy, attempted coup d’état, violent subversion of the rule of law, aggravated damage, and destruction of public property.

The most serious accusation concerns the failed coup he allegedly orchestrated to prevent Lula da Silva’s inauguration and thus cling to power.

The operation, code-named Green and Yellow Dagger after the colors of Brazil’s flag and detailed in a lengthy report by federal police, allegedly included assassination plots. 

An elite army unit was tasked with killing—or poisoning—President Lula, as well as murdering Vice President Geraldo Alckmin. Plans also involved kidnapping, and likely killing, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, long a central figure in investigations into Brazil’s far right and now presiding over Bolsonaro’s trial.

The plan, culminating in the storming of Brazil’s institutions in January 2023, ultimately collapsed largely because parts of the military withheld support, and because international backing—particularly from the United States—never materialized.

For the first time in Brazil’s democratic history, a former president is on trial. 

More unprecedented still, members of the armed forces are facing justice. Unlike Argentina, which prosecuted military leaders for dictatorship-era crimes, Brazil never put its officers on trial. Victims’ families were denied justice, and the army retained an aura of impunity and latent power over democracy.

This trial alters the equation: Brazil is declaring that no one, not even those in uniform, is above the law. It is the first time political and military leaders face prosecution for coup-related crimes, despite the country’s history of repeated golpes.

The case is historic because it reaffirms that democratic principles and the rule of law, though fragile, remain alive. It also signals that ex-presidents cannot consider themselves legibus soluti —free from the law — but must be held accountable like all other citizens (the allusion to Donald Trump is anything but accidental).


quinta-feira, 14 de agosto de 2025

After the Trade War: Remaking Rules From the Ruins of the Rules-Based System - Michael B. G. Froman (Foreign Affairs)

Maurício David me mandou:  

... The global trading system as we have known it is dead. The World Trade Organization has effectively ceased to function, as it fails to negotiate, monitor, or enforce member commitments. Fundamental principles such as “most favored nation” status, or MFN, which requires WTO members to treat one another equally except when they have negotiated free-trade agreements, are being jettisoned as Washington threatens or imposes tariffs ranging from ten to more than 50 percent on dozens of countries. Both the “America first” trade strategy and China’s analogous “dual circulation” and Made in China 2025 strategies reflect a flagrant disregard for any semblance of a rules-based system and a clear preference for a power-based system to take its place. Even if pieces of the old order manage to survive, the damage is done: there is no going back...

 

After the Trade War

Remaking Rules From the Ruins of the Rules-Based System

Michael B. G. Froman

Foreign Affairs, September/October 2025 

Published on August 11, 2025


Michael B. G. Froman is President of the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as U.S. Trade Representative from 2013 to 2017 and Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economic Affairs from 2009 to 2013.

 

The global trading system as we have known it is dead. The World Trade Organization has effectively ceased to function, as it fails to negotiate, monitor, or enforce member commitments. Fundamental principles such as “most favored nation” status, or MFN, which requires WTO members to treat one another equally except when they have negotiated free-trade agreements, are being jettisoned as Washington threatens or imposes tariffs ranging from ten to more than 50 percent on dozens of countries. Both the “America first” trade strategy and China’s analogous “dual circulation” and Made in China 2025 strategies reflect a flagrant disregard for any semblance of a rules-based system and a clear preference for a power-based system to take its place. Even if pieces of the old order manage to survive, the damage is done: there is no going back.

Many will celebrate the end of an era. Indeed, although U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs and disregard for past agreements have put the final nails in the coffin, the turn against global trade has been embraced by both Democrats and Republicans in Washington over the past several years. But before critics revel in the death of the rules-based trading system, they should consider the costs and tradeoffs that come with its dismantlement—and think carefully about the elements that should be rebuilt, even if in altered forms, to avert considerably worse outcomes for the United States and the global economy.

