Timothy Snyder sobre a guerrilha de mentiras conduzida por ditaduras como China e Rússia - 17/04/2024

 

Political Warfare and Congress

My Testimony from 17 April

TIMOTHY SNYDER APR 19

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The essence of “political warfare,” in the sense defined by the Chinese communist party, is that Beijing uses media, psychology, and law to induce adversaries to do things counter to their own interests. 

Political warfare works through you or it does not work. So if you are not willing to think about yourself, you are not thinking about political warfare.

I had the honor of testifying to Congress on the question of Chinese political warfare this past Wednesday, April 17th. This testimony was before the Oversight Committee, which has devoted months of time, money, and attention to an impeachment inquiry which is based on a mendacious claim by a man in contact with Russian intelligence services. 

That congressional impeachment inquiry, based on a Russian fabrication, then became the subject of Chinese propaganda tropes, designed to spread the lie that President Biden took a bribe. This false notion, generated by Moscow, can only be spread by Beijing because there are Americans in the middle, American elected officials, who do their part. 

A hearing on political warfare in Congress, and especially before this particular committee, requires self-reflection. 

The hearing had some moments of interest, many of which are circulating as clips. Feel free to post your favorites in the comments.

The below text is my formal written testimony, which you can find in with all the notes and references on the congressional website. Video of my opening remarks is here. The entire session can be viewed here.

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Testimony to Oversight Committee, “Defending America from the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Warfare, Part I”

Professor Timothy Snyder, 17 April 2024

Democracy is in decline, dragged down by the autocratic lie. The autocrats offer no new visions; instead they lie about democracies and insert lies into democracies. The test of disinformation is its power to alter the course of crucial events, such as wars and elections.

Russia undertook a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the basis of a big lie about Nazis.

Even as we meet today, Russian (and Chinese) propaganda shapes House debates about Ukraine, the most important foreign policy decision of our time. In domestic politics, the most important matter in coming months the coming presidential election.

To begin with the war. Beijing cares about Ukraine because it is the decisive conflict of our time. It can spread lies about Ukraine thanks to prior Russian labor. Beijing wrongly blames the war on Washington. Chinese information actions seek to attract American actors around to Russian propaganda tropes meant to justify Russian aggression and bring about American inaction.

Though Americans sometimes forget this, Ukrainian resistance is seen around the world as an obvious American cause and an easy American victory. So long as Ukraine fights, it is fulfilling the entire NATO mission by itself, defending a European order based in integration rather than empire, and affirming international order in general. It is also holding back nuclear proliferation.

Given these obvious strategic gains, American failure in Ukraine will lead other powers to conclude that a feckless and divided United States will also fail to meet future challenges. The fundamental goal of Russian (and thus Chinese) propaganda is to prevent American action, thereby making America seem impotent and democracy pointless -- also in the eyes of Americans themselves.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is intimately connected to a possible Chinese war of aggression against Taiwan. As Taiwanese leaders continually and urgently remind us, Ukrainian resistance deters Chinese aggression. Ukraine deters China in a way that the United States cannot, without taking any action that Beijing could interpret as provocative. A Russian victory in Ukraine, therefore, would clear the way for Chinese aggression in the Pacific. It would strengthen China's ally, force Europe into a subordinate relationship to

Beijing, and discredit democracy. It would also bring into Russian hands Ukrainian military technologies that would be significant in a Chinese war of aggression.

Russia's one path to victory in Ukraine leads through minds and mouths in Washington, DC. Russian and Chinese propaganda therefore celebrates the inability of Congress to pass aid for Ukraine, and praises those who hinder the passage of such a bill. But the specific propaganda memes that China spreads (and some American leaders repeat) about the war are of Russian origin. Russia is the leader in this field; China is imitating Russian techniques and Russian tropes.

A central example is the Russo-Chinese invocation of "Nazism." Russian began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine with the grotesque claim that its aim was the "denazification" of Ukraine. (Ukraine is a democracy with freedom of expression, assembly and religion, which elected a Jewish president with more than 70% of the vote. Russia is a one-party state with a leader cult that is fighting a criminal war and suppressing all domestic opposition.) This "Nazi" meme was immediately boosted by the Chinese government. Over the weekend before this hearing, a Member of Congress tweeted this Russian disinformation trope.

