Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: situação em 11/12/2024 - CDS

 Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: situação em 11/12/2024:

A situação nas frentes de batalha do Donbas ucraniano se complicam para as Forças de defesa da Ucrânia, segundo leio no boletim do CDS desta quarta 11/12/2024:

"Approximately 150,000 Russian military personnel operate on the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vremivka directions, including over 70,000 on the Pokrovsk direction, 35,000-36,000 on the Kurakhove direction, and more than 40,000 on the Vremivka direction. (...)
If the enemy advances to the area where the Vovcha and Solona rivers converge near Dachne from the north, the position of Ukrainian Defense Forces units in Kurakhove will become critically complicated unless they manage to retreat in time. In the southern part of the Kurakhove bridgehead, Ukrainian Defense Forces units will soon have to abandon Hannivka and Uspenivka to avoid encirclement and retreat in a northwesterly direction.
On the Vremivka direction, intense battles for Velyka Novosilka are expected to unfold soon, as the enemy's future ability to organize and carry out a further offensive toward Rozlyv and Bahatyr, as well as to conduct a deep flanking maneuver against the Ukrainian Defense Forces' grouping from the south, depends on it. (...)
By the end of the current year, the enemy will not succeed in seizing the "belt of fortresses" Kostyantynivka – Druzhkivka – Kramatorsk – Sloviansk or occupying Donetsk Oblast. The upcoming battle for Pokrovsk will mark the apex of the enemy’s offensive operation in the Southwestern Theater of Operations in 2024.
The enemy's military command in the theater of operations until March 2025 will be creating conditions to achieve the military-political goal of the “Special Military Operation”: reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and the junction of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk Oblasts near the village of Temyrivka.

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 11.12.24

Personnel - almost 757,340 (+1,400);
Tanks 9,526 (+2);
Armored combat vehicles – 19,616 (+20);
Artillery systems – 21,067(+3);
Vehicles and fuel tanks – 31,073 (+36);
UAV operational and tactical level – 20,111 (+4).

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank.

A culpa da guerra é da Otan, como não poderia deixar de ser… - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Não é a primeira, nem será a última vez, que leio mais um livro desses acadêmicos les plus en vue sobre a guerra da Ucrânia que, non variatur, atribuiu ao “avanço da Otan sobre as fronteiras russas” as causas da atua guerra de agressão de mil dias da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Por acaso estou lendo ao mesmo tempo em que vejo no noticiário internacional as manifestações do povo georgiano contra seus proprios dirigentes que pretendem forçar uma aliança com s Rússia de Putin, na direção contrária do que deseja s maioria da população. Nem vou mencionar o nome do livro, publicado nos EUA, contendo esse absurdo de desconsiderar totalmente a vontade da população, da Ucrânia, da Georgia, da Moldova, de se juntar à UE e de buscar ardentemente s proteção da Otan contra a prepotência russa.

Como se a CIA, os serviços ocidentais fossem capazes de mobilizar milhares de cidadãos em protestos contra seus dirigente corruptos e lideres alinhados com os designios de Moscou. Surpreende-me a cegueira de certos acadêmicos.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 3/12/2924

Putin pode destruir o que quiser; os ucranianos só podem se defender, não atacar?

 As democracias ocidentais que apoiam a Ucrânia agonizam em torno das “linhas vermelhas” de Putin, que não tem nenhuma restrição em matar civis e destruir o país e acha que ninguém tem o direito de responder à altura:

Debate over Ukraine weapons restrictions divides allies, administration

By Isabelle Khurshudyan, Siobhán O'Grady, Michael Birnbaum and Ellen Francis (WP)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/24/ukraine-weapons-limits-biden-permission-atacms/?utm_campaign=wp_todays_headlines&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_headlines&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F3f15e0c%2F66f28dcce1d3e04a6f610643%2F596b79f3ade4e24119b43ed3%2F11%2F70%2F66f28dcce1d3e04a6f610643

KYIV — The United States’ lingering refusal to relax restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western missiles for deeper strikes on Russian territory has exacerbated a growing divide between the allies — with Kyiv angry over yet another setback in slowing Russia’s assault across the country while its biggest backer considers the possibility of Moscow’s backlash. (…)

A guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: postura de embaixadores brasileiros ao ínício da invasão (março de 2022)

 Agora que o Brasil se dispõe a apresentar, com a China, um "plano de paz" sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússua contra a Ucrânia, totalmente enviesado em favor do agressor, reproduzo abaixo postagem refletindo comentários de embaixadores brasileiros no início da insana guerra: 

segunda-feira, 14 de março de 2022

Brasil condena invasão russa, mas teme guerra econômica: ex-chanceleres e embaixadores opinam sobre a posição do Itamaraty - Janaína Figueiredo (O Globo)

 Brasil condena invasão russa, mas teme guerra econômica: ex-chanceleres e embaixadores opinam sobre a posição do Itamaraty

BUENOS AIRES 

Depois de ter acompanhado o voto de condenação da Rússia pela invasão da Ucrânia na Assembleia Geral e no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, em sintonia com a posição dos Estados Unidos e dos países da União Europeia (UE), entre muitos outros, o Brasil . Gera tensão, também, afirmaram fontes diplomáticas, o que alguns têm chamado de politização pelos principais adversários do governo de Vladimir Putin de organismos multilaterais, para acuar ainda mais a Rússia.

Na semana passada, depois de ter proibido a importação de vodca, caviar e diamantes russos e solicitado ao Congresso americano que interrompa o livre comércio com a Rússia, o governo de Joe Biden e seus aliados europeus começaram a articular uma jogada que visa suspender os direitos de voto de Moscou no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e no Bando Mundial (Bird).

A outra guerra:

O objetivo dos EUA e da União Europeia é cortar todo o acesso da Rússia a fontes de financiamento externo. Em palavras da presidente da Comissão Europeia, Ursula von der Leyen, vamos nos assegurar de que a Rússia não possa obter créditos ou qualquer outro tipo de benefícios nestas instituições. O objetivo final, caso um acordo que permita alcançar um cessar fogo seja alcançado nas próximas semanas, seria expulsar a Rússia da ordem econômica internacional. Nas sanções mais duras já aplicadas contra uma potência, o país que é a 11ª economia do mundo já teve muitos de seus bancos suspensos do sistema de transações internacionais Swift e as reservas de seu Banco Central depositadas nos EUA, na Europa e no Japão foram congeladas.

