Zelenskiy’s 'victory plan' to EU, NATO - Andrew Gray

Ukraine's Zelenskiy to pitch 'victory plan' to EU, NATO By Andrew Gray Reuters, October 16, 202411:42 PM Summary Ukrainian leader takes blueprint to Brussels Plan includes call for NATO invitation Kyiv's key allies have not endorsed plan so far Moscow says Ukraine needs to 'sober up' BRUSSELS, Oct 17 (Reuters) - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy takes his "victory plan" to the European Union and NATO on Thursday, pitching for a NATO membership invitation and a major increase in military support for Kyiv's campaign against Russia's invasion. Zelenskiy's plan contains requests that Ukraine's allies have so far declined to grant, such as a call for an invitation to join the U.S.-led NATO military alliance and permission to use Western weapons to strike deep inside Russia. Zelenskiy presented the plan to Ukraine's parliament on Wednesday at a critical time, as Moscow's forces advance in the east, a bleak winter of power cuts looms and a U.S. presidential election casts uncertainty over the future of Western support. On Thursday, he brings the plan, which he said could end the war "no later than next year", to a summit of European Union leaders and a meeting of NATO defence ministers, both in Brussels. He has already presented the five-point blueprint, which Zelenskiy said has three secret annexes, to key Western leaders such as U.S. President Joe Biden. While voicing strong support for Kyiv, none has given the plan a full-throated endorsement. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on Wednesday the plan represented "a strong signal" from Zelenskiy but added: "That doesn't mean that I here can say I support the whole plan. That would be a bit difficult, because there are many issues." Rutte said NATO's 32 members would have to discuss the plan in detail to understand it better. "You will have maybe some different views on particular aspects of the plan, but that doesn't say that we are not standing squarely behind Ukraine," he said. NATO MEMBERSHIP CALL NATO has declared that Ukraine will become a member, without saying when. But it cannot join while at war, as this would draw the alliance directly into a conflict with Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has cited Ukraine's potential membership of NATO as a reason for the invasion. Zelenskiy argued NATO could issue an invitation now, even if membership itself comes further down the line. "We understand that NATO membership is a matter for the future, not the present," he told the Ukrainian parliament. "But Putin must see that his geopolitical calculations are failing. The Russian people must feel this, that their 'tsar' has lost geopolitically to the world." The Kremlin said it was too early to comment in detail on the plan, but that Kyiv needed to "sober up" and realise the futility of the policies it was pursuing. Zelenskiy said his plan also proposes establishing a "comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package" inside Ukraine to protect against threats from Russia and to destroy its military power. He did not elaborate. The plan also offers the West a role in developing Ukraine's natural mineral resources and proposes Ukrainian troops could replace some U.S. forces in Europe. The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here. Reporting by Andrew Gray, Sabine Siebold and Lili Bayer; Writing by Andrew Gray; Editing by Bill Berkrot. Andrew Gray is Reuters' European Affairs Editor. Based in Brussels, he covers NATO and the European Union and leads a pan-European team of reporters focused on diplomacy, defence and security. A journalist for almost 30 years, he has previously been based in the UK, Germany, Geneva, the Balkans, West Africa and Washington, where he reported on the Pentagon. He covered the Iraq war in 2003 and contributed a chapter to a Reuters book on the conflict. He has also worked at Politico Europe as a senior editor and podcast host, served as the main editor for a fellowship programme for journalists from the Balkans, and contributed to the BBC's From Our Own Correspondent radio show.

UN Resolution, "Uniting for Peace" in favor of Ukraine - Anton Geraschenko, Christian Tomuschat

 Hoje no Mundo Militar liked

Anton Gerashchenko

@Gerashchenko_en

It is very important! I ask for maximum dissemination and cooperation! Let's do it! There is a UN Resolution commonly known as "Uniting for Peace" resolution. It was adopted in 1950 and states that if the UN Security Council cannot reach an agreement on urgent international peace matters, then the responsibility for this is handed over to UN General Assembly (where there is no veto power). Here is a Wikipedia article about this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_377 UN Security Council is scheduled to meet on January 10th regarding Russia using missiles from North Korea in Ukraine. With Russia having veto power in the Security Council, isn't that the right time to put this resolution in action? One of the most serious consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine is destroying the global security system as now it is de-facto not functioning. Without firm, decisive actions, without a clear position, the world will plummet into chaos and constant wars.

