Ukraine could face defeat in 2024. Here's how that might look - Frank Gardner BBC

Uma possibilidade bem real, dada a falta de apoio militar e econômico do Ocidente e de suas hesitações em atacar a Rússia diretamente, ou de estrangulá-la economicamente de forma mais efetiva. (PRA)

Ukraine could face defeat in 2024. Here's how that might look

By Frank Gardner

BBC security correspondent, April 12, 2024

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68778338

The former commander of the UK's Joint Forces Command has warned that Ukraine could face defeat by Russia in 2024.

General Sir Richard Barrons has told the BBC there is "a serious risk" of Ukraine losing the war this year. 

The reason, he says, is "because Ukraine may come to feel it can't win".

"And when it gets to that point, why will people want to fight and die any longer, just to defend the indefensible?"

Ukraine is not yet at that point. 

But its forces are running critically low on ammunition, troops and air defences. Its much-heralded counter-offensive last year failed to dislodge the Russians from ground they had seized and now Moscow is gearing up for a summer offensive. 

So what will that look like and what are its likely strategic objectives?

"The shape of the Russian offensive that's going to come is pretty clear," says Gen Barrons. 

"We are seeing Russia batter away at the front line, employing a five-to-one advantage in artillery, ammunition, and a surplus of people reinforced by the use of newish weapons."

These include the FAB glide bomb, an adapted Soviet-era "dumb bomb" fitted with fins, GPS guidance and 1500kg of high explosive, that is wreaking havoc on Ukrainian defences.

"At some point this summer," says Gen Barrons, "we expect to see a major Russian offensive, with the intent of doing more than smash forward with small gains to perhaps try and break through the Ukrainian lines. 

"And if that happens we would run the risk of Russian forces breaking through and then exploiting into areas of Ukraine where the Ukrainian armed forces cannot stop them."

But where? 

Last year the Russians knew exactly where Ukraine was likely to attack - from the direction of Zaporizhzhia south towards the Sea of Azov. They planned accordingly and successfully blunted Ukraine's advance. 

Now the boot is on the other foot as Russia masses its troops and keeps Kyiv guessing where it is going to attack next.

"One of the challenges the Ukrainians have," says Dr Jack Watling, senior research fellow in land warfare at the Whitehall thinktank the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), "is that the Russians can choose where they commit their forces. 

"It's a very long front line and the Ukrainians need to be able to defend all of it."

Which, of course, they cannot.

"The Ukrainian military will lose ground," says Dr Watling. "The question is: how much and which population centres are going to be affected?"

It is quite possible that Russia's General Staff have yet to go firm on which direction to designate as their main effort. But it is possible to broadly break down their various options into three broad locations.

Kharkiv

"Kharkiv," says Dr Watling, "is certainly vulnerable."

As Ukraine's second city, situated perilously close to the Russian border, Kharkiv is a tempting goal for Moscow. 

It is currently being pummelled daily with Russian missile strikes, with Ukraine unable to field sufficient air defences to ward off the lethal mix of drones, cruise and ballistic missiles aimed in its direction. 

"I think the offensive this year will have breaking out of the Donbas as its first objective," adds Gen Barrons, "and their eye will be on Kharkiv which is 29km [18 miles] or so from the Russian border, a major prize."

Could Ukraine still function as a viable entity if Kharkiv were to fall? Yes, say analysts, but it would be a catastrophic blow to both its morale and its economy.

The Donbas

The area of eastern Ukraine known collectively as the Donbas has been at war since 2014, when Moscow-backed separatists declared themselves "people's republics". 

In 2022 Russia illegally annexed the two Donbas oblasts, or provinces, of Donetsk and Luhansk. This is where most of the fighting on land has been taking place over the past 18 months. 

Ukraine has, controversially, expended enormous efforts, in both manpower and resources, in trying to hold on to first the town of Bakhmut, and then Avdiivka. 

It has lost both, as well as some of its best fighting troops, in the attempt.  

Kyiv has countered that its resistance has inflicted disproportionately high casualties on the Russians. 

That is true, with the battlefield in these places being dubbed "the meat grinder". 

But Moscow has plenty more troops to throw into the fight - and Ukraine does not.

The Commander of US Forces in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, has warned that unless the US rushes significantly more weapons and ammunition to Ukraine then its forces will be outgunned on the battlefield by ten to one.

