O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

Mostrando postagens com marcador resenha de livro. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador resenha de livro. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 2 de junho de 2019

A Constituição contra o Brasil: artigos de Roberto Campos - Paulo Roberto de Almeida, resenha de Lucas Berlanza

Uma resenha de meu livro em torno dos artigos de Roberto Campos sobre a Constituição de 1988:

“A Constituição contra o Brasil”: uma nova forma de ler Roberto Campos

Nunca existirá livro mais indispensável para conhecer o icônico liberal brasileiro Roberto Campos que seu grande trabalho de memórias e reflexões A Lanterna na Popa. É provavelmente impossível. No entanto, a obra organizada pelo também diplomata Paulo Roberto de Almeida e lançada pela LVM Editora, A Constituição contra o Brasil – Ensaios de Roberto Campos sobre a Constituinte e a Constituição de 1988, é uma adição oportuníssima à bibliografia existente sobre esse mordaz e lúcido mato-grossense.
Os conceitos aqui abordados não são inéditos. Os principais, que se repetem em diversos textos desta coletânea, estão expostos no segundo volume de A Lanterna, em versão bastante mais resumida. No entanto, é uma experiência insubstituível deliciar-se com a sequência de 65 artigos de Roberto Campos – sendo um deles, As falsas soluções e as seis liberdades, não um artigo, mas o texto integral de seu famoso discurso de abertura do mandato no Senado Federal em 1990 -, organizados em ordem cronológica, todos eles escritos durante e depois da feitura do texto que hoje oferece as diretrizes fundamentais da lei brasileira.
Em A Lanterna, o leitor vê a descrição do próprio Roberto Campos de seus atos e reflexões. Em A Constituição contra o Brasil, esse mesmo leitor tem a ímpar oportunidade de visualizá-lo em ação, acompanhar o desenvolvimento, a progressão de suas irritações, de seu inconformismo, de suas investidas espirituosas e acidamente divertidas contra os seus contemporâneos constituintes de 88 e tudo aquilo que se entronizou na “Carta Magna” de dirigista e delirante, consagrando a mentalidade demagógica e estatizante da Nova República.
Os artigos são precedidos e sucedidos por trabalhos da lavra do próprio Paulo Roberto de Almeida. O primeiro, Roberto Campos e a trajetória constitucional brasileira, é uma competente contextualização dos ensaios de Campos, procurando situá-los em sua época e nos eventos que se passavam. O segundo, concluindo o livro, intitulado A Constituição contra o Brasil: uma análise de seus dispositivos econômicos, é uma reflexão de Almeida sobre os aspectos esquizofrênicos da Constituição no campo econômico e suas consequências, palpavelmente sentidas nos anos que sucederam sua elaboração.
Há muitas passagens de interesse e curiosidade histórica, como aquela em que Roberto Campos afirma que Paulo Rabello de Castro e Paulo Guedes seriam nomes de uma “brilhante e jovem geração emergente” que “corrigiriam o sinistro legado do PMDB: perda de credibilidade externa e incredulidade interna”. Duas coisas Campos não pôde prever: que ao desafio do legado peemedebista se somaria o legado medonho do PT e que Paulo Rabello, na hora de dar testemunho de suas ideias, seria tão decepcionante. De Paulo Guedes, escolhido para o ministério do presidente eleito Jair Bolsonaro, o futuro há de dizer se poderá provar que o velho Campos não estava totalmente errado em seu prognóstico.
Aparece aqui ainda certa convicção em uma espécie de fatalismo da ampla concretização das economias de mercado que talvez sofresse alguma dose de decepção, tivesse Campos vivido mais um pouco. De todo modo, aqui e acolá, o leitor garimpará alguns tesouros e algumas informações que permitem traçar um quadro mais preciso das ideias com que o mato-grossense chegou a simpatizar: veem-se vários elogios aos economistas da Escola Austríaca, especialmente Mises e Hayek, resgatados com sucesso nos últimos anos para o público brasileiro; um aceno simpático à demarquia, sistema político proposto por Hayek e advogado no Brasil pelo empresário Henry Maksoud; um elogio ao então deputado Flávio Rocha e ao economista Marcos Cintra pela proposta de simplificação tributária; ataques certeiros ao imposto sindical e até a leitura de que, se não permite violências do Estado, a Nova República já vinha sendo marcada pelo aumento alarmante da violência geral e dos crimes comuns.
Tem lugar ainda nos artigos sua crítica ao sistema presidencialista, uma “semi-ditadura temporária” que fracassou no Brasil, com alguma menção esporádica a seu projeto de semipresidencialismo ou presidencialismo parlamentar, além de sua defesa do voto distrital misto, da limitação do acesso dos partidos à representação no Parlamento e da exigência de fidelidade partidária. Isso decorre em parte de sua visão do sistema da Constituição de 1988 como um sistema “promiscuísta”, em que os poderes se invadem em suas prerrogativas e perdem sua eficácia na contenção de crises, favorecendo a emergência de impasses institucionais, bem como de sua desaprovação ao que chamou de “multipartidarismo caótico”, que leva à fragmentação e ao nosso tão famoso presidencialismo de coalizão.
Transparece ainda sua admiração pelo primeiro presidente militar, Castelo Branco, de quem foi ministro, e sua concepção de que a certeza de que uma nova Constituição inteiramente formada pelos parlamentares constituintes seria o único caminho para o Brasil era uma doença, apelidada de “constitucionalite”, acometendo políticos com delírios de grandeza e dispostos a “brincar de Deus”. Para Roberto Campos, melhor teria sido modificar a Constituição do regime militar, que já contava com muitas virtudes desobedecidas pelos próprios militares e seu “Poder Revolucionário Constituinte”, como a sua “severidade antiinflacionária”. Em vez disso, a Nova República preferiu consagrar um texto inteiramente novo, criado sob o influxo das circunstâncias políticas e que teve a desgraça de surgir logo antes da queda do muro de Berlim, inspirado na anacrônica e esquerdizante Constituição portuguesa da Revolução dos Cravos.
Roberto Campos diagnostica nos seus artigos uma inumerável coleção de patologias “nacionalisteiras” e estrovengas paquidérmicas que o Brasil abraçou ao, no momento de sua transição para uma abertura política, menosprezar a necessidade ainda mais urgente de uma abertura econômica, que inserisse o país definitivamente no moderno capitalismo. Seu apelo, posto que lamentavelmente ainda atual e vivo como nunca, precisa ser replicado e resgatado, para que possamos o quanto antes dizer que seus artigos já são “apenas” peças primorosas da História.

