O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Meus livros podem ser vistos nas páginas da Amazon. Outras opiniões rápidas podem ser encontradas no Facebook ou no Threads. Grande parte de meus ensaios e artigos, inclusive livros inteiros, estão disponíveis em Academia.edu: https://unb.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Andrés Velasco. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Andrés Velasco. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 14 de novembro de 2025

A New Economic Playbook for Policymakers - Tim Besley, Andrés Velasco (Project Syndicate)

 A New Economic Playbook for Policymakers

Project Syndicate, Nov 13, 2025
Tim Besley and Andrés Velasco tout a promising successor to the Washington Consensus that recognizes the importance of politics.


A New Economic Playbook for Policymakers
TIM BESLEY and ANDRÉS VELASCO
Project Syndicate, Nov 13, 2025

The Washington Consensus assumed that economic growth would automatically follow market liberalization. That belief has not aged well, and a new policy approach must include innovation, good jobs, climate stability, gender equality, and a state empowered to provide effective regulation and high-quality public services.
LONDON – Voters in many countries are furious. Democratic leaders, lacking a playbook, seem unable to address the causes of that fury. The only people benefiting from this vacuum are populists and wannabe strongmen.
In Britain, the Labour government looks like it wants to go back to the tax-and-spend solutions of the past, while some Conservatives pine for a revival of Margaret Thatcher’s free-market policies. Both appear clueless in articulating a vision that is attractive to today’s voters.
Especially damning is the perception, common in many countries, that governments, hamstrung by political paralysis or excessive regulation, cannot get anything done. If democratic politicians are all talk and no action, then populists, with their boasts (rarely fulfilled) of decisive action to come, offer an appealing alternative.
To help create a new playbook, we asked a group of leading economists what the world should have learned in the 35 years since the so-called Washington Consensus became a policy lodestar. Their answers, which have just been published in book form, constitute the London Consensus, offering hope that a new policy approach, based on sound economic principles, can help push back against authoritarian populism.
Like its predecessor, the London Consensus holds that an economy with low inflation, prudent fiscal policies, and openness to world trade offers the best hope for human flourishing. But unlike the Washington Consensus, the new playbook showcases a transformed approach to economics that includes innovation, good jobs, gender equality, a focus on climate, and a political economy that empowers the state to deliver.
A first order of business is getting economies to grow again. Despite being cursed as “neo-liberal” by its critics, the Washington Consensus had surprisingly little to say about economic growth. Its assumption that growth would automatically follow market liberalization has not aged well.
Over the last 35 years, thanks largely to the work of the most recent Nobel laureates, including our London Consensus co-author Philippe Aghion, we have learned that “getting the prices right” is not enough. Growth depends on innovation, which requires striking the right balance between competition and rewards for new ideas. Governments play a role by supporting research, education, and a financial system that allows firms to invest and adopt new technologies.
Although growth and well-being are linked, that connection, too, is no longer viewed as automatic. People care about incomes and consumption. But they also care about the health of their communities and the sense that policies and national politicians treat “people like them” fairly. A new approach must focus on how economic systems shape both prosperity and the social fabric that holds communities together.
Left-behind regions require a great deal more than cash transfers. The loss of jobs and businesses weakens local communities and affects people’s lives and sense of dignity in ways that money alone cannot fix. Place-based policies should be a central component of the new playbook. We need to take good jobs to where people are, not vice versa.
People want stability as well, so moderating the ups and downs of the economy should also be a main goal of policy. The Washington Consensus focused only on one kind of instability, caused by irresponsible fiscal and monetary policies, but that was too narrow. Today we understand that financial crises, health emergencies, and even climate change can also be major sources of shocks.
By serving as an insurer of last resort, as they did during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2007-09 global financial crisis, governments can protect citizens from losing their jobs, savings, or access to health care. But advocating such an activist fiscal policy is not the same as claiming that anything goes. On the contrary: to supply last-resort insurance, governments must be able to borrow during crises, which in turn requires that they run surpluses and cut their debts in good times.
The Washington Consensus gave the impression that the state’s role should be minimal, but that was always too simplistic. An effective government should be small enough not to get in the way of the private sector, but strong and capable enough to do all the things government needs to do in a modern economy, which includes providing effective regulation and high-quality public services. In turn, building government capacity requires long-term investment in people, institutions, and systems.
The quality of governance also depends on political institutions, which to be successful must evolve along a narrow corridor. When power is too fragmented, reaching agreement on matters of common interest becomes impossible. And when power is concentrated in too few hands, without effective checks and balances, unresolved grievances accumulate, driving citizens to seek untried alternatives.
The London Consensus believes that good economics cannot be separated from good politics. Insofar as it assumed that adopting sound economic policies would automatically cause political problems to sort themselves out, the Washington Consensus was naive. The political origins of economic policies make a big difference. Reforms imposed from above, without local support or legitimacy, usually fail.
Moreover, what may seem like good economic policies can have bad political effects if they increase inequality or resentment. Rather than treating politics as an obstacle, economists should see it as essential to making fair and lasting economic choices.
We do not claim that the Washington Consensus caused the current wave of populism. But when it comes to addressing today’s challenges, it does not provide the answers. For that, we need to go beyond the old recipes. The London Consensus provides a fruitful alternative.

quarta-feira, 22 de outubro de 2025

The London Consensus -Tim Besley, Irene Bucelli, Andrés Velasco (eds.) (LSE)

The London Consensus

Tim Besley, Irene Bucelli, Andrés Velasco (eds.)

London: London School of Economics, 2025 

Preface

The year 2025 marks three-and-a-half decades since the publication of John Williamson’s essay on the Washington Consensus. The ideas contained in that essay have many advocates and also plenty of critics, but there is no denying they have been extremely influential as a list of do’s and don’ts in economic policy and development.

Mindful of that anniversary, in May 2023 we convened a conference at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), whose aim was to bring together a group of economists and other social scientists to explore what would constitute a new consensus in their respective areas of expertise. In most topics, we also sought the views of discussants.

We did not provide an overall conceptual framework for the conference or a template for the individual contributions. These were entirely developed by the authors in the spirit of provoking discussion, and the meeting fostered a lively exchange of ideas.  Many authors chose to edit their contributions in line with the comments that they received at the conference and afterwards. The book is a record of that exchange, but the events and debates that motivated it continue to evolve. The next phase of the project will be disseminating these ideas and to respond to a fast-moving policy landscape. Only time will tell how well the ideas in this book stand the test of time and whether they prove influential.

The project would not have been possible without the generosity and vision of LSE Emeritus Governor, Benefactor and Alumnus Mario Francescotti. His leadership in establishing the research programme on Renewing the Social Contract at LSE launched this process of academic enquiry. His support has been crucial throughout the project, from the original conference in 2023 to the turning of the papers into the present volume. We acknowledge his support with gratitude.

LSE is a cosmopolitan hub for contrasting policy ideas, but also a place where diverse views co-exist in a collegial way. The School’s motto is rerum cognoscere causas, Latin for ‘to know the causes of things’. This book follows in that tradition. Its success will be judged by the debate that it fosters.

Tim Besley

Irene Bucelli

Andrés Velasco