The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated - Lawrence Freedman

Os 28 pontos do Plano Trump-Putin para a capitulação da Ucrânia comentados por um especialista no assunto:

The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated
Lawrence Freedman
Nov 21, 2025
https://samf.substack.com/p/the-witkoff-dmitriev-peace-plan-annotated

We now know a bit more about the process which led to the new peace plan and we now have a copy of its contents, to which I will turn soon.

Yesterday I noted that the plan, which was largely drafted by Steve Witkoff and Kirll Dmitriev, neither of whom are professional diplomats, was slanted in Russia’s favour, had been leaked by Dmitriev apparently to give it a push, had not been negotiated with either Kyiv or Moscow, and that many provisions were unclear even though the stories insisted that it was to be presented to Kyiv as a fait accompli.

With more reporting since I posted it seems that the proposal is more developed and has involved more people around the Trump administration. My guess is that as people looked at the plan it was starting to get pushback (possibly from Ukrainians) and that Dmitriev leaked it to give it a higher status and invest it with momentum, but that is only a guess.

At any rate if that is what was intended it succeeded as it is now being discussed as something real and in play. But it is clearly insufficiently developed to be presented as a fait accompli, and contrary to the original leaks, that will not now happen. This is not least because the Russians have been blindsided and are unhappy with the process and some of the content. So it is up for consultation and discussion with both sides.

We can now go further because a copy of the ‘28 point plan’ is in circulation, which I assess below. In key provisions, most importantly the territorial, but also in limiting the Ukrainian army and keeping Ukraine out of NATO, it reflects a Russian ‘wish list’, but it is only to fair to acknowledge that in some respects, notably on security guarantees and reconstruction, it tries to offer something to Ukraine. The effort appears to be one of trying to come up with a package that could work for both sides, though requiring both to make concessions.

By the nature of the conflict, the most important concessions come from Ukraine as it was the victim of aggression and it is its territory and not Russia’s that is occupied. But there is a lot in this that Russia still won’t like or at least will want to reframe. As important, it’s a dog’s breakfast, with some strange provisions, leaving open many questions for contentious interpretation and potential reframing.

I’ve provided annotations, noting the issues it raises. Others I’m sure will pick up points I’ve missed.

Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.

A full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All ambiguities of the past 30 years will be considered resolved.

[What ambiguities? Promises of non-aggression have been made before, for example in the 1997 Founding Act, so while these are good things to say it remains unclear how much they can be trusted]

Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further.

[No membership of NATO for Ukraine, and also in this formulation, any other potential candidates, has been a feature of Trump plans from the start. What is ‘an expectation not to invade.’ It imposes no obligations. A simple ‘will not’ would suffice.]

A dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, will be held to address all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation, in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.

[How can the US ‘mediate’ a dialogue between Russia and an alliance of which it is a part? Otherwise similar aspirations have been found in previous treaties].

Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

[More on this below].

The size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

[This is more than envisaged under previous Russian proposals - in 2022 it was 85,000 - but why is it needed for a sovereign country? There is no mention of limitations on particular classes of weapons - aircraft, tanks etc. There are no restrictions envisaged on Russian forces.]

Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include a provision in its charters that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

[Ukraine aspires to join NATO. Its constitution can be changed to preclude that, though this will be contentious. It can then be changed back again at a later date. If this is referring to the 1949 Washington Treaty that was signed and sealed in 1949. It has only been amended to take account of new members. The NATO Council could certainly promise not to admit Ukraine, although it could also change its mind].

NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

[There goes the Coalition of the Willing (CoW), or at least the part of the plan that envisaged small European military contingents backing up Ukrainian front line forces (which would now also be limited).]

European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

[It’s an odd statement, as it is up to Poland, but I presume this is intended to rescue the part of the CoW plan that envisaged air support that could impose a no-fly zone. I can’t imagine Russia will be delighted by this but in practice it could happen anyway. No mention of potential role for CoW naval forces.]

U.S. guarantee:

The United States will receive compensation for providing the guarantee.

[What does this mean? From whom, in what form and how much? A security guarantee is a promise to act in certain contingencies. It doesn’t cost much to make the promise. This plays to Trump’s transactional view of alliance security but it is a weird insertion in a peace treaty]

▪️ If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.

[Of course unlikely but remember that the Russian pretext for the full-scale invasion was that Ukrainian forces were ‘invading’ the Luhansk enclave]

▪️ If Russia invades Ukraine, then in addition to a decisive and coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.

[Well unless the US intends to do it all by itself ‘decisive and coordinated’ means a NATO response and not just a US one (so does NATO get compensated?). In fact this has more automaticity than NATO’s Article V. So Ukraine should be happy with this but for the same reason Russia will not. Once sanctions have been removed it will not be easy to reinstate them. If Ukrainian territories have been integrated into Russia does that mean that the US would lead a fight to get them back or just withdraw recognition?]

▪️ If Ukraine, without cause, launches a missile at Moscow or Saint Petersburg, the security guarantee will be considered void.

[But Rostov would be OK? And what would be sufficient cause to justify a missile launch? Another weird clause.]

Ukraine has the right to EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is under consideration.

That is up to EU but nice if Russia conceded as this whole wretched business began when Putin tried to stop Ukraine signing an association agreement with the EU in 2013]

A powerful global package for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including but not limited to:

a. Creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing sectors, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence.
b. The United States will cooperate with Ukraine to jointly restore, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage.
c. Joint efforts to rebuild war-affected territories to restore, reconstruct, and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.
f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.

