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Mostrando postagens com marcador Project Syndicate. Mostrar todas as postagens
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segunda-feira, 22 de janeiro de 2024

The global consequences of the war in Ukraine - Joschka Fischer (Social Europe)

 


The global consequences of the war in Ukraine

JOSCHKA FISCHER

That Russia lacks the means to achieve its neo-imperial vision will not stop it from pursuing it to the bitter end.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022 changed everything for Ukraine, for Europe and for global politics. The world entered a new era of great-power rivalry in which war could no longer be excluded. Apart from the immediate victims, Russia’s aggression most concerned Europe. A great power seeking to extinguish an independent smaller country by force challenges the core principles upon which the European order of states has organised itself for decades.

The war of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, stands in stark contrast to the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, which occurred in a largely non-violent manner. Since the Mikhail Gorbachev ‘miracle’—when the Soviet Union started pursuing liberalising reforms under him in the 1980s—Europeans had begun to imagine that Immanuel Kant’s vision of perpetual peace on the continent might be possible. It was not.

Historical revision

The problem was that many Russian elites’ interpretation of the globally significant events of the late 1980s could not be more opposed to Kant’s idea. They saw the demise of the great Russian empire (which the Soviets had recreated) as a devastating defeat. Though they had no choice but to accept the humiliation, they told themselves they would do so only temporarily until the balance of power had changed. Then the great historical revision could begin.

Thus, the 2022 attack on Ukraine should be viewed as merely the most ambitious of the revisionist wars Russia has waged since Putin came to power. We can expect many more, especially if Donald Trump returns to the White House and effectively withdraws the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But Putin’s latest war not only changed the rules of coexistence on the European continent; it also changed the global order. By triggering a sweeping remilitarisation of foreign policy, the war has seemingly returned us to a time, deep in the 20th century, when wars of conquest were a staple of the great-power toolkit. Now, as then, might makes right.

Cold war

Even during the decades-long cold war, there was no risk of a ‘new Sarajevo’—the political fuse that detonated the first world war—because the standoff between two nuclear superpowers subordinated all other interests, ideologies and political conflicts. What mattered were the superpowers’ own claims to power and stability within the territories they controlled. The risk of another world war had been replaced by the risk of mutually assured destruction, which functioned as an automatic stabiliser within the bipolar system of the cold war.

Behind Putin’s war on Ukraine is the neo-imperial goal that many Russian elites share: to make Russia great again by reversing the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union. On December 8th 1991, the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine met in Białowieża National Park and agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, reducing a ‘superpower’ to a regional (albeit still nuclear-armed) power in the form of the Russian Federation.

No, Putin does not want to revive the communist Soviet Union. Today’s Russian elite knows that the Soviet system could not be sustained. Putin has embraced autocracy, oligarchy and empire to restore Russia’s status as a global power, but he also knows that Russia lacks the economic and technological prerequisites to achieve this on its own.

For its part, Ukraine wants to join the west—meaning the European Union and the transatlantic security community of NATO. Should it succeed, it would probably be lost to Russia for good, and its own embrace of western values would pose a grave danger to Putin’s regime. Ukraine’s modernisation would lead Russians to ask why their political system had consistently failed to achieve similar results. From a ‘Great Russia’ perspective, it would compound the disaster of 1991. That is why the stakes in Ukraine are so high, and why it is so hard to imagine the conflict ending through compromise.

Junior partner

Even in the case of an armistice along the frozen front line, neither Russia nor Ukraine will distance themselves politically from their true war aims. The Kremlin will not give up on the complete conquest and subjugation (if not annexation) of Ukraine, and Ukraine will not abandon its goal of liberating all its territory (including Crimea) and joining the EU and NATO. An armistice thus would be a volatile interim solution involving the defence of a highly dangerous ‘line of control’ on which Ukraine’s freedom and Europe’s security depended.

Since Russia no longer has the economic, military and technological capabilities to compete for the top spot on the world stage, its only option is to become a permanent junior partner to China, implying quasi-voluntary submission under a kind of second Mongol vassalage. Let us not forget: Russia survived two attacks from the west in the 19th and 20th centuries—by Napoleon I and Adolf Hitler, respectively. The only invaders who have conquered it were the Mongols in the winter of 1237-38. Throughout Russia’s history, its vulnerability in the east has had far-reaching consequences.