Uniting for Peace

General Assembly resolution 377 (V)

New York, 3 November 1950

By Christian Tomuschat

Professor emeritus at Humboldt University, Berlin

 

https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html

 

(Paper from 2008)

 

On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title “Uniting for Peace”. The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea. At the initial stage of this armed conflict, in June 1950, the Security Council had been able to recommend to the Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950). The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence the Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of nine members “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The majority of the members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22). Given that its protests remained fruitless, the USSR sent again, as from August 1950, a delegation to the meetings of the Council which cast a negative vote on a United States draft resolution condemning the continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities. In order to overcome this impasse, the United States, under the leadership of its Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson, succeeded in persuading the General Assembly that it should claim for itself a subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace and security, as enunciated by Article 14 of the Charter. The result of these efforts was resolution 377 A (V).

The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that where the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly shall seize itself of the matter. Procedural and substantive steps are suggested. First of all, if the Assembly is not in session, it may meet in emergency special session at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of its own members. Second, such a session shall be convened with a view to making appropriate recommendations for “collective measures…including the use of armed force when necessary”. As also the language of the resolution clearly reveals, the General Assembly can never be a full substitute for the Security Council in this area. Accordingly, only “recommendations” are mentioned, i.e., pronouncements devoid of any binding legal force. Additionally, resolution 377 A (V) establishes two auxiliary bodies, a Peace Observation Commission, which existed until 1960, and a Collective Measures Committee, which had a short life of only two years. None of these bodies has played any role of major significance.

Although the General Assembly did not attempt to arrogate to itself powers akin to those rooted in Chapter VII of the Charter, it stands to reason that originally resolution 377 A (V) was hardly reconcilable with the Charter. Articles 11 and 12 establish unequivocally the primacy of the Security Council with regard to all matters relating to international peace and security. As far as procedure is concerned, Article 12, paragraph 1, stipulates that while the Council is exercising its function in respect of any dispute or situation, “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation”. On the other hand, where “action” seems to be necessary, the General Assembly is enjoined to refer the matter to the Council (Article 11, paragraph 2). This configuration, however, was hard to uphold. Politically, it is definitely quite unwise to keep the General Assembly on the sidelines when a major conflict erupts. Almost as a logical consequence, Article 11, paragraph 2, and Article 12, paragraph 1, have suffered an erosion process of which resolution 377 A (V) constitutes only one element among many others. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ has formally confirmed that the prohibition of simultaneous action has been superseded by practice (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras. 27-28).

To date, ten emergency special sessions have been convened. The first one took place on the occasion of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt and the British-French attack on the Suez Canal zone; the tenth emergency special session, dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, started in 1997 and has not yet come to its end. (It was adjourned by resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006, para. 13, and can at any time be resumed upon request by Member States.)

According to political criteria, different patterns can be distinguished. If the Security Council is unanimous in requesting such a session, the harmony between the two main organs of the United Nations is not disturbed. The crisis in Lebanon prompted the Security Council in 1958 to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly (resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958). It did so without mentioning explicitly resolution 377 A (V), and one may indeed have doubts as to whether this was a case of application of that resolution since there was no lack of unanimity of the permanent members. The situation in Lebanon was referred to the General Assembly because the Security Council had no solution to offer. The second situation is characterized by a vote of a majority of the members of the Security Council against the opposition of some other members, including permanent members. In such instances, the veto does not operate since referral to the General Assembly is considered to constitute a procedural determination and hence not subject to such blocking power. Understandably, the first emergency special session was called by the Security Council against the resistance of France and the United Kingdom (resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956). In the Hungarian crisis, which unfolded almost at the same time, the roles were distributed differently, with only the USSR opposing the motion (resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956). Similar configurations could be observed with regard to the holding of emergency special sessions on the Republic of the Congo (resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960: opposition of Poland and the USSR), on the conflict between India and Pakistan on account of East Pakistan/Bangladesh (resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971: abstention of France, Poland, the USSR and the United Kingdom), and on Afghanistan (resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980: opposition of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR). Total emancipation from the Security Council is reached where the Secretary-General convenes an emergency special meeting at the request of a United Nations Member acting with the support of a majority in the General Assembly. The seventh emergency special session on Palestine (1980-1982) was in fact initiated by Senegal, the eighth emergency special session on Namibia (1981) goes back to a request by Zimbabwe, and the tenth emergency special session was solicited by Qatar as the Chair of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. It stands to reason that in such instances the overwhelming weight of third world countries can manifest itself to its full extent. Urgent matters may also be dealt with during the ordinary sessions of the General Assembly if the Security Council takes no action owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. (A prominent example is provided by General Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986, dealing with the aerial and naval attack on Libya by the United States.)

