Ukraine vs. Russia preferences in Slavonic studies - Dasha Nepochatova

 What I Find Very Difficult at Oxford

Dasha Nepochatova

(Via Anton Geraschenko)

I think I’ve already mentioned that when I entered the university, I did not expect that in Slavonic Studies the overwhelming majority of research would be dedicated to Russia. In fact, my dissertation will be the first one about Ukraine in this department.

Since I hadn’t even thought about this beforehand, because I had no expectations at all, I was genuinely shocked when I first encountered this reality. The world is banning Russia — in sports and many other spheres — yet here it is being studied: its cinema, literature, LGBT community, and so on. On the one hand, scholarship is scholarship, and that’s natural. But at the same time Ukraine is not being studied. That’s the problem.

This was in 2024. The war had already been going on for two and a half years.

When the shock passed, I realized that the only thing I could do was to help build Ukrainian Studies within our sub-faculty. Because it is almost impossible to counter the Russian narrative when most professors are professors on Russia and there is not a single professor on Ukraine. That was the first layer — the one I gradually adapted to.

Later another layer emerged — the narrative around the Soviet Union. Yes, the USSR is studied in other programs too, but in Slavonic Studies, for example, they study GULAG literature. And when I attended a two-day workshop on this topic, I realized that 90% of the presentations were about Russian writers, and none about Ukrainian ones. The topic of the Executed Renaissance wasn’t even mentioned, as if no one had ever heard of it. That’s when I understood that even Soviet history studies turn into studies of Russia.

This was deeply painful. Even more painful than discovering the imbalance in Slavonic Studies. That situation can still be explained somehow, but this one cannot be explained at all. And I thought that programs like this should apply an approach similar to gender quotas — like in parliaments, where at least 30% of MPs must be women. Yes, it’s artificial regulation, but I see no other way.

I eventually worked through that shock as well. I poured even more energy into creating Ukrainian Studies, understood how to build a strategy, what to say, and even drafted a large fundraising document explaining why this work is necessary.

But then a new year came, and unexpectedly I encountered another layer — an even more painful one — and I felt like there was nothing I could do about it. This term I took a course in world literature.

In one of the lectures, dedicated to Nordic literature — the sagas of the Vikings — the professor quoted different texts. In one of them (the Saga of Bjorn) it said that the Vikings set out “east into Russia to see King Vladimar.” Then another reference to ancient “Russian” literature appeared on the slide.

The next lecture, with a different professor, was on medieval literature, and of course she also spoke about “Russian literature” created in Kyiv.

I couldn’t remain silent and wrote the professor an email.

⸻

“I wanted to share a brief reflection on two details that particularly caught my attention. The use of the term “Russia” in the slide referring to King Valdimar in the Saga of Bjorn is historically inaccurate. King Valdimar corresponds to Prince Volodymyr the Great (c. 958–1015), ruler of Kyivan Rus’, a polity centred in Kyiv and established in the 9th century. Moscow was founded only in 1147, and the Muscovite state — the precursor of modern Russia — emerged several centuries later.

Kyivan Rus’ is the historical predecessor of the Ukrainian state, not the Russian one. Translating “east into Russia” or referring to that region as “Russia” therefore projects a much later political identity backwards in time and perpetuates the imperial myth of a “shared history” — a narrative that contemporary Russia actively exploits to justify its aggression against Ukraine.

Similarly, the quotation from Schlözer (1773), which places “Russian literature” among medieval traditions, reflects the 18th-century Eurocentric habit of treating all East Slavic culture as “Russian.” Acknowledging this historiographical bias and postcolonial studies could add valuable nuance to how medieval identities are discussed and contextualised.

In the present context of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine overlooking these distinctions risks appearing as a form of knowledge distortion, however unintended. It is particularly sensitive when presented to undergraduate students, whose critical thinking skills are still developing. I believe that we all share a responsibility to encourage intellectual curiosity, historical accuracy, and awareness of how narratives are shaped — especially those that carry deep political and cultural implications.

