Consequences of the defeat of Russia - Nadin Brzezinski (Medium)

Consequences of the defeat of Russia

 Nadin Brzezinski

Medium Daily Digest, Jan 2, 2023

https://nadinbrzezinski.medium.com/consequences-of-the-defeat-of-russia-ec7e12c9971c

The defeat of the Russian Federation will have geopolitical consequences. The defeat of Russia will also have some obvious dangers for the West, but mainly for the global order. This is a look at this from the very big picture level; you might say the 10,000 feet level. So it is, by it’s very nature, filled with generalities.

Russian defeat is coming

The defeat of Russia on the battlefield is getting closer. Granted, most nations would not be doubling down as they lose over 100,000 plus soldiers in the span of ten months. However, Russia is, partly because Vladimir Putin can’t face the reality of defeat at the hands of a country he considers inferior or nonexistent. There is also another reality. Even amid this pain, large majorities of Russians still support the war. However, there is a slowly building resistance that is becoming more adept at sabotage. 

Russia has a nationalist far right that believes in the mission. They know they are fighting NATO, not Ukraine. They believe this war is one of survival for the state. Whether these are Duginists, Rushist (this is a Neonazi formation), or the Russian Imperial Movement, they believe in the expansion of Russia geographically and influence. One reason for this is to secure more defensible borders within Europe. 

Russia also lost a lot of influence after 1991 and many Russians, not just the far right, believe the fall of the USSR was a mistake. There is a revanchist mood and a desire for empire. However, not everybody does, and as the consequences of the war grow, resistance will continue to grow.

Internal consequences

The war's first and most obvious consequence is a direct effect on the economy. People are removed from factories and other productive work within the economy. Even without sanctions, this will affect the ability to produce goods and services. We know that the heart of the economy is extractive industries, chiefly petroleum and minerals. Russia is now under a price cap for its oil with the west. 

Russia has also mostly abandoned hard currencies for its national fund, instead holding them in Yuan and gold. This ties Russia to China in more ways than they will be comfortable with. Russia has a tiny economy when compared to China. Putin is tying Russia to China as he tries to build a multipolar world where Russia is a great power. That Russia will emerge with a greatly diminished influence has not yet dawned on most Russians. 

This is not a world where Moscow is the senior partner. It’s not the 1950s when Beijing depended on Moscow for a lot of help. In time, Even with information control, it will. One way it’s starting is the green ribbon movement and the halting beginnings of Zamisdat. While Russians still support the war, I believe that support will not continue forever. 

Russia is a totalitarian state. Therefore polling, even by the respected Levada Center, is fraught with fear. But the general mobilization is breaking the social contract. Remember, it was I sat on the couch and did not become political as long as you let me live my life however I want to. This is over. And as more Russians face the reality of a grisly death at the front, more and more will become political. 

I am not talking about the far right, which never left the political stage. To their credit, many of them have willingly joined the army. This is about the comfortable middle-class Russians or even the working class who don’t care about politics. They are fully depoliticized, but this is likely changing. When they learn that Artem, who worked in a factory, got mobilized and did not come home, that starts the process. 

For the moment, Russia has been careful to mobilize mainly people with military training. In the Federation, only they get roped in for conscript service, and the comfortable types bribe their way out. That’s not going to continue for long. Soon they will not be able to bribe themselves away from the army. All the St George Ribbons and cult of the Great Patriotic War now become real service in an army that does not care about its personnel.

To be clear, the Russian army never has.

Putin will likely lose power

This brings me to the next reality. When the war is lost, Vladimir Putin will not survive as leader. There is a long history of Russian Tsars not enduring significant defeats. For the moment, oligarchs continue to die in strange circumstances. It’s so bad that a joke online explains that buying a Russian advent calendar is interesting. Every time you open a window, an oligarch falls out. It’s grim, but critics have indeed been dying in mysterious circumstances.

Putin is familiar with the fate of those who are defeated. In 1905 reforms were forced. In 1917 the Romanov Tsar and his family died. Nikita Khrushchev lost power after the stand down to the US during the Cuban Missile crisis. While Mikhail Gorbachev survived, he was despised within Russia while respected in the West. The whole political persona of Vladimir Putin comes from the end of the USSR. That is his identity. So is expanding the reach and influence of the Russian Federation to the former glory and borders of the Soviet Union. 

There is discontent among the top leadership, and the Oligarchs, in particular, are not too happy. They have lost billions of US Dollars and access to villas in Italy or apartments in London. Worse case, if their military-age children are still in Russia, they may not avoid a military funeral. These people are not apolitical. But they are not fools either. A recent story from the Washington Post pointed to the patterns we all have seen on Telegram channels.

Internal conflict

This brings me to the fight for power inside the Russian Federation. We are facing the collapse of Russia. This is the third collapse in just over 100 years. First, it was 1917, and it was a revolution. This led to the end of the Romanov dynasty. It was followed by a civil war and the rise of Joseph Stalin. The Stalin era was followed by forced industrialization, the gulags, purges, and the Holodomor. It also led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which led to Poland's split in 1939. In 1941 Stalin was betrayed by Germany with Operation Barbarossa. 

It likely would have faced defeat without help through American Lend-Lease. However, the Soviet Union emerged from World War Two with full control of Eastern Europe and the maximum expansion of Russia. It reached from the pacific to Berlin.