Although the shifting of responsibilities to the General Assembly may not be consistent with the original intentions of the drafters of the Charter, it is today fully accepted that emergency special sessions have become an integral part of the legal order of the United Nations. On the other hand, the need for the holding of such sessions has considerably decreased, as for many years the General Assembly is frequently in session much beyond the usual period from September to December. On a regular basis sessions are resumed in plenary meetings for short periods in the months before the start of a new session in September. In the early years, Member States were not represented in New York throughout the year. Today, urgent matters can be dealt with by the General Assembly at short notice. As already pointed out, the tenth emergency special session, which started in 1997, has not yet been concluded and has for many years operated alongside the regular sessions of the General Assembly. (In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall case (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 152, at para. 34), the ICJ did not raise any objections against that practice.) It has become a special forum to deliberate on the policies and practices of Israel with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories, totally changing its character from a meeting convened to discuss urgent matters to a permanent, but intermittent conference on a topic of paramount interest to the international community.

Obviously, the crucial element of resolution 377 A (V) was the affirmation that the General Assembly may, if deemed appropriate by it, recommend collective action, including the use of force. In this core sense, the resolution has been implemented only once in the Korean crisis. By resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 it made a finding to the effect that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in aggression in Korea (para. 1) and “call[ed] upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea” (para. 4), which of course meant military assistance. The resolution does not explicitly refer to the Uniting for Peace resolution, but it emphasizes that the Security Council, “because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (preamble). Thus, the wording is exactly copied from resolution 377 A (V). The establishment of the peacekeeping operation First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 with a view to monitoring the frontline between Israel and Egypt does not come within the same category since UNEF I had no combat function to discharge but was meant to neutralize the conflict solely by its presence between the two opposing parties in accordance with the “classic” peacekeeping concept which was given birth on that occasion. On the whole, it is not easy to draw the demarcation line between “measures” contemplated specifically by resolution 377 A (V) and other measures which the General Assembly may recommend within the framework of its general mandate without any hindrance. According to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, the exclusive powers of the Security Council are confined to coercive or enforcement action (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, at 164), but the ICJ did not discuss specifically the impact of resolution 377 A (V). In this connection, the question arises, inter alia, how the imposition of an embargo, as formerly practiced by the General Assembly in a sustained fashion to the detriment of South Africa, is to be characterized (this practice commenced with resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986). In any event, it has become a regular feature of resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to armed conflicts to call upon the parties to desist from any hostilities and to withdraw their troops to their own territories (see, for instance, resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008, on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan). Such requests are not considered as requiring any particular legitimation under resolution 377 A (V).

Resolution 377 A (V) has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within the United Nations, a potential that is not disclosed in a recent description of the role and authority of the General Assembly (see resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, annex, para. 1). But it would actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the support of one of the permanent members. To date, resolution 498 (V) of 1951 remains the only example of a situation where the General Assembly, at that time under dominating Western influence, recommended taking such action, notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member.

 

This Introductory Note was written in October 2008.

 

Related Materials

 

A. Jurisprudence

International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971,p. 16.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.

 

B. Documents

Security Council

Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 (Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea).

Resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956 (Complaint by Egypt against France and the United Kingdom).

Resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956 (The situation in Hungary).

Resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958 (Complaint by Lebanon - Complaint by Jordan).

Resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960 (The Congo Question).

Resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971 (The Situation in the India/Pakistan Subcontinent).

Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980 (International peace and security).

