O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

Mostrando postagens com marcador Wilson Center. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Wilson Center. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 30 de setembro de 2022

O Wilson Center se pronuncia sobre as eleições no Brasil - Anya Prusa (Wilson Center)

WILSON CENTER weekly report: 

 


domingo, 21 de junho de 2020

A mentalidade soviética nos EUA, de Pasternak a George Floyd - Izabella Tabarovsky (Wilson Center, WSJ)






The American Soviet Mentality
Collective demonization invades our culture
BY

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, JUNE 15, 2020
The American Soviet Mentality

Russians are fond of quoting Sergei Dovlatov, a dissident Soviet writer who emigrated to the United States in 1979: “We continuously curse Comrade Stalin, and, naturally, with good reason. And yet I want to ask: who wrote four million denunciations?” It wasn’t the fearsome heads of Soviet secret police who did that, he said. It was ordinary people.
Collective demonizations of prominent cultural figures were an integral part of the Soviet culture of denunciation that pervaded every workplace and apartment building. Perhaps the most famous such episode began on Oct. 23, 1958, when the Nobel committee informed Soviet writer Boris Pasternak that he had been selected for the Nobel Prize in literature—and plunged the writer’s life into hell. Ever since Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago had been first published the previous year (in Italy, since the writer could not publish it at home) the Communist Party and the Soviet literary establishment had their knives out for him. To the establishment, the Nobel Prize added insult to grave injury.
Within days, Pasternak was a target of a massive public vilification campaign. The country’s prestigious Literary Newspaper launched the assault with an article titled “Unanimous Condemnation” and an official statement by the Soviet Writers’ Union—a powerful organization whose primary function was to exercise control over its members, including by giving access to exclusive benefits and basic material necessities unavailable to ordinary citizens. The two articles expressed the union’s sense that in view of Pasternak’s hostility and slander of the Soviet people, socialism, world peace, and all progressive and revolutionary movements, he no longer deserved the proud title of Soviet Writer. The union therefore expelled him from its ranks.
A few days later, the paper dedicated an entire page to what it presented as the public outcry over Pasternak’s imputed treachery. Collected under the massive headline “Anger and Indignation: Soviet people condemn the actions of B. Pasternak” were a condemnatory editorial, a denunciation by a group of influential Moscow writers, and outraged letters that the paper claimed to have received from readers.
The campaign against Pasternak went on for months. Having played out in the central press, it moved to local outlets and jumped over into nonmedia institutions, with the writer now castigated at obligatory political meetings at factories, research institutes, universities, and collective farms. None of those who joined the chorus of condemnation, naturally, had read the novel—it would not be formally published in the USSR until 30 years later. But that did not stop them from mouthing the made-up charges leveled against the writer. It was during that campaign that the Soviet catchphrase “ne chital, no osuzhdayu”—“didn’t read, but disapprove”—was born: Pasternak’s accusers had coined it to protect themselves against suspicions of having come in contact with the seditious material. Days after accepting the Nobel Prize, Pasternak was forced to decline it. Yet demonization continued unabated.
Some of the greatest names in Soviet culture became targets of collective condemnations—composers Dmitry Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev; writers Anna Akhmatova and Iosif Brodsky; and many others. Bouts of hounding could go on for months and years, destroying people’s lives, health and, undoubtedly, ability to create. (The brutal onslaught undermined Pasternak’s health. He died from lung cancer a year and a half later.) But the practice wasn’t reserved for the greats alone. Factories, universities, schools, and research institutes were all suitable venues for collectively raking over the coals a hapless, ideologically ungrounded colleague who, say, failed to show up for the “voluntary-obligatory,” as a Soviet cliché went, Saturday cleanups at a local park, or a scientist who wanted to emigrate. The system also demanded expressions of collective condemnations with regards to various political matters: machinations of imperialism and reactionary forces, Israeli aggression against peaceful Arab states, the anti-Soviet international Zionist conspiracy. It was simply part of life.