quarta-feira, 1 de maio de 2019

O povo contra a democracia - Yascha Mounk (livro)


O mundo está em crise. Populistas autoritários tomaram o poder. Os cidadãos estão perdendo a confiança em seu sistema político. A democracia liberal foi posta em xeque. Em O povo contra a democracia, um livro contundente e necessário, Yascha Mounk faz uma análise precisa desse cenário comum a diversas nações. Ainda é possível reverter a situação e assegurar os valores democráticos? Sim, mas não há tempo a perder.
“Qual é exatamente a natureza dessa crise? E o que a impulsiona? Em meio a tantos livros do gênero, O povo contra a democracia destaca-se pela qualidade das respostas a essas perguntas. Mounk fornece uma combinação admirável de experiência acadêmica e senso político.” — The Economist
Inclui prefácio exclusivo à edição brasileira.

Leia um trecho: https://www.companhiadasletras.com.br/trechos/14645.pdf

Confira a repercussão na imprensa 

Veja: Civilização em risco
O cientista político Yascha Mounk diz que a ligação histórica entre liberdade individual e instituições democráticas está se esgarçando.

Estadão: “Temo que possa ser o início de uma era populista”, afirma Yascha Mounk em entrevista
Cientista político analisa o fenômeno político em novo livro e diz que discurso de Jair Bolsonaro é preocupante”.

Folha de S.Paulo: “Democracia liberal está sendo corroída”
Para Yascha Mounk, conflito entre vontade popular e direitos individuais ameaça sistema.

BBC News Brasil: “É preocupante depender de militares para manter estabilidade do governo”, diz cientista político de Harvard

Correio Braziliense: Cientista político Yascha Mounk fala sobre as ameaças autoritárias
Em entrevista ao Correio, Yascha Mounk analisou a situação de democracias no Brasil e no mundo.

Folha de S.Paulo: “Se subestimarem o perigo que vem de Bolsonaro, teremos um problema”, diz professor de Harvard

Yascha Mounk, autor de O povo contra a democracia, lançou edição em português na quinta-feira (25).

sábado, 20 de abril de 2019

Diplomacia americana: seu longo declínio, no livro de William Burns - Jeremi Suri

O autor da resenha, Jeremi Suri, refere-se às memórias de Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, para sinalizar que, depois de sua longa e segura ascensão, a diplomacia americana empreendeu um longo declínio, provavelmente concomitante à militarização da presença americana no mundo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Long Rise and Sudden Fall of American Diplomacy

One of Washington's most accomplished diplomats has traced how U.S. foreign policy went astray over decades—and how it can get back on track.


Syrian President Bashar al-Assad  shakes hands with U.S. under secretary for political affairs William Burns ahead of their meeting in Damascus on Feb 17, 2010. (Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad shakes hands with U.S. under secretary for political affairs William Burns ahead of their meeting in Damascus on Feb 17, 2010. (Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images) 

On the afternoon of Sept. 11, 2001, one of America’s most experienced diplomats, William Burns, sat in the deserted U.S. State Department compound, five blocks from the evacuated White House, contemplating the future of American foreign policy. The department’s computer systems were down, so he reverted to writing longhand. Burns, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, composed four pages that he later handed to Secretary of State Colin Powell, outlining ideas for the “imaginative and hard-nosed diplomacy” necessary to drain the Middle East of the terrorism that had now reached the United States. Burns’s advice was prescient; its rejection by the White House, Congress, and much of the American public reveals the debilitating “militarization of diplomacy”—the subject of Burns’s compelling memoir, The Back Channel.
“What was unfolding,” Burns writes, “was less a clash of civilizations than a clash within a civilization, a deeply battered Islamic world in the midst of a desperate ideological struggle. There were limits to what we could do directly to shape that debate. What we could do, however, was to help create a sense of geopolitical order that would deprive extremists of the oxygen they needed to fan the flames of chaos, and give moderate forces the sustained support they needed to demonstrate that they could deliver for their people.”

