O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Financial Times. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Financial Times. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 14 de novembro de 2024

What Trump unleashed means for America - Francis Fukuyama Financial Times

Meu comentário ao final. (PRA)

What Trump unleashed means for America

Republican is inaugurating a new era in US politics and perhaps for the world as a whole

Francis Fukuyama

Financial Times, November 8, 2024

 

The blowout victory of Donald Trump and the Republican party on Tuesday night will lead to major changes in important policy areas, from immigration to Ukraine. But the significance of the election extends way beyond these specific issues, and represents a decisive rejection by American voters of liberalism and the particular way that the understanding of a “free society” has evolved since the 1980s.

When Trump was first elected in 2016, it was easy to believe that this event was an aberration. He was running against a weak opponent who didn’t take him seriously, and in any case Trump didn’t win the popular vote. When Biden won the White House four years later, it seemed as if things had snapped back to normal after a disastrous one-term presidency.

Following Tuesday’s vote, it now seems that it was the Biden presidency that was the anomaly, and that Trump is inaugurating a new era in US politics and perhaps for the world as a whole. Americans were voting with full knowledge of who Trump was and what he represented. Not only did he win a majority of votes and is projected to take every single swing state, but the Republicans retook the Senate and look like holding on to the House of Representatives. Given their existing dominance of the Supreme Court, they are now set to hold all the major branches of government.

But what is the underlying nature of this new phase of American history?

Classical liberalism is a doctrine built around respect for the equal dignity of individuals through a rule of law that protects their rights, and through constitutional checks on the state’s ability to interfere with those rights. But over the past half century that basic impulse underwent two great distortions. The first was the rise of “neoliberalism”, an economic doctrine that sanctified markets and reduced the ability of governments to protect those hurt by economic change. The world got a lot richer in the aggregate, while the working class lost jobs and opportunity. Power shifted away from the places that hosted the original industrial revolution to Asia and other parts of the developing world.

The second distortion was the rise of identity politics or what one might call “woke liberalism”, in which progressive concern for the working class was replaced by targeted protections for a narrower set of marginalised groups: racial minorities, immigrants, sexual minorities and the like. State power was increasingly used not in the service of impartial justice, but rather to promote specific social outcomes for these groups.

The real question at this point is not the malignity of his intentions, but rather his ability to actually carry out what he threatens In the meantime, labour markets were shifting into an information economy. In a world in which most workers sat in front of a computer screen rather than lifted heavy objects off factory floors, women experienced a more equal footing. This transformed power within households and led to the perception of a seemingly constant celebration of female achievement.

The rise of these distorted understandings of liberalism drove a major shift in the social basis of political power. The working class felt that left wing political parties were no longer defending their interests, and began voting for parties of the right. Thus the Democrats lost touch with their working-class base and became a party dominated by educated urban professionals. The former chose to vote Republican. In Europe, Communist party voters in France and Italy defected to Marine Le Pen and Giorgia Meloni. All of these groups were unhappy with a free-trade system that eliminated their livelihoods even as it created a new class of super-rich, and were unhappy as well with progressive parties that seemingly cared more for foreigners and the environment than their own condition.

These big sociological changes were reflected in voting patterns on Tuesday. The Republican victory was built around white working-class voters, but Trump succeeded in peeling off significantly more Black and Hispanic working-class voters compared with the 2020 election. This was especially true of the male voters within these groups. For them, class mattered more than race or ethnicity. There is no particular reason why a working-class Latino, for example, should be particularly attracted to a woke liberalism that favours recent undocumented immigrants and focuses on advancing the interests of women. It is also clear that the vast majority of working-class voters simply did not care about the threat to the liberal order, both domestic and international, posed specifically by Trump. 


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Comentário PRA:


Eu não teria muito a comentar a respeito do artigo do Fukuyama, a não ser o fato de que, tendo sido escrito por um intelectual, ele se sente na obrigação de oferecer argumentos elegantes, baseados em conceitos da ciência política (liberalismo, democracia, etc.), ao que nada mais é do que reações prosaicas e muito ordinárias (ou seja comuns) de um eleitorado preocupado majoritariamente com sua situação conjuntural ou momentânea, assim como reações ou adesões a impulsos veiculados nas redes e na midia de baixa qualidade. 
No último meio século, ou mais, o eleitorado da Europa Ocidental e da América do Norte alterna regularmente entre partidos e políticas social-democratas de um lado e conservadoras, de outro, segundo a satisfação imediata decseus interesses os mais anódinos.
Os primeiros são mais generosos por certo tempo (salários, beneficios sociais, assistência, etc.), e acabam provocamdo inflação e crises fiscais. Os segundos entram, corrigem os malfeitos, depois o eleitorado se cansa da austeridade e volta a votar pela generosidade social-democrata. E assim segue.
Os eleitores trumpistas podem não ter votade PELO maluco negacionista e autoritário, e sim CONTRA o inflacionista e leniente com a ameaça imigratória, agitada fraudulentamente como a causa dis problemas atuais.

