O impasse na Ucrânia: poucas armas, poucos avanços nas frentes de batalha: O Ocidente perdeu a vontade? - Ishaan Tharoor, Sammy Westfall (WP)

 

By Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall  The Washington Post, Jan 31, 2024 Email

Ukraine’s hopes for victory over Russia are slipping away A member of a Ukrainian air defense unit in the woods north of Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Tuesday. (Alice Martins for The Washington Post/FTWP) It’s hard to ignore the sense of desperation in Ukraine’s corridors of power. Nearing two years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, authorities in Kyiv maintain their long-standing entreaty to partners in the West: Deliver us more arms, more aid, more political commitments. President Volodymyr Zelensky toured Western capitals at the end of last year, pleading for support amid growing international fatigue with the conflict and paralysis in U.S. Congress over new supplemental funding for Kyiv. Around the same time, his top general, Valery Zaluzhny, bemoaned the “stalemate” that had set into place after the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 failed to make strategic headway against Russia’s deep defensive lines. U.S. officials and their Western counterparts, as my colleagues reported over the weekend, anticipate a lean year ahead, where Ukraine’s increasingly exhausted forces focus more on consolidating their defense than chipping away at Russia’s land-grabs. The Kremlin controls roughly a fifth of Ukraine’s internationally-recognized territory — including Crimea, which it illegally annexed in 2014, and a broad sweep of Ukraine’s southeast. The U.S. view of the course of the conflict undercuts Zelensky’s stated ambition of driving Russia out by this October. Last week, Pentagon officials came empty-handed to a monthly 50-nation coordinating meeting for Ukraine, with future U.S. money for arms and aid snared by domestic politics. On the front lines, reports indicate stocks of ammunition and artillery shells are running low for many Ukrainian units. “We get asked what’s our plan, but we need to understand what resources we’re going to have,” Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko told my colleagues. “Right now, everything points to the possibility that we will have less than last year, when we tried to do a counteroffensive and it didn’t work out. … If we will have even less, then it’s clear what the plan will be. It will be defense.” Looming far away from the battlefield is the political drama in Washington. House Republicans have already stymied the latest tranche of funding that President Biden is trying to allocate for Kyiv. Analysts believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is holding out for a potential return to power of former president Donald Trump, the likely Republican presidential candidate for the November election. Trump may scale back support for Ukraine and take a friendlier view of the Kremlin’s security concerns in Eastern Europe. As my colleagues reported, the Biden administration and European allies are working on a longer-term, multilateral plan aimed at warding against this scenario and future-proofing support for Ukraine. That includes pledges of economic and security assistance that stretch into the next decade, and may pave the way for Ukraine to get integrated into Western blocs like the European Union and NATO. Biden is set to unveil the U.S. plank of this strategy in the spring. “The policy holds risks, including political ones, if Ukrainians begin to blame their government for stagnant front lines,” my colleagues wrote. “Likewise, in Western capitals, officials are keenly aware that their citizens’ patience with funding Ukraine’s war is not infinite. Amid the planning, Washington also seems to be readying the argument that, even if Ukraine is not going to regain all of its territory in the near term, it needs significant ongoing assistance to be able to defend itself and become an integral part of the West.” But, in the near term, both the shortfalls on Ukraine’s front lines and divisions in Washington may cement the fate of the war. “While the first half of 2024 may bring few changes in control of Ukrainian territory, the materiel, personnel training, and casualties that each side accrues in the next few months will determine the long-term trajectory of the conflict,” wrote Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank. “The West in fact faces a crucial choice right now: support Ukraine so that its leaders can defend their territory and prepare for a 2025 offensive or cede an irrecoverable advantage to Russia.” The West may have already squandered its best chance to enable Ukraine to fully liberate its territory. In his new book, “Our Enemies Will Vanish: The Russian Invasion and Ukraine’s War of Independence,” Wall Street Journal international correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov outlines how Western governments slow-rolled military support to Ukraine out of fear of triggering a possible nuclear-armed escalation with Russia. The United States and its allies have sent Ukraine an unprecedented flow of aid, but critics say the overly careful calibration of that support undermined the Ukrainian war effort. “The United States and its partners held back from supplying Ukraine with Western-made capabilities at a time when they would have had the biggest effect, and prohibited Kyiv from using Western weapons to strike military targets on Russian soil,” Trofimov wrote, in an adapted excerpt from his book published in The Washington Post. “By the time many of these Western systems did arrive, in the second year of the war, Russia had built up defenses, mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and switched its industries to wartime footing. The best window of opportunity for a clear and quick Ukrainian victory had disappeared.” Other experts aren’t so sure, and contend that the Biden administration had a responsibility to avoid a spiraling confrontation with Russia. “More aid, sooner, would have been better — but there’s no guarantee it would have brought a decisive Ukrainian victory,” wrote Bloomberg Opinion columnist Hal Brands. “The best guarantee of that outcome would have been threatening direct military intervention, a strategy that virtually no one wanted to pursue because the risks were so obvious and, potentially, so severe. Indeed, it would have required Biden to more aggressively cross Russia’s red lines at the very moment when uncertainty about Putin’s response was at its peak.” Instead, Ukrainians and their boosters lament what could have been after Ukrainian forces surprised virtually everyone in repulsing Russia’s initial offensive on Kyiv and defiantly standing their ground in the early months of the war. “He opened his mouth like a python and thought that we’re just another bunny,” Zelensky told Trofimov in a 2022 interview, referring to Putin. “But we’re not a bunny and it turned out that he can’t swallow us — and is actually at risk of getting torn apart himself.” Russia, though, has also stood its ground, withstood international sanctions and is preparing for fresh offensives in Ukraine, on top of its incessant, indiscriminate missile barrages into Ukrainian cities. Kyiv knows its ability to resist hinges on foreign backing. “We wouldn’t survive without U.S. support, it’s a real fact,” Zelensky said in a television interview this month.