The Russian war of destruction in Ukraine is the pre-eminent test of democracy; U.S. elections come next. Russia is also the leader here.  China has has no Paul Manafort.  It lacks American human assets with experience in directing foreign influence campaigns and close to American presidential campaigns. Nothing China has done (as yet) rivals the Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee in 2016.

On social media, CCP propaganda demeans the Biden administration. But China's social media campaign on behalf of Trump in 2024 looks like a copy (a poor one) of Russia's on behalf of Trump in 2016. CCP propaganda invokes the false charges raised in impeachment hearings, but the lies that China magnifies arose from a person in contact with Russian intelligence. What China can do is try an influence campaign based on a Russian initiative -- and American impeachment hearings. Insofar as this works at all, it is a cycle: Russia-America-China -- with the Chinese hope that the propaganda it generates from Russian initiatives and American actions will cycle back to distress Americans and hurt the Biden administration.

The CCP's internet propaganda is posted on X (Twitter). Likewise, Russia's denazification meme did not need a Russian or a Chinese channel to reach Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene. Nor did she need a Russian or Chinese platform to spread the disinformation trope further. She and her American followers used X (Twitter).

Marjory Taylor Greene is not the only member of Congress to have presented the Russian "denazification" trope in public debate. In the case of Matt Gaetz, we know that the transmission belt was Chinese, because he cited a Chinese state propaganda source in congressional debate.

It is not clear in what sense X is an American platform; in any event, its owner, Elon Musk, has removed prior safeguards identifying state propaganda outlets, driving much higher viewing of Russian and Chinese propaganda.  Under Musk, X (Twitter) has been particularly lax in policing known Chinese propaganda accounts, ignoring their flagging by government and other platforms. Musk has also personally spread specific Russian propaganda tropes.

Russian lies are meant not only to disinform, to make action more difficult, but also to demotivate, to make action seem senseless. Russian memes work not by presenting Russia as a positive alternative, but by demoralizing others. No one wants to be close to "Nazis," and the simple introduction of the lie is confusing and saddening.

The same holds with the Russian meme to the effect that Ukraine is corrupt. A completely bogus Russian source introduced the entirely fake idea that the Ukrainian president had bought yachts. Although this was entirely untrue, Representative Greene then spread the fiction. Senator J.D. Vance also picked up the "yacht" example and used it as his justification for opposing aid to Ukraine.

The larger sense of that lie is that everyone everywhere is corrupt, even the people who seem most admirable; and so we might as well give up on our heroes, on any struggle for democracy, or any struggle at all. Ukraine's president, Volodymr Zelens'kyi, chose to risk his life by remaining in Kyiv and defending his country against a fearsome attack from Russia which almost all outsiders believed would succeed within days. His daring gamble saved not only his own democracy, but opened a window of faith that democracies can defend themselves. It confirmed the basis lesson of liberty that individual choices have consequences. The lie directed at Zelens'kyi was meant not only to discredit him personally and undermine support for Ukraine, but also to persuade Americans that no one is righteous and nothing is worth defending.

Insofar as legislators such as Marjorie Taylor Greene and J.D. Vance are vectors of propaganda, they are themselves playing a part of the Russian (or Russo-Chinese) operation. As such they are not merely spreading fictions; they are also modelling a "Russian" style of government, a politics of impotence, in which big lies are normal, corruption is thought to be routine, and nothing gets done. Russian lies about Ukraine are meant to prevent action to help Ukraine; but in a larger sense they are also meant to spread the view that those in power are incapable of any positive action at all.

When legislators embrace Russian lies, they demobilize the rest of us, conveying the underlying notion that all that matters is a clever fiction and a platform from which to spread it. A first step legislators can take is to cease to spread known propaganda tropes themselves. Russian (or Russo-Chinese) memes work in America when Americans choose to repeat them.

Republican leaders quite properly raise concerns about Russian memes in the Republican mouths. The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have warned in recent weeks that Russian disinformation has shaped the views of Republican voters and the rhetoric of Republican elected officials. Representative Michael R. Turner said that "We see directly coming from Russia attempts to mask communications that are anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia messages — some of which we even hear being uttered on the House floor."