The command economy of the Soviet system was not resilient or able to cope with the population's needs. In time it became sclerotic. The reforms that Gorbachev introduced were late to save the empire. This led to the second collapse of Russia in 1991.

The withdrawal from Eastern Europe, starting in Berlin in 1989, came partly from troops that had not been paid for months. You might also remember the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which led to a large group of war veterans mostly despised in their own country. They had trouble reintegrating. Ukraine War veterans will likely face the same fate.

Unlike the 1917 collapse and revolution, 1991 was a more pleasant affair. The west also helped. This is from the New York Times archive from 1991:

The United States delivered 75 tons of food left over from the Persian Gulf war to the hungry Moscow region today, part of a relief effort that American and Russian officials said they expected to continue through the winter.

The food, flown in through the snow on two military cargo planes from a supply base in Pisa, Italy, was to go directly to hospitals, orphanages and homes for the elderly.

The delivery from Sheremetyevo Airport in Russian trucks was observed by Americans, including embassy dependents, and by Russian and Red Cross officials, to make sure that its contents were not stolen and put on sale by Russian black marketeers.

The flights had a paradoxical quality: The American military, after decades of cold war training to fight a hot war against the Soviet Union, arrived here to help this country feed its hungry. An Echo of World War II

What we also did was send economists to help a transition to a more western economy. The problem is that the reforms were neoliberal and led straight to the first generation of oligarchs and the gang wars of the 1990s.

This brings me to the next point. In 1991 the Baltic States, Ukraine, and some central Asian republics voted to leave the Soviet Union and become independent states.

New successor states

Under the present Russian constitution leaving the Federation is more complex than just doing a referendum. It was under the USSR. This is likely going to lead to regions leaving regardless. We have the noise of this in Dagestan and Tatarstan, for example. Ramzan Kadyrov may decide it’s time to turn on Russia. His father fought for independence in the 1990s, but in the end, he turned against that effort, and Kadyrovites became strong allies of the regime in Moscow.

There is also a Chechen battalion fighting for Ikhteria (Chechnya) on the side of Ukraine. As things devolve, it may become the heart of a force fighting for independence. It would be the third Chechen war in two generations.

In my view, control of the Far East will become harder, given military losses. However, this war has also been used to dispose of potentially problematic first peoples, such as Buryats, who have suffered incredibly high losses—more on the Far East below.

I believe some regions will take advantage of this central weakness and declare independence. Some of these new states may look at the more democratic rule. Some, like the 1990s, will become dystopias.

This brings me to the geopolitics of this, and again this is a 10,000-foot overview. It’s not very detailed, and at this point, it’s an informed guessing game.

Loose nukes

This is the fear of the west. While Russian nukes may or may not work at this point, we all need to assume they do. However, this was a worry in the 1990s and will be again.

The nightmare is that a group like Al Qaida might get their paws on a device. This could be a dirty weapon going off somewhere in the west. It could also be a Russian group set on revenge for the Empire's destruction. Or, for that matter, successor states may get nuclear weapons.

This was the reason for the Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed Ukraine’s security in exchange for surrendering the nuclear arsenal on her territory. Because of the present war, I don’t expect any successor state to surrender strategic weapons willingly.

Geopolitical consequences

Russia's defeat will not just be limited to her territory and Ukraine. It will have genuine consequences globally. Remember, this is a high-level overview.

The Middle East

Russia has had its hands in the Middle East since World War Two. It supported the Nasser Revolution, and the Israeli-Arab wars were proxy wars with the United States.

At this point, her influence is already greatly diminished. The Arab Spring may have failed, but Arab states have still turned West and increasingly recognize Israel’s right to exist.

Russia still has a naval base at the port of Latakia. She still supports Bashar Al Assad. The west allowed both Assad and Putin to use chemical weapons during the hot phase of the civil war because the west was unwilling to confront Russia. Why? We all thought they had an active military, but chiefly it’s the strategic arsenal.

When Russia is defeated, she might withdraw her forces from Syria. I almost expect it. This includes the port of Latakia. Especially if Russian regions start declaring independence. Russia is facing economic collapse. Unlike in the 1990s, I think we all have lost that fear of the Russian bear.

This means that both Israel and Turkey will grow in influence. If the ongoing Iranian revolution succeeds, many more Islamist groups will also lose support. Russia’s defeat may help that process along.

Latin America

Think Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. These are Russian allies in the region. A defeat of Russia could lead to a similar economic crisis Cuba faced in the 1990s. Venezuela is a basket case, less so Nicaragua.

Without the support of Moscow, Cuba might transition away from the revolution. Internal forces are pushing for this anyway. Venezuela is already selling oil to the west. Nicolas Maduro may be in the process. Chevron has returned to the market. His economy is a basket case with a refugee flow that is quite large, chiefly to Colombia and some to the United States.

There is a history of mistrust of the United States that is very justified. Why some regimes turned towards the Soviet Union starting in the 1950s, but a second Russian collapse might mean that this resistance lessens.

However, the modern form of globalization might be over, and Latin America might finally form a trading block to increase its economic power. Climate change will also change many of those commercial and population dynamics.

Africa

Like Latin America, Africa turned to the Soviet Union in the 1950s. It has increased its influence since many African states, like Angola or the Central African Republic, were not directly colonized by Russia.

These days it gets complicated. Wagner is used precisely for this and to guard extractive industries. This is particularly the case in Mali.

