Can the Emerging Economic Powers Govern the Globe? (2019) - Uri Dadusch (The Globalist)

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 Global Economy

Can the Emerging Economic Powers Govern the Globe?

Can a G7 dominated by developing nations provide the impulse to global governance as did the old G7? The answer is no.

Uri Dadusch

The Globalist, April 1, 2019

https://www.theglobalist.com/global-governance-g7-wto-us-china/

What a difference ten years can make. It was nearly ten years ago when, in a paper written with Benn Stancil and titled “The World Order in 2050,” he and I predicted that by 2030 — in 11 years from now — five of the seven largest economies of the world would be drawn from the ranks of developing countries as defined by the World Bank at the time of our writing.

As we believed then, only the United States as No. 2 and Japan as No. 4 would represent the advanced countries among the new G7 (as measured by their respective GDP), with Japan dropping out of that group in 2050.

China, we predicted, would be the world’s largest economy, and India would be No. 3. The other countries in the new G-7 would be Brazil, Mexico and Russia. Our 2030 forecast will probably be proven wrong.

If I were revising the forecast today, Indonesia, the Philippines or Nigeria might challenge Mexico, Russia and Brazil for a slot in the new G7 in 2030. However, the main message remains – the G7 in 2030 will bear little, if any, resemblance to the old G7 composed only of advanced nations.

Population size = economic power

The projection that developing countries will overtake the advanced countries in economic importance is based on simple reasoning.

Essentially, developing economies are home to more than 80% of the world’s people of working age. Their level of productivity is only a fraction of that of the advanced nations at the present time, but they are catching up.

In most developing countries, this catch-up will occur gradually, as they absorb technologies, norms and institutions that the advanced nations developed and adopted long ago. This catch-up process is still dynamic enough to give them a significant growth edge.

In addition, all growth in the number of people of working age occurs in developing countries. Developing countries also boasts a higher rate of savings and investment than advanced countries on average. There, an increased share of the elderly and the rising fiscal cost of pensions and health-care contribute to reduced national savings.

Due to these factors, in a typical year developing countries now account for about two-thirds of the total growth of world GDP. That also means that international businesses will likely see more new sales in developing than advanced countries in 2019.

Global governance

In light of this tectonic shift, it is important to ask: Can a G7 dominated by developing nations provide the impulse to global governance that did the old G7? The answer is no, for three reasons.

1. There is no clear leader. Starting 75 years ago, led by the United States, the members of the old G7 established the post-war liberal democratic order. The United States and the UK created the World Bank and the IMF in 1944. Much later, a small group created the GATT system which paved the way to the WTO.

A host of other international institutions that provide global public goods were created under the old G7. The United States had established its leadership credentials as an enlightened victor in WW2 and a savior of France and the UK. There is no historical legitimacy for a leader such as China.

True, China is already the largest economy on a PPP basis, but the United States continues to be the largest economy in terms of current dollars — which are what matter most in international purchasing power — as well as the richest and the most advanced technologically.

The United States also remains the predominant military power and, despite Trump’s many foibles, in many ways a leader in values and norms.

Yet, it appears at present that the U.S. government, at least under its current management, no longer wants to lead on many global issues — except in ways that are of immediate and direct interest to the United States.

In other words, the United States continues to claim primacy and is determined to preserve its primacy. The United States may no longer want to lead, but it is reluctant to allow others to lead.

2. Developing nations are facing daunting challenges – namely development and poverty reduction, and they do not always see establishing global public goods as a priority.

You can argue that this is the wrong course to pursue. After all, developing countries will suffer most from, for example, climate change, the collapse of the WTO, financial instability and the exhaustion of fisheries.

But the fact is that these threats — although very real — are less pressing than the imperative of fighting hunger and disease, to provide heat and shelter, to provide clean water and to build transport infrastructure and invest in education. All of those priorities are reflected in the politics of developing countries.

In addition, even if the United States did not exist, it is far from clear that nations would coalesce around an emerging leader such as China, nor that China would eagerly take on the mantle.