Limitações:

A ofensiva anti-Rússia em organismos internacionais deve avançar em âmbitos como a Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC), onde os países do G-7 Alemanha, França, Reino Unido, Canadá, Japão e EUA pedirão que seja revogado seu status de nação mais favorecida (MFN, na sigla em inglês). Este estatuto é concedido aos 164 integrantes da OMC, para garantir a igualdade de condições a todos os países-membros cujos governos se comprometem a tratar uns aos outros em pé de igualdade e sem qualquer tipo de discriminação. Dessa forma, eles têm acesso a tarifas mais baixas, menos barreiras comerciais e cotas de importação mais elevadas.

Os EUA, a UE e outros aliados da Ucrânia no conflito estão, com essa atitude, afirmou uma fonte do Itamaraty, minando o funcionamento de organismos essenciais na governança econômica global e o avanço de processos considerados importantes para o Brasil em âmbitos como a OMC, FMI, Bird e G-20, entre outros. Essa ofensiva, ressaltou a fonte, vai trazer graves consequências não somente para Putin, mas para muitos outros países.

Por enquanto, o Brasil não expressou publicamente seus temores pela politização de organismos internacionais. Até agora, a delegação brasileira na ONU expressou questionamentos à dimensão das sanções econômicas anunciadas e, também, ao envio de armas à Ucrânia. Ou seja, houve aval à condenação, mas, também, críticas à frente contra Moscou liderada por EUA e UE.

Ciberguerra:

Ouvidos pelo GLOBO, os ex-chanceleres Celso Amorim e Celso Lafer e os embaixadores Rubens Ricupero e Marcos Azambuja avaliaram as posições adotadas até agora pelo Brasil e pelas partes envolvidas no conflito.

Na visão de Amorim, o ataque da Rússia à Ucrânia é uma ação condenável, além de um erro político. No entanto, se o Brasil quisesse ter alguma participação em esforços pela paz, seria melhor se abster nas votações, como fizeram os demais países do Brics, incluindo a Índia, que é parte do Quarteto, fórum asiático liderado pelos EUA. O ex-chanceler e Azambuja destacaram a necessidade de levar em consideração as preocupações da Rússia por sua segurança.

Já Lafer defendeu uma posição mais incisiva do Brasil, sem abrir espaço para a neutralidade abdicante que ele identifica nas declarações do presidente Jair Bolsonaro. Já Ricupero foi o mais crítico em relação à atuação da missão brasileira na ONU: Em termos concretos, ela equivale a condenar a vítima a ser massacrada.

Conheça as opiniões de Amorim, Lafer, Ricupero e Azambuja

 Celso Amorim: Invasão é condenável, mas em outro momento Brasil teria condições de mediação

"É uma situação muito complexa. A Rússia sempre se preocupou com a expansão da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (Otan), que também foi criticada, mesmo condenada, por pensadores americanos. A Ucrânia não era apenas um país da Europa Oriental, era parte da antiga União Soviética e do Império Czarista. Diferentemente de outros países e regiões, tem um componente emocional muito forte para os russos.Mas isso não justifica a guerra, sou contra a ação militar unilateral. Fui embaixador na ONU e prezo especialmente por suas normas. A Carta da ONU foi construída em torno do não recurso à guerra para resolver problemas. Só admite o uso da força quando autorizada pelo Conselho de Segurança ou em legítima defesa. Diferentemente do que pregavam os EUA antes da Guerra do Iraque, não existe legítima defesa preventiva. Não tenho dúvida de que a ação é condenável, além de um erro político.

Como deveria ser a ação do Brasil? Não tenho certeza. Havia duas posições possíveis. A que foi adotada, votar a favor da condenação, mas dando uma explicação de que se é contra as sanções, defender uma solução pacífica, o que, devo admitir, é razoável. Mas, numa outra situação, em que o Brasil estivesse mais ativo internacionalmente, com a mesma justificação você poderia conceber um voto de abstenção. Continuaria condenando, mas considerando que há preocupações de segurança que são legítimas. Se o Brasil, de alguma maneira, quiser participar de algum esforço em favor da paz, é melhor se abster. Se fosse um governo que conversasse com todos, talvez tivesse sugerido uma abstenção. Na situação atual, não poderíamos esperar isso, até porque uma abstenção de Bolsonaro ficaria sob suspeita."

Celso Lafer: Posição deve ser mais incisiva ao condenar guerra de conquista

"A Rússia faz uso da força contra a integridade territorial e a independência da Ucrânia. Desrespeita o Artigo 2, parágrafo 4 da Carta da ONU e põe em questão um dos princípios básicos do direito internacional: o do respeito à soberania territorial dos Estados. A guerra resultou de uma decisão militar para alcançar fins políticos unilateralmente definidos por Putin: pôr termo à Ucrânia como país independente para alcançar a sua incorporação a uma expressão eslava da Rússia e atender preocupações de segurança. Ela denega aspirações majoritárias da população ucraniana a uma identidade nacional própria. A Assembleia Geral da ONU expressou em resolução a condenação da comunidade internacional à agressão da Rússia.

O Brasil votou a favor da resolução. Seguiu a tradição diplomática brasileira em consonância com os princípios constitucionais que regem as relações internacionais do país. O Brasil é um país de escala continental que, em contraste com outros, definiu todas as suas fronteiras por arbitragem e negociações. É o que faz da defesa da integridade territorial e da condenação da guerra de conquista parte integrante do capital diplomático do Brasil. Rui Barbosa realçou que entre os que destroem a lei e os que a observam não há neutralidade admissível. (...) Não há imparcialidade entre o direito e a injustiça. Na sua lição, quando existem normas internacionais, como as da Carta da ONU, pugnar pela observância das normas não é quebrar a neutralidade: é praticá-la. Por isso, creio que a posição brasileira deve ser mais incisiva. Não cabe abrir espaço para a impassibilidade de uma neutralidade abdicante que identifico nas manifestações do presidente da República."

