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Mostrando postagens com marcador Max Fisher. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Max Fisher. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 26 de setembro de 2013

USA and the Syria question: much ado (from Obama) about nothing - Max Fisher (WP)

Why Obama’s big U.N. speech on Syria was so awkwardly inconsistent


In his address to the United Nations on Tuesday, President Obama did his best to rally the organization to action on Syria. His case was forceful but, at moments, the logic seemed strained, even contradictory. And it was all made a bit awkward by the fact that Obama's urgent call to action came more than two years into the war, after two far milder U.N. addresses.
There were two contradictions in Obama's comments to the United Nations on Syria. The first was with the Obama of General Assemblies past, who espoused a very different view of the war and how to handle it. Previously, Obama had not advocated any of the military and diplomatic actions that, today, he declared so vital that failing to pursue them could undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations itself. The second contradiction was in Obama's two goals in Syria – punishing Assad for his chemical weapons and ending the war – which he framed as complimentary even though they would appear to work at cross-purposes.
This gets to the bigger, underlying contradiction: Obama has a habit of conflating his case for punishing chemical weapons use with his case for ending the war, and says we can do both at the same time. But he advocates contradictory actions in pursuit of those two goals.
To be clear, this is not to argue that Obama is hypocritical or somehow dishonest. But he's got a very tough needle to thread: he's trying to rally an action-resistant United Nations into very difficult and unpopular action; he's also trying to push it toward two very different forms of action. Those are really difficult goals. That Obama is back-bending through some less-than-consistent rhetoric is a sign of just how difficult.
Still, the shift in Obama's position is revealing. Just one year ago, in his United Nations General Assembly speech, Obama said of Syria only that "we must stand with those Syrians who believe in a different vision." The war, at that point, was already horrifically violent; President Bashar al-Assad's forces had not used chemical weapons but they had committed plenty of the slaughter that Obama cited today as cause for action. Yet, in his previous addresses, he'd made no call for action, no declaration that the "legitimacy" of the U.N. was on the line, as he argued today.
If the United Nations Security Council failed to pass a sufficiently tough resolution to force Assad to give up his chemical weapons, Obama warned, "then it will show that the United Nations is incapable of enforcing the most basic of international laws." Those are pretty high stakes, after two years of relative U.S. inaction on Syria, despite tens of thousands killed. Obama's prior U.N. addresses since the war began, in 2011 and 2012, somewhat undermined his big call to action today. In those two speeches, he did not demand U.N. action – nor pledge any concrete U.S. steps.
You could argue that Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons on Aug. 21 changed all that, justifying Obama's radically different approach. But Obama, in making his case for action today, cited not just chemical weapons growing sectarianism, the danger of regional destabilization, extremism and the larger human costs of the war. Those were all present a year ago. And Obama argued for specific action not just to end chemical weapons but to end the war itself – which did not seem to merit the same sort of response for him last year.
On paper, Obama's two overriding goals in Syria are actually pretty straightforward. First, he wants to uphold the international norm against the use of chemical weapons, which he believes Assad violated by using chemical weapons against civilians on Aug 21. Second, he wants for Assad to step down voluntarily as part of a negotiated peace deal with the rebels that would also leave elements of Assad's government intact.
The problem comes when Obama explains how to achieve those goals. He told the United Nations today that the threat of force could compel Assad to give up his chemical weapons, but that actual military force could not end the war. He argued, on the one hand, "I do not believe that military action by those within Syria or by external powers can achieve a lasting peace." On the other, he said that only the threat of military strikes had compelled Assad to accept the chemical weapons deal.
One might reasonably conclude, taking Obama's arguments at face value, that the world would have to pursue these goals separately. At one point, it would have to pick: threaten and maybe use force to get rid of the chemical weapons, or instead of force pursue a diplomatic peace deal.
The problem, though, is that Obama has linked his two pursuit, saying that the one complements the other. "Our agreement on chemical weapons should energize a larger diplomatic effort to reach a political settlement within Syria," he said. That's a bit of a contradiction: military force would undermine a peace deal, but it would force Assad to give up his chemical weapons and thus "energize" a peace deal.
How do you square that circle? Some hawkish analysts argue that Obama should use a credible threat of military action, or military action itself, to compel Assad to the negotiating table, just as that action compelled Assad to volunteer his chemical weapons. More dovish analysts would say that strikes should be off the table in both cases. Others might suggest that the goal of ending the war is simply out of Obama's reach and that, if he were brutally honest, he would drop it from his speeches. Those are all reasonable and internally consistent cases. But perhaps they're not what Obama believes can sell at the United Nations this year.
Max Fisher
Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. He has a master's degree in security studies from Johns Hopkins University. Sign up for his daily newsletter here. Also, follow him on Twitter orFacebook.