The main geopolitical divide of the 21st century will centre on the Sino-American rivalry. Though Russia will hold a junior position, it nonetheless will play an important role as a supplier of raw materials and—owing to its dreams of empire—as a permanent security risk. Whether this will be enough to satisfy Russian elites’ self-image is an open question.

Joschka Fischer was Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.

Copyright Project Syndicate 2024, ‘The global consequences of the war in Ukraine


domingo, 12 de novembro de 2023

Project Synducate tem um número especialmente interessante este 12/11/2023

 

This week at Project Syndicate, Nouriel Roubini warns that markets are assigning far too low a probability to worst-case scenarios in the Middle East; Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson criticize American leaders' failure to consider why China exhibits the strengths that it does; Melissa Parke shows how artificial intelligence can make nuclear war more likely; and more.

Economics & Finance

The Economic Consequences of the Gaza War


Nouriel Roubini outlines four scenarios for how the conflict could play out and affect markets and the global economy.

Economics & Finance

America’s Real China Problem


Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson shine a light on the institutions underpinning US rivals’ apparent strengths and comparative advantages.
The Oligarchs’ Grip: Fusing Wealth and Power


Sponsored by De Gruyter

The Oligarchs’ Grip: Fusing Wealth and Power

By David Lingelbach and Valentina Rodríguez Guerra

“The book argues oligarchs are opportunists. They seize their big chance during times of turmoil.”
– Financial Times

Innovation & Technology

Preventing AI Nuclear Armageddon


Melissa Parke warns that applying artificial intelligence to weapons systems compounds an already unacceptable risk.

Economics & Finance

Doing Economic Nationalism the Right Way


Dani Rodrik touts East Asian developmentalism as an enduring model for shaping domestic strategies.
PS Longer Reads: The Hidden Gender Wealth Gap

The Hidden Gender Wealth Gap


Céline Bessière and Sibylle Gollacdocument an underappreciated form of inequality that threatens to set women back once again.

Politics & World Affairs

Preparing for a Russian Nuclear Meltdown


Bennett Ramberg urges American policymakers to start planning for scenarios in which Vladimir Putin’s regime collapses.

Economics & Finance

An Industrial Strategy for Europe


Daniel Gros explains why the EU needs to look beyond direct subsidies to boost the continent’s tech sector.
PS Big Question: Will the Israel-Hamas War Spread?

Will the Israel-Hamas War Spread?


Comfort EroNegar MortazaviDjavad Salehi-Isfahani, and Sinan Ülgen assess the likely behavior of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.

Politics & World Affairs

The Wars of the New World Order


Brahma Chellaney examines the forces and trends that are driving a global geopolitical reckoning.

Economics & Finance

Certain Uncertainty in the US Bond Market


Barry Eichengreen thinks that investors who are piling back into US Treasuries could be in for a rude awakening.
PS Say More: Jayati Ghosh on greedflation, debt, corporate taxation, and more

Jayati Ghosh on greedflation, debt, corporate taxation, and more


Jayati Ghosh argues that advanced-economy rate hikes were unnecessary and damaging, proposes ways to reduce the power of agribusiness, and more.

Innovation & Technology

The Attention Economy Goes to Court


J. Bradford DeLong examines the arguments being put to the test in the antitrust case against Google.

Politics & World Affairs

How Poland Won Back Its Democracy


Maciej Kisilowski highlights five critical factors that propelled the country’s anti-populist opposition to victory.

domingo, 17 de setembro de 2023

O G20 (doravante G21) NÃO É o grupo mais importante - Jim O’Neill, Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Project Syndicate)