Não creio em nenhuma elaboração sofisticada para explicar o voto num desclassificado, a não ser a busca ingênua de um bode expiatório a problemas correntes.
Gostaria de complementar minhas observações, não necessariamente sobre o artigo de Fukuyama, escrito muito em cima da vitória do Trump, mas mais especificamente sobre o grau de divergência de Trump e de seu futuro governo com respeito ao que se poderia esperar de qualquer governo bizarro, para os padrões normais para a política americana.
Mas, meus comentários, acima, são excessivamente centrados sobre a alternância regular e esperada entre tendências partidárias conservadoras e mais progressistas na Europa e nos EUA, o que não é, nunca foi e provavelmente sequer será, a qualquer título, o caso de Trump e de seu governo, que rompe com qualquer norma de civilidade na política. 
Quando Fukuyama escreveu, ele ainda não tinha ideia de quais, quem seriam os designados por Trump para cargos estratégicos, o que se revela agora da pior qualidade possível, com consequências inimagináveis nas áreas de segurança e defesa, de justiça, de saúde, de energia, de meio ambiente, ou seja, praticamente tudo o que há de mais relevante num governo.
Trump rompe com todos os padrões aceitáveis de competência na nomeação de assessores,  e na adoção de políticas cooperativas em escala regional ou multilateral.
Creio que, como no caso do Bolsonaro no Brasil, nunca a política americana foi tão desafiada, em sua forma e no seu conteúdo. Sequer podemos imaginar uma continuidade desse tipo de administração em mais um mandato depois deste, o que aliás já foi cogitado por Trump.
Talvez Fukuyama escreva mais algum artigo, esperando as primeiras decisões de Trump na área da política externa. (PRA)

 

 



sábado, 13 de julho de 2024

O retorno da geopolítica aos assuntos de investimentos - Financial Times (via Adam Tooze)

 Geopolitics and investment

Adam Tooze (from FT), 12/07/2024

“Over the past 20 or 30 years, [geopolitics] has been deflationary, created lower risk and made it easier to invest,” says Ali Dibadj, chief executive of Janus Henderson, the British-American investment group that manages about $353bn in assets. “Going forward it is the complete opposite: it is probably inflationary; it is probably going to create more risk; and it is going to make it harder to invest.” 

An industry that over the past two decades has been hoovering up mathematicians to devise new trading strategies is now leaning on political scientists for guidance. Most investors are used to dealing with pockets of instability and conflict, but many say the sheer number of recent shocks — even in traditionally stable democracies — and the long-term nature of conflicts represent a sea change. … Theodore Bunzel, head of geopolitical advisory at Lazard, says the firm set up a dedicated political unit in 2022 as clients were increasingly demanding advice on how to navigate investments in regions such as China. …. “In the past, the impulse was to remove politics from corporate decision making,” Bunzel says, but that is becoming impossible due to “tension between large, interconnected powers”. … Rothschild & Co Goldman Sachs followed suit last year with a geopolitical advisory unit … PR firm Brunswick — best known for advising clients on mergers and acquisitions situations — has hired a string of advisers with geopolitical expertise including a former president of the World Bank, a former director-general of the World Trade Organization, and a former director of the US National Security Agency. … 

Boutique investment bank Centerview recently hired Richard Haass, the former head of the Council on Foreign Relations, as a senior counsellor. Lord Mark Sedwill, the former head of the British civil service, is a member of the risk committee at Rothschild, while Schroders has brought in former British ambassador to China, Sir Sebastian Wood, and Sir Nicholas Carter, former chief of the defence staff in the UK, to advise on geopolitics and navigating international conflict. … The number of funds offering investors a way to invest in emerging markets while excluding China has ballooned from eight at the start of 2022 to 20 today, according to Morningstar, and inflows have exploded as tensions between the US and China have worsened. Almost $1bn a month has been invested into EM ex-China funds this year, up from an average of about $500mn a month in 2023 and $200mn a month in 2022. 

Others are turning to even more explicitly political funds. This year Tikehau Capital, the Paris-listed group that manages $48bn in assets, launched a “European Sovereignty Fund” as a response to “escalating geopolitical tensions and the repercussions of excessive globalisation”.

From FT

 

quinta-feira, 16 de maio de 2024

Liaisons dangereuses: China e Rússia afrontando o mundo - Financial Times e PRA

 Retiro isto de um editorial recente do Financial Times, que se preocupa com o mundo:

“China-Russia: an economic ‘friendship’ that could rattle the world. After Putin’s invasion of Ukraine trade links between the two countries have strengthened. So have Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions.”

Editorial, 15/05/2024

Preocupante, deveras. O FT defende os velhos princípios do Iluminismo britânico, aquele que trouxe democracia e DH ao mundo. 

Pessoalmente, considero que é meu dever ético, como  servidor do Estado, mas primeiramente como cidadão consciente, criticar posições governamentais que colidem com valores e princípios tradicionais (até constitucionais) do país, quando extravasam para preconceitos político-ideológicos de escassa racionalidade instrumental ou diplomática. 

O Brasil de Lula 3 colocou o Brasil no campo das autocracias — China Rússia, Irã, Venezuela — e por isso considero ser necessário manifestar-me a respeito de posições que são indefensáveis no plano moral e no do Direito Internacional.

