Sancoes americanas ao Iran: implicações geopolíticas - J.P. Morgan

Geopolitical Flashpoints

Global Implications of Re-Imposing Sanctions on Iran

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By Joyce Chang, John Normand^AC, Ben Ramsey^AC, Giyas M Gokkent^AC, Nur Raisah Rasid^AC, Abhishek G Deshpande^AC, Pedro Martins Junior, CFA^AC, David Aserkoff, CFA^AC, Meera Chandan^AC, Jonathan Cavenagh^AC, Anezka Christovova^AC, Robert Habib^AC, Daniel P Hui^AC, Tarek Hamid^AC, Matthew Anavy, CFA^AC

Click here for the full Note and disclaimers

A special message from Joyce Chang, Global Head of Research In this edition of Geopolitical Flashpoints, which can also be found on J.P. Morgan Markets, the Global Research teams examine the economic and market implications of the re-imposition of Iran sanctions on November 5 as the Trump administration deadline to unilaterally withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nears on November 4. The reports highlighted below summarize the latest developments and include recommendations and views across asset classes.

As the November 4 deadline that President Trump set to unilaterally withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)¹ and the re-imposition of sanctions on November 5 looms, we assess the macro and market implications. The basic aim of US secondary sanctions is to force non-US companies to choose between transacting with the US and its financial system, or with Iran. Ending the Iran deal was a key foreign policy plank of candidate Trump’s election platform and the effects of the sanctions are already becoming evident. The latest Iranian export data suggests that many countries that import Iranian oil have already started to reduce their imports significantly well ahead of the November 4 deadline. While there is still uncertainty around how much Iranian barrels would be lost once the sanctions are implemented, the markets have tried to price in anywhere between 0.5mbd (in early June) to just over 1mbd (late Sep/early October) of exports being curtailed. Iran crude exports fell to around 1.6mbd in September as major importers including China scaled back their crude purchases. We now expect Brent to average $85/bbl in 4Q18 and $83.5/bbl in 2019, with Brent to finish at around $90/bbl by year-end. The upward revision in our forecasts was strongly driven by significant supply-side risks, more than offsetting the expected softness in demand. In the absence of Iran supply concerns, oil prices would have likely hovered around or below $70/bbl, but with the presence of Iran risks we expect oil prices to remain well supported in the months ahead. Iran oil sanctions could put 1.5-2.4mbd of oil exports at risk, which would more than compensate any demand drop due to slower global growth and trade tensions. While the growth impact of US-China trade disputes matter for commodities demand, Iran matters a lot more in the case of oil, given the large supply shock it could represent in the very near term. Iran poses a first order effect via supply shock whereas US-China trade war poses a second order effect via economic growth slowdown. 

Background on US sanctions on Iran and decision to re-impose sanctions

Since the late-1980s, a series of sanctions have been imposed against Iran, including by the United States, the European Union and members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, due to Iran’s refusal to suspend the enrichment of uranium and other activities deemed malign by participating members. As a result of sanctions, Iranian inflation topped 40%oya, while oil exports and growth collapsed after 2012. After 20 months of talks, in July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed between the 5 permanent Security Council members, Germany and the European Union with Iran, to limit the country’s nuclear program in return for lifting the European Union and United Nations nuclear-related sanctions and US secondary sanctions, although US comprehensive primary sanctions preventing US individuals and companies from engaging with Iran remained in place.

On May 8, President Trump announced that the US would unilaterally withdraw from JCPOA and reimpose all sanctions lifted or waived in connection with JCPOA after wind-down periods of 90 or 180 days. As President, Trump had signed waivers in 2017, but finally made a May 2018 announcement regarding his intention to quit the JCPOA, blaming Iran’s ballistic missile tests and actions across the MENA region as justification for the US to pull out from “the decaying and rotten deal”. The re-imposition of so-called “secondary sanctions” aimed at non-US companies’ dealing with Iran began after the wind-down periods; the first set of secondary sanctions became effective on August 7², which reimposed sanctions to include purchase or acquisition of US dollar banknotes by Iran, trading in commodities such as gold, steel, coal, semi-finished metals, such as aluminum, and some other transactions related to commodities, currencies and sovereign debt. The next set of sanctions—which target the oil trade—come into effect on November 5³. The sanctions to be reimposed to include those targeting Iran’s port operation, shipping sector, and most importantly, transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), amongst others. In addition, sanctions on provision of underwriting services, insurance or re-insurance and transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions under Section 1245. The transfer of payments may be impacted if the SWIFT network is disconnected as in 2012. In addition to these sanctions, the US government will reimpose, as appropriate, the sanctions on persons removed from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. President Trump’s executive orders would not only turn the clock back to the sanctions regime that prevailed before the JCPOA—critically, on a bilateral basis, compared to the multilateral framework that prevailed before—but they may want to go even further. The sanctions can effectively cutoff access to the US financial sector not only for any party dealing directly with Iran, but also third parties (including international banks, insurance companies, shipping companies) facilitating significant transactions with Iran.

Additionally, on October 3rd, the US Secretary of State terminated the Iran Amity signed in 1955 after Iran used it as a basis for a case at the International Court of Justice. The Amity Treaty, an agreement to encourage good relations and trade, was signed with the Iranian Shah, who was a US ally. Although an insignificant act in itself, it does point toward a more hawkish stance on Iran. 

Oil Commodities Research View

Global oil supply should tighten after the imposition of Iran sanctions, with risks biased to the upside especially after US mid-term elections. The upward revision in our forecasts has been driven by significant supply-side risks as importers of Iranian crude have scaled back significantly in the run-up to the November 4 deadline. This has been one of the key drivers of oil prices in 2018. Front month Brent has risen by as much as $20/bbl since the start of the year until recently when it touched $86.3/bbl on Oct 03. There is still uncertainty around how much Iranian barrels would be lost once the sanctions are implemented and we estimate the markets have tried to price in anywhere between 0.5mbd (in early June) to around 1.5mbd (late Sep/early October) of exports being curtailed. Iran exports close to 2.5mbd of its crude output with the remainder consumed domestically. In a briefing published by the US State Department in June, it was suggested that oil imports from Iran should be cut down to zero. Whilst there have been several comments earlier this year by the State Department that reflected no predisposition towards waivers, this position has changed to a case-by-case basis waivers for countries that are making efforts to reduce their imports. Despite the levels of waivers remaining unclear and uncertain in the near-term, we do expect the US administration to push these countries to significantly reduce their imports from Iran eventually even if they were to receive some waivers initially to allow them to replace Iranian crude supply.