Rubens Ricupero: Criticar entrega de armas é deixar Ucrânia à mercê da Rússia

"Primeiro é preciso saber qual é a posição brasileira, se é a do Bolsonar ou se é a da missão do Brasil na ONU. A segunda questão é, se chegarmos à conclusão de que quem representa o Brasil é a missão, temos de analisar o conteúdo dessa posição. A posição que o governo tem expressado na ONU é oposta à de Bolsonaro. A posição do Brasil é de concordar e aprovar as duas resoluções que condenaram a invasão russa em todos os sentidos. O que se pode dizer dessa posição é que ela rigorosamente é correta. Mas, a partir daí, é preciso indagar sobre as consequências dessa posição. A delegação brasileira concordou em que a Rússia agrediu a Ucrânia sem provocação, atuando contra os princípios da Carta da ONU, ou seja, uma agressão indiscutível. Ao se declarar contrária ao fornecimento de armas, ela mostra uma incoerência. Se não se quiser o envolvimento direto, só há uma maneira, que é fornecer à vítima meios para se defender.

Por isso, eu chamaria a posição brasileira de ineficaz: ela equivale, no fundo, a deixar a Ucrânia à mercê da Rússia. Num caso como este, no qual mais de 140 países reconhecem que há uma agressão injusta, e, por outro lado, não se pode obter uma resolução do Conselho de Segurança porque a Rússia vai vetar, creio que a posição lógica e consequente seria aprovar as sanções e o fornecimento de armas. É a única maneira, embora insatisfatória, para ajudar o país agredido a se defender. Do ponto de vista legalista ao extremo, a posição brasileira é correta, mas é ineficaz. Em termos concretos, ela equivale a condenar a vítima a ser massacrada. No fundo, significa que perante a História estamos lavando as mãos."


Entrevista: 

Marcos Azambuja: O país tem que se equilibrar entre seus princípios e interesses

"O Brasil tem de ter em vista que essa guerra terá uma duração longa na vida internacional. O país deve fazer, e fez, a reafirmação dos seus princípios de convivência pacífica, de respeito à Carta das Nações Unidas, aos seus compromissos com a própria Constituição brasileira. O Brasil precisa dizer, e disse, que nos princípios e nos valores ele é fiel a sua tradição e a sua história. Mas ele também tem de cuidar dos seus interesses, que estão em jogo. Dos cinco países do Brics, China, Índia e África do Sul se abstiveram de votar na Assembleia Geral pela condenação da Rússia. Só o Brasil votou a favor. Minha preocupação é que o Brasil se reserve para ser valioso mais tarde, na procura de soluções.

O Brasil deve manter suas posições de princípio e entender as razões que levaram a Rússia a fazer o que fez. A Guerra Fria terminou com uma derrota tão absoluta dos países do então socialismo real que os derrotados não tinham o que negociar. Agora, a Rússia voltou a ser uma grande potência que tem interesses estratégicos, políticos e econômicos. O Brasil é movido por duas forças que, de certa maneira, são contraditórias. Ao se separar dos Brics, mostrou que continua fiel a seus valores. Mas deve se reservar para um processo negociador que virá. Quem vai conduzir isso? Não podemos fazer nada que agrave mais ainda a situação. A Rússia tem de se dar conta que não pode pretender a recriação de um império. E a Ucrânia tem de se dar conta de que a Crimeia não voltará e a região de Donbass vai se separar. Diplomacia é negociação. O que vejo são gestos truculentos. A solução é que haja algum tipo de interlocução. A negociação, essência da diplomacia, é a procura por meios imperfeitos de soluções imperfeitas."

https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/brasil-condena-invasao-russa-mas-teme-guerra-economica-ex-chanceleres-embaixadores-opinam-sobre-posicao-do-itamaraty-25430976

Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: A iniciativa de aceitar a imposição da Rússia teria que partir da Ucrânia - Demetrio Magnoli (FSP)

 A iniciativa de aceitar a imposição da Rússia teria que partir da Ucrânia

Em nome do "anti-imperialismo", o governo Lula escolhe o papel de amigo menor da China, oferecendo suas credenciais democráticas para conferir legitimidade à iniciativa diplomática de Xi Jinping

Demétrio Magnoli

Folha de S. Paulo, 21/09/2024

"O Brasil quer estar com a China, com a Índia, com os EUA, com a Venezuela, com a Argentina... Com todo mundo, de forma soberana, respeitável. Porque nós não aceitamos ser menores do que ninguém'.

Parte do desejo de Lula, expresso na formatura dos diplomatas, será realizado na cúpula dos Brics, em outubro. Xi Jinping e Putin articulam uma nova expansão do bloco, com o ingresso da Venezuela - e, de quebra, da Nicarágua. Os Brics tornam-se caixa de ressonância da China, enquanto o Brasil conforma-se com uma posição "menor" no seu interior.

"Nós queremos paz, não queremos guerra", proclamou Lula diante da mesma plateia, referindo-se à guerra na Ucrânia. Foi a senha para anunciar uma reunião patrocinada por Brasil e China, às margens da Assembleia-Geral da ONU, com o fim de divulgar um plano de paz sino-brasileiro às nações convidadas, do chamado Sul Global. Na forma delineada pela proposta, a paz interessa à Rússia, não à Ucrânia, e premia a guerra de agressão.

O plano não menciona, nem mesmo retoricamente, o conceito de soberania territorial ou as fronteiras ucranianas de 1991 reconhecidas pela Rússia no tratado de 1994. Como registrou Zelenski, seus pressupostos autorizariam a anexação dos territórios ucranianos ocupados pelas forças russas no momento de um cessar-fogo. Não foi por outro motivo que o Brasil, assim como a China, boicotou a conferência de paz realizada em junho, na Suíça, que operou com base nas normas do direito internacional.

Algum dia, a guerra terminará. Talvez, por falta de alternativa realista, a Ucrânia venha a ser obrigada a ceder territórios. Mas a iniciativa de aceitar a imposição imperial teria que partir do governo ucraniano, nunca de terceiros países. O plano sino-brasileiro representa, de fato, uma operação diplomática destina- da a reforçar a posição russa.

Os objetivos de Putin não se limitam à anexação do Donbass e do Sul ucranianos. A invasão foi deflagrada para, além disso, converter o país vizinho em Estado vassalo, nos moldes da Belarus. O Kremlin pretende inserir a Ucrânia na jaula do "mundo russo" (Russkiy Mir).

O plano sino-brasileiro contempla tal ambição, por meio de uma senha discursiva facilmente decifrável, que rejeita a "divisão do mundo em grupos políticos ou econômicos isolados". A paz que pregam China e Brasil proíbe a Ucrânia de, como qualquer Estado soberano, ingressar numa união político-econômica (União Europeia) e numa aliança militar (OTAN). Obviamente não haveria objeção a um futuro ingresso forçado na Organização do Tratado de Segurança Coletiva (OTSC), a aliança militar comandada por Moscou.

