quinta-feira, 17 de outubro de 2024
Zelenskiy’s 'victory plan' to EU, NATO - Andrew Gray
sexta-feira, 27 de setembro de 2024
The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course - The Economist leader
Zelensky in Washington
The war is going badly. Ukraine and its allies must change course
Time for credible war aims—and NATO membership
The Economist, September 26, 2024
IF UKRAINE AND its Western backers are to win, they must first have the courage to admit that they are losing. In the past two years Russia and Ukraine have fought a costly war of attrition. That is unsustainable. When Volodymyr Zelensky travelled to America to see President Joe Biden this week, he brought a “plan for victory”, expected to contain a fresh call for arms and money. In fact, Ukraine needs something far more ambitious: an urgent change of course.
A measure of Ukraine’s declining fortunes is Russia’s advance in the east, particularly around the city of Pokrovsk. So far, it is slow and costly. Recent estimates of Russian losses run at about 1,200 killed and wounded a day, on top of the total of 500,000. But Ukraine, with a fifth as many people as Russia, is hurting too. Its lines could crumble before Russia’s war effort is exhausted.
Ukraine is also struggling off the battlefield. Russia has destroyed so much of the power grid that Ukrainians will face the freezing winter with daily blackouts of up to 16 hours. People are tired of war. The army is struggling to mobilise and train enough troops to hold the line, let alone retake territory. There is a growing gap between the total victory many Ukrainians say they want, and their willingness or ability to fight for it.
Abroad, fatigue is setting in. The hard right in Germany and France argue that supporting Ukraine is a waste of money. Donald Trump could well become president of the United States. He is capable of anything, but his words suggest that he wants to sell out Ukraine to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin.
If Mr Zelensky continues to defy reality by insisting that Ukraine’s army can take back all the land Russia has stolen since 2014, he will drive away Ukraine’s backers and further divide Ukrainian society. Whether or not Mr Trump wins in November, the only hope of keeping American and European support and uniting Ukrainians is for a new approach that starts with leaders stating honestly what victory means.
As The Economist has long argued, Mr Putin attacked Ukraine not for its territory, but to stop it becoming a prosperous, Western- leaning democracy. Ukraine’s partners need to get Mr Zelensky to persuade his people that this remains the most important prize in this war. However much Mr Zelensky wants to drive Russia from all Ukraine, including Crimea, he does not have the men or arms to do it. Neither he nor the West should recognise Russia’s bogus claim to the occupied territories; rather, they should retain reunification as an aspiration.
In return for Mr Zelensky embracing this grim truth, Western leaders need to make his overriding war aim credible by ensuring that Ukraine has the military capacity and security guarantees it needs. If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the futility of further big offensives. Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest.
This will require greater supplies of the weaponry Mr Zelensky is asking for. Ukraine needs long-range missiles that can hit military targets deep in Russia and air defences to protect its infrastructure. Crucially, it also needs to make its own weapons. Today, the country’s arms industry has orders worth $7bn, only about a third of its potential capacity. Weapons firms from America and some European countries have been stepping in; others should, too. The supply of home-made weapons is more dependable and cheaper than Western-made ones. It can also be more innovative. Ukraine has around 250 drone companies, some of them world leaders— including makers of the long-range machines that may have been behind a recent hit on a huge arms dump in Russia’s Tver province.
The second way to make Ukraine’s defence credible is for Mr Biden to say Ukraine must be invited to join NATO now, even if it is divided and, possibly, without a formal armistice. Mr Biden is known to be cautious about this. Such a declaration from him, endorsed by leaders in Britain, France and Germany, would go far beyond today’s open-ended words about an “irrevocable path” to membership.
This would be controversial, because NATO’s members are expected to support each other if one of them is attacked. In opening a debate about this Article 5 guarantee, Mr Biden could make clear that it would not cover Ukrainian territory Russia occupies today, as with East Germany when West Germany joined NATO in 1955; and that Ukraine would not necessarily garrison foreign NATO troops in peacetime, as with Norway in 1949.
NATO membership entails risks. If Russia struck Ukraine again, America could face a terrible dilemma: to back Ukraine and risk war with a nuclear foe; or refuse and weaken its alliances around the world. However, abandoning Ukraine would also weaken all of America’s alliances—one reason China, Iran and North Korea are backing Russia. Mr Putin is clear that he sees the real enemy as the West. It is deluded to think that leaving Ukraine to be defeated will bring peace.