Twitter has been used as a platform for exercises in unanimous condemnation for as long as it has existed. Countless careers and lives have been ruined as outraged mobs have descended on people whose social media gaffes or old teenage behavior were held up to public scorn and judged to be deplorable and unforgivable. But it wasn’t until the past couple of weeks that the similarity of our current culture with the Soviet practice of collective hounding presented itself to me with such stark clarity. Perhaps it was the specific professions and the cultural institutions involved—and the specific acts of writers banding together to abuse and cancel their colleagues—that brought that sordid history back.
On June 3, The New York Times published an opinion piece that much of its progressive staff found offensive and dangerous. (The author, Republican Sen. Tom Cotton, had called to send in the military to curb the violence and looting that accompanied the nationwide protests against the killing of George Floyd.) The targets of their unanimous condemnation, which was gleefully joined by the Twitter proletariat, which took pleasure in helping the once-august newspaper shred itself to pieces in public, were New York Times’ opinion section editor James Bennet, who had ultimate authority for publishing the piece, though he hadn’t supervised its editing, and op-ed staff editor and writer Bari Weiss (a former Tablet staffer).
Weiss had nothing to do with editing or publishing the piece. On June 4, however, she posted a Twitter thread characterizing the internal turmoil at the Times as a “civil war” between the “(mostly young) wokes” who “call themselves liberals and progressives” and the “(mostly 40+) liberals” who adhere to “the principles of civil libertarianism.” She attributed the behavior of the “wokes” to their “safetyism” worldview, in which “the right of people to feel emotionally and psychologically safe trumps what were previously considered core liberal values, like free speech.”
It was just one journalist’s opinion, but to Weiss’ colleagues her semi-unflattering description of the split felt like an intolerable attack against the collective. Although Weiss did not name anyone in either the “woke” or the older “liberal” camp, her younger colleagues felt collectively attacked and slandered. They lashed out. Pretty soon, Weiss was trending on Twitter.
As the mob’s fury kicked into high gear, the language of collective outrage grew increasingly strident, even violent. Goldie Taylor, writer and editor-at-large at The Daily Beast, queried in a since-deleted tweet why Weiss “still got her teeth.” With heads rolling at the Times—James Bennet resigned, and deputy editorial page editor James Dao was reassigned to the newsroom—one member of the staff asked for Weiss to be fired for having bad-mouthed “her younger newsroom colleagues” and insulted “all of our foreign correspondents who have actually reported from civil wars.” (It was unclear how she did that, other than having used the phrase “civil war” as a metaphor.)
Mehdi Hasan, a columnist with the Intercept, opined to his 880,000 Twitter followers that it would be strange if Weiss retained her job now that Bennet had been removed. He suggested that her thread had “mocked” her nonwhite colleagues. (It did not.) In a follow-up tweet Hasan went further, suggesting that to defend Weiss would make one a bad anti-racist—a threat based on a deeply manipulated interpretation of Weiss’ post, yet powerful enough to stop his followers from making the mistake.
All of us who came out of the Soviet system bear scars of the practice of unanimous condemnation, whether we ourselves had been targets or participants in it or not. It is partly why Soviet immigrants are often so averse to any expressions of collectivism: We have seen its ugliest expressions in our own lives and our friends’ and families’ lives. It is impossible to read the chastising remarks of Soviet writers, for whom Pasternak had been a friend and a mentor, without a sense of deep shame. Shame over the perfidy and lack of decency on display. Shame at the misrepresentations and perversions of truth. Shame at the virtue signaling and the closing of rank. Shame over the momentary and, we now know, fleeting triumph of mediocrity over talent.
It is also impossible to read them without the nagging question: How would I have behaved in their shoes? Would I, too, have succumbed to the pressure? Would I, too, have betrayed, condemned, cast a stone? I used to feel grateful that we had left the USSR before Soviet life had put me to that test. How strange and devastating to realize that these moral tests are now before us again in America.