The collapse of Russia will mean Yevgeny Prigozhin will have to recall the troops home. There will be no money to pay him. I also foresee his lucre soldiers as active combatants in a possible Russian civil war.

China

Here we come to the real beneficiary of a Russian collapse. It is not the United States. It is China. First, let me go to the obvious. The Far East is contested by China. Over the decades, there have been firefights by the border. As far as China is concerned, the city of Omsk is China.

This is a recent piece on this from Forbes, but the history is long:

While there’s no way to know what Xi is thinking, China’s long-established pattern of behavior suggests that, as Russia redirects border security units to a grinding conflict in Ukraine, it is worth considering if China might be mulling expansionist contingencies to the north, along the sprawling and sparsely held 2,615 mile Russian frontier.

On the other hand, on both the Indian frontier and in the South China Sea, China moved into sovereign territory with little advance notice. In both cases, China’s expansionism was opportunistic, taking advantage of an administrative or military vacuum to suddenly “change the facts on the ground.”

China wanted that territory, not just because it controlled it in the 19th century. This was the Amur annexation of the 19th century. But because this territory is rich in natural mineral resources, China wants it for its growing economy. It also would provide a safety valve for her population.

But let’s look beyond the Far East. China is building a new Silk Road and influencing operations in Africa and Latin America.

All these are areas where Russia, or whatever remains of Moscow, will have to withdraw from. So the big winner in a Russian collapse will be an ascendant China. I will add this since Russia is making the Yuan part of its national wealth fund, it will become dependent on Beijing.

Putin wanted a multipolar world and to finally defeat the main adversary. We may still get a multipolar world. One where the United States, China, and India may play critical roles. While I did not mention India in this piece, she is also becoming a focus of power.

In this list, Russia is nowhere to be seen. Part of this is that she is facing yet another collapse. In this case, I do not think the west will help much. However, like in 1991, we might still see American cargo planes with food on the way to Russian cities. This is mainly to slow down the process of social collapse. In other words, we might try to manage that.

However, given how much the far right in Russia blames us for all their ills, there is a danger in doing that which did not exist in 1991.

Geopolitics is the biggest threat to globalisation - Martin Wolf (Financial Times)

 Geopolitics is the biggest threat to globalisation

The consequences of a great power rupture may be even worse now than during the cold war

Martin Wolf

Financial Times, Londres – 4.11.2022

 

How might globalisation end? Some seem to imagine a relatively peaceful “decoupling” of economies until recently stitched so tightly together. But it is likely that the fracturing of economic ties will be both consequence and cause of deepening global discord. If so, a more destructive end to globalisation is likely. 

Humanity has, alas, done this before. Since the industrial revolution in the early 19th century, we have had two periods of deepening cross-border economic integration and one of the reverse. The first period of globalisation preceded 1914. The second began in the late 1940s, but accelerated and widened from the late 1970s, as ever more economies integrated with one another. In between came a lengthy period of deglobalisation, bounded by the two world wars and deepened by the Depression and the protectionism that both accompanied and worsened it. Finally, since the financial crisis of 2007-09, globalisation has been neither deepening nor reversing. 

This history hardly suggests that a period of deglobalisation is likely to be a happy one. On the contrary, 1914-45 was marked by the collapse of political and economic order, both domestic and global. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917, itself a consequence of the first world war, launched communism on the world. On some estimates, communism killed around 100mn people, even more than the two world wars.

This period of chaos and calamity had some beneficial outcomes: it made European empires untenable; it brought forth modern welfare states; and it made humans a little more aware of their shared destiny. Yet, in all, it was an epoch of catastrophe. 

A controversial question is how and how far peace is linked to globalisation. As John Plender recently argued, trade does not necessarily secure peace. The onset of the first world war at a time of relatively buoyant trade surely demonstrates this. The causality goes rather in the opposite direction, from peace to commerce. In an era of co-operation among great powers, trade tends to grow. In one of mutual suspicion, especially one of open conflict, trade collapses, as we see now between Russia and the west.

People sometimes point to the English liberal Norman Angell as a naive believer in the view that trade would bring peace. Yet, in The Great Illusion, written shortly before the first world war, he argued that countries would gain nothing of value from war. Subsequent experience entirely vindicated this view: the principal participants in the war all lost. Similarly, ordinary Russians will not benefit from the conquest of Ukraine or ordinary Chinese from the conquest of Taiwan. But this truth did not preclude conflict. Under the leadership of psychopaths and the influence of nationalism and other dangerous ideologies, we are capable of grotesque follies and horrific crimes. 

A possible response is that nothing similar to what happened during the “great deglobalisation” of the 20th century can happen this time. At worst, the outcome might be a bit like the cold war. This, however, is unduly optimistic. It is quite likely that the consequences of a rupture of great power relations will be even worse in our time than it was then. 

One obvious reason is that our capacity for mutual annihilation is far more than an order of magnitude greater today. A disturbing recent study from Rutgers University argues that a full-scale nuclear war between the US and Russia, especially given the probability of a “nuclear winter”, could kill over 5bn people. Is that unimaginable? Alas, no. 

Another reason why the outcome could be even worse this time is that we depend on a high level of enlightened co-operation to sustain an inhabitable planet. This is particularly true of China and the US, which together generate over 40 per cent of global CO₂ emissions. The climate is a collective action challenge par excellence. A breakdown of co-operative relations is likely to end whatever chance exists of avoiding a runaway process of climate change.