Indeed, a dysfunctional Ukraine could itself become a dangerous neighbour. Already, corruption and nationalism are on the rise. If Ukrainians feel betrayed, Mr Putin may radicalise battle-hardened militias against the West and NATO. He managed something similar in Donbas where, after 2014, he turned some Russian-speaking Ukrainians into partisans ready to go to war against their compatriots.
For too long, the West has hidden behind the pretence that if Ukraine set the goals, it would decide what arms to supply. Yet Mr Zelensky cannot define victory without knowing the level of Western support. By contrast, the plan outlined above is self- reinforcing. A firmer promise of NATO membership would help Mr Zelensky redefine victory; a credible war aim would deter Russia; NATO would benefit from Ukraine’s revamped arms industry. Forging a new victory plan asks a lot of Mr Zelensky and Western leaders. But if they demur, they will usher in Ukraine’s defeat. And that would be much worse.
domingo, 25 de agosto de 2024
Timothy Snyder on the non-sensical war of aggression by Putin against Ukraine
Two-and-a-half years ago, Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, setting off the largest war the world has seen since 1945. Although Russia's leaders have offered various spurious justifications for their illegal war of aggression, Vladimir Putin's nost consistent explanation has been ideological: Russia is an ancient state, and Ukraine is historically Russian land. Let us take advantage of this half-anniversary to consider this claim. Anniversaries take hold of the imagination, especially the round ones. The fullness of years and the beauty of numbers seduce us into myths of eternity and goodness. But history, unlike legend, is composed of fragments, of bits, of things we understand halfway, and seek to grasp ever better. This is one reason why few historians grapple with the gilded myths that Putin has put forward about the ancient past, most notoriously in a long essay in 2021 and then in a tedious interview with Tucker Carlson in 2024 (both linked below). When confronted with magical thinking by dictators, historians feel out of place, like a bridge player invited to judge prestidigitation, say, or a surgeon hired to care for wax figures. Putin is in love with a legend. Historically speaking, this is very familiar: new regimes, such as Putin's, seek compensation in myths of ancient origin. Putin's idea of Russia, his justification for the killing of hundreds of thousands of people, his rationalization of his attempt to destroy Ukraine as a people — it all rests on a very familiar sort of tall tale: we were here first. These stories are generally complete falsehoods, from the “we” through the “were” and the “here” and the “first.” And so it is for Putin. But the stories get repeated so often that they take on a kind of leaden plausibility, like a bad habit. It takes a little work to throw them off. So here goes! The legend begins with a single obscure incident, understood by Putin to prove the existence and endurance of a Russian state: Long ago there was a city called Novgorod, inhabited by people who were unable to get along. These quarrelsome folk, the Slavs, invited three Viking brothers, known as the Rus, to come and rule them. The arrival of Vikings began an unbroken tradition of a Russian "centralized state." As he says, Putin has the story from a medieval chronicle, "The Tale of Bygone Years," probably from the early twelfth century. The monk (or monks) in Kyiv who compiled this text had heard about the arrival of the Vikings known as the Rus from Scandinavia, which had taken place about four hundred years earlier. In the intervening centuries, the various parts of the fractious Scandinavian clans had founded, taken over, and lost control of a number or towns in eastern Europe. The monk or monks knew were trying to explain why the Kyivan part of a Scandinavian ruling clan still known by the name Rus was more important than other clans in other places. "The Tale of Bygone Years" is one of dozens of helpful medieval sources which touch on the Scandinavians in eastern Europe, which mix fable and useful information. These texts have to be read critically and together, and alongside the findings of archeologists and numismatists who have worked in the places in question. In what follows I will be doing this.