In a collectivist culture, one hoped-for result of group condemnations is control—both over the target of abuse and the broader society. When sufficiently broad levels of society realize that the price of nonconformity is being publicly humiliated, expelled from the community of “people of goodwill” (another Soviet cliché) and cut off from sources of income, the powers that be need to work less hard to enforce the rules.
But while the policy in the USSR was by and large set by the authorities, it would be too simplistic to imagine that those below had no choices, and didn’t often join in these rituals gladly, whether to obtain some real or imagined benefit for themselves, or to salve internal psychic wounds, or to take pleasure in the exercise of cruelty toward a person who had been declared to be a legitimate target of the collective.
According to Olga Ivinskaya, who was Pasternak’s lover and companion during those years, the party brass, headed by Nikita Khrushchev, was only partly to blame for the nonpublication of Doctor Zhivago. The literary establishment played an important role as well. Reading over her recollections of the meetings at the Writers’ Union, it is hard not to suspect that some of its members were motivated not so much by fear of reprisals or ideological fervor but by simple conformity and professional jealousy. Some, I imagine, would have only been too happy to put spokes in the wheels of a writer whose novel—banned at home, but published abroad—was being translated into dozens of languages and who had been awarded the world’s most prestigious literary prize.
For the regular people—those outside prestigious cultural institutions—participation in local versions of collective hounding was not without its benefits, either. It could be an opportunity to eliminate a personal enemy or someone who was more successful and, perhaps, occupied a position you craved. You could join in condemning a neighbor at your cramped communal flat, calculating that once she was gone, you could add some precious extra square meters to your living space.
And yet even among this dismal landscape, there were those who refused to join in this ugly rite. A few writers, for example, refused to participate in demonizing Pasternak. And is it karma or just a coincidence that most of these people—many of them dissidents, who were outside the literary establishment—remain beloved among Russian readers today, while the writings of the insiders, ones who betrayed and condemned, have been forgotten?
The mobs that perform the unanimous condemnation rituals of today do not follow orders from above. But that does not diminish their power to exert pressure on those under their influence. Those of us who came out of the collectivist Soviet culture understand these dynamics instinctively. You invoked the “didn’t read, but disapprove” mantra not only to protect yourself from suspicions about your reading choices but also to communicate an eagerness to be part of the kollektiv—no matter what destructive action was next on the kollektiv’s agenda. You preemptively surrendered your personal agency in order to be in unison with the group. And this is understandable in a way: Merging with the crowd feels much better than standing alone.
Those who remember the Soviet system understand the danger of letting the practice of collective denunciation run amok. But you don’t have to imagine an American Stalin in the White House to see where first the toleration, then the normalization, and now the legitimization and rewarding of this ugly practice is taking us.
Americans have discovered the way in which fear of collective disapproval breeds self-censorship and silence, which impoverish public life and creative work. The double life one ends up leading—one where there is a growing gap between one’s public and private selves—eventually begins to feel oppressive. For a significant portion of Soviet intelligentsia (artists, doctors, scientists), the burden of leading this double life played an important role in their deciding to emigrate.
Those who join in the hounding face their own hazards. The more loyalty you pledge to a group that expects you to participate in rituals of collective demonization, the more it will ask of you and the more you, too, will feel controlled. How much of your own autonomy as a thinking, feeling person are you willing to sacrifice to the collective? What inner compromises are you willing to make for the sake of being part of the group? Which personal relationships are you willing to give up?
From my vantage point, this cultural moment in these United States feels incredibly precarious. The practice of collective condemnation feels like an assertion of a culture that ultimately tramples on the individual and creates an oppressive society. Whether that society looks like Soviet Russia, or Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, or Castro’s Cuba, or today’s China, or something uniquely 21st-century American, the failure of institutions and individuals to stand up to mob rule is no longer an option we can afford.