Vitória da Rússia na Ucrânia levaria Ocidente a guerra contra China, diz ex-aliado de Putin, Mikhail Khodorkovski - Catherine Belton O Estado de S. Paulo,

Vitória da Rússia na Ucrânia levaria Ocidente a guerra contra China, diz ex-aliado de Putin

Para o magnata russo Mikhail Khodorkovski, exilado e crítico de Putin, uma vitória russa encorajaria Pequim a iniciar um conflito por causa de Taiwan

Por Catherine Belton

O Estado de S. Paulo, 15/02/2023

LONDRES - Uma vitória militar russa na Ucrânia encorajará Pequim e levará a uma guerra entre os Estados Unidos e a China por causa de Taiwan, alertou Mikhail Khodorkovski, o magnata russo exilado e crítico do regime de Vladimir Putin, em uma entrevista antes dos comentários que fará para líderes globais em uma grande conferência de segurança e defesa na Alemanha no próximo fim de semana.

“Uma guerra perdida na Ucrânia é um trampolim para a guerra na Ásia-Pacífico”, disse Khodorkovski em entrevista ao Washington Post em Londres, onde vive atualmente. “Você precisa entender que quando até mesmo um cara grande é atingido no rosto, vários outros caras começam a duvidar se aquele cara é realmente tão forte, e eles vão querer arrancar os dentes dele. … Se os EUA querem ir para a guerra na Ásia, então o caminho mais correto para isso é mostrar fraqueza também na Ucrânia.”

Khodorkovski, que passou uma década na prisão na Rússia antes de ser perdoado por Putin em 2013, disse que intensificar a ajuda militar ocidental à Ucrânia e garantir sua vitória é a única maneira de os EUA evitarem tal conflito militar com a China.

Khodorkovski deve falar neste fim de semana na Conferência de Segurança de Munique, onde ele e duas outras figuras da oposição, o ex-campeão mundial de xadrez Garry Kasparov, e Yulia Navalnaya, mulher do líder da oposição preso Alexei Navalny, foram convidados em vez de representantes oficiais do governo russo.

Seus convites representam uma clara repreensão ao Kremlin sobre a guerra de Putin na Ucrânia. É a primeira vez que membros da oposição foram convidados em vez de autoridades russas para a conferência de segurança, um evento de alto nível em que Putin fez um discurso histórico rejeitando o Ocidente em 2007 e onde o ministro das Relações Exteriores da Rússia, Serguei Lavrov, é normalmente um rosto familiar.

A Rússia se recusou a participar da conferência do ano passado, realizada pouco antes do início de sua invasão, dizendo que o evento estava “se transformando em um fórum transatlântico” e “perdendo sua inclusão e objetividade”.

Christoph Heusgen, presidente da conferência de segurança, disse que representantes oficiais da Rússia não seriam convidados enquanto Putin “negasse o direito de existência da Ucrânia”.

Três caminhos

Na entrevista, Khodorkovski, que já foi o homem mais rico da Rússia como principal proprietário da companhia petrolífera Yukos, disse que o Ocidente agora tem uma escolha entre três caminhos em sua estratégia de apoio à Ucrânia.

A trajetória atual, apesar dos acordos recentes para fornecer tanques de batalha avançados, representa apenas um apoio militar incremental e está abrindo caminho para uma guerra prolongada e cheia de riscos, disse Khodorkovski. Nesta situação, não há garantias de que a Ucrânia possa sustentar seu atual nível de baixas, enquanto as disputas políticas nos Estados Unidos antes da eleição presidencial de 2024 podem levar os legisladores a cortar o fornecimento de armas e a ajuda econômica.

“Se o Ocidente considerar que a Ucrânia tem força suficiente para continuar a perder de 350 a 500 pessoas por dia em mortos e feridos, e se puder garantir um fornecimento garantido e constante de armas e munições, tudo bem”, disse ele. “Mas isso é um risco muito grande.” Enquanto isso, disse ele, Putin poderia tentar responder “assimetricamente” desestabilizando governos na África, nos Bálcãs e no Oriente Médio, bem como potencialmente no Ocidente.

Um segundo caminho envolveria o Ocidente intensificar rápida e significativamente a assistência militar para incluir mísseis de longo alcance e caças que permitiriam à Ucrânia destruir as linhas de abastecimento russas.

“A única coisa que pode impactar a situação no campo de batalha é a aviação”, disse Khodorkovski. “Todo o resto é secundário.”

Embora o apoio ocidental à Ucrânia tenha sido muito maior do que muitos esperavam, “isso não cancela o fato de que o Ocidente precisa fazer muito mais”, disse ele. A assistência frequentemente acompanha os eventos no campo de batalha e “quando você começar a fornecer esses mísseis e tanques, já será tarde demais. … Se em três meses a frente se mover em direção a Kiev, eles darão aviões, mas será tarde demais porque não haverá mais aeródromos “, disse ele.

