A tale of two countries: Belarus and Lithuania - Thorvaldur Gylfason, Eduard Hochreiter (Social Europe)

A tale of two countries: Belarus and Lithuania

THORVALDUR GYLFASON and EDUARD HOCHREITER

Social Europe, 16th May 2023

https://www.socialeurope.eu/a-tale-of-two-countries-belarus-and-lithuania

In 1991, Belarus did not join the Baltic states in striking out independently from the Soviet Union. Now the jury is in.

Independence from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991 offered its successor states the chance for fundamental reforms. They used these opportunities in strikingly different ways.

Lithuania, as with the other Baltic states, broke away from the old system as quickly as possible—indeed it was the first former Soviet republic to do so, declaring independence in March 1990. Belarus, remaining under autocratic rule, remained closely tied to Russia.

At first, the Belarusian model of ‘state capitalism’ seemed to work but around 2012 things began to deteriorate. Having spurned the ‘European perspective’ adopted by Lithuania, the associated absence in Belarus of democracy, institutional reforms, good governance and, of course, integration into the European Union now do not bode well for its economic and political future.

Radically different paths

Following the example of Estonia, Lithuania was an early and radical reformer. It rushed toward integration into the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004, adopted the euro in 2015 and has become one of the best-performing countries in central and eastern Europe (CEE).

In contrast, Belarus, after timidly implementing some reforms in the first few years of independence, has remained stuck since 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka was elected president. Its state-capitalist model has been based on an implicit social contract: the authorities guaranteed law and order, employment opportunities and a low dispersion of income, while the public sacrificed political freedom. Evidently, this contract broke down in the last few years—decisively so after the rigged elections of August 2020, followed by mounting suppression after the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The economic corollaries of this are shown in Figure 1. Having reversed the initial decline in output at the start of the transition from plan to market, the economies of Lithuania and Belarus grew broadly in tandem from 1995 in terms of gross domestic product per head. The data do have to be taken with a pinch of salt, however: Belarus benefited from implicit energy subsidies from Russia which averaged a whopping 18 per cent of GDP during 2001-08 and many prices remain controlled. Lithuania lost about a quarter of her population to emigration in the past 25 years but did perform better, on a per capita basis, especially after 2012.

Figure 1: per capita GDP, 1990-2021 (constant international 2017 dollars at purchasing-power parities)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2023

The story is similar when it comes to the fundamental social indicator of life expectancy (Figure 2). Lithuanians have lived longer than Belarussians since 1995. After 1990, life expectancy in Belarus fell by three years compared with a little more than two in Lithuania, where the reversal began in 1994 but in Belarus was delayed until 2002. True, in 2020, the life-expectancy deficit which had opened up between Belarus and other CEE states, bar Georgia, was reduced because the country attracts few tourists, so limiting contagion from the coronavirus (for which Lukashenka advocated driving tractors and drinking vodka as remedies).

Figure 2: life expectancy 1990-2020 (years)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2023

Investment quality

Why is GDP per person so much higher in Lithuania than in Belarus and why has the income differential continued to grow in Lithuania’s favour? To answer that question, we have compared the evolution of standard determinants of growth in the two countries since independence.

Investment is a key determinant. Both countries saw a surge of gross investment in machinery and equipment from around 2000, later reversed, leaving the investment ratio essentially unchanged from the mid-to-late 1990s until 2021. Belarus did though invest about 30 per cent of its GDP on average during 1990-2021, compared with 21 per cent in Lithuania.

Official investment data do not however distinguish quantity from quality. One may doubt its quality in Belarus where investment decisions, in Soviet fashion, have been motivated more by politics than return and the state owns two-thirds of the banking system. Thus, preferential credits have been extended to state-owned enterprises and agriculture.

The booming information-technology industry has been fully competitive in world markets, as have refined oil products and fertilisers, though Belarus has long received ‘loyalty’ rents from Russia. Recently, many foreign IT firms have left the country and the ‘loyalty’ rents have declined, while sanctions have been placed on Belarus’ exports.