Izabella Tabarovsky is a researcher with the Kennan Institute at the Wilson Center focusing on the politics of historical memory in the former Soviet Union.

quinta-feira, 11 de abril de 2019

Mourao at the Wilson Center, in Washington

A Conversation with His Excellency Hamilton Mourão, Vice President of the Republic of Brazil

The first 100 days of the Bolsonaro administration have been marked by political paralysis, in large part due to the successive crises generated by the President’s own inner circle, if not by himself. Amidst the political noise, Vice President Hamilton Mourão has emerged as a voice of reason and moderation, capable of providing direction in domestic and foreign affairs alike. Vice President Mourão has taken over management of the crisis in Venezuela and has been increasingly sought after by officials from China, Europe, and the Middle East, as well as the business community, to act as an interlocutor for the government. The former four-star general has also become a favorite of Brazilian journalists—who are frequently critical of the new administration—for his willingness to engage with the media and for his important remarks on the need for government to value a diversity of opinions. 

Selected Quotes from Vice President Mourão

“We are committed to restoring the confidence in the country and in its institutions so we can resume the path to our social and economic development. From the outset, our government has taken steps toward reform of the State: We reduced the number of ministries, appointing a cabinet without political influence, far from the practice that sold the government to political parties. We have also cut more than twenty thousand positions in different levels of the federal government, the so-called ‘commissioned positions’, which are open for non-career appointments, and therefore were part of the give and take game of old politics.”
“The armed forces will keep as they are, and as they have been in the last 34 years since the end of the military regime in Brazil in 1985. We have received the task from the Brazilian people to run the government for the next four years and to do our best, our big efforts, to change the course of action that Brazil was taking and to restore our economy and to restore the security of our people and to put the country back on its tracks so that we can reach sustainable development.”
"We have to do all that is in our hands to press the Maduro government to call new elections, to get out. And, okay, they don’t have the capacity to solve what is happening there. The country is shattered economically, the population is suffering because they don’t have access to food, they don’t have access to medicines. The problem now of electric power has reached the point of no return… What can we do? It is what we are doing through the Group of Lima. We have to apply [political and economic] pressure… The political pressure is being applied since the moment that we did not recognize anymore Maduro as the real government in Venezuela. And the economic pressure… the great pressure comes from the U.S.”
“…There is no question about the change [in climate], it’s changed. In Rio, any rain is a big problem. By the typography of the city, by the disorganization of and occupation of the city, so we have to deal with this. Of course, at first there was all that talk about the Paris Agreement, okay, we are going to stay in the Paris Agreement, we have to fulfill the Paris Agreement, and I think that we in Brazil can pass a good word to everybody once we do our homework on this problem of sustainability and the environmental question. Also I look forward, because there is going to be a market for carbon credits in the nearby future. Well, we will have a lot of carbon credits to sell.”
The Brazil Institute was honored to welcome Vice President Mourão at the Wilson Center on April 9, for a conversation on the political outlook for Brazil in the coming year and beyond. 
04-09-2019 A Conversation with His Excellency Hamilton Mourão, Vice President of the Republic of Brazil
Header image by Agência Brasil