The latest Iranian export data suggests that many countries that import Iranian oil have already started to reduce their imports significantly well ahead of the November 4 deadline. Iran crude exports fell to around 1.6mbd in September as major importers including China scaled back their crude purchases. Additionally, buyers of Iranian oil have indicated their reluctance to buy Iranian oil to avoid any repercussions given the uncertainty. Currently the market is not short oil as Iranian oil is still in the market and Saudi Arabia and Russia have ramped up oil production to avoid a spike that concerned some of its key consumers and allies. However, the risk of losing another 0.5mbd to even 1.5mbd (from current ~1.5mbd) in a worst case scenario where US pushes towards it zero Iran export target could tighten the oil markets significantly in the near-future and OPEC’s spare capacity could be challenged even in a modest oil demand growth environment. The retaliation from Iran to return to full-scale Uranium enrichment or block Strait of Hormuz could be seen as a major geo-political risk to oil but also the region that is currently steeped in various conflicts.

Oil markets are currently very fragile and anxious as the very drivers, such as strong demand and tight OPEC supply that helped balanced the markets earlier this year, have started to raise uncertainty around the recovery in oil price. Despite the weakness in physical markets due to the factors mentioned above, we think the impact on the oil markets from the loss of Iranian barrels will only be felt once physical markets show signs of tightness post re-imposition of sanctions on November 5. Once the physical markets show signs of tightness, then the lack of spare capacity and rising geo-political risks surrounding oil producing countries including Iran, Venezuela, Russia and Saudi Arabia should be sufficient in returning robust support under oil prices once again. We don’t doubt that the Kingdom can increase production towards its 12 mbd capacity; however, the timing of it is what markets will question once Iran’s sanctions are in force and start to tighten physical markets and markets for medium/heavy sour crude. Most of the Kingdom’s available nameplate capacity remains constrained. At 10.7mbd of current production, their nameplate spare capacity is 1.3mbd as also suggested by the Saudi Oil minister but the real available capacity is questionable in the near term. Abhishek Deshpande

Economic and Political Views

The effect of sanctions against Iran’s economy has already become evident, with Iranian oil production declining 12% from its peak in May, as trade partners begun to reduce their oil imports. Oil prices have reacted in sympathy, as our commodities strategy has commented extensively. As a result of these developments, the Iranian rial depreciated by up to 75% in the black market through September and inflation accelerated to 31.4%oya. Against this background, a series of protests have erupted with deteriorating economic conditions throughout the year. Iran has threatened the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one fifth of global oil trade passes, if the country is not permitted to export its oil. Despite Donald Trump’s offer to meet Iranian president Hassan Rouhani without preconditions, it remains unlikely that the Iranian government will return to negotiations in the near-term. 

The reactions of large importers of Iranian oil, like China and India, would seem to be critical to judge the degrees of freedom enjoyed by countries that otherwise would spurn such US extraterritorial sanctions. The EU for its part has staked out a strong stance to defend its political decision to try to keep the Iran deal (JCPOA) alive, notably with the extension of the 1996 EU “Blocking Statute” to include US Iran sanctions, which ostensibly compels European entities to not comply with extraterritorial US sanctions. However, it remains to be seen whether, in practice, the Blocking Statute will dissuade European companies from deciding to stop dealing with Iran given many firms have too much to lose if their US business / access to the US financial system becomes compromised. The more interesting European policy proposal (in conjunction with China and Russia) is that of an Special-Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to allow non-US firms to effectively deal with Iran in legitimate business (as per EU law) anonymously, and therefore, not run the risk of being targeted by the US. This proposal, which has been strongly criticized by the US, has yet to be unveiled and tested operationally. A key battleground on the US’s willingness and ability to counter this proposal would be whether the Trump administration would challenge the SPV itself or the European or other central banks supporting the SPV. At the country level, while Turkey and India are most vulnerable through the trade channel, another perhaps even stronger impact of sanctions could come through the financial channel, as local companies and banks could be denied access to critical USD payment systems. Turkey, India, Korea and China have the highest exposure to Iran through the trade channel, with bilateral trade with Iran ranging from 0.9%-2.75% of overall trade for these economies. Ben Ramsey, Giyas Gokkent, Nur Raisah Rasid

Cross-Asset Strategy Views

We have been long petro assets to varying degrees all year and recommend keeping such exposure while supply risks persist and Brent is below $90/bbl. We were maximum long in Q1 and Q2 (long Oil futures, overweight US Energy Equities and HY Energy Credit, and long either NOK, CAD or RUB), moderately long in Q3 (we went tactically short crude in early summer), and now close to maximum long again (re-entered long Brent in September). To be sure, the value proposition of petro assets varies considerably, with Energy Equities, Energy Credit, Russian Equities and US inflation breakevens discounting the highest oil price, and petro-currencies like RUB factoring in the lowest price. But the ruble is only interesting as an Iran hedge for those who think that higher oil prices will do more good for Russia through a higher trade surplus than further Russia-specific sanctions might harm capital flows. For now, we are neutral oil currencies given a generally strong US dollar environment, and hedge Iran supply risks through oil directly or with oil stocks and credit. John Normand

Global FX Views

The primary transmission of Iran sanctions to FX is likely to be through oil prices with our commodity strategists expecting that Brent could breach $90/bbl going into year-end. This will likely inform the performance of petro-exporters vs. importers. We have long argued that even though petro-FX has lagged oil prices, a more selective stance on these currencies is required. The performance of several petro-FX has been held back due to various idiosyncratic factors that have not translated into a growth boost for these currencies. Even though oil prices have been increasing for 2 years, our growth forecasts for petro-currencies have not increased by much.

On a more granular basis, growth in G10 countries (CAD and NOK) has fared better than EM petro FX (COP, MXN, RUB) where average growth forecasts have actually been downgraded over this same period. Among G10 petro-FX, we are structurally bullish on NOK (neutral in the recommended trade recommendations, but long NOK in the long-term recommendations) and have bullish forecasts for CAD (though for reasons other than high global oil prices, as local crude prices are in fact heavily depressed). Oil prices have impacted forecasts of RUB in recent weeks (RUB targets were upgraded by 5% over the next three quarters), but we are still neutral which is still a more favorable stance compared to other high-yielders in the region such as ZAR where we are underweight. In Latin America, we are neutral both MXN and COP as weak EM appetite and policies implemented domestically could continue to offset the terms-of-trade positives from higher oil prices.