Uma terceira rota veria Washington e seus aliados eventualmente “dar meia-volta e partir como fizeram no Afeganistão e como fizeram na Síria e em outros lugares”, disse ele.

“Putin é uma pessoa que pensa retrospectivamente e considera que, se algo aconteceu antes, muitas vezes acontecerá novamente da mesma forma no futuro”, disse Khodorkovski. “E ele não costuma errar nisso. Pensando retrospectivamente, ele vê que cada vez que começa uma pequena e nova guerra, ele é capaz de consolidar a sociedade ao seu redor e vê os americanos irem embora várias vezes. … Mas se ele terminar a operação na Ucrânia com sucesso para si mesmo, então os patriotas nacionais que agora são sua principal fonte de apoio não permitirão que ele pare e a próxima guerra começará.”

Embora a agressão russa continue além da Ucrânia, disse Khodorkovski, qualquer vitória aparente de Putin na Ucrânia também encorajaria a China a avançar para Taiwan , ele disse. “Quando ouço americanos dizerem que precisamos escolher entre ajudar a Ucrânia e ajudar Taiwan porque não podemos estender a ambos, parece tão primitivo que tenho a sensação de que deve ser um truque”, disse ele.

Qualquer acordo negociado em que a Ucrânia seja forçada a concordar em ceder território, como as regiões de Donetsk e Luhansk, endureceria a posição dos falcões, em quem o presidente russo foi forçado a contar para angariar apoio público à guerra. Putin seria então “forçado sob pressão” a lançar novos ataques à Ucrânia, disse Khodorkovski.

Khodorkovski há muito usa sua Open Russia Foundation para combater o regime de Putin e agora patrocina uma série de projetos de oposição política russa. Seu livro mais recente, How to Slay a Dragon (Como matar um dragão, na tradução livre), conclama o Ocidente a começar a se preparar para um regime pós-guerra pós-Putin, no qual o sistema presidencial da Rússia deve ser desmantelado e substituído por uma república parlamentar.

Uma rápida escalada no apoio ocidental à Ucrânia para encerrar a guerra rapidamente, derrotando as tropas russas, seria “melhor para a Rússia”, disse Khodorkovski. “Menos pessoas morrerão e o acúmulo de força dos terríveis patriotas nacionais será menor”, disse ele.

Caso contrário, o país enfrentará um colapso muito mais profundo. Quanto mais a guerra continuar, maior a chance de que os russos parem de culpar seu governo pela morte de seus entes queridos e culpem a Ucrânia, disse ele.

De acordo com Khodorkovski, um conflito prolongado também é arriscado para Putin, que enfrenta ressentimentos de ambos os lados de uma elite profundamente dividida: o campo patriota nacionalista, que acredita que Putin deveria agir de forma mais decisiva e radical para conquistar a Ucrânia, e uma política mais liberal. campo mental que considera a guerra um erro terrível.

Até o momento, não há indícios de que alguém vá agir contra o presidente autoritário. Mas se ficar claro que Putin está perdendo a guerra, Khodorkovski disse que a história pode se repetir com os governadores regionais se recusando a receber ordens de Moscou, como fizeram em 1999, uma situação que acabou forçando o enfraquecido presidente Boris Yeltsin a renunciar.

Putin, até agora, está se mantendo firme. “A propaganda ainda é capaz de convencer as pessoas de que elas estão vencendo no front”, disse Khodorkovski, acrescentando que mesmo um esforço fracassado de recrutamento não prejudicou Putin. “A mobilização foi mais fácil para ele do que muitos esperavam”, disse, acrescentando: “Agora é uma questão do que acontece no campo de batalha. Tudo o mais tem um significado absolutamente marginal”.

https://www.estadao.com.br/internacional/vitoria-da-russia-na-ucrania-levaria-ocidente-a-guerra-contra-china-diz-ex-aliado-de-putin/

Pode-se isolar totalmente a Rússia? Seria inteligente fazê-lo? Funciona? - Ivan Krastev (Financial Times)

 To isolate Russia is not in the west’s power or interest

Treating the entire country as a geopolitical Chernobyl would be a strategic blunder

Ivan Krastev

Financial Times, Londres – 25.4.2022

 

As the world reeled from the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one question was left unanswered. On whose behalf was the war declared? Are the majority of Russians hostage to Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions, or is Russian society the equivalent of Putin writ large? 

During the invasion’s first days, most Europeans leaned towards the hostage theory and expected ordinary Russians to voice their opposition. It took the revelation of the unfathomable atrocities in Bucha for public opinion to shift, reconceiving of Putin’s war as Russia’s war. 

The Kremlin’s total media control and growing repression were seemingly no longer sufficient to explain, let alone justify, the silence of Russian society. Did Russians not know the truth about Bucha or did they do not want to know it? Many Europeans were outraged by the way the country’s citizens swallowed hard and shut their eyes to their army’s barbarism. 

After the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, an exclusion zone was created around the reactor that exploded. For Europeans and for the western political mind generally, Russia has become a geopolitical Chernobyl: a site of moral disaster, a place of danger to be sealed off. And so many Europeans today are dreaming about a world without Russia. 

