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Mostrando postagens com marcador Social Europe. Mostrar todas as postagens
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domingo, 21 de maio de 2023

A tale of two countries: Belarus and Lithuania - Thorvaldur Gylfason, Eduard Hochreiter (Social Europe)

A tale of two countries: Belarus and Lithuania

Social Europe, 16th May 2023

https://www.socialeurope.eu/a-tale-of-two-countries-belarus-and-lithuania

In 1991, Belarus did not join the Baltic states in striking out independently from the Soviet Union. Now the jury is in.

Independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991 offered its successor states the chance for fundamental reforms. They used these opportunities in strikingly different ways.

Lithuania, as with the other Baltic states, broke away from the old system as quickly as possible—indeed it was the first former Soviet republic to do so, declaring independence in March 1990. Belarus, remaining under autocratic rule, remained closely tied to Russia.

At first, the Belarusian model of ‘state capitalism’ seemed to work but around 2012 things began to deteriorate. Having spurned the ‘European perspective’ adopted by Lithuania, the associated absence in Belarus of democracy, institutional reforms, good governance and, of course, integration into the European Union now do not bode well for its economic and political future.

Radically different paths

Following the example of Estonia, Lithuania was an early and radical reformer. It rushed toward integration into the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004, adopted the euro in 2015 and has become one of the best-performing countries in central and eastern Europe (CEE).

In contrast, Belarus, after timidly implementing some reforms in the first few years of independence, has remained stuck since 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka was elected president. Its state-capitalist model has been based on an implicit social contract: the authorities guaranteed law and order, employment opportunities and a low dispersion of income, while the public sacrificed political freedom. Evidently, this contract broke down in the last few years—decisively so after the rigged elections of August 2020, followed by mounting suppression after the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The economic corollaries of this are shown in Figure 1. Having reversed the initial decline in output at the start of the transition from plan to market, the economies of Lithuania and Belarus grew broadly in tandem from 1995 in terms of gross domestic product per head. The data do have to be taken with a pinch of salt, however: Belarus benefited from implicit energy subsidies from Russia which averaged a whopping 18 per cent of GDP during 2001-08 and many prices remain controlled. Lithuania lost about a quarter of her population to emigration in the past 25 years but did perform better, on a per capita basis, especially after 2012.

Figure 1: per capita GDP, 1990-2021 (constant international 2017 dollars at purchasing-power parities)

Belarus,Lithuania
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2023

The story is similar when it comes to the fundamental social indicator of life expectancy (Figure 2). Lithuanians have lived longer than Belarussians since 1995. After 1990, life expectancy in Belarus fell by three years compared with a little more than two in Lithuania, where the reversal began in 1994 but in Belarus was delayed until 2002. True, in 2020, the life-expectancy deficit which had opened up between Belarus and other CEE states, bar Georgia, was reduced because the country attracts few tourists, so limiting contagion from the coronavirus (for which Lukashenka advocated driving tractors and drinking vodka as remedies).

Figure 2: life expectancy 1990-2020 (years)

Belarus,Lithuania
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2023

Investment quality

Why is GDP per person so much higher in Lithuania than in Belarus and why has the income differential continued to grow in Lithuania’s favour? To answer that question, we have compared the evolution of standard determinants of growth in the two countries since independence.

Investment is a key determinant. Both countries saw a surge of gross investment in machinery and equipment from around 2000, later reversed, leaving the investment ratio essentially unchanged from the mid-to-late 1990s until 2021. Belarus did though invest about 30 per cent of its GDP on average during 1990-2021, compared with 21 per cent in Lithuania.

Official investment data do not however distinguish quantity from quality. One may doubt its quality in Belarus where investment decisions, in Soviet fashion, have been motivated more by politics than return and the state owns two-thirds of the banking system. Thus, preferential credits have been extended to state-owned enterprises and agriculture.

The booming information-technology industry has been fully competitive in world markets, as have refined oil products and fertilisers, though Belarus has long received ‘loyalty’ rents from Russia. Recently, many foreign IT firms have left the country and the ‘loyalty’ rents have declined, while sanctions have been placed on Belarus’ exports.

Net foreign direct investment in Lithuania amounted to nearly 4 per cent of GDP on average in 1990-2021, compared with 2 per cent in Belarus. Again, quality matters and the benefits of EU and NATO membership clearly show. FDI in Belarus is heavily tilted toward Russia, which accounts for around 80 per cent of its total (2016 figure), while most FDI in Lithuania stems from the EU.

Market integration

The second key determinant of growth is trade. Exports of goods and services from Lithuania amounted to 58 per cent of GDP on average in 1990-2021—a bit less than the 61 per cent in Belarus. But, while the Belarusian export ratio has held steady since the mid-1990s and maintained its eastward orientation, the Lithuanian ratio shot up from 40 per cent to 80 per cent, reflecting its integration into western markets and participation in the EU single market; Belarus, like Russia, retains a rather restrictive import regime.