I understand that such terminology is often inherited from long-standing academic conventions, but within an institution like Oxford — where we have both the tools and the responsibility to approach history with precision — it seems particularly important to revisit these inherited frameworks.

I share these reflections with genuine respect for your scholarship, and with appreciation for the thought-provoking nature of your lecture, which encouraged me to raise this perspective.”

⸻

To my surprise, the professor responded quickly and very positively. He thanked me for the feedback, promised to revise the lecture, and even asked whether he should re-deliver it with the corrections.

I might not have written this post at all if today I hadn’t come across Judith Jesch’s book Women in the Viking Age. Naturally, I picked it up to look through it, and immediately stumbled on the chapter titled Russia. The term Kyivan Rus’ isn’t mentioned at all, even though the chapter discusses Princess Olha.

And so now I have a question. What do we do with all of this? Do we have scholars working on the decolonization of Kyivan Rus’ at the level of international universities? Because the professor’s reaction to my comment was constructive — he agreed with my arguments. But so much of our history has been stolen — how do we fix it? How do we communicate it? Where do we find the strength and resources? Because to me this is a falsification of knowledge. And Western institutions are participating in it.

The photos are the slide from that lecture and a page from the book.

Author: Dasha Nepochatova, President of Oxford Universtiy Ukrainian Society

Avaliação da Conferência sobre Paz na Ucrânia na Suíça - Anton Geraschenko

The Ukrainian Peace Summit that took place in Switzerland last weekend was the first gathering of world leaders dedicated to ending Russia's war against Ukraine.

Russia and China made great efforts to prevent the Summit from taking place and tried to make sure it was attended by a small number of participants.

But the Peace Summit was truly unprecedented in scale - it physically brought together representatives of more than 90 countries, including 56 heads of state and government. This is an extraordinary number. It required some serious diplomatic work.

The Summit demonstrated strong support for Ukraine from Western countries. However, the event did not unite the world in support of Ukraine and did not provide specific answers on how to end the war, as expected.

Presence did not mean support for all countries. And some countries chose a wait-and-see strategy.

The main outcome of the Peace Summit is in the opportunities it generates. The presence of such a large number of countries confirmed that the Summit's agenda is of interest not only to Ukraine.

According to military expert Oleksii Kopytko, the main content and background at the event centered around:

◾️ "food" (guarantees of freedom of ship navigation) 

and

◾️ "nuclear safety" (new rules of nuclear weapons proliferation).

First, as early as 2021, the Ukrainian side publicly drew the attention of its partners that Russia was destroying the very idea of freedom of ship navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia continues to try to redefine borders starting from the seas - e.g., their recent attempt in the Baltic Sea. And if it is possible for some in one part of the world, it will be possible for others - which is already clearly proved by the Houthis.

If the violator is not punished, chaos in sea communications will become the new norm. Development of drone technologies makes the entry point into the process much cheaper for all sorts of evil-doers. Aircraft carriers can't always solve this problem.

Second, Ukraine voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for promises. The lack of security guarantees made many countries think hard.

Russia's full-scale aggression has maximized the demand for possession of their own nuclear weapons among all those who hesitated previously. No one will be convinced anymore that there are any "guarantees." And Russia, finding itself in a strategic deadlock, has also started to play this card.

In February, Russia hinted that it was ready to give away nuclear weapons to its "friends." To reinforce the thesis, it did so in Belarus, which Russia controls.

The Kremlin is trying to present BRICS as an entity with nuclear weapons "for those who are on our team." Europe, of course, is extremely concerned about this. 

Against the background of all this, many people on the planet have a question for global powers: "Fellow leaders, either fulfill your duties and deal with this mess, or there will be trouble."

There are two "deal with the mess" options on the table:

1. Appeasing the aggressor. 

🔹️Pro: the easy way out, the costs fall mainly on the victim of the aggression, all the risks are postponed for the future. 

🔹️Con: No insurance against further aggression, open-door policy for all dictators, more and more countries will obtain their own nuclear weapons.

