O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

quarta-feira, 28 de dezembro de 2011

Piratas ingleses em nossas praias (antigamente) - Economist


Early colonial adventures

Pirate, colonist, slave

The admirable adventures and strange fortunes of Master Anthony Knivet

ONE cold morning in 1591 an English sailor found himself shivering on Ilhabella, now an island of yacht clubs and well-appointed weekend houses that is to Brazil what Martha’s Vineyard is to America. He had been left for dead—again—the fourth or fifth time Fate had deserted him in his short career as a pirate. He survived for eight days by catching crabs in his stockings and cooking them over a fire, and then for a further two weeks by picking at the carcass of a beached whale.
He was naked, alone but for the savages who lurked inland and a man-eating dragon he had spotted in the shallows, and far from Virginia, where England would subsequently found a colony: here was a man in the wrong hemisphere at the wrong time. Yet painful as they were to him, Anthony Knivet’s misfortunes offer a fascinating, if mostly overlooked, insight into an early stage of colonialism. Unusually, Knivet was both an exponent and a victim of it. He experienced both the thrill and enchantment of contact with remote tribes and the brutality of enslavement. And he recorded all that (with the odd embellishment) in his memoir.
Brazil at the end of the 16th century was an inhospitable place. Its original inhabitants, who had first encountered the Portuguese in 1500 when a group of sailors landed and claimed the territory for their king, were coming to the conclusion that their new neighbours made unreliable allies in intertribal wars. Even more offputtingly, the European newcomers spread smallpox, which proved fatal to people who had not had their immune systems tested by centuries of living with children and other animals under the same roofs.
For their part, the Portuguese colonists—disappointed that the instant riches promised by the new world had proved elusive—were knuckling down to the hard work of oppressing the natives, forcing them to work in sugar mills. A majority of their settlements had failed, and in some cases Portuguese leaders had been cornered and ritually executed (the first bishop of Brazil must have tasted particularly sweet to the Caeté tribesmen who ate him in 1556). The memory of the very first encounter between Europeans and Indians, at which the two groups exchanged hats and waved their arms around to communicate, had faded.
To add to the problems of the Portuguese living in Brazil, the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns under Philip II made them a legitimate target for English privateers such as Sir Thomas Cavendish, the commander of the small flotilla of five ships that transported our hero to Brazil. Cavendish had already sailed around the world, crossing the Atlantic, passing through the Strait of Magellan at the tip of South America and then working his way through the Pacific, round the Cape of Good Hope and back to Plymouth. This success, which brought him fame and a knighthood, must have raised the expectations of Knivet and the other sailors on his expedition. Cavendish’s last crew had set off from England wearing wool and leather and returned dressed in Asian silks.
The voyage of 1591 started well enough. The boats sailed down to Portugal and on to the Canary Islands, then considered the easiest point of departure for a transatlantic crossing. Heading farther south they stalled in the doldrums—a zone close to the equator that can becalm ships and rattle aircraft—for nearly a month, before a sturdy wind carried them to Brazil in 20 days.
On making landfall the sailors began to fight each other over food. Knivet reports that when one man got hold of a good chunk of meat he would drag it off to a hole or to “the Wildernesse under some Trees”, and stay there until there was nothing left but bones. The long crossing, the distance from home, and the scarcity of comforts for men who must have spent the previous weeks dreaming of plenty, had eroded the conventions of polite society in just under two months.
Captivity and compassion
Their stomachs filled, the English plotted their first raid on a Portuguese settlement. The port of Santos—now Brazil’s biggest and home to a celebrated football team, whose black and white shirt was made famous by Pelé—was then a village with a collection of sugar mills attached. Knivet and his comrades waited for the church bell to ring for mass, then rushed ashore. They rounded up some 300 men, women and children in church and took temporary control of the place. Their stocks replenished and some sugar mills destroyed, they moved on to the town of São Vicente, burning mills as they went.
At this point a problem familiar to invaders of many lands, past and present, reared its head. The party was big enough to terrorise and capture some Portuguese settlements, but too small to hold on to them. The English returned to their ships at Santos and set off towards the Plata river, on whose banks Buenos Aires now sits. The Plata is navigable for hundreds of miles and would therefore allow Cavendish and his ships to explore inland, and perhaps find some of the gold and silver that always seemed to lie beyond the next set of hills.