One then has to fall back on the hope that today’s deepening global divisions can be contained, as they were, by and large, during the cold war. One rejoinder to this hope is that there were some close-run moments during the cold war. The second is that the Soviet economy was not integrated into the world’s, while China and the west are both competitors and integrated with one another and the rest of the world. There is no painless way of decoupling these economic links. It is folly to imagine there is. The effort seems sure to create conflict. 

Indeed, the recently announced controls on US exports of semiconductors and associated technologies to China looks a decisive step. Certainly, this is far more threatening to Beijing than anything Donald Trump did. The aim is clearly to slow China’s economic development. That is an act of economic warfare. One might agree with it. But it will have huge geopolitical consequences.

Deglobalisation is most unlikely to be the outcome of carefully calibrated and intelligent decoupling. This is not how we humans work. People might pretend deglobalisation has something to do with reducing inequality. That is nonsense, too: the more open economies are frequently relatively equal. 

It is conflicts over power that most threaten globalisation. By seeking to enhance their security, great powers make their rivals more insecure, creating a vicious downward spiral of distrust. We are already a long way down this spiral. That reality will shape the fate of the world economy. We are not headed towards a benign localism, but towards negative-sum rivalry. Our world may not survive a virulent bout of that disease.

"I Don’t Believe in Applying Old Labels To New Geopolitical Developments": Annalena Baerbock, new Germany's Foreign minister (Der Spiegel)

A "chancelera" (no sentido de ministra das relações exteriores) do novo governo alemão, uma Verde, dá uma importante entrevista para o Der Spiegel. A vida não vai ser fácil para o Bozo.

German Foreign Minister-Designate Annalena Baerbock

"I Don’t Believe in Applying Old Labels To New Geopolitical Developments"

Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party is slated to become Germany's first female foreign minister. She spoke to DER SPIEGEL about the policy challenges the country faces abroad and the more immediate crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Interview Conducted by Valerie Höhne, Martin Knobbe und Jonas Schaibl

Der Spiegel, Hamburgo – 30.11.2021

DER SPIEGEL: Ms. Baerbock, you have just spent several weeks negotiating with the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) and the market-oriented Free Democratic Party (FDP) behind you. What have you learned about future chancellor Olaf Scholz?

Baerbock: When you sit together day and night, you also get to know each other as people. And I can say: The later the hour, the more humorous the conversations.

DER SPIEGEL: And the FDP? It’s often viewed by your party as being neoliberal, right-wing and frivolous.

Baerbock: We often have different points of view, but they can really enrich debates. It is precisely the considerable common ground between the Greens and the FDP in social policy that is reflected in the coalition agreement.

DER SPIEGEL: FDP head Christian Lindner said at the presentation of the coalition agreement that the three parties are united by the fact that they want to overcome the status quo. During the negotiations, though, voices from the Green Party frequently said that the FDP had proven to be a status quo party. Which is true?

Baerbock: Probably both.

DER SPIEGEL: Can you please explain?

Baerbock: It's not that complicated. In Germany, you still have to go to City Hall with paper documents. In such instances, the FDP says clearly: Things can’t continue the way they are. We agree. In other policy areas, we have different ideas about whether something needs to change and what. With financial market regulations, for example, we would have liked to see more change.

DER SPIEGEL: What is the main message of this coalition agreement?

Baerbock: That we can really make a difference. Our aim is to bring politics up to date with reality and to break the stalemates that exist in our country regarding major, future-oriented projects. In digitalization, climate protection and societal cohesion.

DER SPIEGEL: The reality is that the coalition is already facing a major crisis. Olaf Scholz has finally presented the new coalition government’s coronavirus containment policy, but he hasn’t even uttered the word "lockdown." Is the new government acting with as little foresight as the old one?

Baerbock: Everyone is very conscious of the dramatic nature of the situation. We must now do everything in our power to ensure that hospital care remains secure and doesn’t collapse. To that end, we have jointly presented a catalog of seven acute measures. It is good that, in the future, there will be a crisis unit in the Chancellery with representatives from the federal government and from the states. In addition, there will finally be a scientific advisory board that will evaluate the situation on a daily basis.

DER SPIEGEL: Even without a scientific advisory board, you can conclude that the seven points won’t be enough to prevent disaster.

Baerbock: What we have to do now is consistently enforce the protective measures, including 2G and 2G-plus in broad areas and 3G at the workplace and on public transport and in rail transport. (Ed’s: 2G means people have to either be vaccinated or have recently recovered from a coronavirus infection in order to participate in certain aspects of public life, while 2G-plus means they must recently have tested negative on top of that. With 3G, a person has to either be vaccinated, have recovered from corona recently or have undergone a same-day corona test.) The council of experts is reviewing whether that goes far enough. If necessary, we will take further action.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you rule out the possibility of another lockdown?

Baerbock: I do not rule out the possibility that further steps will be needed, possibly sweeping measures. That’s why it is so important to use the next few days to get an honest picture.

DER SPIEGEL: If you’re aiming for a certain centralization of pandemic control, isn't the recent decision to let a law expire that granted the federal government sweeping powers in implementing virus containment measures counterproductive? Instead, the center of power has been shifted back to parliament, which reacts more slowly.