If Washington continues on its current course—defined by unilateralism, transactionalism, and mercantilism—the consequences will be grim, especially as Beijing continues on its own damaging course of subsidized excess capacity, predatory export policies, and economic coercion. The risk of the United States and China playing by their own rules, with power the only real constraint, is contagion: if the two largest economies in the world operate outside the rules-based system, other countries will increasingly do the same, leading to rising uncertainty, drags on productivity, and lower overall growth.

Yet clinging to the old system and pining for its restoration would be deluded and futile. Nostalgia is not a strategy; nor is hope. Looking beyond the existing structures does not mean simply accepting a Hobbesian state of nature. The challenge is to create a system of rules outside the rules-based system of old.

That will require starting over. The best option for moving forward is to craft a system made up of coalitions of the like-minded, which together would constitute a network of open plurilateral relationships—smaller and more flexible than the multilateral trading system. Some coalitions would be mechanisms for trade integration and liberalization. Others might serve to secure supply chains or even to restrict trade in the service of national security. Some countries would be members of multiple coalitions with varied purposes, and coalitions would likely have overlapping memberships and variable geometry. From a purely economic point of view, this system would be suboptimal and less efficient than the global trading system was. But it might well be the most politically sustainable outcome that could—crucially—prevent unilateralism from spinning out of control. It would, in short, allow for a global economy shaped by rules even without a global rules-based system.

PRESENT AT THE DESTRUCTION

The global trading system developed as one part of the multilateral economic structure that the United States led in building, starting during World War II and continuing into the early years of this century. Along with institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Washington established first the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—the GATT, which laid out a set of rules, such as MFN, and created a process by which countries negotiated market-opening commitments—and then, in 1995, the WTO. The 1994 Uruguay Round agreement, which established the WTO, introduced a range of new trade disciplines and a binding dispute-settlement procedure, marking a major step forward in strengthening the multilateral rules-based system. At its founding, the WTO had 76 member countries; today, it has more than 160, which account for 98 percent of global trade.

In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers hoped that the rules-based trading system that had taken shape in much of the noncommunist world in the preceding decades would expand to encompass former U.S. adversaries, such as Russia, and emerging markets, such as China. The rules would enhance stability, promote openness and integration, and facilitate the peaceful resolution of economic disputes, to the United States’ economic and strategic benefit. Yet even before this system was fully in place, opposition to it emerged, beginning in the early 1990s with the fierce debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The first WTO ministerial meeting held in the United States, in Seattle in 1999, was met with massive, headline-grabbing protests.

Trade policy has gotten both more credit and more blame than it deserves in the economic debates of recent decades. Critics of the system tend to conflate the effects of globalization with those of trade policy. Globalization itself had less to do with trade agreements than with technology—particularly the invention of the shipping container and the spread of broadband. From the 1960s on, containerization drastically reduced the cost of shipping goods by sea and land, and there were improvements in the efficiency of air freight, as well. A 2023 National Bureau of Economic Research working paper by Sharat Ganapati and Woan Foong Wong found that from 1970 to 2014, the cost of transporting goods by weight fell between 33 and 39 percent and the cost of transporting goods by value fell between 48 and 62 percent. All of this made the development of global supply chains for goods increasingly attractive. The same was true for trade in services with the spread of computers and Internet access. Seamless connectivity meant that everything from customer and back-office processing to coding and data analytics could be done almost anywhere on earth.

The decline in U.S. manufacturing employment—one of the primary harms in the United States attributed to trade—also flowed mainly from technological change. Researchers at Ball State University have calculated that “almost 88 percent of job losses in manufacturing [between 2000 and 2010] can be attributable to productivity growth, and the long-term changes to manufacturing employment are mostly linked to the productivity of American factories.” Trade, they found, accounted for just 13.4 percent of job loss.

Indeed, that decline in manufacturing employment, which occurred across advanced industrialized countries, started well before Washington signed any major trade agreements. The percentage of U.S. employment in manufacturing shrank by around two to five points per decade from the 1970s through the first decade of this century, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Germany, broadly considered a manufacturing powerhouse, experienced a similar decline. China’s emergence as the manufacturing floor for the global economy accelerated this trend, but it did not cause it entirely on its own. In developed economies with robust manufacturing sectors, the secular decline of manufacturing employment long predates the era of peak globalization.