A storm blew up and two of the ships collided. The weather was freezing; Knivet reports getting frostbite and twice almost being flung overboard by powerful waves. Their rigs shredded, the remaining boats limped back to Santos. This time the Portuguese were not in church. The Englishmen who went ashore in search of food were killed. Knivet, who stayed on board, escaped only to be shipwrecked again, and to begin his diet of crab and whale meat in solitary confinement on the beach.
With no prospect of returning home he could either surrender to the Portuguese—who might or might not execute him—or try his luck with the Indians. Sleeping by a fire one night, before he had made his choice, Knivet woke to find a tribesman by his side. This Indian led him along the beach to a headland, which the two of them rounded with Knivet, who could not swim, clinging to the man’s back like a child in a swimming pool. Once back on land, the Indian whistled to his companions, who appeared on the cliff top. There was a Portuguese too, the master of the man Knivet thought was rescuing him. He spared Knivet’s life, but sent him to work as a slave at a sugar mill in Rio de Janeiro.
Sugar was to Portuguese Brazil as gold and silver were to the Spanish in Mexico and the Andes, or as tobacco would later be to the English in Virginia. An earlier generation of Portuguese colonists had refined a system of forced labour to grow cash crops on the islands of São Tomé and Madeira. This model was replicated in Brazil, initially with Indians providing the labour in place of the Africans who had performed the role in the earlier experiments. Later it would spread to the Caribbean, and from there to the American South.
Turning a field of sugar cane into the granules that sweeten hot drinks is hard work. The cane, which must be cut back-strainingly close to the ground, contains sharp fibres that lacerate ungloved hands. Once the field is cleared the stubs of cane are burned, giving off a thick black smoke that hangs over the land. The cane must be crushed and its juices boiled until all that is left is a dense syrup, which can then be refined into sugar. Most of the slaves who did this work have left no written trace of their activities, so Knivet’s descriptions of the life of a mill worker are interesting. “I had neither meat nor clothes,” he reports, “but blows as many as Galley slaves.”
Passed from one master to a second, Knivet was eventually trusted to trade with the local Tupi-speaking Indian tribes. The story of first contacts between such tribes and the Portuguese was one of desire for metal tools trumping well-founded suspicion of white men. These exchanges were invariably the prelude to full-scale conquest, as co-operation between Indians and colonists broke down and conflict, slavery and land clearances ensued. In the first century of Portuguese colonisation, perhaps 90% of Brazil’s original population of some 5m Indians (according to the best guess) was wiped out through disease and warfare. Knivet would have taken some tools with him, along with other trinkets, and was expected to come back with slaves.
His first expedition took him to a village where he was ushered into a great hall and told to sit in a hammock. (In the 20th century, before such contact was frowned upon, anthropologists went into remote Indian villages and filmed similar halls: the roofs were made from finely woven palm fronds held up by poles, the floors covered in smooth red earth.) After some time waiting in his “net”, 20 women appeared, wailing. An elderly chief, his body painted red and black, followed. His cheeks and lower lip were pierced and ornamented with a “faire green stone”. He beat his thigh and chest and cried out. Then food was produced.
It is hard to know what to make of this ceremony, though it is possible that it marked the adoption of Knivet into the tribe, rather like the ritual performed by the Powhatans and misunderstood by Captain John Smith in Virginia a few decades later. If so, his affiliation proved temporary; he returned to Rio with around 70 slaves in tow.
The life of a slave trader was less grim than a mill worker’s, but Knivet was still a thousand leagues from Plymouth and as far as ever from making his fortune. When he heard that Richard Hawkins, son of Sir John Hawkins, an early slave trader and architect of the Elizabethan navy, was nearby, he tried to escape and join the ship. But Knivet’s small boat was dashed on the rocks and he was soon recaptured.
This time his punishment was harsher. Initially condemned to death “as a Runaway and a Lutheran”, his life was spared thanks to the intercession of Jesuit priests.
Neither meat nor clothes, but blows as many as Galley slaves
The Jesuits, who were also early colonists in Brazil, had a tense relationship with the Portuguese planters, who disapproved of the monks’ habit of herding potential Indian slaves into mission towns for the salvation of their souls. Spared death, Knivet was whipped in public, imprisoned and then sent back to a sugar mill with iron hoops tied around his legs lest he try to escape again.