We also assess the impact of higher oil prices on energy importers. J.P. Morgan FX forecasts for energy importers have been downgraded in recent weeks. For instance, in G10, our Japan strategists downgraded JPY in October in part motivated by deteriorating external balances related to oil. We are short JPY versus USD in our recommended macro portfolio. In EM, our strategists point to INR underperformance in part being linked to higher oil prices (where FX targets were cut in sympathy with CNY in September). In addition, higher oil prices have also had an impact on TRY weakness, but admittedly this has been a secondary driver given other idiosyncratic factors in the country. Meera Chandan, Jonathan Cavenagh, Anezka Christovova, Robert Habib, Daniel Hui

US Credit Research Views

Second order impacts on US Credit from sanctions on Iran are meaningful. Few, if any, of the companies in our combined universes are actively involved directly in Iran post the last round of sanctions. However, sanctions are likely to increase the overall risk premium and volatility of the commodity, which should filter through the ecosystem. In the near term, a greater call on US shale could have an additive effect to the services sector as activity levels increase on the back of the expectation of sustained higher prices. More importantly, increased cash flow and improved leverage metrics have particularly topical implications.

Sanctions could accelerate Rising Star pipeline. US High Yield (specifically BB) rated credit stands at a cross-road, with a substantial amount of BB-rated E&P and MLP credits poised for transition to investment grade at current strip pricing. Sanctions could easily accelerate that trend as E&Ps use excess cash flow from the “Iran bump” to pay down debt and/or achieve critical mass for investment grade ratings. Similarly, on the Investment Grade side, one of the greatest overhangs market wide on US credit is the “low-BBB wall” and potential Fallen Angel implications during the next cyclical downturn. Capital and balance sheet discipline remain front and center in Energy. Therefore, we expect BBB-rated Energy companies to continue to use excess cash flow to pay down debt and bolster balance sheets as well as start to return value to shareholders in a disciplined way. 

Value continues to accrue to critical infrastructure. Finally, one important downside of sanctions impact is the potential supply demand imbalance when/if sanctions end. Midstream company bonds remain a source of “safe spread” and are somewhat insulated from the commodity. We continue to see good value in Midstream and MLPs especially in a more volatile crude oil environment. Prudent growth and deleveraging remain the focus, and in a world of wider differentials and increased volatility, value is inexorably moving within the industry food chain towards infrastructure. Tarek Hamid and Matthew Anavy

Emerging Markets Equity Strategy Research Views

Near-term upside via better support to oil prices offsetting medium-term negative geopolitical risk to EM equities could be the result of the US decision to advance on the Iranian sanctions. The near-term positive is backing to higher oil prices. There is a strong historical co-movement between GEM equities and oil price rallies and corrections. During periods of rising oil prices, the median return for GEM equities was USD20%. In 80% of the positive return periods for oil, GEM equities also posted positive returns. LatAm and CEEMEA are the most impacted by the change in oil prices and EM Asia the least. Russia, Colombia, Brazil, Thailand and Poland have the highest positive sensitivity to oil price changes. The potential medium-term negatives to EM equities could include a narrower hallway to US-EU future cooperation in other geopolitical sensitive issues such as Russia and Syria, for example, and an unintended re-escalation of nuclear investments in the Middle East region for neighbors to defend themselves from a possible Iran threat. 

Overall oil strength has been more positive for GEM vs. DM equities as it is possibly associated with periods of high economic growth expectations. This is where the risk lies in the current cycle. The core reason for the upward revision in oil prices is a supply constraint and weaker global growth. We prefer to keep a Neutral rating on Energy to remain less directionally dependent on short-term volatility in oil prices. We could indirectly benefit from higher oil prices by OW positions on Russia, Brazil, and on energy in the ASEAN region.Pedro Martins and David Aserkoff

Please find below links to recently published reports from the J.P. Morgan Research team.

GLOBAL RESEARCH

J.P. Morgan Perspectives: Geopolitics and Markets: Risks on the Rise (Global Research, 1 November 2018)

Geopolitical Flashpoints: Will the US introduce further sanctions on Russia?, (Anatoliy A Shal, Nicolaie Alexandru-Chidesciuc, et al, 26 September 2018)

Geopolitical Flashpoints: Macro and Market Implications of Reimposition of US Sanctions on Iran (Global Research, 24 May 2018)

EMERGING MARKETS ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Iran sanctions: On again: Bracing for the November 5 reimposition (Ben Ramsey, Giyas M Gokkent, Nur Raisah Rasid, 1 November 2018)

Middle East and North Africa Weekly (Giyas M Gokkent, 15 October 2018)

Europe, Middle East and Africa Emerging Markets Weekly (Nicolaie Alexandru-Chidesciuc, 7 July 2018)

MENA Macro, Credit and Equity conference: Highlights from presentations and panel discussions (Nicolaie Alexandru-Chidesciuc and Zafar Nazim, 2 July 2018)

COMMODITIES RESEARCH

Oil Market Special: OPEC: A linchpin in global geo-politics, (Abhishek G Deshpande, Prateek Kedia, 19 October 2018)

Oil Market Weekly: Back to the 90s, (Abhishek G Deshpande, 8 October 2018)

OIL MARKET OUTLOOK - APPEC WEEK: EM matters but Iran matters more in the near-term, (Abhishek G Deshpande, 24 September 2018)

Oil Market Quarterly 3Q18: EM matters but Iran matters more in the near-term (Abhishek G Deshpande, Thomas Anthonj, et al, 23 September 2018)

Commodities Derivatives Quarterly 3Q18: Oil vol trapped between Iran and USD; Gold gamma to remain under pressure, (Arindam Sandilya, Ladislav Jankovic, 21 September 2018)

Oil Market Weekly: Demand outlook pitted against supply shocks (Abhishek Deshpande, 15 October 2018)

Commodities Quarterly 3Q18: Base metals and agriculture poised to join oil higher in 4Q after a weak 3Q(Abhishek Deshpande, Shikha Chaturvedi, Natasha Kaneva et al, 21 October 2018)