THE CHINA RECKONING

Still, a key driver of today’s wariness of trade is that the rules of the rules-based system did not sufficiently anticipate the challenge of China. The emergence of China as an export-driven economic powerhouse resulted in what has become known as the “China shock”—the rapid closure of factories in particular communities in the United States.

It is true that the multilateral trading system suffered from design flaws that proved to be particularly salient with the rise of China—and consequently planted the seeds of the system’s demise. These included the weakness of certain restrictions on state subsidization and the nonmarket behavior of state-owned enterprises, as well as the protection of intellectual property rights; the difficulty of graduating members from developing-country status, which allowed them more lenient treatment; and a consensus, one-country-veto decision-making process that made reform all but impossible. At the time of China’s accession to the WTO, in 2001, there was reason to believe that Beijing was on an irreversible path toward market reform and liberalization. Such hopes rested not just on the rhetoric of China’s leaders at the time but also on the painful actions they took to restructure significant portions of the economy. Yet hopes were dashed as reform stalled under President Hu Jintao and then in some ways went into reverse under President Xi Jinping.

WTO rules on intellectual property, subsidies, and state-owned enterprises proved insufficient in the face of the emergence and integration of a China that reformed its economic approach less than expected. And the challenge was not just that China played by its own set of rules; it was also the problem of scale. China’s surplus of manufactured goods—which approached $1 trillion last year—far exceeds those of earlier manufacturing giants, such as Germany and Japan. By the UN Industrial Development Organization’s estimate, China is well on its way to producing 45 percent of global industrial output by the end of the decade.

Such industrial overcapacity, sustained by domestic preferences, state-directed subsidies, and market protections, bears a considerable share of the blame for the current situation. As China’s economic strategy increasingly challenged the integrity of a trading system designed to promote integration and interdependence, Washington grew skeptical of the system itself. In 2015, the Obama administration called it quits on the Doha Round of global trade negotiations, concerned that the resulting agreement would have locked in preferential treatment for China at the expense of the United States and the rest of the world. In his first term, Trump showed broad disregard for the multilateral system, preferring to revert to the pre-WTO period in which the United States, as the largest economy in the world, wielded its power unilaterally. And the Biden administration did nothing meaningful to reform the WTO.

Today, the three major functions of the WTO have ground to a halt. As a negotiating forum, it has in recent years managed to conclude only marginal multilateral agreements, such as one on trade facilitation that expedites the entry of goods at customs. As a body for monitoring members’ trade practices, it has had no recourse when large economies simply ignore their obligations to report policies. And as a dispute-settlement organization, it has been hobbled by disagreements over the mandate and functioning of its appellate body. In response to such disagreements, Washington, across several administrations, objected first to the reappointment of certain members of the body and ultimately to the appointment of any new members, effectively preventing any meaningful effort to settle disputes.

LOSSES AND GAINS

Self-flagellation about the failures of the trading system has practically become the price of entry to discussions about the global economy’s future. The standard account of those has become the starting point for a supposed “new Washington consensus.” Yet those failures should be weighed against the benefits, for it is all too easy to take the international economic system and the institutions that maintain it for granted.

For one thing, the global trading system has played a central role in lifting as many as a billion people out of poverty. The World Bank has concluded that “trade has been a powerful driver of economic development and poverty reduction.” Between 1990 and 2017, global GDP nearly tripled, developing countries’ share of exports increased from 16 to 30 percent, and global poverty plummeted from 36 to nine percent.

Another common fallacy in today’s debate about trade is that it has benefited only other countries, not the United States. The clearest benefit has been for American consumers, by giving them access to more, and more varied, goods at lower prices. Research from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis found that a ten percent reduction in U.S. import costs brings welfare gains to both high- and low-income households. The greatest benefits, however, go to low-income households, with welfare gains of the poorest households 4.5 times as high as those of the richest. The economist Michael Waugh, who wrote the report, noted that “in layman’s terms, a dollar price reduction is of higher value to the poor than the rich.”