Justamente por respeitar o contribuinte (que me sustentou durante a carreira ativa na diplomacia), penso que devo usar minha expertise especializada (de origem, estudada, e a adquirida no itinerário profissional) para colocá-la a serviço da nação, com todos os requerimentos de uma postura empiricamente embasada em fatos, e não coonestar com posições que notoriamente se chocam com o que seria razoável admitir para uma nação comprometida com a democracia e os DH.

O governo Lula está mantendo relações perigosas com essas ditaduras, o que não corresponde ao nosso ideal de país, nem às normas consagradas na Carta da ONU e no Direito Internacional.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 16/05/2024


sábado, 13 de abril de 2024

Financial Times on Russia: a special edition April 10, 2024

 

Russia

EU’s sanctions regime in turmoil after oligarchs win legal battle

APRIL 11, 2024

Russia ˃

Europe should talk less and prepare more against Russian threat, says Finnish president

Alexander Stubb urges allies to refrain from ‘belligerent’ rhetoric about Russia attacking soon

APRIL 11, 2024

David Cameron warns US politicians against ‘appeasement’ of Russia 

UK foreign secretary steps up efforts to secure aid for Ukraine but is snubbed by senior Republican

APRIL 10, 2024

EU court rules in favour of Russian oligarchs Fridman and Aven in blow to sanctions regime

Judgment finds insufficient evidence that billionaires had undermined Ukraine

APRIL 10, 2024

Terror attack creates a central Asian dilemma for Putin

Tajiks are among those blamed for the massacre but Russia’s war economy depends on immigrant Muslim workers

APRIL 10, 2024

Russia is filling the vacuum left by the west in the Sahel

The courting of Niger’s military junta epitomises the growing security challenge in this part of Africa

APRIL 10, 2024

segunda-feira, 19 de fevereiro de 2024

Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe -Financial Times

Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe 

Business model in tatters after biggest customer slashes 
Financial Times, Feb 17, 2024

Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe.
Vladimir Putin was effusive late last year after Gazprom reported record sales to China, telling chief executive and longtime ally Alexei Miller: “This is great, I congratulate you on the results of your work.” 
But the Russian president’s praise, proudly trumpeted on state media, belies the crisis unfolding at a company that is struggling with the loss of its biggest market. Europe has defied expectations by breaking its addiction to Russian gas, and the state-run gas monopoly — Putin’s trump card when he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine — has become one of the war’s biggest corporate casualties. “Gazprom understands that it will never again have as big and fat a slice of the pie as Europe, and it simply has to accept that,” said Marcel Salikhov, head of the Institute for Energy and Finance, a Russian think tank. “The only way forward now is to look for relatively smaller sources of revenue and gradually develop them, gathering crumbs.” In an interview with state television channel Rossiya 1 on Sunday, Putin admitted Russia had previously profited more from exporting energy, but denied the loss of business was causing problems. “Maybe it was more fun [previously], but on the other hand, the less we depend on energy, the better, because the non-energy part of our economy is growing,” he said. While Moscow decided early in the war to slash gas supplies to Europe, a move that initially boosted prices enough to offset the slump in exports, the effect was shortlived. Pre-tax earnings hit a record Rbs4.5tn ($49.7bn) in the first six months of 2022 but slumped 40 per cent to Rbs2.7tn a year later, while net profits slid from almost Rbs1tn to Rbs255bn. 
Researchers at the state-controlled Russian Academy of Sciences have even predicted the company’s full-year 2023 results will show it has ceased to be profitable, and that net losses could hit Rbs1tn by 2025. The EU has proved more adept at sourcing alternative gas than many thought possible — Russia’s share of the bloc’s gas imports dropped from more than 40 per cent in 2021 to 8 per cent last year, according to EU data — while prices have collapsed from their peaks in the early days of the war. 
The EU is aiming to eliminate all imports of Russian fossil fuels by 2027. On Sunday, Putin said Russia had coped well after Europe stopped buying its gas, “by exploring alternative routes and focusing on its own gasification efforts.” But in reality these are not a replacement for the EU export business. With its main export business in tatters, Gazprom has sought to find new buyers but its deals in central Asia and minor supply boosts to China and Turkey will compensate for only 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the lost European market, according to Salikhov. Achieving any substantial change in this scenario will require enormous investment in pipelines and other infrastructure to serve new markets, as well as the involvement of external partners that are in less of a hurry to commit. When the invasion began, Gazprom appeared to be in a much better position than other Russian energy exporters given that the country’s gas, unlike its oil, was not under any western sanctions. But its prospects changed in September 2022 when underwater blasts ruptured the Nord Stream gas pipelines that had carried 40 per cent of Russia’s gas exports to Europe, drastically reducing Moscow’s ability to use the fuel as leverage. Moscow and the west have accused each other of sabotage. Gazprom did not reply to a request for comment. The Russian market, which has always accounted for a much bigger share of the company’s output than Europe, has helped it stay afloat but with gas sold at a much lower price domestically, local sales cannot make up for the collapse of the EU market. Gazprom has to sell gas domestically at regulated prices, while competitors such as Rosneft and privately-run Novatek can offer discounts to attract bulk buyers. “After the war started, Gazprom intensified its efforts to ensure fair competition on the Russian market with the lifting of domestic price restrictions,” said Irina Mironova, a lecturer at the European University at Saint Petersburg, who previously worked as an analyst at Gazprom. Critics have long suggested that Putin has used the group to funnel profits to his acolytes — although the subject remains taboo in Russia. State-owned Sberbank’s investment arm in 2018 sacked two senior analysts after they published a report saying Gazprom deliberately opted for unprofitable projects to secure lucrative contracts for companies owned by the president’s close friends Gennady Timchenko and Arkady Rotenberg. Gas emanating from a leak on a Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea in 2022. Moscow and the west have accused each other of sabotage 