Close encounters
The manager of this mill beat Knivet repeatedly. “I grew desperate and carelesse what I did to end my life,” he writes. One cold night he fell asleep for half an hour by the furnace used to boil the juice from the sugar cane. The manager beat him so hard that Knivet thought his ribs were broken. He leapt up, grasped his master close, and with a knife that he had been carrying for the purpose “hurt him in the side, the backe, and the arme”. Convinced that he had killed the man (he hadn’t), and by now freed from the leg irons, he ran off into the forest.
Pursued by his captors, Knivet recounts that he hid in a tree for two days. Wandering alone along a beach once more, he met another man who had run away from his master, an Indian called Quarisisacupa. “Never man found truer friendship of any then I did of him,” he writes. Together they wandered inland, a journey through a wilderness supposedly populated by leopards (this is plausible, as jaguars do live in Brazil), lions (which do not), crocodiles (just about possible), sirurucus (a large, venomous cobra that now faces extinction) and other serpents.
The lion, like the dragon in the shallows off Ilhabella, might have been an irresistible invention by a writer whose audience would have expected travellers to the new world to come back with tales of exotic beasts. Or perhaps it was a hallucination—or merely a case of misidentification by someone who had never seen one before. In any case, the beast is a rare impostor in a story that otherwise fits with other contemporary accounts, even if no other witnesses to Knivet’s own wanderings have left anything by way of corroboration. Some other early writers about Brazil were far more imaginative: despite never actually existing, a fierce tribe of female warriors were reported so often that they have a giant river named after them (the Amazon).
Knivet and Quarisisacupa made their way back to the Indian village where he had been welcomed before and found the same chief in charge. They stayed for nine months, one of the longest sojourns by an outsider with a Brazilian tribe until the invention of anthropologists. Knivet gives frustratingly few details of what life was like, though it is clear he enjoyed himself enough to want to stay. At one point he made a speech to the tribesmen, denouncing the Portuguese for their cruelty and duplicity, and imploring them, like a tropical Henry V, to join him in battle against them.
When the Portuguese did come, to trade rather than fight, their knives and axes again proved too shiny to resist. This time Knivet was one of the goods traded in return for tools, despite entreating the Portuguese commander “to give me leave to end my life amongst the Cannibals”.
Bloudie crueltie and Heathen mercy
Knivet was pressed into service once more as a slave-gatherer. It might seem odd that someone who compared “the bloudie crueltie of Christian Portugals” unfavourably with “the Heathen mercy of savage Man-eaters” should use his understanding of tribal customs and languages to boost Brazil’s sugar production so barbarically. But slavery was part of the furniture of European minds until well into the 18th century; and besides, he must have had little choice in the matter.
This work took him farther afield, where he encountered stranger tribes: “when I saw them first,” he writes of one group, “I thought they had beene borne with feathers on their heads and bodies, like fowles of the aire”. Knivet drew on these adventures to write one of the earliest contributions to the ethnography of the continent, which forms an annex to his brief memoir.
He did eventually make it back to England, though not before another failed escape had taken him across the Atlantic, to Portuguese Angola, and back again. What became of him after his homecoming is unclear. But the story he wrote was published by Richard Hakluyt, a director of the Virginia Company and enthusiastic lobbyist for empire, in 1625. It has been oddly neglected by English-speaking historians: at the time of writing Knivet has no Wikipedia entry in English, a sure sign of obscurity.
His voyages belong to the first age of globalisation, before the success of colonial ventures seemed guaranteed, and before the borders drawn by European expansion hardened into the familiar form they have today. Knivet moved easily between the worlds of the Portuguese and the Indians: he greatly preferred the latter. His compassion for them and horror at their treatment forms part of a thin but tough thread of sympathy running through the colonisation of the Americas—from the sermon given on Hispaniola by Antonio de Montesinos in 1511, to Montaigne’s essay “On The Cannibals” in 1580, through to the movements to abolish slavery and, some would add, to modern conceptions of human rights.
Knivet’s tale offers a glimpse of how a different history—collaborative rather than repressive—might have unfolded. The timing of its publication makes it probable that some of the Puritans who took part in the Great Migration of the 1630s would have read it before they set out. If so, they might well have expected to make a better job of relations with the natives than had the horrid Portuguese Catholics. They didn’t.