These were the insights of a former ambassador to Jordan who had served in high-ranking positions on the National Security Council (NSC) and in the State Department. In his memoir, Burns explains why his emphasis on diplomacy was so important as the United States embarked on a new global war against terrorism. Washington could never master the deeply complex histories, motivations, and factions within and around the region. The United States would have to rely on local relationships, which would require compromise, negotiation, and some humility. U.S. military power could not replace the necessary deference to regional sensibilities. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak captured this well when he warned Burns, “You must not underestimate how much trouble those Iraqis can be. They spend their whole lives plotting against each other.”
If Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s classic memoir, Present at the Creation, narrates the growth of U.S. diplomacy during the early Cold War, Burns’s memoir captures the apex of U.S. diplomacy and its rapid decline 50 years later. Acheson’s generation of political leaders valued and supported the nation’s diplomats; Burns’s political masters, particularly after 9/11, did not. Burns offers a cogent argument for why that must change, soon.
U.S. leaders had excelled in the diplomacy surrounding the end of the Cold War. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker built enduring relationships with diverse leaders across the Soviet bloc and the Middle East. They negotiated compromises that gave other leaders what they needed in return for endorsement of key U.S. aims: nuclear arms control, reunification of Germany, and the reversal of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Bush and Baker were less successful in negotiating a peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors, but they made progress there, too. Baker was the great U.S. diplomat of the late 20th century, as seen by Burns, who served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and frequently traveled with the secretary: “His skills, weight within the administration, relationships with all the key players in the region, and proven ability to deliver could not be easily replicated. He seemed like the right peacemaker at the right time.”
Bush and Baker’s international achievements left a void as their successors undervalued the diplomacy they had carefully crafted to reach those results. A unipolar post-Cold War hegemon, the United States possessed unmatched military and economic power, and its ideological righteousness seemed unassailable. Who needed difficult, slow diplomatic compromises when U.S. leaders could get what they wanted largely through pressure and force?
The militarization of U.S. diplomacy began, according to Burns’s account, when President Bill Clinton pushed for rapid NATO expansion into the former Soviet bloc, despite prior U.S. commitments to the contrary (as confirmed by Burns in his memoir) and strong Russian objections. Although Clinton offered strong personal support to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, he failed to address the growing sense of insecurity and grievance within Russia. It appeared that the United States was muscling into Russian geopolitical space, brandishing guns and dollars. Washington offered little to assure concerned Russians, other than continued aid to a drunk, pro-American figure in the Kremlin.
The former Soviet bloc states had good reason to seek NATO membership, but the United States needed to do more to accommodate Russian fears. Diplomacy of this kind received little attention among Clinton’s impatient advisors. Burns, then the U.S. minister-counselor for political affairs in Russia, recounts: “Sitting at the embassy in Moscow in the mid-1990s, it seemed to me that NATO expansion was premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst. … It was wishful thinking, however, to believe that we could open the door to NATO membership without incurring some lasting cost with a Russia coping with its own historic insecurities.”
The destructive cocktail of U.S. wishful thinking, military power, and ideological self-righteousness reached maximum potency with the Iraq War. Burns calls it America’s “original sin” of the post-Cold War order, “born of hubris, as well as failures of imagination and process.” Burns commends President George W. Bush’s personal sincerity, but he describes him as “reckless” in his commitment to overthrow Saddam Hussein militarily and ignore all advice to the contrary. Burns recounts what he and others at State, and within the Western alliance, told the White House: “There was ‘no evidence of an Iraqi role’ in 9/11, ‘no [regional or international] support for military action,’ and ‘no triggering event.’ There was a ‘relatively weak internal opposition [in Iraq],’ and little clarity on what might happen on the day after.”
These observations—repeated and confirmed by virtually all experienced diplomats at the time—were not an argument for doing nothing. Burns fills many pages with elaborations on the options, short of U.S. invasion, that would have addressed terrorism and other threats in the Middle East. These options included tightened international sanctions, increased support for alternative groups and power centers in the region, and, most important, closer cooperation among U.S. allies—most of whom were eager to show their support for the United States after 9/11.
Washington ran roughshod over all of these diplomatic options. The United States isolated itself, antagonized allies and adversaries, and diverted its resources to a lengthy military occupation that further destabilized the region. The winner of the war was Iran, which saw a regional rival defeated and found new influence in Iraq. The United States was a clear loser, as the “war in Iraq sucked the oxygen out of the administration’s foreign policy agenda.” Mired in Iraq, facing opposition around the globe, Washington found its diplomatic leverage diminished in almost every region. Burns recounts how Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of this situation by throwing his weight around in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe. The United States had cornered itself.
Most damaging, the United States never recovered the diplomatic capital lost in Iraq. Burns recounts many skilled U.S. efforts to contain Russia and denuclearize Libya and Iran, but from military intervention to drone warfare Washington consistently “overrelied on American hard power to achieve policy aims and ambitions.” Even critics of the Iraq War presumed the United States had underused or misused military power; they did not address the diplomatic deficit. U.S. leaders failed to educate the public about the importance of forging compromise abroad, and they frequently encouraged more skepticism toward diplomacy. This was most evident during the Barack Obama administration’s negotiations with Iran, when members of Congress worked to undermine sensitive negotiations while they were still in process, calling recklessly for military intervention instead.
Before Donald Trump’s presidency, many Americans had adopted a dangerous “dismissiveness toward diplomacy.” This was a marked change from the last decades of the 20th century and the presidency of George H.W. Bush in particular. Allies, including much of Western Europe, now distanced themselves from Washington, both frustrated and concerned about U.S. callousness. Adversaries, especially Russia and China, swooped in to acquire new partners and isolate the United States. Ironically, post-Cold War U.S. militarization cracked open the liberal international order that U.S. diplomats had carefully and successfully nurtured for more than 50 years.
There are no easy solutions. The skilled U.S. diplomacy of the late Cold War was a historical aberration, reflecting the accumulated experience of the prior half-century and the leadership of a few distinctive personalities. The U.S. electoral system does not favor diplomats or the slow compromises they nurture in foreign policy. And the United States invests far more in military power than other less kinetic elements.
Nonetheless, Burns’s memoir reminds us of the continued importance of diplomacy, and it points to a number of things Americans can do to improve its practice for the national interest. First, it is high time Americans grapple with the failure of the war in Iraq. They need to hold their leaders historically accountable for their disastrous dismissal of diplomacy, rather than hunting for successful military roads not taken. Recognizing that military power cannot succeed without diplomacy, as evidenced in Iraq, is crucial for building the domestic support U.S. diplomats desperately need. They are the keys to winning future conflicts.
Second, the militarization of U.S. diplomacy is centered in the White House. Burns recounts how the NSC grew in size and influence during his 30 years in government. It frequently crowds out the diplomatic voices coming from the State Department, as happened during deliberations surrounding the expansion of NATO and the war in Iraq. The NSC has become a crisis-driven center for foreign policy, which has repeatedly privileged rapid military solutions for deep diplomatic problems. Reducing its influence, and empowering professional diplomats with area-specific experience, will create more space for creative, informed policymaking. Burns makes this point well: “Responsibility needs to be pushed downward in Washington, and ambassadors in the field need to be empowered to make more decisions locally.”
Third, and perhaps most important, Americans need to educate themselves about diplomacy. This is an old problem in a society that is skeptical about cosmopolitan elites and generally ignorant of its own history. In a very competitive world, managing global relationships will be more important than ever for business and policy. Investing in educating citizens about diplomacy—through language instruction, history, political science, and other related subjects—must become a priority. Educational leaders should take up this cause. The U.S. government should also invest in the issue, beginning with the education of its own diplomats. A recent study that I completed with my colleague, Ambassador Robert Hutchings, shows that the U.S. foreign service is behind many of its peers in the quality and quantity of diplomatic education that it offers to its own diplomats. The United States should at least begin to address the diplomatic deficit among its talented representatives.
Burns’s career captures an underutilized asset in U.S. foreign policy. America has the capacity to produce world-class diplomats, and it needs more of them than ever before. The “imaginative and hard-nosed diplomacy” that Burns describes amid the smoldering ruins of 9/11 should guide thinking about U.S. foreign policy as the country emerges from recent setbacks. Without renewed diplomacy, U.S. force will never be enough.