Trade agreements also made it easier to export U.S.-made products and services by eliminating both tariff and nontariff barriers in other markets (which, as Trump himself has noted, have generally been higher than barriers in the U.S. market). They thereby reduced the impetus to move production abroad to serve those markets, where nearly all global consumers live, and supported jobs that on average pay more than nonexport-related jobs in the United States. Since the inception of the WTO, exports of goods have grown more than 150 percent, adjusted for inflation, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (Imports grew more than 250 percent adjusted for inflation over this period.) A U.S. Census Bureau report found, based on data from 1992 to 2019, that firms engaged in trade “exhibit higher net job creation rates than non-traders controlling for firm size, age, and sector.” In an analysis for the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Gary Hufbauer and Megan Hogan calculated that U.S. GDP in 2022 would have been $2.6 trillion lower without gains from post–World War II trade—averaging to gains of $19,500 per American household.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meeting with Trump in Turnberry, Scotland, July 2025European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meeting with Trump in Turnberry, Scotland, July 2025 Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

Trade policy has also worked to level the playing field for American workers by pressing other countries to adopt better environmental, labor, intellectual property, regulatory, and anticorruption practices. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example, would have not only opened markets long closed to U.S. products, such as Japan, but also introduced enforceable standards on labor rights, environmental protection, and subsidization of state-owned enterprises in emerging markets, such as Malaysia and Vietnam—key ingredients of “fair trade.” In effect, the TPP dangled a reduction of already low U.S. tariffs as an incentive to get other countries to adopt policies consistent with U.S. interests and values while creating a U.S.-led alternative to Chinese economic power. (Before the first Trump administration, U.S. tariffs were relatively low, with the average applied tariff around three percent and significant restrictions in place in few sectors, such as shoes, clothing, sugar, dairy, and trucks.)

Yet such arguments have always been a tough sell politically, since the benefits of trade liberalization are broadly shared but largely invisible. No one walks out of a Walmart and exclaims, “Thank goodness for the WTO!” Meanwhile, the costs of trade are acutely felt by a small number of workers in specific industries. Globalization could be blamed for introducing competition from other countries with lower labor costs, putting downward pressure on manufacturing wages in the United States and creating incentives to move production abroad.

The China shock was an especially dramatic demonstration of this dynamic—less because of its overall scale than because of how concentrated its losses were in particular communities. The economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson concluded that between 1999 and 2011, Chinese imports resulted in the loss of some two million jobs, including one million manufacturing jobs. That loss is relatively modest in the context of the overall U.S. economy: every year, some 50 million American workers experience “job separations,” including resignations and layoffs. Yet these losses were geographically concentrated, resulting in the devastation of individual communities heavily reliant on industries that could not withstand a flood of Chinese imports, with the effects of closures spilling over into the rest of the local economy. Although “creative destruction” might have worked in aggregate, it meant little to specific towns or cities that had no way to replace gutted industries with new ones on a relevant timeline. And there was little understanding of the need for domestic policies, such as effective worker transition assistance, lifelong learning and upskilling programs, and place-based economic development strategies, that aggressively addressed the localized effects of globalization—a gap that has yet to be adequately addressed.

HOW TRADE WARS END

For years now, Washington’s response to the shortcomings of the global trading system has been ad hoc at best. The first Trump administration imposed broad tariffs on China and targeted ones on allies and partners. It also negotiated what was essentially a purchase and sale agreement, rather than a trade agreement, with China, requiring it to buy more commodities and other products from the United States (which China did not in the end fulfill).