In their imagination the west no longer consumes Russia’s energy resources. Cultural contacts are severed and Europe’s borders are fortified. It would be as if Russia had disappeared. Even pathologically optimistic business leaders see little opportunity of reinvesting in Russian markets in the coming years. And while Putin remains in power, a significant easing of western sanctions appears a remote prospect. 

Many western policymakers have already given up on the hope of change in Russia. Instead they focus on measures aimed at limiting the country’s ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives. 

But any attempt to seal off Russia would be very different from the west’s cold war policy of containment of the Soviet Union. As George Kennan conceived it, containment was predicated on an assumption that over time the Soviet regime was destined to collapse because of its internal contradictions. A Chernobyl-style isolation would assume that Russia can never change. 

The cold war was rooted in a discourse in which the regime was to be blamed but the people declared innocent. The Soviet Union was depicted as a prison-house, and Soviet leaders were never recognised as legitimate representatives of their society. 

In contrast to this idea of an evil regime and a repressed people in which change is still imaginable, a policy that seeks to create an “isolated Russian zone” unconsciously adopts a discourse in which Russia as a civilisation is immutable. 

There are myriad moral reasons why Russia should be ghettoised as a geopolitical Chernobyl. But treating Russia as a collective Putin will be a strategic blunder. Here is why. 

First, this notion will primarily benefit the Russian leader. It unwittingly gives him the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Russian people. Worse, it justifies his twisted narrative that the only Russia the west can tolerate is a weak or defeated one. If Russia is a geopolitical Chernobyl, the only reasonable strategy for any freedom-loving Russian is to bolt for the exits.

Second, an isolation strategy is probably self-defeating because it closes off interest in what is happening in Russia. It predicts that Russians’ failure to speak against the war means that the country will never change its attitude towards it. It will miss the fact that more than a few Russians support the war not because they support the regime but because they irrationally hope that the war will change the regime. 

Opposition-minded people hope that a defeat for the Russian army in Ukraine will bring Putin down. Many of his supporters relish the destruction of the despised, Putin-enabled offshore elite. In the words of a famous rock singer, after the west seized the property of the oligarchs, Russians finally became “equal like in 1917”. 

Third, to bet on a world without Russia is ultimately futile because the non-western world, which may not favour the Kremlin’s war, is hardly eager to isolate Russia. Many see the current barbarism as disgusting but not exceptional. They practice value-free realism. Many of the states that US president Joe Biden invited to his Summit for Democracy have not placed sanctions on Russia. 

Russia’s military offensive in the Donbas only intensifies the clash between those who view the country as morally irreparable and those who see it as an unavoidable reality in global politics. The offensive will force European public opinion to choose between “the peace party” (those who insist that the west’s priority should be to stop hostilities as soon as possible, even at the cost of major concessions from Ukraine) and “the justice party” (those who insist the priority should be to expel Russian troops from Ukrainian territory even at the cost of prolonged war). 

Peace and justice do not rhyme in European history. Whether you call the invasion of Ukraine Putin’s war or Russians’ war is not a matter of taste but a strategic choice. It signals the west’s expectations about its relations with post-Putin Russia, whenever that arrives.

 

The writer is chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and permanent fellow at IWM Vienna.

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation - Robert D. Atkinson (The Globalist) - A PARANOIA do "Ocidente"

 Meu pitaco sobre uma escorregada séria do boletim The Globalist (agora um pouco menos globaliza).

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

My God, até o diretor da The Globalist se perdeu na política de contenção da China, numa postura totalmente defensiva do que resta do suposto "Ocidente" em face do "desafio" de se contrapor aos avanços da China em C&T. 
Esses caras perderam completamente o rumo, pois acham que o Atlântico Norte (EUA e UE) precisam de unir para "enfrentar" o desafio da China nessa área. Eles devem achar que ainda existe uma diferença (ou oposição) entre essa coisa chamada "Ocidente" e o ROW, ou seja, o resto do mundo. 
Que loucura! Desse jeito, esse "Ocidente" na defensiva vai perder o que eles consideram, de forma totalmente equivocada, um "enfrentamento" entre dois sistemas opostos. 
Ora, a China, a despeito de ser uma ditadura, é uma economia totalmente de mercado (com participação estatal não muito distante de certas democracias de mercado, a despeito do planejamento, que é bom inclusive para o "Ocidente"), e deve se desenvolver com base nas mesmas tecnologias que o "Ocidente" (um conceito totalmente ridículo hoje em dia), embora com alguma espionagem industrial aqui e ali, pirataria, etc. (nada que as potências "ocidentais" também não façam, justamente contra a China, que agora passou na frente em várias áreas).
Enfim, acho que The Globalist está se tornando menos globalista...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Dear Reader,

In today’s feature, Robert Atkinson talks about boosting transatlantic technology cooperation. He emphasizes the importance of the European Union and the United States addressing the real technology competitiveness challenge -- China.

To defend their economic futures, the two transatlantic partners need to maintain their technology lead over China, he says, especially in technologies like 6G, energy storage, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors.