Mass matters. The Russian army's tactics, leadership and equipment may be inferior to Ukraine's, but it has such superiority in numbers, especially artillery, that if it does nothing else this year, its default option will be to keep pushing Ukraine's forces back in a westward direction, taking village after village.

Zaporizhzhia

This, too, is a tempting prize for Moscow. 

The southern Ukrainian city of more than 700,000 (in peacetime) sits dangerously close to the Russian front lines.

It is also something of a thorn in Russia's side given that it is the capital of an oblast of the same name that Russia has illegally annexed, and yet the city is still living freely in Ukrainian hands.

But the formidable defences that Russia built south of Zaporizhzhia last year, in the correct expectation of a Ukrainian attack, would now complicate a Russian advance from there. 

The so-called Surovikin Line, consisting of triple layers of defences, is laced with the largest, most densely packed minefield in the world. Russia could partially dismantle this but its preparations would probably be detected. 

Russia's strategic objective this year may not even be territorial. It could simply be to crush Ukraine's fighting spirit and convince its Western backers that this war is a lost cause. 

Dr Jack Watling believes the Russian objective is "to try to generate a sense of hopelessness". 

"This [Russian] offensive will not decisively end the conflict, irrespective of how it goes for either side," he says.

Gen Barrons is also sceptical that, despite the dire situation Ukraine now finds itself in, Russia will automatically drive home its advantage with a decisive advance. 

"I think the most likely outcome is that Russia will have made gains, but will not have managed to break through. 

"It will not have forces that are big enough or good enough to punch all the way through to the river [Dnipro]... but the war will have turned in Russia's favour."

One thing is certain: Russia's President Vladimir Putin has no intention of giving up on his assault on Ukraine. 

He is like a poker player gambling all his chips on a win. He is counting on the West failing to supply Ukraine with the sufficient means to defend itself. 

Despite all the Nato summits, all the conferences and all the stirring speeches, there is a chance he may be right. 

Como lidar com o imperialismo expansionista russo-putinesco na Europa? - Sven Biscop (Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations_

 The phrase above applies to the European (and Belgian) elections, but also to the EU and its candidate countries. If the EU is not ready to do for Georgia and Moldova what it is doing for Ukraine, if necessary, it should not have invited them in. This is the argument of my new Egmont Commentary, which I hope will be of interest.

Best wishes,

 

Sven 

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop   Director – Europe in the World Programme, Egmont Professor – Ghent University  Associate Member – Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences    Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations Rue des Petits Carmes 15, B-1000 Brussels + 32 473 31 68 23   s.biscop@egmontinstitute.be

 

If Russia “Protects” Transnistria, Will the EU Defend Moldova? And Georgia?

https://www.egmontinstitute.be/if-russia-protects-transnistria-will-the-eu-defend-moldova-and-georgia/

If Russia “Protects” Transnistria, Will the EU Defend Moldova? And Georgia?

By Sven Biscop

 (5 March 2024) 

In

 

• Commentaries

• EU and strategic partners,
 
• EU strategy and foreign policy,
 
• Europe in the world,
 
• European defence / NATO

 

On 28 February 2024, the day before Putin’s annual speech in parliament, Transnistria asked Russia for protection against Moldova, the state from which the region has broken away. Fabricating a threat against a kindred people as a pretext for invasion: the playbook is well known. That is how Russia has justified its wars against Georgia and Ukraine, and how it threatens the Baltic States. But the playbook is much older: in 1938-9, the purported plight of the Sudeten Germans was Hitler’s pretext for dismembering Czechoslovakia. There are parallels – but they do not run in Russia’s favour.

 

Minsk Is Not Munich

There are differences too. Russia already is in Transnistria, with some 1500 troops that have been there since 1992. And the EU already is in Moldova, with an EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) of up to 40 security officials, launched in April 2023 to assist with building resilience against hybrid actions. The West is not abandoning anybody, therefore. Indeed, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands have only just opened an embassy in Chisinau, and Greece and Spain will follow shortly.

Perhaps Putin had understood the Minsk Agreements that France and Germany mediated between Ukraine and Russia in 2014-5 as a Munich moment: the first step towards the West letting Ukraine go. But then he overlooked another accord: the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, also signed in 2014, by which (wittingly or unwittingly) Europe committed itself to the survival of Ukraine, whatever the future might bring. Putin should have remembered that when Nazi Germany violated the Munich Agreement, Britain and France could indeed not prevent the destruction of Czechoslovakia – but they did then offer a security guarantee to Poland and went to War when Hitler invaded it. In a similar vein, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine provoked the EU and the US into non-belligerent yet massive and indeed vital support for Kyiv. In June 2022, the EU accepted both Ukraine and Moldova as candidates for membership, cementing its commitment.