 

General Assembly

Resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 (Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea).

Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 (UNEF I).

Resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986 (Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa).

Resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986 (Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986).

Resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006 (Revitalization of the General Assembly).

Resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006 (Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory).

Resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008 (The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan).

 

C. Doctrine

J. Andrassy, “Uniting for Peace”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 50 (1956) 563-582.

J. Krasno and M. Das, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council”, in: B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London et al.: Routledge, 2008, 173-195.

K. S. Petersen, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950”, International Organization, vol. 13 (1959) 219-232.

H. Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 20 (1982) 1-49.

E. Stein and R. Morrissey, “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier, 2000, 1232-1235.

C. Tomuschat, “‘Uniting for Peace’: ein Rückblick nach 50 Jahren”, Die Friedens-Warte, Journal of International Peace and Organization, vol. 76 (2001) 289-303.

D. Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: the Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Low, Vaughan et al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 154-174.

A. Zimmermann, “Uniting-for-Peace und Gutachtenanfragen der Generalversammlung”, in: Weltinnenrecht. Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2005, 909-925.

 

Ukraine: 2023 explained - Anton Gerashenko

 From Anton Geraschenko:

“ It is the end of the year and there are many articles, expert opinions, and simply personal conclusions about 2023, which is ending, as well as predictions for the next year, 2024, for Ukraine and the world. 

Here are some of my thoughts about 2023:

The year 2023 was not the year of Victory for Ukraine and our allies, as many believed. Nor did I hope it would be. But it was not a year of defeat either. It was the year of the hardest marathon. A year of dragging out the war. A year of realism and hard work. Another year that Ukraine endured and withstood.

Ukraine didn't get enough aid for a counter-offensive and the war became positional, protracted, and of a trench type. 

Then the conflict in the Middle East erupted. The focus of attention shifted and Ukraine practically disappeared from the agenda of global media. Ukraine started to receive not only less attention but also less aid. 

Russia has made many conclusions this year, changed its tactics and its goals. Russia is learning. If earlier, in February 2022, they were counting on a blitzkrieg, in 2023 Russia has set itself up for a long war: it has completely put its economy on a wartime footing, pushed the military-industrial complex to the maximum, agreed on massive arms deliveries with its allied dictators, and these agreements are not hampered by bureaucracy and deliveries are taking place quickly and regularly.

Putin finally "cleaned up" his entourage after surviving Prigozhin's mutiny. He eliminated Prigozhin, as well as Wagner PMC leadership, and dealt with the generals involved in the mutiny. 

Putin has become more aggressive, confident, and active. He is now permanently bound to the war and his power is directly tied to the war.

Russia openly states that this war is the beginning of the re-division of the world. It is a war not only with Ukraine but with the West and the US. Putin is building an empire. 

Russia has not had any significant victories this year, but it has mobilized, regrouped, and is becoming increasingly dangerous. 

This year Russia has waged the war on many frontlines: cyber wars, wars against civilian infrastructure, information wars (huge bot factories on all social networks), corrupting politicians, journalists, espionage, desecration, interfering in elections, attempting to disunite, sowing panic, sowing discord among allies. Russian propaganda may seem crude and primitive at first glance, but it is not. It has its audience not only in Russia and forms certain moods. The theses of Russian propaganda can be seen in many Western sources. Fighting the propaganda must continue!

Personally for me, this year was a year of heavy losses. My close friends died. 

I shut down my emotions and became much less public. 

In 2022, my main focus was to draw the world's attention to Russia's war crimes in Ukraine. I gave a huge number of interviews and spoke to diplomats, journalists, and philanthropists. 

This year, I focused on improving Ukraine's defense capabilities and on charity projects.

I didn't believe the war would be over quickly. But I am not among those who think that this horror will last forever. All wars end and it is important for us that the conditions for Ukraine are the best possible. 

This year, I've been focused on specific actions and specific things. Without inflated expectations. It's been a year of constant work. For the sake of all who are gone and for the sake of all who will live.

A little later I will write what I expect from 2024 and what we want to achieve. Thank you to everyone who is by our side, who is our friend, who supports Ukraine! I appreciate you all immensely and I am deeply grateful to you all!”

December 17, 2023