Net foreign direct investment in Lithuania amounted to nearly 4 per cent of GDP on average in 1990-2021, compared with 2 per cent in Belarus. Again, quality matters and the benefits of EU and NATO membership clearly show. FDI in Belarus is heavily tilted toward Russia, which accounts for around 80 per cent of its total (2016 figure), while most FDI in Lithuania stems from the EU.

Market integration

The second key determinant of growth is trade. Exports of goods and services from Lithuania amounted to 58 per cent of GDP on average in 1990-2021—a bit less than the 61 per cent in Belarus. But, while the Belarusian export ratio has held steady since the mid-1990s and maintained its eastward orientation, the Lithuanian ratio shot up from 40 per cent to 80 per cent, reflecting its integration into western markets and participation in the EU single market; Belarus, like Russia, retains a rather restrictive import regime.

Turning to education, our third determinant, Belarus has maintained the good sides of Soviet education, especially in mathematics and science, but remains poor in languages. In both countries, nearly all youngsters attend secondary school, but Belarus has lagged behind Lithuania in recent years. Reflecting the success of the IT industry, Belarus has though recently caught up with Lithuania in individual use of the internet.

It is in the area of democratic rule and good governance that we find the starkest differences—and in Belarus the political and institutional situation is turning from bad to worse. Lithuania has been an unfettered democracy since the early 1990s, consistently scoring top grades in international comparisons: Freedom House awards Lithuania a democracy score of 90 out of 100, while Belarus was demoted from 15 in 2015 to just 11 in 2021.

The distribution of income is less equal in Lithuania than in most advanced economies. As social cohesion is good for growth, Belarus’ low Gini coefficient of inequality may have contributed to growth in the past. More recently though, especially since 2020, social cohesion has all but disappeared.

Accounting for growth

Is growth more driven by crude capital accumulation or more efficient use of existing capital and other resources? The latter include ‘human’ and ‘social’ capital accumulated through education, good governance, efficient organisation, strong institutions and so on. In earlier comparative studies of Estonia and Georgia and Croatia and Latvia, we quantified the relative contributions of different growth determinants to income gaps using a simple growth-accounting model.

When it comes to Lithuania and Belarus, overall efficiency and education again outweigh investment as explanations for the income differential in 2019. Intensive growth is what counts.

Belarus and Lithuania adopted different transition models and reaped different political and economic outcomes. Lithuania was a frontrunner in transition while Belarus started late and its unique, state-capitalist model quickly stalled.

From 1995 to 2021 the income gap between the two countries rose from 83 per cent to twofold in Lithuania’s favour with adjustment for purchasing-power parities and from 58 per cent to more than threefold without it. The latter may be a more appropriate yardstick, in view of the extensive price controls and distortions in Belarus.

Lithuania has outperformed Belarus in most respects, even though Belarus has since 1991 invested 50 per cent more than Lithuania in machinery and equipment relative to GDP and had a more equal income distribution. Lithuania has invested more in human capital and has had more external trade—and, importantly, more democracy, less corruption and better governance.

‘Soft’ factors, such as institutions, governance and education, have prevailed in shaping relative economic performance. Belarus missed an opportunity to boost economic efficiency (‘total factor productivity’) and thus provide a basis for rapid long-run growth. In light of increasing oppression, sanctions and the flight of human capital, its future appears bleak.

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Thorvaldur Gylfason is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Iceland and a former member of Iceland´s Constitutional Council.

Eduard Hochreiter

Eduard Hochreiter is senior research associate at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). Previously he worked for the Austrian central bank and the International Monetary Fund and was associate professor of international monetary economics at the University of Innsbruck and the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

From White Russia to Belarus: Norway snubs Kremlin - Peter Dickinson (The Atlantic Council).

 BelarusAlert

May 31, 2022

From White Russia to Belarus: Norway snubs Kremlin with name change

By Peter Dickinson

FILTER RESULTS

HIDE

Norway has announced that it will from now on use the name “Belarus” instead of “Hviterussland” (literally “White Russia”) in all official documents. The move is seen as a symbolic snub to Russia and recognition of Belarus’s aspirations to emerge from the Kremlin orbit and embrace democracy. “We believe it is right to change the use of names in solidarity with the Belarusian democratic movement,” commented Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials underlined the symbolic importance of the switch and stressed the need to emphasize the difference between Belarus and Russia. 

Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Anniken Huitfeldt first broke the news of the name change in a personal call with the exiled leader of Belarus’s democratic opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (pictured), on the eve of this year’s International Day of Solidarity with Belarus, which is marked annually on May 29. “Although there are both historical and linguistic arguments for writing “Hviterussland,” it is ultimately a political issue,” stated Huitfeldt. “We do this as a sign of solidarity with the Belarusian democratic movement. They will not be a continuation of Russia.”

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed the Norwegian gesture, which she praised as “more than just symbolic.” Belarusian journalist Hanna Liubakova shared this sentiment, commentingthat she saw Norway’s step as a sign of growing international recognition that referring to modern Belarus as “White Russia” was anachronistic and misleading. 

Subscribe for the latest from BelarusAlert

Receive updates for events, news, and publications on Belarus from the Atlantic Council.

• Email*

Norway’s decision to begin using the name Belarus in official documents is part of a regional trend, with fellow Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark also making similar switches from their own outdated versions of “White Russia” in recent years. This reflects broader changes in international perceptions of the country following a 2020 pro-democracy uprising that thrust Belarus into the global headlines following decades spent in the post-Soviet shadows.

For much of the post-Soviet period, Belarus was perhaps best known internationally as the last dictatorship in Europe. It owed this dubious honor to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who won election in 1994 before proceeding to dismantle the country’s fledgling democracy and reestablish a Soviet-style one-party state.  

For over a quarter of a century, Lukashenka was able to successfully suppress all domestic opposition and strengthen his grip on power while maintaining close ties with neighboring Russia. He faced the first serious challenge of his entire reign in August 2020 when heavy-handed attempts to rig the country’s presidential election served as a focal point for simmering public frustrations, leading to the eruption of mass protests across the country on the evening of the vote.

This pro-democracy protest movement gained momentum in subsequent weeks and caught the world’s imagination. It dominated international news coverage for much of late summer and early fall 2020, with many seeing the unprecedented people power uprising as the latest chapter in the slow-motion collapse of the Soviet Empire. The Lukashenka regime looked destined to fall until Russia intervened with a financial lifeline and a promise to send in the Russian security services if necessary.

Lukashenka has remained entirely dependent on Russian support ever since. In return, he has gradually surrendered his country’s sovereignty to the Kremlin, allowing Moscow to expand its political, economic, and military footprints in the country. In February 2022, Lukashenka permitted Putin to use Belarus as a platform for the invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of Russian troops flooded across the Belarusian border into Ukraine as part Putin’s failed attempt to seize Kyiv. The country has also served as a launch pad for the bombardment of Ukrainian towns and cities.

Belarus: país onde o ditador prendeu o Papai Noel - Comunidade belarussa no Brasil

 Recebi, de representantes da comunidade belarussa no Brasil, o texto abaixo, que reproduzo fielmente, a despeito do fato de não conhecer seus redatores e de não poder me pronunciar sobre o seu conteúdo.

Este espaço, o blog Diplomatizzando, o meu quilombo de resistência intelectual, se destina justamente a divulgar material inteligente sobre questões relevantes, como é o caso da defesa da democracia e dos direitos humanos na Belarus.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 5 de janeiro de 2021

Belarus: país onde o ditador prendeu o Papai Noel 

 

Há mais de quatro meses, os belarussos protestam contra a fraude eleitoral, a violência policial em relação aos manifestantes pacíficos e a violação generalizada dos direitos humanos pelo governo de Aliaksandr Lukashenka, há 26 anos no poder. 

 

O caso belarusso não é uma procura de integração com o bloco ocidental ou oriental. Belarus não tem conflitos internos e divisão territorial baseada em diferenças de etnia, língua e/ou cultura. A oposição do país não é representada no governo do ditador, não está dividida e não trava batalhas entre si. 