Jeremi Suri holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a professor in the University's Department of History and the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

More from Foreign Policy
By Taboola



Read More
Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti, left, and Zhihang Chi, Air China's vice president for North America, at Los Angeles International Airport on Feb. 19, 2015. (Mark Ralston/AFP/Getty Images)

Cities Will Determine the Future of Diplomacy

Urban centers are taking international relations into their own hands. 
A security guard walks past a welcoming banner at Pristina International Airport prior to the arrival of the U.S. Vice President Joe Biden in Kosovo on May 21, 2009. (Armend Nimani/AFP/Getty Images)

America Is Wide Open for Foreign Influence

If you’re an outsider with a political agenda, there’s no better country to target than the United States.
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar at the White House on March 15, 2018. (Chris Kleponis-Pool/Getty Images)

Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster

Trump is mulling new auto tariffs that could send the global economy into a tailspin.

sexta-feira, 19 de abril de 2019

Um historiador da escravidao americana - David Brion Davis (Drew Gilpin Faust, NYRBooks)

The Scholar Who Shaped History


The Scholar Who Shaped History

Since the middle of the twentieth century, our understanding of the American past has been revolutionized, in no small part because of our altered conceptions of the place of race in the nation’s history. And that revolution has taken place largely because of a remarkable generation of historians who, inspired by the changing meanings of freedom and justice in their own time, began to ask new questions about the origins of the racial inequality that continued to permeate our segregated society nearly a century after slavery’s end.
Published in 1956, just two years after the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Boarddecision called for school integration, Kenneth Stampp’s pathbreaking The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South turned prevailing wisdom on its head. His history, written with a premise of fundamental black and white equality, yielded insights about slavery quite unlike the conclusions of earlier writings based on unquestioned assumptions of black inferiority. The leading early-twentieth-century historian of slavery, Ulrich B. Phillips, had portrayed a benevolent system designed to uplift and protect benighted Africans. Stampp, deeply affected by the emerging civil rights movement, painted a very different picture. With vivid archival detail, he demonstrated that slavery was harsh and exploitative of those who, he explained in words that rather startlingly reveal both the extent and limits of midcentury white liberalism, were after all “white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less.”
But the outpouring of research and writing about slavery in the years that followed went far beyond simply changing assumptions about race and human equality. It yielded as well an emerging recognition of the centrality of slavery in the American experience—not just in the South, but in northern society too, where it persisted in a number of states well into the nineteenth century. It also fundamentally shaped the national economy, which relied upon cotton as its largest export, and national politics, where slaveholding presidents governed for approximately two thirds of the years between the inaugurations of Washington and Lincoln.
At the same time, the burgeoning study of slavery was revolutionizing the practice of history by significantly expanding the kinds of sources scholars thought to employ in their effort to illuminate the elusive past. In order truly to understand slavery, it seemed imperative in the post–civil rights era to have a far richer understanding of the experience and perspectives of the slaves themselves. Yet by law throughout the South, slaves had been prohibited from reading and writing and thus prevented from leaving the written records on which history traditionally so largely depended.
In order to create the new history of slavery, scholars ventured into unaccustomed fields of research—demography, quantitative analysis, which came to be dubbed “cliometrics,” oral history, folklore, music, material culture, archaeology, and comparative history, to name a few. These modes of inquiry have now become staples in historical fields well beyond the study of America’s peculiar institution. In developing a new history for slavery over the past half-century, scholars have at the same time contributed to fundamentally changing the ways history is done, significantly expanding the kinds of remnants of the past that might be tapped as sources of historical understanding.
The new scholarship that placed slavery at the heart of American history and that recognized race as a central and enduring dimension of the American experience was the creation of prodigiously talented scholars who both argued and collaborated, at once learning from and disputing with one another, at times bringing especially vehement scholarly debates to prominent attention in the national media, to magazine covers and television talk shows. For me, a southern historian, a graduate student and assistant professor in the 1970s, it was a heady time, when history mattered so intensely to contemporary life and when brilliant scholars produced a stream of weighty volumes, each one of which required revised understanding and prompted—even mandated—new directions for research. They included such individuals as Kenneth Stampp, Stanley Elkins, Eugene Genovese, Herbert Gutman, John Hope Franklin, Lawrence Levine, Leon Litwack, John Blassingame, Orlando Patterson, Robert Fogel, and Stanley Engerman. And prominent among them, David Brion Davis. Davis did not focus his primary attention on the experience of slaves or the details of the institution of slavery, but about what he defined in the title of his influential Pulitzer Prize–winning 1966 book The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (PSWC): slavery as a problem and contradiction in human thought and human morality, not just in American history but across both world history and geography from the Greeks onward.
Davis’s book and his subsequent work would become a major influence in the emergence of a comparative history of slavery and abolition, in essence a global history well avant la lettre. It would, among other achievements, powerfully influence traditional approaches to intellectual history by embedding ideas in social and political action and institutions. This was historical writing with a scope and ambition that would shape scholars and scholarship for decades to come.
Now, in 2014, David Brion Davis, age eighty-six, has published the final volume in the trilogy he inaugurated with PSWC and continued with The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823 (PSAR) in 1975. In the years since, he also has written or edited twelve other books, and he has published in these pages a continuing account of slavery scholarship, contributing some three dozen essays since the 1970s. The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Emancipation, which he began in 1980, completes the trilogy and is, he writes, “the fulfillment of a career.” This career has produced not just extraordinary scholarship and numbers of graduate students who are now leading historians in their own right. Davis has also been dedicated to extending and disseminating a true understanding of the place of slavery in American history by founding and then leading the Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance, and Abolition at Yale and by offering a course on slavery for high school teachers each summer for nearly a decade.