Before analyzing the legend that Putin loves, it would be helpful to spell out all of the claims it contains and that he draws from it, some of which are explicit, and some of which are implicit -- things that the listener might go away from the story believing, even though they are never stated. 1. There was a city called Novgorod when the Vikings known as the Rus arrived. 2. There were three Viking brothers. 3. The Vikings accepted the invitation and peacefully and durably ruled. 4. The people of this city were in some sense Russians because they were Slavs. 5. These Vikings were also in some sense Russians, since they called themselves “Rus.” 6. The existence of an ethnic group in a town more than a thousand years ago means a right to rule today by a dictator who calls himself a name that he also associates with that ethnic group. 7. The existence of the rulers of that ethnic group more than a thousand years ago means a right to rule today by a dictator who calls himself a name that he also associates with those rulers. 8. Events in one location more than a thousand years ago justify the existence and actions of a transcontinental empire engaged in a war of aggression against a neighboring state. 9. An algorithm exists whereby we can justify repression and war today via obscure, distant events. 10. This algorithm is known to dictators who tell the story, carry out the repressions and start the wars. When spelled out like this, the claims reveal their magical character. Even if claims 1-5 were completely correct, the moral and political interpretations Putin offers in claims 6-10 are illogical and repugnant. Such “reasoning” is why few historians will engage Putin's legend directly. It has nothing to do with history -- with assembling evidence, with questioning hypothesis, with making reasonable arguments based upon sources and traditions of interpretation. It is a claim to power, whose only sense arises from the power itself. That is really all that needs to be said. Having understood that, historians can choose to go the extra mile, and note that the factual claims (1-5) are balderdash. It only really makes sense to do this in a constructive rather than in a destructive spirit, in an effort to reveal something about what we actually do know about early medieval Scandinavia and eastern Europe, and how we know it. It is in that spirit that I will proceed. Let us consider each claim in turn. 1. There was a city called Novgorod when the Vikings known as the Rus arrived. There was not. Novgorod had not yet been founded at the time of the arrival of the Rus in the territories that are now northeastern Russia. It was founded about a quarter millenium later. (It had also not yet been founded when Vikings first began to lay claim to Kyiv, which already existed and was probably controlled by Khazars.) Novgorod is attractive for a Russian myth because it exists now and it existed at the time the monks were writing. But it did not exist at the time of the events the monks were recounting. But this is just the very beginning of the profound untruthfulness of the story. Here is what we know. Traders from Scandinavia were present around the body of water we now call Lake Ladoga in the sixth century. Around the middle of the eighth century, the Vikings who called themselves Rus established a trading emporium at a site that Russian archaeologists call Ladoga, but which the Vikings themselves called Aldeigja. Packed away in storage in the Hermitage in St.Petersburg is a bronze figure from Aldeigja in its early days: Odin with his two ravens. This contemporary piece of evidence, similar to other figures from Scandinavia, and one among thousands, tells us more than later chronicles about the time and place and people. The power center associated with Aldeigja was probably called the Rus Khaganate. We believe that it was called this because of contemporary evidence: a recorded encounter between Rus emissaries and the king of the Franks. About a century after the foundation of Aldeigja, the Vikings known as Rus established another trade center, which they called Holmgar∂, and which Russians later called Gorodishche. The town Novgorod in its turn was founded more than a hundred years after that and about a mile away. It had nothing to do with the first encounter of the Rus and the locals. It could not have done so, since it did not then exist. 2. There were three Viking brothers. This is a different sort of claim. One can show with considerable certainty, on the basis of the archaeological evidence, when Scandinavian Rus towns such as Aldeigja and Holmgar∂ were established, and have a pretty good idea of who lived there and what occupations were pursued. One cannot of course disprove, on this basis, that there were once three Viking brothers. The reasons to disbelieve this claim are of a different kind, arising from the study of political myth and its structures. The number 3 has a profound significance in Indo-European stories about the origin of the world. According to Tacitus, the ancient Germanic peoples (whose culture preceded that of the Germanic Vikings), believed that the earth god had a son, and that son had three sons, and those three sons founded all the other peoples. Odin was himself one of three brothers. In Viking times, the settlement of new (from the Viking perspective) lands was systematically justified by a story of the arrival of three brothers, usually sons or grandsons of Odin. In this manner the Viking clan who had power justified its position and its right to control lands (and native peoples). The Tale of Bygone Years, which is essentially one saga among many others, reproduced this standard trope of the Scandinavian sagas. It is worth emphasizing that the story of the three brothers is always about why Scandinavians get to rule other people. The survival of the “three-brothers” trope is a reminder of Scandinavian domination. That is its meaning. 