818) Uma teoria aprioristica das relacoes internacionais

Aos que se interessam por teorias de relações internacionais, o paper abaixo pode representar uma contribuição útil para aqueles que sempre desconfiaram de Morgenthau, mas nao tinham, até aqui, instrumentos para refutá-lo.
O autor não pretende simplesmente refutar Morgenthau e sua teoria "realista" de RI. Ele pretende oferecer uma via alternativa à questão de saber se apenas teorias empiricamente verificáveis são possíveis em RI.
Acho que ele consegue e sua conclusão é deveras interessante.
Conferir seus argumentos no link abaixo:

Toward an A Priori Theory of International Relations
Mark R. Crovelli
http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/crovelli3.pdf

Transcrevo apenas suas conclusões, para induzir à leitura do artigo completo:

"V. CONCLUSION
It should be clear that the preceding foundation for an a priori theory of international relations in no way needs to be “tested” against the a posteriori evidence. No amount of psychological “evidence,” historical “evidence,” demographic “evidence,” hypothetical assumptions about human rationality, or interpretive “evidence” could ever refute (or substantiate for that matter) these deductions. This is not to say that these deductions are completely impervious to attack. On the contrary, one may wish to contest the validity of many of them. The vital thing to notice, however, is that in order to attack them one must attack the deductive process which produced them. These deductions have essentially the same epistemological status as mathematical proofs. If one wishes to contest the validity of a mathematical proof, one does not go out in the world and search for cases in which 5+7 does not equal 12, or examine the psychological makeup of the mathematician. Instead, if one wanted to" disprove the mathematical proof, one would attack the deductive process which produced it. To point to a posteriori “evidence” as if it were able to refute the proposition 5+7=12, or the proposition “man acts” and all its derivatives would be an immediate sign that one had entirely
misunderstood the status of the propositions. As Hoppe points out in this regard:
“These propositions’ validity ultimately goes back to nothing but the indisputable axiom of action. To think, as empiricism does, that these propositions require continual testing for their validation is absurd, and a sign of outright intellectual confusion.” The deductions I have thus far made, insofar as they are accepted, point to two general conclusions about international relations:
1) Interference in the international economic market by States always decreases the subjective ex ante wellbeing of all the individuals who are affected by the interference, and always shifts resources away from their most value-productive uses, and
2) The very existence of tax-funded States creates a situation in which frequent and large-scale warfare is more likely than in cases where tax-funded States do not exist.
These conclusions, moreover, indicate that international relations as a field cannot afford to simply examine the relations between States as if human life is impossible in the absence of States. 48 Indeed, if the preceding exposition is even partially correct, human life would be preferable in many ways in a world without any States.