“Gazprom’s model, which consisted of generating excessive profits in Europe and then distributing them among contractors close to Putin . . . no longer exists,” said Vladimir Milov, a former deputy energy minister who was the architect of Gazprom’s reforms in the early 2000s and who later became an associate of opposition figure Alexei Navalny, who died in an Arctic penal colony on Friday according to Russian authorities. 
The primary recipient of Gazprom’s profits is now the Russian state, which shortly after the invasion imposed an additional monthly levy of Rbs50bn on the company until 2025. While gas exports to China have risen, the volumes remain relatively small — Russia sent about 22bn cubic metres of gas to the country via pipeline last year, a fraction of the average annual 230 bcm it exported to Europe in the decade before the Ukraine war. The company could improve its prospects if it reaches an agreement on the construction of the 3,550km “Power of Siberia 2”, which would connect the gasfields that once supplied Europe to China, and a second pipeline to the Asian nation. 
However, Beijing and Moscow have yet to agree on the PS2 project, which will pass through Mongolia. “Those two sides still need more time to do more detailed research on the economic studies,” Mongolia’s Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene told the FT in January. 
The gas group has become one of the war’s biggest corporate casualties. 

Even under the most optimistic scenario the PS2 would take years to build and would not make up for lost European sales, independent analysts and state-sponsored researchers agree. Construction of the pipeline will also be different from other Gazprom projects, as it will most likely be financed from the state budget — which has historically enjoyed generous contributions from the gas company — and not from Gazprom’s excess profits. Meanwhile, while Russian liquefied natural gas exports are gradually increasing, they remain a fraction of the prewar pipeline deliveries. Novatek accounts for most of Russia’s LNG exports, with Gazprom lacking the specialised infrastructure to convert and transport the liquid form of the fuel, having bet on pipelines rather than liquefaction technologies at the dawn of the Putin era. Gazprom’s oil business, Gazprom Neft, has become the company’s main lifeline, contributing 36 per cent of revenues and 92 per cent of net income in the first half of 2023. The division’s market value even surpassed that of its parent company last year. “Oil is not a side business for Gazprom, it is not just the cherry on the cake — it is the entire layer of it,” said Sergey Vakulenko, a former head of strategy at Gazprom 

Neft who is now a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. 
Gazprom’s oil business, Gazprom Neft, has become the company’s main lifeline © Oliver Bunic/Bloomberg 

He also noted Gazprom’s generous dividends to shareholders including the state had often been very close to the sum of dividends it received from Gazprom Neft. However, he described the group’s position as “not great, not terrible”, insisting “the company isn’t yet on the verge of collapse”. 
Ron Smith, oil and gas analyst at Moscow-based BCS Global Markets, also said Gazprom’s financial position was not yet “catastrophic”. But the company faces the risk that its fortunes and prospects will never be the same again.

segunda-feira, 1 de janeiro de 2024

Os melhores livros de economia de 2023, segundo Martin Wolf - Financial Times, Valor

Os melhores livros de economia de 2023, segundo Martin Wolf 

Financial Times

 

História do capitalismo, 'Chicago boys' e economia da China estão entre os temas das obras selecionadas 

Liberalismo, história do capitalismo, 'Chicago boys' e economia da China são alguns dos temas abordados pelos livros de economia do ano, segundo o comentarista-chefe do jornal britânico Financial Times, Martin Wolf.

Veja abaixo as obras sugeridas, seguidas pelos comentários do colunista.

 

Plunder: Private Equity’s Plan to Pillage America

[Pilhagem: O Plano do Private Equity para Saquear os Estados Unidos]

por Brendan Ballou, PublicAffairs, 368 pp., R$ 251 e R$ 48,58 (ebook)

Sempre houve duas maneiras de ganhar dinheiro: criação de valor e pilhagem. Uma boa sociedade é aquela em que a primeira supera a última. Neste livro poderosamente argumentado, Ballou, atualmente na divisão antitruste do Departamento de Justiça dos EUA, insiste que os retornos dos investimentos em private equity derivam em grande parte da pilhagem. Isso é particularmente provável onde esses lucros são obtidos às custas dos impotentes —prisioneiros, pacientes ou idosos. Dados os incentivos, os resultados que ele descreve parecem inevitáveis.

 

Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology

[Impérios Digitais: A Batalha Global para Regular a Tecnologia]

por Anu Bradford, Oxford University Press, 607 pp., R$ 131,27 (ebook)

A chegada da economia digital, agora acelerada pelo surgimento da inteligência artificial, inevitavelmente —e corretamente— criou uma resposta política e regulatória. Neste livro abrangente e importante, Bradford, da Faculdade de Direito de Columbia, esclarece as abordagens contrastantes da China, dos EUA e da UE. Ela observa que os dois últimos confrontam a China, "em nome de salvar a democracia da autocracia". Mas há uma batalha para salvar a democracia do poder da tecnologia desenfreada também. Este é crucial: trata-se de saber se a tecnologia controla a democracia ou a democracia controla a tecnologia.