O Brasil tem motivos geopolíticos e econômicos para praticar uma neutralidade ativa, evitando alinhamento a um dos polos da rivalidade global EUA-China. Contudo, em nome do "anti-imperialismo", o governo Lula escolhe o papel de amigo menor da China, oferecendo suas credenciais democráticas para conferir legitimidade à iniciativa diplomática de Xi Jinping.

A alegação "anti-imperialista" tem pernas curtas. Trump esclareceu que, de volta à Casa Branca, em purraria a Ucrânia a uma "paz chinesa" recebeu em troca um cumprimento de Putin. Nessa hipótese o Brasil estaria "com todo mundo" como deseja Lula, mas de modo pouco "respeitável".

 

Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: resumo dos resultados

 Como diriam os hermanos, se le pasó todo al revés…

A RECAP on Putin's invasion of #Ukraine. 

1: Finland joined #NATO.

2: Sweden joined NATO.

3: Outdated Russian military tactics exposed as unchanged since WW2.

4: Russian military exposed as poorly equipped & disastrously led.

5: Russian army decimated with losses & casualties reported between 500,000 to 700,000. It now largely depends on poorly trained conscripts & volunteers.

6: Putin's endless red lines exposed as written in washable paint.

7: Medvedev's daily nuclear threats exposed as the drunken ramblings of a man-child.

8: Russia's Black Sea fleet driven from occupied #Crimea. Now barely operates in the Black Sea due to Ukrainian attacks. Ukraine's also sunk its flag ship the Moskva (Moscow).

9: Ukraine's grain & other sea exports keep growing. Russia aimed to capture all of Ukraine's Black Sea ports back in Feb 2022. 

10: Proving Putin wrong, Western countries support for Ukraine remains steadfast.

11: Massive sanctions imposed on Russia and they keep coming. Sanctions include banning Putin's vast propaganda media from the EU. 

12: Putin's planned 3 day invasion of Ukraine has now lasted well over 2 years and counting.

13: Russia hasn't achieved any of its military objectives. It still doesn't control all of eastern or southern Ukraine. 

14: Things are going so bad, Russia banned its soldiers from using mobile phones in occupied Ukraine - as too much bad news getting seen in Russia.

15: August 6th 2024: Ukraine invaded Russia's Kursk region - in BROAD DAYLIGHT. With the majority of Russia's army in Ukraine, Russia foolishly relied on young conscript soldiers to defend its border. 

As a consequence, large numbers of Russian soldiers have surrendered & Ukrainian troops continue to capture large swaths of the Kursk region. 

16: Putin claimed 😉 he invaded Ukraine to make Russia safer. And he's achieved the exact opposite. 

17: DID I MENTION UKRAINE'S INVADED RUSSIA? 😀

Guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia: dados recentes do CDS

Relatório de 6/08/2024; 

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 06.08.24  

Personnel - almost 585,140 (+1050); 

Tanks 8,421 (+4);

Armored combat vehicles – 16,294 (+8); 

Artillery systems – 16,384 (+39);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,138 (0);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 910 (0);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 22,148 (+54);

Aircraft - 363 (0);

Helicopters – 326 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 13,158 (+36);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,420 (+6);

Boats/ships – 29 (0).

Humanitarian+general:

• During the night of July 5-6, the occupiers attacked Ukraine with four ballistic missiles, two guided aviation missiles, and 16 kamikaze drones. Ukrainian air defense shot down two ballistic and two aviation missiles, as well as 15 UAVs.

• During the nighttime attack by Russian troops with missiles and drones on the Kyiv region, all enemy targets were shot down. However, there was damage to an apartment building, an office building, a gas station, and a forester's house. In Kyiv, debris from a downed Russian missile damaged a car parking lot.

• On August 6, the Russian army dropped explosives from a drone on people on the street in a suburb of Kherson, injuring six people.

• In Sumy, explosions were heard during the day on August 6. Russian invaders launched guided aerial bombs (KABs) and missile strikes on the infrastructure in the Sumy district. Preliminary reports indicate there were no casualties, and the effects of the enemy strike are being clarified.

• As a result of a Russian "Iskander" strike on the Shevchenkivskyi district of Kharkiv around 10 a.m., 12 people were injured, including an 8-month-old baby and one person was kiled. A fire broke out at the impact site, there are still people under the rubble.

• Around 11 a.m. on August 6, Russian forces dropped explosives from a drone on the Dniprovskyi district of Kherson, injuring two women aged 70 and 83.

• In the city of Beryslav, Kherson Oblast, a civilian received fatal injuries due to an attack by a Russian drone.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020. We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email at cds.dailybrief@gmail.com 

Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine - Alexander Gabuev (Foreign Affairs)

 

Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine

Beijing Has No Interest in a Peace Agreement It Can’t Help Broker

By Alexander Gabuev

Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2024

For a moment last August, it seemed that Beijing was finally ready to distance itself from its “no limits partnership” with Moscow. That month, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent his special envoy for the war in Ukraine, Li Hui, to discuss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s peace formula with diplomats from several countries, including Ukraine and the United States. The formula calls for Russia to withdraw to Ukraine’s 1991 borders, send its war criminals to international tribunals, and pay reparations to Kyiv. The plan clearly represents Kyiv’s favored conclusion to the conflict, and merely by engaging with it, Beijing suggested that it might be ready to play hardball with Moscow.

But China’s first public participation in discussions about that formula was also its last. On May 31, Beijing announced that it would not be joining some 90 other countries at a June 15–16 peace summit in Switzerland to debate, based on Zelensky’s proposal, how to end the war. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, explained that Beijing would attend the summit only if Russia were a participant and if any plan presented would receive a hearing. For Ukraine, both requirements are nonstarters.

Xi, it seems, will not abandon his troublesome Russian partner or even pay lip service to aiding Kyiv. Instead, China has chosen a more ambitious, but also riskier, approach. It will continue to help Moscow and sabotage Western-led peace proposals. It hopes to then swoop in and use its leverage over Russia to bring both parties to the table in an attempt to broker a lasting agreement.

This gambit is unlikely to work. Neither Russia nor Ukraine appears anywhere close to being ready for serious peace talks—at least for now. Kyiv and its partners do not trust China to operate in good faith. And Beijing has very little experience in pulling off the kind of major, international negotiations it wants to spearhead here.

