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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Project Syndicate. Mostrar todas as postagens
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domingo, 8 de dezembro de 2024

Geralmente é The Rise and Fall, mas vamos ler The Fall and Rise of American Democracy - Daron Acemoglu Project Syndicate

The Fall and Rise of American Democracy

in World

by Daron Acemoglu

Project Syndicate, 04/12/2024

 

BOSTON – It should not have come as such a surprise that US voters were largely unmoved by the Democrats’ warnings that Donald Trump poses a grave threat to American institutions. In a January 2024 Gallup poll, only 28% of Americans (a record low) said that they were satisfied with “the way US democracy is working.”

American democracy has long promised four things: shared prosperity, a voice for the citizenry, expertise-driven governance, and effective public services. But US democracy – like democracy in other wealthy (and even middle-income) countries – has failed to fulfill these aspirations.

It wasn’t always so. For three decades following World War II, democracy delivered the goods, especially shared prosperity. Real (inflation-adjusted) wages increased rapidly for all demographic groups, and inequality declined. But this trend came to an end sometime in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, inequality has skyrocketed, and wages for workers without a college degree have barely increased. About half of the American workforce has watched incomes among the other half soar.

While the past ten years were somewhat better (the almost 40-year increase in inequality appears to have stopped sometime around 2015), the pandemic-induced surge in inflation took a big toll on working families, especially in cities. That is why so many Americans listed economic conditions as their main concern, ahead of democracy.

Equally important was the belief that democracy would give voice to all citizens. If something wasn’t right, you could let your elected representatives know. While this principle was never fully upheld – many minorities remained disenfranchised for much of American history – voter disempowerment has become an even more generalized problem over the past four decades. As the sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild puts it, many Americans, especially those without a college degree, living in the Midwest and the South, came to feel like “strangers in their own land.”

Worse, as this was happening, the Democrats moved from being the party of working people to becoming a coalition of tech entrepreneurs, bankers, professionals, and postgraduates who share very few priorities with the working class. Yes, right-wing media also stoked working-class discontent. But it could do so because mainstream media sources and intellectual elites ignored the economic and cultural grievances of a significant share of the public. This trend has also accelerated over the last four years, with highly educated segments of the population and the media ecosystem constantly emphasizing identity issues that further alienated many voters.

If this was simply a case of technocrats and intellectual elites setting the agenda, one could tell oneself that at least the experts were at work. But the promise of expertise-driven governance has rung hollow at least since the 2008 financial crisis. It was experts who had designed the financial system, supposedly for the common good, and made huge fortunes on Wall Street because they knew how to manage risk. Yet not only did this turn out to be untrue; politicians and regulators rushed to rescue the culprits, while doing almost nothing for the millions of Americans who lost their homes and livelihoods.

The public’s distrust of expertise has only grown, especially during the COVID-19 crisis, when issues such as lockdowns and vaccines became litmus tests for belief in science. Those who disagreed were duly silenced in the mainstream media and driven to alternative outlets with rapidly growing audiences.

That brings us to the promise of public services. The British poet John Betjeman once wrote that “Our nation stands for democracy and proper drains,” but democracy’s provision of reliable drains is increasingly in doubt. In some ways, the system is a victim of its own success. Starting in the nineteenth century, the United States and many European countries enacted legislation to ensure meritocratic selection and limit corruption in public services, followed by regulations to protect the public from new products, ranging from cars to pharmaceuticals.

But as regulations and safety procedures have multiplied, public services have become less efficient. For example, government spending per mile of highway in the US increased more than threefold from the 1960s to the 1980s, owing to the addition of new safety regulations and procedures. Similar declines in the productivity of the construction sector have been attributed to onerous land-use regulations. Not only have costs risen, but procedures designed to ensure safe, transparent, citizen-responsive practices have led to lengthy delays in all sorts of infrastructure projects, as well as deterioration in the quality of other services, including education.

In sum, all four pillars of democracy’s promise seem broken to many Americans. But this doesn’t mean that Americans now prefer an alternative political arrangement. Americans still take pride in their country and recognize its democratic character as an important part of their identity.

The good news is that democracy can be rebuilt and made more robust. The process must start by focusing on shared prosperity and citizen voice, which means reducing the role of big money in politics. Similarly, while democracy cannot be separated from technocratic expertise, expertise can certainly be less politicized. Government experts should be drawn from a broader range of social backgrounds, and it would also help if more were deployed at the local-government level.