3. The developing nations are a far more diverse group than the leading advanced countries. The per capita income gap between them can be 10 or 20 to 1, compared to 2 to 1 in advanced countries.

Similarly, the absolute size difference between China and nearly all others in the rest of the developing group is far bigger than that between the United States and the other traditional G7.

The members of the old G7 also exhibit broadly similar economic structures. The new G7 may include a market economy such as Brazil and a state capitalist system such as China. It may include resource-based Russia and manufacturer Mexico.

The new G7 notably also includes single party authoritarian states such as China, quasi-autocracies such as Russia and democratic Mexico, India and Brazil.

These differences translate into different priorities, strategies and visions. This makes coordination difficult and the spontaneous emergence of a single leader unlikely.

A period of transition

The implication is that the next 50 years will, at best, constitute a period of transition in global governance. During this period, the best hope is that today’s large developing nations advance to be richer, more homogenous and respond to their populations’ natural demands for enfranchisement and for accountability.

During this long transition, the globe can only be governed — if it can be governed at all — by a condominium of powers, which includes, as a minimum, the United States, China, India, Russia, Japan and some form of European power, whether in the shape of the largest European nations or a more coordinated EU.

More needed than the “G2”

How this condominium evolves is highly uncertain. What is clear is that it will be impossible for global governance in any area to advance without both consent and active coordination between China and the United States. That will be a necessary, not a sufficient condition for global reforms.

Also essential will be the coopting, not coercing, of the middle powers which form the remainder of the condominium board members. This tension is most evident today in the struggle of survival of the WTO, the most important single institution underpinning the present liberal economic order.

Legal consequences of the war in Ukraine - César Chelala (The Globalist)

 Legal consequences of the war in Ukraine 

By César Chelala

The Globalist, April 29, 2022

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its intervention into that country’s internal affairs constitute serious breaches of international law.

The eloquent statement about aggression from Nuremberg

According to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, “War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone but affect the whole world…

To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”

The international Criminal Court more and more relevant

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states that the crime of aggression is one of the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community,” and provides that the crime falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

As of November 2019, 123 states are parties to the Statute of the Court. Four of these signatory states – the United States, Russia, Israel and Sudan — have informed the United Nations Secretary General that they no longer intend to abide by the laws of the Statute.

Those four nations therefore claim to have no legal obligations arising from their signature.

Starvation tactics violate the Geneva Convention of 1949

Current Russian military actions in Ukraine are clear violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949, particularly its attacks against civilians who are not participating in hostilities.

The Russian army has blockaded hundreds of Ukrainian civilians in the basements of churches, theaters, and subway stations in conditions of near starvation.

All UN member states bound by the Geneva Convention

The 1949 Geneva Conventions have been ratified by all Member States of the United Nations, which are then bound by its tenets.

In 1965, the UN General Assembly issued a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Domestic Affairs of States (UNGA resolution 2131).

A red line against interfering in the affairs of other states

According to that declaration, “no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state…and no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of another state or interfere in civil strife in another state.”

Russia’s interference in Ukraine is not new

Even before launching its armed aggression, Russia had conducted a campaign of cyberattacks against critical Ukrainian infrastructures.

Nicaragua and interference by the United States

The UN General Assembly resolutions, however, are considered recommendations and are not, therefore, legally binding.

The principle of non-intervention was alleged in the case of Nicaragua vs. United States, following the U.S. support for the “contras” fighting the Nicaraguan government and the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

The case was decided in 1986 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States and awarded reparations to the Nicaraguan government.

The United States violated international law against Nicaragua

According to the ICJ, the actions of the U.S. against Nicaragua violated international law. The U.S. resisted participating in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.

Neither Russia nor the U.S. has the right to “preventive” war

Related to the principle of intervention is the reputed right to carry out preventive war against another country perceived to be a threat.

That principle was argued – unsuccessfully — by the Bush administration war against Iraq. It also does not stand in Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine.

The threat was to Ukraine, not Russia

If any party should have felt threatened it would be Ukraine, given the massive deployment of military equipment by the Russian government on the border area with Ukraine before launching its fateful attack.