But these obstacles are unlikely to sway Xi. He has little to lose if the war in Ukraine goes on. China will therefore continue to be a stick-in-the-mud: indirectly helping Russia, derailing Kyiv-led diplomatic initiatives, and pretending to engage in diplomacy instead of genuinely trying to work with other parties to find a solution.

CLOSER AND CLOSER

For Beijing, ties to Russia are of great strategic significance. China and Russia share a 2,600-mile border, and Russia provides China with cheap natural resources and even some advanced military technologies. Xi also benefits from having a like-minded authoritarian among the UN Security Council’s permanent members.

There are still limits to Chinese-Russian relations. Western markets are essential to the health of the Chinese economy, and they give Beijing access to cutting-edge technology. As a result, Beijing has been careful to avoid crossing Washington’s redlines. But China does operate on the basis that everything which isn’t forbidden is allowed. Beijing may not be shipping lethal aid to Russia, but many Russian operators and their partners in China and Central Asia use China as a staging ground for industrial products key to Russia’s embattled economy, such as machine tools and chips. In two years, trade between the countries has increased by more than 60 percent, to a record $240.1 billion.

The White House, aware of its economic power, has tried using sanctions to stop this cooperation. In December 2023, it issued an executive order threatening to apply secondary sanctions on any international bank found to be even unknowingly clearing payments for the Russian military industry. Later, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken made trips to China and outlined to Chinese leaders and financial institutions the grave consequences they would face for violations. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, meanwhile, visited Europe to brief allies on the issue and called on them to put pressure on Beijing.

China expects that the peace summit will fail.

These measures have had some effect. According to customs data, Chinese exports to Russia decreased by double digits throughout March, April, and May. An overwhelming majority of Chinese banks have started to take an extremely cautious approach when clearing any Russia-related transactions. Some have abandoned dealings with Russian entities altogether. But it is unclear whether these measures will stop the flow of products which have been identified by Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU as essential to the Kremlin’s military industry—and which China ships to Russia in massive quantities.

Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow are continuing to lay the foundations for a deeper and more durable economic relationship. During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to China on May 16, Chinese and Russian state railroad companies signed an agreement to expand cross-border infrastructure that will help facilitate Russian exports to the east. On the same trip, Putin likely greenlit a scheme to ship more Russian gas to Central Asia so that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could have more gas to ship to China, thus enabling Moscow and Central Asian governments to increase their profits. Following his trip, Putin called the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to tell them about the visit, something he has never done before. On June 7, Gazprom signed contracts that would expand Russian gas exports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

Beijing and Moscow also discussed ways to clear sensitive exports from China to Russia. To do so, they could designate specialized banks that are largely immune to U.S. restrictions. Such banks would not connect themselves to the global financial system and have correspondence accounts only in Russia, settling all payments in yuan and rubles through China’s international payment system. Their transactions would be cloaked under multiple layers of shell companies. The United States could try to target this system by tracking down suspicious transactions and sanctioning the banks, but that would be difficult because all the payments would bypass U.S.-dollar and other Western payment systems. China, after all, used a similar scheme with its Kunlun bank to effectively evade sanctions on Iran.

Economics isn’t the only area in which China and Russia are deepening their relations. They are also presenting an increasingly unified diplomatic front. Putin and Xi have now visited each other three times since the war in Ukraine began and displayed great mutual fondness. During a visit to Moscow in March 2023, Xi told Putin that “there are changes happening, the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years,” and suggested that the Chinese and Russian leaders should “drive those changes together.” When saying goodbye to Putin this May, Xi embraced him twice on camera—something he rarely does. The message of closeness was intentional and clear.

MY WAY OR THE HIGHWAY

Putin and Xi may have a genuine affinity for each other, but Beijing also has a self-interested reason to side with Moscow in peace endeavors: China has its own peace initiative, and so it wants to sabotage the United States and Europe’s efforts. On May 23, a week after the most recent meeting between Xi and Putin and a week before China declined to attend the Swiss peace summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Celso Amorim, chief adviser on national security to the president of Brazil. In a joint statement on settling the Ukraine crisis, they called for an international peace conference in which both Russia and Ukraine would be represented and all peace plans would be reviewed. (Not surprisingly, Brazil has also refused to send high-level officials to the Swiss conference, and may send no one at all.)

Beijing knows that, for now, its proposal will go nowhere. But it has reasons to believe that the June summit will end in a diplomatic impasse that will be difficult to conceal, despite the best efforts of the organizers and Ukraine’s partners. Even if the summit’s participants can create a concluding joint statement that is cogent and pro-Ukraine, there is no way for them to impose it on the Kremlin. In fact, since many key countries of the global South will send only low-level delegations to the summit or else skip it altogether, the practical effect of the meeting’s communiqué will be even more modest than that of the UN General Assembly’s 2022 resolutions criticizing Russian aggression.

In other words, China expects that the peace summit will fail. It believes the meeting will do nothing to advance peace or to rally the world behind Ukraine’s maximalist demands. That failure may give Beijing a shot to make itself a central player in diplomatic efforts, or at least pretend to be one—perhaps by partnering with friendly countries that have a proven track record in Ukraine-related talks. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example, have facilitated discreet talks on prisoner swaps. Turkey was instrumental in reopening the Black Sea to grain shipments. All three states are on good terms with Beijing.

There’s a reason why China feels confident that it can present itself as a major broker. Beijing has the ultimate trump card: the ability to bring Russia to the table. Russian officials may have initially given China’s initiatives the cold shoulder in 2023, but they have since thanked Beijing multiple times for its proposal and signaled their readiness to negotiate if China’s approach is accepted. Putin himself expressed these sentiments in a statement to Russian journalists as he departed Beijing. “We have said more than once that we believe that China is sincerely striving to settle this problem,” Putin said. “It offers different options and is very flexible.” These comments suggest that Putin may have even reached an understanding with Xi, wherein Russia agrees to negotiate if called on by Beijing in exchange for China pledging not to travel to Switzerland.

If Beijing can indeed either directly or indirectly create a cease-fire agreement, it could work wonders for the government’s geopolitical standing. By stopping the killing and destruction, China would be celebrated in both the global South and in many European countries. Beijing would also be subject to less U.S. and European criticism of its support for Putin’s aggression. At the same time, because a cease-fire would not resolve the territorial dispute between Moscow and Kyiv, the issue of reparations to Ukraine, or accountability for war crimes, Western sanctions would continue—ensuring that Russia remains economically dependent on Beijing. And because any pause in hostilities will not stop Russia from expanding its military, a cease-fire will not obviate the need for the United States to dedicate resources to Europe. Washington’s bandwidth in the Indo-Pacific—including in the schedules of its most senior national security officials—would therefore remain limited.

DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR

China may have formidable leverage over Russia and, as a result, influence in any negotiations. But the most ambitious scenario, in which Beijing plays a leading role in the war’s termination, is highly unlikely to materialize. For the time being, both Kyiv and Moscow have no appetite to stop fighting. The Russians believe that Ukrainian defensive lines will eventually crumble due to limited manpower and Western support. Ukraine and its backers hope that Russian advances on the battlefield will remain incremental and exact an unsustainably high cost, which will force Moscow to reconsider its objectives. Neither thinks the conflict will be endless.

Even if both sides were ready to talk, it is hard to see how they could reach a bargain. The parties will likely never agree over the status of Russian-occupied territories, and were they to agree to disagree they would still have to contend with unrelated, unacceptable demands. The Kremlin, for instance, would insist that any deal to end the war be contingent on the West stopping its flow of military support to Ukraine, leaving the country at Putin’s mercy and allowing Moscow to invade again. For Kyiv, this is understandably a nonstarter.

China’s relations with Ukraine’s allies—both the United States and Europe—are another stumbling block. Any complex negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will have to involve Kyiv’s partners. Moscow will want to have at least some one-on-one negotiations with Washington—since the Kremlin sees the United States as a principal party to the conflict—and China will want to link the termination of the war with fixing at least some aspects of its bilateral ties to the West. But both endeavors will cause issues. For moral reasons, it will be difficult, though not entirely impossible, for Washington to negotiate with Moscow without Ukrainians in the room. The United States will not abandon its approach to competition with China, be it on export controls, the beefing up of U.S.-led alliances in the Indo-Pacific, or tariffs on Chinese products. And Beijing’s actions regarding Ukraine, including its efforts to undermine the Swiss conference, have eroded trust in China in key Western capitals. That trust has been all but destroyed in the European capital most crucial to an agreement: Kyiv.

Finally, China has no proven track record when it comes to complex negotiations. A much-touted deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran was really negotiated from the bottom up, with Riyadh and Tehran giving Beijing the opportunity to portray itself as a mediator. China has never taken the lead in major crisis diplomacy. And its inertia, lack of diplomatic imagination, and refusal to risk failure—particularly when Xi’s prestige is in jeopardy—will most likely prevent it from the kind of innovation needed to find a solution. Indeed, it is unclear whether China actually believes that it can put a stop to the hostilities or if it is merely posturing.

For Americans concerned about the United States being usurped by Beijing, the latter country’s lack of capacity may seem like good news. But it does not mean Washington will have it easier. In fact, China’s failure could make the United States’ endeavors more difficult. The war in Ukraine may be a drain on the West’s resources and on the economies of developing countries, but it suits Beijing’s interests just fine. China has gained power over Russia, all while paying minimal economic and diplomatic penalties. China, then, may stay the course. It can continue to ridicule the West’s approach to the war and call for diplomacy without trying to achieve much in reality.

A destruição maciça perpetrada por Putin em sua guerra de agressão contra a Ucrânia - CDS

Não sei se Lula, seu governo, ou a diplomacia brasileira tomam conhecimento ou se interessam por esse tipo de destruição gratuita, assassina, terrorista: 

Humanitarian+general:

• According to information provided by the Situation Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian forces shelled 13 regions of Ukraine over the past day. A total of 115 towns and villages and 150 infrastructure objects were attacked with various types of weapons. The number of casualties is being updated/clarified.

• On the night of May 21, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 29 attack UAVs of the "Shahed-131/136" type, 28 of them were shot down.

• During the night of May 20-21 in Kharkiv, the occupiers attacked one of the favorite leisure spots of local residents. Four people were injured.

• The enemy struck Kharkiv throughout the night. Debris from enemy "Shahed" drones was found at four locations. According to the State Emergency Service, 5 people were injured as a result of the Russian "Shahed" attack. At 7:05 AM, the Russians launched a missile strike on a transport infrastructure facility, injuring a 53-year-old civilian man. As a result of the shelling, 25 trucks and buses and 3 cars were damaged.

• On May 21, Russian forces launched drone strikes on a police vehicle evacuating people from the Vovchansk community. The law enforcement officer suffered a concussion.

• On Tuesday, May 21 Russian forces dropped explosives from a drone on the village of Antonivka in Kherson Oblast, resulting in injuries to three women.

• On May 21, Russian forces targeted the Shumenskyi neighborhood in Kherson. An apartment building was hit, injuring three people, including a 15-year-old boy.

• Russian forces launched a missile strike on Konotop in Sumy Oblast, damaging industrial infrastructure. The consequences of the Russian attack are being clarified.

• The Russian occupation authorities have declared thousands of apartments and houses in the occupied territories of Ukraine as "ownerless property" and intend to confiscate them for the benefit of the state. According to calculations by "Novaia Gazeta Europa," over three years, the occupation administrations have identified 13.3 thousand "ownerless" real estate objects, half of which were identified in less than the full year of 2024.

• According to Petro Andryushchenko, an advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol, up to 80,000 Russians have arrived and are currently residing in Mariupol, which is temporarily occupied by the Russian army. Russia's aggression has led to one of the largest humanitarian catastrophes in Mariupol. The city is nearly 90% destroyed due to shelling. The occupiers are also demolishing damaged buildings to conceal the evidence of their crimes. During the blockade and occupation, Russian forces destroyed 50% of the city's high-rise buildings—934 buildings in total, of which 465 have already been demolished. Over 52,000 apartments of Mariupol residents have been destroyed.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020.

A ofensiva russa contra Kharkiv e seus resultados em perdas militares - Boletim diário do CDS

 Registro o boletim completo desta jornada especialmente destruidora, mas destaco de imediato as perdas russas nas diversas frentes de batalha registradas por esse think tank ucraniano, independente do governo. 

Mais 1.400 vítimas do lado russo num único dia. Até quando as famílias russas suportarão esse nível de perdas de seus familiares, de uma guerra provocada e mantida por Putin.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 14/05/2024

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 14.05.24  

Personnel - almost 485,430 (+1400); 

Tanks 7,496 (+11); 

Armored combat vehicles – 14,460 (+43); 

Artillery systems – 12,515 (+28);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,070 (0);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 798 (+1);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,907 (+29);

Aircraft - 351 (+1);

Helicopters – 325 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 9,985 (+49);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,197 (0);

Boats/ships – 27 (0).