 

But the War Might Yet Expand

Putin did not actually mention Moldova in his speech. Perhaps the Transnistrian call for help is a sign of desperation more than anything else, as things have been going bad for the leadership ever since Ukraine closed the border when war started. Transnistria being where it is, Russia can difficultly reinforce or supply its troops there, and Russia has of course failed to link it up with the territory that it occupies in Ukraine. Nevertheless, if Putin felt it necessary to create a diversion, the troops currently in Transnistria could cause havoc. And already today Russia is engaged in a massive subversion campaign in Moldova. The call for protection is itself an example of that. Is the EUPM sufficient to bolster the country?

The EU also has to worry about Georgia, which in December 2023 became a candidate for membership as well. There too, Russian troops shore up breakaway regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those border on Russia, however; it is Georgia that is isolated, in a military sense. The Montreux Convention limits access via the Black Sea, and while the country does border on fellow EU candidate Turkey, the latter (though a NATO Ally) has its own special relationship with Russia. In case of renewed hostilities, how would the EU (and the US) get military support to Georgia? And in Georgia too, massive Russian influence operations are underway.

Even Armenia now appears to be hoping for some sort of security support from Europe. Armenia was gravely disappointed with Russia’s lack of support when in September 2023 Azerbaijan in a swift war took control of Nagorno-Karabakh. in February 2024, Armenia suspended its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), its military alliance with Russia. Azerbaijan, at the same time, is a key partner of the EU’s Global Gateway. The EU need not choose sides between them; it needs a strategy for regional stability.

 

Defend Your Candidate!

Accepting a country as a candidate creates obligations towards it, and it alters the geopolitical position of the EU, almost as much as actual enlargement.

Enlargement always was a geopolitical project, but never before has it been actively contested by another great power. In the past, the EU has accepted as candidates countries that came out of war, on the Balkans, but never a country currently at war, like Ukraine, or facing a great risk of war, like Georgia and Moldova. In geopolitical terms, these were three buffer states in between the EU and Russia. Ukraine and Moldova have now become border states – they are the frontier of the West; Georgia, however, is a geopolitical outpost. The security guarantee contained in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union does not yet apply, of course. But the EU can also not just stand idly by when a candidate is threatened or aggressed, in a military or a hybrid way – not without greatly damaging its credibility. And if the EU is not seen to stand up for its candidates, other powers might begin to doubt even the strength of solidarity between current Member States, to the detriment of deterrence.

By accepting new candidates, the EU has de facto altered its geopolitical situation. That must now be reflected in an updated strategy. At the very least, the EU should prepare contingency plans for non-belligerent support to Georgia and Moldova, up to the same massive scale as for Ukraine if necessary. That will require courage and resources. But if the EU is not willing to defend them, it should not have accorded candidate status to countries facing such a high risk of conflict. Geopolitics and strategy is not a game for the meek or the miserly.

 

Sven Biscop cannot help seeing historical analogies – he has just read too many books.

 

 

The most dangerous European scenario - Jakub Janda

 From @JakubJanda:

“THE MOST DANGEROUS EUROPEAN SCENARIO:

Jakub Janda

Jan 27, 20333

(based on my private talks with many European political and military leaders)

If the United States would end its material military support to Ukraine in short and mid-term, it could mean the following cascade of (worst case) events:

- since Europe is unable to deliver weapons & ammo Ukraine needs in near-close quality and quantity, Ukrainian defenders will have to first select to which attackers they shoot at, later this will become a strategic problem forcing Ukrainian leadership to search for any form of cease-fire

- why would terrorist Russia agree on any cease-fire or keep such promise if they would see their own strategic initiative and Ukraine desperately lacking defensive weps and ammo? Russia would keep attacking until Ukraine has to plead for capitulation, likely leading to internal political instability in Ukraine

- during this process, we can expect several million Ukrainians running West in panic, flooding Central and part of Western Europe, leading to natural rise of far-right (which is always a Russian fifth column), shaking internal stability of European NATO member states

- since most of Europe lacks large and modern air force able to deterring Russia, we will be (as always) dependent on the decisions of the American President. Those hundreds of F-35s ordered by European nations will be coming after like 2028/2030, so we have at least 4-5 year gap when much of Europe is really vulnerable. 