In addition, Putin had at his disposal other means to show his supposed anger at the expansion of NATO. He didn’t need to initiate a war that has already caused thousands of deaths and the forced displacement of millions of civilians.

The United Nations needs structural changes

Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused the United Nations of being ineffective because of its failure to protect

Ukraine from Russian attack. However, the UN is as strong and effective as its member states want it to be.

The UN Security Council needs urgently to be revisited, incorporating new members and reconsidering the conditions of the veto power of present members.

A new international security framework is needed

International laws regarding the use of force and intervention against another country have been repeatedly breached in recent times.

The serious consequences of the armed interventions against Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Yemen and now Ukraine indicate the need to honor those laws.

Conclusion

A new international security framework needs to be created whereby every country will feel secure that it will not be invaded at the whim and unilateral decision of more powerful countries.

Until the perpetrators of these violations accept such a framework, brutal force will continue to be used and the sovereignty of nations will continue to be violated.

========

• Russia’s war and its intervention into Ukraine’s internal affairs constitute serious breaches of international law.
  
• According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the crime of aggression is one of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.
  
• The U.S., Russia, Israel and Sudan have stated that they no longer abide by the laws of the Rome Statute of the ICC.
  
• Russia’s current starvation tactics against civilians in Ukraine are clear violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949.
  
• The 1949 Geneva Conventions have been ratified by all Member States of the United Nations, which are bound by its tenets.
  
• In 1965, the UN General Assembly issued a “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Domestic Affairs of States.”
  
• Neither Russia nor the U.S. has the right to “preventive” war. The George W. Bush Administration unsuccessfully argued that principle with regard to Iraq.
  
• President Zelensky has called the United Nations ineffective. The UN is only as strong and effective as its member states want it to be.
  
• A new international security framework needs to be created so that no country will be invaded at the whim and unilateral decision of more powerful countries.
  

O novo Hitler europeu: Putin, o psicopata russo - Uwe Bott, Stephan Richter (The Globalist)

Europe’s New Hitler: Another Psychopath at Work

 Vladimir Putin is a murderous despot: Why the West’s response to Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine matters. And why we must deal firmly with his European enablers.

By Stephan Richter and Uwe Bott 

The Globalist, February 24, 2022 

https://www.theglobalist.com/europes-new-hitler-putin-invades-ukraine/

Let there be no doubt, Putin is cunning and brutal. He is an abuser, a killer, an assassin. He completely lacks any shred of human decency. He is Europe’s new Hitler.

A bad leader, even by Soviet standards

Under his reign, the fatal Dutch disease has only spread further, piling hardship over hardship on the Russian people. Putin’s only skill has been consolidating power by eliminating all those opposed, all the while offering a steady diet of making empty promises population at large.

There is a darkness to Putin’s personality that is unsettling even to many Russians who certainly had their share of leaders with dark souls.

A sociopath in a clinical sense

Now, it is critical to understand the underlying pathology of Vladimir Putin. Putin is a sociopath in a clinical sense, with strong tendencies towards paranoia and narcissism.

His actions are driven by the deep insecurities of his own personality, by his constant need for external affirmation.

Putin constantly has to publicly prove his own virility, which – in his mind – is done by displaying violence and cruelty (and getting away with it).

In this vein, Putin is a very simple man. He is also, if one is willing to understand his personal profile, a very predictable man.

Of course, he craves the opposite. He craves to be admired for his smarts and for his vision, but deep inside he knows that he possesses neither.

Enter Western enablers

For more than ten years after the “end” of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the American part of the Western world was inebriated by its sense of complete and utter superiority.

And the European – especially German – part of the Western world deluded itself that there was no more reason to have an army.

Germany’s pro-Russian fifth brigade

Initially, all the rage was talk about a “peace dividend.” Subsequently, Germany’s pro-Russian fifth brigade (including a significant segment of the SPD, now the majority party in the German government) shifted its empty-headed rhetoric.

Ever eager to please Putin, the SPD’s demand was that, any time Putin’s Russia acted in a despotic fashion, the West should not engage in “escalation”.