Turning to education, our third determinant, Belarus has maintained the good sides of Soviet education, especially in mathematics and science, but remains poor in languages. In both countries, nearly all youngsters attend secondary school, but Belarus has lagged behind Lithuania in recent years. Reflecting the success of the IT industry, Belarus has though recently caught up with Lithuania in individual use of the internet.

It is in the area of democratic rule and good governance that we find the starkest differences—and in Belarus the political and institutional situation is turning from bad to worse. Lithuania has been an unfettered democracy since the early 1990s, consistently scoring top grades in international comparisons: Freedom House awards Lithuania a democracy score of 90 out of 100, while Belarus was demoted from 15 in 2015 to just 11 in 2021.

The distribution of income is less equal in Lithuania than in most advanced economies. As social cohesion is good for growth, Belarus’ low Gini coefficient of inequality may have contributed to growth in the past. More recently though, especially since 2020, social cohesion has all but disappeared.

Accounting for growth

Is growth more driven by crude capital accumulation or more efficient use of existing capital and other resources? The latter include ‘human’ and ‘social’ capital accumulated through education, good governance, efficient organisation, strong institutions and so on. In earlier comparative studies of Estonia and Georgia and Croatia and Latvia, we quantified the relative contributions of different growth determinants to income gaps using a simple growth-accounting model.

When it comes to Lithuania and Belarus, overall efficiency and education again outweigh investment as explanations for the income differential in 2019. Intensive growth is what counts.

Belarus and Lithuania adopted different transition models and reaped different political and economic outcomes. Lithuania was a frontrunner in transition while Belarus started late and its unique, state-capitalist model quickly stalled.

From 1995 to 2021 the income gap between the two countries rose from 83 per cent to twofold in Lithuania’s favour with adjustment for purchasing-power parities and from 58 per cent to more than threefold without it. The latter may be a more appropriate yardstick, in view of the extensive price controls and distortions in Belarus.

Lithuania has outperformed Belarus in most respects, even though Belarus has since 1991 invested 50 per cent more than Lithuania in machinery and equipment relative to GDP and had a more equal income distribution. Lithuania has invested more in human capital and has had more external trade—and, importantly, more democracy, less corruption and better governance.

‘Soft’ factors, such as institutions, governance and education, have prevailed in shaping relative economic performance. Belarus missed an opportunity to boost economic efficiency (‘total factor productivity’) and thus provide a basis for rapid long-run growth. In light of increasing oppression, sanctions and the flight of human capital, its future appears bleak.

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Thorvaldur Gylfason is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Iceland and a former member of Iceland´s Constitutional Council.

Eduard Hochreiter is senior research associate at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). Previously he worked for the Austrian central bank and the International Monetary Fund and was associate professor of international monetary economics at the University of Innsbruck and the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

sábado, 19 de novembro de 2022

Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: coletânea de artigos do forum Social Europe

War in Ukraine: our coverage

The most-read articles on Social Europe this year have, unsurprisingly, been those about Ukraine in the wake of the Russian invasion. So we have gathered them all together on one page, automatically updated and organised by theme, for ease of reading.

https://socialeurope.eu/focus/war-in-ukraine


quinta-feira, 27 de junho de 2019

Social justice in the Treaty of Versailles: a very brief history - Ingo Venzke (Social Europe)

Social justice in the Treaty of Versailles: a very brief history

The centenary of the Treaty of Versailles should remind us how closely it connected the fragile promise of peace to the quest for social justice. 
Treaty of Versailles
Ingo Venzke
The Treaty of Versailles, which settled the scores after World War I, also set up the International Labour Organization (ILO) to work towards social justice. The treaty asserted that ‘universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice’. In the background was the Russian revolution of 1917—it was out of fear of communism that the ILO emerged.
After the industrial revolution, transnational labour movements leaned towards strong forms of socialism, stoked fears of communist revolution and paved the way for the ILO. They placed emphasis on the power relations between labour and capital, and the inequitable distribution of gains between them.
For them, the ILO was the bearer of the hope that their broad demands of social justice would be met in practice. In a truly innovative and still unique fashion, the ILO then included the representatives of workers in its tripartite structure, next to the representatives from government and employers.
In substantive terms, however, the ILO bracketed many of the more radical questions about how to organise the economy. The idea of social justice gradually shrank and the injustice of forms of domination and exploitation—let alone their transformation—fell from view.
Today, the ILO’s public-relations tag continues to reflect this reductive understanding when it translates the advancement of social justice into the promotion of decent work. Instead of the distribution of gains remaining central, the focus has been on the minimal protection of workers in an increasingly globalised economy which favours the haves over the have-nots.
True, there has been increasing attention to high levels of inequality. And the idea of social justice is regaining its broader punch—directed at privilege rather than poverty and at power rather than protection. But a sense of why the Treaty of Versailles tied universal and lasting peace to social justice is nowhere to be found. Tracing that sense over time might mitigate the risk that history repeats itself.