3. The Vikings accepted the invitation and peacefully and durably ruled. In the case of this bit of nonsense, both literary and archaeological methods help. One does not have to be a student of early legends to understand that the "invitation" story is suspect. Right down to the present, invading armies claim that they have come only at the invitation of the people whose lands they now occupy. Contemporary Russians should be particularly sensitive to this, since the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1919, the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 were all justified by supposed invitations from within the invaded country. The ancient Scandinavians also knew this trick, and the story of their being "invited" to the region of Aldeigja and Holmgar∂, in what is now northwestern Russia, is an obvious colonial tale. Not only is it certainly fictional, its purpose was to deny (not to affirm) the agency of the local people. The entity that Putin has in mind was the Rus Khaganate. The name Rus referred to the Scandinavian clan; the Scandinavians borrowed the term “kagan” for ruler from the Khazars, their partner in the slave trade. Vikings were in the area in order to facilitate trade southward for Arabic silver. The chief goods they traded were at first furs and then slaves. During the period in question, the Vikings known as the Rus understood systematic slave raids in the area, killing the adult men and then selling women, boys and girls into slavery. The power center around Aldeigja and Holmgar∂ had its ascent and its collapse. Either it was attacked by other Scandinavians, or it was challenged by local rebellions of peoples subject to slave raids, or perhaps both. The Rus Khaganate seems to have collapse in about 870. Rus and other Scandinavian traders remained active, and trade emporia would be revived and new towns founded, but the first Rus polity seems to have ended then. 4. The people of this city were in some sense Russians because they were Slavs. Here one must apply the literary criticism not to the Tale of Bygone Years but to Putin himself. He never actually says that the people in the Aldeigja and Holmgar∂ regions were Russians; he wrongly believes that they were Slavs, and implies a Russian identity by claiming that their actions laid the basis for a "centralized Russian state." This is, of course, a trick. It is absurd to imagine Russians existing 1200 or 1300 years ago, and Putin avoids the absurdity by slipping in his imaginary Russians by silent implication. And so the point must be made explicitly: there were no Russians anywhere in the world 1200 or 1300 years ago. There was no notion whatever of a Russian people. The backup position would be that these people were Slavs and thus in some sense proto-Russians. That is not how history works: there is no natural, inevitable progression from people speaking a language 1200 or 1300 years ago to the cultural identities or political regimes of today. But even if one believes in this political magic, and even if one believes that people speaking a slavic language 1200 or 1300 years ago were somehow proto-Russians, there is still a major problem. The people who lived in the area at the time did not generally speak Slavic languagues. They were mainly Finns, not Slavs. For that matter, Finns seem to have been the most important group not only in the Aldeigja and Holmgar∂ regions, but in all of what is now northeastern Russia, including what is now the Moscow region. (There was, of course, no city of Moscow at the time.) 5. These Vikings were also in some sense Russians, since they called themselves “Rus.” Here again we confront an implicit claim, one that is is backed by a semantic trick. There is now a country called the Russian Federation, which is named after an earlier country called the Russian Empire, which was named after Vikings who called themselves Rus, or after the medieval power centers established by the Rus, the first of which was the Rus Khaganate. There is a power in names, just as there is a power in anniversaries and round numbers. If those people were called Rus, must they not have been Russians? Well, no. The Rus came first. The Russian Empire was named after them about a thousand years after they appeared. The naming confuses things, but it need not confuse us. At the time period in question, other European rulers had no difficulty establishing who the Rus were: they were Swedes. In the poems and stories they sang and wrote, and in the traces they left in their burial ground, the Rus were unambiguously Scandinavians. To be sure, they were influenced by the peoples with whom they came into contact: Finns, Balts, Arabs, Bulgars, Khazars, Slavs. This was a period of the globalization of Scandinavia, and the Rus were part of an exploratory impulse that reached four continents In the eighth and ninth centuries, the Rus were Scandinavian trading and clans. Later on, as some Rus settled ever further south, for example in Gnezdevo, Chernihiv, and Kyiv, the Scandinavians reinforced their elite status by marrying Scandinavians from Scandinavia, by treating them as allies and friends, and by expanding upon and sharing in Scandinavian culture. After the collapse of the Rus Khaganate, other Rus managed to establish another power center, much later, at Kyiv. Now rather than cooperating with the Khazars they were taking over their land and tribute centers. The Rus (or other Scandinavians) also built the first towns in other parts of eastern Europe, for example in the area around Moscow (which of course did not exist at the time). After telling his deeply implausible legend about Novgorod, Putin's next move is to cite the Tale of Bygone Years about Kyiv. The person or people who wrote that saga was concerned to show that the Rus ruler of Kyiv, was the most important prince in the region. By the time of the writing of the chronicle, Novgorod did