The big error

Falsely assuming that the Russian Bear had been put to sleep at the burial of communism, Western leaders took their eyes of the growing, incrementally mounting threat that Vladimir Putin built.

Western leaders closed their eyes to Russian attempts to intimidate Georgia and the Baltic states and other former states of the Soviet Union.

Western money hustlers

Instead of keeping the eye on the ball, the Western world got all enamored by the – almost always illicitly gained – riches of Russian oligarchs.

London, in particular, became a major money laundering center for their dirty profits, with Germany being a close second aider and abetter.

Angela Merkel, Gerhard Schröder top aide-de-camp

That Angela Merkel ever dared to claim that the North Stream 2 pipeline was strictly a “private sector project” is the height of conceit.

It leads one to wonder which side, the Russian or the Western one, the long-time German Chancellor was actually working on.

After the beginning of the (continued, now massive) invasion of Ukraine, her legacy is forever tarnished.

Self-prostituting sports teams

Sports teams got lucrative sponsorships especially from Russian fossil fuel giants to cement their own legacies, particularly on the European soccer stage.

European soccer stadiums are soiled by Russian oligarchs who occupy the owners’ suites. Europe’s soccer pitches are soiled by players running around in Gazprom jerseys, all in pursuit of grabbing a piece of that deeply human-despising Russian cake of criminal wealth.

Mere spinelessness – or active collaboration?

All of this normalized continuous Russian abuses to such extent that the reactions to Russian “overreach” such as Putin’s annexation of the Crimea region or murders or attempted murders of dissidents on foreign soil received little more than a shrug of the shoulders.

This stance was so engraved in the lazy heads of Western electorates that they voted or kept in power the forces that idly stood by the mounting atrocities of the serial killer, Vladimir Putin.

Donald Trump, Russia’s very active, ex-sleeper agent

Putin-puppet, Donald Trump, was even elected President of the United States with the help of Russian intelligence.

While none of this has gone unnoticed and some of it has been – at least temporarily – reversed through the “unelection” of Donald Trump, who just a couple of days ago praised Putin as a “genius” for his Ukraine actions, it is mystifying, to a degree, how it was and is possible.

But is it too late now?

The invasion of Ukraine is in full effect. It is difficult to imagine that it will be reversed or stopped because only a NATO military response could bring that about. The risks of a nuclear war would seem too great for that to happen.

But by understanding the key takeaways from how we got here and why, we ought to be able to design the kind of actions that would contain Putin’s westward drive.

Four main principles

Without delving into a detailed list of sanctions/actions that the West must take (the list is long), these sanctions/actions should be guided by a set of four main principles.

1. The long-term goal of these actions must be to contain Russia beyond Putin. This implies, for example, that Europe must develop a detailed long-term plan to completely and permanently end energy dependence on Russia.

Obviously, an aggressive (and credible, meaning executable) move towards renewable, clean energy sources would not only meet that goal but also help saving the planet.

2. Europe must understand that self-defense, credible self-defense is the most effective weapon in preventing war.

To discard ill-advised pacifism or to overcome reasonable historic guilt does not equate imperialism. Rather, it is in full recognition of all historical lessons ever learned. It’s the best guarantee for peace, we have.

3. While fully aware of the unlikelihood of Russian adoption of democratic values anytime soon, Europeans and Americans must launch a full-fledged effort to highlight that Putin’s aggression, or the aggression of future Russian leaders will only further impoverish the Russian people.

And they must directly address the Russian people to drive this point home. Social media are an excellent medium to promote such campaign. Radio Free Europe played a role during the Cold War, but it was a bit player when compared to today’s social media.

4. Everything has a price. Nothing comes for free. These are not catch-phrases. These are “unconventional truths”.

Conclusion

We are all creatures of comfort. The recent pandemic should have steeled us though, teaching us that the unexpected does happen and that we must take sometimes controversial and always painful actions in order to protect the greater good.

In following these principles, the actions/sanctions against Putin and – yes, Russia itself – become fairly self-evident.