Nagging reminder

The spectre of communism was still haunting Europe after World War I. The ILO’s preamble claimed that ‘conditions of labour exist, involving such injustice, hardship and privation to a large number of people so as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world is imperilled’. Like other peace treaties, Versailles longed for the quiet prior to the war. But Soviet Russia was a nagging reminder that communism had cast its spell.

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The link between peace and social justice gradually widened beyond a fixation with communism towards inter-state relations and rising fascism. John Maynard Keynes already argued in his The Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in 1919, that the economic subjugation of Germany would ‘sow the decay of the whole civilised life of Europe’. It was ever more apparent that social injustice within and across countries provided a formidable breeding ground for fascism.
Towards the end of World War II, allied policy once more aimed at shielding western Europe from Soviet influence, through economic reconstruction and a military bloc. But that is only part of the story. The vivid memory of economic crises in the 1920s and 30s, and the political opportunity these provided for fascism in Europe as well as in Asia, pushed social justice to the centre of attention, for a moment even past military security.
It is part of the forgotten foundations of the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that they originally had a mandate to work towards economic justice in inter-state relations. The so-called World Trade Charter once again closely linked peace and social justice—now with communism and fascism in mind.
Fifty-three out of the 56 states at the time signed the charter on the closing day of the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, Cuba. The charter would have set up the International Trade Organization (ITO), whose first article recognised that the creation of ‘conditions of stability and well-being … are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations’.
It not only aimed at fair labour standards but also at more equitable economic relations generally, for instance through the regulation of primary commodities and industry development. Against expectations, the ITO never came into existence to keep these ideas alive.

Rather marginalised

The ILO was rather marginalised in that context. Part of its programme had been absorbed by the still-born ITO. The ILO still helped however to enshrine the aim of ‘promot[ing] social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’ as one of the leading ends of the United Nations. It affirmed its role with its 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia.
Yet, while much praised as a counter-current to what Alain Supiot calls the ‘total market’, the declaration actually showed great ambivalence: it affirmed that ‘labour is not a commodity’ and, at the same time, promoted higher levels production as well as consumption through greater volumes of trade. While it harboured fickle hopes for an equitable way of organising the economy, it foreshadowed a further reduction of what social justice would come to mean.
Developments in the 1970s shaped the beliefs still prevalent today: the contribution of trade to peace was reduced to growth through efficiency gains, and to the intertwining of countries in a global division of labour. A concern for the relationship between labour and capital—and the distribution of power between them—was overtaken by a preoccupation with growth through globalisation.
In that context, the ILO continued to focus its work on worker protection and technical assistance, in a now largely decolonised world. In fact, it spearheaded the move towards an emphasis on basic needs, which was subsequently adopted by other institutions (notably the World Bank) and by human-rights discourses more generally.
This was in sync with an essentially neoliberal outlook: human rights in general, and worker rights in particular, were scaled down to minimal protection. That focus has allowed the injustice of relations within and across societies to be sidelined entirely. The reasons why somebody is poor or needs protection fell from view.
Loaded with symbolism, in 1975 the ILO left its premises on the lake of Geneva to the secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which developed into the World Trade Organization in 1995). The building which once proclaimed that labour is not a commodity now houses the organisation that facilitates global production around the commodity of labour. The spirit of social justice has been left wandering in some despair.

Compelling reminders

The centenary of the Treaty of Versailles should not only evoke images of World War I. It should also prompt us to recover and reconsider venerable beliefs about the link between peace and social justice. The ILO disappointed the hopes of the labour movements at the time—that it would strengthen the position of labour in relation to capital. The organisation’s tripartite structure and its very existence nevertheless still serve as compelling reminders of the widespread conviction that universal and lasting peace is only available if it is based on social justice.
That belief came to the fore even more prominently in the institutional designs of the period after World War II. Postwar plans were shaped by the experience of fascism, adjacent to the continuing fear of communism. But concerns for social justice were again sidelined by arresting military, potentially nuclear, confrontation and then by the neoliberal fixation on efficiency gains in globalised production.
Today, the implosive potential of inequality again captures attention and pushes old questions back on the agenda. Tracing how the Treaty of Versailles linked peace to social justice may allow a recognition that what used to be known should not have to be learned anew.
Ingo Venzke is professor of international law and social justice at the University of Amsterdam and director of the Amsterdam Center for International Law.