[In principle all good but this will require a lot of money. (e) presumably refers to the US-agreement on minerals but it is not explicit]

Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:

a. Sanctions relief will be discussed and agreed upon gradually and individually.
b. The United States will conclude a long-term economic cooperation agreement aimed at mutual development in the spheres of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, Arctic rare-earth mining projects, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia will be invited to return to the G8.

[Not surprising but Russia will worry that (a) will be a slow process, and it is very dependent upon EU and UK so they will need to agree package. This is their major leverage over the fate of this plan

Equally it is not for the US to decide alone if Russia can rejoin the G7. It has to be agreed by the other members]

Frozen assets will be used as follows:

US$100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led efforts for Ukraine’s reconstruction and investment. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this initiative.
Europe will add US$100 billion to increase the investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. European frozen assets will be unfrozen.
The remaining frozen Russian assets will be invested in a separate U.S.–Russia investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in designated areas. This fund will aim to strengthen relations and increase shared interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.

[I can’t believe that Russia will agree to any of this. They want their assets back. Equally Ukraine wants them as reparations for all the losses they have suffered - and even then it will not be enough. What is with the US making a profit from this?]

A joint U.S.–Russia security working group will be established to facilitate and ensure implementation of all provisions of this agreement.

[At the very least Ukraine should also be part of this process, otherwise it is wholly reliant on the US to look after its interests when it has been doing the mediating. Russia will continue to accuse Ukraine of breaking provisions and Ukraine needs to be able to defend its position and point to areas of Russian non-compliance. As drafted denies Ukraine any agency over the implementation ]

Russia will codify a non-aggression policy toward Europe and Ukraine.

[Following the UN Charter would be a start. I’ve no idea what this could mean. Non-aggression should not be conditional.]

The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation and arms control treaties, including the START I Treaty.

[The non-proliferation is not time limited so it does not need extension. I presume they mean New START rather than START 1, and its extension would be welcome.]

Ukraine agrees to remain a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be put into operation under IAEA supervision, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.

[This assume Zaporizhzhia remains de facto part of Russia see below]

Both countries commit to implementing educational programs in schools and society aimed at fostering understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:

a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and protection of linguistic minorities.
b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and prohibited.

[Well good luck with all of that if it is supposed to apply to Russia. As the Kremlin has adopted its own self-serving definition of what constitutes Nazi ideology and activity (more or less anything hostile to Russia) we can only guess how this would be used. Equally interesting to see how Ukrainian rights are to be protected in Russia.]

Territories:

a. Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, effectively granting de facto recognition along that line.
c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

[This meets Russia’s core territorial demand, although with some strange twists. De facto is less than de jure. It normally refers to a situation that exists in reality and cannot easily be changed, but is not necessarily recognized in law. In the event of a ceasefire being agreed it was always safest to assume that the occupied territories would become de facto Russian, without being recognised as such by Ukraine or the wider international community (as with Crimea). De jure refers to situations that are legally recognised and have official status. Russia has incorporated the four claimed oblasts into its constitution and wants them officially recognised. At any rate you don’t formally recognise something as de facto - it just is. So this would be meaningless. Russia will want de jure.

Turning the remaining part of Donetsk into a neutral demilitarised zone is an odd sort of compromise. First this is full of Ukrainian defences, including minefields (there are no reference to demining anywhere in the document). Demilitarising it would be no small matter. And if it is part of Russia - even if de facto - how can it be neutral. Ukrainians also live there. Are they supposed to abandon their homes or become Russian or have some limbo status because they are in neutral territory?]

After future territorial arrangements are agreed, both Russia and Ukraine commit not to alter them by force. Any security guarantees will not apply if this obligation is violated.

Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnipro River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain through the Black Sea.

[There were agreements on this in the past which Russia abandoned]

A humanitarian committee will be created to resolve outstanding issues:

a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an “all for all” basis.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages, including children, will be returned.
c. A family reunification program will be implemented.
d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of victims of the conflict.

[Hard to object but not exactly strong on detail]

Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

[There is a need for Ukrainian elections but it also requires the conditions for them to be conducted safely. Can the residents of Donetsk vote? At rate elections are up to the Ukrainians as a sovereign country. Why not include a demand for free and fair Russian elections?]

All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for actions during the war and agree not to bring claims or pursue grievances in the future.

[War crimes go unpunished].

This agreement will be legally binding.
Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

[This is modelled on Gaza. How does it relate to point 15 or indeed the other provisions on guarantees? What happens when Trump goes? Who will be on this Peace Council? What will be the terms of reference? Most peace treaties will have provisions to deal with disputes and if necessary provide for arbitration. With Gaza the Trump plan was backed by the great majority of regional states and the aim was to write Hamas out of the script. The military and political relationships were quite different.]

Once all parties accept this memorandum, a ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides withdraw to the agreed points for the start of the agreement’s implementation.

Wisely Zelenskyy has said he’ll work with the Americans on the plan. He might as well wait until the Russians formulate a response. For now their reaction has been muted. If the Russians just accepted it they could claim a sort of victory but it would not quite be on their terms. As I surmised yesterday and have shown above this is not a fully developed plan which could be presented, as was the Gaza plan, on a take it or leave it basis. Even then Netanyahu fiddled with the details at the end.