The Biden administration kept most of the Trump tariffs in place and added a few more. Despite questioning both the economic and national security value of tariffs imposed on Chinese products such as footwear and apparel, the administration did not want to “reward” Beijing by reducing them. It also innovated the use of export controls, foreign investment restrictions, and industrial policy. Although such measures were focused on strategic industries such as semiconductors and electric vehicles, administration officials did not fully develop a clear framework, with guardrails and limiting principles, to prevent the list of products and technologies essential to national security from growing indefinitely and evolving over time into a policy of simple protectionism. Initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity aimed to draw countries and their supply chains closer to the United States, but without the possibility of market access—deemed too politically sensitive—the impact was marginal.

Still, the Biden administration called for reform of the WTO, rather than for its destruction, and in most ways acted according to the principles of the rules-based system. The second Trump administration appears to have a different goal in mind: nothing less than the dismantling of the global trading system, rooted in the president’s strong preference for unilateral action and belief that bilateral trade deficits are an existential threat. On April 2, his so-called Liberation Day, Trump declared a national emergency and announced “reciprocal” tariffs of up to 50 percent on scores of countries. Since then, he has repeatedly moved the goalposts for agreements while also threatening tariffs as a cudgel on nontrade issues, such as migration, fentanyl, the war in Ukraine, and even the judicial system in Brazil. And he has sought to impose “deals” unilaterally when negotiations have run aground.

The risk of the United States and China playing by their own rules is contagion.

Wherever tariff levels precisely land, the current trade wars are almost certain to end with significantly higher barriers to trade. These will impose both costs on American consumers and challenges to American businesses. More than half of U.S. imports today are intermediate goods—inputs into the production of final goods. Accordingly, more expensive or less accessible inputs will make U.S. products less competitive, as was well documented after Trump’s first term. In 2018, Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff on steel and a ten percent tariff on aluminum. “Tariffs on steel may have led to an increase of roughly 1,000 jobs in steel production,” the economists Kadee Russ and Lydia Cox later concluded. “However, increased costs of inputs facing U.S. firms relative to foreign rivals due to the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum likely have resulted in 75,000 fewer manufacturing jobs in firms where steel or aluminum are an input into production.” The Council on Foreign Relations’ Benn Steil and Elisabeth Harding calculated that productivity, or output per hour, in the U.S. steel industry has dropped by 32 percent since 2017. If the Trump administration’s goal is to create more manufacturing jobs, its approach is likely to have exactly the opposite effect.

Then there is the cost of retaliation and imitation, as other governments respond and follow the U.S. example by imposing tariffs and restrictions of their own. If countries retaliate, it will harm U.S. exports, including agriculture. Imitation might also involve radically expanding the use of the emergency and national security justifications for weaponizing trade, as the United States has. The U.S. position has long been that no one else could tell the United States what was necessary for its national security. But until recently, Washington rarely invoked the national security justification. Trump has expanded the use of this tool to impose restrictions on steel, aluminum, and automobiles, including from close allies. Other countries have since followed suit. In 2024, a rec­ord 95 “Technical Barriers to Trade” regulations at the WTO cited national security concerns, applied to everything from cocoa beans to alcoholic beverages to animal feed.

Exacerbating all these costs is the uncertainty that results from Trump’s approach. Consumers, companies, and investors tend to sit on the sidelines when they are unsure about the general economic outlook and the specific tariffs or other trade measures they might face. The potential impact of tariffs on reducing growth and even triggering a recession could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The United States thus finds itself the subject of a grand experiment in which long-standing assumptions about economics and global trade are being questioned, with significant near-term costs and uncertain long-term benefits. The Trump administration has, in effect, turned the political economy of trade on its head. The costs of its policies are likely to be highly visible and felt immediately by most Americans, while the promised benefits, to the extent they come, are likely to be enjoyed by comparably few workers several years in the future. It will soon become clear if the public is willing to accept near-term sacrifice for the sake of Trump’s vision for reindustrializing the U.S. economy. But no matter how fierce the eventual political reaction, there is no going back to the trading system that existed before.

CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

Given the experience of the first half of the twentieth century in trade and beyond, it would seem obvious that international cooperation achieves better outcomes than the raw exercise of unconstrained power. Yet today’s trade policy represents a return to a form of power politics in which might makes right. The United States is acting unilaterally because, as the largest economy and consumer market in the world, it can. And China, lip service to multilateralism notwithstanding, is increasingly doing the same.

Contagion could follow, spurring cycles of unilateralism and transactionalism that could easily spin out of control. Some countries might follow the current U.S. example and explicitly reject the rules-based system. Others might follow China’s example and celebrate the system in word while undermining it in deed. Either way, the proliferating barriers to trade will reduce growth and damage productivity. Gutted rules will create uncertainty and friction, which could lead to instability and conflict.

Over time, the global economy could come to resemble the pre–World War II system, which was marked by the frequent use of trade as a weapon. For dominant economies, the short-term benefits of this raw use of power and disregard for constraints might appear to balance out the costs, but over the longer term, there are likely to be unintended consequences. Meanwhile, smaller and poorer countries will find themselves with insufficient market power to use tariffs and other trade restrictions in the same way.

Other governments may at first strive to maintain the old order, no matter what the United States and China do, well aware that an abandonment of the system altogether would mean a return to a beggar-thy-neighbor world. For some countries, this effort reflects an ideological commitment to the multilateral rules-based system. The entire European project, for example, is rooted in the notion of rules and regulatory-based integration, making it difficult for the European Union to pursue an entirely unilateralist strategy. Developing countries, meanwhile, lack the power and leverage to influence major trading partners and so have relied on the WTO and the dispute-resolution system to level the playing field.

There is thus likely to be a caucus of countries that continue to extol the virtues of the multilateral rules-based system, hoping that ultimately the United States will return to that system and China will modify its economic strategy to comply with it. This effort would play out in much the same way as the climate change regime has, with some countries coming together around a set of rules while many of the most important players choose their own paths instead. And as in the case of climate change, this caucus of countries will likely be frustrated.

COALITIONS OF THE WILLING

If an anarchical trade system is undesirable, but a return to the status quo ante is impossible, that leaves one clear task: developing a new system of rules even as the global economy moves away from a fully multilateral rules-based system. The most viable option is to build a new system around open plurilateralism: coalitions of countries that share interests in specific areas and come together to adopt high standards on certain issues, and then remain open to other countries that share similar interests and are prepared to implement those standards.

For some countries, these coalitions could focus on trade liberalization, based on a shared willingness to provide market access to one another, in whole or in part, in order to further integration and economic efficiency. For others, coalitions could be avenues for pursuing regulatory harmonization or taking on new issues, such as AI, even if in an informal and nonbinding manner, similar to the role of the Financial Stability Board, an international body formed after the 2008 financial crisis that coordinates recommendations for financial regulation. And with any of these, any individual government could simply opt not to join if it considers the costs of compromise on the relevant issues greater than the benefits.

In some cases, a coalition of countries with similar national security interests could coordinate on technology transfer and industrial policy—in other words, around a common approach to restricting trade rather than facilitating it. A coalition could, for example, discourage its members from importing certain products and services, such as telecommunications infrastructure, from countries that pose a national security threat while encouraging the development of secure supply chains among its members. Or it could align export controls and establish common rules for the use of state subsidies. The United States could forge a coalition aimed at building a competitive, collective industrial base to meet the challenge posed by China’s scale, as former Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and the Council on Foreign Relations’ Rush Doshi recently recommended in these pages.

image003.pngA container being loaded onto a cargo ship in Bangkok, July 2025 Athit Perawongmetha / Reuters

How should the United States incentivize countries to join such coalitions? The negotiation of traditional trade-liberalizing agreements appears to be off the table politically, at least for now. Threatening to impose tariffs—that is, using sticks rather than carrots—might secure agreement in the short run, but to be durable, the other members of the coalition must see it as in their interest to align themselves with the United States rather than hedge their bets with China or remain on the sidelines altogether.