Oil Market Quarterly 3Q18: EM matters but Iran matters more in the near-term (Abhishek Deshpande, 23 September 2018)

Commodities Derivatives Quarterly 3Q18: Oil vol trapped between Iran and USD; Gold gamma to remain under pressure (Arindam Sandilya and Ladislave Jankovic, 21 September 2018)

Oil Market Weekly: President, Dollar & Oil (Abhishek Deshpande, 27 August 2018)

Iranian Sanctions and Global Oil Market Update (Abhishek Deshpande, 11 May 2018)

CROSS-ASSET STRATEGY RESEARCH

The J.P. Morgan View: Bond yields haven’t hit their cycle highs – mapping contagion through 2019 (John Normand, 12 October 2018)

The J.P. Morgan View: Rethinking the US-China trade war and the Oil outlook (John Normand, 21 September 2018)

US CREDIT RESEARCH

Investment Grade Energy: Sector Overview, October 2018 (Matthew Anavy et al, 19 October 2018)

High Yield Energy: Sector Enamored with Its Own Mortality (Tarek Hamid et al, 19 September 2018)

ASIA PACIFIC EQUITY RESEARCH

Rocks, Fuel and Steel: Retail Fuel Price Hikes Restart; Iran Sanction Impact; US Rig Count Moves Higher; Steel Steady, Aluminum Volatile (Pinakin Parekh, CFA, Priyanshi Jain, Scott L Darling, 14 May 2018)

OIL AND GAS EQUITY RESEARCH 

Middle East Oil Macro - Saudi Conference Feedback: Oil policy moving into 'offense' as fiscal outlook improves(Christyan F Malek et al, 24 October 2018)

Middle East Oil Macro: Manaar call feedback: US/Iran sanctions to drive shift in OPEC/Russia production policy(Christyan F Malek et al, 16 October 2018)

Big Oil 'Trilemma' Key Investor Debates: ESG focus accelerating; frustration with negative de-coupling from oil; greater EPS predictability key for RDS (Christyan F Malek et al, 16 October 2018)

EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY STRATEGY RESEARCH 

Key Trades and Risks: Emerging Markets Equity Strategy (Pedro Martins Junior et al, 16 October 2018)

VIDEO AND PODCASTS

Middle East Oil Macro - Saudi Conference Feedback: Oil policy moving into 'offense' as fiscal outlook improves(Christyan F Malek et al, 24 October 2018)

1. ¹ JCPOA was signed between Iran, the P5+1 (France, UK, China, Russia and the US plus Germany) and the European Union
2.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/
3.  https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf

Click here for the full Note and disclaimers

Russia-EUA; as relacoes ambiguas ou indefinidas - Carnegie Endowment

Os EUA de Trump configuram o primeiro caso de um império quase universal que renuncia deliberadamente à liderança em seus próprios termos – que no caso da América tradicional deveriam ser os de uma ordem liberal democrática fundada sobre a liberdade de mercados – e adere a uma visão do mundo introvertida, introspectiva, de abandono de suas obrigações com os satélites.
Curioso caso de suicídio imperial...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Brasília, 7 de julho de 2018

Can the Trump-Putin Summit Restore Guardrails to the U.S.-Russian Relationship?

Carnegie Endowment, July 6, 2018

President Donald Trump’s habit of challenging the Washington establishment and upending decades of U.S. foreign policy conventions is by now well documented. Equally well documented is his desire to change the course of U.S.-Russian relations. Therefore, his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki on July 16 should not come as a surprise to anyone. Trump’s many pronouncements on Russia and Putin over the years leave no doubt that he is eager to turn the page on any number of hot-button issues, including Putin’s annexation of Crimea, the wars in eastern Ukraine and Syria, the multiple rounds of sanctions, and Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

Moreover, Trump’s desire “to get along” with Russia is hardly unprecedented. Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. and Russian president has similarly attempted to develop a cooperative bilateral and personal relationship. Each attempt has ended in bitter disappointment, leaving U.S.-Russian relations in even worse shape. The relationship has been through a series of booms invariably followed by busts, highlighting very real differences between them that no amount of presidential bonhomie can overcome.

What is needed today is not another symbolic handshake or commitment to move past the old differences, but rather a sober look at the root causes of successive crises in U.S.-Russian relations as well as a clearer understanding of why major disagreements have lingered despite both sides’ attempts at reconciliation.

Putting those disagreements aside is not the same as resolving them. The underlying causes of past crises have been ignored. If the relationship between Moscow and Washington is to move beyond the boom-bust cycle, the key question is whether these differences and their causes can be addressed. Observers are skeptical that the meeting in Helsinki can accomplish that but hope that the two presidents can launch a much-needed yet long-delayed dialogue about the true state of the U.S.-Russian relationship. That alone could be a major accomplishment of the first full-fledged Trump-Putin summit.

A Clash of Visions

At the heart of the long-standing conflict between Russia and the United States is a disagreement about their respective approaches to the conduct of foreign affairs. Until Trump arrived on the scene, the United States traditionally championed (even though admittedly it has not always adhered to it) the international liberal order—including political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberalism in international relations—and actively promoted liberal values beyond its borders. Russia has adhered to a very different—realist—philosophy and stressed the importance of national interests rather than liberal values in the conduct of its foreign policy. As much as the United States has sought to promote the international liberal order, Russia has resisted its expansion, especially in areas that could touch on Russian interests.

This fundamental disagreement has hardly been addressed, let alone resolved in the course of the entire post–Cold War history of the bilateral relationship. (While there are abundant signs that Trump sees the international liberal order as fundamentally harmful to the political and economic vitality of the United States, he is learning that its continued existence is hard to wish away or dismantle overnight.)

The U.S. national security establishment—buoyed by a perceived victory in the Cold War and the failure of the Soviet Union and its discredited ideology—took largely a laissez-faire approach to this problem, firmly believing that Washington was on the right side of history. The establishment believed that any opponents would sooner or later realize the errors of their ways and embrace its worldview. And if they did not, they would eventually pay the price for resisting the forces of history.

Their Russian counterparts rejected the proposition that they had lost the Cold War and refused to accept the consequences of the West’s victory. Moscow’s vision has been deeply affected by its experience at the end of the Cold War and guided by a firm resolve to prevent it from being repeated. Since the mid-1990s, resistance to the U.S.-led liberal order has been the centerpiece of Russia’s foreign policy. With neither side willing or able to compromise and each convinced that it has chosen the only viable path, their fundamental disagreement has put a powerful brake on successive attempts to repair the relationship and set it on a sustained, mutually beneficial track.