2. Making sure the aggressor loses and making that a precedent. 

🔹️Pro: global security is restored.

🔹️Con: requires a lot of hard work.

Doing nothing is not an option. The fire may become uncontrollable.

Ukraine is the point where all this can be solved so that it does not have to be solved later everywhere else.

Even those who did not sign the final document at the Summit (and those who were not present) clearly understand the price of the issue. This really is not about Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. This is their lives. And the Summit clearly showed that.

From Anton Geraschenko

Kyiv, June 18, 2024

Putin se crê todo poderoso, como os tiranos mais desequilibrados - Anton Geraschenko

 Putin: Russia has the right to supply weapons to countries from which strikes can be performed on countries supplying weapons to Kyiv.

Russia wants to create chaos and tension all over the world. This is a global danger. It will escalate while Russia is strong enough to do so. https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1798450178325917985/video/1

Putin quer ter o direito exclusivo de transferir armas para quem ele quiser, para com isso fomentar ataques contra os que apoiam a Ucrânia. Ele não quer que ninguém mais tenha esse direito. Isso se chama tirania. 

Lula está de acordo com essa postura?

Medvedev é o louco dos recados de Putin - Anton Geraschenko

 Em outros termos, qualquer amigo da Rússia poderá atacar os EUA e outros paises com armas russas:

“ "Their enemy is the US, so they are our friends. And we will rejoice at their successful strikes with our weapons against our common enemies!"  - Medvedev posted a lengthy text (on a Thursday morning, no less) expanding Putin's threats. The translation is below.

I have said before that the longer this war goes on, the less secure the world will become, the more tension will appear globally. The only way to stop that is to provide Ukrainian Defenders with everything they need ASAP.

"Yesterday, for the first time, the President of Russia allowed our weapons to be sent to regions that are at war with the states that supply weapons to the former Ukraine (or, more precisely, use these weapons on our country). In other words, to those forces that are in conflict with America and NATO countries. 

This is a very significant change in our foreign policy. After all, as the Yankees and their European slobbery dogs reason: we have the right to transfer any weapons to the former Ukraine (i.e. the enemy of our country), but all other countries cannot help Russia. In other words, we will destroy you in every possible way, but no one dares to supply the Russians with weapons/equipment/other means to defend the country.

Let the US and its allies now feel the direct use of Russian weapons by third parties. These persons or regions are intentionally not named, but they can be anyone who considers Pindostan and its comrades to be their enemies. Regardless of their political beliefs and international recognition. 

Their enemy is the US, so they are our friends.

And let the use of Russian weapons by “regions” not yet named be as destructive as possible for their and our enemies. And let the “sensitive facilities of the states supplying weapons to Kyiv” burn in the flames of hell. They will burn together with those who control them. 

And we will rejoice at their successful strikes with our weapons against our common enemies!"

Sobre a necessidade de ajudar a Ucrânia a se defender da Rússia, como Israel de Teheran - Anton Geraschenko

Transcrevendo:

Iran, for the first time in history, dared to launch a direct strike against Israel but proved incapable of achieving not only the objectives set by the leadership but also of inflicting any serious damage on Israeli territory.

In the aftermath of this attack, once again, we can see that allied solidarity is important. If air targets hadn't been destroyed by Jordan, the US, France, or Great Britain, it would have been so much more difficult for Israel to repel the Iranian attack. If Western countries did not fear a clash with Russia and did not restrict aid, it would be easier for Ukraine to fend off attacks by an aggressor state.

Regarding future predictions: the question for today is whether and how Israel will respond to Iran's actions on the night of April 13-14. If it raises the bar with its  response, Iran, in turn, will also respond, and thus, we will find ourselves in a real huge war.

So, as I have said many times before, if the Russian-Ukrainian war is not stopped within a few months, it could metastasize into the globalization of conflicts in critical areas around the world and, as a result, World War III.