None of this is likely to happen under the incoming Trump administration, of course. As an obvious threat to US democracy, he will erode many critical institutional norms over the next four years. The task of remaking democracy thus falls to center-left forces. It is they who must weaken their ties to Big Business and Big Tech and reclaim their working-class roots. If Trump’s victory serves as a wake-up call for the Democrats, then he may have inadvertently set in motion a rejuvenation of American democracy.

 

Daron Acemoglu, a 2024 Nobel laureate in economics and Institute Professor of Economics at MIT, is co-author (with Simon Johnson) of Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs, 2023).

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.

www.project-syndicate.org 

============

Grato a Maurício David pela transcrição, como a maior parte dos materiais aqui postados.

quarta-feira, 27 de novembro de 2024

The End of the Liberal West - Joschka Fischer (Social Europe)

 Ex-chanceler alemão:

The End of the Liberal West

Donald Trump’s reelection marks a critical moment for the global liberal order, forcing Europe to confront its vulnerabilities and redefine its future.

We all think, speak, and write within certain intellectual frameworks that we largely take for granted. But, eventually, the passage of time renders familiar categories and ideas obsolete. For example, who still talks about the “Soviet Union” today, apart from historians? 

In a similar vein, this year’s presidential election in the United States was the most significant political event of 2024, and it will almost certainly be remembered as a historical turning point. The outcome will shape global events for decades to come. 

The effects will be felt on two levels. The first is the more immediate, practical, operational level of day-to-day governance. With Donald Trump back in the White House, the US will withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, impose new tariffs on its trade partners, and launch a massive campaign to round up and expel millions of undocumented immigrants. Taken together, this all represents a fundamental shift in how the world’s most powerful country operates, and in what it represents. 

Then there is the global dimension, where many scenarios are possible – from major power shifts to the dissolution of long-standing alliances and the disintegration of the world’s governing institutions and norms. What will happen to transatlantic relations? What about Ukraine? Will the US develop closer ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes at the expense of the European Union and other allies? 

Trump won decisively despite his contempt for democratic institutions, his efforts to overturn the 2020 election, and his subsequent 34-count felony conviction. Though voters know about his chaotic approach to governance, his habitual mendacity, and his sinister immigration policies, he won every swing state. Even with full knowledge of who Trump is, more Americans voted for him than for Kamala Harris. 

We must not mince words: liberal democracy in the US has suffered a lethal blow. It will be under increasing pressure on both sides of the Atlantic, and there is no guarantee that it will survive. After all, can there be any future for the liberal West without the US as its leader? I believe the answer is no. 

Trump will begin his second term with Republican control over both houses of Congress, and many observers expect the 6-to-3 conservative majority on the Supreme Court to back him unequivocally. In June, the Court ruled, in a case brought by Trump, that presidents enjoy broad immunity from criminal prosecution for “official” acts. Thus, he will be able to govern – indeed, to rule – unimpeded. There is nothing to stop him from reshaping American liberal democracy into an illiberal oligarchy. 

Obviously, the pressure on European democracies to contribute more to their own security will intensify. But Trump has no interest in strengthening the EU – quite the opposite, in fact – and the EU’s capability to advance independently without the tacit support of the US is doubtful. Doing so would require a fundamental shift in Europeans’ political mentality, and such a change is currently nowhere in sight. Moreover, the Franco-German engine that has always propelled the EU is no longer operational, and no one knows when, or if, it will be restarted. 

Another major issue is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Will the current Israeli government now rush to annex the West Bank? What will it do about Iran, which has been amassing near-weapons-grade uranium? All signs point to a major war in the region – to a violent restructuring that will bring anything but peace or even a lasting ceasefire. 

That brings us to the final, all-important question: What will the world look like without a liberal West? For decades, the transatlantic alliance projected power (both hard and soft) and modeled the values that underpinned a cohesive global order. But now the global order is in the midst of a chaotic transition. 

If Europe fails to come together at this moment of tumultuous change, it will not get a second chance. Its only option is to become a military power capable of protecting its interests and securing peace and order on the world stage. The alternative is fragmentation, impotence, and irrelevance. The challenge is compounded by a massive technological shift toward digitalization and AI, as well as by Europe’s demographic crisis. Though the continent has too many elderly people and too few young people, it is increasingly opposed to immigration. 