Our response will determine not only how Russia’s flappy wings will effectively be clipped, but also how we are going to address the looming threat of China.

More on this topic

• The Transatlantic World is Falling Apart 
• Ukraine and the Return of Geopolitics 
• Russia and Globalization

About Stephan Richter

Director of the Global Ideas Center, a global network of authors and analysts, and Editor-in-Chief of The Globalist.

Full bio → | View all posts by Stephan Richter →

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation - Robert D. Atkinson (The Globalist) - A PARANOIA do "Ocidente"

 Meu pitaco sobre uma escorregada séria do boletim The Globalist (agora um pouco menos globaliza).

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

My God, até o diretor da The Globalist se perdeu na política de contenção da China, numa postura totalmente defensiva do que resta do suposto "Ocidente" em face do "desafio" de se contrapor aos avanços da China em C&T. 
Esses caras perderam completamente o rumo, pois acham que o Atlântico Norte (EUA e UE) precisam de unir para "enfrentar" o desafio da China nessa área. Eles devem achar que ainda existe uma diferença (ou oposição) entre essa coisa chamada "Ocidente" e o ROW, ou seja, o resto do mundo. 
Que loucura! Desse jeito, esse "Ocidente" na defensiva vai perder o que eles consideram, de forma totalmente equivocada, um "enfrentamento" entre dois sistemas opostos. 
Ora, a China, a despeito de ser uma ditadura, é uma economia totalmente de mercado (com participação estatal não muito distante de certas democracias de mercado, a despeito do planejamento, que é bom inclusive para o "Ocidente"), e deve se desenvolver com base nas mesmas tecnologias que o "Ocidente" (um conceito totalmente ridículo hoje em dia), embora com alguma espionagem industrial aqui e ali, pirataria, etc. (nada que as potências "ocidentais" também não façam, justamente contra a China, que agora passou na frente em várias áreas).
Enfim, acho que The Globalist está se tornando menos globalista...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Dear Reader,

In today’s feature, Robert Atkinson talks about boosting transatlantic technology cooperation. He emphasizes the importance of the European Union and the United States addressing the real technology competitiveness challenge -- China.

To defend their economic futures, the two transatlantic partners need to maintain their technology lead over China, he says, especially in technologies like 6G, energy storage, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors.

Cheers,

Stephan Richter, Editor-in-Chief

The Globalist

Today's Feature

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation

The EU and the U.S. need to address the real technology competitiveness challenge, which is China. | By Robert D. Atkinson https://theglobalist.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=fe900a29e67b9f5bd30ac3091&id=eb86167b1f&e=23ed0dfe5f

THEGLOBALIST.COM

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation - The Globalist

The EU and the U.S. need to engage in more transatlantic technology cooperation to address the real competitiveness challenge – China.

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation

The EU and the U.S. need to address the real technology competitiveness challenge, which is China. 

By Robert D. Atkinson, 

The Globalist, November 29, 2021

During the era of the Cold War, the United States and Europe cooperated militarily, but competed economically. At the time, the Soviet Union posed a military, not an economic, threat to the West.

Today, in what could become a second Cold War, this time with China, the U.S. and Europe need to put great emphasis on cooperating economically. 

The reason for this is straightforward: From the vantage point of each of the transatlantic partners, China poses a threat to our economic competitiveness. 

More transatlantic technology cooperation needed

As such, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and the EU to build upon the initial steps of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The goal must be, first, to reduce economic tensions between the two regions and second, to foster formal cooperation.

This is especially true with regard to supporting advanced and emerging technology development and production.

China: Unfair, state-directed capitalism

As Barry Naughton notes in The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020, China has not only become the world’s manufacturing workshop. 

It is also seeking to be the world leader in emerging technologies such as biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence and others.

What’s more, China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism.

To be sure, both the EU and the United States have industrial policies – but these policies mostly support foundational elements like workforce training, infrastructure and R&D.

China looking for dominance

In contrast, China’s predatory regime, especially subsidies to industry, goes way beyond what is considered acceptable industrial policy.