For this and other reasons, the problem cannot be dismissed as "foreign." Elite American actors such as Congressional representatives and billionaires know what they are doing when they spread Russian memes. Most Americans, however, confront them unknowingly.

From the perspective of Russia (and China), all social media platforms present an attack surface. Non-Chinese platforms are the main vectors of Russian and disinformation. During the 2020 presidential election, for example, the largest Facebook group for American Christians was run by people who were neither. While ByteDance/TikTok is important, it is less so than Twitter and Facebook. Social media as such favors hostile interventions over locally reported news. During the 2020 presidential election, for example, the main Facebook site for American Christians was run by people who are neither.

ByteDance/TikTok is an attractive target for legislation, but a ban on TikTok unaccompanied by other policy will have limited effects. It will not prevent China from carrying out influence operations in the United States, nor would it stop China from gathering information on American citizens. To hinder Russian (and Chinese, and other) operations, all platforms would have to be regulated.

In the contest between authoritarian and democratic regimes, it will ultimately be not just self-defense but creative initiative that defines and saves the democracies. The era of hostile disinformation is also the era of the decline of reporting, and the two phenomena are linked. An American who has access to reporting will be less vulnerable to disinformation, and better able to make navigate the demands of democratic citizenship. A victory over disinformation will be won in a climate in which Americans have access to reliable information and reasons to trust it.

Constitutional Courage - Timothy Snyder; o grande medo americano

 

Constitutional Courage

How our fears endanger our future

TIMOTHY SNYDER JAN 10

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If we ignore the Constitution now, it will not protect our rights later.  We are ignoring it now, because we are afraid.

The Constitution is meant to handle our emotions, to “address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals,” in Alexander Hamilton’s words.  

But there is one fear it cannot address: fear of the Constitution itself.  Too many of us, right now, are running in fear of the Constitution. 

How did it come to this?  An insurrectionist, Donald Trump, purports to be running for president, although the Constitution forbids this.  Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment frankly disqualifies anyone who has taken part in an insurrection, or given aid and comfort to insurrectionists.  Trump has done both, and boasts of having done both. 

The authors of Section Three anticipated just such a frightful situation.  An insurrectionist who swears an oath and violates it has done something terrible.  He will have allies who have tasted tyranny and liked it.  By mandating just how to deal with such a person, Section Three lends us strength we might not otherwise have.  The Constitution defends itself by guiding us towards our better selves. 

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Yet Americans who should know better are choosing fear over the Constitution, finding excuses to ignore what it says.  Indeed, they are choosing to fear the Constitution.  Far too many politicians and other media commentators respond to our present situation -- a real insurrectionist who has tried to overthrow the Constitution while in office, a real Constitutional ban on insurrectionists running for office a second time -- by saying that it is the Constitution that must yield. 

Their slogan is: “let the voters decide.”  That is to say: in the case of Trump, and Trump alone, let us simply overlook what the Constitution says. 

The exceptionalism reeks of fear.  In no other case do we wish away the qualifications for office.  There will be thousands and thousands of contested elections in the United States in November 2024.  With respect to only one of them are people saying that legal qualifications for office do not matter. 

The slogan “let the voters decide” makes no sense within our Constitutional order.  We only have voters because we have elections, and we only have elections as organized under the Constitution.  Claiming that voters (and electoral systems) can disregard the Constitution is senseless, because people become citizens and thus voters in ways defined by the Constitution.  No Constitution, no citizens, no voters. 

The real issue, though, is elsewhere.  “Let the voters decide” appeals not to law or logic but to conformism and fear.  It evades critique from within our Constitutional order because it rejects that order.  Rather than following Constitutional procedures meant to handle fear, it redirects fear against those Constitutional procedures.   

When we are ourselves afraid to defend the Constitution, we indulge in a kind of victim-blaming.  Trump tried to overthrow the Constitution; when we say “let the voters decide,” we suggest that the Constitution deserved it.  In ignoring Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, we refuse, as it were, to hear the Constitution's side of the story. 