Cycles of Frustration

And such attempts by U.S. presidential administrations have been made repeatedly. Bill Clinton’s administration’s partnership for reform with Russia was intended to help Russia transform itself into a market economy and democratic society, which was expected, in turn, to make it a willing member of the international liberal order. The offer of partnership with NATO was intended to assuage Russian concerns about NATO as a threatening military alliance, as it expanded into Central Europe. These pursuits were premised on the expectation that Russia would change and follow the U.S. lead.

George W. Bush’s administration had hoped to transform the relationship in the wake of 9/11 and redefine the strategic nuclear relationship with Russia by moving away from the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and the legacy of what it believed were obsolete, binding arms control agreements inherited from the Cold War. As a practical matter, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which the Russians regarded as a cornerstone of strategic stability. The underlying logic of this approach was that if the two countries were no longer in an adversarial relationship and no longer threatened each other, they could dispense with that legacy. Beyond the nuclear realm, the Bush administration engaged in democracy promotion as a means of spreading stability and prosperity. Russia rejected both the idea of moving past MAD and the historical inevitability of democratic change as profoundly threatening to its interests.

Barack Obama’s administration’s attempt to “reset” the relationship with Russia in the aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also paid little heed to the underlying causes of the conflict between Russia and the United States. With “modernization” as its principal theme, this policy, just as its predecessors, was premised on the idea of encouraging domestic change in Russia that would ultimately lead to changes in its foreign policy and acceptance of the U.S.-led international liberal order. None of this happened.

U.S. policymakers were not the only ones frustrated. Their Russian counterparts too had many frustrations and complaints about U.S. handling of the bilateral relationship, which they have voiced repeatedly over the past three decades. The Russian narrative includes broken U.S. promises not to expand NATO, interference in Russian domestic politics and use of double standards when criticizing it for its democracy deficit, refusal to treat Russia as a peer, reliance on economic sanctions to achieve desired political and diplomatic outcomes, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, unilateral use of military force, and regime change and destabilization under the guise of democracy promotion in countries within Russia’s self-proclaimed sphere of interests or that are simply friendly to it.

Different Approaches, Same Result

Aside from unrealistic expectations, the successive attempts to improve U.S.-Russian relations often had a significant structural flaw, reflecting important differences between U.S. and Russian policymaking. The U.S. approach to the relationship typically favors small steps and modest initiatives that bubble up from within the national security establishment and seek to promote understandings on a relatively narrow set of issues. If progress is achieved, it can serve as a springboard for expanding the conversation and hopefully achieving further progress on a broader agenda. Eventually, the series of incremental successes will build up to a broad, U.S.-driven strategic agenda and rise to the level of a presidential deliverable.

The Russian approach to the relationship is exactly the opposite. It begins with a broad understanding about the quality of the relationship at the highest level, which provides strategic guidance for lower-level policymakers to reach agreements on individual components of the jointly designed overall agenda. It is an approach that favors grand bargains among equals and unvarnished realpolitik rather than small steps.

Regardless of whose approach is more likely to result in an improved relationship, it is dubious that the Kremlin or the White House is actually in a position to test it at the moment. Instead, both appear poised to sustain the tensions, each blaming the other side for the current state of affairs. The political atmosphere in both capitals is such that any proposal for a compromise with the other side is certain to trigger charges of surrender and betrayal of national interest. A corrosive lack of trust is omnipresent.

In Russia, the United States is widely portrayed as a country governed by a “deep state,” an entrenched elite guided by profound antipathy toward Russia and intent on marginalizing Russia on the world stage, destabilizing its domestic politics, and undermining its economy. This entrenched elite is so powerful, according to this narrative, that it can thwart presidential initiatives aimed at improving relations with Russia. Under these circumstances and congressional moves to tie Trump’s hands, the Kremlin appears to have written off the United States as a potential partner for the foreseeable future. Consequently, there is very little chance for another reset, and the current state of affairs between Moscow and Washington is here to stay.

In the United States, Russia has emerged as both the “geopolitical enemy number one” and, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s, not just a source of external threats to U.S. national security and interests abroad but also a threat to its domestic political order. The list of U.S. concerns includes, but is not limited to, Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the use of social media by Russian state-sponsored actors to sow internal U.S. political divisions, Russian cyber intrusions aimed at disrupting U.S. critical infrastructure and networks, the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, support for President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, suppression of civil liberties in Russia, and, more broadly, Russian efforts to undermine the U.S.-championed international liberal order. Taken together, these concerns amount to a powerful indictment and, quite understandably, help cement doubts in many quarters about the wisdom of seeking better relations with Russia.

Emphasis on Managing

Nevertheless, further tensions between Russia and the United States are fraught with dangers that neither side would welcome. As demonstrated by the choreography involved in U.S. and Russian activities in Syria, neither side is seeking an outright military confrontation. Should such a confrontation occur, it would be as a consequence of a miscalculation or an accident. Both sides’ interests would be better served by mutual efforts focused on managing an inherently competitive, and oftentimes adversarial, relationship rather than engaging in brinkmanship.

Such efforts could build on some modest accomplishments that have already proved effective in tense and potentially dangerous situations. For example, military-to-military contacts at the highest level—between Russia’s Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and his U.S. counterpart, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford—have created an effective channel for communication and for lower-level efforts to deconflict the two militaries’ activities in Syria. (A deadly incident in Deir Ezzor on February 7, 2018, involving Russian private military contractors was a crucial exception to the rule.) A similar effort is urgently needed to manage U.S. and Russian military activities in the airspace and at sea in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. With neither side willing to cease its military activities in either region yet evidently not interested in an outright collision, both sides should, in theory, have incentives to avoid an accident there.

In the words of Dmitri Trenin,

The issue is not that Russian daredevils are performing acts of hooliganism in the air or that NATO pilots in international airspace are unaware that they are coming too close to Russian borders or assets. Each side seeks to make a point to the other, and neither is willing to step back, thus continuing the dangerous game. The only way out of this situation lies in a mutual understanding to stop testing each other’s nerves and aerobatic skills and instead to observe a protocol under which neither party provokes the other. This could be a first, relatively easy step toward military de-escalation.