So, what now? Will Europe prepare itself, or will it revert to a structure resembling the one that followed the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, in which Russia’s influence was dominant and pervasive? Europeans woke up on November 6 to a result that will affect them more profoundly than all their own elections combined. Trump will not only change America (for the worse); he will also shape European history – if we let him.

Copyright Project Syndicate

Joschka Fischer was Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.


segunda-feira, 25 de novembro de 2024

Trump vai ser bem sucedido? - A Trump Boom? Michael R. Strain (Project Syndicate)

 A Trump Boom?

Michael R. Strain

Project Syndicate, Nov 19, 2024


With his remarkable electoral comeback, Donald Trump has defined an era in American political history. But his legacy will depend on whether his policies advance long-term American prosperity by cutting taxes and boosting investment, or undermine it with trade wars and mass deportations.

 

WASHINGTON, DC – Donald Trump’s stunning and decisive return to power makes it official: We live in the Age of Trump. The 2008 global financial crisis was a turning point in history, and it is now clear that Trump is the dominant political figure of the post-crisis period.

Trump began his rise to power in 2015 and has towered over the current decade. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance will work to extend his legacy into the 2030s. Like Andrew Jackson in the nineteenth century and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the twentieth, Trump has created and defined an era in American political history.

But the strength and endurance of Trump’s legacy will depend on whether his policies advance long-term prosperity. As the saying goes, nothing succeeds like success. His first big opportunity will come immediately. With key provisions of Trump’s 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) – including lower individual tax rates and expansion of the child tax credit – set to expire at the end of 2025, Congress and the new administration will spend a considerable portion of the next year passing a new tax package.

Much of the focus will be on avoiding tax increases on households. But given that Republicans will control both the House of Representatives and Senate for the next two years, Trump also has an opportunity to extend tax cuts for businesses. Under an expiring TCJA provision, businesses are allowed to deduct the full cost of certain investments in the year the spending occurs, rather than over time. Such “full expensing” encourages more investment by increasing returns. The 2017 business tax cuts are already boosting investment and workers’ wages, as well as supporting multinational corporations’ domestic operations.

During next year’s tax negotiations, Trump should make full expensing a permanent part of the tax code, as he did with the corporate-rate reduction in 2017. He should aim to reduce the corporate rate further and to strengthen businesses’ incentive to engage in research and development.

Of course, additional tax cuts will increase deficits and debt, which, over the longer term, will reduce investment and weaken the positive economic effects of the tax cuts. There are three sources of revenue that Trump and Congress can tap to offset the revenue losses from reducing business taxes.

First, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) created around two dozen tax credits to encourage domestic clean-energy innovation and manufacturing, and provides a $7,500 credit for individual purchases of new battery-powered or hydrogen fuel-cell electric vehicles. The law will likely cost more than $1 trillion in its first decade, and trillions more after that. Congress and Trump should repeal the IRA and use part of the revenue to cut business taxes. Even partial repeal of the IRA – such as the subsidies for vehicle purchases – would provide ample revenue to offset the cost of tax cuts.

The second option is to raise revenue from households. Congress could allow some of the individual income tax cuts from 2017 to expire, and it could fully eliminate certain itemized deductions, including those for mortgage interest and state and local tax payments.

Finally, US lawmakers can pursue more fundamental tax reforms. The US income tax system is broken. Its maddening complexity introduces substantial economic distortions that slow growth and reduce wages. By taxing income, it discourages work, savings, and investment. The US political system has long been unable to change the tax code so that it can raise the revenue required to finance government spending.

Congress and Trump have a big opportunity to overhaul this system. Rather than taxing corporate income, they could implement a national consumption tax and a tax on business cash flows. With full expensing for investment, the latter would accelerate productivity and wage growth. On the household side, wages would be taxed but capital gains would not be, thus encouraging savings and investment. The tax on wages could match the progressivity of the current income tax system.

Because some consumption goods are imported and some are exported (and not consumed domestically), this system would require a border-adjustment provision. Imports would be taxed, and exports would not be. The border adjustment is not a tariff; but since it resembles one, Trump could sell it as delivering on his promise to support domestic production.

Beyond fixing US tax policies, Trump can also secure his pro-prosperity legacy through deregulation. To that end, he should replace Lina Khan, the controversial head of the US Federal Trade Commission who has chilled dealmaking throughout Joe Biden’s presidency. For good reason, Trump’s victory this month was met with a collective sigh of relief from business leaders, investors, and dealmakers, who have had to put mergers and acquisitions on hold.