This is a plan that even if there was no change to the underlying principles and concessions would require a lot more work, and so will delay a ceasefire. As soon as both sides can object and amend that will lead to a protracted negotiation and so even more delay. The advantage is that having a plan set down allows one to see the pitfalls. It does not necessarily enable one to see a way though them.

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Ukraine: Alternatives to Trump’s Russia Appeasement - HAROLD JAMES Project Syndicate

Alternatives to Trump’s Russia Appeasement

HAROLD JAMES
Project Syndicate, Feb 14, 2025

By adopting a strategy toward Russia that is ominously reminiscent of British and French appeasement of Nazi Germany in 1938, US President Donald Trump has all but assured that Europe will not achieve peace for our time. This time, however, France and Britain have the means to avert a catastrophe in the making.

PRINCETON – US President Donald Trump says he wants to bring peace to Ukraine. But his approach cannot work, because it fails to address the problem of security guarantees. There will be no peace as long as Ukraine must face Russia on its own.
But perhaps this flaw can be overcome. In theory, technical innovation in the miniaturization of warfare might offer new ways of ensuring peace, and France and the United Kingdom – both nuclear powers – could step in as America steps back.
Now is the time to consider such possibilities. Speaking at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels this week, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth appears to have just surrendered many of the key elements that would have been subject to negotiations. Before talks have even begun, the US says it will impose territorial losses on Ukraine and bar it from joining NATO. Worse, these comments were immediately followed by a euphoric social-media post from Trump about a conversation he had with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
With both parties in the war near exhaustion, it is not foolish to explore the options for achieving a lasting peace in the absence of complete capitulation by one side. But the path Trump has chosen leads directly into an impossible thicket. A lasting and credible solution requires removing the cause of war. But what is that cause?
For Ukrainians, it is Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Removing the cause thus would require a change in the Russian government – an unlikely outcome.
For Putin, the cause is what he sees as an illegitimate government in Ukraine. Indeed, as he made clear in a wide-ranging essay published in July 2021, he denies the legitimacy of Ukrainian independence itself. Removing the cause thus would require eliminating Ukraine as a sovereign nation-state.
History is full of ironies, and the latest flurry of peace initiatives comes just before the Munich Security Conference, a meeting held a few hundred yards away from the site of the most notorious failed peacemaking attempt in modern history. It was there, in 1938, that Adolf Hitler managed to convince Britain and France that Czechoslovakia, not Nazi Germany, was the cause of conflict on the continent.
After a month of crisis diplomacy, the British, French, and Italian leaders met Hitler at the Führerbau (“the Führer's building”) in Munich and imposed a political settlement on Czechoslovakia, stripping it of the so-called Sudetenland, a western region with a substantial German-speaking minority that had been radicalized by Nazi propaganda.
Although peace agreements are often driven by a revulsion to the horrors of war, they also often set the stage for new conflicts. In a September 27, 1938 radio address to the British people, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain reflected on, “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.” Within a year, Britons were putting on gas masks and building defenses.
Meanwhile, in France, the argument for peace (appeasement) in 1938 and 1939 was distilled in the question: “Mourir pour Dantzig?” (“To die for Gdansk?”). But those who believed they had kept themselves safe through clever diplomacy were soon dying for France.
The language of failed peacemaking follows a familiar pattern. First, we are told that the big boys will handle it by sidelining bothersome smaller countries with their complicated histories. As Trump said of his conversation with Putin, “We both reflected on the Great History of our Nations.” The big European powers exhibited the same arrogance in 1938.
Second, we are told that simple logic will suffice. Or as Trump put it, “President Putin even used my very strong Campaign motto of, ‘COMMON SENSE.’” It was also common sense that the Sudeten question, not Hitler’s desire to unite Europe under Nazi rule, was at the heart of the 1938 crisis.
Third, the peacemongers invoke the threat of civilizational collapse. Russia has consistently threatened nuclear war, and similar fears of escalation shaped British decision-making in the late 1930s. “The real triumph,” Chamberlain told the House of Commons on October 3, 1938, “is that … representatives of four great Powers can find it possible to agree on a way of carrying out a difficult and delicate operation by discussion instead of by force of arms, and thereby they have averted a catastrophe which would have ended civilisation as we have known it.”
With the benefit of hindsight, the real triumph would have been to freeze the conflict until a real solution could be worked out. That might take decades, as in postwar Germany, or even longer, as on the Korean Peninsula since the 1953 armistice. There may be a gradual thaw, as occurred in relations between East and West Germany, or there may not be. Either way, West Germany and South Korea both remained secure after the fighting stopped because they were protected by the West’s Cold War deterrence framework.
Likewise, effective deterrence is the key to ensuring that the conflict in Ukraine remains truly frozen, and that Russia does not just use the freeze to build up its military capacity until it can apply irresistible force. During the Cold War, such deterrence was achieved with the threat of mutual assured destruction. The same mechanism could offer a way out now.
It could be applied by France and the UK, which, along with the US and Russia, are parties to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby Ukraine agreed to give up more than 1,700 Soviet-era nuclear weapons in exchange for the other parties’ promise to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Either France or the UK – or preferably both – could supply nuclear weapons to Ukraine and any other vulnerable targets of Russian aggression.
Had Britain and France been capable of arming Czechoslovakia effectively in 1938, there would have been no German invasion, and maybe no World War II. But this simply wasn’t possible at the time. Today is different. France and Britain do possess the means of deterrence, and technological transfers are much easier.
There has long been talk of finding a new form of multilateralism in a world that is becoming more fragmented and multipolar. France and Britain have a chance to show how this might work, and how it could restore some peace and security to a world that is tottering on the edge of the abyss.