Beyond the immediate danger of an unintended military confrontation on Europe’s southern and northern flanks, one other issue requiring immediate attention is arms control. Mutual accusations of violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the approaching expiration of the New START Treaty in 2021 underscore the precarious state of the entire bilateral arms control structure the United States and Russia have inherited from the Cold War era. Even though it is increasingly inadequate to constrain the reemerging arms race between the two nuclear superpowers, and leaves out other nuclear powers, including China, that structure could provide an indispensable foundation for future efforts to manage and contain their arms race, as well as possibly involve other nuclear powers in these efforts. The collapse of that structure would cause irreparable harm to future bilateral and multilateral arms control and U.S.-Russia strategic stability. It would not serve the interests of either side.

Although the political climate in both capitals is not propitious for seeking compromises, there is no plausible argument for not engaging in dialogue about the INF Treaty, each side’s charges of the other’s violations, the future of arms control, and strategic stability. It would be unrealistic to expect such a dialogue to produce a resolution of the dispute about the INF Treaty. However, if conducted in good faith, it could clarify each side’s position and concerns and, potentially, lead to the development of a conceptual framework for resolving the dispute. It is difficult to see the risk entailed in such a dialogue, while it could produce substantial benefits. U.S. and Russian official delegations met in September 2017 for strategic stability talks. Another meeting was scheduled for April 2018 but postponed without a new date. This dialogue should be resumed. The potential agenda should comprise new issues, including the risk that new cyber capabilities pose to strategic command and control and long-standing Russian concerns about U.S. missile defense deployments and conventional strategic systems.

Moreover, official dialogue should be supplemented by Track II or Track 1.5 engagement between U.S. and Russian experts. In the past, such contacts were useful for testing concepts and exploring new ideas in an unofficial setting, which subsequently fed into official exchanges. In the current atmosphere of tensions reminiscent of the Cold War, unofficial contacts could once again prove useful, assuming that they actually have buy-in from officials on both sides.

While useful and urgently needed, none of the measures sketched out in the preceding paragraphs is likely to repair the relationship or amount to more than minimal steps necessary for managing it and preventing it from deteriorating further and causing irreparable damage to its key components. Moreover, while necessary, they may not be sufficient to avert further setbacks in the relationship.

The real work to repair U.S.-Russian relations will have to be done at the political level. It will have to begin with lowering the heat of political rhetoric in both Washington and Moscow and conducting a high-level dialogue about the nature of major disagreements and mutual grievances and about their goals, expectations, and desired rules of the road for the relationship. Such a dialogue could can be advanced by more informal discussions between senior U.S. and Russian figures who are less constrained by official roles.

In preparation for political dialogue, each side could take some significant steps to signal the seriousness of its intent and lack of interest in further escalation of tensions. Such steps would not have to be symmetrical but could instead be aimed at addressing some of the other side’s more significant concerns. Conceivably, both sides could take proactive steps to signal their interest in deescalating tensions and halting the destructive cycle.

For example, the military stand-off between Russia and the West is becoming a permanent feature of increased tensions between the two sides. This is a direct result of Russia’s ongoing military modernization efforts and troop deployments and NATO’s efforts to reestablish the credibility of Article 5 commitments for frontline member countries in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. It is unlikely that either side will have an incentive to scale back or defer deployments or training activities along the NATO-Russia frontier any time soon. Still, it is possible that Trump will make a grand gesture akin to his spontaneous decision at the June 2018 summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to suspend major military exercises with South Korea.

It’s also conceivable that the Kremlin could begin to exercise greater restraint in deliberate harassment of U.S. ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Such a move by the Kremlin would be cost-free and entail no permanent changes to its operations in either region but would send an important signal to Washington about the Russian leadership’s desire for deescalation or at least not escalation. For its part, NATO could underscore that the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act’s “three no’s” commitment—which pledged that no nuclear or substantial combat forces would be deployed on the territory of new member states as long as NATO and Russia “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security”—is still in effect and that the alliance’s post-2014 forward deployments constitute a response to Russian actions.

Sanctions, which have become the central tool of U.S. policy toward Russia, represent an even more complicated challenge. For the Kremlin, the U.S. sanctions constitute both a challenge and an opportunity. They restrict Western investment and technology transfer, but they also have a rallying-around-the-flag effect that consolidates Russian elites. Furthermore, they prompt Moscow to look for partners beyond the West and redefine Russia’s position as a non-Western global player operating from its base in northern and central Eurasia.

On the one hand, the sanctions program has provided an effective tool for curtailing business as usual, punishing Russia for various actions, and, some would claim, probably deterring future disruptive behavior (at least, on the margins). On the other hand, Western sanctions are not, in and of themselves, a substitute for an effective policy unless they are paired with a coherent diplomatic strategy. For example, the Iran nuclear deal, now abandoned by the Trump administration but otherwise viewed widely as a diplomatic success, was achieved with the help of a dual-track approach that combined increasingly severe sanctions with sustained negotiations. The diplomatic track included a multilateral road map with sanctions relief and other incentives. Such concepts are conspicuously missing from current U.S. policy toward Russia. Policymakers must begin to articulate practical policy outcomes that inform the future use of sanctions.

Prospects

The current state of affairs between Russia and the United States is somewhat of a paradox. There is a deep reluctance in both capitals to admit that they are once again in a Cold War. Yet there is broad consensus that the differences between them are real and profound. Voices in both capitals point out the dangers associated with the current state of affairs, the lack of reliable political channels of communications, and the risk of unintended escalation. These sensible voices are realistic about the likelihood of the relationship being repaired overnight as a result of a brief meeting between the two presidents.

The experience of the Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore suggests that such a brief encounter cannot resolve the differences that have accumulated in the course of decades. But the experience of the Singapore summit also suggests that such encounters can create a positive atmosphere for the real hard work of repairing relations to begin. The Trump-Putin summit potentially can accomplish the same, very important results. It can empower the reasonable voices to begin the conversation in earnest about the state of the relationship, about ways to repair it, and, at the very least, a mutually acceptable way for managing it. If that is the outcome of the Trump-Putin summit, it should rightly be called a success.

A Russia e o resto: a nova guerra fria - Book review, Richard Sakwa

'Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order' [review]

Richard Sakwa. Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. ix + 362 pp. $84.99 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-107-16060-6; $24.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-316-61351-1.
 