The just and sustainable end of the Russian-Ukrainian war remains essential if the world is to have any hope of surviving the confrontation between democracies and dictatorships and not waiting until a major devastating war.

The issue of aid to Israel and Ukraine must have this consequence - a feeling of common sense and a realization of the need to confront dictatorships such as Russia and Iran more forcefully.

Adequacy is now the main response to the serious challenges that the democratic world is facing as dictatorships feel their impunity and ability to change other countries' borders and determine which countries will exist on the political map of the world and which will not.

Unless the democratic world proves that it can effectively combat this, conflicts will only intensify, and it won't be possible to avoid heavy casualties and serious damage as a result of attacks by dictatorial regimes.

Anton Geraschenko

A Ucrânia necessita fronteiras abertas da UE para seus produtos agrícolas - Anton Geraschenko

 From: Anton Geraschenko

Friends,

The following post is about something extremely important for the Ukrainian economy and Ukrainian survival. Please read it and help spread the message. If you know someone who needs to read this post, please share it with them. 

In 2022, after Russia launched the full-scale invasion on Ukraine, the EU introduced a temporary suspension of import duties and quotas on Ukrainian agricultural exports to the Union.

Now, they have been restored for another year except for a cap on imports of Ukrainian poultry, eggs and sugar. It is vital for Ukrainian economy that they are not capped in the foreseeable future.

The agriculture area is one of the largest sources of revenue for Ukraine - about 60%. It brings much-needed income to finance the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to help Ukrainians survive. It provides jobs and the opportunity for people to support themselves and their families, to donate to the Army. It keeps people in Ukraine, not making them refugees and needing support from other countries.

Some facts:

🔷️The European Union consumes over 12 million tons of poultry meat per year. Of this amount, about 200,000 tons were Ukrainian in 2023.

🔸️Meanwhile, Ukraine has exported 425,000 tons of poultry in 2023. So while the total amount of Ukrainian poultry in EU is very, very small (as is its capability to drive up prices), for Ukraine these numbers (and the money earned) make about half of our poultry exports.

🔸️Moreover, the EU currently gives shelter to millions of Ukrainian refugees who fled from the war. So the demand for all types of food in the EU has increased when these consumers moved there.

🔸️Ukrainian poultry and egg industry has suffered tremendously in the war - at least 6 million chickens (hens etc) died from occupation, blackouts, combat, you name it. Consequently, the egg production has dropped significantly, as well. The industry needs money to restore its facilites. The money comes from exports.

🔷️As for sugar, the cap could lead to factories closure in Ukraine as the Ukrainian sugar industry is export-oriented. With the sea export routes being limited and the cap on exports to EU, Ukrainian factories will suffer losses. This will lead to closures. This means less jobs available, less taxes paid into the Ukrainian economy, less money for the Ukrainian Army - and more financial support from the EU, in the end.

❗️Fair competition IS important. But the situation itself is not fair. Ukraine is fighting for her survival and lives in different circumstances. So the preferences are actually a way to make the competition fair.

There will be a vote on this issue soon in the EU. I urge everyone to spread this message. Allowing Ukrainian exports is a real support for Ukraine, a real way to help us stand. Thankful to all who understands this.

O czar de todas as Rússias e seu poder absoluto - Anton Geraschenko

 Putin has (re)established himself as the Russian emperor

Anton Geradchenko

March 18, 2024

His goal is to rule for as long as he possibly can and die his own death in this status.

From now on, Putin is the center and the foundation of all power in Russia. His system of governing has shifted from being based on competition between the different "Kremlin towers" to a "Politbureau" of a small number of people, each of whom is responsible for specific areas, experts believe. Putin holds the final decision-making power, but he won't get into details of things that do not concern his end goal - being in power for as long as he is alive.

Putin as tsar has absolute power. He expects and rewards absolute loyalty. Among other things, this means that social lifts in Russia are non-existent now. Any modernization of the system is impossible. Obedience becomes the key virtue. This will obviously lower the quality of executive decisions made on all levels.

