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Mostrando postagens com marcador Consequences of the defeat of Russia. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Consequences of the defeat of Russia. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 13 de janeiro de 2023

Consequences of the defeat of Russia - Nadin Brzezinski (Medium)

Consequences of the defeat of Russia

 Nadin Brzezinski

The United States delivered 75 tons of food left over from the Persian Gulf war to the hungry Moscow region today, part of a relief effort that American and Russian officials said they expected to continue through the winter.

The food, flown in through the snow on two military cargo planes from a supply base in Pisa, Italy, was to go directly to hospitals, orphanages and homes for the elderly.

The delivery from Sheremetyevo Airport in Russian trucks was observed by Americans, including embassy dependents, and by Russian and Red Cross officials, to make sure that its contents were not stolen and put on sale by Russian black marketeers.

The flights had a paradoxical quality: The American military, after decades of cold war training to fight a hot war against the Soviet Union, arrived here to help this country feed its hungry. An Echo of World War II

While there’s no way to know what Xi is thinking, China’s long-established pattern of behavior suggests that, as Russia redirects border security units to a grinding conflict in Ukraine, it is worth considering if China might be mulling expansionist contingencies to the north, along the sprawling and sparsely held 2,615 mile Russian frontier.

On the other hand, on both the Indian frontier and in the South China Sea, China moved into sovereign territory with little advance notice. In both cases, China’s expansionism was opportunistic, taking advantage of an administrative or military vacuum to suddenly “change the facts on the ground.”