Harold James is Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University. A specialist on German economic history and on globalization, he is a co-author of The Euro and The Battle of Ideas, and the author of The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle, Krupp: A History of the Legendary German Firm, Making the European Monetary Union, The War of Words, and, most recently, Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization (Yale University Press, 2023).

It's worse than we thought (about Ukraine) - Viktor Kravchuk (Substack)

 It's worse than we thought

Better if history just repeats itself instead of becoming a worse version of it.

VIKTOR KRAVCHUK FEB 13

ALONG THESE THREE YEARS, I LOST MOST OF my ability to cry, and instead, my body finds other ways to balance my feelings. But I'm sure many people are crying as they realize what is happening.

Trump is making a deal with Putin.

Why? Why would anyone want to align with someone like that?

Illustration: Marian Kamensky

How can someone announce negotiations with the person who is commanding an invasion of a foreign country, where his armies stand accused of the worst war crimes?

The worst part of it all is not the war crimes themselves, as terrible as they are. The worst is that Trump is doing exactly what he said he would do. He is behaving exactly as predicted, following his agenda of insensitivity, hate, and recklessness.

He is exactly as we have always known, yet many times we failed to believe it. We thought our institutions were powerful enough to prevent the worst from happening. The worst inside the worst-intentioned human beings. And our institutions are strong.

But just like eight decades ago, we are living in a perfect storm.

This storm is what makes things worse.

This storm happens when someone emerges from obscurity and achieves domination of the discourse, exploiting contradictions within our societies and spreading distorted narratives with alarming speed. As the storm unfolds, large segments of society rally behind their ideas, forming a cult-like following where violence and hate become the norm.

Those who seize power in such conditions are far more dangerous than they appear. They develop influence to a level that even history’s most notorious totalitarian regimes struggled to achieve.

The moment of Trump's announcement was when I realized that history is clearly repeating itself. It was impossible to recall 1938, when Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich waving a document and claiming it “peace for our time.”

We know today that he had been deceived by Hitler. The historical judgment of Chamberlain is controversial, but he is often associated with innocence or ineptitude. Eighty-three years later, Trump is going one step further.

He isn’t being fooled by Putin. He’s collaborating with him.

This isn’t just politics. This is about power, control, and the erosion of everything we hold dear. The world can’t afford another Munich moment. Putin’s ambitions won’t stop at Ukraine, just as Hitler’s didn’t stop at Czechoslovakia.

I know what I'm saying. I'm in Ukraine. I feel the war. I witness its horrors every single day. My life has became living every aspect of this war. I see the widespread destruction Putin has inflicted on my family and every family in my country.

And I will keep fighting. For my nation, for my people. For my survival. I will be right here writing and telling my story to the world. Not just until Ukraine prevails, but until this empire of hate, terror, greed, dystopia, and vulgarity is completely defeated everywhere.

Because as long as these people have power, our planet will never be certain if it will survive another night.

🌻

---

🔖I hope I’m reaching you with an inspiring content and make at least a little difference in your perceptions about Ukraine.

The Domino Theory Is Coming for Putin - Casey Michel (Foreign Policy)

Argument

An expert's point of view on a current event.

The Domino Theory Is Coming for Putin

A series of setbacks for Russia is only gaining momentum.

By Casey Michel, head of the Human Rights Foundation's Combating Kleptocracy Program and author of American Kleptocracy: How the U.S. Created the World’s Greatest Money Laundering Scheme in History. 

Foreign Policy, January 29, 2025, 8:51 AM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/29/domino-theory-putin-russia-georgia-transnistria-belarus/?tpcc=world_brief&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=World%20Brief%2001302025&utm_term=world_brief

For many, the daily news out of Ukraine paints a dour picture of Kyiv’s future. Russian troops continue to grind forward, sacrificing themselves by the tens of thousands for the sake of seizing more and more Ukrainian land. Dreams of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive are long gone, with calls in the West for everything from Ukrainian neutrality to recognizing Russian sovereignty on stolen Ukrainian lands picking up steam.

These views aren’t without some merit. But they risk missing the forest of the daily news cycle for the trees of where we are—and just how battered and bloodied Russia truly is. On the economic front, Russia has seen both soaring interest rates and galloping inflation, providing a toxic brew of stagflation, from which there’s little likelihood of escape. On the manpower front, Russian President Vladimir Putin is so skittish of a potential new round of mobilization that he’s forced to rely on North Korean conscripts. And on the tactical front, Putin is no closer to Ukrainian collapse than he was in early 2022. He has created for himself, as scholar Michael Kimmage described, a “nightmare,” with only disastrous choices remaining, both for Putin’s rule and for Russian strategic interests writ large.

Indeed, it is the latter point that presents the greatest evidence of Putin’s disastrous turn and perhaps the greatest, or at least the most overlooked, suite of opportunities for Western policymakers. Few have made the connection, but a clear trend line has emerged over the past few years. Thanks to Putin’s monomaniacal fixation on Ukraine, he has been willing to sacrifice other geostrategic projects elsewhere, unwilling to step into the breach to help what had previously been key Russian interests. We’ve started to see a Russian variant of a domino theory emerge—one that has begun gutting Russian interests elsewhere, and illustrating, as few other things can, just how atrophied Russian power projection has become.