 

A Crash Course on Crises: Macroeconomic Concepts for Run-ups, Collapses, and Recoveries

[Curso Intensivo sobre Crises: Conceitos Macroeconômicos para Crescimentos, Colapsos e Recuperações]

por Markus Brunnermeier e Ricardo Reis, Princeton University Press, 136 pp., R$ 188,72 e R$ 171 (ebook)

"As economias às vezes passam por crises macrofinanceiras." De fato, elas passam, como aprendemos dolorosamente nas últimas décadas. Neste excelente e felizmente breve livro, dois estudiosos renomados atualizam estudantes e profissionais ocupados sobre o melhor pensamento sobre como essas crises se originam e se desenrolam e como os formuladores de políticas precisam responder. Um guia valioso para aqueles que precisam entender o que a economia contemporânea tem a dizer sobre esse tópico vital.

 

Economics in America: An Immigrant Economist Explores the Land of Inequality

[Economia nos EUA: Um Economista Imigrante Explora a Terra da Desigualdade]

por Angus Deaton, Princeton University Press, 280 pp., R$ 171,25 e R$ 84,99 (ebook)

Deaton, vencedor do prêmio Nobel, é também um imigrante nos EUA. Neste livro altamente agradável de ensaios, ele se concentra principalmente no país em que agora vive. Ele também condena a ajuda internacional. Isso é surpreendente e também muito amplo. No entanto, Deaton emerge do livro como um ser humano decente que deseja tornar o mundo um lugar melhor. Infelizmente, ele também chegou à conclusão de que a economia e os economistas não são tão bons nisso quanto ele gostaria.

 

The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism

[O Projeto Chile: A História dos Chicago Boys e a Queda do Neoliberalismo]

por Sebastián Edwards, Princeton University Press, 376 pp., R$ 132 e R$ 108,99 (ebook)

"A história das reformas de livre mercado no Chile pode ser resumida em duas palavras: sucesso e negligência." Assim resume Edwards, ele mesmo de origem chilena, o resultado deste "experimento". Essas reformas tiveram origem na ditadura, tornaram o Chile "em uma geração a estrela mais brilhante da América Latina", pelo menos economicamente, e, de forma um tanto surpreendente, sobreviveram à transição para a democracia e finalmente naufragaram em reação popular contra a desigualdade e injustiças percebidas. Edwards conta essa história complexa e controversa de forma excelente.

 

The Eight Per Cent Solution: A Strategy for India's Growth

[A Solução de Oito Por Cento: Uma Estratégia para o Crescimento da Índia]

por Nikhil Gupta, Bloomsbury, 400 pp., R$ 231,23 e R$ 48,79 (ebook)

Este é um livro excepcional. O autor, economista-chefe da Motilal Oswal Financial Services, explica e aplica a abordagem dos "saldos setoriais" à economia indiana. Essa análise ilumina a fraca posição financeira e a deterioração das economias das famílias e, mais recentemente, também do setor corporativo de capital fechado. Diante da provável fraqueza do consumo das famílias, dos gastos do governo e das exportações, há pouca chance de um boom desejado nos investimentos. O equilíbrio desta década deve ser, argumenta ele, um tempo de cura, antes que o crescimento possa acelerar.

 

Legacy: How to Build the Sustainable Economy

[Legado: Como Construir a Economia Sustentável]

por Dieter Helm, Cambridge University Press, 265 pp., R$ 245 e R$ 50,42 (ebook)

Helm, da Universidade de Oxford, apresenta um caso apaixonado para a transição para uma economia sustentável com base no princípio de que cada geração lega um estoque de capital —físico e, muito mais importante, natural— tão bom quanto o que herdou. Para tornar essa abordagem operacional, devemos abraçar as ideias gêmeas de "quem polui paga" e o "princípio da precaução". Helm argumenta que a implementação dessas ideias requer um conceito de cidadania. Infelizmente, os desafios de fazer essa ideia funcionar globalmente são assustadores.

 

The Trade Weapon: How Weaponizing Trade Threatens Growth, Public Health and the Climate Transition

[A Arma do Comércio: Como a Arma do Comércio Ameaça o Crescimento, a Saúde Pública e a Transição Climática]

por Ken Heydon, Polity, 204 pp., R$ 49,06 (ebook)

O comércio se tornou uma arma. Heydon, ex-funcionário do comércio australiano, argumenta que essa abordagem —na forma de sanções comerciais, busca de autossuficiência nas cadeias de valor, uso de medidas comerciais em nome da "segurança nacional" e restrição de importações necessárias para a transição climática— é "prejudicial para a economia mundial, pois diminui e distorce os benefícios do fluxo internacional de bens e serviços". Um livro corajoso e necessário.