 

Após as eleições presidenciais em 09 de agosto de 2020, a sociedade belarussa, com todas as suas classes, empresários, trabalhadores de fábricas, estudantes, donas de casa, cientistas, médicos, atletas, artistas, aposentados, especialistas em TI, entre outros, ao lado dos belarussos no exterior e políticos de diversas correntes da oposição, se uniu em apenas três reivindicações principais. São elas: renúncia de Lukashenka, libertação de todos os presos políticos e novas eleições presidenciais, dessa vez transparentes.

 

 

Perseguição e violência

 

Mais de 30 mil pessoas foram detidas desde o início das manifestações que continuam sendo diárias. Para 28 de dezembro de 2020, 169 pessoas são consideradas prisioneiras políticas. A Procuradoria-Geral de Belarus instaurou um processo criminal contra a líder da Belarus democrática, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, que, segundo fontes independentes, teria ganhado a eleição presidencial, e o Conselho de Coordenação, criado para promover a transferência pacífica do poder. Sviatlana e os membros do Conselho, refugiados na Lituânia, estão sendo acusados de formação de grupo extremista.  

 

 

As vítimas que jamais voltarão

Ainda no segundo dia dos protestos Aliaksandr Taraikouski foi assassinado pelas forças policiais com tiro no peito. Aliaksandr estava desarmado e não apresentava perigo aos policiais. Depois dos primeiros dias dos protestos, marcados por uma violência policial brutal, dezenas de pessoas encontravam-se desaparecidas. Algumas delas foram encontradas depois nas prisões e nos hospitais, outras foram encontradas mortas, com sinais de tortura. Nenhum inquérito foi aberto. O caso mais recente foi a morte do jovem Raman Bandarenka, que saiu do prédio em que morava para saber por que pessoas não identificadas estavam tirando as fitas vermelhas e brancas, que os moradores tinham amarrado na quadra como símbolo de protesto. Raman foi conduzido à viatura policial e mais tarde faleceu no hospital devido à lesão cerebral grave. O médico e a jornalista que contaram a verdade sobre o caso de Raman estão presos. 

 

 

Detenção dos Papais Noéis

 

Esperando o período de Natal e Ano Novo, o povo belarusso já estava trocando piadas sobre a roupa revolucionária de Papai Noel, tradicionalmente vermelha e branca. E não demorou muito para saber que o Papai Noel foi detido depois de uma festa na praça da cidade de Navapolatsk. Os policiais enxergaram na festa para crianças uma manifestação política. Na capital, Minsk, foram detidos vários Papai Noéis ao mesmo tempo - durante a tradicional corrida dos Papais Noéis que se realiza em várias cidades europeias.  

 

Diplomatas que se posicionaram 

 

O primeiro diplomata belarusso a se posicionar publicamente após as eleições foi Ihar Liaschenya, embaixador de Belarus em Bratislava, servidor com o maior tempo de serviço na qualidade de chefe de missão diplomática. Em sua mensagem de vídeo, Ihar condenou a violência policial e o desrespeito da vontade popular. Posteriormente, pediu demissão. Vladimir Astapenka, embaixador belarusso na Argentina, condenou a fraude eleitoral e pediu demissão por “não poder representar um presidente ilegítimo”. Logo depois, o ex-embaixador foi acusado de desvio de verba pública e atualmente está sendo processado. Só em setembro histórias parecidas aconteceram com, no mínimo, 30 diplomatas belarussos que se manifestaram de alguma forma, mesmo em redes sociais. Foram exonerados embaixadores em Madrid e Riga. Diplomatas que serviam na Bélgica, Letônia, Polônia, Índia, Emirados Árabes e outros países foram chamados a Belarus e posteriormente demitidos. O único diplomata do Ministério a falar indonésio também foi demitido.    

 

Nobel de literatura pede socorro

 

A última integrante do Conselho de Coordenação em liberdade no território belarusso, a Nobel de literatura Sviatlana Aleksievich, chamou jornalistas e embaixadores europeus para socorrê-la depois de ameaças, ligações anônimas e tentativas de arrombar a porta do apartamento dela em Minsk. Certa da possibilidade de sua detenção, Sviatlana pediu ajuda do corpo diplomático. 16 embaixadores europeus passaram dois dias no apartamento dela para evitar que Sviatlana fosse presa. Depois do ocorrido, a Nobel partiu para Alemanha e não pretende voltar até a renúncia de Lukashenka.  