The first domino to fall came in 2023, when troops from Azerbaijan stormed into the separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing ethnic Armenians to flee en masse. Rather than being the supposed guarantor of stability—and a key security partner of Armenia, which backed Nagorno-Karabakh for decades—Russia wilted in the face of Azerbaijan’s push. Tucking tail, Russian troops left the region entirely, scuttling a military base where nearly 2,000 Russian troops had once been deployed.

A year later, the next domino toppled. With the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Russia not only lost its key regional ally, but watched as its primary claim as a security guarantor for autocratic regimes disintegrated. Rather than act as a swaggering great power that could shore up illiberal leaders, Moscow was suddenly outed as a government that could do neither.

Both developments—the disappearance of Nagorno-Karabakh and the dissolution of Assad’s regime—are downstream from Putin’s overwhelming focus on subjugating Ukraine, regardless of the cost. All of which begs a pair of questions: Given that he’s been completely consumed by this messianic obsession with Ukraine, which pro-Russian domino will be the next to fall? And how can Western policymakers be ready to take full advantage?

Start with the oldest Russian-backed enclave there is: Transnistria. A sliver of eastern Moldova, Transnistria has been occupied by Russian troops since the earliest days of the post-Soviet era. If anything, the recalcitrance to find a solution to Transnistria was something of an “original sin” for Western policymakers, unwilling as they were to face the realities and reverberations of Russian imperialism, long before Putin set his sights on Ukraine. By the late 1990s, it was clear that Russian promises to remove Moscow’s troop presence from Moldova—and to finally end the Kremlin’s willingness to carve up a separate, sovereign country in the middle of Europe—were hardly credible. By and large, the West looked the other way, letting this blindingly, breathtakingly obvious example of Russian revanchism fester.

Now, though, it is Moscow’s relations with Transnistria that are suddenly in question. Earlier this year, Moscow cutting off its gas line to Europe left the entire region in, quite literally, the dark. While there has been some progress in restoring energy capacity, sudden chatter has emerged about the potential “collapse” of Transnistria wholesale and what that means for Moldova and the rest of the region more broadly. The West has been almost entirely absent from the conversations about potential solutions, let alone what this may mean strategically—a bizarre absence, given Transnistria’s border with Ukraine and the clear designs that Moscow has on eventually linking its Ukrainian gains with its Moldovan holdings.

Elsewhere, Georgia remains mired in a domestic political contretemps worse than anything the country has seen in years. After recent parliamentary elections—broadly viewed as fraudulent—the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party claimed victory, and with it, the right to thwart Tbilisi’s pro-Western direction. The stolen vote was the culmination of a longer trajectory, with the party’s leadership dismantling the underpinnings of Georgian democracy. Similar to the descent of Ukrainian democracy seen under former leader Viktor Yanukovych, whose pro-Kremlin sympathies resulted in Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan Revolution, Georgian Dream’s lurch toward authoritarianism has resulted in the kinds of protests that increasingly resemble those that toppled Yanukovych.

Meanwhile, it is in Belarus that we can find the West’s greatest blind spot—and, arguably, the greatest pressure point for testing just how weak Moscow’s reach and influence is now. In 2020, pro-democratic protests erupted across the country, presenting the greatest threat to the decades-long rule of Belarusian despot Aleksandr Lukashenko. However, in one of the greatest (and most overlooked) foreign-policy failures of U.S. President Donald Trump’s first administration, Washington did little to back the democratic protesters and instead ceded all influence to Moscow. As such, when it appeared that Lukashenko was on his last legs, Putin interceded, reinforcing the regime and restoring the rule of one of Moscow’s longtime clients. Years later, Lukashenko remains in power, and Belarus remains a key staging ground for Moscow’s ongoing assaults on Ukraine.

Now, Belarus faces yet another inflection point. On Jan. 26, another election in Belarus assured Lukashenko’s regime of another term in office—or so the dictator hopes. After all, it was the immediate aftermath of Belarus’s previous election, without even the pretense of fairness or freedom, that unexpectedly jump-started the country’s 2020 protests. While the regime has arrested tens of thousands since, that’s hardly a guarantee of post-election stability this time around. If anything, with Belarus’s opposition far more organized and far more committed than even five years ago, Lukashenko can hardly be sure that this won’t be his last thieved election—especially with his primary patron completely distracted and increasingly drained.

All these developments—Transnistria going dark, Georgia turning turbulent, and Belarus once again facing the same ingredients that sparked its largest pro-democracy protests just a few years ago—would be newsworthy on their own. But it’s the fact that the primary backer of Transnistria separatists, Georgian illiberals, and Lukashenko’s regime are suddenly watching their external influence erode that presents new opportunities for the West, if only Brussels, London, and Washington take advantage.

Indeed, it is somewhat shocking that the West hasn’t sketched out a better strategy for the broader region in recent months. The European Union has continued encouraging Moldova’s pro-EU direction, but the West remains effectively a nonactor when it comes to things like Transnistria. In Georgia, the United States recently sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, the architect of the country’s democratic decline, but it’s clear that there’s little strategy beyond these kinds of individual responses. And Belarus, meanwhile, is effectively a black hole of policy analysis, even for the new administration in Washington. Reams of paper have been produced on new U.S. strategy regarding Ukraine, Russia, and Europe, but there’s been precisely nothing written on Belarus, which appears to be a complete vacuum of strategic thinking.