- Even if brave countries like Poland, Sweden, Finland or Baltic republics spend as much as they urgently can, our strategic balance of (military and political) power to Russian terrorists is not favourable to Europeans, if we cannot be sure about American strategic decisions after January 2025

- we see a lot of symbolic actions by large European economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), but are they running their defense industry and spending to semi-war levels like Russia does? Not at all, because they are not scared by the most realistic change of Russian attack on EU/NATO countries in last four decades. Why? Because they are not in the first line and many within their economic establishments still hope to get back to “normal” business with Russia. We are facing the most dangerous split over strategic plans across European allies now.

So, supporting Ukrainian defenders with everything we have got is the only realistic change we have to keep this war from erupting in a geostrategic disaster for Europe.”

Ucrânia ataca pontos sensíveis da infraestrutura econômica russa - Tendar

From X, January 24, 2024

The strike against Russian oil facilities in Tuapse, Russia, only days after the successful strike against the Ust-Luga terminal removes all doubt that we are dealing with a targeted effort to eliminate all major Russian oil and gas ports, so that they are rendered useless for any operations.

When looking at the Russian oil and gas pipeline map, then you will notice that almost all of them head West. There is a small pipeline going east, but it is not connected to the main oil fields in Western Siberia and only small in size. Russia's economic lifeline goes all the way West. In the past, this was the matter of problems for the West, since Russia used this power to blackmail Europe. Now, its close proximity has become the source of weakness.

Among all of those pipelines only 5 end in Russian sea ports. Every other pipeline, especially the Druzhba pipeline, enters Western (NATO) territory and are therefore subject of sanctions or worse. The Druzhba pipeline goes anyway partly through Ukrainian territory and the rest such as the pumping stations are anyway in firing range.

3 of the pipelines end near Sankt Petersburg in the Baltic Sea, 2 of them go the Black Sea. Among of them, Ukraine successfully struck 2 already. Ust-Luga is inoperable for the next weeks or even months. Shipping companies will increasingly reconsider sending their vessels to those ports which are military targets.

This will be a big headache for the Russian war effort. The current attacks are still small in size, using a handful of drones, but already caused considerable damage. When Ukraine starts mass-hitting those ports, then the Russian air defense will not be able to stop the outcome, even when destroying 99% of all drones. 

The National Geographic map is from 2006 and yet not much has changed since then. The major difference I see is the extension of the natural gas pipeline grid of which some have been turned into "sea water pipelines". The irony behind that speak for itself. Putin and his oligarchs never ever anticipated this situation, like everything since February 2022. Everything what Moscow does makes a bad situation worse and I'm sure that sooner or later somebody in Putin's circle (of which nobody is a saint but simply tired of this vicious cycle) will do the math that it is easier to remove Putin than remove the Ukraine will for freedom and independence.

#Ukraine #Russia #Oil #NaturalGas

UN Resolution, "Uniting for Peace" in favor of Ukraine - Anton Geraschenko, Christian Tomuschat

 Hoje no Mundo Militar liked

Anton Gerashchenko

@Gerashchenko_en

It is very important! I ask for maximum dissemination and cooperation! Let's do it! There is a UN Resolution commonly known as "Uniting for Peace" resolution. It was adopted in 1950 and states that if the UN Security Council cannot reach an agreement on urgent international peace matters, then the responsibility for this is handed over to UN General Assembly (where there is no veto power). Here is a Wikipedia article about this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_377 UN Security Council is scheduled to meet on January 10th regarding Russia using missiles from North Korea in Ukraine. With Russia having veto power in the Security Council, isn't that the right time to put this resolution in action? One of the most serious consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine is destroying the global security system as now it is de-facto not functioning. Without firm, decisive actions, without a clear position, the world will plummet into chaos and constant wars.

Uniting for Peace

General Assembly resolution 377 (V)

New York, 3 November 1950

By Christian Tomuschat

Professor emeritus at Humboldt University, Berlin

 

https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html

 

(Paper from 2008)

 

On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title “Uniting for Peace”. The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea. At the initial stage of this armed conflict, in June 1950, the Security Council had been able to recommend to the Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950). The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence the Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of nine members “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The majority of the members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22). Given that its protests remained fruitless, the USSR sent again, as from August 1950, a delegation to the meetings of the Council which cast a negative vote on a United States draft resolution condemning the continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities. In order to overcome this impasse, the United States, under the leadership of its Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson, succeeded in persuading the General Assembly that it should claim for itself a subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace and security, as enunciated by Article 14 of the Charter. The result of these efforts was resolution 377 A (V).