What this might mean for Ukraine and the world?

◾️As it happened with the USSR, this system is not sustainable and will decay. However, that will not happen soon enough as Russia has a lot of resources and its people don't expect much in terms of quality of life.

◾️ The war becomes an important "component" of Putin's power and authority. He will not stop and won't care about any number of Russian losses. He must be stopped with force and power, militarily.

◾️ Putin will look for subtle(ish) ways to undermine NATO and EU as whole institutions and their member states separately. Provocations, propaganda, uncertainty, clashing groups between each other, creating discord and mistrust - these are all tried and tested Russian tools. Russia is prepared to invest huge amounts of money into that.

◾️The importance of sanctions increases further, especially in cutting Russia off from technological advances - equipment, technologies, specialists.

◾️Timely and full military and financial assistance to Ukraine is key. 

There is no time for lingering and hoping Russia will collapse on its own or something unexpected will happen that will alter the course of history. Challenging times require sturdy leaders who think strategically.

Putin pretende expandir a Rússia até a antiga URSS, na Europa e mais além - Anton Geraschenko

 From: Anton Geraschenko

Europe and NATO might be closer to war with Russia than they may now believe.

Let's  recall how many experts and politicians denied a potential full-scale  Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, even though there was enough  evidence - but in hindsight, it seems obvious.

On the other hand,  many knew and believed that a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine  was going to happen, but was there a plan for a confrontation? The first  months after the invasion were a time of confusion and waiting for  events to unfold. Ukraine survived primarily thanks to the heroism of  the people who went out to stop Russian tanks with their bare hands.

Today,  it seems that we are back in the spring of 2022, when there is no  unity, no specific common plan of action, no determination, and the West  is watching the development of events.

With the war in Ukraine, Russia has clearly seen that the West is afraid of escalation in the context of mutual destruction.

Indeed, Russia won't be able to wage a large-scale war against NATO (unless it has powerful allies).

Therefore, Russia might resort to the tactic of gradual steps: strike, cease hostilities, and offer to negotiate. 

Russia  sees that NATO is not reacting swiftly, that there is no unanimity and  decisions are made collectively by consensus, and that there is a  tendency to delay and resolve issues diplomatically. 

Russia has  long openly stated that it is at war with the West, that it wants NATO  to collapse, and that it wants to change the geopolitical outlook of the  world.

At the moment, Russian population is prepared for a  conflict with NATO, for huge human losses, for a possible nuclear war,  and it approves, on the whole.

At the same time, Russia can carry out strikes of various kinds: 

◾️ strikes on critical civilian infrastructure in European NATO countries;

◾️ Russian missiles can "accidentally" fly into the space of a NATO country and each time reach farther and farther;

◾️ interfere in elections;

◾️ launch cyberattacks, leak wiretaps;

◾️ crash and take control of social media;

◾️ cut cables at the bottom of the seas;

◾️ blackmail with grain, oil, fertilizers, nuclear war, etc.;

◾️ corrupt and blackmail politicians, journalists, and celebrities in the West;

◾️ spread propaganda;

◾️ push allies against each other, manipulate them.

After  another strike, Russia would send signals to the moderate governments  and politicians: "Don't fight for your allies with us if you don't want  your population to be dragged into a war and be the ones blamed for it.  This is not your 'conflict'. And we will give your country cheap gas for  it, for example."

So, first of all, it is not about a possible  direct military, forceful confrontation between NATO and Russia, but  about who is scared of it and who will be the first to want to negotiate  and agree to the terms of the other side. 

I am sure that Putin today believes that he has already won.

He  sees the West being unprepared for war on all levels. He sees the lack  of aid to Ukraine. So, for him, this is evidence that Russia is  defeating the West right at this particular moment.

The West's  psychological fear of nuclear escalation and direct confrontation is the  possible future basis for negotiating a security architecture in Europe  and the world on Russia's terms. 

Thus, Russia does not need a  force equal to the military might of NATO. It only needs to scare the  West, or rather the people who are now making decisions, with  psychological pressure to make them indecisive.