exist, and so a story presented itself which linked the two places and showed the superiority of Kyiv. The story is that a Viking from Novgorod managed to take Kyiv by dressing himself up as a trader and fooling the naive local rulers. At his moment of his triumph this Viking produced a baby and proclaimed that the child was by blood the true ruler of the land. After this improbable succession of events that Viking of the story proclaimed Kyiv “the mother of Rus cities,” a bit of language meant to assure people in the twelfth century that the present rulers of Kyiv should dominate over other Rus in other towns. One could perform the same kind of analysis on this story. At the time The Tale of Bygone Yearswas written, there was no Russia. There were no Russians. There were clans of Scandinavians called Rus, who were engaged in a contest of dominance, with towns and emporia that rose and fell. Part of this contest was a story, set down in the early twelfth century, describing the arrival of the Rus in Kyiv, a historical event of the early tenth century. Rus did in fact arrive in Kyiv, but not as the story describes. The Vikings in the story could not have come from Novgorod, since at the time the Rus began to settle the Kyiv area Novgorod had not yet been founded. It was much later on, when both cities did exist, at the time of the chronicle, when the Scandinavians in Kyiv wanted to justify both their own pedigree and their own dominance. The story can only be understood in these terms. Otherwise it is just comical. The baby thing is ridiculous; no Viking ever went to war with a baby on display, nor did any Viking have the idea of a royal dynasty of which the baby would be the heir. The dressup game is a fictional stratagem familiar from Scandinavian sagas as well as contemporary Byzantine war stories. Even if one ignores the legendary and preposterous character all that, the timing of the events is challenged by the recorded birth and death dates of the clever wardrobe Viking and the portable baby Viking. The hero of the Kyiv story, the clever wardrobe Viking known as Helgi (or Oleh or Oleg in Ukrainian or Russian) is a semi-mythical character. There is no reason to believe that he represented a dynasty coming from Novgorod, since Novgorod did not exist yet, and since the Rus khaganate had ceased to exist. It is likely that, if he came at all, Helgi came from Gnezdovo, which was a rival of Chernihiv and Kyiv at the time. Helgi means “hero” and this Helgi is one of dozens who populate medieval Scandinavian stories. This Helgi supposedly died by fulfilling a complicated prophesy involving his horse, a story which features in multiple north European settings. The Kyiv incident could not have happened, did not happen, and even had it happened would have no implications for the present war. It is not really worth the effort to press the point further about Kyiv, not least because the validity of the Kyiv tale, which is nil, would depend on the validity of the prior Novgorod story, which is nil. You can seewhy historians hesitate to engage in all this. What Putin is doing has nothing to do with history as a discipline. He is engaged in building a legend, which us based on other legends. And each of his sentences is so rich in various kinds of error that it takes hundreds of words to explain all of the wrongness! And in taking the tale seriously, the historian fears that he has made it more serious. This is what I called “dancing with a skeleton” in my book Reconstruction of Nations, where I discourage it. I am only doing it now since the both the myth and the war persist, and people (even outside Russia) persist in justifying the war by the myth. By concentrating upon the fundamental legend, the one on which all the others depend, I hope to have shown that the structure itself is empty. The rules Putin sets down for interpreting the past cannot be accepted. It is nothing more than fantasy following force. This is the most important point. If we grant that tyrants are right to start wars because of fictions of brothers and babies, because of stories that are not even wrong, then every single corner of the world is subject to invasion and the entire international legal order is void. Even were we to accept the way Putin thinks about the past, which we absolutely should not do, it would lead to a very different conclusion than he thinks. The best guesses of long-dead monks are not a solid basis for contemporary statehood. Tbe Tale of Bygone Years cannot do what Putin asks of it. If, in order to exist today, states have to prove their ancient pedigree and their durable ethnic and political history, then Putin would have to accept that there is no basis for the existence of today’s Russian Federation. Were Putin to follow his own logic, he would not be invading Ukraine, but handing over European Russia to Finland or Sweden. |
sábado, 13 de julho de 2024
Desafios da atualidade política mundial - presidente Mike Johnson, da USA House of Representatives
Speaker of the House Mike Johnson at Hudson on the eve of NATO’s seventy-fifth summit:
Key Insights
1. America’s actions will determine the path of the free world.
“While democracy is not perfect, the burden of self-government is certainly far lighter than the yoke of tyranny. But right now, absent American leadership, we’re looking at a future that could be well-defined by communism and tyranny, rather than liberty and opportunity and security. In Europe, Putin has made it clear that his plans don’t stop with Ukraine. He’s likened himself to Tsar Peter the Great, and you can read his essay about restoring the Russian Empire—an empire that would include our military partners in Vilnius, Helsinki, and Warsaw. Xi Jinping made abundantly clear he’s interested in expanding his communist footholds, including in the South China Sea. In the Middle East, the ayatollah wants to resurrect the caliphate and eliminate Israel.”