The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that where the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly shall seize itself of the matter. Procedural and substantive steps are suggested. First of all, if the Assembly is not in session, it may meet in emergency special session at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of its own members. Second, such a session shall be convened with a view to making appropriate recommendations for “collective measures…including the use of armed force when necessary”. As also the language of the resolution clearly reveals, the General Assembly can never be a full substitute for the Security Council in this area. Accordingly, only “recommendations” are mentioned, i.e., pronouncements devoid of any binding legal force. Additionally, resolution 377 A (V) establishes two auxiliary bodies, a Peace Observation Commission, which existed until 1960, and a Collective Measures Committee, which had a short life of only two years. None of these bodies has played any role of major significance.

Although the General Assembly did not attempt to arrogate to itself powers akin to those rooted in Chapter VII of the Charter, it stands to reason that originally resolution 377 A (V) was hardly reconcilable with the Charter. Articles 11 and 12 establish unequivocally the primacy of the Security Council with regard to all matters relating to international peace and security. As far as procedure is concerned, Article 12, paragraph 1, stipulates that while the Council is exercising its function in respect of any dispute or situation, “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation”. On the other hand, where “action” seems to be necessary, the General Assembly is enjoined to refer the matter to the Council (Article 11, paragraph 2). This configuration, however, was hard to uphold. Politically, it is definitely quite unwise to keep the General Assembly on the sidelines when a major conflict erupts. Almost as a logical consequence, Article 11, paragraph 2, and Article 12, paragraph 1, have suffered an erosion process of which resolution 377 A (V) constitutes only one element among many others. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ has formally confirmed that the prohibition of simultaneous action has been superseded by practice (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras. 27-28).

To date, ten emergency special sessions have been convened. The first one took place on the occasion of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt and the British-French attack on the Suez Canal zone; the tenth emergency special session, dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, started in 1997 and has not yet come to its end. (It was adjourned by resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006, para. 13, and can at any time be resumed upon request by Member States.)

According to political criteria, different patterns can be distinguished. If the Security Council is unanimous in requesting such a session, the harmony between the two main organs of the United Nations is not disturbed. The crisis in Lebanon prompted the Security Council in 1958 to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly (resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958). It did so without mentioning explicitly resolution 377 A (V), and one may indeed have doubts as to whether this was a case of application of that resolution since there was no lack of unanimity of the permanent members. The situation in Lebanon was referred to the General Assembly because the Security Council had no solution to offer. The second situation is characterized by a vote of a majority of the members of the Security Council against the opposition of some other members, including permanent members. In such instances, the veto does not operate since referral to the General Assembly is considered to constitute a procedural determination and hence not subject to such blocking power. Understandably, the first emergency special session was called by the Security Council against the resistance of France and the United Kingdom (resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956). In the Hungarian crisis, which unfolded almost at the same time, the roles were distributed differently, with only the USSR opposing the motion (resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956). Similar configurations could be observed with regard to the holding of emergency special sessions on the Republic of the Congo (resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960: opposition of Poland and the USSR), on the conflict between India and Pakistan on account of East Pakistan/Bangladesh (resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971: abstention of France, Poland, the USSR and the United Kingdom), and on Afghanistan (resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980: opposition of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR). Total emancipation from the Security Council is reached where the Secretary-General convenes an emergency special meeting at the request of a United Nations Member acting with the support of a majority in the General Assembly. The seventh emergency special session on Palestine (1980-1982) was in fact initiated by Senegal, the eighth emergency special session on Namibia (1981) goes back to a request by Zimbabwe, and the tenth emergency special session was solicited by Qatar as the Chair of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. It stands to reason that in such instances the overwhelming weight of third world countries can manifest itself to its full extent. Urgent matters may also be dealt with during the ordinary sessions of the General Assembly if the Security Council takes no action owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. (A prominent example is provided by General Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986, dealing with the aerial and naval attack on Libya by the United States.)