And that’s all a shame and an opportunity foregone. After all, it’s not just people like Assad suddenly learning that Putin’s support apparently comes with an expiration date. Transnistria separatists, Georgia’s budding autocrats, Belarus’s thug-in-chief—all of them have suddenly realized that Putin’s backing, even for them, isn’t bottomless. As they’ve seen, the Russian president will always, always prioritize Ukraine over Russian interests elsewhere, including client regimes and kleptocratic allies along Russia’s other borders.

This is, of course, a trend that has been years in the making. For over a decade, Putin has prioritized subjugating Ukraine over Moscow’s other key strategic goals, dating all the way back to the creation—and immediate implosion—of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. In the years since, Putin has prioritized the gelding of Ukraine over everything from a viable economy to stable relations with the West, even to the point of risking regime stability itself. Indeed, at this point, it’s fair to say that Putin may well choose domination of Ukraine over even places like Sakha or Chechnya, both of which remain part of the Russian Federation for the time being but have clear histories as separate, sovereign states—one of the primary reasons that Russia’s territorial stability is hardly guaranteed, or why, as the Economist said, Putin is “turning Russia into a failed state.”

Questions and crises of Russia’s internal stability are still a ways off. But that is, ultimately, where this accelerating collapse of dominoes is heading. That is all the more reason the West must begin formulating policy not just on the next dominoes to fall—places like Transnistria, Georgia, and even Belarus—but also on what a post-Putin Russia may well, and should, look like. After all, once they start tumbling, dominoes have a way of continuing to fall. The West should be ready.

Casey Michel is head of the Human Rights Foundation's Combating Kleptocracy Program and author of American Kleptocracy: How the U.S. Created the World’s Greatest Money Laundering Scheme in History. X: @cjcmichel

Eastern Europe Is In The Crosshairs: Ukraine and Poland - Michal Kranz (Persuasion)

 Eastern Europe Is In The Crosshairs

A deal in Ukraine seems all but inevitable. That puts Eastern Europe in real danger. 

MICHAŁ KRANZ NOV 25 ∙ GUEST POST PERSUASION

Polish troops at NATO Multinational Corps Northeast, February 2, 2024. (Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images.)

For much of the past year in Warsaw, the first question I’d be asked by Poles and Ukrainians alike when they learned I’d grown up in the United States was who I thought would win the 2024 election. The follow-up, inevitably, was whether a victorious Trump would really let Ukraine and Eastern Europe fall to the Russians.

In the day or two following Trump’s win, this fear was palpable among Polish friends and loved ones. But, after months of warnings of the apocalyptic consequences of Trump’s return to power for Ukraine and NATO’s East, a new narrative has emerged along Europe’s frontier with Russia—don’t panic, but prepare.

The likely conclusion of the war in Ukraine during Trump’s first year in office will only be the tip of the iceberg of the transformations on the horizon for Eastern Europe. States in the region, most notably Poland and the Baltics, are already looking beyond Ukraine to a scenario in which Russia might soon be ready to unleash its war machine on NATO’s East itself, which, without ironclad American security guarantees, would be more vulnerable than ever. And yet, for Eastern Europe, this tense moment offers surprising opportunities. In the absence of America’s guiding and often constraining hand, they will have the chance to redefine their own defense future, reap the rewards of the post-war economic order in Ukraine, and finally force Western Europe to confront the realities of the multipolar world head-on.

What we are looking at, in other words, is a complete shift of the balance of power in Eastern Europe. In the short term, Poland and the Baltics will have no choice but to pick up slack and assume a stronger position in Europe than they have in memory, as they stare down the barrel of a Russia that will only be further emboldened by a de facto triumph in Ukraine and the weakening of the American security blanket in Europe. Meanwhile, Ukraine is facing its worst-case scenario, with the spigot of U.S. support likely to turn itself off—forcing Europe to take the reins of Ukraine’s, and its own, defense for the first time in generations.

The chances of Trump doing an about-face on aid for Ukraine and continuing to fund its defense are, unfortunately, very slim—and Ukraine is expected to be forced to the negotiating table. European efforts, led by Poland, to continue supporting Ukraine’s military, will at best stave off the inevitable, and the Biden administration knows this. Recent changes in policy like the lifting of prohibitions on Ukraine’s use of long-range ATACMS against Russian territory and shipments of anti-personnel mines are, more than anything else, measures meant to help Ukraine secure as favorable a position as possible prior to negotiations and to give it at least a modicum of deterrence against future Russian aggression.

It goes almost without saying that any peace deal is likely to end in the permanent occupation of the territories Russia currently holds and in forcing Ukraine to abandon its NATO ambitions—in short, a win for Russia. But even then, many questions remain about how such a “peace” would be administered in practice, and how Ukraine could avoid being swallowed up by Russia down the line. The leading proposal of the Trump transition team, as reported by The Wall Street Journal, would compel Ukraine to promise not to join NATO for twenty years, while a continuing flow of U.S. armaments deters future Russian aggression and some kind of European peacekeeping force polices the demilitarized zone where the fighting has frozen. 

A proposal along those lines suits Poland well, with Polish president Andrzej Duda last year suggesting that Polish troops could be deployed to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping effort. Meanwhile, Poland is poised to benefit immensely from post-war reconstruction efforts, with 3,000 Polish companies registering with the Polish Investment and Trade Agency to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction. Helping to guarantee Ukraine’s security on the ground does of course carry considerable risk—bringing Poland all the closer to a clash with Russia. Nevertheless, this is exactly the sort of role Polish leaders have spent years preparing the country’s military for.