 

Atletas clamam por justiça

 

Os atletas belarussos não ficaram indiferentes aos acontecimentos no país. Depois do ocorrido em agosto, foi criada a União Livre dos Atletas de Belarus. A União promove um abaixo-assinado pelas novas eleições, libertação de presos políticos e abertura de inquéritos contra os responsáveis pela violência policial. No momento, o abaixo-assinado conta com 1.885 assinaturas de atletas, técnicos, jornalistas e funcionários do esporte. Atletas também leiloam seus troféus e itens pessoais em prol das vítimas do regime. Como resultado, vários atletas foram presos, ameaçados, impedidos de treinar ou perderam apoio financeiro do governo. Nesse contexto, o Comitê Olímpico Internacional adotou uma série de medidas contra o Comitê Olímpico Nacional de Belarus. 

 

A beleza que exige sacrifícios 

 

Volha Khizhynkova, ex-assessora de imprensa do clube de futebol Dynamo-Brest e detentora do título Miss Belarus 2008, foi detida ao andar na rua. O policial que testemunhou no julgamento disse que lembrou de Volha participando do protesto porque “ela é bonita”. Inicialmente condenada a 12 dias de prisão, passou 42 dias presa. Como muitos atletas e figuras públicas, Volha foi submetida a tortura física e psicológica, mantida junto com 23 mulheres numa cela com capacidade para seis pessoas. 

 

Lei sobre a cidadania

 

Em 17 de dezembro de 2020, foi aprovada uma nova Lei sobre a cidadania que permite privar as pessoas de cidadania belarussa em casos de acusação de ações criminais como terrorismo, traição do Estado ou conspiração para tomar o poder, entre outras. O direito de retirar a cidadania é concedido ao "presidente" e só se aplica em caso de belarussos naturalizados. 

 

Entrar não pode, sair

Desde o início de agosto, o governo belarusso impede a entrada no país dos próprios cidadãos, a exemplo do arcebispo da Igreja Católica em Belarus Tadevuch Kandrusevitch. O arcebispo foi proibido de entrar em Belarus ao retornar de uma viagem à Polônia, em agosto de 2020, sem explicações, enquanto a lei ainda garantia a entrada dos cidadãos belarussos no país sem limitações. Logo depois das eleições, o arcebispo tinha condenado a violência policial contra manifestantes pacíficos.

 

Por outro lado, a líder da Belarus democrática Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya foi levada à força para fora de Belarus, a mando do ditador, e não pode voltar para o seu país. Maryia Kalesnikava que trabalhou na campanha eleitoral de Tsikhanouskaia, foi sequestrada pela KGB e levada até a fronteira com a Ucrânia com o intuito de expulsá-la do país, mas ela rasgou o próprio passaporte no posto de controle da fronteira e desde então encontra-se na prisão da KGB (sim, Belarus é único país no mundo onde a KGB ainda existe com esse mesmo nome).

 

Fechamento das fronteiras terrestres

 

A partir de 21 de dezembro de 2020, as fronteiras terrestres de Belarus estão fechadas para saída de cidadãos e estrangeiros residentes por tempo indeterminado. O motivo oficial é a pandemia da COVID-19. O fechamento das fronteiras terrestres preocupa a população que desconfia dos seus verdadeiros motivos. Desde agosto de 2020, a via terrestre é a principal forma de saída do país para aqueles que fogem da perseguição do governo ou buscam uma vida melhor. Os analistas apontam que o fechamento das fronteiras terrestres dificultaria uma possível fuga dos policiais e ex-aliados de Lukashenka. 

 

O impedimento de saída dos cidadãos por via terrestre é uma medida pouco eficaz de controle da COVID-19 no país, pois protegeria, em primeiro lugar, os países terceiros que já possuem medidas próprias. É importante ressaltar que Belarus é um dos poucos países no mundo onde não foram implementadas medidas de proteção contra a COVID-19 por mais de seis meses. Desde o início da pandemia, Lukashenka chamou as medidas de prevenção de psicose mundial, promoveu eventos em massa e aconselhou a tomar vodka, visitar sauna e andar de trator para fortalecer a saúde. 