Cheers,

Stephan Richter, Editor-in-Chief

The Globalist

Today's Feature

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation

The EU and the U.S. need to address the real technology competitiveness challenge, which is China. | By Robert D. Atkinson https://theglobalist.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=fe900a29e67b9f5bd30ac3091&id=eb86167b1f&e=23ed0dfe5f

THEGLOBALIST.COM

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation - The Globalist

The EU and the U.S. need to engage in more transatlantic technology cooperation to address the real competitiveness challenge – China.

Boosting Transatlantic Technology Cooperation

The EU and the U.S. need to address the real technology competitiveness challenge, which is China. 

By Robert D. Atkinson, 

The Globalist, November 29, 2021

During the era of the Cold War, the United States and Europe cooperated militarily, but competed economically. At the time, the Soviet Union posed a military, not an economic, threat to the West.

Today, in what could become a second Cold War, this time with China, the U.S. and Europe need to put great emphasis on cooperating economically. 

The reason for this is straightforward: From the vantage point of each of the transatlantic partners, China poses a threat to our economic competitiveness. 

More transatlantic technology cooperation needed

As such, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and the EU to build upon the initial steps of the new US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The goal must be, first, to reduce economic tensions between the two regions and second, to foster formal cooperation.

This is especially true with regard to supporting advanced and emerging technology development and production.

China: Unfair, state-directed capitalism

As Barry Naughton notes in The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020, China has not only become the world’s manufacturing workshop. 

It is also seeking to be the world leader in emerging technologies such as biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence and others.

What’s more, China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism.

To be sure, both the EU and the United States have industrial policies – but these policies mostly support foundational elements like workforce training, infrastructure and R&D.

China looking for dominance

In contrast, China’s predatory regime, especially subsidies to industry, goes way beyond what is considered acceptable industrial policy.

On top of that, the Chinese Communist Party compels technology transfer for market access, encourages intellectual property theft and operates tax and regulatory policies that discriminate against EU and U.S. firms.

That, combined with real strengths of the Chinese economy – a massive domestic market that lures in foreign investment, a massive technical and scientific labor force and improving research universities – mean that China is gaining rapidly technologically. 

At the expense of EU and U.S.

That gain has and will come at the expense of the EU’s and U.S.’s global market shares in advanced technologies.

The result of that shift cannot be underestimated. Initially, China systematically assembled the components needed to be the manufacturing workshop of the world. 

This systematic approach has made it hard, even with the Trump tariffs and measures by Japan and other countries, to move production out of China.

Silicon China?

Now, China is seeking to establish the same robust innovation ecosystem that will give it strong reinforcing strengths. China wants to be not Silicon Valley, but Silicon China – and not just for IT, but for every advanced technology.

The list of tech sectors China seeks to dominate is long. It ranges from aviation, battery technology, biotech, materials, clean energy, transportation, machinery and, of course, advanced IT.

If China were to achieve this leadership position, its lead will become self-reinforcing as competitors weaken and China’s advantages (e.g., capital, STEM workers, patents, tacit knowledge) improve.

Not another Asian tiger

If China were simply following the path of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), there would be less to worry about. 

All of these countries, as well as Japan, only sought comparative advantage in some industries – as opposed to absolute advantage in most industries.

More crucially, they were (or quickly became) democracies that did not seek to challenge long-standing principles of the rule of law and human rights. 

A Maoist global hegemon?

China not only seeks absolute advantage in most if not all advanced and emerging industries. Under the leadership of President Xi, it has become clear that China is reverting to its Leninist and Maoist authoritarian origins.

If China becomes the global technology leader, it reinforces China’s efforts to be militarily superior and a global hegemon. That would give China the ability to hold the West hostage for key products and supplies.

What to do? Three steps

There are three key steps the United States and Europe should take. First, stop fighting each other economically. Resolving the long-standing Boeing-Airbus feud and focusing on the real challenger – China’s Comac – was a good first step.

The United States eliminating its steel and aluminum tariffs on EU imports was a good second step. For its part, Europe, including member states like Germany and France, needs to dial back its “digital sovereignty” agenda which is targeted at the United States and U.S. companies. 

Second, both regions need to ramp up cooperation against unfair Chinese economic practices, including cooperation on cybersecurity, investment screening, bringing trade cases before the WTO and cooperative export controls.

Time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation

Finally, and most ambitiously, it is time for more formal EU-US technology policy cooperation. 

In a world where the development of technology has become much more technologically complex, neither region is large enough to specialize in all major technologies.

Therefore, each region should allow the other region’s companies to participate in government-funded industry research programs, like the EU’s Horizon 2020 program and similar U.S. programs that agencies like the National Science Foundation operate.

Moreover, as the governments roll out or expand specialized technology programs in technologies like 6G, energy storage, battery technology, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU firms, universities and governments.

Finally, governments should review and minimize or eliminate regulatory barriers to science and technology cooperation, including enabling easier cross-border work of scientists and engineers.

Conclusion

The sooner the EU and the U.S. can stop seeing each other as the competition and work to address the real technology competitiveness challenge – China – the more likely both regions can ensure their economic futures, while upholding critical values.

About Robert D. Atkinson

Robert Atkinson is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

Full bio → | View all posts by Robert D. Atkinson 

https://www.theglobalist.com/author/ratkinson/

Takeawys: 

To defend their economic futures, the two transatlantic partners need to maintain their technology lead over China.

The sooner the EU and the U.S. stop seeing each other as the competition, the better. 