=========

Russia's war on Ukraine. 14.05.24

Operational situation

CDS MAY 14

In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) "North" on the Kharkiv direction, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces are conducting urban clearance operations in Vovchansk. Combat actions are ongoing, but the situation remains under control.

In the "Khortytsia" OSG operational zone on the Kupyansk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 22 enemy attacks along the Lyman Pershyi - Synkivka, Vilshanka - Synkivka, Krokhmalne - Berestove, Kolomyichykha - Stelmakhivka, Kovalivka - Novoyehorivka, and Ploshchanka - Makiyivka directions. In some sectors, the Ukrainian Defense Forces improved their tactical positions. Battles for individual positions continue along the Kovalivka - Novoyehorivka and Kyslivka - Ivanivka directions. On the Lyman direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 1 enemy attack along the Chervonopopivka - Ivanivka direction, improving tactical positions in certain sectors. On the Siversk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 15 enemy attacks along the Lysychansk - Bilohorivka, Novodruzhesk - Bilohorivka, Vesele - Verkhnyokamianske, Zolotarivka - Verkhnyokamianske, Vesele - Rozdolivka, and Mykolaivka - Spirne directions, with no success for the enemy. On the Kramatorsk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 35 enemy attacks along the Bakhmut - Ivanivske, Bakhmut - Klishchiivka, and Odradivka - Klishchiivka directions. 

In the "Tavriya" OSG operational zone, on the Pokrovsk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 33 attacks on the Ocheretyne - Novooleksandrivka, Ocheretyne - Yevhenivka, Ocheretyne - Kalynove, and Arkhanhelske – Novooleksandrivka directions. Due to the intense enemy fire, some positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces were changed to ensure the preservation of personnel's lives.  On the Kurakhove direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 13 enemy attacks, including areas such as Staromykhailivka - Krasnohorivka and Slavne - Novomykhailivka. On the Vremivka direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 11 attacks in the areas of Solodke - Vodyane, Zavitne Bazhannia - Staromayorske, and Volodyne - Staromayorske. On the Hulyaipole direction, the enemy did not conduct offensive (assault) actions but delivered artillery and mortar attacks on Chervone and Zelenyi Hai.  On the Orikhiv direction, the enemy, with air support, attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces twice in the area of Robotyne.

In the operational zone of the "Odesa" OSG on the Prydniprovskiy direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 4 enemy attacks in the direction of Oleshkivski Pisky - Krynky.

General conclusion: 

• The relativelyrapid advancement of Russian forces in Vovchansk and the destruction of several bridges over key waterways within the town indicate that the Russian military command is establishing a buffer zone rather than attempting to advance deeper into Ukrainian territory.

• Enemy advancement rates have decreased on the Kharkiv operational direction, while losses have increased.

• The command of the enemy's "Sever (North)" Operational Grouping doesn't have enough troops and gear to push forward towards Stary Saltiv and Artemivka, which makes it tough for the "Zapad (West)" Operational Grouping to make progress on the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.

• In the last 6 months, the Ukrainian Defense Forces' ability to intercept aerial targets has significantly decreased. They managed to intercept only 46% of targets, compared to 73% in the previous 6 months, with the rate falling to 30% in April.

• The adversary escalated the use of missiles and strike UAVs by 45% over the last 6 months, including a doubling of Shahed UAVs. The Russian Aerospace Forces continually experiment and adapt their air strike structure to exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian Air Defense systems.

• Responsibility for several missile strikes on Ukraine lies with the 52nd and 121st Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiments of the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, operating from Engels (Saratov Oblast) and Shaykovka (Kaluga Oblast) airbases. They employ Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers, using Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles, and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers from Engels airbase, utilizing Kh-22/32 cruise missiles.

• The adversary faces challenges evacuating wounded from the Dnipro Delta islands due to a shortage of boats and the dominance of Ukrainian Defense Forces' UAVs in the Dnipro Delta.

Change in the line of contact (LoC):

• There were 148 combat engagements on various fronts.

• On the Kharkiv direction, units of the 79th and 280th Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division and the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 11th Army Corps are operating in the areas of Lyptsi and Vesele. The enemy is attempting to break through on two main direcyions – towards Lyptsi (along the general direction of Strilecha - Hlyboke and along the Lypets River from the direction of Lukyantsi). The enemy has fully occupied Hlyboke and is advancing southwest of Oliinykove and north of Lukyantsi, where it has achieved tactical success; its forward units are engaged in combat in the Lukyantsi area.

• On the Vovchansk direction, units from the 1st and 47th Tank Divisions of the 1st Tank Army, along with the 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 6th Combined Arms Army, are pushing towards Vovchansk from Pletenivka while also trying to flank the city from the west. They're moving along the Siversky Donetsk River towards Ohirtseve - Buhruvatka and Hatyshche - Synelnykove to cut off the road from Starytsya to Vovchansk in the Prylipka area. Though they haven't reached the road, the enemy is attempting to penetrate the area of Kreydova Hora north of Buhruvatka, advancing through the forest zone south of Ohirtseve. They've captured the Vovchansk Meat Processing Plant, a footwear factory, and are advancing towards the city center along the right bank of the Vovcha River. The enemy continues attacks in Prylipka and conducts clearance operations in Starytsya and Buhruvatka, but hasn't fully controlled these areas. Russian forces attacked along the Izbytske - Starytsya - Buhruvatka line and near Tykhe. Fighting occurred between Lyptsi and the Vovchansk bulge near Zelene.

• The Ukrainian Defense Forces counterattacked near Hlyboke but withdrew from Ternova. The tactical group of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in Vovchansk has only two logistical routes across two bridges, which have not yet been destroyed.

• On the Kupyansk direction, Russian forces attacked near Synkivka, Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Berestove, Stelmakhivka, Makiivka, and Novoyehorivka.

• On the Lyman direction, Russian forces attempted an unsuccessful assault on the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces between Torske and Terny. They made minor advances north of Torske and south of Yampolivka. The Ukrainian Defense Forces launched three ATACMS missiles at an ammunition depot in the occupied territory of Sorokine, Luhansk Oblast.

• On the Siversk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas of Bilohorivka, Verkhnyokamianske, Spirne, Vyimka, and Rozdolivka, and conducted counterattacks near Spirne and Rozdolivka.