The belief among Eastern Europe’s leaders is that, no matter what they do, they are in Russia’s crosshairs—and the priority must be an active defense. Leaders further west on the continent have tepidly come around to the same conclusion, with recent pledges to invest not only in national defense spending, but also in developing Europe’s military-industrial complex. There is no reason to think that Putin will be placated through a negotiated settlement in Ukraine. Quite the contrary. With, effectively, a win in Ukraine behind him and a U.S. leadership unwilling to engage militarily in Europe beyond the bare minimum, Putin may well decide the time is ripe for further reconstitution of the Soviet sphere of influence. Western Europe has been inching up its readiness, with France for instance on track to bring its defense spending up the 2% GDP mark this year, but Eastern Europeans know that if Russia strikes, it will be up to them to hold the line. Poland at the moment has the third largest military in NATO, and, if Ukraine’s army was able to keep Russian forces at bay for nearly three years, the hope is that Poland’s more robust and technologically advanced military could do the same.

It is hard to overstate just how uncertain the security of Eastern Europe suddenly becomes with Trump’s election. A full-scale American retreat from NATO is less likely than widespread discussion might make it seem—the recent landmark opening of a U.S. base in Poland and efforts to Trump-proof American aid to Ukraine and NATO mean that it will be difficult for Trump to distance himself from the alliance entirely. But, with Russia updating its nuclear doctrine, firing a nuclear-capable ballistic missile at Ukraine, and last week placing the new U.S. base in Poland on its potential target list, Putin clearly believes that he has the upper hand—and that Europe lacks the will or the ability to properly defend its Eastern frontier. 

With Trump on track to alter the entire regional paradigm a few short months from now, NATO’s East is scrambling to mitigate the fallout. That puts Poland, in particular, in the hot seat and in need of not only proving its worth as a rising military powerhouse, but also of working with countries like Romania, Sweden, the Baltic states, and besieged Ukraine to collectively keep Moscow at bay. But this moment is, above all, a crucible for Europe. For decades, Western Europeans have been able to bask in the security blanket the United States offered and to indulge in pacifistic visions. That illusion ended first for the states bordering Putin’s Russia, but Europe is now facing the same fork in the road—either make security a priority and forge an independent path forward on defense, or let Putin continue to have his way.

Michal Kranz is a Warsaw-based journalist who covers Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He has reported from the ground during the war in Ukraine, covered politics and society in Lebanon, and regularly reports on regional developments from Poland.

Zelenskiy’s 'victory plan' to EU, NATO - Andrew Gray

Ukraine's Zelenskiy to pitch 'victory plan' to EU, NATO By Andrew Gray Reuters, October 16, 202411:42 PM Summary Ukrainian leader takes blueprint to Brussels Plan includes call for NATO invitation Kyiv's key allies have not endorsed plan so far Moscow says Ukraine needs to 'sober up' BRUSSELS, Oct 17 (Reuters) - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy takes his "victory plan" to the European Union and NATO on Thursday, pitching for a NATO membership invitation and a major increase in military support for Kyiv's campaign against Russia's invasion. Zelenskiy's plan contains requests that Ukraine's allies have so far declined to grant, such as a call for an invitation to join the U.S.-led NATO military alliance and permission to use Western weapons to strike deep inside Russia. Zelenskiy presented the plan to Ukraine's parliament on Wednesday at a critical time, as Moscow's forces advance in the east, a bleak winter of power cuts looms and a U.S. presidential election casts uncertainty over the future of Western support. On Thursday, he brings the plan, which he said could end the war "no later than next year", to a summit of European Union leaders and a meeting of NATO defence ministers, both in Brussels. He has already presented the five-point blueprint, which Zelenskiy said has three secret annexes, to key Western leaders such as U.S. President Joe Biden. While voicing strong support for Kyiv, none has given the plan a full-throated endorsement. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on Wednesday the plan represented "a strong signal" from Zelenskiy but added: "That doesn't mean that I here can say I support the whole plan. That would be a bit difficult, because there are many issues." Rutte said NATO's 32 members would have to discuss the plan in detail to understand it better. "You will have maybe some different views on particular aspects of the plan, but that doesn't say that we are not standing squarely behind Ukraine," he said. NATO MEMBERSHIP CALL NATO has declared that Ukraine will become a member, without saying when. But it cannot join while at war, as this would draw the alliance directly into a conflict with Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has cited Ukraine's potential membership of NATO as a reason for the invasion. Zelenskiy argued NATO could issue an invitation now, even if membership itself comes further down the line. "We understand that NATO membership is a matter for the future, not the present," he told the Ukrainian parliament. "But Putin must see that his geopolitical calculations are failing. The Russian people must feel this, that their 'tsar' has lost geopolitically to the world." The Kremlin said it was too early to comment in detail on the plan, but that Kyiv needed to "sober up" and realise the futility of the policies it was pursuing. Zelenskiy said his plan also proposes establishing a "comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package" inside Ukraine to protect against threats from Russia and to destroy its military power. He did not elaborate. The plan also offers the West a role in developing Ukraine's natural mineral resources and proposes Ukrainian troops could replace some U.S. forces in Europe. The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here. Reporting by Andrew Gray, Sabine Siebold and Lili Bayer; Writing by Andrew Gray; Editing by Bill Berkrot. Andrew Gray is Reuters' European Affairs Editor. Based in Brussels, he covers NATO and the European Union and leads a pan-European team of reporters focused on diplomacy, defence and security. A journalist for almost 30 years, he has previously been based in the UK, Germany, Geneva, the Balkans, West Africa and Washington, where he reported on the Pentagon. He covered the Iraq war in 2003 and contributed a chapter to a Reuters book on the conflict. He has also worked at Politico Europe as a senior editor and podcast host, served as the main editor for a fellowship programme for journalists from the Balkans, and contributed to the BBC's From Our Own Correspondent radio show.