China is not only seeking absolute advantage on a host of technologies. It is seeking that advantage largely through unfair, state-directed capitalism.

The list of tech sectors China seeks to dominate is long. It ranges from aviation, battery technology, biotech, materials, clean energy, transportation, machinery and, of course, advanced IT.

It is time for more formal EU-US technology cooperation. In technologies like 6G, energy storage, autonomous systems, quantum computing and semiconductors, there should be joint collaboration between US and EU.

If China becomes the global technology leader, it reinforces China’s efforts to be militarily superior and a global hegemon. 

“I Have Eliminated 'the West’ from My Vocabulary” - Christoph Heusgen, Merkel's Foreign Policy Advisor (Der Spiegel)

 French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Merkel and foreign policy adviser Christoph Heusgen in 2017 during a flight from Triest to Paris.

Foto: Energistyrelsen / Bundesregierung / Guido Bergmann / action press

Interview with Merkel’s Former Foreign Policy Adviser “I Have Eliminated 'the West’ from My Vocabulary”

Christoph Heusgen served for 12 years as Angela Merkel’s top foreign policy adviser. In an interview, he speaks about the chancellor’s successes, mistakes, the amateurish nature of Donald Trump’s government and the right approach to an ascendant China.

Interview Conducted by Christiane Hoffmann und Christoph Schult

Der Spiegel, 23.09.2021, 12.45 Uhr

https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-merkel-s-former-foreign-policy-adviser-i-have-eliminated-the-west-from-my-vocabulary-a-e3ab1e9d-998f-4d56-9b17-ab950cef5334?sara_ecid=nl_upd_1jtzCCtmxpVo9GAZr2b4X8GquyeAc9&nlid=bfjpqhxz

About Christoph Heusgen

Foto: Luiz Rampelotto / dpa

Christoph Heusgen, 66, served as foreign policy adviser to German Chancellor Angela Merkel from 2005 to 2017. After studying economics in St. Gallen and at the Sorbonne, he joined the foreign service in 1980. From 1999 to 2006, he headed the staff of EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Javier Solana in Brussels. After leaving the Chancellery, he represented Germany as its permanent representative to the United Nations in New York until summer 2021. Heusgen comes from the city of Neuss, Germany, and is a member of the center-right Christian Democratic Union party.

DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Heusgen, you served as a foreign policy adviser to Angela Merkel from the time she took office in 2005 until 2017. Merkel is considered a major proponent of realpolitik, especially when it comes to foreign policy. What explanation can you offer regarding the degree to which Berlin was taken by surprise by the reality on the ground in Afghanistan?

Heusgen: It wasn’t just in German foreign policy circles – everyone was surprised by the dynamics that developed in Afghanistan.

DER SPIEGEL: Shouldn’t we have been able to predict that the Taliban was going to seize power in the country again?

Heusgen: Hindsight is always 20/20. As a matter of principle, it was right for us to be engaged in Afghanistan, both militarily and in terms of development policy. But we made the mistake of not forcing good governance on Afghan leaders. We should have attached much stricter conditions to our aid. Having seen how Afghan politicians thought first and foremost about themselves and their clans, it is not surprising in retrospect that this government had no standing with the population or with the security forces. When things got serious, everyone ran for the hills. This could have been foreseen with a little common sense.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think the West could have succeeded in Afghanistan if things had been done differently?

Heusgen: Personally, I think we should have stayed longer in Afghanistan, just as the Americans did for decades in Japan, South Korea and Germany. The key difference was the that the governments there helped in building democracy and institutions, and they also had the backing of the people.

DER SPIEGEL: What bothered you more: the negotiations with the Taliban under former U.S. President Donald Trump or the unconditional withdrawal under Joe Biden?

Heusgen: Excuse me, but the Trump administration was an amateurish, diplomatic mess. It was a grave mistake to forge an agreement with the Taliban and sideline an Afghan government that had been receiving support for years. Biden’s decision was logical and consistent. He knows how incredibly expensive the deployment is and how unpopular it is in the U.S. But I still wish he would have decided differently.

DER SPIEGEL: What does the defeat in Afghanistan mean for current and future deployments? How, for example, can we prevent a similar situation from arising in Mali, where the German armed forces are also deployed?

Heusgen: The lesson is that we need to set clearer conditions. We cannot have a transitional president who refuses to move forward with the transition to civilian rule. We need to be clear: Either you implement good governance reforms, or we will end our support. If the government doesn’t look after the welfare of its people, the terrorists will continue to gain ground. Foreign troops can’t do anything to change that.

DER SPIEGEL: But you also then have to carry through with it.

Heusgen: Yes, then you have to get out.

"When the Chinese wake up in the morning, the first things they are thinking about is not how they can strengthen the international legal order."

DER SPIEGEL: Was Afghanistan a defeat for the West?

Heusgen: I have actually eliminated the term "the West" from my vocabulary.

DER SPIEGEL: Why?

Heusgen: From my point of view, it is no longer about a dispute between the West and the East today, but between states that adhere to a rules-based international order, to the United Nations Charter, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and those that do not. These principles are not Western, but universal. The West has become a negative fighting word that the Russians and Chinese use against us, along the lines of: The West is yesterday’s news.

DER SPIEGEL: What’s your assessment of foreign policy in the Merkel era?

