Brazil
Focus – David Fleischer
SPECIAL Report April 11 2017
THE ODEBRECHT “LIST”
The “list”
of politicians accused of receiving kickbacks/bribes during the plea bargaining
by the Odebrecht directors, managers and employees has been anxiously awaited
in Brasília for several weeks and most thought that it would be made public
“after the Easter holiday (next week): “The End
of the World”. .
But,
no – STF Judge José Edson Fachin (the reporter for all Lava Jato accusations)
had prepared (on 4th April) the release of this list for Wednesday,
12th April. However, somehow the O
Estado de São Paulo gained access to the “list” and published on its
internet site mid-Tuesday afternoon, 11th April.
This
list has one-third of Pres. Temer’s
cabinet: 8 ministers; more than one-third of the Senate: 29 Senators; 42
federal deputies; 3 governors; and
one TCU judge [14 different parties]. Apparently, there are more governors on the
Odebrecht “list” but their cases will be deliberated at the STJ. There are other politicians, such as Lula and
Dilma Rousseff, whose “fate” will be deliberated in the first level federal
court of Judge Sérgio Moro in Curitiba.
This
“list” exploded exactly during the “presentation” by former President Dilma
Rousseff at Columbia University. Other
senators and deputies are already being investigated and/or prosecuted by the
Supreme Court.
Also,
the release of this list by the OESP coincided with final attempt by
the Chamber of Deputies to approve the Complementary Law for the fiscal
recovery of “bankrupt” state governments (Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and
Minias Gerais) – especially the counterpoint austerity measures to be required
by the federal government in lieu of a three-year suspension of these states’
debt payments.
Two
national party presidents are on this list: Sen.
Aécio Neves (PSDB-MG) and Sen. Romero Jucá (PMDB-RR).
Temer’s “Lame Duck” cabinet:
Eliseu Padilha (PMDB-RS) – Casa Civil
Wellington Moreira Franco (PMDB-RJ) –
General Sec. of the Presidency
Gilberto Kassab (PSD-SP) – Science,
Technology & Communications
Helder Barbalho (PMDB-PA) – National
Integration
Alyosio Nunes (PSDB-SP) – Foreign
Relations
Blairo Maggi (PP-MT) – Agriculture
Bruno Araújo (PSDB-PE) –Cities
Marcos Pereira (PRB-ES) – MDIC
Earlier
this year, Pres. Temer explained how the “Odebrecht list” would affect his
cabinet. He differentiated the three
“stages” of these accusations: 1) Accused – no problem (wait and see
during the STF investigation); 2)
Denounced at the STF – the cabinet minister would suspended temporarily; and 3) Declared “réu” by the STF –
the minister would be gone permanently.
Thus,
in Brasília it is assumed that Temer will not dismiss any of his “lame duck” ministers. This episode came at a very important
juncture for the Temer government è exactly
when it is trying (desperately) to approve important reforms in Congress –
social security reform, labor legislation reform and a “timid” tax reform – in
addition to “political reform”.
To
gain approval of these reforms (especially the social security reform), Temer’s
main political articulators (his “hard core nucleus”) – Eliseu Padilha and
Moreira Franco – are VERY important and should remain in their posts at least
until they are denounced at the STF (who knows when). Remember:
In order to give Moreira Franco the status of foro previlegiado at the
Supreme Court, Temer named him to a cabinet-level position so that he could
acquire the special status at the STF.
Some Possible Consequences:
1)
This episode will delay and make approval of the reforms more difficult. Sen. Renan Calheiros (PMDB-AL), the current
PMDB floor leader in the Senate, will become even more desperate to approve the
law regulating the “abuse of authority” that could coerce judges, prosecutors
and federal police officers – and derail the Lava Jato investigation
-- but probably Congress will not approve this.
If approved, it is possible that Pres. Temer might veto this, or the STF
would declare this measure unconstitutional.
2)
The already weakened Pres. Michel Temer will be further weakened and perhaps
lose control of his support group in Congress – many of whom are “desperate”
regarding their possible reelection in 2018..
3)
Investors (domestic and foreign) who are already a bit “cautious” regarding
Brazil will adopt an even more rigorous “wait and see” position. Although Brazil’s economy has shown some
positive signs of recovery, increased levels of foreign and domestic
investments are crucial for new job creation and a strong reduction in
unemployment.
4) Perhaps
the only item of the “political reform” to be approved might be the closing of
the proportional representation lists (the voter could only vote for one
pre-ordered list, rather than individual candidates). Many of the accused think that they would be
able to “hide” within their party’s pre-ordered list.
5) It
is possible that in the 2018 elections there might be a much larger turnover
rate for federal deputies. Every four
years the average rate is around 50%, but in 2018 might reach 65% or 70%.