Although the shifting of responsibilities to the General Assembly may not be consistent with the original intentions of the drafters of the Charter, it is today fully accepted that emergency special sessions have become an integral part of the legal order of the United Nations. On the other hand, the need for the holding of such sessions has considerably decreased, as for many years the General Assembly is frequently in session much beyond the usual period from September to December. On a regular basis sessions are resumed in plenary meetings for short periods in the months before the start of a new session in September. In the early years, Member States were not represented in New York throughout the year. Today, urgent matters can be dealt with by the General Assembly at short notice. As already pointed out, the tenth emergency special session, which started in 1997, has not yet been concluded and has for many years operated alongside the regular sessions of the General Assembly. (In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall case (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 152, at para. 34), the ICJ did not raise any objections against that practice.) It has become a special forum to deliberate on the policies and practices of Israel with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories, totally changing its character from a meeting convened to discuss urgent matters to a permanent, but intermittent conference on a topic of paramount interest to the international community.

Obviously, the crucial element of resolution 377 A (V) was the affirmation that the General Assembly may, if deemed appropriate by it, recommend collective action, including the use of force. In this core sense, the resolution has been implemented only once in the Korean crisis. By resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 it made a finding to the effect that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in aggression in Korea (para. 1) and “call[ed] upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea” (para. 4), which of course meant military assistance. The resolution does not explicitly refer to the Uniting for Peace resolution, but it emphasizes that the Security Council, “because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (preamble). Thus, the wording is exactly copied from resolution 377 A (V). The establishment of the peacekeeping operation First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 with a view to monitoring the frontline between Israel and Egypt does not come within the same category since UNEF I had no combat function to discharge but was meant to neutralize the conflict solely by its presence between the two opposing parties in accordance with the “classic” peacekeeping concept which was given birth on that occasion. On the whole, it is not easy to draw the demarcation line between “measures” contemplated specifically by resolution 377 A (V) and other measures which the General Assembly may recommend within the framework of its general mandate without any hindrance. According to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, the exclusive powers of the Security Council are confined to coercive or enforcement action (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, at 164), but the ICJ did not discuss specifically the impact of resolution 377 A (V). In this connection, the question arises, inter alia, how the imposition of an embargo, as formerly practiced by the General Assembly in a sustained fashion to the detriment of South Africa, is to be characterized (this practice commenced with resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986). In any event, it has become a regular feature of resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to armed conflicts to call upon the parties to desist from any hostilities and to withdraw their troops to their own territories (see, for instance, resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008, on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan). Such requests are not considered as requiring any particular legitimation under resolution 377 A (V).

Resolution 377 A (V) has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within the United Nations, a potential that is not disclosed in a recent description of the role and authority of the General Assembly (see resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, annex, para. 1). But it would actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the support of one of the permanent members. To date, resolution 498 (V) of 1951 remains the only example of a situation where the General Assembly, at that time under dominating Western influence, recommended taking such action, notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member.

 

This Introductory Note was written in October 2008.

 

Related Materials

 

A. Jurisprudence

International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971,p. 16.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.

 

B. Documents

Security Council

Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 (Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea).

Resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956 (Complaint by Egypt against France and the United Kingdom).

Resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956 (The situation in Hungary).

Resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958 (Complaint by Lebanon - Complaint by Jordan).

Resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960 (The Congo Question).

Resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971 (The Situation in the India/Pakistan Subcontinent).

Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980 (International peace and security).

 

General Assembly

Resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 (Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea).

Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 (UNEF I).

Resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986 (Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa).

Resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986 (Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986).

Resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006 (Revitalization of the General Assembly).

Resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006 (Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory).

Resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008 (The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan).

 

C. Doctrine

J. Andrassy, “Uniting for Peace”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 50 (1956) 563-582.

J. Krasno and M. Das, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council”, in: B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London et al.: Routledge, 2008, 173-195.

K. S. Petersen, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950”, International Organization, vol. 13 (1959) 219-232.

H. Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 20 (1982) 1-49.

E. Stein and R. Morrissey, “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier, 2000, 1232-1235.

C. Tomuschat, “‘Uniting for Peace’: ein Rückblick nach 50 Jahren”, Die Friedens-Warte, Journal of International Peace and Organization, vol. 76 (2001) 289-303.

D. Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: the Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Low, Vaughan et al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 154-174.

A. Zimmermann, “Uniting-for-Peace und Gutachtenanfragen der Generalversammlung”, in: Weltinnenrecht. Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2005, 909-925.