Baerbock: Parliament has shown that it is capable of acting very quickly. We changed the legal basis, not the fight against the pandemic. We have re-enforced those efforts with other measures, such as the 3G rule in the workplace. And, I reiterate: If necessary, we will tighten the rules as quickly as possible.

DER SPIEGEL: Does it make sense to introduce a general vaccination requirement now?

Baerbock: We are not ruling out a general vaccination requirement. But that will not help slow the fourth wave we are seeing right now. Part of the uncertainty among the population also stems from the fact that things are too often announced that aren’t carried out in the end. Before a general vaccination requirement could be adopted, it is necessary to clarify the legal basis and what conditions must be met. Vaccine doses must be available immediately and in sufficient quantities, and vaccination facilities must be available everywhere. It is also important to me that, in parallel to booster vaccinations and compulsory vaccination in sensitive areas such as nursing or in day-care centers and schools, logistical preparations for child vaccinations absolutely need to be made. Adults can stand in line for hours for a vaccination if need be. But you can’t do that with children.

DER SPIEGEL: You were your party’s chancellor candidate, but now you won’t even be vice chancellor. Does that bother you?

Baerbock: I am looking ahead. Our government will likely be taking office in the midst of the most serious health-care crisis this country has ever seen. We have big tasks to tackle. That is where I am currently focusing my energies.

DER SPIEGEL: Has the internal power struggle in your party between centrists and the left wing over cabinet posts hurt the incoming coalition?

Baerbock: No. Debates are part of inner-party democracy. It’s never easy when there are a lot of smart people, but only a limited number of ministries. But the national committee was unanimous in its nominations. Now it’s full steam ahead for the vote in parliament that will put the Green Party back in government after 16 years.

DER SPIEGEL: During the election campaign, you repeatedly said that this would be the last federal government that would still be able to influence the climate crisis. Is the coalition in a position to stop current developments?

Baerbock: We must do everything we can to at least slow down further global warming. Globally, we are currently on track for a temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius. Of that, 1.2 degrees are already irreversible. That is why these actually are the decisive years for turning things around. Four years isn’t enough to do it, but we can and must get started.

DER SPIEGEL: What precisely does the coalition plan on doing?

Baerbock: The measures needed for our country to contribute to limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius are contained in the agreement.

DER SPIEGEL: That’s an ambitious promise. The coalition agreement still states that the coal phase-out should "ideally" be brought forward to 2030. Where is the leverage for starting a real turnaround?

Baerbock: With a CO2 price in European emissions trading of 60 euros per ton, coal-fired power plants will no longer be profitable by the end of the decade, especially with renewable energies continuing to get cheaper. A CO2 certificate currently costs as much as 70 euros, and the price is likely to grow more expensive. However, if the European market price falls, we will introduce a national minimum threshold of 60 euros, that has been agreed. That gives industry planning security. Companies that switch to climate-neutral cement or steel can be sure that they are not throwing their investments out the window.

DER SPIEGEL: You are saying that the use of the word "ideally" in the coalition agreement in lieu of a firm commitment is irrelevant?

Baerbock: Yes, that only means: as soon as the supply of renewable energies is sufficient to replace coal. Of course, we will still need reliable electricity in 2029, whether at three o'clock in the morning or at minus 7 degrees. That is why, logically, the coal phase-out is linked to the expansion of renewable energies, which will entail the greatest effort.

DER SPIEGEL: Again: Where are the binding rules?

Baerbock: The crucial thing is that it was agreed in the coalition deal that the expansion of renewable energies will be defined as a public interest in the future. Which was always the case with mining law – coal mining came first. Now, it’s renewable energies. And we need them not only for the electricity sector, but also for the transport sector and industry. Green power plants will have priority in planning processes and we will provide the state with the appropriate enforcement rights. That may sound technical, but it is a small revolution.  It means that on balance, the importance of renewable energy and infrastructure is increasing. In this way, we are accelerating the planning and approval processes.

DER SPIEGEL: Many experts have called for a higher CO2 price for transport and heat. Why hasn’t that happened?

Baerbock: In light of exploding energy prices, an additional price increase right now wouldn’t be good for social reasons. And we’ve always said that you can’t rely on price alone. Otherwise, the richest people in the country will buy their way out, and everyone else will be left out in the cold. That’s why we now have a good mix of a price effect, regulatory law and subsidy policy.

DER SPIEGEL: Contrary to expectations, the Greens didn’t get the Transport Ministry. Will FDP control of the ministry slow down the transportation revolution?

Baerbock: In terms of content, we have anchored strong guardrails in the treaty. The coalition is committed to supporting the Europe-wide phaseout of the internal combustion engine by 2035. It will also ensure that there are 15 million fully electric cars by 2030, and that the charging point infrastructure will be expanded. Together, this will mean that only zero-emission cars will be newly registered in Germany at the beginning of the next decade.

DER SPIEGEL: How painful is it for you that you had to forego the Transport Ministry?

Baerbock: You can’t have it all, and in the coalition agreement, we fought for the foundations of the transformation in drive systems. We will be responsible for three key transformative portfolios: economy, environment and agriculture. Working together, we can really make a difference, especially if the economy and the environment are no longer played off against each other.

DER SPIEGEL: But aren’t you running the risk of losing the interpretive battle right from the get-go if there’s no high CO2 price, you don't have control of the Transport Ministry and you’ve already given up on imposing a mandatory speed limit on autobahns?