Heusgen: Over the past four years in New York (where Heusgen was Germany’s ambassador to the United Nations), I have seen that Germany has an excellent reputation, thanks in part to its chancellor. When I then return to Germany, I can only shake my head at my nagging compatriots, who complain about so many things here. People are always envious of us in New York, as an example of a country that works well and of a chancellor with foresight who, for 16 years, has ensured reliability, stability and balanced crisis management – in the euro and financial crises, the Ukraine crisis and the refugee crisis. When it comes to the refugee crisis, especially, perceptions in Germany and abroad diverge widely. My American colleague Susan Rice told me at the time that the refugee policy had permanently changed her view of Germany. Opening the border to Syrian refugees in 2015 was a great thing for our country’s reputation.

DER SPIEGEL: Crisis management is indeed considered to be Merkel’s legacy. But shouldn't the aim of successful foreign policy be to avoid crises, to pursue forward-looking policies? The refugee crisis, in particular, could have been avoided if the migrants in Syria’s neighboring countries had been dealt with at an early stage.

Heusgen: It is true that more could have been done. We have learned from that. Today, Germany is the second-largest financial contributor to the United Nations. We provide massive support to the World Food Program and UNICEF.

DER SPIEGEL: Could we not have predicted the Ukraine crisis? It was becoming clear, after all, that Russia was not going to accept the country’s orientation toward the West. Did Germany fail to prevent Ukraine from getting pushed into this conflict?

Heusgen: No, the chancellor had that in mind. We did not want to promote that conflict. That is why, against strong opposition from the United States, she prevented Ukraine from being granted the prospect of joining NATO; nor did the Association Agreement with the European Union open up any prospect of membership. She always kept in mind what was tolerable for Russia. But then, overnight, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych said: No, I'm not going to do this thing with the EU.

Chancellor Merkel, adviser Heusgen: "Germany has to do more."

DER SPIEGEL: Because Russia had placed massive pressure on him.

Heusgen: But we could not have known that Russia was planning an invasion. U.S. Senator John McCain, however, felt it could have been foreseen. From the moment when President Obama stood by and watched as Assad cross his red line in Syria in 2013 and deployed poison gas against the civilian population. McCain felt Putin saw this as a sign of weakness and believed that the Americans would not intervene in Ukraine either. But we still couldn’t tell the Ukrainians: Sorry, because of your geographical position, there can be no Association Agreement.

DER SPIEGEL: In your opinion, is Germany having a particularly hard time coming up with a forward-looking, strategic foreign policy?

Heusgen: I believe that Germany is still in the process of taking the step from being a divided nation to a reunified country that also parlays its economic strength into political strength. We have to get away from always looking first at what others want and think. Leadership is expected from Germany. This, of course, includes crisis prevention. We do that, too – in the Balkans or in Libya, for example. When it came to military intervention in Libya in 2011, Germany had the foresight to recognize that there was no upside, and it abstained at the UN Security Council.

DER SPIEGEL: The decision was not considered far-sighted, but rather typical of the Germans' reticence when it comes to military missions.

Heusgen: In retrospect, the decision has given us great credibility in Libya and in the region; it provides the foundation for our mediation in the country. I see this as part of a forward-looking policy to try to keep the EU’s backyard stable. This also includes our engagement in Africa, which has been a central focus of the chancellor in recent years.

DER SPIEGEL: Is Germany properly positioned for a leadership role in foreign policy?

Heusgen: No one else seems interested. The U.S. is pulling back, and you can see it everywhere. China has developed in a very nationalistic manner. When the Chinese wake up in the morning, the first thing they are thinking about is not how to strengthen the international legal order. So, Germany has to do more.

"If the chancellor then makes a decision, you have to accept it."

DER SPIEGEL: The election platforms of the center-left Christian Democrats and the business-friendly Free Democrats call for Germany to establish a National Security council along the lines of the one in the U.S. The Greens have similar ambitions. Is this a good idea?

Heusgen: A National Security Council would be good for a unified foreign policy. So that, for example, the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry aren’t working at cross purposes. But that is difficult in a country that has coalition governments. The Chancellery, where central decisions are made, must coordinate closely with the ministries in order to implement them.

DER SPIEGEL: Are there issues where you say today: I should have been more persistent, even with the chancellor. It is said that you have always had a more critical stance about, for example, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline under the Baltic Sea.

Heusgen: Let me answer that on principle. My role in the Chancellery was that of foreign policy adviser. However, decisions very often also have economic or domestic policy dimensions that the chancellor must take into account. If the chancellor then makes a decision, you have to accept it. She’s the politician, I am the civil servant. If you can’t deal with that, then you should find another job or go into politics yourself.

DER SPIEGEL: You were known for making some striking statements during your time on the UN Security Council. Did it feel good to drop the diplomatic restraint at times?

Heusgen: Those are two completely different roles. As adviser to the chancellor, it isn’t your job to be in the public eye, but when you sit on the Security Council, you speak for Germany. In a situation in which Russia, China and Trump’s America had trampled on the international order, I saw it as my duty to stand up for international law from morning until night – especially in light of Germany’s history. I have indeed often taken a very clear stand on this, and many other countries have thanked me for it. Even my Russian counterpart says that things are no longer as interesting without me there.

"The Trump administration was an amateurish, diplomatic mess."