Grandes corporacoes: para o bem e para o mal - Economist


The East India Company

The Company that ruled the waves

As state-backed firms once again become forces in global business, we ask what they can learn from the greatest of them all

A POPULAR parlour game among historians is debating when the modern world began. Was it when Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press, in 1440? Or when Christopher Columbus discovered America, in 1492? Or when Martin Luther published his 95 theses, in 1517? All popular choices. But there is a strong case to be made for a less conventional answer: the modern world began on a freezing New Year’s Eve, in 1600, when Elizabeth I granted a company of 218 merchants a monopoly of trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope.
The East India Company foreshadowed the modern world in all sorts of striking ways. It was one of the first companies to offer limited liability to its shareholders. It laid the foundations of the British empire. It spawned Company Man. And—particularly relevant at the moment—it was the first state-backed company to make its mark on the world.
Twenty years ago, as the state abandoned the commanding heights of the economy in the name of privatisation and deregulation, it looked as if these public-private hybrids were doomed. Today they are flourishing in the emerging world’s dynamic economies and striding out onto the global stage.
State-controlled companies account for 80% of the market capitalisation of the Chinese stockmarket, more than 60% of Russia’s, and 35% of Brazil’s. They make up 19 of the world’s 100 biggest multinational companies and 28 of the top 100 among emerging markets. World-class state companies can be found in almost every industry. China Mobile serves 600m customers. Saudi Arabia’s SABIC is one of the world’s most profitable chemical companies. Emirates airlines is growing at 20% a year. Thirteen of the world’s biggest oil companies are state-controlled. So is the world’s biggest natural-gas company, Gazprom.
State-owned companies will continue to thrive. The emerging markets that they prosper in are expected to grow at 5.5% a year compared with the rich world’s 1.6%, and the model is increasingly popular. The Chinese and Russian governments are leading a fashion for using the state’s power to produce national champions in a growing range of “strategic” industries.
The parallels between the East India Company and today’s state-owned firms are not exact, to be sure. The East India Company controlled a standing army of some 200,000 men, more than most European states. None of today’s state-owned companies has yet gone this far, though the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has employed former People’s Liberation Army troops to protect oil wells in Sudan. The British government did not own shares in the Company (though prominent courtiers and politicians certainly did). Today’s state-capitalist governments hold huge blocks of shares in their favourite companies.
Otherwise the similarities are striking. Both the Company and its modern descendants serve two masters, keeping one eye on their share price and the other on their political patrons. Many of today’s state-owned companies are monopolies or quasi-monopolies: Brazil’s Petrobras, China Mobile, China State Construction Engineering Corporation and Mexico’s Federal Electricity Commission, to name but a few of the mongrel giants that bestride the business world these days. Many are enthusiastic globalisers, venturing abroad partly as moneymaking organisations and partly as quasi-official agents of their home governments. Many are keen not only on getting their government to provide them with soft loans and diplomatic muscle but also on building infrastructure—roads, hospitals and schools—in return for guaranteed access to raw materials. Although the East India Company flourished a very long time ago, in a very different world, its growth, longevity and demise have lessons for those who run today’s state companies and debate their future, lessons about the benefits of linking a company’s interests to a nation’s and the dangers of doing so.
The gifts of government
One of the benefits the Company derived from its relations with the state was limited liability. Before the rise of state-backed companies, businesses had imposed unlimited liability on their investors. If things went wrong, creditors could come after them for everything they possessed, down to their cufflinks, and have them imprisoned if they failed to pay. Some firms had already been granted limited liability, and the Company’s officers persuaded Queen Elizabeth that it should be given this handy status too.
A second benefit of state backing was monopoly. In the 17th century, round-the-world voyages were rather like space missions today. They involved huge upfront costs and huge risks. Monopoly provided at least a modicum of security. The third benefit was military might. The Company’s Dutch and Portuguese competitors could all call on the power of their respective navies. The English needed to do likewise in order to unlock investors’ purses.