We are attacking the Constitution because we lack the courage to defend it.  And so we begin to unwind the constitutional order. 

Take the familiar example of checks and balances. The slogan “let the voters decide” suggests that potential presidents are beyond the reach of the other branches of government, despite what the Constitution says.  Section Three of the Fourteenth amendment raises questions that courts will have to answer.  Saying “let the voters decide” denies them that role.  Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment very explicitly defines a role for Congress after an insurrection.  Congress may vote to allow an insurrectionist to take part in elections. 

The point goes deeper, into the very logic of constitutionalism.  Checks and balances illustrate the Constitution's capacity to transform human imperfections into decent politics.  One of those imperfections is fear.  When we direct our fear at the Constitution itself, however, we push those imperfections past the point where they can be borne.  When we are too fearful of the Constitution to allow the Constitution to address our fears, fear builds to become the main mode of politics.

We then legitimate mob rule because we imagine some future mob.  We obey a tyrant in advance.  Directing our fear at the Constitution makes the tyrant's ascent far too easy. 

The Constitution can defend itself in general, and even against the specific threat of an insurrectionist candidate -- but not on its own, not as a piece of paper, not without defenders who read it and affirm it.  When we ignore what the Constitution says, and blame the Constitution for our own cowardice, we join in Trump's attack upon it. 

It takes a little courage to admit that we are afraid, rather than to project our fears.  It takes a little more courage to act, rather than dissemble and delay.  If we want constitutional rule, right now is the easiest moment to mount its defense, in the way marked out by the Constitution itself. 

It only gets harder from here.

Timothy Snyder pergunta se a Suprema Corte tem condições de julgar o insurreto ex-presidente golpista

Nem todas as cortes supremas se parecem. Algumas são supremamente mais ridículas do que outras...

Courting Ridicule

When constitutionalism becomes comedy

TIMOTHY SNYDER JAN 8

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I am concerned that the Supreme Court, in ruling on Trump's eligibility for office, will make itself ridiculous. 

We stand on the threshold of comedy already. 

A Supreme Court justice takes big gifts from people who have an interest in Court rulings.  Morally shocking, but also ludicrous. 

The Court responds by ignoring a fundamental principle of justice: that one cannot judge oneself.  This is tragic, but also funny.

The wife of that justice supported the overthrow of Constitutional rule during an attempted coup.  It’s hard to miss the humorous side of that. 

She urged the president (through baffling texts to his chief of staff) to (among many other things) "release the Kraken."  This is horrible in its totality, but hilarious in the detail.

She attended and helped organize the rally that became the assault on the Capitol on January 6th, 2020.  And she helps run a for-profit consulting firmthat takes money from people who have cases before the Supreme Court.

In a Court wishing to maintain a veneer of seriousness, Clarence Thomas would recuse himself from cases where Ginni Thomas is making money and from cases concerning Trump's insurrection.  

Thomas did recuse himself from a single case that touched on January 6th, when doing so did not matter. That’s distressing; but it’s also amusing to consider that he thought he was fooling anyone.

What is left for Supreme Court justices at this point is an overt commitment to legal theory.  Most justices, Thomas included, are "originalists," and indicate that they are bound, in their rulings, by doctrines known as intentionalism or textualism.  

In intentionalism, the Constitution is held to mean what its framers intended it to mean.  In textualism, the Constitutionalism is held to mean what its plain language indicates. These views are what most justices want us to take seriously. It would help if the justices who propound these views would act consistently with them.

Court rulings favor big business and make it harder for people to vote.  We are assured that this a side effect of intentionalist and textualist readings of the Constitution.  It is mere coincidence, we are told, that these rulings align with the interests of the political forces who organized the justices' education, ascent, and appointment. Perhaps this is true.  Perhaps it is coincidence.  Perhaps textualism and intentionalism mean something.  

Or perhaps it is all a sham. We are about to find out. 

The Supreme Court is about to consider Anderson vs. Griswold, the Colorado Supreme Court ruling that Trump may not appear on a primary ballot. 

This is a case made for a textualist or an intentionalist.