Baerbock: I would, of course, preferred to see the diesel subsidy abolished, for example. But more crucial is the fact that, over the next few years, we’ll be building thousands of wind turbines and power lines and expanding charging point infrastructure. The coalition agreement provides a very solid basis for this.

DER SPIEGEL: Will your critics at the environmental organizations or Fridays for Future see it that way, too?

Baerbock: A strong civil society has to put its finger on the weak spots. I have no problem with that. The task now is now that of building a complete climate infrastructure in the country, which is extremely difficult, especially considering that so little has happened in recent years. But there is no way around it. We have the opportunity and the obligation to bring our industrialized country into an era without fossil energies and to secure prosperity for future generations. It is clear that the 1.5-degree path can only be achieved if European and international partners join in. That is why we need an active foreign policy element for dealing with climate change. The technologies we develop in Germany over the next few years must be exported to the world.

DER SPIEGEL: That will be your job, too. You are about to become Germany’s first female foreign minister. What does that mean to you?

Baerbock: At the beginning of the 1960s, women had to protest in front of the entrance to the Chancellery to finally get a female minister into the cabinet. There was strong resistance to overcome. But women before me did it. I am grateful to these women.

DER SPIEGEL: You said in a television interview before the election that if you became chancellor, your first trip abroad would be to Brussels. Will the same apply to a Foreign Minister Baerbock?

Baerbock: First, our party members have to vote on the coalition agreement and the tableau of cabinet appointments. Regardless: A strong German foreign policy can only be a European one. It is urgent that the Weimar Triangle be revived – Warsaw, Berlin and Paris are crucial to Europe. And even though we have several points of controversy with the Polish government, it is clear: We need close cooperation with our Eastern European partners.

DER SPIEGEL: You have spoken out against putting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany into operation. What is your plan here?

Baerbock: My criticism of the gas pipeline is well known, for geostrategic and energy policy reasons. At the moment, the pipeline can’t be put into operation anyway. The Federal Network Agency just suspended certification.

DER SPIEGEL: Once you are sworn in, you will immediately have to address a significant developing conflict. Russia is mobilizing troops on its border with Ukraine and it is supplying less gas to Europe. In Belarus, refugees are being smuggled to the border. Is this a hybrid attack by Russia against the EU?

Baerbock: These are anything but easy times. We are experiencing a double blackmail by Lukashenko. On the one hand, refugees are being abused to divide Europe. On the other, the government wants to be recognized by the Europeans as negotiating partner, even though it is suppressing the opposition. You cannot allow yourself to be blackmailed by dictators. The EU must stand together as a community of values. That is why it is right to tighten sanctions and continue to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime. At the same time, diplomacy always means seeking dialogue.

DER SPIEGEL: So, unlike your fellow party members, you have no problem with the fact that Chancellor Angela Merkel called Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko?

Baerbock: You cannot pursue foreign policy without dialogue. We are also talking to the Taliban to get people to safety, after all. But it did not need to be the chancellor calling Lukashenko.

DER SPIEGEL: Poland isn’t letting migrants and refugees into the country at the EU’s external border. Is this the right way to handle the conflict?

Baerbock: Poland needs European solidarity. But of course international law must also be respected at Europe’s external borders, that is clear.

DER SPIEGEL: What might a solution look like?

Baerbock: There is no simple solution. But it is important that Germany, the EU and Poland act together. Even if, from my point of view, providing for the refugees – also on Polish, i.e., EU territory – must be the top priority.

DER SPIEGEL: Are we in a new Cold War with Russia and China?

Baerbock: I don’t believe in simply applying old categories to new geopolitical developments. We are in a systemic rivalry with authoritarian regimes and must make every effort to defend the international rules-based order. It is a matter of protecting the principles of international law, human rights and the international peace order. For several years, it has not only been a matter of military threats, but also of hybrid aggression.

"It is good that the evacuation mission in Afghanistan will be dealt with in a parliamentary committee of inquiry."

DER SPIEGEL: You personally rejected Germany’s participation in NATO’s atomic deterrent, but now nuclear sharing is in the coalition agreement. Do you have to go against your beliefs?

Baerbock: In a coalition, each partner has to move a bit so that we can make progress together. The coalition agreement contains a commitment to nuclear sharing. At the same time, we reaffirmed our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and a Germany free of nuclear weapons. Germany will advocate nuclear disarmament as an observer at the Meeting of States Parties to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We have always emphasized that these efforts are only possible in close consultation with our European and international partners.

DER SPIEGEL: Thousands of local hires who worked for Germany – who saved the lives of German troops – are still stranded in Afghanistan. What will your message to them be once you are sworn in as foreign minister?

Baerbock: It is good that the evacuation mission in Afghanistan will be dealt with in a parliamentary committee of inquiry. We must learn our lessons for future missions. And, of course, every effort must continue to be made to protect and welcome people who are at risk because they worked with us in the past.

DER SPIEGEL: Ms. Baerbock, we thank you for this interview.

 

The Geopolitical Olympics: Could China Win Gold? - Graham Allison (The National Interest)

Sumary:

 I’m writing to share my article published today in The National Interest previewing some of the major findings of a forthcoming Harvard report, “The Great Rivalry: China vs. the US in the 21st Century.”