2. An axis of adversaries is working to undermine the United States militarily and economically.
“Today, we don’t face one primary enemy as we did in the Soviet Union, and so far, thankfully, we don’t see a new kind of Tripartite Pact. But we do see a group of nations openly aligned against the United States. It’s an interconnected web of threats. I refer to it as a China-led axis, composed of partner regimes in Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and even Cuba. Now they each have their own cultures and their own specific sinister aims, but they all wake up every morning thinking how they can take down America. And they’re increasingly using their collective military, technological, and financial resources to empower one another in their various efforts to cut off our trade routes, and steal our technology, and harm our troops, and upend our economy.”
domingo, 19 de maio de 2024
The State of Russia in 2024: Documentary by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
quinta-feira, 2 de maio de 2024
Um dia na vida da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: 1/05/2024 (Centre for Defence Strategies - CDS)
Russia's war on Ukraine. 01.05.24
In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) "Khortytsia", on the Kupyansk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 6 enemy attacks in the areas of Berestove, Stelmakhivka and east of Kopanka. On the Lyman direction, they repelled 21 attacks in the areas of Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Terny, and Serebriansk Forest. On the Bakhmut direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 33 Russian attacks in the areas of Bilohorivka, Verkhnyokamianske, Rozdolivka, Spirne, Novyi, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Chasiv Yar.
In the "Tavriya" OSG operational zone on the Avdiivka direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 33 enemy attacks in the areas of Arkhanhelske, Keramik, Sokil, Umanske, Semenivka, Yasnobrodivks, and Netaylove. On the Novopavlivka direction, they continued to hold back the enemy in the areas of Heorhiivka, Praskoviivka, and Urozhaine, where the adversary, supported by aviation, attempted to breach Ukrainian troops' defenses 18 times. On the Orikhiv direction, the enemy, supported by aviation, attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces 5 times in the area of Staromayorske, Robotyne and southwest of Bilohirya.
In the operational zone of the "Odesa" OSG on the Kherson direction, the enemy remains determined to dislodge the units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro River and launched 2 unsuccessful attacks.
General conclusion:
· The command of the Russian forces is executing a significant troop movement between operational directions.
· The adversary's command has initiated the repositioning of operational-tactical and army aviation assets from forward airbases, including those situated deep within the operational theater, to the interior of Russian territory following the delivery of long-range strike capabilities, such as ATACMS missiles, to the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The overall strength of enemy aviation units deployed directly at forward airbases has decreased from 303-305 units of combat and special aviation to 280-283 units.
· Russian troops persist in maneuvering around Chasiv Yar from the flanks via Bohdanivka in the northeast and Ivanivske in the east, bolstering their presence to advance towards the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal. The frequency of attacks on Chasiv Yar surpasses those on the Avdiivka direction, where the adversary has temporarily halted its push.
· The adversary's tactics near Chasiv Yar remain consistent, resembling the operation near Bakhmut: initially, positions are assaulted by "Storm-Z" and "Storm-V" punitive units followed by assault landing units that consolidate their gains.
· Russian forces are advancing near Keramik to move towards Arkhanhelske, while also attempting to push westward from Ocheretyne towards Sokol and southwest towards Novopokrovske – Novoselivka Persha.
· The adversary's tactics in the Ocheretyne and Novokalynove areas have shifted. The enemy seeks unmined gaps between the Ukrainian defense positions, attacking through them and advancing northward, parallel to the Ukrainian defensive line.
· The adversary's attempts to consolidate their positions northwest of Avdiivka force them to choose between advancing westward towards Pokrovsk or moving north to support the grouping operating near Chasiv Yar.
· The "Tavriya" OSG command, not waiting for tactical losses, replaced several forward units with fresh ones, indicating the presence of reserves and proper control of the situation by the OSG command staff.
· Mechanical malfunction was detected in GLSDB ammunition, causing the separation section of the deployment block to fail, leading to GBU-39 misses. The Ukrainian Defense Forces have suspended the use of GBU-39 until the manufacturer resolves the issue, which is unrelated to GPS signal interference.
· Anonymous Telegram channels spread false information about an alleged emergency at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant which reportedly resulted in increased radiation levels in the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne regions.
Change in the line of contact (LoC):
· There were 122 combat engagements on various fronts.