domingo, 7 de julho de 2013

Egito: os dilemas de El Baradei (WP)

Three reasons Mohamed ElBaradei is an odd choice to be Egypt’s new prime minister
By Max Fisher
The Washington Post, July 6, 2013

Mohamed ElBaradei, the 71-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner, former head of the United Nations’ nuclear agency and Egyptian opposition figure has just added a new line to his resume: He’s been appointed the interim prime minister of Egypt. ElBaradei is in some ways a good choice: He’s well-known, internationally respected, old enough that he’s perhaps more likely to cede power willingly, and seen as too much of a statesman to indulge in the self-serving power grabs that have marked the tenures of past Egyptian leaders. And ElBaradei is likely to do well with international institutions such as the IMF, which now-deposed president Mohamed Morsi had rebuffed.

In other ways, though, the decision to appoint ElBaradei and his decision to accept the post are strange choices for Egypt at this moment. Here are a few.

(1) Little natural constituency, likely to alienate key groups

Egypt has more than a few serious problems right now, sadly, but one of the biggest is its political divisions, which are so wide and bitter that any single leader or group would struggle to govern. Maybe ElBaradei can unite the country, but he is not ideally situated for the task.

This is a moment when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, who are not few in Egypt, are probably asking themselves whether they should even bother participating in this government or just dedicate themselves to undoing it. ElBaradei is seen as associated with Egypt’s relatively small population of well-off, well-educated, secular, liberal urbanites - or, worse, associated with Westerners. When I looked for a photo to illustrate this post, the first one that popped up showed ElBaradei smiling alongside Angelina Jolie, on stage at the Berlin International Film Festival.

ElBaradei is almost perfectly positioned to further enrage and alienate Islamists, who are popular among Egypt’s many rural and low-income communities. While he had a warm relationship with the group before the revolution, making common cause with it against then-President Mubarak, he is so much the opposite of everything the Muslim Brotherhood stood for while Morsi was in power that the group could see him as anti-Brotherhood choice.

Shadi Hamid, who follows Egyptian politics for the Brookings Institution, told USA Today that ElBaradei and the Brotherhood are now “arch enemies of sorts.” And it’s not just Islamists. Hamid wrote on Twitter that ElBaradei “was the man pro-army nationalists seemed to hate most not too long ago.”

(2) Has not proved to be a charismatic or populist leader

This also gets to the challenge of uniting Egypt, an urgent and difficult task for the country’s post-Morsi government. ElBaradei, for all his considerable credibility, seems most comfortable giving interviews to reporters or posting to Twitter, not speaking before crowds.

On Jan. 30, 2011, as protests against Mubarak’s government gained steam, ElBaradei landed at a still-idealist Tahrir Square. The protest movement was then the closest it would be to matching his vision; his name was already floating around as a possible leader for this leaderless movement. The crowds should have been putty in his hands. But his visit was strangely brief and disappointingly uninspiring, an opportunity lost for ElBaradei. It will only be more difficult now for him to champion the movement, and these are the people who should be his natural base.

(3) Compromising his democratic ideals

Even if the military coup that deposed Morsi and dissolved the constitution ends up being a good thing for Egypt’s democracy in the long term, it’s hard to think of anything more anti-democratic than a coup. ElBaradei, whatever his faults, has remained so untarnished in the two-and-a-half difficult years since Mubarak’s fall in large part because of his adherence to the democratic idealism of those first revolutionary days. In January 2012, he quit Egypt’s first post-Mubarak presidential race, announcing, “My conscience does not permit me to run for the presidency or any other official position unless it is within a democratic framework.”

Yet, strangely enough, as the military stepped in to remove Morsi on July 3, ElBaradei was there on Egyptian state TV, implicitly blessing the anti-democratic act that has now installed him in power. Maybe, from ElBaradei’s perspective, the coup was inevitable or necessary and that shouldn’t force him to turn down the prime ministerial appointment just for the sake of consistency. But it’s a sad bit of irony that, by taking the job, ElBaradei sacrifices some of the democratic credibility that got him there in the first place.