• As we watch the results of the Tokyo Olympics, it’s hard to remember when in the century-long history of the modern Olympics China won its first medal. Answer: the 1984 Games in Los Angeles. By 2008, it had displaced the US from an accustomed position—taking home 48 medals to the US’s 36. And while most betting sites have the US winning the most gold in Tokyo, as Yogi Berra taught us: “it ain’t over til it’s over.”
• In the geopolitical Olympics, China’s rise to rival the US has been even more dramatic. Who today is the manufacturing workshop of the world? Who is the number one trading partner of most nations in the world? Who has been the principal engine of economic growth in the decade and a half since the Great Recession of 2008?
• In the military arena, who has eroded America’s competitive edge in every domain of warfare to the point that “today, every domain is contested: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace”—in the words of former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis?
• Who is the largest producer and consumer of automobiles? Who does Elon Musk see as the largest market for Tesla and other EVs? In the technology likely to have the greatest impact on economics and security in the next generation—AI—who is the clear leader in facial recognition, voice recognition, integrated surveillance, and fintech?
• The Big Takeaway from the Report is that the time has come to recognize China for what it is: a “full-spectrum peer competitor.” But as the essay says unambiguously: for the authors of the report, this does not mean “game over” for the USA. To the contrary, it means “game on.” 

Part of a set of Transition Memos for the new administration prepared by members of the Harvard China Working Group led by the late Ezra Vogel and me, and supported by a grant from the Harvard Global Institute, the five chapters of the report along with other memos have been provided to those leading the Biden administration’s strategic reviews (as well as those who had been heading up plans for a second Trump term). After the Biden team and leaders of Congress have had the opportunity to use the memos and chapters in whatever ways they find helpful, they will be published later this year as Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center discussion papers. But since there have recently been a number of public comments and inquiries about the report, it seemed appropriate to preview some of the key findings.

If you have reactions, we will look forward to reading them.

Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Follow me on Twitter

Complete Article:

The Geopolitical Olympics: Could China Win Gold?

In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower.

Graham Allison

The National Interest, July 29, 2021

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/geopolitical-olympics-could-china-win-gold-190761

The Tokyo Olympics offers an apt analogy for reflecting on the much more consequential geopolitical Olympics in which China is challenging the United States today. In the century-long history of the modern Olympics, when did China win its first medal? Not until the 1984 Games in Los Angeles. Just a quarter-century later, in the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China displaced the United States from its accustomed position as No. 1—taking home forty-eight gold medals to the United States’ thirty-six.

While the United States snapped back in 2012 and 2016, the outcome of this summer’s games looks to be tight. Most betting sites have the United States winning forty gold medals to China’s thirty-three. But curveballs and caveats abound: tight rules have banned spectators and excluded elite athletes who failed Covid-19 tests. Meanwhile, several favored U.S. Olympians have stumbled in early competition. Sportswriters can be forgiven for repeating Yogi Berry’s one-liner about baseball: “It ain’t over till it’s over.”

In the geopolitical Olympics, China’s rise to rival the United States has been even more dramatic. Only two decades ago at the dawn of the twenty-first century, China did not even appear on the league tables of any geopolitical competition. Economically, it was classified as a “poor, developing country” (and thus allowed to join the World Trade Organization on terms reserved for developing economies). Technologically, with a per capita income at roughly the same level as Guyana and the Philippines, its citizens did not have enough money to buy advanced computers or cellphones, much less the resources to produce them. Militarily, it was for the Defense Department inconsequential, covered as what it called a “lesser included threat.” Diplomatically, it sat quietly, following Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to “hide and bide.”

But that was then.

In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower. Moreover, to paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel, all this has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished.

Who is today the manufacturing workshop of the world? Who is the No. 1 trading partner of most nations in the world? Who has been the principal engine of economic growth in the decade and a half since the Great Recession of 2008? By the yardstick that both the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Monetary Fund have concluded is the best single metric for comparing national economies, who has the largest economy in the world? 

In the military arena, who has eroded America’s competitive edge in every domain of warfare to the point that “today, every domain is contested: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace”—in the words of former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis? While the United States remains the only global military superpower, in the Department of Defense’s most carefully constructed simulations of conflict over Taiwan, who has won eighteen of the past eighteen war games—according to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work?

Who is the largest producer and consumer of automobiles? Who does Elon Musk see as the largest market for Teslas and other electric vehicles? In the technology likely to have the greatest impact on economies and security in the next generation—artificial intelligence (AI)—who is the clear leader in facial recognition, voice recognition, supercomputers, and fintech—in the judgment of Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google (which is the leading AI company in America)?

Readers who hesitate before answering these questions will find bracing the forthcoming Report from Harvard’s China Working Group on the “Great Rivalry: China vs. the US in the 21st Century.” Prepared as part of a package of Transition Memos for the new administration after the November 2020 election, chapters of the report have been provided to those leading the Biden administration’s strategic reviews (as well as to those who had been heading up plans for a second Trump term). After the Biden team and leaders of Congress have had an opportunity to use them in whatever ways they find helpful, the chapters will be published later this year as Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Discussion Papers. But since there have recently been a number of public comments and inquiries about the report, this essay previews some of our key findings.