Internal  dissension and endless discussions of escalation only reinforce Russia's  belief that NATO will back down if Russia moves on.

Will Russia  wait 10 to 20 years? I don't think so. Putin is already in his advanced  years and wants to end his life with a "victory" - restoring Russia to  the confines of the USSR.

So things could develop much faster. 

Russia has been saying for ten years that it is at war with NATO and that it wants to defeat NATO.

Russian people are internally ready for everything, even for nuclear war.

Today,  Ukraine continues to contain Russia and fight for our existential  survival. But our forces are unequal. We have no time for indecision and  no time for deliberations. We must not allow the situation to reach the  "too late" part. Unity, determination, and weapons are needed urgently.

“A Ucrânia NÃO DEVE EXISTIR”: Dmitry Medvedev - Anton Geraschenko

 Não sei se Lula, Amorim ou qualquer um dos seus assessores diplomáticos concordariam com os argumentos rudes do vice-presidente do Conselho russo de Segurança sobre a inutilidade de se pensar sobre a existência da Ucrânia. Pelo menos ele é sincero…

From: Anton Geraschenko

Today Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, once again wrote in his Telegram channel that Ukraine should be destroyed as an independent state and that the only option that Russia offers for Ukrainians is to live in an empire:

"The existence of Ukraine is deadly for Ukrainians. And I am not at all referring only to the current state, the Bandera political regime. I am talking about any, absolutely any Ukraine. 

No matter how much they aspire to the mythical European Union and NATO. When choosing between eternal war and inevitable death and life, the absolute majority of Ukrainians (except for a minimal number of sick nationalists) will eventually choose life. They will realize that life in a big common state, which they do not love much now, is better than death. Their death and the death of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realize this, the better." - he wrote.

UN Resolution, "Uniting for Peace" in favor of Ukraine - Anton Geraschenko, Christian Tomuschat

 Hoje no Mundo Militar liked

Anton Gerashchenko

@Gerashchenko_en

It is very important! I ask for maximum dissemination and cooperation! Let's do it! There is a UN Resolution commonly known as "Uniting for Peace" resolution. It was adopted in 1950 and states that if the UN Security Council cannot reach an agreement on urgent international peace matters, then the responsibility for this is handed over to UN General Assembly (where there is no veto power). Here is a Wikipedia article about this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_377 UN Security Council is scheduled to meet on January 10th regarding Russia using missiles from North Korea in Ukraine. With Russia having veto power in the Security Council, isn't that the right time to put this resolution in action? One of the most serious consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine is destroying the global security system as now it is de-facto not functioning. Without firm, decisive actions, without a clear position, the world will plummet into chaos and constant wars.

Uniting for Peace

General Assembly resolution 377 (V)

New York, 3 November 1950

By Christian Tomuschat

Professor emeritus at Humboldt University, Berlin

 

https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html

 

(Paper from 2008)

 

On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title “Uniting for Peace”. The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea. At the initial stage of this armed conflict, in June 1950, the Security Council had been able to recommend to the Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950). The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence the Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of nine members “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The majority of the members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22). Given that its protests remained fruitless, the USSR sent again, as from August 1950, a delegation to the meetings of the Council which cast a negative vote on a United States draft resolution condemning the continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities. In order to overcome this impasse, the United States, under the leadership of its Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson, succeeded in persuading the General Assembly that it should claim for itself a subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace and security, as enunciated by Article 14 of the Charter. The result of these efforts was resolution 377 A (V).

The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that where the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly shall seize itself of the matter. Procedural and substantive steps are suggested. First of all, if the Assembly is not in session, it may meet in emergency special session at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of its own members. Second, such a session shall be convened with a view to making appropriate recommendations for “collective measures…including the use of armed force when necessary”. As also the language of the resolution clearly reveals, the General Assembly can never be a full substitute for the Security Council in this area. Accordingly, only “recommendations” are mentioned, i.e., pronouncements devoid of any binding legal force. Additionally, resolution 377 A (V) establishes two auxiliary bodies, a Peace Observation Commission, which existed until 1960, and a Collective Measures Committee, which had a short life of only two years. None of these bodies has played any role of major significance.