Similarly, Trump is expected to rescind Biden’s executive order on AI regulation, which would have subordinated innovation, growth, and long-term prosperity to concerns about racial equity and minimizing job disruption. Biden’s approach is deeply misguided. As I explain in a recent paper, we should be grateful that policymakers of the past did not try to hold back or shape new technologies, and our children and grandchildren will be grateful to us if we continue this tradition. Trump has a chance to become the president who is remembered for ushering in the AI era.

But if nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like failure. The trade war that Trump launched during his first term did not meet its goal of weakening economic ties between the United States and China,  reduced US manufacturing employment, and rendered domestic manufacturing less competitive. A second trade war would threaten Trump’s legacy as one of the great pro-prosperity presidents.

Similarly, deporting several million undocumented immigrants – especially those who have not committed crimes – would disrupt business operations and require law enforcement to intrude into private businesses and communities in harmful ways.

Does Trump want to be remembered as a great champion of prosperity? Or as a president who blew out the deficit, chilled private-sector investment, and harmed businesses? After his astonishing political comeback, we will soon find out.


terça-feira, 12 de novembro de 2024

One Hundred Years of Fascism (2022) - Jason Stanley (Project Syndicate)

Trecho: 

Hitler drew inspiration from the US, which, following the rise of the America First movement, had adopted immigration policies that strictly favored Northern Europeans. Looking to the early American settlers’ genocide of the continent’s native peoples in the name of “Manifest Destiny,” he found a model for his own later actions in pursuit of Lebensraum (territorial expansion). And as historian Timothy Snyder shows in his 2015 book, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning, Hitler hoped to recreate the American Antebellum South’s slavery regime in Ukraine.

 

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF FASCISM

Jason Stanley

Project Syndicate, Longer Reades, Oct 28, 2022

 

https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/fascism-100-years-and-the-threat-today-by-jason-stanley-2022-10

 

For fascist parties and politicians to win elections, they usually must attract support from people who, if asked, would loudly reject the fascist label. But this need not be so difficult: voters merely have to be persuaded that democracy is no longer serving their interests.


NEW YORK – When Fascist Blackshirts marched through the streets of Rome at the end of October 1922, their leader, Benito Mussolini, had just been installed as prime minister. While Mussolini’s followers had already organized into militias and begun to terrorize the country, it was during the 1922 march, historian Robert O. Paxton writes, that they “escalated from sacking and burning local socialist headquarters, newspaper offices, labor exchanges, and socialist leaders’ homes to the violent occupation of entire cities, all without hindrance from the government.”

By this point, Mussolini and his Fascist Party had been normalized, because they had been brought into the center-right government the previous year as an antidote to the left. The government was in disarray, its institutions delegitimized, and leftist parties were squabbling among themselves. And Fascist violence had fueled disorder that Mussolini, like a racketeer, promised to resolve.

But while Mussolini presided over Fascism’s first real taste of political power, his movement was not the first of its kind. For that, one must look instead to the United States. As Paxton explains, “It may be that the earliest phenomenon that can be functionally related to fascism is American: The Ku Klux Klan … the first version of the Klan was arguably a remarkable preview of the way fascist movements were to function in interwar Europe.”


THE GREAT RACE TO THE BOTTOM

As important as these functional parallels between movements and organizations were, it is at the level of ideology that one finds the common denominator shared by American and European (especially German) variants of fascism. In 1916, the American eugenicist Madison Grant published The Passing of the Great Race, which decried the supposed replacement of whites in America by Black people and immigrants, including “Polish Jews.” According to Grant, these groups posed an existential threat to the “Nordic race” – America’s “native class.”

While Grant did not object to the presence of Black people in America, he insisted that they must be kept subordinate. His book was an exercise in scientific racism, arguing that “Nordic whites” are superior to all other races intellectually, culturally, and morally, and thus should command a dominant position in society. At the core of his worldview was a racialized version of American nationalism: Nordic whites were the only “real” Americans, but they were at risk of being “replaced” by other races. 