Still, getting into bed with the government was risky for the Company. It meant getting close to courtiers who wanted to extract revenue from it and exposing itself to politicians who wanted to rewrite its charter. The Whig revolutionaries who deposed James II in 1688 briefly promoted a competing outfit that the Company first fought and eventually absorbed. Rival merchants lobbied courtiers to undermine its monopoly. But for the most part it dealt with these political problems brilliantly. Indeed its most valuable skill—its “core competence” in the phrase beloved of management theorists—was less its ability to arrange long-distance voyages to India and beyond than its ability to manage the politicians back home.
The Company created a powerful East India lobby in Parliament, a caucus of MPs who had either directly or indirectly profited from its business and who constituted, in Edmund Burke’s opinion, one of the most united and formidable forces in British politics. It also made regular gifts to the Court: “All who could help or hurt at Court,” wrote Lord Macaulay, “ministers, mistresses, priests, were kept in good humour by presents of shawls and silks, birds’ nests and attar of roses, bulses of diamonds and bags of guineas.” It also made timely gifts to the Treasury whenever the state faced bankruptcy. In short, it acted as what George Dempster, a stockholder, called a “great money engine of state”.
The Company was just as adept at playing politics abroad. It distributed bribes liberally: the merchants offered to provide an English virgin for the Sultan of Achin’s harem, for example, before James I intervened. And where it could not bribe it bullied, using soldiers paid for by Indian taxes to duff up recalcitrant rulers. Yet it recognised that its most powerful bargaining chip, both home and abroad, was its ability to provide temporarily embarrassed rulers with the money they needed to pay their bills. In an era when governments lacked the resources of the modern tax-and-spend state, the state-backed company was a backstop against bankruptcy.
State-backed monopolies are apt to run to fat and lose their animal spirits. The Company was a model of economy and austerity that modern managers would do well to emulate. For the first 20 years of its life it operated out of the home of its governor, Sir Thomas Smythe. Even when it had become the world’s greatest commercial operation it remained remarkably lean. It ruled millions of people from a tiny headquarters, staffed by 159 in 1785 and 241 in 1813. Its managers reiterated the importance of frugality, economy and simplicity with a metronomic frequency, and imposed periodic bouts of austerity: in 1816, for example, they turned Saturday from a half to a full working day and abolished the staff’s annual turtle feast.
The Company’s success in preserving its animal spirits owed more to necessity than to cunning. In a world in which letters could take two years to travel to and fro and in which the minions knew infinitely more about what was going on than did their masters, efforts at micromanagement were largely futile.
Adam Smith denounced the Company as a bloodstained monopoly: “burdensome”, “useless” and responsible for grotesque massacres in Bengal
The Company improvised a version of what Tom Peters, a management guru, has dubbed “tight-loose management”. It forced its employees to post a large bond in case they went off the rails, and bombarded them with detailed instructions about things like the precise stiffness of packaging. But it also leavened control with freedom. Employees were allowed not only to choose how to fulfil their orders, but also to trade on their own account. This ensured that the Company was not one but two organisations: a hierarchy with its centre of gravity in London and a franchise of independent entrepreneurs with innumerable centres of gravity scattered across the east. Many Company men did extremely well out of this “tight-loose” arrangement, turning themselves into nabobs, as the new rich of the era were called, and scattering McMansions across rural England.
Money and meritocracy
The Company repaid the state not just in taxes and tariffs, but also in ideas. It was one of the 18th and 19th centuries’ great innovators in the art of governing—more innovative by some way than the British government, not to mention its continental rivals, and outgunned only by the former colonies of America. The Company pioneered the art of government by writing and government by record, to paraphrase Burke. Its dispatches to and from India for the 15 years after 1814 fill 12,414 leather-bound volumes. It created Britain’s largest cadre of civil servants, a term it invented.
State-backed enterprises risk getting stuffed with powerful politicians’ half-witted nephews. The Company not only avoided this but also, in an age when power and money were both largely inherited, it pioneered appointment by merit. It offered positions to all-comers on the basis of exam performance. It recruited some of the country’s leading intellectuals, such as Edward Strachey, Thomas Love Peacock and both James and John Stuart Mill—the latter starting, at the age of 17, in the department that corresponded with the central administration in India, and rising, as his father had, to head it, on the eve of the Company’s extinction.
The Company also established a feeder college—Haileybury—so that it could recruit bright schoolboys and train them to flourish in, and run, India. These high-minded civil servants both prolonged the Company’s life when Victorian opinion was turning ever more strongly against it and also provided a model for the Indian and domestic civil service.