Although the General Assembly did not attempt to arrogate to itself powers akin to those rooted in Chapter VII of the Charter, it stands to reason that originally resolution 377 A (V) was hardly reconcilable with the Charter. Articles 11 and 12 establish unequivocally the primacy of the Security Council with regard to all matters relating to international peace and security. As far as procedure is concerned, Article 12, paragraph 1, stipulates that while the Council is exercising its function in respect of any dispute or situation, “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation”. On the other hand, where “action” seems to be necessary, the General Assembly is enjoined to refer the matter to the Council (Article 11, paragraph 2). This configuration, however, was hard to uphold. Politically, it is definitely quite unwise to keep the General Assembly on the sidelines when a major conflict erupts. Almost as a logical consequence, Article 11, paragraph 2, and Article 12, paragraph 1, have suffered an erosion process of which resolution 377 A (V) constitutes only one element among many others. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ has formally confirmed that the prohibition of simultaneous action has been superseded by practice (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras. 27-28).

To date, ten emergency special sessions have been convened. The first one took place on the occasion of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt and the British-French attack on the Suez Canal zone; the tenth emergency special session, dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, started in 1997 and has not yet come to its end. (It was adjourned by resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006, para. 13, and can at any time be resumed upon request by Member States.)

According to political criteria, different patterns can be distinguished. If the Security Council is unanimous in requesting such a session, the harmony between the two main organs of the United Nations is not disturbed. The crisis in Lebanon prompted the Security Council in 1958 to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly (resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958). It did so without mentioning explicitly resolution 377 A (V), and one may indeed have doubts as to whether this was a case of application of that resolution since there was no lack of unanimity of the permanent members. The situation in Lebanon was referred to the General Assembly because the Security Council had no solution to offer. The second situation is characterized by a vote of a majority of the members of the Security Council against the opposition of some other members, including permanent members. In such instances, the veto does not operate since referral to the General Assembly is considered to constitute a procedural determination and hence not subject to such blocking power. Understandably, the first emergency special session was called by the Security Council against the resistance of France and the United Kingdom (resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956). In the Hungarian crisis, which unfolded almost at the same time, the roles were distributed differently, with only the USSR opposing the motion (resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956). Similar configurations could be observed with regard to the holding of emergency special sessions on the Republic of the Congo (resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960: opposition of Poland and the USSR), on the conflict between India and Pakistan on account of East Pakistan/Bangladesh (resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971: abstention of France, Poland, the USSR and the United Kingdom), and on Afghanistan (resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980: opposition of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR). Total emancipation from the Security Council is reached where the Secretary-General convenes an emergency special meeting at the request of a United Nations Member acting with the support of a majority in the General Assembly. The seventh emergency special session on Palestine (1980-1982) was in fact initiated by Senegal, the eighth emergency special session on Namibia (1981) goes back to a request by Zimbabwe, and the tenth emergency special session was solicited by Qatar as the Chair of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. It stands to reason that in such instances the overwhelming weight of third world countries can manifest itself to its full extent. Urgent matters may also be dealt with during the ordinary sessions of the General Assembly if the Security Council takes no action owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. (A prominent example is provided by General Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986, dealing with the aerial and naval attack on Libya by the United States.)

Although the shifting of responsibilities to the General Assembly may not be consistent with the original intentions of the drafters of the Charter, it is today fully accepted that emergency special sessions have become an integral part of the legal order of the United Nations. On the other hand, the need for the holding of such sessions has considerably decreased, as for many years the General Assembly is frequently in session much beyond the usual period from September to December. On a regular basis sessions are resumed in plenary meetings for short periods in the months before the start of a new session in September. In the early years, Member States were not represented in New York throughout the year. Today, urgent matters can be dealt with by the General Assembly at short notice. As already pointed out, the tenth emergency special session, which started in 1997, has not yet been concluded and has for many years operated alongside the regular sessions of the General Assembly. (In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall case (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 152, at para. 34), the ICJ did not raise any objections against that practice.) It has become a special forum to deliberate on the policies and practices of Israel with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories, totally changing its character from a meeting convened to discuss urgent matters to a permanent, but intermittent conference on a topic of paramount interest to the international community.