Davis came somewhat indirectly to slavery studies. An undergraduate philosophy major at Dartmouth and then a graduate student in Harvard’s program in the History of American Civilization, he was interested in how ideas are refracted through real human problems in the everyday world. History, Davis believed, could serve as a “source for disciplined moral reflection.” In his dissertation and first book, the problem he chose to consider was homicide—how a human being can come to deny and obliterate the humanity of others. But his inquiry into the nature of dehumanization soon shifted its focus to the injustices of race and slavery that had been under increasing academic and public discussion in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Davis had himself experienced something of an epiphany on these issues during his military service at the end of World War II. A peripatetic childhood had taken him to five high schools across the North, yet he had never shared a classroom with an African-American. A training camp in Georgia introduced him to the injustices of southern segregation, but an incident on a troop ship carrying him to Germany at the very conclusion of the war made an even more forceful and lasting impression. Ordered to descend into the hold and enforce the prohibition against gambling among those quartered below deck, Davis discovered with dismay hundreds of black soldiers—whom he had not even known were on board—segregated in conditions he believed not unlike those of a slave ship. Davis’s experiences in the army introduced him to the realities of racial prejudice and cruelty that he had never imagined existed in America’s twentieth-century democracy. The shock of recognition rendered these impressions indelible, but it was a chance circumstance of his graduate school years that seems to have transformed them into a scholarly commitment.
In his time at Dartmouth and Harvard, slavery and race occupied almost no place in the curriculum. The work of the great scholar W.E.B. DuBois, for example, Harvard’s first black Ph.D., was not a part of the historical training offered by his own alma mater. But during Davis’s last spring in Cambridge, as he was finishing his dissertation, he encountered Kenneth Stampp, a visiting scholar on the verge of publishing The Peculiar Institution. Davis came to see that slavery and its abolition offered an extraordinary vehicle for examining how humans shape and are shaped by moral dilemmas and how their ideas come to influence the world.
Historians are interested in change, and the history of slavery provided Davis an instance of change in human perception of perhaps unparalleled dimensions and significance. Understanding and explaining that change became his life’s work. Why, he wondered, did slavery evoke essentially “no moral protest in a wide range of cultures for literally thousands of years”? And then, “what contributed to a profound shift in moral vision by the mid- to late eighteenth century, and to powerful Anglo-American abolitionist movements thereafter?”
PSWC launched Davis’s inquiry with a focus on the “problem” at the heart of the institution in all its appearances across time and space: “the essential contradiction in thinking of a man as a thing,” at once property and person, object and yet undeniably an agent capable even of rebelling against his bondage and destroying the master who would deny his agency. Grappling with this contradiction vexed every slave society, but only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did these inconsistencies begin to yield substantial opposition to the institution itself. After tracing the cultural heritage of these ideas from Plato and Aristotle, through the evolution of Christianity, into the thought of the Enlightenment and the seemingly paradoxical strengthening of both rationalist and evangelical impulses in the course of the eighteenth century, the first volume of Davis’s trilogy introduces the origins of modern antislavery thought.
In PSAR, Davis then explores the implications of this intellectual legacy and emerging antislavery consciousness in the social and political milieu that both enabled and circumscribed their impact. The second volume of Davis’s trilogy seeks to demonstrate the “points of intersection between ideals and social action” and succeeds in situating intellectual history in a world of action and consequence. It is hard to think of any scholar who has made a better case for the proposition that ideas matter and can even override power and wealth, as Davis makes clear in his oft-repeated point that emancipation ultimately triumphed even though slavery was in fact flourishing economically in the nineteenth-century world that abolished it.
During the three decades he worked on The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Emancipation, Davis altered its original plan as he took up parts of the story in other books, most notably in a study of the changing relationship of slavery to ideas of human progress and in a volume based on his lectures to high school teachers that chronicles the rise and fall of slavery in the New World. These projects have permitted him to craft PSAE as a “highly selective study” focused on abolitionism in Britain and the United States, while employing what he has characterized elsewhere as “a wide-angle lens” on bondage more broadly. Unlike its predecessor, PSAE does not include dates in its title, but the “Age” Davis discusses reaches from the 1780s and the post-Revolutionary emancipationist impulse in the United States to the 1880s and the abolition of slavery in Brazil.
Davis begins by introducing what he identifies as the “central theme” of the book: “dehumanization and its implications,” a theme that has indeed been central to his work since he was writing about homicide long ago. The debates over slavery in the era of the American Revolution, he had shown in the preceding volume of the trilogy, had left a perception of black “incapacity for freedom” as the fundamental justification for the perpetuation of slavery. These assumptions of black inferiority, variously characterized as innate in a discourse that allocated increasing importance to race, or acquired through the oppressions of the slave system itself, were held not only by whites. They deeply affected blacks as well, Davis writes, in a form of “psychological exploitation” that yielded “some black internalization and even pathology” but also “evoked black resistance.” As escaped slave and black abolitionist Henry H. Garnet described the “oppressors’ aim”: “They endeavor to make you as much like brutes as possible. When they have blinded the eyes of your mind,” then slavery has “done its perfect work.”
Davis’s emphasis on the centrality of dehumanization and his treatment of the internalizing of these notions of inferiority in a form of “black self-contempt” evoke historians’ bitter battles of the 1960s and 1970s over Stanley Elkins’s highly controversial portrait of “Sambo” as a model slave personality, a docile being whose psychological oppression had emasculated and infantilized him and left him without culture or community.
Objecting to such a characterization, a generation of historians set about to discover—successfully—evidence of black culture, community, family, creativity, and identity thriving within slavery. But Davis reminds us that cruelty and injustice necessarily take a powerful toll on their victims, and he cites numerous statements by nineteenth-century African-Americans—both slave and free—that acknowledge the withering and lingering effects of slavery on the heart and mind. A half-century beyond Elkins’s book and the controversy it generated, Davis asks us to embrace a more nuanced understanding of both the damage slavery inflicted on individuals and communities and the extraordinary resilience marshaled against it.
The force of these conceptions of black incapacity and their salience for the progress of emancipation lead Davis to explore how they were related to three realities that proved of critical importance for the coming of freedom: the influence of the Haitian Revolution, the movements for colonization and emigration, and the leadership and example of free blacks, who represented the “most killing refutation of slavery” and served as “the key to slave emancipation.”