· On the Kupyansk direction, Russian forces attacked positions held by the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the central and southeast sectors of Kyslivka, but only managed to advance in the eastern sector. Positional battles persisted in the areas of Berestove, Krokhmalne, Stelmakhivka, Kopanka, Raihorodka, Tverdokhlibove, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske.
· On the Lyman direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces regained control over previously lost positions near Kreminna, advanced east of Yampolivka, reclaiming positions along the windbreaks in that area.
· Positional battles persisted in the areas of Terny, Torske, Zarichne, near the Serebriansk Forest, and near Bilohorivka.
· On the Bakhmut direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled attacks by the enemy’s 6th and 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 2nd Army Corps in the areas of Verkhnyokamianske and Rozdolivka. Russian forces advanced to the eastern bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal south of Chasiv Yar, where underground sections of the canal are located. Enemy special operations forces intensified their activities during the night. Battles persisted near the “Novyi” neighborhood, Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, New York, Shumy, and Pivdenne. The enemy aviation continued to strike the area of the "Kanal" neighborhood.
· On the Avdiivka direction, the adversary is focused on achieving tactical success near Ocheretyne and Novokalynove. The enemy's penetration into Ukrainian defenses is assessed by the following indicators: 2.7 km along the front and 1.52 km in depth north of Novokalynove, 1.75 km along the front and 1.15 km in depth northwest of Ocheretyne towards Novooleksandrivka. The adversary advanced west of Semenivka and Berdychi.
· Battles persisted near Arkhanhelske, Sokol, Solovyove, Umanske, and Netaylove. Russian forces near Ocheretyne are located 13 km from the T0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.
· On the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces have advanced up to 450 meters along the front line of up to 1 kilometer on the northeast outskirts of Krasnohorivka. Combat operations were ongoing in the areas of Heorhiivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kostyantynivka. The 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 68th Army Corps of the enemy is advancing near Novomykhailivka.
· On the Berdyansk direction, units of the 5th Separate Tank Brigade of the 36th Army advanced up to 1 km near Staromayorske. The intensity of combat in the area of Velyka Novosilka has increased. Enemy aircraft are striking Ukrainian positions in this area with glide bombs. Positional battles persisted in the areas of Staromayorske, Urozhaine, Pryiutne, and Novodarivka.
· On the Orikhiv direction, the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Army have advanced to the western outskirts of Robotyne. Combat operations were ongoing northwest of Verbove. Enemy aviation operates at low altitudes, exploiting the limited capabilities of the Air Defense Forces of the Ukrainian Defense Forces on this direction.
· On the Kherson direction, the enemy launched mass shelling of Nestryha Island, attempted to land a landing force there, and recapture lost positions but suffered losses and retreated. Russian forces also unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions near Krynky.
· In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consists of:
o Mediterranean Sea: 2 ships, including 1 “Kalibr” sea launched cruise missile carrier. The total salvo is 16 cruise missiles.
Changes in the enemy disposition:
· The operational deployment of enemy "Sever (North)" Operational Grouping in its operational zone on the territory of the Russian Federation (border areas of Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod Oblasts of the Russian Federation) continues, with completion expected by May 7-8. The 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, and the 197th Separated C2 Battalion of the 44th Army Corps have arrived in Kursk Oblast. The 44th Army Corps comprises up to 3,700 personnel and up to 450 units of military equipment. The " Sever (North)" Operational Grouping has already deployed up to 50,000 personnel.
· The relocation of the 76th Airborne Division from the operational zone of the "Dnieper" Operational Grouping on the Orikhiv direction either to the "Zapad (West)" Operational Grouping in Luhansk Oblast or to the "South" Operational Grouping on the Kramatorsk direction is ongoing. One airborne battalion is currently in transit.
· Four Su-30SM fighters and four Su-25 attack aircraft have been moved from Eisk to Privolzhsky, Armavir airbases. Eight Su-25 attack aircraft from Taganrog are now at Budenovsk. Four MiG-31BM fighters from Primorsko-Akhtarsk have been redeployed to Privolzhsky. Two Su-35 fighters from Tikhoretsk are now stationed at Akhtubinsk. Five Su-30SM fighters from Krymsk are relocated to Privolzhsky. Four Su-25 attack aircraft from Millerovo are transferred to Budennovsk. Five Su-30SM fighters and five Su-24M bombers from Saki are now at Eisk. Two Su-35 fighters from Baltimore (Voronezh) are relocated to Lipetsk. After a missile strike by the Ukrainian Defense Forces on Kushchevskaya, up to seven Su-35 fighters from Akhtubinsk are moved. Overall, during the day 43 aircraft of various types were withdrawn from the area targeted by the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
Escalation indicators:
· The enemy is intensifying its efforts in the vicinity of Ocheretyne and increasing pressure on the flanks of this breach.