Grant tapped into a powerful political current of his time. In the years that followed, the “America First” movement would emerge to oppose “internationalism” and immigration. As Sarah Churchwell of the University of London notes in her brilliant 2018 book, Behold, America: The Entangled History of “America First” and “the American Dream,” in February 1921 US Vice President Calvin Coolidge “wrote an essay for Good Housekeeping called ‘Whose Country is This?’” Coolidge’s answer, as Churchwell recounts, was unambiguous: “‘Our country must cease to be regarded as a dumping ground’ and should only accept ‘the right kind of immigration.’” By that, he explicitly meant “Nordics.”

It was also in 1921, Churchwell notes, that the Second Ku Klux Klan adopted “America First” as part of its official credo. With its fevered commitment to white supremacy and traditional gender roles, the Second Klan focused its efforts on spreading paranoia about Jewish Marxists and their attempts to use labor unions to promote racial equality. Meanwhile, the American industrialist Henry Ford had been financing the publication and distribution of The International Jew, a compilation of articles that placed Jews at the center of a global conspiracy. Jews, Ford claimed, controlled American media and cultural institutions, and were bent on destroying the American nation.

One finds the same kind of racialized nationalism running through Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler’s 1924 prison manifesto. Hitler was incensed by the presence of foreigners, and especially Jews, in Vienna, but he made clear that his hatred was not for the Jewish religion. Before arriving in Vienna, he writes, Hitler had rejected anti-Semitism, because he saw it as a form of discrimination against Germans on the basis of religion.

But Hitler came to see Jews as the ultimate enemy, portraying them as members of a foreign race who had become assimilated in Germany in order to take it over. This, he claimed, would be achieved by loosening immigration laws to “open the borders,” encouraging intermarriage to destroy the Aryan race, and using control of the media and culture industries to destroy traditional German values. According to Nazi propaganda, Jews were the force behind international communism and the source of the mythical “stab in the back” that had supposedly caused Germany to lose World War I.

Hitler drew inspiration from the US, which, following the rise of the America First movement, had adopted immigration policies that strictly favored Northern Europeans. Looking to the early American settlers’ genocide of the continent’s native peoples in the name of “Manifest Destiny,” he found a model for his own later actions in pursuit of Lebensraum (territorial expansion). And as historian Timothy Snyder shows in his 2015 book, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning, Hitler hoped to recreate the American Antebellum South’s slavery regime in Ukraine.


THE MISRULE OF LAW

The fact that American racialized nativism and German fascism embodied shared practices, not just shared beliefs, merits closer attention. As the American legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw has shown, legal practices historically have enforced and perpetuated unjust hierarchies of value in ways that often go unnoticed. Hence, the point of anti-discrimination laws is not to offer special protections for any specific group – say, Black women; rather, it is to ensure that the law does not reproduce discriminatory social, political, and historical hierarchies of value.

This is one of the central insights of critical race theory (CRT), which evolved from the work of Crenshaw, Derrick Bell, and other scholars who have explored how legal practices perpetuate discrimination – sometimes as a side effect of motivated reasoning by those in power, and sometimes as a policy’s explicit intent. And, because CRT has become one of the most important theoretical tools in anti-fascist practice, it is also the new bugbear of the white nationalist right.

CRT urges us to recognize law as the core manifestation of a political ideology. In the case of fascism, citizenship is based on racial identity, which in turn rests on a founding myth of hierarchy and superiority. While a race-based conception of national identity was not central to Italian Fascism, it was the driving force behind Nazism. With the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, German citizenship came to be based on Aryan superiority. Only those of “German blood” could be German citizens with political rights. Jews, by dint of being non-Aryans, were excluded from citizenship and therefore stripped of political rights.

Not by coincidence, Black Americans had long suffered similar treatment in the post-Civil War American South. As James Q. Whitman of Yale Law School documents in Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, Nazi ideology borrowed straightforwardly from the Jim Crow regime’s use of legal practice to structure the nature of citizenship. While the Allied victory eventually ended German racial fascism in 1945, America’s Jim Crow regime would survive for another generation.


FASCIST BIG TENTS

The defeat of Nazi Germany had required America to overcome the power of the isolationist America First movement at home. But the draconian immigration policies that the movement had inspired in the 1920s were still in place in the 1930s, when America infamously turned away many Jewish refugees attempting to flee Europe ahead of the Holocaust.

In a 1939 Reader’s Digest essay titled “Aviation, Geography, and Race,” the leading spokesman of America First, the aviator Charles Lindbergh, wrote: “It is time to turn from our quarrels and to build our White ramparts again. This alliance with foreign races means nothing but death to us. It is our turn to guard our heritage from Mongol and Persian and Moor, before we become engulfed in a limitless foreign sea.” Lindbergh advocated neutrality in the war between Britain and Germany, regarding both as allies against open immigration into Europe and the US by non-white peoples.