• On the Kramatorsk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces regained previously lost positions in the wooded area in the southwest of Bohdanivka. Heavy fighting continued around Chasiv Yar. Combat operations persisted near Hryhorivka, Ivanivka, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.

• Russian forces attempted to launch offensive operations from the western outskirts of Bohdanivka towards Kalynivka to create conditions for encircling Chasiv Yar through its northern flank. They also advanced on the southern flank of Chasiv Yar, particularly west of Ivanivka and in the vicinity of the Stupky-Holubivskyi-2 nature reserve. The attack on Klishchiivka was unsuccessful and resulted in the loss of nearly the entire assault group.

• On the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces were advancing westward from Ocheretyne towards Novooleksandrivka, westward from Semenivka towards Umanske, and attacking in the area of Arkhanhelske, on the Solovyove-Novopokrovske line, towards Umanske, and on the line of Netaylove-Pervomaiske-Nevelske.

• On the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces are advancing towards the center of Krasnohorivka, within the vicinity of Paraskoviivka, and in the fields south of the village. The enemy has launched 18 attacks in the direction of Kurakhove, particularly near Krasnohorivka and Novomykhailivka.

• On the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces have advanced north in Robotyne and in the fields east of Robotyne. Positional battles have been ongoing near Robotyne and Verbove.

• On the Pryndniprovskiy direction, positional battles were ongoing on the eastern bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky. The Ukrainian Defense Forces launched a missile strike on the positional area of the enemy's radar station of the 3^rd Radio-Technical Regiment of the 31st Air Defense Division on Mount Ai-Petri in the occupied Crimea.

• In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consists of:

  • Mediterranean Sea: 3 ships, including 1 “Kalibr” sea launched cruise missile carrier. The total salvo is 8 cruise missiles.

Changes in the enemy disposition:

• Up to 25,000 personnel, including the 13th BARS detachment, are involved in operations in the Chasiv Yar area.

Possible operation situation developments:

• The enemy command has deployed up to 5-6 BTGs, reinforced with tank units (presumably from the 11th Tank Regiment of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division and the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division). Within the next 24 hours, the enemy command may increase its efforts on the Kharkiv direction, by engaging an additional 2 BTGs from the 30th and 41st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 44th Army Corps or the 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 6th Army.

• In the near future, the enemy will launch an invasion from the territory of Kursk Oblast with the forces of the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, supported by units of the 11th Army Corps, in the general direction towards Velyka Pysarivka.

• Expect enemy capture of Synkivka soon, along with intense rear-guard actions north of Kupyansk's eastern outskirts, for Stepova Novoselivka, Pishchane, and Berestove.

• The adversary may concentrate additional assault units in the advance zone of the 98th Airborne Division, where it previously managed to advance closest to the Chasiv Yar boundary. It will attempt to break through on May 10-11 along two axes: in the advance zone of the 217th Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division towards the "Kanal" neighborhood and in the advance zone of the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division towards the "Novyi" neighborhood.

• The adversary may attempt to bypass Chasiv Yar without directly assaulting the city, by operating from the south and southeast, while simultaneously forming a northern flank for the Toretsk operation.

• The isolation or complete capture of Kostyantynivka will significantly impair the Defense Forces' ability to maintain the frontline in the southern part of Donetsk Oblast, as it will disrupt the main logistical route along Highway N-20.

• The "Center" Operational Grouping command is focused on executing the following operational plan: to establish conditions for the blockade and encirclement of the Kurakhove area or to create advantageous circumstances for launching an offensive operation to encircle "Tavriya" OSG’s defense in Toretsk area from the south.

• The enemy's "Vostok" Operational Grouping is gearing up for active operations on the southern flank of the Kurakhove-Vuhledar bulge of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in coordination with the left flank of the "Yug" Operational Grouping, which is currently attempting to break through towards Kurakhove through Hryhorivka and Paraskoviivka-Kostyantynivka along the Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly Rivers.

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 14.05.24  

Personnel - almost 485,430 (+1400); 

Tanks 7,496 (+11); 

Armored combat vehicles – 14,460 (+43); 

Artillery systems – 12,515 (+28);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,070 (0);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 798 (+1);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,907 (+29);

Aircraft - 351 (+1);

Helicopters – 325 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 9,985 (+49);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,197 (0);

Boats/ships – 27 (0).

Humanitarian+general:

• According to information provided by the Situation Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian forces shelled 10 regions of Ukraine over the past day. A total of 96 towns and villages and 78 infrastructure objects were attacked with various types of weapons. The number of casualties is being updated/clarified.

• During the night of May 14th, the Ukrainian air defense successfully shot down all 18 Russian Shahed drones launched by the adversary.

• On May 14th, during daylight hours, Russian occupying forces dealt multiple strikes on residential areas in the central part of Kharkiv. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at least 16 people were injured, including three children. As a result of Russian shelling of Kharkiv on the evening of May 14, 21 people were injured, including three children.

• The Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office reports that on May 14th, in the village of Starytsya in the Vovchansk community, a Russian serviceman shot and killed a local resident at close range. Additionally, during the armed attack, another man went missing.

• In Vovchansk, two civilian volunteers went missing on May 10th. According to the police, they were shot by occupiers, and one of them may have been killed.

• On the morning of May 14th, Russian forces attacked the city of Nikopol, resulting in the death of a 45-year-old man. Another local resident sustained shrapnel wounds.

• Due to increased electricity consumption (due to cold weather), scheduled emergency power outages were implemented in Kyiv in the evening of May 14, including for residential areas, according to a statement from the Kyiv City Military Administration. Later, "Ukrenerho" announced that it was forced to implement controlled emergency power outages in all regions of Ukraine. Additionally, electricity imports from neighboring countries are breaking records again. Over the course of a day, electricity imports from Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Moldova totaled 21,072 MW-hours.

• At the Zmiiv and Trypillya Thermal Power Plants, debris from missile strikes on March 22 and April 11 is still being cleared. The debris removal is expected to continue for another one and a half to two months.

• Only half of the Ukrainian refugees currently residing in Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic are willing to return home if conditions allow. Most respondents cited the need for normal functioning of critical infrastructure (34%) and security (34%). Other important factors include housing (26%) and the cessation of full-scale invasion (26%). Additionally, 16% emphasized the opportunity to find employment, and 13% highlighted the importance of their children being able to attend school or daycare. These findings are from a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in April.

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