For a textualist, intentionalist, or originalist of any sort, Anderson vs. Griswoldis utterly simple.  The text of Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution forbids insurrectionists such as Trump from holding office. The intentions of those who discussed and formulated Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment are similarly clear.

This is where the comic potential emerges.  This Court is unlikely ever to hear again a case of such simplicity, in which the text and context of the Constitution so obviously demand an unambiguous verdict: to confirm the Colorado ruling. 

If the Court does otherwise, it will look silly. 

But three of our textualists and the intentionalists were appointed by Trump, and silliness seems to be the general expectation. The theory of Trump's lawyers, as one of them has actually said out loud, is that Supreme Court justices appointed by Trump belong to Trump.

The tittering has begun. Like an audience that sees the banana peel on the stage, commentators goad the justices towards the pratfall. It is widely proclaimed that the Court's decision rule should not be the Constitution, but instead the psychological state of Trump supporters.  

“Maybe folks’ll be upset” would indeed be a funny way to decide a case. 

Such a pitchfork ruling, a judgement based not on law but on guesses about the moods of strangers, would be as far from intentionalism and textualism as the justices could get. It is just the sort of thing that intentionalists and textualists say that they never do. Their heroic pose is that they must do just what the Constitution says, regardless of the consequences.

After a pitchfork ruling, the entire originalist pretence — that justices stand bravely apart from the moment and evaluate the text or context of the Constitution as they must — would dissolve.

The consequences of courting ridicule are, of course, very serious. Our form of government depends on a balance between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches.  When such a government is toppled, it is usually by an executive who is able to dominate the other two branches.  One way that an executive does so is by mocking the other two branches, portraying them as unnecessary and led by buffoons.

And so actual buffoonery helps no one. If Trump is left on the ballot in defiance of the Constitution by people who claim to be its protectors, he will not respect it or them.  But the danger of constitutional comedy is general.  It leaves the rule of law more vulnerable, and makes regime change more likely.

On Tiranny : Twenty lessons from the Twentieth Century - Timothy Snyder

 On Tiranny: Twenty lessons from the Twentieth Century

Timothy Snyder

January, 6, 3024

https://open.substack.com/pub/snyder/p/on-tyranny?r=8ma92&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post 

These are twenty lessons from the twentieth century I published seven years ago, first as a kind of online declaration, and then, with historical examples, in a pamphlet called On Tyranny.

They were written in advance of the first Trump presidency, and have been used since in the U.S. and around the world. 

For those who want democracy and the rule of law in the United States after 2024, I would only add: now is the time to organize, to prepare to win locally and nationally, and to talk not only about what is to be lost but what can be gained. 

I wrote On Tyranny in a defensive mode; but freedom is something not only to be defended but to be defined and to be celebrated. As for me, I believe that if we can get through the next year, things could get better. Much better.

For now, three years after Trump’s attempt to end democracy and the rule of law in the United States, a reminder of the lessons. I recall them now in then hope that I won’t have to do so again a year from now.

1. Do not obey in advance.  Most of the power of authoritarianism is freely given. In times like these, individuals think ahead about what a more repressive government will want, and then offer themselves without being asked.  A citizen who adapts in this way is teaching power what it can do. 

2.  Defend institutions.  It is institutions that help us to preserve decency.  They need our help as well.  Do not speak of "our institutions" unless you make them yours by acting on their behalf.  Institutions do not protect themselves.  They fall one after the other unless each is defended from the beginning.  So choose an institution you care about -- a court, a newspaper, a law, a labor union -- and take its side.

3. Beware the one-party state.  The parties that remade states and suppressed rivals were not omnipotent from the start.  They exploited a historic moment to make political life impossible for their opponents.  So support the multiple-party system and defend the rules of democratic elections.  Vote in local and state elections while you can.  Consider running for office.

4. Take responsibility for the face of the world.  The symbols of today enable the reality of tomorrow.  Notice the swastikas and the other signs of hate.  Do not look away, and do not get used to them.  Remove them yourself and set an example for others to do so.

5. Remember professional ethics.  When political leaders set a negative example, professional commitments to just practice become more important. It is hard to subvert a rule-of-law state without lawyers, or to hold show trials without judges.  Authoritarians need obedient civil servants, and concentration camp directors seek businessmen interested in cheap labor.