The specific assignment to which our report on the “Great Rivalry” responds was “to document what has actually happened in the past two decades in the array of races between China and the US.” The goal was to provide an objective database that could serve as a foundation for policymakers who would undertake a fundamental strategic reassessment of the China challenge. Five chapters drill down on the rivalry in five core arenas of power: economic, technological, military, diplomatic, and ideological. Each chapter begins by identifying criteria, metrics for assessing various races, and the best-unclassified sources of data on each topic. Each then summarizes the evidence about what has happened over the past two decades and concludes with a candid assessment of where the competitors now stand.

In offering judgments, we have made our best effort to follow the lead of judges in the Olympics: scoring results impartially according to established criteria. For example, in assessing where the United States and China currently stand in AI applications for voice recognition, we report the results of Stanford’s international challenge for machine-reading, where Chinese teams won three of the top five spots, including first place. In most of these races, this means reporting that China’s performance has improved dramatically. But as the report explains, these advances should not be surprising, since China has essentially been playing catch up, closing gaps by copying technologies and practices pioneered by the United States and others.

Nonetheless, for Americans—including us!—news about China overtaking us and even surpassing us in some races is unsettling. Indeed, as students of international security, we recognize that the international order the United States has led for the seven decades since World War II provided a rare “long peace” without war between great powers, and larger increases in health and prosperity worldwide than in any equivalent period in history. The impact of China’s meteoric rise on that order is thus a matter of deep concern. But as John Adams repeatedly reminded his compatriots as they fought for freedom against the most powerful nation in the eighteenth-century world: “facts are stubborn things.”

In brief, the major findings of our report across the five arenas are these. First, China is not only rising. It has already risen to a point that it has upended the post-Cold War order: geopolitically, economically, technologically, militarily, diplomatically, and politically. Washington officials continue straining to see China in our rearview mirror. They insist that it is no more than what they call a “near-peer competitor.” Reality says otherwise. The time has come to recognize China as a full-spectrum peer competitor of the United States. As such, it poses a graver geopolitical challenge than any American living has ever seen.

The difference between the terms is not just semantic. If our assessment is correct, the Director of National Intelligence’s 2021 Global Threat Assessment describing China as “increasingly a near-peer competitor” is wrong. And the difference matters. Ask American athletes in Tokyo about peer competitors.

Second, China has not only overtaken the United States in a number of significant arenas, including the size of its economy, but has established leads the United States is unlikely to recover. While many readers may find this hard to believe, they should consider the arithmetic. Since China has four times as many people as the United States, if Chinese workers were only one-quarter as productive as Americans, their gross domestic product (GDP) would equal that of ours. GDP, of course, is not everything. But it forms the substructure of power in relations among nations.

Third, if both nations continue on their current trajectories, by 2030, China’s economy will be twice the size of America’s. Moreover, in many other sports that the United States has traditionally dominated, China is likely to have sustainable advantages. Painful as it will be, Americans will have to find some way to come to grips with a world in which, at least in some realms, “China is No. 1.”

Fourth, in contests like the Olympics, winning the largest number of medals is essentially a matter of national pride. In core geopolitical rivalries, however, including GDP, relative military capabilities for potential conflicts (for example, over Taiwan), or leadership in frontier technologies like AI, if China succeeds in winning gold medals that we should have, the consequences for the American economy, American security, and the American-led international order will be profoundly negative. Anyone who has doubts about what life under Chinese rules looks like should watch what is happening in Hong Kong.

Fifth, contrary to those for whom these findings lead to defeatism, the authors of the Harvard report decidedly do not believe that this means “game over” for the United States.  Historically, American democracy has been slow to awake to great challenges. On the battlefield, had its greatest wars ended after the first innings, American colonists would have never become independent, Germany would have emerged the victor in World War I, Asia would now be a grand Japanese co-prosperity area, and Europeans would be speaking German in a Nazi empire. Had the United States not made the Soviet Union’s launch of the first satellite into space a “Sputnik moment” of awakening, the United States would not have been the first nation to send a man to the moon.

In the past two decades, China has risen further and faster on more dimensions than any nation in history. As it has done so, it has become a serious rival of what had been the world’s sole superpower.

Recognition of the magnitude of the challenge posed by what Singapore’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew presciently predicted would be “the biggest player in the history of the world,” is the beginning of wisdom. We believe it should—and will—lead the United States to mobilize a response proportionate to the challenge.

As the United States and China compete neck-and-neck in the Tokyo Games, the head of China’s General Administration of Sports, Gou Zhongwen, has made no secret of China’s goal. As he put it recently: the Tokyo and Beijing Games are stepping stones on the path to China’s becoming a global “sports power by 2035.” In pursuit of this mission, China sent its biggest-ever team to Tokyo with 777 athletes to America’s 621. Nonetheless, as she arrived in Tokyo, the CEO of the U.S. Olympic Committee declared: “Team USA is ready” for everything. In sum, the game is on.

Americans have never shrunk from competition. Indeed, our market economy and democracy are founded on the proposition that fair competition will spur the rivals to run faster than they would do running alone. But for students of war and peace, the big question is: in the great geopolitical rivalry, can the United States and China can find a way to structure and manage constructive competition? Can the necessity for coexistence drive enlightened leaders to engage in peaceful competition in which each nation does its best to demonstrate which system—America’s democracy, or China’s Party-led autocracy—can deliver more of what human beings want? Since citizens’ lives in both countries depend on an affirmative answer, we must hope and pray that they can find their way to yes.

Graham T. Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is the former director of Harvard’s Belfer Center and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?