 

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization

[Sete Crashes: As Crises Econômicas Que Moldaram a Globalização]

por Harold James, Yale, 376 pp., R$ 296 e R$ 157,73 (ebook)

Neste fascinante livro, James, um renomado historiador de economias e políticas econômicas, analisa o impacto de sete crises econômicas na história da globalização: as fomes da década de 1840, a crise financeira de 1873, a Primeira Guerra Mundial e as hiperinflações subsequentes de 1914-23, a Grande Depressão dos anos 1930, a inflação dos anos 1970, a Grande Recessão de 2008 e os lockdowns de 2020-22. Sua conclusão surpreendente é que os choques de oferta promovem a globalização, enquanto os choques de demanda a inibem.

 

Freedom from Fear: An Incomplete History of Liberalism

[Liberdade a partir do Medo: Uma História Incompleta do Liberalismo]

por Alan Kahan, Princeton University Press, 528 pp., R$ 424 e R$ 228,58 (ebook)

As raízes tanto da economia de mercado quanto do estado democrático estão no liberalismo. Neste livro notável, Kahan narra em detalhes persuasivos a história desse conjunto transformador de ideias. Hoje, como frequentemente antes, o liberalismo enfrenta inimigos, essencialmente porque "o projeto liberal de criar uma sociedade onde ninguém precise ter medo assusta aqueles que pensam que algumas pessoas e/ou alguns grupos devem ter medo." Os liberais não podem ceder nisso. Mas, ele sugere, eles devem adicionar um pilar moral/religioso aos seus pilares políticos e econômicos mais tradicionais.

 

Ours Was the Shining Future: The Story of the American Dream

[Nosso Futuro Foi Brilhante: A Ascensão e Queda do Sonho Americano]

por David Leonhardt, Riverrun/Random House, 528 pp., R$ 139,34 e R$ 50,10 (ebook)

Leonhardt demonstra o fracasso do capitalismo americano em gerar prosperidade amplamente compartilhada desde 1980, rotulando isso como a "Grande Estagnação Americana". A história não é apenas econômica. A expectativa de vida, por exemplo, ficou bem abaixo dos níveis de outros países de alta renda, enquanto a expectativa de vida daqueles que não foram para a universidade realmente diminuiu. Leonhardt, um escritor sênior do The New York Times, dá vida a essas realidades. Em parte como resultado das tendências que ele descreve, a democracia americana está em risco. Este é um livro importante.

 

Visions of Inequality: From the French Revolution to the End of the Cold War

[Visões da Desigualdade: Da Revolução Francesa ao Fim da Guerra Fria]

por Branko Milanovic, Belknap Press, 368 pp., R$ 213,42 e R$ 159,92 (ebook)

A desigualdade está de volta, como um tópico político e como foco de estudo. Neste livro fascinante, Milanovic, um dos estudiosos mais influentes do mundo sobre desigualdade, examina o que os principais economistas do passado tinham a dizer sobre essa questão. Ele passa de Quesnay a Kuznets, passando por Smith, Ricardo, Marx e Pareto. No final, ele analisa o trabalho de Thomas Piketty. Hoje, ele argumenta, temos mais teorias, mais dados e um foco mais amplo tanto na desigualdade nacional quanto global. Também temos mais preocupação. O campo está em pleno crescimento.

 

The Capitalist Manifesto: Why the Global Free Market Will Save the World

[O Manifesto Capitalista: Por Que o Livre Mercado Global Salvará o Mundo]

por Johan Norberg, Atlantic, 304 pp., R$ 265 e R$ 53,49 (ebook)

Norberg é talvez o defensor mais eficaz do capitalismo de livre mercado do mundo. Neste livro, ele retorna ao tema de que "liberdade de escolha e competição" são os motores do progresso econômico. Ele está, é claro, correto. Além disso, a evidência também mostra que sociedades mais prósperas são, em geral, mais felizes. No entanto, o que ele diz está longe de ser totalmente verdadeiro. Não apenas as bases sociais e políticas dos mercados livres são difíceis de construir, mas suas consequências sociais e políticas podem ser prejudiciais: o capitalismo é bom; o capitalismo desenfreado não é.

 

My Journeys in Economic Theory

[Minhas Jornadas na Teoria Econômica]

por Edmund Phelps, Columbia University Press, 248 pp., R$ 242,98 e R$ 98,90 (ebook)

Neste adorável livro, Phelps, vencedor do Prêmio Nobel de Economia, descreve sua jornada de criatividade intelectual. Ele é famoso por sua contribuição, junto com Milton Friedman, para a ideia da "taxa natural" de desemprego. Posteriormente, ele se envolveu em ideias de justiça econômica encabeçadas pelo filósofo John Rawls e, assim, recomendou subsídios salariais. Mais recentemente, ele se concentrou na ideia de que o progresso econômico é o fruto da criatividade dispersa. Sociedades que incentivam isso alcançam um "florescimento em massa"; mas aquelas que não o fazem, não.

 

Making Sense of China’s Economy

[Compreendendo a Economia da China]

por Tao Wang, Routledge, 295 pp., R$ 349,99 e R$ 160,34 (ebook)

Este é um livro indispensável para aqueles que tentam entender a economia chinesa. A autora cresceu na China continental e atualmente é economista-chefe da China no banco de investimentos UBS em Hong Kong. Sua análise é bem informada e penetrante. Ela conclui que a taxa de crescimento anual da China provavelmente ficará entre 4% e 4,5% entre 2021 e 2030, uma queda acentuada em relação aos 8% alcançados de 2010 a 2019. Mas pode até ser tão baixa quanto 3%, à medida que as restrições domésticas e externas interagem. É muito improvável que ultrapasse 5%.