6. Be wary of paramilitaries.  When the men with guns who have always claimed to be against the system start wearing uniforms and marching with torches and pictures of a leader, the end is nigh.  When the pro-leader paramilitary and the official police and military intermingle, the end has come.

7. Be reflective if you must be armed.  If you carry a weapon in public service, may God bless you and keep you.  But know that evils of the past involved policemen and soldiers finding themselves, one day, doing irregular things.  Be ready to say no.

8. Stand out.  Someone has to.  It is easy to follow along.  It can feel strange to do or say something different.  But without that unease, there is no freedom.  Remember Rosa Parks.  The moment you set an example, the spell of the status quo is broken, and others will follow.

9. Be kind to our language.  Avoid pronouncing the phrases everyone else does.  Think up your own way of speaking, even if only to convey that thing you think everyone is saying.  Make an effort to separate yourself from the internet.  Read books.

10. Believe in truth.  To abandon facts is to abandon freedom.  If nothing is true, then no one can criticize power, because there is no basis upon which to do so.  If nothing is true, then all is spectacle.  The biggest wallet pays for the most blinding lights.

11. Investigate.  Figure things out for yourself.  Spend more time with long articles. Subsidize investigative journalism by subscribing to print media.  Realize that some of what is on the internet is there to harm you.  Learn about sites that investigate propaganda campaigns (some of which come from abroad).  Take responsibility for what you communicate with others.

12. Make eye contact and small talk.  This is not just polite.  It is part of being a citizen and a responsible member of society.  It is also a way to stay in touch with your surroundings, break down social barriers, and understand whom you should and should not trust.  If we enter a culture of denunciation, you will want to know the psychological landscape of your daily life.

13. Practice corporeal politics.  Power wants your body softening in your chair and your emotions dissipating on the screen.  Get outside.  Put your body in unfamiliar places with unfamiliar people.  Make new friends and march with them.

14. Establish a private life.  Nastier rulers will use what they know about you to push you around.  Scrub your computer of malware on a regular basis.  Remember that email is skywriting.  Consider using alternative forms of the internet, or simply using it less.  Have personal exchanges in person.  For the same reason, resolve any legal trouble.  Tyrants seek the hook on which to hang you.  Try not to have hooks.

15. Contribute to good causes.  Be active in organizations, political or not, that express your own view of life.  Pick a charity or two and set up autopay.  Then you will have made a free choice that supports civil society and helps others to do good.

16. Learn from peers in other countries.  Keep up your friendships abroad, or make new friends in other countries.  The present difficulties in the United States are an element of a larger trend.  And no country is going to find a solution by itself.  Make sure you and your family have passports.

17. Listen for dangerous words.  Be alert to use of the words "extremism" and "terrorism."  Be alive to the fatal notions of "emergency" and "exception."  Be angry about the treacherous use of patriotic vocabulary.

18. Be calm when the unthinkable arrives.  Modern tyranny is terror management.  When the terrorist attack comes, remember that authoritarians exploit such events in order to consolidate power.  The sudden disaster that requires the end of checks and balances, the dissolution of opposition parties, the suspension of freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, and so on, is the oldest trick in the Hitlerian book.  Do not fall for it.

19. Be a patriot.  Set a good example of what America means for the generations to come.  They will need it.

20. Be as courageous as you can.  If none of us is prepared to die for freedom, then all of us will die under tyranny.

These lessons are the openings of the twenty chapters of On Tyranny, which has been updated to account for the Big Lie, the coup attempt, the war in Ukraine, and the risks we face in 2024.  On Tyranny has also been published in a beautiful graphic edition, illustrated by Nora Krug.

Ukraine: The State of the War p Timothy Snyder

 Os interessados numa história da Ucrânia, dos tempos ancestrais à atualidade, podem visualizar o curso que ele deu na Yale, disponível no seu canal no YouTube.