quinta-feira, 3 de abril de 2014

Portal das Eleicoes Brasil 2014 - Brazil Institute, Wilson Center


Elections Portal 2014

Brazil Institute, Wilson Center
The Elections Portal is a comprehensive guide that provides easily accessible information on the 2014 Brazilian Elections, created by the Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center.Here, you can find background on the party platforms, the candidates, polls, debates, and information on important issues to the electorate. Our objective is to inform, educate, and foster dialogue.
Leading presidential candidates Eduardo Campos, Dilma Rousseff and Aécio Neves
Leading presidential candidates Eduardo Campos, Dilma Rousseff and Aécio Neves
Introduction By Paulo Sotero
In October 2014, Brazil will hold the seventh consecutive general election since the reinstatement of democracy in 1985. At stake are the presidency and vice-presidency of the Republic, the governorship of 27 states, all 513 seats of the Federal Chamber of Deputies and one third of the 81 Federal Senate seats. Federal deputies and Federal senators serve four and eight year terms, respectively. An estimated college of 140 million voters will also choose a total of 1,059 more delegates to the 27 unicameral states. Candidates will be presented by some 25 political parties, which will form electoral coalitions, which may vary by state and region. A successful candidate for president and governor must receive 50% plus one of the valid votes. Voting in Brazil is mandatory. Voters have to present an electoral id card issued by theSuperior Electoral Tribunal, a specialized branch of the federal judiciary in charge of organizing and running elections. Elections are held on Sundays in thousands of precincts. Citizens cast their ballot electronically. Results are tallied and published a few hours after the closing of the polls.
Six months before the elections, President Dilma Rousseff seems well positioned to be reelected. Polls suggest that she may be able to renew her mandate for four more years in the first round of elections, scheduled for October 5th, a feat that her popular predecessor and political mentor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, did not achieved when he successfully ran in 2002 and 2006. The popularity of president Rousseff comes, however, with one important caveat. Two third of the voters tell posters that the want change. If no candidate receives the majority plus one of the valid votes in the first round, the top two will face off in a second round, scheduled for October 26.
According to analysis based on polls released in early 2014, Rousseff may benefit from a demobilizing effect among voters of the massive street protests that shook Brazil in June 2013. Surveys indicate that since the protests there has been a substantial increase in voters who say that they will spoil their vote or leave it blank as an act of protest against a political system many feel to be dysfunctional and self-serving. This would reduce the number of valid votes and in turn, make it easier for the front runner to win in the first round.
Much could change, however, when the electoral campaign heats up and enters the final stretch, in mid-July.  Media reports suggest that former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, an astute reader of Brazilian political trends and electoral moods, worries about the possibility of Rousseff facing a significant challenge in a second round from popular governor of Pernambuco Eduardo Campos, a former ally of the Workers’ Party-led coalition.  New factors could weigh heavily and dramatically change the March 2014 electoral outlook.  Among those are the economic indicators of growth, employment and inflation, expected protests around the time of the World Cup, to be played in twelve Brazilian cities, and the shape of regional electoral alliances. Delays in the completion of construction and renovations of the stadiums to be used during the World Cup and mass transportation systems to move millions of soccer fans during the tournament have already prevented the government to develop a positive narrative around the games. In early March, it was announced that President Dilma Rousseff will not make a welcome speech at the opening of the World Cup, in São Paulo, to avoid being booed by the public.  More important and potentially consequential was the shaken state of the PT’s alliance with it main ally, the center-right PMDB, in the early stages of the campaign.  Another factor much speculated about was the potential candidacy to the Federal Senate of Justice Joaquim Barbosa, in Campos’ Socialist Party ticket, which he denies but experts view as possible. The first black member of Brazil’s Supreme Court, Barbosa gained exposure and became widely popular as the presiding judge of the recently concluded Mensalão trial of political corruption.
Brazilian voters will start to focus on the electoral campaign after the World Cup, which will start on June 12 and end on July 13. Although a poor or victorious performance by the Brazilian national team could affect the mood of the country, history recommends against such speculations.  In 1950, the last time the World Cup was played in Brazil, the national team lost the final to Uruguay and the newly inaugurated stadium of Maracanã, in Rio de Janeiro. A few months later, however, former dictator Getúlio Vargas, who had initiated the construction of the stadium, was democratically elected president.  The nexus between the World Cup and election results has remained an improbable one after the redemocratization of 1985. Brazil’s poor performance in 1994 did not affect the election of former senator and minister of Finance Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who ran with the support of President Itamar Franco. Another loss, four years later, did not prevent Cardoso’s reelection. In 2002, when Brazil won the World Cup for the fifth time, Cardoso’s candidate lost to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. A devout soccer fan, Lula had little trouble being reelected in 2006 and helping his candidate, Dilma Rousseff, get elected in 2010, years in which Brazil did not do well in the Soccer World Cup.
In the event of a victorious performance by the Brazilian team this year, it is unlikely that Rousseff would attempt to obtain political dividend from the explosion of national joy that is sure to occur.  First because it could backfire. More importantly, however, is that the last government in Brazil that used the national team’s triumph in a World Cup as political propaganda, in 1970, was the one that tortured a political prisoner named  Dilma Rousseff.

Photos courtesy of Flicrk users Fernando StankunsRede Brasil AtualPSDB MGand Roberto Pereira

segunda-feira, 4 de fevereiro de 2013

Brazil Institute at Wilson Center: debate sobre o progresso industrial

O importante, para quem não puder participar do debate (e só podem os que vivem em Washington, DC, e nas cercanias), é o trabalho sobre a competitividade (ou falta de) das exportações brasileiras, linkado no anúncio abaixo.