Reviewed by Gerard Toal (Virginia Tech) Published on H-Diplo (May, 2018) 
Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=51562

Richard Sakwa does not like the term the “new Cold War.” To him, the label is misleading and obscures a much broader shift in global politics since 2014. His new book, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order, is an account of that larger shift, and Russia’s place within it. Sakwa is Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent and an associate fellow at Chatham House. He is a remarkably productive scholar. This is his seventh book on Russian politics since 2008, and there is another, The Putin Phenomenon, in the works (cited p. 119). Sakwa, who is of British Polish decent, is also no stranger to controversy. His 2015 book, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, argued that Euro-Atlantic expansionism and Ukrainian nationalism were key negative forces contributing to the Ukraine crisis of 2014. The book was strongly criticized by some Ukraine scholars though critically appreciated by others. Sakwa is part of a select group of scholars regularly invited to the Valdai Discussion Group (which includes the chance to hear Vladimir Putin in person) and his latest book reflects his deep knowledge of Russian elite thinking on world order and geopolitical change.
Sakwa provides a comprehensive account of post-Cold War geopolitics, with a decided emphasis on great power diplomacy, institution-building, strategic competition and its baleful results. He dubs the twenty-five years between 1989 and 2014 an era of “cold peace,” one characterized above all by the failure of Western security organizations to transcend Cold War institutions and habits. Russia was shut out of negotiations over the creation of a post-Cold War security order in Europe as NATO and the EU saw matters in terms of enlargement of their own existing structures, not the creation of something new in dialogue with Russia. By denying “the logic of transcendence,” Sakwa argues, this enlargement precipitated the result it sought to avert. “Europe could not be ‘whole and free’ if Russia was effectively excluded” (p. 6) is an arresting early claim (repeated p. 165). Throughout Sakwa uses a distinctive vocabulary of contrasting geopolitical visions to describe this dynamic. The EU and NATO represented the Historical West; they viewed themselves as victors in the Cold War. Afterwards, they wanted to create a Wider Europe based around extended and radicalized Historical Western norms and practices (what others term an expanded liberal empire). Russia’s aspiration, however, was to become a founding member of a transformed Greater West that would establish a Greater Europe on the Eurasian landmass. Mikhail Gorbachev’s “common European home” and Charles de Gaulle’s Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” are expressions of this vision. Greater Europe is ostensibly pluralist, open to political regimes of many different types. The European Union is only one of many different visions of being European. The problem of the cold peace, according to Sakwa, was that NATO and the EU represented monological visions of security and prosperity. The Historical West viewed the United States as the security lynchpin on the European continent and liberal market democracies as normative for the domestic structure of states. Willing only to enlarge not to change, the Historical West generated accumulating frustration, disillusionment, and resistance on the part of an excluded Russia. With Greater Europe off the table, Russia sought instead to create a Greater Eurasia (the Eurasian Economic Union). In 2014, the cold peace impasse on the European continent gave way to a hot war in Ukraine. Russian neorevisionism emerged as a predictable backlash against the expansionist logic of Euro-Atlantic liberal hegemony. Today, Russia and China are both neorevisionist powers. It is not, in the end, Russia against the Rest but Russia as part of the Rest against the Historical West.
Sakwa documents this thesis in great detail in the book, providing an impressive synthesis of international relations theory, post-Cold War history, and in-depth discussion of contemporary contentious issue areas. The great value of Sakwa’s work is its thorough articulation of Russian leadership perspectives and commentariat writings on the dilemmas of cold peace geopolitics alongside those of select Western observers, usually political realists but not exclusively so. Sergei Karaganov, dean of the faculty at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, and Henry Kissinger are liberally quoted through the text. Karaganov argued in 2016 that the West after the Cold War sought to continuously limit Russia’s freedom, sphere of influence, and markets while expanding its own. The West “used Russia’s weakness to take away its centuries-old gains and make it even weaker” (p. 39). Sakwa sees this argument as “going too far” for the West was open to Russia’s inclusion in Western security structures but “it wanted a different Russia to the one on offer; while Russia wanted to join the community, but on its own terms” (p. 39). Kissinger argued that Russia should have been engaged by the West in traditional realpolitik terms. The goal should not have been transformation of Russia but the development of a strategic concept that could manage their differences within an emerging multipolar world order.
There are some standout chapters in Russia against the West. Using English school international relations theory, Sakwa provides a compelling account of the Kremlin’s geopolitical attitude towards world order. This distinguishes between two levels of the international system, the primary institutions of international society which are states, and the secondary level of institutions which are collective organizations that seek universal practices and norms. Russia is a clear supporter of the primary level of institutions, which rest on state sovereignty and bargaining between great powers in a multipolar system. The secondary level is the realm of international organizations, regimes of norms, and systems of global governance. These bind and constrict state sovereignty in the name of universal norms and aspirations. Russia and other non-Western powers object to what they see as the capture of this second level by liberal internationalist norms and values, which ultimately advance the self-interest of Western states. Sakwa argues that Russia is not a revisionist power seeking to tear up the current international order. Rather, it is a neorevisionist state, critiquing the hegemonic ambitions and double standards of the liberal international order but, at the same time, defending the autonomy of an international society organized around state sovereignty. “Moscow assumed the paradoxical position of challenging the practices of the liberal order while defending the principles of international society” (p. 129). Putin is a traditionalist, not a radical; a “legitimist,” not a revolutionary. Neorevisionism is “an unstable combination of attempts to modify the structures and practices of the hegemonic global order while remaining firmly ensconced in that order” (p. 132). International law has different meanings in this contest. To neorevisionist states, international law belongs to the primary level of international society. It is or should be delimited by respect for state sovereignty above all else. To liberal hegemony, international law is an expression of universal values and rules. It can and should be used against states that violate these.