 

Revitalizing the World Trading System

[Revitalizando o Sistema de Comércio Mundial]

por Alan Wolff, Cambridge University Press, 588 pp., R$ 471,38 e R$ 194,59 (ebook)

Wolff, ex-vice-diretor-geral da OMC (Organização Mundial do Comércio), escreveu o guia definitivo sobre o passado, presente e possível futuro do sistema multilateral de comércio. Surpreendentemente, dada a crescente hostilidade à OMC e ao comércio em si nos EUA, seu próprio país, e a falta de apoio entusiasmado em outros lugares, especialmente da China e da UE, ele é otimista: "A autarquia não pode ser alcançada... Não pode haver desacoplamento das principais economias, exceto a um custo inaceitavelmente alto." A OMC é o único lugar onde a cooperação internacional necessária pode ser sustentada, porque ela, assim como o comércio em si, é global.

 

Age of the City: Why Our Future Will Be Won or Lost Together

[Era da Cidade: Por que Nosso Futuro Será Ganho ou Perdido Juntos]

por Ian Goldin e Tom Lee-Devlin, Bloomsbury Continuum, 256 pp., R$ 223 e R$ 94 (ebook)

"Em 1800", observam Goldin, de Oxford, e Lee-Devlin, do The Economist, "havia 1 bilhão de seres humanos compartilhando nosso planeta, aproximadamente 70 milhões dos quais habitavam cidades. Hoje, a população global é de 8 bilhões, com mais de 4,5 bilhões de pessoas vivendo em cidades." Isso representa um aumento de 6.300% na população urbana do mundo. Até o final deste século, a população urbana pode ter dobrado novamente. As cidades são, sem dúvida, nossa criação mais extraordinária. Elas são fontes de criatividade deslumbrante. Também são lugares de imensa desigualdade. Este livro fascinante explica os desafios que elas representam e o que precisa ser feito para torná-las melhores para todos os seus habitantes.

 

Techno-Feudalism: What Killed Capitalism

[Tecnofeudalismo: O que Matou o Capitalismo]

por Yanis Varoufakis, Vintage, 287 pp., R$ 260 e R$ 112,19 (ebook)

Varoufakis é uma notável combinação de analista e sonhador. Neste livro, o ex-ministro das Finanças grego afirma que algo novo, que ele chama de "tecnofeudalismo", substituiu a economia capitalista tradicional. Nesta nova economia, os grandes monopólios de tecnologia, proprietários onipresentes da "nuvem", são vistos como senhores feudais, cobrando de todos nós "aluguéis da nuvem" pelo direito de acessar o que eles possuem. Certamente, isso não está completamente errado. Se suas propostas para transformar esse novo sistema em uma utopia moderna fazem sentido é outra questão. Mas, como sempre, Varoufakis faz seus leitores pensarem. Isso é uma conquista importante.

 

quinta-feira, 25 de maio de 2023

Rússia passa a construir fortificações para se defender da ofensiva ucraniana - Financial Times

Military briefing: how Russia is fortifying its frontline for Ukraine’s counteroffensivering an o

While Kyiv spent months preparing an operation to liberate occupied territory, Moscow has been digging inperatio.to liberate occupied territory, Moscow has been digging in

Financial Times, May 25, 2023. 


Ukraine’s months-long preparation for its next counteroffensive to try to wrest back occupied territory has allowed Russia to fortify its positions along the almost 1,000km frontline. Satellite images reviewed by the Financial Times and analysed by military experts revealed a multi-layered Russian network of anti-tank ditches, mazes of trenches, concrete “dragon’s teeth” barricades, steel “hedgehog” obstacles, spools of razor wire and minefields. “Russian forces really seemed to realise . . . that a lot of the terrain they had control over was going to be difficult to defend without entrenched positions,” said Brady Africk, an open-source intelligence researcher and analyst at the American Enterprise Institute who is tracking and mapping Russia’s defensive build-up.

In preparation for Ukraine’s looming counter-offensive, Russia has spent months significantly fortifying the almost 1,000km frontline across the roughly 100,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory it currently occupies.

Russia’s most heavily fortified frontline area is in southern Zaporizhzhia province, where Ukraine is expected to try to break through and sever the “land bridge” connecting Russian territory with occupied Crimea.

There, Russian forces have created a multi-layered defence composed of anti-tank ditches, zig-zag trenches, concrete dragon’s teeth barricades, steel “hedgehog” obstacles, razor wire and minefields.

Russia has paid special attention to the Berdyansk airfield near the Sea of Azov. The airfield is known to be a hub for Russian military aircraft.

The northern border of Crimea, which Russia has occupied since 2014, has also been heavily fortified with a combination of trenches and tank traps.

The defences stretch from Armyansk in the north to Dzhankoi in the north-west. Both are crucial transport hubs and gateways to the peninsula.

The towns of Tokmak, Polohy, Bilmak and Ocheretuvate, which sit at important road junctions, have been completely encircled by defences. 

Russia constructed layers of “dragon’s teeth”, trenches and other obstacles across an extensive swath of occupied territory near the eastern cities of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and Popasna, after capturing them in May and June 2022. A Ukrainian breakthrough there would face significant challenges.