Obviously, the crucial element of resolution 377 A (V) was the affirmation that the General Assembly may, if deemed appropriate by it, recommend collective action, including the use of force. In this core sense, the resolution has been implemented only once in the Korean crisis. By resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 it made a finding to the effect that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in aggression in Korea (para. 1) and “call[ed] upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea” (para. 4), which of course meant military assistance. The resolution does not explicitly refer to the Uniting for Peace resolution, but it emphasizes that the Security Council, “because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (preamble). Thus, the wording is exactly copied from resolution 377 A (V). The establishment of the peacekeeping operation First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 with a view to monitoring the frontline between Israel and Egypt does not come within the same category since UNEF I had no combat function to discharge but was meant to neutralize the conflict solely by its presence between the two opposing parties in accordance with the “classic” peacekeeping concept which was given birth on that occasion. On the whole, it is not easy to draw the demarcation line between “measures” contemplated specifically by resolution 377 A (V) and other measures which the General Assembly may recommend within the framework of its general mandate without any hindrance. According to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, the exclusive powers of the Security Council are confined to coercive or enforcement action (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, at 164), but the ICJ did not discuss specifically the impact of resolution 377 A (V). In this connection, the question arises, inter alia, how the imposition of an embargo, as formerly practiced by the General Assembly in a sustained fashion to the detriment of South Africa, is to be characterized (this practice commenced with resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986). In any event, it has become a regular feature of resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to armed conflicts to call upon the parties to desist from any hostilities and to withdraw their troops to their own territories (see, for instance, resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008, on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan). Such requests are not considered as requiring any particular legitimation under resolution 377 A (V).

Resolution 377 A (V) has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within the United Nations, a potential that is not disclosed in a recent description of the role and authority of the General Assembly (see resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, annex, para. 1). But it would actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the support of one of the permanent members. To date, resolution 498 (V) of 1951 remains the only example of a situation where the General Assembly, at that time under dominating Western influence, recommended taking such action, notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member.

 

This Introductory Note was written in October 2008.

 

Related Materials

 

A. Jurisprudence

International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971,p. 16.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.

 

B. Documents

Security Council

Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 (Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea).

Resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956 (Complaint by Egypt against France and the United Kingdom).

Resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956 (The situation in Hungary).

Resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958 (Complaint by Lebanon - Complaint by Jordan).

Resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960 (The Congo Question).

Resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971 (The Situation in the India/Pakistan Subcontinent).

Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980 (International peace and security).

 

General Assembly

Resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 (Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea).

Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 (UNEF I).

Resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986 (Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa).

Resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986 (Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986).

Resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006 (Revitalization of the General Assembly).

Resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006 (Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory).

Resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008 (The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan).

 

C. Doctrine

J. Andrassy, “Uniting for Peace”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 50 (1956) 563-582.

J. Krasno and M. Das, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council”, in: B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London et al.: Routledge, 2008, 173-195.

K. S. Petersen, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950”, International Organization, vol. 13 (1959) 219-232.

H. Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 20 (1982) 1-49.

E. Stein and R. Morrissey, “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier, 2000, 1232-1235.

C. Tomuschat, “‘Uniting for Peace’: ein Rückblick nach 50 Jahren”, Die Friedens-Warte, Journal of International Peace and Organization, vol. 76 (2001) 289-303.

D. Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: the Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Low, Vaughan et al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 154-174.

A. Zimmermann, “Uniting-for-Peace und Gutachtenanfragen der Generalversammlung”, in: Weltinnenrecht. Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2005, 909-925.