 O criador do acrônimo BRIC em 2001 (como mera carteira de investimentos para fundos institucionais), já deformado para BRICS em 2011, e agora totalmente desfigurado para BRICS+, com a inclusão de seis novos membros muito pouco representativos, acha que nem esse “grupo” (a serviço da China), nem o G7, a coalizão formada nos anos 1970 com as economias então dominantes, representam a base de um entendimento global. Ele está totalmente enganado: a declaração final do G20 de Nova Delhi — a partir de agora G21, com a inclusão da União Africana — não reflete nenhum consenso global, nem sobre os desafios comuns (meio ambiente e problemas sociais e desequilibrios entre regiões), nem sobre o mais importante desafio à paz e segurança internacionais: a guerra de agressão contra a Ucrânia pela Rússia de Putin (sequer mencionados na Declaração). Adicionalmente, a UA não é, nem nunca será o equivalente da UE, na economia  mundiais. Jim O’Neill equivocou-se na sua análise: o mumdo está tão fragmentado atualmente como esteve na primeira Guerra Fria.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The G20 Wins the Group Battle

Jim O’Neill
Project Syndicate, September 16, 2023

The joint declaration that emerged from last week’s summit in New Delhi offered further confirmation that the G20 is the only body with the scope and legitimacy to offer truly global solutions to global problems. Alternative groupings such as the G7 and the new expanded BRICS look like sideshows in comparison.

London - NDON – Following the recent summit of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), where the group agreed to add six new  members I argued 


that neither it nor the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – plus the European Union) has the credibility or the capacity to tackle global challenges. That leaves the G20 (comprising 19 of the world’s largest economies, plus the EU) as the only grouping with the legitimacy to offer truly global solutions to global problems.

The joint declaration that emerged from last week’s G20 summit in New Delhi provides further confirmation of this. Member states reached a consensus to address a wide range of issues. Despite obvious challenges – such as the considerable differences in how member states operate – they managed to reassert the G20’s relevance after a lengthy period in which its role had been called into question.


We should applaud those who played the biggest roles – presumably India and the US – in pushing through the final communiqué. The New Delhi declaration could be the first step in a stronger concerted effort to address global issues like climate change, the need for a revamped World Bank, infectious disease control, economic stability, the war in Ukraine, and other matters. Though this agenda was agreed in the absence of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Russian and Chinese representatives who did attend would not have signed on to anything without having cleared it with their respective governments.

Many speculate that Xi skipped the summit in order to snub India – one of China’s longstanding rivals – and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Whatever the motive, his decision had the effect of undermining the significance of the recent BRICS meeting, which many saw as a victory for China.

As I argued last month, the lack of Indo-Chinese solidarity will be a major stumbling block for the new BRICS. Now, Xi’s absence from the G20 summit has deepened the divide between the two countries. If Xi wants to convince us otherwise, he will need to reach out to Modi. As matters stand, the success of the G20 meeting makes Modi the clear winner in this season of summitry. Perceptions matter, and right now he looks more like a visionary statesman than Xi does.

Moreover, the G20 achieved another subtle, but important, step by agreeing to expand its ranks to include the African Union – making it a G21. This breakthrough gives Modi a clear diplomatic victory, allowing him to burnish his image as a champion of the Global South. It also further underscores the seemingly random nature of the BRICS’ own expansion, which includes Egypt and Ethiopia, but not other, more important African countries, such as Nigeria. The big question now is whether a permanent seat at the table will make the African Union itself a more effective body.

quarta-feira, 2 de agosto de 2023

Lula’s Dance with Dictators - Andres Velasco (PS)

Lula’s Dance with Dictators

Project Syndicate, Aug 1, 2023

Brazil's president has enjoyed much international goodwill since returning to the presidency, but only because his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, was so thuggish and anti-democratic. Sadly, now Lula is consorting with tyrants who make even the awful Bolsonaro look good.

LONDON – When a right-wing politician with authoritarian leanings (think Donald Trump) courts a genocidal dictator like Vladimir Putin, we recoil in distaste but are not surprised. But when a former human-rights advocate and working-class hero backs dictators guilty of abominable butchery, shock is followed by abhorrence. That is how I feel watching Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, embrace Putin and Venezuelan tyrant Nicolás Maduro. Lula’s is a moral failure of appalling proportions. 

Start with his love-in with Maduro, which is less well-known globally. At a regional summit in late May, progressive activists gasped when Lula claimed that human-rights violations and anti-democratic practices in Venezuela are just a “narrative construction.” This in a country where, according to Human Rights Watch, “police and military units have killed and tortured with impunity in low-income communities,” and “authorities harass and persecute journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society organizations.” 