	View in browser The state of the war Thoughts from Kyiv TIMOTHY SNYDER SEP 7   READ IN APP   Upgrade to paid Greetings from Kyiv.  I have spent the last several days in Ukraine, here in the capital, and in the southerly regions of Odesa, Mykolaïv, and Kherson, trying to get a sense of the state of the war.  I will write more about the experience, but I thought that it might be a good time to share my most general sense.   It is a crucial moment, partly because of what is happening, and partly because of our own sense of time. One and a half years is an awkward period for us.  We might like to think that it can be brought to a rapid conclusion, with this or that offensive or weapon.  When the war does not quickly end, we jump  to the idea that it is a “stalemate,” which is a situation that lasts forever.  This is false, and serves as a kind of excuse not to figure out what is going on.  This is a war that can be won, but only if we are patient enough to see the outlines and the  opportunities. Russia’s gains in this invasion were made almost entirely during its first few weeks, in February and March 2022.  Those gains were largely possible thanks to the fact that Russia had seized the Crimean Peninsula in its earlier invasion of Ukraine in 2014.  Over the course of 2022, Ukraine won the battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, and took back about half of the territory Russia gained.  In the first half of 2023, Russia undertook an offensive that gained almost nothing but the city of Bakhmut.  In the second half of this year Ukraine has undertaken a counter-offensive which has taken far more territory than did the Russian offensive, but which has not (yet) changed the overall strategic position (but could).  In Russia, a military coup was attempted by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the mercenary group that took Bakhmut.  He and Putin made a deal, after which Putin killed him.  In a related development, Sergei Surovikin, probably the most capable Russian general, has been relieved of his command.  Russia now has no meaningful offensive potential. Its strategy is to continue terror against civilians until Ukrainians can endure no longer.  This, judging from my experience anyway, is not a tenable approach.  On the other hand, Russia has had time to extensively fortify a long long of defense in the east and south, and to prepare for Ukrainian offensives. This makes Ukrainian offensives very difficult.  Ukraine did want to press forward last year, before the fortifications were built.  It lacked the necessary weapons, and Elon Musk chose to cut Ukraine off from communications.  That move likely extended the war. Because Musk’s decision was based on his internalization of Russian propaganda about nuclear war, and was accompanied by his repetition of that propaganda, he made a nuclear war more likely.  If powerful men convey the message that just talking about nuclear war is enough to win conventional wars, then we will have more countries with nuclear weapons and more conventional wars that can escalate into nuclear ones. Ukraine has been resistant to this line of Russian fearmongering, fortunately for us all. Ukraine did not have the arms it needed last year in part for the same reason: Americans allowed Russian propaganda to displace strategic calculation. By now, though, the American side has generally understood that Russia’s nuclear threat was a psychological operation meant to slow weapons deliveries.  The United States and European partners have delivered arms to Ukraine, which has been absolutely indispensable. Hhistorically speaking, though, the pace is slow.  Fighter planes are coming, but a year late for the current offensive.  So Ukrainians are now trying an offensive in conditions that American staff officers would find challenging.  Americans take for granted economic superiority, prior destruction of logistics, and air supremacy, none of which describe the Ukrainian position.  Ukrainians do not even have numerical superiority, let alone of the 3-1 or 5-1 variety that would be standard advice for an offensive. The fighting this summer has been very hard and very costly for Ukraine, harder and costlier, I think, than it had to be.  I visited wounded soldiers in a rehabilitation center earlier today; among the many feelings this aroused was some guilt that my people could have done more to protect these people. (If you want to protect them, consider a gift to Come Back Alive or United24 or Unite with Ukraine). Kherson oblast, Ukraine, September 2023, TS That said, Ukrainian territorial advances this summer have been sufficient to trigger a barrage of calls for a cease-fire from Kremlin-friendly voices.  Given the way or media seems to work, these calls (rather than the events on the ground) sometimes seem to be the news.  Pro-Kremlin op-eds smuggle in the assumption that Ukraine is not advancing, when in fact it is. The Kremlin allies make their case in terms of Ukrainian suffering, but never cite Ukrainians, nor the polling data that shows overwhelming support for the war. There is zero reason to believe that the Kremlin would actually feel constrained by such an agreement in any place; it did not even begin to hold to the terms of the agreement after its last invasion, and in invading again Moscow has violated all of its agreements with Ukraine (while making clear that it does not consider Ukraine a state).  