How to Improve Brazil's Industrial Growth and Export Performance

Please join the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Brazil Institute and the Program on America and the Global Economy for “How to Improve Brazil’s Industrial Growth and Export Performance”
 Tuesday February 12th, 2013
4:00 pm – 5:30 pm

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 6th Floor Flom Auditorium
Featuring

- Otaviano Canuto, Vice President and Head for Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank           
- José Guilherme Reis, Lead Trade Economist, World Bank
- Matheus Cavallari, Consultant, World Bank
Discussants:    

- John Bryson, Distinguished Scholar, Wilson Center, and former Secretary of Commerce under President Barack Obama
- Kent Hughes, Director, Program on American and the Global Economy

Moderator: Paulo Sotero, Director, Brazil Institute
Please RSVP to brazil@wilsoncenter.org (acceptances only) with your name and affiliation


Modest industrial production growth and disappointing export performances are at the center of an economic policy debate that has been raging in Brazil since 2011, in which the rate of GDP expansion abruptly declined from 7.5% in 2010 to 2.7% and dropped again to around 1% last year.
On February 12, the Brazil Institute and the Program on America and the Global Economy will convene a seminar to examine the causes of the negative trend and what needs to happen for the country to return to the average 4% annual growth of the Lula years, while improving the productivity and competitiveness of its economy, as President Dilma Rousseff has pledged to do. 


The discussion will feature the co-authors of an important policy research working paper recently published by the World Bank under the title:
Brazilian exports: climbing down a competitiveness cliff 
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469382&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_20130107091437.
 

Location: Woodrow Wilson Center at the Ronald Reagan Building
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW ("Federal Triangle" stop on Blue/Orange Line).
A map to the Center is available at www.wilsoncenter.org/directions
Note: Please allow additional time to pass through security.

segunda-feira, 12 de outubro de 2009

1415) O projeto sobre a Guerra Fria do Wilson Center

Acabo de escrever um ensaio sobre a Alemanha antes e depois da derrubada (que prefiro ao termo queda) do muro de Berlim. Apoiei-me bastante nos materiais do programa de pesquisa do Wilson Center sobre a Guerra Fria, assim como sobre os materiais disponíveis no National Security Archive, da George Washington University.
Abaixo a relação dos materiais disponíveis no projeto do Wilson Center:

Cold War International History Project
Virtual Archive 2.0
Link: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection

Collection :
1945-46 Iranian Crisis
1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina
1956 Hungarian Revolution
1956 Polish Crisis
1980-81 Polish Crisis
Albania and the Indochina War
Albania and the Non-Aligned Movement
Algeria in the Cold War
Anti-Colonialism in the Cold War
Bandung Conference
Bulgaria in the Cold War
China in the Cold War
Chinese Foreign Policy in the Third World
Cold War Origins
Communist Activity in Latin America
CSCE Negotiation Process
Cuba in the Cold War
Cuban Missile Crisis
Czechoslovakia in the Cold War
East German Uprising
Economic Cold War
End of the Cold War
France in the Cold War
Germany in the Cold War
Hungary in the Cold War
Intelligence Operations in the Cold War
Mongolia in the Cold War
North Korea in the Cold War
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Poland in the Cold War
Post Stalin succession struggle
Romania in the Cold War
Sino-Soviet Relations
Sino-Soviet Split
Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks
Soviet Foreign Policy
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia
Soviet Nuclear Development
Stalin and the Cold War
The Cold War in Africa
The Cold War in Asia
The Cold War in Latin America
The Cold War in the Middle East
The Horn of Africa Crisis
The Korean War
The Mitrokhin Archive
The Nikita Khrushchev Papers
The Non-Aligned Movement
The Vietnam (Indochina) War(s)
The Warsaw Pact
Todor Zhivkov Papers
US-Cuban Relations
US-Soviet Relations
USS Pueblo Crisis
Warsaw Pact Military Planning
Western Media
Yugoslavia in the Cold War