When Davis began his study of the Age of Emancipation, he was struck by how little historical attention had been directed at the Haitian Revolution. His own writings have helped generate a level of scholarly interest in Haiti that has done much to mitigate that neglect. In this volume, Davis builds on that work to consider the ways Haiti influenced emancipationist efforts from the British Parliament’s 1792 consideration of outlawing the slave trade to Brazil’s abolition nearly a century later. Haiti was, in the words of Frederick Douglass, the “pioneer emancipator.” But, as Davis recounts, Haiti’s experience sent contradictory messages about the meanings of black freedom. Certainly the uprising demonstrated that slaves had not been so dehumanized as to lack the initiative and capacity to organize effective military forces and win independence. Yet at the same time, the violence and terror of the revolt reinforced white images of blacks as brutes.
In the short run, the Haitian Revolution “seriously damaged” the worldwide antislavery movement. But in the longer term, Haiti became the symbol of a polity and a society in which blacks could fully claim and exercise their freedom. In the eyes of free blacks, Haiti represented a harbinger of hope for universal emancipation in its demonstration that “bondage was not an inevitable or eternal fate.”
The obstacles that dehumanization of slaves posed for emancipation played out as well in the movements for colonization and migration that emerged in the early nineteenth century. Davis believes that colonization, the effort to free blacks and return them to Africa, has been poorly understood by modern historians, and he seeks to introduce a more complex view of its character and appeal. The founding of the American Colonization Society in 1816 was deeply influenced by fears that Haiti aroused about the potential for violence inherent in an oppressed black population, and Davis finds among colonization’s advocates the same preoccupation with the dehumanization of slaves that he identifies in discussions of the meanings of the Haitian Revolution.
Spokesmen for the American Colonization Society argued that removing blacks from the degradations of American slavery would enable them to prove their capacity for civilization and thus combat the prejudices that had grown up in response to slavery’s oppressions. White proponents of colonization, David argues, were genuinely perplexed about how to deal with racism and the conditions that had produced it. But their ideas were greeted with “vehement hostility” by free blacks who perceived the colonizationists’ purposes as racial removal rather than benevolent uplift, a conclusion encouraged by the racist remarks of such prominent advocates of colonization as Henry Clay, who called the free black population “a dangerous and useless part of the community.”
Yet some black leaders, such as Henry H. Garnet, proposed emigration schemes of their own, stressing Africa’s glorious past and envisioning an escape from white oppressions in a kind of proto–black nationalism. Davis underscores the “complex dynamic…between the white desire to expel and the black quest for independence.” But the bitter opposition of African-Americans, conveyed by publications like Samuel Cornish’s Freedom Journal, founded in 1827, and David Walker’s stirring 1829 Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World, characterized colonization as itself a new form of oppression and thwarted any alliance between the movement and committed antislavery forces.
By the early 1830s a new biracial mobilization for “immediate” emancipation of American slaves emerged with the establishment of William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator in 1831, with his “all-out attack” on colonization in 1832, and with the founding of the New England Anti-Slavery Society and the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1832 and 1833. Significantly, Davis points out, it was the financial support of free black Philadelphia merchant James Forten and a subscription list of which 75 percent were black readers that kept The Liberatoralive. And significantly, too, it was the accomplishments of the free black community, of men such as Forten, Douglass, and Walker, that best refuted the efforts to dehumanize their race.
The “free colored man’s elevation,” Frederick Douglass remarked, “is essential to the slave colored man’s emancipation.” The “first emancipation,” the wave of manumissions that followed the Revolution, together with the ending of slavery in the North, created a substantial free black community that became the core of the abolition movement. At the same time the lingering anomaly inherent in being at once black and free sharpened the contradiction between the prejudices of race and the new nation’s commitment to citizenship and equality.
In the repudiation of gradualism, Davis sees “a token of a major shift in intellectual history.” Garrison’s voice, as Forten observed, “operated like a trumpet call.” Although Garrison himself remained committed to pacifistic “moral suasion,” there emerged what Davis describes as a “very slow and gradual acceptance of violence,” encouraged by the outrages that followed the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850 and exemplified by the end of that decade in John Brown’s raid, which pointed the nation toward the violent end of slavery in the Civil War.
Davis, however, underscores the contingency of ultimate emancipation. The North could have decided not to fight; the South could have won—in which case, Davis believes, slavery would in all likelihood have continued into the twentieth century. Instead, the Emancipation Proclamation and, especially, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments established freedom and citizenship as the “culmination of the Age of Emancipation.”
Although the American Civil War ultimately proved the most significant instrument of liberation, Britain served throughout the Age of Emancipation as a “model” and “global leader,” combating the oceanic slave trade and freeing 800,000 slaves in its colonies. Its powerful abolition movement emerged in a different setting from that in the United States, however, and Davis uses the contrasts between them to illuminate each. With no slave population at home, British opposition to slavery did not stir up the kinds of fears of racial “amalgamation” and violence that challenged the American antislavery movement. The persistence of class hierarchies in Britain and its colonies made race seem a somewhat less necessary form of social division and order. Gradations of power and status contrasted with the starker American dichotomy of slave and free sustained by the boundaries of racism and legal bondage.
In both Britain and the United States, however, antislavery forces helped create the conditions for an emancipation that was, as Davis describes it, “astonishing…. Astonishing in view of the institution’s antiquity…, resilience, and importance.” Hailing this example of human beings acting so decisively against both habit and self-interest, Davis proclaims abolition to be “the greatest landmark of willed moral progress in human history.”
David Brion Davis has spent a lifetime contemplating the worst of humanity and the best of humanity—the terrible cruelty and injustice of slavery, perpetuated over centuries and across borders and oceans, overturned at last because of ideas and ideals given substance through human action and human agency. He concludes his trilogy by contemplating whether the abolition of slavery might serve as precedent or model for other acts of moral grandeur. His optimism is guarded. “Many humans still love to kill, torture, oppress, and dominate.” Davis does, after all, describe the narrative of emancipation to which he has devoted his professional life as “astonishing.” But even in his amazement, he has written an inspiring story of possibility. “An astonishing historical achievement really matters.” And so does its history.
Letters