In Germany, fascists had entered government as a result of their rapidly rising popularity in electoral politics, starting in 1928. The German economy had experienced a series of terrible shocks, from hyperinflation to soaring unemployment. Hitler’s Nazis, naturally, blamed these problems on Jews, communism, and international capitalism. Like Mussolini’s Blackshirts, they violently attacked leftists and provoked open street fighting – and then presented themselves as the only force that could restore order.

Nazi ideology appealed to multiple constituencies. With its promise to strengthen the nation by supporting traditional gender roles and the creation of large Aryan families, it appealed to religious conservatives. And with its hostility toward communism and socialism, it promised to protect big business from organized workers. The Nazis opposed capitalism only as a universal doctrine – that is, as one that granted Jews the right to property – and portrayed themselves as the protectors of Aryan private property against “Judeo-Bolshevism.”

On the cultural front, it bears emphasizing that fascist parties have always been violent defenders of a strictly binary conception of gender. In the 1920s, Berlin was a cultural boomtown and a center of emerging European gay life, which Nazi ideology associated with Jews. The city was also the site of Magnus Hirschfeld’s Institut für Sexuallewissenschaft, a vast library and archive housing a wide variety of gender expression. That made him one of the Nazi Party’s main enemies. When the Nazis started burning books, Hirschfeld’s library was among the first targets.

It is no surprise that fascists have always found common cause with religious conservatives. While fascism and Christianity forged an alliance of convenience in Italy and Germany, they all but fused into a single ideology elsewhere. In Romania, for example, the Legion of the Archangel Michael was both the most Christian and the most violently anti-Semitic of the European fascist parties.

In Brazil, a Catholic integralist form of fascism was imported directly from Italy by Plínio Salgado. The role of Christianity is also obvious in the structure of the Russian fascism that is ascendant today. Russians and Russia are depicted as the last defenders of Christianity against the heathen forces of decadent Western liberalism and gender fluidity. And, of course, Christianity has always animated American fascism, with its ideological core of white Christian nationalism.


FROM PUTSCH TO PARLIAMENT

By the end of the 1920s, the Nazis had managed to appeal to multiple groups that did not regard themselves as Nazis. And owing to the widespread distrust of more mainstream political parties and institutions, they became the second-largest parliamentary party after the 1930 election, and then the leading party following the election in 1932.

Though German conservatives looked askance at the Nazis, they regarded Hitler as preferable to any option on the left. Thus, with the support of the conservative establishment, Hitler was appointed chancellor by Germany’s president in 1933. While Hitler had made his virulent opposition to democracy abundantly clear in his statements and writings, German conservatives handed him power anyway, demonstrating – at best – unforgivable naivete.

In fact, every canonical example of European fascists’ success in the twentieth century involved political parties coming to power through the normal electoral process, after having broadcast their anti-democratic sentiments and sometimes even their express intentions. Conservative leaders and voters chose fascism over democracy, believing that they would win out in the end.1

For a fascist party to triumph, it must attract support from people who, if asked, would loudly deny that they share its ideology. This need not be so difficult: voters merely have to be persuaded that democracy is no longer serving their interests.


FASCISM TODAY

If we think of fascism as a set of practices, it is immediately evident that fascism is still with us. As Toni Morrison pointed out in a 1995 speech, the US has often preferred fascist solutions to its national problems. Consider, for example, the Prison Policy Initiative’s findings on global incarceration rates in 2021: “Not only does the US have the highest incarceration rate in the world; every single US state incarcerates more people per capita than virtually any independent democracy on earth.”

This is a burden that falls disproportionately on the formerly enslaved population of the country. And unlike in many other democracies, prisoners in 48 US states cannot legally vote. In Florida, strict disenfranchisement laws strip one million people – enough to shift the state’s partisan leaning toward Republicans – with past felony records of their voting rights. And under the state’s current Republican governor, Ron DeSantis, an election police force has been created to address a nonexistent epidemic of voter fraud. In the run-up to the 2022 midterm elections, there have been highly publicized arrests of Black people with felony records who thought they could vote (and who, in some cases, had received confusing messages about the matter from the state).