On top of that, the Chinese Communist Party compels technology transfer for market access, encourages intellectual property theft and operates tax and regulatory policies that discriminate against EU and U.S. firms.

That, combined with real strengths of the Chinese economy – a massive domestic market that lures in foreign investment, a massive technical and scientific labor force and improving research universities – mean that China is gaining rapidly technologically. 

At the expense of EU and U.S.

That gain has and will come at the expense of the EU’s and U.S.’s global market shares in advanced technologies.

The result of that shift cannot be underestimated. Initially, China systematically assembled the components needed to be the manufacturing workshop of the world. 

This systematic approach has made it hard, even with the Trump tariffs and measures by Japan and other countries, to move production out of China.

Silicon China?

Now, China is seeking to establish the same robust innovation ecosystem that will give it strong reinforcing strengths. China wants to be not Silicon Valley, but Silicon China – and not just for IT, but for every advanced technology.

The list of tech sectors China seeks to dominate is long. It ranges from aviation, battery technology, biotech, materials, clean energy, transportation, machinery and, of course, advanced IT.

If China were to achieve this leadership position, its lead will become self-reinforcing as competitors weaken and China’s advantages (e.g., capital, STEM workers, patents, tacit knowledge) improve.

Not another Asian tiger

If China were simply following the path of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), there would be less to worry about. 

All of these countries, as well as Japan, only sought comparative advantage in some industries – as opposed to absolute advantage in most industries.

More crucially, they were (or quickly became) democracies that did not seek to challenge long-standing principles of the rule of law and human rights. 

A Maoist global hegemon?

China not only seeks absolute advantage in most if not all advanced and emerging industries. Under the leadership of President Xi, it has become clear that China is reverting to its Leninist and Maoist authoritarian origins.

If China becomes the global technology leader, it reinforces China’s efforts to be militarily superior and a global hegemon. That would give China the ability to hold the West hostage for key products and supplies.

What to do? Three steps

There are three key steps the United States and Europe should take. First, stop fighting each other economically. Resolving the long-standing Boeing-Airbus feud and focusing on the real challenger – China’s Comac – was a good first step.

The United States eliminating its steel and aluminum tariffs on EU imports was a good second step. For its part, Europe, including member states like Germany and France, needs to dial back its “digital sovereignty” agenda which is targeted at the United States and U.S. companies. 

Second, both regions need to ramp up cooperation against unfair Chinese economic practices, including cooperation on cybersecurity, investment screening, bringing trade cases before the WTO and cooperative export controls.

Time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation

Finally, and most ambitiously, it is time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation. 

In a world where the development of technology has become much more technologically complex, neither region is large enough to specialize in all major technologies.

Therefore, each region should allow the other region’s companies to participate in government-funded industry research programs, like the EU’s Horizon 2020 program and similar U.S. programs that agencies like the National Science Foundation operate.

Moreover, as the governments roll out or expand specialized technology programs in technologies like 6G, energy storage, battery technology, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU firms, universities and governments.

Finally, governments should review and minimize or eliminate regulatory barriers to science and technology cooperation, including enabling easier cross-border work of scientists and engineers.

Conclusion

The sooner the EU and the U.S. can stop seeing each other as the competition and work to address the real technology competitiveness challenge – China – the more likely both regions can ensure their economic futures, while upholding critical values.

About Robert D. Atkinson

Robert Atkinson is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

Full bio → | View all posts by Robert D. Atkinson 

https://www.theglobalist.com/author/ratkinson/

Takeawys: 

To defend their economic futures, the two transatlantic partners need to maintain their technology lead over China.

The sooner the EU and the U.S. stop seeing each other as the competition, the better. 

China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism.

The list of tech sectors China seeks to dominate is long. It ranges from aviation, battery technology, biotech, materials, clean energy, transportation, machinery and, of course, advanced IT.

It is time for more formal EU-US technology cooperation. In technologies like 6G, energy storage, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU.

If China becomes the global technology leader, it reinforces China’s efforts to be militarily superior and a global hegemon.