The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course - The Economist leader

 Zelensky in Washington

The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course

Time for credible war aims—and NATO membership

The Economist, September 26, 2024

IF UKRAINE AND its Western backers are to win, they must first have the courage to admit that they are losing. In the past two years Russia and Ukraine have fought a costly war of attrition. That is unsustainable. When Volodymyr Zelensky travelled to America to see President Joe Biden this week, he brought a “plan for victory”, expected to contain a fresh call for arms and money. In fact, Ukraine needs something far more ambitious: an urgent change of course.

A measure of Ukraine’s declining fortunes is Russia’s advance in the east, particularly around the city of Pokrovsk. So far, it is slow and costly. Recent estimates of Russian losses run at about 1,200 killed and wounded a day, on top of the total of 500,000. But Ukraine, with a fifth as many people as Russia, is hurting too. Its lines could crumble before Russia’s war effort is exhausted.

Ukraine is also struggling off the battlefield. Russia has destroyed so much of the power grid that Ukrainians will face the freezing winter with daily blackouts of up to 16 hours. People are tired of war. The army is struggling to mobilise and train enough troops to hold the line, let alone retake territory. There is a growing gap between the total victory many Ukrainians say they want, and their willingness or ability to fight for it.

Abroad, fatigue is setting in. The hard right in Germany and France argue that supporting Ukraine is a waste of money. Donald Trump could well become president of the United States. He is capable of anything, but his words suggest that he wants to sell out Ukraine to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin.

If Mr Zelensky continues to defy reality by insisting that Ukraine’s army can take back all the land Russia has stolen since 2014, he will drive away Ukraine’s backers and further divide Ukrainian society. Whether or not Mr Trump wins in November, the only hope of keeping American and European support and uniting Ukrainians is for a new approach that starts with leaders stating honestly what victory means.

As The Economist has long argued, Mr Putin attacked Ukraine not for its territory, but to stop it becoming a prosperous, Western- leaning democracy. Ukraine’s partners need to get Mr Zelensky to persuade his people that this remains the most important prize in this war. However much Mr Zelensky wants to drive Russia from all Ukraine, including Crimea, he does not have the men or arms to do it. Neither he nor the West should recognise Russia’s bogus claim to the occupied territories; rather, they should retain reunification as an aspiration.

In return for Mr Zelensky embracing this grim truth, Western leaders need to make his overriding war aim credible by ensuring that Ukraine has the military capacity and security guarantees it needs. If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the futility of further big offensives. Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest.

This will require greater supplies of the weaponry Mr Zelensky is asking for. Ukraine needs long-range missiles that can hit military targets deep in Russia and air defences to protect its infrastructure. Crucially, it also needs to make its own weapons. Today, the country’s arms industry has orders worth $7bn, only about a third of its potential capacity. Weapons firms from America and some European countries have been stepping in; others should, too. The supply of home-made weapons is more dependable and cheaper than Western-made ones. It can also be more innovative. Ukraine has around 250 drone companies, some of them world leaders— including makers of the long-range machines that may have been behind a recent hit on a huge arms dump in Russia’s Tver province.

The second way to make Ukraine’s defence credible is for Mr Biden to say Ukraine must be invited to join NATO now, even if it is divided and, possibly, without a formal armistice. Mr Biden is known to be cautious about this. Such a declaration from him, endorsed by leaders in Britain, France and Germany, would go far beyond today’s open-ended words about an “irrevocable path” to membership.

This would be controversial, because NATO’s members are expected to support each other if one of them is attacked. In opening a debate about this Article 5 guarantee, Mr Biden could make clear that it would not cover Ukrainian territory Russia occupies today, as with East Germany when West Germany joined NATO in 1955; and that Ukraine would not necessarily garrison foreign NATO troops in peacetime, as with Norway in 1949.

NATO membership entails risks. If Russia struck Ukraine again, America could face a terrible dilemma: to back Ukraine and risk war with a nuclear foe; or refuse and weaken its alliances around the world. However, abandoning Ukraine would also weaken all of America’s alliances—one reason China, Iran and North Korea are backing Russia. Mr Putin is clear that he sees the real enemy as the West. It is deluded to think that leaving Ukraine to be defeated will bring peace.

Indeed, a dysfunctional Ukraine could itself become a dangerous neighbour. Already, corruption and nationalism are on the rise. If Ukrainians feel betrayed, Mr Putin may radicalise battle-hardened militias against the West and NATO. He managed something similar in Donbas where, after 2014, he turned some Russian-speaking Ukrainians into partisans ready to go to war against their compatriots.

For too long, the West has hidden behind the pretence that if Ukraine set the goals, it would decide what arms to supply. Yet Mr Zelensky cannot define victory without knowing the level of Western support. By contrast, the plan outlined above is self- reinforcing. A firmer promise of NATO membership would help Mr Zelensky redefine victory; a credible war aim would deter Russia; NATO would benefit from Ukraine’s revamped arms industry. Forging a new victory plan asks a lot of Mr Zelensky and Western leaders. But if they demur, they will usher in Ukraine’s defeat. And that would be much worse.