We should recognize this for what it is: the return of Jim Crow tactics designed to intimidate Black voters. Unlike the Third Reich, the Jim Crow regime never suffered defeat and elimination in war. Instead, its practices have quietly persisted in varying forms, often serving as a model for laws like those in Florida. In most cases, racist laws are made to appear racially neutral. Literacy tests for voting, for example, are ostensibly neutral but discriminatory in fact.

Nor is this tactic confined to the US. In India, the Hindu nationalist ruling party has created a national registry to codify citizenship and expel “illegal immigrants,” cynically exploiting the fact that a significant number of Indian Muslims lack official documentation. Hindu nationalists can now target Indian Muslims and threaten them with deportation to Bangladesh. At the same time, the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act gives non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan a fast track to citizenship.

The manipulation of citizenship laws to privilege one group as the true representatives of the nation is a feature of all fascist movements. As Tobias Hübinette of Karlstad University has pointed out, Sweden’s far-right party, the Sweden Democrats, has “a direct organizational lineage tracing back to World War II-era Nazism.” Its platform asserts a racially homogenous Swedish national identity, and its candidates have “campaigned openly for the installation of a repatriation program with the explicit purpose of making non-Western immigrants move back to their countries of origin.” In the September 2022 election, the Sweden Democrats became the second-largest party in parliament– echoing the Nazi Party’s achievement in 1930.

Far-right leaders elsewhere in Europe have also been openly campaigning against multiracial democracy, though Muslim minorities have been substituted for the massacred Jewish population as the Fifth Column in their “Great Replacement” theory. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used the courts and the law to silence opposition media and peddle a Christian nationalist nostalgia for a lost greater Hungary. By stoking fears of sexual and religious minorities, he has shown how a leader can win elections time and again while openly campaigning against the press, universities, and democracy itself.


A NEW WAVE?

In the century since Mussolini’s March on Rome, leaders and parties who openly run against democracy all too easily prevail in elections. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro has called for removing democratic institutions and repeatedly praised the country’s former military dictatorship. And despite his disastrous first term, he stands a decent chance of winning in the second-round vote on October 30. And in the US, the Republican Party has become a cult of personality beholden to a white nationalist leader who led an effort – most of which he plotted in the open – to overthrow American democracy.

Fascists can win when social conservatives decide that fascism is the lesser evil. They can win when enough citizens decide that ending democracy is a reasonable price to pay for achieving some cherished goal – like the criminalization of abortion. They can win when a dominant cohort chooses to end democracy in order to preserve its cultural, financial, and political primacy. They can win when they attract votes from those who merely want to thumb their noses at the system or lash out in resentment. And they can win when business elites decide that democracy is just a substitutable input.

Fascist parties feed a longing for national innocence, which is why they run on narratives of national glory that erase past crimes. Hence, some parents will support fascist parties – while vehemently disclaiming the label of fascism for themselves – to prevent their children from learning about the racist legacies that underpin the persistence of racist outcomes.

Today, as in the past, fascist movements often have a powerful symbolic dimension that makes them contagious internationally. In the figure of Giorgia Meloni, Italy has its first far-right leader since Mussolini. Having long promoted admiration of Mussolini’s legacy and hatred of immigrants and sexual minorities in her pursuit of party and government positions, Meloni’s ascension to the Italian premiership is a potent symbol for global fascism.

Finally, the world has its most openly fascist leader since Hitler in the figure of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has demonstrated why we must never become complacent about this ideology and its implications. Putin’s genocidal war against Ukraine shows that he is not a pragmatic actor, but rather a fanatic seeking to recreate a lost Russian empire. In mustering such effective resistance, the Ukrainians have confirmed the ancient truth suggested in Pericles’s famous funeral oration: democracies fight better than tyrannies, because democratic citizens fight by their own choice.

When institutions have been delegitimized for presiding over enormous economic disparities, cronyism, and generational crises, massive social change becomes possible. Sometimes, that change is positive, as when the labor movement helped establish the weekend, improve workplace safety, and abolish child labor. But such moments are inherently perilous. Fascism is the dark side of liberation, and history shows that it is often what democratic polities will prefer.


Jason Stanley, Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, is the author of Erasing History: How Fascists Rewrite the Past to Control the Future (Atria/One Signal Publishers, 2024).