segunda-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2019

Os piores inimigos dos livros: os intelectuais - Fernando Baez (resenha de Jeronimo Teixeira)

Sempre amigo dos livros, e relutante em desfazer-me de meus milhares de amigos – não tenho a menor ideia de quantos são, pois eles se espalham em meu apartamento e, sobretudo, numa kit-biblioteca, mantida especialmente com essa finalidade –, sou suspeito para falar da eliminação de livros.
Não sei como – ou melhor, sei, foi escrevendo um artigo sobre os "intelectuais" – acabei caindo nesta antiga resenha de um jornalista da Veja, que fala sobre a destruição de bibliotecas inteiras.
De ordinário sou pacífico, mas acho que eu seria capaz de esganar quem dá ordens de eliminar livros...
Leiam.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 11 de fevereiro de 2019

Recomendação: A História universal da destruição dos livros
Este artigo foi publicado originalmente em Veja On-line no dia 31/05/2006.
Autor: Jerônimo Teixeira

Os livros são objetos frágeis. Suscetíveis a diversas ameaças naturais – traças, inundações, incêndios –, têm de enfrentar ainda as mais destrutivas paixões humanas: o fanatismo religioso e a censura ideológica. História Universal da Destruição dos Livros (tradução de Léo Schlafman; Ediouro; 438 páginas; 49,90 reais), do ensaísta venezuelano Fernando Báez, é um assustador painel histórico da eliminação de bibliotecas. São documentados cinco milênios do que Báez chama de "memoricídio". Nunca houve uma época histórica sem alguma forma de perseguição aos livros (e, por extensão, a seus autores). Mais perturbador é constatar que não são só os brutos e ignorantes que acendem as fogueiras. O típico biblioclasta (destruidor de livros), pelo contrário, é um erudito que conhece em profundidade determinada tradição religiosa ou ideológica – e que por isso mesmo deseja banir qualquer dissidência. Até mesmo Platão teria destruído, segundo testemunhos, a obra de filósofos rivais. 
"Os maiores inimigos dos livros são intelectuais", disse Báez a VEJA.
Especialista na conservação de bibliotecas, Báez trabalha como consultor de órgãos como a Unesco. Sua História Universal é um exaustivo inventário da destruição cultural. O trajeto histórico do livro começa no que hoje é o Iraque. Foi naquela região que apareceram as primeiras evidências da escrita, em tabletas de argila produzidas pelos sumérios, há cerca de 5.000 anos. Sítios arqueológicos da época já revelaram tabletas destruídas e queimadas, como resultado de ações de guerra. A mais célebre biblioteca da Antiguidade, na cidade egípcia de Alexandria, também acabou destruída. Fundada em III a.C., essa biblioteca foi provavelmente o maior acervo de livros do mundo antigo. A causa de seu desaparecimento definitivo ainda é matéria de controvérsia entre historiadores.
O patriarca cristão Teófilo provavelmente foi responsável pela destruição de um anexo da biblioteca de Alexandria, no século IV. A religião sempre foi uma das principais motivações dos biblioclastas. Durante a Contra-Reforma, o rigor da Inquisição foi tal que até Bíblias em língua corrente eram queimadas, pois a Igreja Católica só admitia o livro sagrado em latim. O fanatismo político tem tanto poder destrutivo quanto o religioso. No século XX, não há imagem mais simbólica do obscurantismo biblioclasta do que as fogueiras de livros na Alemanha, em 1933 – um prelúdio sinistro do genocídio que os nazistas promoveriam na Europa. Joseph Goebbels, ministro da Propaganda nazista e mentor ideológico da destruição, estudou filologia na Universidade de Heidelberg. O livro de Báez registra outras ironias do mesmo naipe – como, por exemplo, a censura e a queima de livros promovidas na China comunista por um movimento que se intitulava Revolução Cultural.
História Universal encerra-se com um capítulo sobre a Guerra do Iraque. Báez fez parte de uma comissão de especialistas que visitou o país pouco depois da invasão americana, em 2003, para aferir os danos causados ao patrimônio cultural iraquiano. Seu relato é desolador: museus, bibliotecas, sítios arqueológicos arrasados. Os danos começaram com os bombardeios, mas a devastação maior se deu quando os primeiros combates cessaram. Turbas enfurecidas saquearam e queimaram a Biblioteca Nacional e o Museu Arqueológico de Bagdá. Foi uma reação de revanche: a população identificava as instituições culturais com o regime deposto de Saddam Hussein, que nomeava seus diretores. O Exército americano omitiu-se vergonhosamente de defender um acervo de importância universal – o Iraque concentra peças de numerosas civilizações antigas, como os sumérios, babilônios e assírios. Contrabandeados para fora do país, livros raros e peças arqueológicas alimentaram o mercado negro internacional. Da Biblioteca Nacional sumiram edições antigas das Mil e Uma Noites. Do museu, foram roubadas algumas tabletas de argila sumérias que estariam entre os primeiros livros da história. É outra melancólica ironia: o primeiro grande "memoricídio" do século XXI aconteceu no lugar onde nasceu a palavra escrita.