 

Manifestação no apartamento 

 

Afixar a bandeira histórica belarussa, de cores branca e vermelha, símbolo da resistência ao regime, passou a ser considerado um ato ilícito. As consequências vão de multa à prisão. Um dos casos mais emblemáticos é o de uma senhora de 87 anos, sobrevivente da Segunda Guerra Mundial, julgada por ter colocado a bandeira na sacada do apartamento. O juiz qualificou o ato como manifestação não autorizada. Um morador de Minsk pensou em se prevenir e enviou uma carta à prefeitura solicitando autorização para a manifestação no próprio apartamento por meio de afixação de bandeira na janela. A resposta da prefeitura foi negativa. 

 

Prêmio Sakharov para a Liberdade do Pensamento

 

Em 10 de dezembro de 2020, o Parlamento Europeu homenageou algumas figuras públicas belarussas com o Prêmio Sakharov para a Liberdade do Pensamento. O prêmio é destinado àqueles que dedicam suas vidas à defesa dos direitos humanos e da liberdade. Esse ano, o prêmio foi concedido a Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaia, líder de Belarus democrática, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, seu marido e preso político, Ales Bialiatski, diretor do Centro para a Defesa dos Direitos Humanos Viasna, Siarhei Dyleuski, membro do comitê de greve da Fábrica de Tratores de Minsk, Sviatlana Aleksievitch, prêmio Nobel de literatura, entre outras personalidades de destaque na luta pela democracia e liberdade em Belarus. 

 

Marchas da Sabedoria

 

Os aposentados, tradicionalmente considerados um dos núcleos mais conservadores da sociedade, se juntaram ao protesto pacífico contra a ditadura em Belarus. Semanalmente às segundas-feiras, as vovós e os vovôs se reúnem nos centros urbanos para fazer passeatas, popularmente chamadas de marchas da sabedoria. Uma das figuras de destaque da marcha é uma senhora de 73 anos, ativista Nina Bahinskaia, que tem participado de manifestações a favor da democracia desde 1988 e costura com as próprias mãos as bandeiras que carrega. A saída dos aposentados às ruas foi, também, uma forma de reforçar o protesto pacífico, evitando detenções em massa e violência policial. Supunha-se que os idosos não seriam espancados, nem presos. No entanto, têm surgido casos de utilização de gás lacrimogêneo contra idosos, detenções e julgamentos. Várias pessoas com mais de 60 anos estão presas. 

 

Protesto descentralizado 

 

Diante da violência policial em relação aos manifestantes pacíficos, aumento de detenções e, posteriormente, de torturas na prisão, os protestos mudaram de cara. Em vez de grandes marchas no centro e nos principais bairros das cidades, os manifestantes estão fazendo passeatas pelas quadras onde moram. As marchas descentralizadas, presentes em todos os bairros da capital e em vários bairros de outras cidades, ajudaram a diminuir a concentração dos policiais e as detenções. Porém, são frequentes os relatos de detenções de pedestres, inclusive dos apoiadores do regime, que estavam na rua sem motivação política, acompanhados de crianças pequenas ou animais de estimação.  

 

Posicionamento dos Estados Unidos

 

Em 27 de dezembro, Donald Trump aprovou o orçamento de 2021. Parte desse documento foi a Lei de Democracia, Direitos Humanos e Soberania de Belarus. Com a assinatura do presidente americano, os Estados Unidos deixam de reconhecer Lukashenka como presidente eleito, reconhecem o Conselho de Coordenação como uma instituição legítima de transferência de poder, apelam à realização de novas eleições presidenciais e libertação dos presos políticos, não reconhecem o Estado da União de Belarus e Rússia, poderão apoiar a promoção de democracia, do jornalismo livre e da tecnologia de informação, entre outras medidas. 

 

What Putin fears: Russians and Belarusians are tired of backwards-looking autocrats - Editorial Economist

What Putin fears
Russians and Belarusians are tired of backwards-looking autocrats

The old tools of truncheon and syringe may keep them in power. But for how long?