Russia also erected a strong defensive line along the border of eastern Luhansk province to the north, where Ukrainian forces are thought to want to break through somewhere around the town of Kupyansk.

Russia began digging in “in earnest” in November and when its troops took new territory they worked quickly to entrench themselves, he said, adding that Russian forces had “ramped up” work on their fortifications recently. “There was a brief lull in winter, likely due to [the] ground freezing and it becoming more difficult to dig,” Africk said. “But since the ground has softened, we’ve seen the digging of fortifications escalate dramatically, particularly in the past few months.” Military analysts said these fortifications would not be enough to stop Ukrainian troops from advancing, but were likely to slow the offensive.

The stakes for Ukraine are high. A successful operation could give it significant momentum as it tries to drive out Russian troops, convince western partners to continue their military support, and give Kyiv leverage in any future negotiations with Moscow. It would also help keep morale high among Ukraine’s defiant but fatigued population, which has endured the horror of Russia’s full-scale invasion for 15 months. There is also much at stake for Russia. If Ukraine can take back control of the provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — which Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed to have annexed last September — or of the Crimean Peninsula, which the Kremlin seized in March 2014, it could deal a significant blow to a military already showing signs of exhaustion and infighting.

Early signs of Ukraine’s counteroffensive can already be seen in what military experts refer to as “shaping operations” — common tactics used ahead of a large-scale attack. Over the past two weeks, Ukraine’s forces have carried out missile strikes and sabotage on Russian command and control centres, weapons depots and artillery systems. Drone attacks and explosions targeting military facilities in Russia, and even the Kremlin itself, also suggest Ukrainian involvement, according to analysts, despite Kyiv’s denials. Before Moscow claimed to have captured the embattled eastern city of Bakhmut this weekend, Ukrainian troops had attacked Russian forces on their northern and southern flanks, recapturing a few square kilometres of territory — their first gains in the area in months. But observers are yet to see a massive thrust along the lines of the Ukrainian counteroffensive last autumn, when Kyiv’s forces swept through the north-eastern Kharkiv region and recaptured the southern city of Kherson.

Breaking through Russia’s multi-layered defensive lines without sustaining heavy losses would be extremely difficult, said Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow at the Kyiv-based National Institute for Strategic Studies. Success would require synchronising different units deploying armoured vehicles, artillery, mine-clearing and air defence, he added. “On their own, obstacles don’t stop advancing forces. They will only [be effective] if manned properly and complemented with artillery fire, aviation and manoeuvre of reserves.” Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, an American think-tank, said Russia’s fortifications were designed to funnel Ukrainian troops towards areas where they would come under intense fire. “If you have multiple lines of defence, even if Ukraine punches through the first one successfully, then Russia should have enough time to reinforce a second or third,” he said.

The south is likely to be the main focus for Ukrainian forces — something not lost on Moscow even as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military leaders have kept operational plans a closely guarded secret, experts say. “Around November and certainly continuing into the new year, [Russian forces] ramped up construction, particularly in southern Ukraine,” Africk said. “The topography there is a lot flatter and there are wide open fields. It became a priority for Russian forces to make sure they had defensive lines [there].” Satellite images show Russia’s most heavily fortified section of the frontline is in the southern Zaporizhzhia province, where Ukraine is expected to try to break through and sever the “land bridge” connecting Russian territory with occupied Crimea. The connection is crucial for Russian military logistics and supplies.

Russia has constructed an elaborate maze of anti-tank ditches, trenches, concrete and steel obstacles, razor wire and minefields in the area. The Berdyansk airfield near the Sea of Azov, a hub for Russian military aircraft, has been surrounded by deep trenches and three lines of concrete “dragon’s teeth”. Melitopol and Berdyansk were “obvious” locations for Russian fortifications, Lee said. If Ukraine took either, it would gain significant ground and enable its forces to carry out onward campaigns more effectively, he added.

The northern border of Crimea has also been heavily fortified. The defences stretch from Armyansk in the north to Dzhankoi in the north-west. Both are crucial transport hubs and gateways to the peninsula. Dzhankoi also hosts a Russian military airfield. Ukraine is likely to utilise the size of the battlefield to try to catch its enemy off guard. Despite Russia’s extensive defences, the sheer length of the frontline meant the Kremlin’s forces would be stretched, experts said. “The length of the frontline works to our advantage,” said Andriy Zagorodnyuk, chair of the Ukrainian Centre for Defence Strategies and a former defence minister of Ukraine. “[Russian troops] are scattered around this frontline and we will always be able to find areas where they don’t expect us.” Dara Massicot, a senior policy researcher at the Rand Corporation, a US global policy think-tank, said Russia’s performance would depend on several factors, including whether its frontline was manned by “exhausted or maltreated, inadequately trained personnel”.

“The morale of Russian soldiers is variable, from tired to bad — it matters,” she said. Lee said other factors included whether Russia had exhausted its munitions trying to capture Bakhmut — the longest and bloodiest battle of the past year — and whether its newly mobilised forces were ready for the coming fight. “They don’t necessarily have that much combat experience. A lot of them have been just holding trenches. Will they stay in the fight, or will they run?”