When other Latin American leaders protested, Lula moved from the political to the personal. Recall that Lula was tried and convicted for corruption, and went to jail under a 12-year sentence until his conviction was annulled by the Supreme Court in a decision that, according to the Financial Times, “remains controversial.” The accusations against Maduro, Lula blurted out, were “like the lies against me, which no one managed to prove.” 

At one time, Lula might have considered the report on Venezuela by the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, which documented “grave rights violations,” as sufficient proof. Not anymore. 

Having honed his skills at coddling one dictator, Lula moved on to Putin. Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, then-candidate Lula told Timemagazine that Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky bore equal responsibility for the war. A year later, he is yet to change his mind. 

Before the recent European Union-Latin America summit, Lula led a group of countries that first vetoed an invitation to Zelensky and then insisted that the communiqué contain no condemnation of Russian aggression. And that was after he had invited Russian’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, to Brasília where, predictably, Lavrov thanked his Brazilian hosts for their “clear understanding” of the situation in Ukraine.

Lula behaves this way for the same reason that babies suck on their toes: because he can. In Latin America, several governments (Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay among them) object, but none of them is big or influential enough to push Lula off course. The United States and major European countries find his position indefensible (“Brazil is parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda without at all looking at the facts,” said the US National Security Council spokesman), but they have too much going on elsewhere to pick a fight with Brazil. 

Some argue that Brazil is seeking to carve room for an “independent” foreign policy (read: independent from Washington, as evidenced not only by Lula’s coolness toward Ukraine, but also by his repeated criticism of the dollar’s role as a global reserve currency). An independent foreign policy sounds fine, but why does it have to include turning a blind eye to atrocities? France and the Scandinavian countries, among many others, would insist that they run their foreign affairs autonomously, but they do not mince words when it comes to condemning Russia for the carnage it has caused. 

Others claim that Brazil is playing peacemaker by refusing to take sides and insisting that talks between the warring parties be held. But telling the Ukrainians they have to negotiate now is like telling a man who is being attacked by a knife-wielding maniac that he should engage in frank and fruitful dialogue with his assailant. And the idea that Brazil will mediate between two countries at the other side of the world is plainly absurd. When the time comes for talks, maybe India will help. Perhaps Turkey or China will send a representative who can sit at the table. But… Brazil? Really? 

Yet another fanciful view is that Brazil is leading a Global South that will no longer tolerate Western colonialism. So far, so good. But what is Putin’s war if not an instance of colonialism, in which an imperial power is bent on subjugating a smaller neighbor and annexing its territory? Are some imperialists better than others? 

Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric, a tattooed 37-year-old former student activist and proud leftist, doesn’t think so. Boric has been outraged at Lula’s coddling of both Maduro and Putin. He publicly denied that abuses in Venezuela were just a “narrative” and denounced Russia’s “imperial aggression” at the EU-Latin America summit. “Today it is Ukraine” he warned, but “tomorrow it could be any of us.” 

In response, Lula again made it personal, telling media that Boric had misspoken because it was his first EU summit and he was probably “a little anxious.” The spectacle of the 77-year-old Lula talking down to another head of state, 40 years his junior, made even some far-left friends of mine shudder. 

Lula’s stance is rooted in vanity and domestic politics. The vanity springs from a vision of Brazil as a global player, strutting the world stage in the company of its fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). But to behave as though Brazil could wield global power comparable to China’s, or even India’s, is pure folly. The summit pageantry is pleasant, but the substance remains scanty. 

And the BRICS’ track record on defending peace and non-intervention is not exactly stellar. One of their summits took place just after Russia had illegally annexed Crimea. The world begged them to disinvite Putin. They declined. 

The politics is even more mundane. Brazil’s economy is growing more this year than pundits had anticipated, but the global scenario of high interest rates and low growth (in addition to very high domestic public debt) does not bode well. Moreover, Lula’s party does not have a parliamentary majority, so it must negotiate legislation with the opposition. Given somber prospects at home, photo opportunities abroad look particularly appealing. 

Lula has enjoyed much international goodwill since returning to the presidency, but only because his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, was so thuggish and anti-democratic. Sadly, now Lula is consorting with tyrants who make even the awful Bolsonaro look good.