The Economist, Leaders, August 29, 2020

Nothing is as inspiring as seeing people take to the streets to demand their freedoms—and nothing is as terrifying for the dictators they are defying. In Belarus, among scenes that recall the revolts of 1989, people are turning out in their hundreds of thousands after a blatantly rigged election, heedless of the threat of state violence. In the Russian city of Khabarovsk tens of thousands march week after week to protest against the arrest of the local governor and the imposition of Moscow’s rules. Vladimir Putin is rattled. Why else is Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption crusader and Mr Putin’s greatest popular rival for the Russian presidency, lying poisoned in a Berlin hospital bed?

Regimes that rule by fear, live in fear. They fear that one day the people will no longer tolerate their lies, thieving and brutality. They try to hang on with propaganda, persecution and patronage. But it looks increasingly as if Mr Putin is running out of tricks, and as if Alexander Lukashenko, his troublesome ally in Minsk, is running out of road (see article). That is why, despite the Kremlin’s denials, they are falling back on the truncheon and the syringe. And it is why, as the protests roll on, they must be wondering whether state violence can secure their regimes.

Start with the economy. Belarus retains a theme-park version of the old Soviet system. When Mr Lukashenko went to gather support among the workers, he flew off to a state-owned tractor factory like some latter-day Lenin. The country’s exports largely consist of potash and petroleum products refined from Russian oil that used to be discounted. Russia is different from Belarus. Its economy is more open and less monolithic. Yet the commanding heights of industry and finance are in the hands of the oligarchs in the Kremlin’s trusted circle. Mr Putin has thus been unable to unleash competition and dynamism without upsetting the relationships that keep him in power. He has failed to diversify away from hydrocarbons, so the recent double shock of low oil prices and covid-19 has sent the economy reeling. As belts tighten, he has nothing to offer but nationalism and nostalgia.

That cocktail is losing its potency. For two decades Mr Putin has invoked an imaginary past of glory, plenty and certainty in the days of the Soviet and tsarist empires. His regime is a pioneer of disinformation. It invented the troll factory, and has created a media environment where, as one commentator put it, “nothing is true and everything is possible”. Yet Mr Putin’s offering looks tired next to that of Mr Navalny, whose popular YouTube videos are as skilful as the regime’s, but resonate with a growing sense of frustration. They are also grounded in exhaustive research into the regime’s corruption—and thus, in reality.

As well as failing to bring about economic and cultural renewal, both Mr Putin and Mr Lukashenko have failed to renew their regimes. Neither has a plausible successor. Mr Lukashenko has taken to trotting out his 15-year-old son, most recently in combat gear. Mr Putin cannot easily groom a successor lest it upset the factions he must keep sweet. This year he attempted to solve the problem by changing the constitution to allow himself to stay in power until 2036, when he will be 84. But that, too, was a sign of exhaustion. Mr Navalny, by contrast, has been busy organising opposition votes for regional elections to be held on September 13th. He may have been removed from the stage because if Russia had seen a popular movement like that in Belarus, he would have been its most plausible leader.

What can other countries do about all this? The answer begins with defending the principle of human rights. Germany has correctly offered asylum to Mr Navalny. Its doctors can explain what was done to him—and be believed by ordinary Russians. The European Union and America have properly declined to recognise the results of Mr Lukashenko’s stolen election. Their refusal may be spun by propagandists in Minsk and Moscow as evidence that the protests are a covert operation by the West, but the people in the street do not believe it. Outside powers should warn Russia that any use of force in Belarus would be followed by severe sanctions. Mr Putin and Mr Lukashenko will not be restrained by moral, legal or diplomatic norms, but if they spill blood to stay in office there must be consequences.

How long these two dismal regimes will survive is anyone’s guess. Backward-looking autocracies can cling on for years. Mr Putin and Mr Lukashenko are not alone in taking power and promising a return to an imagined era of lost glory. But the pattern is clear. Although this may feel good at first, the people eventually become, in the words of one Belarusian protester, “sick of them”. And that is when dictators should be afraid.■

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "What Putin fears"