Sakwa also gives us a succinct chapter on Russia’s grievances against the West, one that is empathetic without being uncritical. NATO enlargement gets a full discussion but so does missile defense, critique of Western interventionism, and objections to “trans-democracy.” This latter notion describes how democracy got absorbed into Euro-Atlantic visions of security. The spread of democracy and the pursuit of security became fused in practice. Democratic peace theory became dogma: “the security of the Atlantic power system is best advanced by creating a system of states moulded in the Western image and committed to liberal internationalism, the ideological foundations of post-war American power” (p. 99). This liberal imperial compound generated a Kremlin backlash that saw “colored revolutions” as Western-sponsored active measures, interpreting popular protests against autocratic and kleptocratic rules on Russia’s borders as Western plots. Implicit here is a Kremlin domino theory wherein the West is toppling autocratic regimes as a means of eventually knocking over the final piece: Putin’s Russia. Sakwa will infuriate many when he writes: “In a philosophical sense Putin was right: popular democratic revolutions have become a way for the Atlantic ideological and power system to advance. There is plenty of evidence that Western agencies have prepared for, funded and provided ideological support for pro-democracy movements whose ideological orientation is Atlanticist” (p. 102). But he also writes that this denies independent agency and popular demands for free and fair elections, less corrupt administrative systems, and, above all, civil dignity (p. 102). This mode of reasoning—affirming a Kremlin-friendly position yet articulating criticism also—is one he adopts on the all-important question of Crimea: “Crimea’s return can legitimately be considered a ‘democratic secession,’ since the overwhelming majority of the population (as later independent opinion polls confirmed) favored being part of Russia; although the view that it represents an ‘imperial annexation’ is justified to the degree that it lacked agreement with the country from which the territory seceded” (p. 157). Sakwa also writes that the armed insurgency in the Donbas was “covertly assisted by activists and some state bodies in Russia” (p. 157).
Sakwa’s work is impressively comprehensive. He discusses in relative detail the evolution of Russian foreign policy and European Union diplomacy, Eurasian integration, the Ukraine crisis, Western sanctions, Russia’s evolving military doctrines and modernization efforts, NATO’s responses to Russia, the breakdown of arms control regimes, US foreign policy and Russian interventionism in the Syrian civil war, information warfare, and Russia’s aspirational pivot towards China. The book concludes by outlining what he describes as a “global impasse.” This is a new “normal” of wide-ranging and increasingly deeply rooted confrontation between Russia and the United States. The United States is concerned to maintain its hegemonic status while China, Russia, and other powers are forcing a global realignment of power and the rules governing international affairs. He sees a rising of McCarthyism in the United States which is having a chilling effect on the quality of public debate, with those advocating “dissident” views condemned as “Putin apologists” (p. 313). On the central issue inflaming elite opinion in the United States (Russia’s information operations during the 2016 presidential election), Sakwa is skeptical that Russia’s role has been fully proven. The Steele dossier “hit a new low in its puerile collection of unsubstantiated allegations” (p. 241). Instead, he sees a renewed “Russian threat” as generating considerable budget increases for US and NATO agencies to fight Russian “information warfare.”
Sakwa’s work has some clear weaknesses. First, his focus is largely on great power politics. As a result, he has little to say about the strategic dilemmas faced by post-Soviet states next to Russia. There is some discussion of Ukrainian crisis but little about Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia, nor of the enduring territorial conflicts in the near abroad. Central Asia is discussed but only as it relates to the great powers. He shows little interest or empathy for the position of these states. Instead his arguments are shaped by conversations on panels at Valdai, Moscow, London, and Brussels—not Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Tallinn. Sakwa’s book is valuable in terms of enriching the quality and depth of debate over topics that tend to quickly polarize interlocutors, but debate should extend to consider the historical experiences and aspirations of small and medium states too. This does not mean privileging that experience over Russian experiences, as often happens in the West where curated nationalist versions of subaltern experiences, and traumas, are a means of establishing superior victimhood. Rather, the conversation need to include everyone and hold all to the same critical standards of reasoned debate.
Second, Sakwa’s schemas and categorizations tends to structure debate toward Russian standpoints and positions. In some ways, this is a function of his desire to be a correction to widespread antipathy against Russia. But this correction itself needs a critical check. For example, Sakwa makes frequent use of the distinction between “monological” and “pluralist” perspectives, with the former standing in for Western liberal hegemony or Ukrainian nationalism whereas the latter expresses tolerance for diverse regime types and civil nationalist traditions. In practice, however, this reduces divergent traditions of politics—liberal, center-right and social democratic—into a singularity while creatively configuring acceptance of autocracy as “pluralism.” Indeed, autocracy is a category that is largely missing from Sakwa’s discussion. It deserves greater consideration as do variant kleptocratic state arguments made by scholars of Eurasian states. Sakwa does articulate positions that are critical of Russian government behavior, but in a mild manner. The Duma election of December 4 2011, is described as “flawed” (p. 115). Putin’s lies to Angela Merkel early in the Crimea crisis were his “being economical with the truth” (p. 217). Russia’s endorsement of European populists has damaging reputational consequences (p. 276). Because he is much more a hermeneutist of Putin than critic, Sakwa’s arguments shows considerable empathy for Russian government positions. This leads him to re-present arguments more than probe them for contradictions. Thus, for example, he writes that “Russia is not so much concerned with changing international hierarchy, but to defend a space for the conduct of international relations for itself, through the universal application of international law and respect for state sovereignty throughout the international system” (p. 129). Needless to say, many of Russia’s neighboring states would scoff at this.
Third, Sakwa engaged throughout his work with international relations theory but only the most traditional kind: realism (offensive and defensive), liberalism, and some constructivism. Emergent issue areas like cyber warfare and climate change are discussed in passing. There is little consideration of gendered practices or the role of affect, of feminist analysis, or of contemporary scholarship on visuality, memory, and nonhuman agency. This is not because it is absent in the speeches, debates, and practices he discusses. Rather, it is not called out and given separate analytical treatment by him. We need to think deeply, after all, about the micro- and macrosociological dynamics of respect, humiliation, frustration, anger, fear, and reassurance, as well as about the gripping power of spectacles of revolution, “self-determination,” and national glory. Sakwa’s work is more a deliberative approach to Russia-explaining, focused on presenting contentious debates and divergent practices based on clashing conceptualizations.
Finally, some may find the book frustrating because its key concepts and arguments are discussed again and again in the text. Because the book strives to engage with nearly all aspects of current debates on Russia, it sometimes feels like Sakwa has written too much and that his chapters are not as joined up as they could be. In sum, however, Russia against the West is a valuable addition to the growing literature on the “new cold war” (that may not be a new cold war). It deserves to be read,  debated, and criticized.
 
Citation: Gerard Toal. Review of Sakwa, Richard, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2018. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=51562
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