Russian propagandists talking to Russian audiences do not hide that the goal is the destruction of the Ukrainian nation, and that a ceasefire would just be meant to buy time. Now that the nuclear bluff has largely worn itself out, Moscow has changed its approach, trying instead to make people believe that nothing is happening on the battlefield.  Moscow’s hope is to motivate Ukraine’s allies to restrain Ukraine long enough for Russia to shift the balance of forces in its favor.   Ukraine is deploying its own long-range strike capability to destroy airplanes and logistics in Russian territory, which is a necessary condition for winning the war.  This is an awkward development, since western partners don’t always think through how a war like this can be brought to an end.  It ends when one side wins.  The questions are who wins and under what conditions.  The American allies take the correct view that Ukraine to win must break through the Russian lines.  But there are just not that many Ukrainians to throw into surges, and from a Ukrainian perspective those lives should be put at risk when the battlefield has been shaped.  The notion of a breakthrough is also too narrowly defined.  Even setting aside the value of life, which is what this war is all about, military history does show that battlefield victories are the final stage of a larger process that begins with logistics.   This war has brought an entirely new theory of what a defensive war means: fighting only on one’s own territory.  This does not correspond to international law and has never made any sense.  It is a bit like rooting for a basketball team but believing it should play without ever taking the ball past halfcourt, or rooting for a boxer but claiming he is not allowed to throw a punch after his opponent does.  Had such a notion been in place in past wars, none of Ukraine’s partners would ever have won any of the wars they are proud of winning.   The voiced concern is that Russia could “escalate.”  This argument is a triumph of Russian propaganda.  None of Ukraine’s strikes across borders has done anything except reduce Russian capacity.  None has led Russia to do things it was not already doing.  The notion of “escalation” in this setting is a misunderstanding.  In trying to undo Russian logistics, Ukraine is trying to end the war.  Ukraine will not do in Russia most of the things Russia has done in Ukraine.  It will not occupy or seize territory, it will not execute civilians, it will not build concentration camps and torture chambers.  What it must be allowed to do, to have some chance of stopping those Russian practices in Ukraine, is to have the capacity to win the war. With every village that Ukraine takes back, we see the most important de-escalation: away from war crimes and genocide, towards something more like a normal life. Victory will be difficult, but it is the relevant concept.  I don’t know any Ukrainians at this point who have not lost a friend or a family member in this war.  My friends now tend to have a certain dark circle around the eyes and a tendency to look into the middle distance.  And yet the level of determination is very, very high. In the few days I have been here there have been missile attacks in or near both cities where I spent the night, a murderous Russian strike on a market, and a Russian attempt to cut off Ukrainian grain exports with missiles and drones.  This is daily life — but it is Ukrainian daily life, not ours.  The Ukrainians are doing all of the fighting; we are doing part of the funding.  What Ukrainian resistance protects, though, extends far beyond Ukraine. The Ukrainians are defending the legal order established after the Second World War.  They have performed the entire NATO mission of absorbing and reversing an attack by Russia with a tiny percentage of NATO military budgets and zero losses from NATO members. Ukrainians are making a war in the Pacific much less likely by demonstrating to China that offensive operations are harder than they seem.  They have made nuclear war less likely by demonstrating that nuclear blackmail need not work.  Ukraine is also fighting to restore its grain exports to Africa and Asia, where millions of people have been put at risk by Russia’s attack on the Ukrainian economy.  Last but not least, Ukrainians are demonstrating that a democracy can defend itself. Ukrainians are delivering to us kinds of security that we could not attain on our own.  I fear that we are taking these security gains for granted.  (In my more cynical moments, I fear that some of us, perhaps even some presidential candidates, resent the Ukrainians precisely for helping us so much.)   This war will not end because of one sudden event, but nor will it go on indefinitely.  When and how it ends depends largely on us, on what we do, on how much we help. Even if we did not care at all about Ukrainians (and we should), getting this war to end with a Ukrainian victory would be by far the best thing Americans could do for themselves. Indeed, I do not think that, in the history of US foreign relations, there has ever been a chance to secure so much for Americans with so little effort by Americans. I do hope we take that chance. TS Kyiv 7 September