 

terça-feira, 23 de julho de 2024

Unlocking IMF Reform - Barry Eichengreen (Project Syndicate)

Unlocking IMF Reform

Sketching a reform agenda for the International Monetary Fund is easy; implementing reform is hard. It will require, among other things, the US to give up its veto in the institution, and China to assume more responsibility for global stability and the problems of other economies.

In July 1944, exactly 80 years ago, representatives of 44 countries met in an obscure New Hampshire village to negotiate the Bretton Woods Agreement establishing the International Monetary Fund. For many, reaching the ripe old age of 80 would be cause for celebration. For the IMF, the anniversary only highlights the urgency of reform.

Some necessary reforms are straightforward and widely agreed, raising the question of why they haven’t been adopted. First, the IMF should provide its members with regular annual allocations of its in-house financial instrument, special drawing rights. This would provide an alternative to the US dollar as a source of global liquidity while also addressing the problem of chronic global imbalances. Second, the IMF needs to do better at organizing debt restructurings for low-income countries. Its latest attempt, the rather grandly named Common Framework for Debt Treatments, has fallen short. The Fund needs to push harder for cooperation from China’s government and financial institutions, which are unfamiliar with the responsibilities of a sovereign creditor. It should support reforms to speed up restructurings and endorse initiatives to crack down on holdout creditors.

In terms of its surveillance of countries’ policies, the IMF needs to address its perceived lack of evenhandedness; whereas emerging and developing countries are held to demanding standards, high-income countries like the United States are let off the hook. It needs to reinvigorate its analysis of the cross-border spillovers of large-country policies, a process the US has managed to squelch. 

As for its lending policies, the IMF needs to decouple loan size from an anachronistic quota system and reduce the punitive interest rates charged middle-income countries. To ensure the best possible leadership, the managing director should be selected through a competitive process, where candidates submit statements and sit for interviews, after which shareholding governments vote. The victor should be the most qualified individual and not just the most qualified European, as has historically been the case.

Most of all, the IMF must acknowledge that it can’t be everything for everyone. Under recent managing directors, it has broadened its agenda from its core mandate, preserving economic and financial stability, to encompass gender equity, climate change, and other nontraditional issues. These are not topics about which the IMF’s macroeconomists have expertise. The IMF’s own internal watchdog, the Independent Evaluation Office, has rightly warned that venturing into these areas can overstretch the Fund’s human and management resources. Admittedly, the IMF can’t ignore climate change, since climate events affect economic and financial stability. Women’s education, labor force participation, and childcare arrangements belong on its agenda insofar as they have implications for economic growth and hence for debt sustainability. Fundamentally, however, gender-related policies and climate-change adaptation are economic-development issues. They require long-term investments. As such, they fall mainly within the bailiwick of the World Bank, the IMF’s sister institution across 19th Street in Washington. 

An advantage of an agenda focused on the IMF’s core mandate is that national governments are more likely to give the Fund’s management and staff the freedom of action needed to move quickly in response to developments threatening economic and financial stability. The IMF lacks the independence of national central banks. Currently, decision-making is slow by the standards of financial crises, which move fast. Decisions must be approved by an executive board of political appointees who in turn answer to their governments. But central-bank independence is viable only because central bankers have a narrow mandate focused on price stability, against which their actions can be judged. For a quarter-century, observers have argued that a more independent, fleet-footed IMF would be better. But the more the institution dilutes its agenda, the more such independence resembles a pipedream. The other factor underpinning the viability of central-bank independence is that monetary policymakers at the national level are accountable to legitimate political actors, generally parliaments and ministers. The legitimacy of IMF accountability is more dubious, owing to the institution’s governance structure. For antiquated reasons, the US – and only the US – possesses a veto over consequential IMF decisions. Europe is overrepresented in the institution, while China is underrepresented. Until these imbalances are corrected, the Fund’s governance will remain under a shadow. This not only makes the prospect of operational independence even more remote; it also stands in the way of virtually all meaningful reforms, including the straightforward changes listed above. Sketching a reform agenda for the IMF is easy. Implementing it is hard. Real reform will require the US to give up its veto in the institution. It will require China to assume more responsibility for global stability and the problems of other economies. And it will require the US and China to work together. For two countries that haven’t shown much ability to cooperate in recent years, IMF reform would be a good place to start. 

Barry Eichengreen

Writing for PS since 2003 
195 Commentaries

Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a former senior policy adviser at the International Monetary Fund. He is the author of many books, including In Defense of Public Debt (Oxford University Press, 2021).