The Company liked to think of itself as having the best of both private and public worlds—the excitement and rewards of commercial life, on the one hand, and the dignity and security of an arm of the state on the other. But the best of both worlds can easily turn into the worst.
The perils of imperialisation
In the end, it was not rapacious politicians who killed the Company, but the greed and power of its managers and shareholders. In 1757 Sir Robert Clive won the battle of Plassey and delivered the government of Bengal to the Company. This produced a guaranteed income from Bengal’s taxpayers, but it also dragged the Company ever deeper into the business of government. The Company continued to flourish as a commercial enterprise in China and the Far East. But its overall character was increasingly determined by its administrative obligations in India. Revenue replaced commerce as the Company’s first concern. Tax rolls replaced business ledgers. Arsenals replaced warehouses. C.N. Parkinson summarised how far it had strayed, by 1800, from its commercial purpose: “How was the East India Company controlled? By the government. What was its object? To collect taxes. How was its object attained? By means of a standing army. What were its employees? Soldiers, mostly; the rest, Civil Servants.”
Sir Robert Clive with wife, daughter and local help
The Company’s growing involvement in politics infuriated its mighty army of critics still further. How could it justify having a monopoly of trade as well as the right to tax the citizens of India? And how could a commercial organisation justify ruling 90m Indians, controlling 70m acres (243,000 square kilometres) of land, issuing its own coins, complete with the Company crest, and supporting an army of 200,000 men, all of which the East India Company did by 1800? Adam Smith denounced the Company as a bloodstained monopoly: “burdensome”, “useless” and responsible for grotesque massacres in Bengal. Anti-Company opinion hardened further in 1770 when a famine wiped out a third of the population of Bengal, reducing local productivity, depressing the Company’s business and eventually forcing it to go cap in hand to the British government to avoid bankruptcy.
The government subjected the Company to ever-tighter supervision, partly because it resented bailing it out, partly because it was troubled by the argument that a company had no business in running a continent. Supervision inexorably led to regulation and regulation to nationalisation (or imperialisation). In 1784 the government established a board to direct the Company’s directors. In 1813 it removed its monopoly of trade with India. In 1833 it removed its monopoly of trade with China and banned it from trading in India entirely. In 1858, the year after the Indian mutiny vindicated the Company’s critics, the government took over all administrative duties in India. The Company’s headquarters in London, East India House, was demolished in 1862. It paid its last dividend in 1873 and was finally put out of its misery in 1874. Thus an organisation that had been given life by the state was eventually extinguished by it.
A dangerous connection
Ever since its ignominious collapse the Company has been treated as an historical curiosity—an “anomaly without a parallel in the history of the world”, as one commentator put it in 1858, a push-me pull-you the like of which the world would never see again. But these days similarly strange creatures are popping up everywhere. The East India Company is being transformed from an historical curiosity into a highly relevant case study.
The Company’s history shows that liberals may be far too pessimistic (if that is the right word) about the ability of state monopolies to remain healthy. The Company lasted for far longer than most private companies precisely because it had two patrons to choose from—prospering from trade in good times and turning to the government for help in bad ones. It also showed that it is quite possible to rely on the government for support while at the same time remaining relatively lean and inventive.
But the Company’s history also shows that mercantilists may be far too optimistic about state companies’ ability to avoid being corrupted by politics. The merchants who ran the East India Company repeatedly emphasised that they had no intention of ruling India. They were men of business who only dabbled in politics out of necessity. Nevertheless, as rival state companies tried to muscle in on their business and local princelings turned out to be either incompetent or recalcitrant, they ended up taking huge swathes of the emerging world under their direct control, all in the name of commerce.
The Chinese state-owned companies that are causing such a stir everywhere from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (where they account for some of the biggest recent flotations) to the dodgiest parts of Sudan (where they are some of the few business organisations brave enough to tread) are no different from their East Indian forebears. They say that they are only in business for the sake of business. They dismiss their political connections as a mere bagatelle. The history of the East India Company suggests that it won’t work out that way.