One option for the United States is to take advantage of its innovation ecosystem—the unique combination of world-class universities, R & D investment, rule of law, deep capital markets, access to risk capital, and entrepreneurial culture. Many of these assets are currently under threat by Trump administration policies, but over the long run, the value of maintaining U.S. scientific and technological leadership should be self-evident, particularly in the context of great-power rivalry. The U.S. innovation ecosystem might evolve but survive. A club of countries could secure preferential access to these opportunities and to those offered by other members of the club in exchange for alignment on a broader array of economic and national security interests.

These coalitions would be open, meaning that countries that are able and willing to live by the standards are eligible to join. Some might be quite small, focused on securing semiconductor supply chains, for example, and include, say, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Taiwan. Others could represent larger groups of countries willing to agree to a broader set of rules to govern trade and investment relations generally, such as the successor to the TPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, which was finalized without U.S. participation. The membership of coalitions could grow over time, and there could be overlapping membership among different coalitions.

There is no going back to the trading system that existed before.

In the absence of a fundamental change in Beijing’s economic strategy and more, it is hard to imagine China as a candidate for membership in a coalition of this sort that involves the United States any time soon (although there might be room for coalitions cooperating on global public goods, such as pandemic preparedness). It is possible, over time, that Chinese policymakers will change strategy based on their own judgments, driven by demographic, financial, and other pressures. A structure of open plurilateralism, built with allies and partners, might expedite that decision. But after years of trying, U.S. policymakers should by now be quite humble about their ability to directly convince Beijing to change its approach and instead focus on using coalitions to shape China’s external environment.

In this world, the WTO might wither entirely, or it might persist in rump form for countries that have no more attractive coalitions to join. It could also be the repository for technical work and a venue for dispute settlement for countries that opt in. The network of free-trade agreements would continue to exist and could become the foundation for broader coalitions, such as the EU potentially following the United Kingdom’s lead in joining the CPTPP.

A key benefit of open plurilateralism is the flexibility it provides. Not being beholden to holdouts in a system in which each country has a veto, the approach creates opportunities to move forward on issues among those with a common view and a capacity to take on new issues as they arise and new members as they meet the standards. In terms of economic efficiency, this is a second-best solution. By definition, the benefits would be shared only among members. Principles such as MFN would be effectively consigned to the dustbin of history. And the variable geometry of custom-tailored plurilateral agreements could be as messy and inefficient as a spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements. But although such a network would be more complex than the multilateral trading system, it might also prove more politically sustainable. It is a pragmatic response to the current challenge: maintaining at least some rules without the multilateral rules-based system.

COMING STORMS

Whatever the benefits of the postwar global trading system—for growth, poverty alleviation, consumer welfare, and more—there were, at the end of the day, losers as well as winners. Neither the costs nor the benefits were equally shared, and the distributional issues rarely got adequate attention from policymakers. These downsides will remain even in the best-designed system, and it will be essential to find better solutions for the harms. Any new system must come with an accompanying set of domestic policies designed to ensure that American workers and communities can thrive in a rapidly changing economy, whether that change comes from trade, technology, or immigration. Past administrations have made modest attempts at place-based economic development and worker retraining, but never with the seriousness of purpose or degree of prioritization that will be necessary.

Such policies may be even more urgently needed in the wake of the Trump trade wars. The costs of the current approach—in terms of growth, inflation, and productivity—are likely to fall most on the people Trump claims to be championing. Low-income Americans spend a disproportionate share of their income on imported goods. Industries that employ blue-collar workers depend on imported inputs. And the incomes of farmers and ranchers are highly sensitive to retaliation by other countries.

Meanwhile, as the United States grapples with those consequences, the coming impact of artificial intelligence on workers could well dwarf the impact of globalization. The China shock contributed to the elimination of an estimated two million jobs between 1999 and 2011; the widespread application of AI could eliminate tens of millions of jobs over a similar period. So while attention is focused on tariffs, policymakers should be devoting at least as much effort to preparing for the AI-driven restructuring of the American workforce. As with trade, the benefits might be widely shared. But in this case, the costs might be, as well.

 

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