Possible operation situation developments:
· The forces of the 20th and 25th Army are unable to complete the forming operation on the Lyman direction and will not be able to occupy a favorable starting position for the offensive on Lyman and the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration before the beginning of summer.
· The adversary may attempt to bypass Chasiv Yar without directly assaulting the city, by operating from the south and southeast, while simultaneously forming a northern flank for the Toretsk operation. Russian forces may decide to advance north of the salient near Ocheretyne along the N20 Donetsk-Kostyantynivka highway to put pressure on the Ukrainian Defense Forces defending in the area of Toretsk, and possibly threaten the "Tavriya" OSG operational rear and the areas west of Chasiv Yar.
· The "Center" Operational Grouping command is focused on executing the following operational plan: to establish conditions for the blockade and encirclement of the Kurakhove area or to create advantageous circumstances for launching an offensive operation to encircle "Tavriya" OSG’s defense in Toretsk area from the south.
· The enemy's "Vostok" Operational Grouping is gearing up for active operations on the southern flank of the Kurakhove-Vuhledar bulge of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in coordination with the left flank of the "Yug" Operational Grouping, which is currently attempting to break through towards Kurakhove through Hryhorivka and Paraskoviivka-Kostyantynivka along the Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly Rivers.
· The isolation or complete capture of Kostyantynivka will significantly impair the Defense Forces' ability to maintain the frontline in the southern part of Donetsk Oblast, as it will disrupt the main logistical route along Highway N-20.
· In the imminent timeframe, the adversary will attempt to reach the Stara Mykolaivka-Sukha Balka line.
Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 05.01.24
Personnel - almost 469,840 (+1120);
Tanks 7,312 (+5);
Armored combat vehicles – 14,067 (+21);
Artillery systems – 12,024 (+13);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,053 (0);
Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 780 (+1);
Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,175 (+33);
Aircraft - 348 (0);
Helicopters – 325 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level – 9,538 (+7);
Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,126 (0);
Boats/ships – 27 (0).
Humanitarian+general:
· According to information provided by the Situation Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian forces shelled 10 regions of Ukraine over the past day. A total of 121 towns and villages and 138 infrastructure objects were attacked with various types of weapons. The number of casualties is being updated/clarified.
· Four people were injured as a result of Russian artillery shelling and a kamikaze drone strike on Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that occurred on the evening of April 30.
· During the night of May 1st, Russian occupying forces launched three Iskander-M ballistic missiles targeting densely populated areas of the city of Odesa. Three people were killed, and three others were injured in the attack.
· At 10:00 on May 1, Russian forces carried out airstrikes using guided aerial bombs targeting a car and a private residence in the village of Zolochiv, Bogodukhiv district, Kharkiv Oblast. The attack resulted in two fatalities and nine injuries. Around 16:10, the Russian army also shelled the village of Lyptsi. A 78-year-old woman sustained shrapnel wounds and later died.
· On the morning of May 1st, Russian military forces launched an attack on the village of Kalynove in Donetsk Oblast, resulting in the death of one individual and injuring two others. In the afternoon, Russian forces struck the city of Hirnyk in Donetsk Oblast with "Uragan" missile systems. A man and a woman were killed, while six others sustained injuries.
· One girl and two boys have been successfully brought back from the temporarily occupied territory of Kherson Oblast to the area under Ukrainian control. The 11-year-old girl was deprived of parental care and was at risk of ending up in an occupied orphanage. Accompanying her were two boys, aged 9 and 13. They were being cared for by their older adult brother on the occupied territory, who was at risk of being conscripted into the Russian army.
· Ukrainian court sentenced a serviceman from the 94th Operational Deployment Regiment of the Russian National Guard to 12 years in prison for raping a female resident of the occupied Kherson Oblast.
· Ivan Fedorov, the head of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Administration, announced plans to construct five underground schools in Zaporizhzhia city and the surrounding district. The objective is to offer the option for all interested children to resume in-person learning. Ultimately, the plan includes the establishment of 10 underground schools.
Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020. We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email at cds.dailybrief@gmail.com