sábado, 26 de janeiro de 2019

Juca Paranhos, o barao - resenha do livro L. C. Villafane por Roberto Pompeu de Toledo


Uma fábula
Roberto Pompeu de Toledo
VEJA, 30 de janeiro de 2019, edição nº 2619

Em 17 de abril de 1910 entrou festivamente na Baía de Guanabara, vindo dos estaleiros da Inglaterra, o encouraçado Minas Gerais, navio da classe dreadnought, o que havia de mais avançado na época, e sua chegada desencadeou uma onda de patriotismo. Para o jornal O País, o “vulto de aço” da embarcação simbolizava “o Brasil novo, opulento e poderoso que vai na rota de progresso e civilização”. Para a Gazeta de Notícias, incumbiria ao Minas Gerais, “pedaço flutuante da pátria”, levar pelos mares “a força afirmativa da nossa cultura, da nossa grandeza e da nossa civilização”. Contada no recém-lançado Juca Paranhos, o Barão do Rio Branco, exemplar biografia do patrono da diplomacia brasileira escrita por Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos, a história iniciada com a chegada da portentosa embarcação desdobra-se em dois atos e encerra-se como uma fábula.
A causa do reaparelhamento da Marinha brasileira teve em Rio Branco seu mais ardente defensor. A seu ver, tratava-se de contraponto indispensável ao laborioso quebra-cabeça com que negociava nossas fronteiras e toureava as rivalidades e desconfianças com os vizinhos. O governo brasileiro decidiu jogar alto, e optou por encomendar logo três dreadnoughts, a nova maravilha dos mares, lançada em 1906 pela Inglaterra. Em especial, naqueles anos, preocupavam a superioridade militar da Argentina e as pretensões do Peru a nacos do território brasileiro. Por questão de custo, a encomenda foi reduzida a dois, mas ainda assim causava furor. À chegada do Minas Gerais, o primeiro deles, as celebrações incluíram uma canção que aproveitava a melodia da italiana Vieni sul Mar, para honrar o navio com o estribilho, “Oh, Minas Gerais”. (Com letra modificada, em anos posteriores a canção passaria a celebrar o Estado de Minas Gerais.)
O segundo dreadnought, batizado São Paulo, chegou em outubro, bem a tempo de ser incluído no elenco no ato 2 da nossa fábula. Em 22 de novembro, aproveitando-se da ausência do comandante, João Batista das Neves, que saíra para jantar num navio francês em visita ao Rio, a tripulação do Minas Gerais apoderou-se do navio. Ao voltar a bordo, Neves foi saudado aos gritos de “Abaixo a chibata” e morto ao tentar uma reação.
Os navios iam e vinham, exibindo as bandeiras vermelhas da insurgência
   
A insubordinação dos marinheiros, remoída por anos, explodira ao impacto das 250 chibatadas aplicadas na antevéspera a um companheiro. A Revolta da Chibata espalhou-se por outros cinco navios estacionados na Baía de Guanabara. A fina flor da Armada brasileira passara às mãos da chucra marujada, sob o comando de João Cândido, o “Almirante Negro”, como seria apelidado.
Que fazer? Os navios iam e vinham nas águas da baía exibindo as bandeiras vermelhas da insurgência. O governo manteve-se pasmo e paralisado até o dia 25, quando se decidiu pelo ataque aos rebeldes. “Rio Branco se desesperou”, escreve Villafañe Santos. “Assustava-o a perspectiva de ver os principais navios da Armada brasileira destruídos e, em consequência, o Brasil, outra vez, em total inferioridade de meios militares frente a seus vizinhos.” O chanceler chegou a procurar o oficial encarregado do ataque, na tentativa de dissuadi-lo. Afinal, o destino inglório de ver os dreadnoughts, tinindo de novos, arrasados pelas próprias forças a que deviam integrar-se foi evitado depois de negociações no Congresso que incluíram, no dia 26, a promessa de anistia aos revoltosos.
A promessa não foi cumprida. Dois dias depois a repressão já começava a baixar sem piedade contra os amotinados — mas essa é outra história. Interessa-nos o contraste entre o sonho de potência de abril de 1910, à chegada do Minas Gerais, e a realidade de uma Marinha que tratava os marujos a chibatadas, exposta em novembro. “O episódio conta muito sobre a ilusão de modernidade e prosperidade de um país no qual pouco mais de um par de décadas antes a posse de outros seres humanos era legalizada e cuja economia se baseava na exportação de uns poucos produtos agrícolas”, escreve o autor do livro. A frustração bateu forte em Rio Branco. Um contemporâneo, Carlos de Laet, data daí a decadência física que o levaria à morte, um ano e dois meses depois.
Outras histórias oferecem morais já prontas à fábula que poderia ter por título “O dreadnought e a chibata”. O rei estava nu, caberia dizer, ou: o ídolo tinha pés de barro. Formulemos a nossa própria moral. Brincar de “Brasil novo, opulento e poderoso”, orgulhoso “da nossa cultura, da nossa grandeza e da nossa civilização” (para repetir os arroubos ufanistas na chegada do Minas Gerais), só vale quando se traz o povo junto.
Publicado em VEJA de 30 de janeiro de 2019, edição nº 2619