Foto: CHRISTIAN HARTMANN / AFP

DER SPIEGEL: You once asked China and Russia how their presidents could still look in the mirror after they cut off 500,000 children in Syria from humanitarian aid. Was that statement coordinated with Berlin?

Heusgen: I think about formulations like that while I am jogging. If something is crying out to the heavens, you need to consider how to express it in a way that it will be heard. On important issues, you have to seek polarization.

DER SPIEGEL: The chancellor has been accused of being too naive in her dealings with China.

Heusgen: The chancellor had China's growing strength on her radar from the very beginning. She knew early on that the country would be a world power. That’s why she has traveled to China every year since 2006 and started government consultations. This intensive attention paid to China was far-sighted and correct.

DER SPIEGEL: Many thought she was too optimistic about the potential for change created by trade.

Heusgen: I don't agree. I also think the EU's investment agreement with China, which Merkel pushed forward, is right. We must meet China at eye level. The chancellor has never been naive. She has raised human rights concerns with Chinese leaders, she has been critical of the situation of the Uighurs and Tibetans, and she has helped get dissidents out of the country. She has constantly addressed the difficult points, but in a way that kept the discussion going. Of course, we shouldn’t have any illusions. China has become a totalitarian state under Xi Jinping. This will not change in the foreseeable future. We have to remain in dialogue with China and also do business with the country, but in doing so, we must clearly defend our principles and prevent the world from being run according to Chinese rules in the future.

Heusgen on the eyebrow-raising statements he made as Germany's ambassador to the UN: "I think about formulations like that while I am jogging."

Foto: Andreas Chudowski

DER SPIEGEL: The Chinese UN ambassador said goodbye to you by saying that he was glad to be rid of you. What was your experience with the Chinese at the UN?

Heusgen: My experience in New York was that you can work with the Chinese if you do it from a position of strength. It is very important that we do not turn a blind eye, because that won’t get us anywhere. The Chinese will interpret it as weakness. I was given such a "warm” farewell by the Chinese UN ambassador because I was a source of discomfort and clearly addressed the shortcomings: the military threats in the South China Sea, the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong and the treatment of the Uighurs. And we must act together with other countries. We should not breathe a sigh of relief when Beijing goes after other countries like Canada or Australia. We have to stand together – that impresses the Chinese.

DER SPIEGEL: Can you give an example of where that has worked?

Heusgen: I experienced that last year, when the annual declaration of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations was discussed, in which the situation of the Uighurs in Xinyang was condemned. In previous years, Britain and the U.S. were in charge, but last year we Germans took over. Instead of 23, 39 countries joined the declaration. That was an earthquake from the perspective of the Chinese. According to reports, a department head in Beijing had to resign as a result.

DER SPIEGEL: Is that also the way to confront Putin?

Heusgen: In contrast to Russia, China actually does care about its reputation abroad. The Russians don’t care if a resolution is passed against them in the General Assembly by a vote of 120 to five. The Chinese do care – they don't want to lose, and they will try to prevent losing by all means. They blackmail countries. When it comes to an issue that China cares deeply about, you sometimes see African ambassadors reading from Chinese talking points. It’s pretty brutal.

DER SPIEGEL: On the one hand, you are pleading for toughness, but on the other, you are sticking firmly to dialogue. Can that work in the long run?

Heusgen: Name an alternative.

DER SPIEGEL: The U.S. no longer sees China as a partner and competitor, but exclusively as a systemic rival.

Heusgen: The Americans call this "decoupling," but the policy doesn’t work. America’s trade with China may stagnate, but it will not decrease significantly. The economies are far too intertwined for that, and the economic losses would be too high. Furthermore, the Americans are not decoupling entirely. They still want to cooperate with China on climate policy.

DER SPIEGEL: Before Merkel brought you into the Chancellery, you served as chief of staff to Javier Solana, the EU’s first high representative for common foreign and security policy. Are you disappointed by how little has happened in EU foreign policy over the past 20 years?

Heusgen: Those were the golden days of European foreign policy. Solana had previously served as NATO secretary general and could speak on equal footing with EU heads of state and government. No such heavyweight has been appointed to the post of high representative since. Most countries are not prepared to hand more competencies over to Brussels. A first step would be if a former head of state or government were finally appointed to this office.

DER SPIEGEL: What about Angela Merkel?

Heusgen: I don't think she will seek a task like that after the end of her term as chancellor.

DER SPIEGEL: You are a member of the Christian Democratic Union. What distinguishes a Christian Democratic foreign policy from that of the business-friendly Free Democrats, the environmentalist Greens or the center-left Social Democrats?

Heusgen: As a Catholic and a Christian Democrat, the focus for me is on people. Human rights have always very much driven my foreign policy thinking and actions. There is definitely overlap with other parties.

DER SPIEGEL: Is it your hope that Armin Laschet will become chancellor?

Heusgen: Yes.

DER SPIEGEL: What's next for you personally? Is it true that you are likely to succeed Wolfgang Ischinger as chair of the Munich Security Conference?

Heusgen: As chairman of the circle of benefactors of the Munich Security Conference, I will now play an even greater role there and work together with my long-time colleague Wolfgang Ischinger. Apart from that, I have taken on a teaching position at my old university in Sankt Gallen, and I am very pleased about that.

DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Heusgen, we thank you for this interview.

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